Spotlight: Africa's Second Liberation

▪ 1995

      The first three decades of postcolonialism in Africa were characterized by the rise of single-party states and military regimes, but only four were dictatorships on the European or Soviet model—viz., Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Francisco Macías Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire—and they were short-lived. The first generation of independence leaders, made up almost entirely of small modernizing elites, were principally engaged in consolidating their power, unifying their still nascent nation-states, striving for rapid economic growth, and experimenting in new forms of "African democracy" felt to be relevant to their cultures and resources. These varied from consensus politics (as in Tanzania) to socialism in "African dress" (e.g., Sékou Touré in Guinea).

      The general outcome of these attempts was a highly centralized form of government and the creation of a network of state corporations that was used as a means of localizing the economy and for centralized planning. The absence of accountability on the periphery resulted in a form of state capitalism rather than socialism. The high priority given to rapid economic growth favoured urban society and often resulted in the neglect of the rural economy. Two of the prices paid for this lopsided development were a decline in food production and a growing concentration on export crops mercilessly dependent on fluctuating world market prices. Almost everywhere these policies failed to produce economic growth and, with a few notable exceptions, proved unsuccessful in the peaceful integration of the major tribal communities into the evolving nation-state.

      Disillusionment with the policies of the first generation of independence leaders had spread throughout the continent by the mid-1980s. The demand for representative democracy spread from country to country like a bushfire. Flames were further fueled by the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1980s, Africa had entered a new phase of its postcolonial experience, which came to be described as the Second Liberation Movement. The first was an anticolonial struggle against alien rule; the second was a struggle against indigenous undemocratic rule. The new battle cry was for multiparty democracy and respect for human rights.

      The strength and passions of this pro-democratic upsurge, combined with the blatant failure of most of the postindependence governments, compelled the single-party and military regimes to concede, at least in principle, the need for radical political reform. The pressures of the democratic forces also produced a change in Western policies to favour these forces. Freed by the Soviet collapse from their Cold War concerns—which had led them to support any regime perceived as pro-Western, no matter how oppressive—Western governments now established criteria of "good governance" as a condition for economic aid. Regimes such as those in Zaire, Malawi, and Kenya were compelled to abandon their insistence on single-party rule.

      By the beginning of the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa had been plunged into turmoil as the established regimes engaged in rear-guard actions to prevent their total loss of power in the negotiations for democratic constitutions. Prolonged negotiations increased the frustrations and the militancy of the democratic forces, which resulted in the widespread breakdown of law and order. The spirit of the new age was highlighted by Pres. F.W. de Klerk's historic speech in February 1990 announcing the abandonment of apartheid in South Africa.

      The immediate outcome of this first round in the struggle for a form of parliamentary democracy was mixed. Elections allowing for multiparty participation were held in some 31 of the 37 sub-Saharan states, but only 12 of the old regimes were defeated (Zambia, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin, Congo, Mali, Central African Republic, Burundi, Lesotho, Malawi, Madagascar, and, notably, South Africa). The conduct of elections in seven other countries (Mauritania, Djibouti, Cameroon, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Kenya) was more or less flawed. The victory of four of the former ruling parties can be held to have been reasonably fair in four countries (Seychelles, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Guinea-Bissau). In addition, four of the practicing plural democratic countries (Mauritius, Botswana, Senegal, and The Gambia) saw the return of their governments. However, the results in The Gambia were nullified by a subsequent military coup—the first in the 1990s, a new record since the early 1970s. The election result in Nigeria was also vitiated when the military regime intervened to prevent the clear winner, MKO Abiola, from consummating his victory.

      Apart from these two governments, military regimes are currently confined to Sierra Leone and The Sudan. Elections are pending in Tanzania, Namibia, Ethiopia, Zaire, and possibly also Angola. Only in one country, Uganda, does the regime still cling obstinately to the idea of a nonparty state.

      There is strong encouragement to the hopes that democracy can strike its roots in African soil. The continuing success of the well-established pluralist political societies of Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and, until the recent setback, The Gambia and the electoral success in overturning 12 of the former governments are two examples. A third is the outstanding triumph of Eritrea, where a genuinely self-reliant, democratic government was established after 30 years of war. Other cases are those of South Africa and Burundi, where centuries-old ruling minorities agreed to surrender power in favour of majority rule.

      The final success of the Second Liberation Movement depends more than anything else on the capacity of African countries to achieve economic recovery. The experience of the first round of multiparty elections shows that democracy is not yet fully understood; concentration on multipartyism as the criterion for a democratic constitution is misplaced since it is only one of a score of conditions required for the establishment of a democratic society. Without guarantees of other human and civil rights, concentration on multipartyism could lead to a dead end and the discrediting of the democratic process. The requirement of such a full range of principles involved in establishing a democratic constitution has so far been achieved only in the new South Africa.

      The achievement of the conditions needed to establish a fully democratic society, as shown by the experience of Western and other democracies, takes not years but generations of struggle and political evolution. While it took several centuries for the Western democracies to reach their present state, modern conditions suggest that it need not take so long in Africa. Even so, it would be overoptimistic to suppose that fully fledged democratic states can be built in less developed countries within the lifetime of a single generation. Meanwhile, the proper test by which to judge whether African countries are moving toward democracy is to measure the incremental changes in the direction of what former president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania once described as acquiring "the habit of democracy."

      Colin Legum is the editor of Third World Reports and consulting editor of the Africa Contemporary Record.

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