/chuy"neuh/, n.
1. People's Republic of, a country in E Asia. 1,221,591,778; 3,691,502 sq. mi. (9,560,990 sq. km). Cap.: Beijing.
2. Republic of. Also called Nationalist China. a republic consisting mainly of the island of Taiwan off the SE coast of mainland China: under Nationalist control since 1948 but claimed by the People's Republic of China. 16,100,000; 13,885 sq. mi. (35,960 sq. km). Cap.: Taipei.

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Introduction China
Background: For centuries China stood as a leading civilization, outpacing the rest of the world in the arts and sciences. But in the 19th and early 20th centuries, China was beset by civil unrest, major famines, military defeats, and foreign occupation. After World War II, the Communists under MAO Zedong established a dictatorship that, while ensuring China's sovereignty, imposed strict controls over everyday life and cost the lives of tens of millions of people. After 1978, his successor DENG Xiaoping gradually introduced market-oriented reforms and decentralized economic decision making, and output quadrupled by 2000. Political controls remain tight even while economic controls continue to be relaxed. Geography China -
Location: Eastern Asia, bordering the East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea, between North Korea and Vietnam
Geographic coordinates: 35 00 N, 105 00 E
Map references: Asia
Area: total: 9,596,960 sq km land: 9,326,410 sq km water: 270,550 sq km
Area - comparative: slightly smaller than the US
Land boundaries: total: 22,147.34 km border countries: Afghanistan 76 km, Bhutan 470 km, Burma 2,185 km, Hong Kong 30 km, India 3,380 km, Kazakhstan 1,533 km, North Korea 1,416 km, Kyrgyzstan 858 km, Laos 423 km, Macau 0.34 km, Mongolia 4,677 km, Nepal 1,236 km, Pakistan 523 km, Russia (northeast) 3,605 km, Russia (northwest) 40 km, Tajikistan 414 km, Vietnam 1,281 km
Coastline: 14,500 km
Maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 NM exclusive economic zone: 200 NM continental shelf: 200 NM or to the edge of the continental margin territorial sea: 12 NM
Climate: extremely diverse; tropical in south to subarctic in north
Terrain: mostly mountains, high plateaus, deserts in west; plains, deltas, and hills in east
Elevation extremes: lowest point: Turpan Pendi -154 m highest point: Mount Everest 8,850 m (1999 est.)
Natural resources: coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, uranium, hydropower potential (world's largest)
Land use: arable land: 13.31% permanent crops: 1.2% other: 85.49% (1998 est.)
Irrigated land: 525,800 sq km (1998 est.)
Natural hazards: frequent typhoons (about five per year along southern and eastern coasts); damaging floods; tsunamis; earthquakes; droughts; land subsidence Environment - current issues: air pollution (greenhouse gases, sulfur dioxide particulates) from reliance on coal, produces acid rain; water shortages, particularly in the north; water pollution from untreated wastes; deforestation; estimated loss of one-fifth of agricultural land since 1949 to soil erosion and economic development; desertification; trade in endangered species Environment - international party to: Antarctic-Environmental
agreements: Protocol, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling signed, but not ratified: Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol
Geography - note: world's fourth-largest country (after Russia, Canada, and US); Mount Everest on the border with Nepal, is the world's tallest peak People China
Population: 1,284,303,705 (July 2002 est.)
Age structure: 0-14 years: 24.3% (male 163,821,081; female 148,855,387) 15-64 years: 68.4% (male 452,354,428; female 426,055,713) 65 years and over: 7.3% (male 43,834,528; female 49,382,568) (2002 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.87% (2002 est.)
Birth rate: 15.85 births/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Death rate: 6.77 deaths/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.38 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Sex ratio: at birth: 1.09 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.1 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.89 male(s)/ female total population: 1.06 male(s)/ female (2002 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 27.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.) Life expectancy at birth: total population: 71.86 years female: 73.86 years (2002 est.) male: 70.02 years
Total fertility rate: 1.82 children born/woman (2002 est.) HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate: less than 0.2% (2000-01 est.) HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/ 1.25 million (January 2001)
HIV/AIDS - deaths: 17,000 (1999 est.)
Nationality: noun: Chinese (singular and plural) adjective: Chinese
Ethnic groups: Han Chinese 91.9%, Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other nationalities 8.1%
Religions: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 1%-2%, Christian 3%-4% note: officially atheist (2002 est.)
Languages: Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages (see Ethnic groups entry)
Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 81.5% male: 89.9% female: 72.7% (1995 est.) Government China
Country name: conventional long form: People's Republic of China conventional short form: China local short form: Zhong Guo abbreviation: PRC local long form: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Government type: Communist state
Capital: Beijing Administrative divisions: 23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions* (zizhiqu, singular and plural), and 4 municipalities** (shi, singular and plural); Anhui, Beijing**, Chongqing**, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi*, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Nei Mongol*, Ningxia*, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai**, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin**, Xinjiang*, Xizang* (Tibet), Yunnan, Zhejiang; note - China considers Taiwan its 23rd province; see separate entries for the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau
Independence: 221 BC (unification under the Qin or Ch'in Dynasty 221 BC; Qing or Ch'ing Dynasty replaced by the Republic on 12 February 1912; People's Republic established 1 October 1949)
National holiday: Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China, 1 October (1949)
Constitution: most recent promulgation 4 December 1982
Legal system: a complex amalgam of custom and statute, largely criminal law; rudimentary civil code in effect since 1 January 1987; new legal codes in effect since 1 January 1980; continuing efforts are being made to improve civil, administrative, criminal, and commercial law
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
Executive branch: chief of state: President JIANG Zemin (since 27 March 1993) and Vice President HU Jintao (since 16 March 1998) elections: president and vice president elected by the National People's Congress for five-year terms; elections last held 16-18 March 1998 (next to be held NA March 2003); premier nominated by the president, confirmed by the National People's Congress head of government: Premier ZHU Rongji (since 18 March 1998); Vice Premiers QIAN Qichen (since 29 March 1993), LI Lanqing (29 March 1993), WU Bangguo (since 17 March 1995), and WEN Jiabao (since 18 March 1998) cabinet: State Council appointed by the National People's Congress (NPC) election results: JIANG Zemin reelected president by the Ninth National People's Congress with a total of 2,882 votes (36 delegates voted against him, 29 abstained, and 32 did not vote); HU Jintao elected vice president by the Ninth National People's Congress with a total of 2,841 votes (67 delegates voted against him, 39 abstained, and 32 did not vote)
Legislative branch: unicameral National People's Congress or Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui (2,979 seats; members elected by municipal, regional, and provincial people's congresses to serve five-year terms) elections: last held NA December 1997-NA February 1998 (next to be held late 2002-NA March 2003) election results: percent of vote - NA%; seats - NA
Judicial branch: Supreme People's Court (judges appointed by the National People's Congress); Local Peoples Courts (comprise higher, intermediate and local courts); Special Peoples Courts (primarily military, maritime, and railway transport courts) Political parties and leaders: Chinese Communist Party or CCP [JIANG Zemin, General Secretary of the Central Committee]; eight registered small parties controlled by CCP Political pressure groups and no substantial political opposition
leaders: groups exist, although the government has identified the Falungong sect and the China Democracy Party as potential rivals International organization AfDB, APEC, ARF (dialogue partner),
participation: AsDB, ASEAN (dialogue partner), BIS, CCC, CDB, ESCAP, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ISO, ITU, LAIA (observer), MINURSO, MONUC, NAM (observer), OPCW, PCA, UN, UN Security Council, UNAMSIL, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNITAR, UNMEE, UNMIBH, UNMOVIC, UNTSO, UNU, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO Diplomatic representation in the US: chief of mission: Ambassador YANG Jiechi consulate(s) general: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco FAX: [1] (202) 328-2582 telephone: [1] (202) 328-2500 chancery: 2300 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008 Diplomatic representation from the chief of mission: Ambassador Clark
US: T. RANDT, Jr. embassy: Xiu Shui Bei Jie 3, 100600 Beijing mailing address: PSC 461, Box 50, FPO AP 96521-0002 telephone: [86] (10) 6532-3431 FAX: [86] (10) 6532-6422 consulate(s) general: Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang
Flag description: red with a large yellow five-pointed star and four smaller yellow five- pointed stars (arranged in a vertical arc toward the middle of the flag) in the upper hoist-side corner Economy China -
Economy - overview: In late 1978 the Chinese leadership began moving the economy from a sluggish Soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more market- oriented system. Whereas the system operates within a political framework of strict Communist control, the economic influence of non-state organizations and individual citizens has been steadily increasing. The authorities have switched to a system of household and village responsibility in agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the authority of local officials and plant managers in industry, permitted a wide variety of small- scale enterprise in services and light manufacturing, and opened the economy to increased foreign trade and investment. The result has been a quadrupling of GDP since 1978. In 2001, with its 1.27 billion people but a GDP of just $4,300 per capita, China stood as the second largest economy in the world after the US (measured on a purchasing power parity basis). Agriculture and industry have posted major gains, especially in coastal areas near Hong Kong and opposite Taiwan, where foreign investment has helped spur output of both domestic and export goods. On the darker side, the leadership has often experienced in its hybrid system the worst results of socialism (bureaucracy and lassitude) and of capitalism (windfall gains and growing income disparities). Beijing thus has periodically backtracked, retightening central controls at intervals. The government has struggled to (a) collect revenues due from provinces, businesses, and individuals; (b) reduce corruption and other economic crimes; and (c) keep afloat the large state-owned enterprises many of which had been shielded from competition by subsidies and had been losing the ability to pay full wages and pensions. From 80 to 120 million surplus rural workers are adrift between the villages and the cities, many subsisting through part-time low-paying jobs. Popular resistance, changes in central policy, and loss of authority by rural cadres have weakened China's population control program, which is essential to maintaining long-term growth in living standards. Another long-term threat to continued rapid economic growth is the deterioration in the environment, notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table especially in the north. China continues to lose arable land because of erosion and economic development. Beijing will intensify efforts to stimulate growth through spending on infrastructure - such as water control and power grids - and poverty relief and through rural tax reform aimed at eliminating arbitrary local levies on farmers. Access to the World Trade Organization strengthens China's ability to maintain sturdy growth rates, and at the same time puts additional pressure on the hybrid system of strong political controls and growing market influences. Although Beijing has claimed 7%-8% annual growth in recent years, many observers believe the rate, while strong, is more like 5%.
GDP: purchasing power parity - $5.56 trillion (2001 est.)
GDP - real growth rate: 7.3% (official estimate) (2001 est.)
GDP - per capita: purchasing power parity - $4,300 (2001 est.) GDP - composition by sector: agriculture: 17.7% industry: 49.3% services: 33% (2001 est.) Population below poverty line: 10% (2001 est.) Household income or consumption by lowest 10%: 2.4%
percentage share: highest 10%: 30.4% (1998) Distribution of family income - Gini 40 (2001)
index: Inflation rate (consumer prices): 0.8% (2001 est.)
Labor force: 706 million (2000 est.) Labor force - by occupation: agriculture 50%, industry 23%, services 27% (2001 est.)
Unemployment rate: urban unemployment roughly 10%; substantial unemployment and underemployment in rural areas (2001 est.)
Budget: revenues: $161.8 billion expenditures: $191.8 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (2000)
Industries: iron and steel, coal, machine building, armaments, textiles and apparel, petroleum, cement, chemical fertilizers, footwear, toys, food processing, automobiles, consumer electronics, telecommunications Industrial production growth rate: 9.9% (2001 est.) Electricity - production: 1.308 trillion kWh (2000) Electricity - production by source: fossil fuel: 81.83% hydro: 16.83% other: 0.12% (2000) nuclear: 1.22% Electricity - consumption: 1.206 trillion kWh (2000)
Electricity - exports: 10.25 billion kWh (2000)
Electricity - imports: 400 million kWh (2000)
Agriculture - products: rice, wheat, potatoes, sorghum, peanuts, tea, millet, barley, cotton, oilseed; pork; fish
Exports: $262.1 billion (f.o.b., 2001 est.)
Exports - commodities: machinery and equipment; textiles and clothing, footwear, toys and sporting goods; mineral fuels
Exports - partners: US 21%, Hong Kong 18%, Japan 17%, South Korea, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Singapore, Taiwan (2000)
Imports: $236.2 billion (f.o.b., 2001 est.)
Imports - commodities: machinery and equipment, mineral fuels, plastics, iron and steel, chemicals
Imports - partners: Japan 18%, Taiwan 11%, South Korea 10%, US 10% Germany, Hong Kong, Russia, Malaysia (2000)
Debt - external: $167 billion (2001 est.) Economic aid - recipient: $NA
Currency: yuan (CNY)
Currency code: CNY
Exchange rates: yuan per US dollar - 8.2767 (January 2002), 8.2771 (2001), 8.2785 (2000), 8.2783 (1999), 8.2790 (1998), 8.2898 (1997)
Fiscal year: calendar year Communications China Telephones - main lines in use: 135 million (2000) Telephones - mobile cellular: 65 million (January 2001)
Telephone system: general assessment: domestic and international services are increasingly available for private use; unevenly distributed domestic system serves principal cities, industrial centers, and many towns domestic: interprovincial fiber- optic trunk lines and cellular telephone systems have been installed; a domestic satellite system with 55 earth stations is in place international: satellite earth stations - 5 Intelsat (4 Pacific Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region) and 1 Inmarsat (Pacific and Indian Ocean regions); several international fiber-optic links to Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Russia, and Germany (2000) Radio broadcast stations: AM 369, FM 259, shortwave 45 (1998)
Radios: 417 million (1997) Television broadcast stations: 3,240 (of which 209 are operated by China Central Television, 31 are provincial TV stations and nearly 3,000 are local city stations) (1997)
Televisions: 400 million (1997)
Internet country code: .cn Internet Service Providers (ISPs): 3 (2000)
Internet users: 26.5 million (2001) Transportation China
Railways: total: 67,524 km (including 5,400 km of provincial "local" rails) standard gauge: 63,924 km 1.435- m gauge (13,362 km electrified; 20,250 km double-track) narrow gauge: 3,600 km 0.750-m and 1.000-m gauge local industrial lines (1999 est.)
Highways: total: 1.4 million km paved: 271,300 km (with at least 16,000 km of expressways) unpaved: 1,128,700 km (1999)
Waterways: 110,000 km (1999)
Pipelines: crude oil 9,070 km; petroleum products 560 km; natural gas 9,383 km (1998)
Ports and harbors: Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Huangpu, Lianyungang, Nanjing, Nantong, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shantou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wenzhou, Xiamen, Xingang, Yantai, Zhanjiang (2001)
Merchant marine: total: 1,764 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 16,915,047 GRT/ 25,366,296 DWT ships by type: barge carrier 2, bulk 328, cargo 822, chemical tanker 25, combination bulk 10, combination ore/oil 1, container 134, liquefied gas 26, multi-functional large-load carrier 6, passenger 7, passenger/ cargo 45, petroleum tanker 263, refrigerated cargo 26, roll on/roll off 23, short-sea passenger 42, specialized tanker 3, vehicle carrier 1 note: includes some foreign-owned ships registered here as a flag of convenience: Croatia 1, Germany 1, Hong Kong 16, Japan 2, Panama 2, South Korea 1, Spain 1, Taiwan 9, Tanzania 1, Turkey 1 (2002 est.)
Airports: 489 (2001) Airports - with paved runways: total: 324 over 3,047 m: 27 2,438 to 3,047 m: 88 1,524 to 2,437 m: 147 914 to 1,523 m: 30 under 914 m: 32 (2001) Airports - with unpaved runways: total: 165 over 3,047 m: 1 2,438 to 3,047 m: 1 1,524 to 2,437 m: 29 914 to 1,523 m: 56 under 914 m: 78 (2001) Military China
Military branches: People's Liberation Army (PLA): comprises ground forces, Navy (including naval infantry and naval aviation), Air Force, and II Artillery Corps (strategic missile force), People's Armed Police Force (internal security troops, nominally a state security body but included by the Chinese as part of the "armed forces" and considered to be an adjunct to the PLA), militia Military manpower - military age: 18 years of age (2002 est.) Military manpower - availability: males age 15-49: 370,087,489 (2002 est.) Military manpower - fit for military males age 15-49: 203,003,036 (2002
service: est.) Military manpower - reaching males: 10,089,458 (2002 est.)
military age annually: Military expenditures - dollar $20.048 billion (2002); note - this
figure: is the officially announced figure, but actual defense spending more likely ranges from $45 billion to $65 billion for 2002 Military expenditures - percent of 1.6% (2002); note - this is the
GDP: officially announced figure, but actual defense spending is more likely between 3.5% to 5.0% of GDP for 2002 Transnational Issues China Disputes - international: in 2000, China joined ASEAN discussions towards creating a South China Sea "code of conduct" - a non- legally binding, confidence-building measure; much of the rugged, militarized boundary with India is in dispute, but talks to resolve the least contested middle sector resumed in 2001; ongoing talks with Tajikistan have failed to resolve the longstanding dispute over the indefinite boundary; Kazakhstan is working rapidly with China to delimit its large open borders to control population migration, illegal activities, and trade; 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation commits Russia and China to seek peaceable unanimity over disputed alluvial islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers and a small island on the Argun; involved in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei; maritime boundary agreement with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin awaits ratification; Paracel Islands occupied by China, but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan; claims Japanese- administered Senkaku-shoto (Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai), as does Taiwan; demarcation of the land boundary with Vietnam has commenced, but details of the alignment have not been made public; 33-km section of boundary with North Korea in the Paektu-san (mountain) area is indefinite
Illicit drugs: major transshipment point for heroin produced in the Golden Triangle; growing domestic drug abuse problem; source country for chemical precursors and methamphetamine

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officially People's Republic of China

Country, eastern Asia.

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Area: 3,696,100 sq mi (9,572,900 sq km). Population (2004 est.): 1,298,848,000. Capital: Beijing. The Han, or ethnic Chinese, form more than nine-tenths of the population. Languages: dialects of Han Chinese, Mandarin being the most important. Religions: Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Daoism (all legally sanctioned). Currency: renminbi (of which the unit is the yuan). China has several topographic regions. The southwestern area contains the Plateau of Tibet, which averages more than 13,000 ft (4,000 m) above sea level; its central area, averaging more than 16,000 ft (5,000 m) in elevation, is called "the Roof of the World." Higher yet are the border ranges, the Kunlun Mountains to the north and the Himalayas to the south. China's northwestern region stretches from Afghanistan to the northeastern Manchurian Plain. The Tien Shan ("Celestial Mountains") separate China's two major interior basins, the Tarim Basin (containing the Takla Makan Desert) and the Junggar Basin. The Mongolian Plateau contains the southernmost part of the Gobi Desert. The lowlands of the eastern region include the Sichuan Basin, which runs along the Yangtze River (Chang Jiang). The eastern region is divided into northern and southern parts by the Yangtze. The Tarim is the major river in the northwest. China's smallest watershed, in the southwest, provides headwaters for the Brahmaputra, Salween, and Irrawaddy rivers. Its many other rivers include the Xi, Sungari (Songhua), Zhu (Pearl), and Lancang, which becomes the Mekong in Southeast Asia. The discovery of Peking man in 1927 (see Zhoukoudian) dates the advent of early hominids to the Paleolithic Period. Chinese civilization probably spread from the Huang He (Yellow River) valley, where it existed с 3000 BC. The first dynasty for which there is definite historical material is the Shang (с 17th century BC), which had a writing system and a calendar. The Zhou, a subject state of the Shang, overthrew its Shang rulers in the 11th century and ruled until the 3rd century BC. Daoism and Confucianism were founded in this era. A time of conflict, called the Warring States period, lasted from the 5th century until 221 BC. Subsequently the Qin (Ch'in) dynasty (from whose name China is derived) was established, after its rulers had conquered rival states and created a unified empire. The Han dynasty was established in 206 BC and ruled until AD 220. A time of turbulence followed, and Chinese reunification was not achieved until the Sui dynasty was established in 581. After the founding of the Song dynasty in 960, the capital was moved to the south because of northern invasions. In 1279 this dynasty was overthrown and Mongol (Yuan) domination began. During this time Marco Polo visited Kublai Khan. The Ming dynasty followed the period of Mongol rule and lasted from 1368 to 1644, cultivating antiforeign feelings to the point that China closed itself off from the rest of the world. Peoples from Manchuria overran China in 1644 and established the Qing (Manchu) dynasty. Ever-increasing incursions by Western and Japanese interests led in the 19th century to the Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Sino-Japanese War, all of which weakened the Manchu. The dynasty fell in 1911, and a republic was proclaimed in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen. The power struggles of warlords weakened the republic. Under Chiang Kai-shek, some national unification was achieved in the 1920s, but Chiang soon broke with the communists, who then formed their own armies. Japan invaded northern China in 1937; its occupation lasted until 1945 (see Manchukuo). The communists gained support after the Long March (1934–35), in which Mao Zedong emerged as their leader. Upon Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, a fierce civil war began; in 1949 the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, and the communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China. The communists undertook extensive reforms, but pragmatic policies alternated with periods of revolutionary upheaval, most notably in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The anarchy, terror, and economic paralysis of the latter led, after Mao's death in 1976, to a turn to moderation under Deng Xiaoping, who undertook economic reforms and renewed China's ties to the West. The government established diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1979. Since the late 1970s the economy has been moving from central planning and state-run industries to a mixture of state-owned and private enterprises in manufacturing and services, in the process growing dramatically and transforming Chinese society. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 was a challenge to an otherwise increasingly stable political environment after 1980. In 1997 Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule, as did Macau in 1999.
(as used in expressions)
People's Republic of China

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▪ 2009

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2008 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,324,681,000
Chief of state:
President Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premier Wen Jiabao

Domestic Affairs.
 For the Chinese government and the vast majority of its citizens, China's remarkably smooth hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing symbolized that the country had achieved its modern national goals: wealth and power. (See Special Report (Games of the XXIX Olympiad ).) On the one hand, the Olympics were held as China celebrated the 30th anniversary of the beginning of reform and opening up that had helped to create much of the country's wealth, while on the other, the Games were viewed as marking the end of what official Chinese history referred to as China's “national humiliation” at the hands of Western powers and Japan over the previous 150 years.

      Such a momentous year got off to a chaotic start, however, with three weeks of severe snowstorms in January that crippled China's transportation system just as millions of domestic migrant workers were heading home for the Lunar New Year holiday. Hundreds of thousands of troops had to be deployed to maintain order as China's basic infrastructure proved inadequate, despite massive investment in recent years. Faced with mounting criticism of the government's handling of the situation, Premier Wen Jiabao issued a remarkable apology to travelers waiting to return home in southern Hunan province. Although China's government allowed even less political dissent than usual in 2008 as the country prepared for the Olympics, Wen's apology set a precedent for a more responsive, hands-on approach to governance by China's political leadership.

      Other examples of the government's new emphasis on accessibility included a Chinese-language Facebook page created for Wen in May and an online chat session that Pres. Hu Jintao joined at People's Daily Online after he listened to a presentation about the site's popular Strong China Forum. In June the number of Internet users in China reached 253 million, which meant that China had overtaken the U.S. as the country with the world's largest population of online users.

      China's leadership also enhanced its standing with the Chinese people with a strong response to a wave of unrest in Tibet that drew international attention in early March to China's Tibetan policy and human rights record. The unrest began with protests by Tibetan monks but quickly escalated a week later into a day of rioting during which Tibetans burned and looted businesses owned by ethnic Han Chinese in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. Chinese troops were sent to restore order but not before violence had spread to other ethnic Tibetan areas of China, including Qinghai, Gansu, and western Sichuan.

      While there was widespread sympathy internationally for the Tibetan people, China's ethnic Han majority, which accounted for 92% of the country's population of more than 1.3 billion, was deeply shocked by powerful images of Tibetan resentment of Chinese rule. For many Chinese, the Tibetans appeared as ungrateful recipients of the billions of dollars of development projects that the central government had poured into Tibet, including a $4 billion high-altitude railroad that connected Lhasa to the outside world in 2006. For many Tibetans, though, the railroad and the influx of Han Chinese migrants into Tibet threatened to make Tibetans a minority in their own homeland.

      In the weeks following reassertion of Chinese control over Tibet, the world tour of the 2008 Olympic torch drew significant protests in London, Paris, San Francisco, and Seoul in support of the Tibetan uprising. A contingent of Chinese guards dressed in track suits protected the torch as it was attacked by demonstrators trying to snuff it out. In one such incident in Paris, demonstrators tried to wrest the torch away from a paraplegic Chinese athlete. This reinforced the growing sense in China that China itself was under attack.

      On May 12 a magnitude-7.9 earthquake struck Wenchuan township in western Sichuan province, killing nearly 70,000 people and leaving millions homeless. (See Disasters.) The Chinese army mobilized tens of thousands of soldiers in a disaster effort once again led personally by Wen. Abandoning its policy of secrecy about natural disasters, the Chinese government allowed unprecedented coverage of the aftermath of the earthquake by both Chinese and international media. As the scope of the devastation became clear, China allowed foreign relief organizations to enter the country and briefly tolerated protests by the parents of the many children who died when their school buildings collapsed.

      Despite the earthquake, Beijing went ahead with the Summer Games. A major concern for athletes and visitors had been high levels of air pollution in Beijing that had resulted from decades of explosive growth and dramatically increased car ownership. Nonetheless, a policy of shifting heavy industry outside Beijing and last-minute traffic-control measures effectively reduced smog levels. Visitors found a modern capital city studded with ambitious architecture. Major new structures that opened in late 2007 and 2008 included the National Centre for the Performing Arts, known as the Egg, the Beijing National Aquatics Center, known as the Cube, and the Beijing National Stadium, the world's largest steel structure, known as the Bird's Nest.

      The Bird's Nest was the location of the Games' opening ceremony, a mass spectacle that involved some 15,000 performers and celebrated 5,000 years of Chinese cultural achievements and the concept of social harmony (he), the central tenet of the Communist Party of China's (CPC's) ideology under Hu. To ensure social harmony during the Games, three protest zones were set up in Beijing where residents could protest if they registered and received a permit. No permits were granted, however, and in one case two elderly women who had applied to protest were initially sentenced to reeducation by labour, though this sentence was later canceled. A total of 58 foreigners were deported during the Games for protests that authorities said violated Chinese law. At the close of the Olympics, China had won the most gold medals (51) and the second highest number of medals overall (100), affirming its status as a sports superpower.

      In late September China launched a Shenzhou 7 rocket carrying three astronauts, one of whom successfully carried out the country's first space walk. The government's confidence in the mission was strong enough to broadcast the 13-minute space walk live on television. Despite impressive examples of how the central government could mobilize the vast resources at its disposal for national projects or natural disasters, dissent against local governments flickered across China throughout the year. Following protests in 2007 that halted construction of a major chemical plant in the coastal city of Xiamen, residents of Shanghai protested against the proposed Shanghai-Hangzhou Maglev Train during January and February 2008. The protesters opposed the project on grounds that it would lower property values and emit harmful levels of electromagnetic radiation. The project was nonetheless approved in August, with construction slated to begin in 2010. While the Shanghai protests were peaceful, a violent outbreak of rioting occurred in late June in Weng'an, a remote township in Guizhou province. Some 10,000 protesters set fire to government buildings and overturned cars following the death of a 15-year-old girl. The girl's family claimed that she had been raped and murdered, and there were allegations that the crime had been covered up by local authorities.

      The two main political events in 2008 were the National People's Congress in March and the CPC's Central Committee meeting in October. The National People's Congress attempted to streamline the Chinese government by creating new superministries under the State Council extracted from clusters of existing specialized ministries. The Congress also elected Li Keqiang one of four vice premiers under Wen on the State Council and Xi Jinping vice president under Hu. This was interpreted as a setback for Hu, who was believed to favour Li Keqiang as his successor. Both Li and Xi were also among the nine current members of the CPC's Political Bureau's Standing Committee that in practice functions as China's highest executive authority.

      The Central Committee meeting, which was attended by more than 300 senior party members, committed the state to a policy of loosening the restrictive household-registration system that bifurcated Chinese society in terms of access to resources between those born in the country and those born in the city. In addition, the Central Committee also signaled that Chinese farmers would soon be permitted to buy and sell land-use rights. Both policies were intended as concrete steps in narrowing the vast disparity between the incomes of rural and urban residents by accelerating migration to urban areas. In 2007 the per capita income for rural residents was $608, while urban residents earned $2,027 per capita. The party planned to double the annual income of rural residents by 2020.

The Economy.
      In 2008, despite record high oil prices and the world credit crisis, China's economy continued its rapid expansion. Though GDP growth slipped to below 10% (from 11.6% in 2007), China's trade surplus continued to increase rapidly, setting a single-month record of $29.3 billion in September as commodity prices decreased from earlier in the year. In turn this pushed China's foreign-exchange reserves—the world's largest—to $1.9 trillion by the end of the third quarter. That figure was almost twice the size of Japan's foreign reserves, the world's second largest. Up to $1 trillion of China's foreign reserves were held in U.S. treasury bills.

      Nonetheless, China Investment Corp., China's $200 billion sovereign wealth fund, did not seek to diversify significantly from U.S. dollar-denominated assets in 2008. One reason for this was widespread domestic criticism of the fund's losses caused by investments in the U.S. financial firms Morgan Stanley and the Blackstone Group in 2007 and $5 billion frozen in a failed money-market fund in September 2008. Chinese finance officials feared that any significant movement away from U.S. dollar assets could trigger a sharp decline in the value of those assets. The Chinese renminbi, meanwhile, accelerated its appreciation against the U.S. dollar, rising some 6.5% over the course of the year.

      In addition to China Investment Corp., other Chinese financial companies suffered losses related to the 2008 financial crisis. One prominent example was Ping An Insurance, which was forced to write off $2.5 billion in connection with its investment in the Dutch-Belgian bank Fortis after the bank was taken over by the governments of The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In general, though, China's capital controls and its limited appetite for the types of credit risk that caused the financial crisis staved off serious short-term impact on Chinese financial institutions. The main concern was that a slowdown in China's major export markets would ratchet down economic growth in 2009 and beyond.

      Domestically, consumer prices surged in the first half of the year, peaking in May with a consumer price index increase of 7.7%, but by August consumer price inflation had dropped to 4.7% as lower oil and grain prices began to alleviate the pressure. Faced with rapidly changing economic conditions, China's central bank reversed course in September, dropping interest rates for the first time in six years and lowering bank reserve ratios in an effort to anticipate slower economic growth through the end of 2008 and into 2009. A dramatic 70% drop in share prices on the Shanghai Stock Exchange by the third quarter, combined with a sharp decline in real-estate transactions in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and slower growth in industrial output, contributed to the prevailing sense that the economy was slowing down. In response, in November the central government announced a major economic-stimulus plan.

      Two important laws took effect in 2008 that were expected to have a profound impact on China's economic environment. The first of these was the Labour Contract Law, which went into effect on January 1 and required written contracts to formalize employment relationships between workers and employers. The new law made it more difficult to terminate workers and gave workers the right to file complaints and be compensated for wrongful termination. The second law was the Anti-Monopoly Law, which took effect in August. The Anti-Monopoly Law allowed the Chinese government to block acquisitions of companies if the acquisition harmed competition or threatened national economic development.

      In April former Shanghai party chairman Chen Liangyu was convicted of having accepted nearly $340,000 in bribes in connection with a scheme to divert money from pension funds into development projects; he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. In China's southern Guangxi province, Sun Yu, a high-ranking party official, was removed from office and prosecuted for having taken more than $58 million in bribes. Official corruption was estimated to cost China's economy $86 billion annually.

      In addition to corruption, China struggled to contain the damaging effects of a series of food- and drug-safety scandals. In March and April the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) traced tainted batches of Heparin, a commonly used blood thinner, to Chinese suppliers who had sourced the ingredients of the drug from unregulated slaughterhouses. By the end of May, the FDA had identified 149 deaths that it related to tainted Heparin. In all, 10 countries, including China, Japan, and Germany, reported problems with Heparin products.

      The scale of the Heparin scandal, however, was dwarfed by a scandal that began to emerge in August involving dairy products that had been laced with melamine—a chemical used in making plastic—in order to increase apparent protein content. In China alone, more than 50,000 babies became ill and four died as a result of having ingested milk formula containing melamine. By the end of October, the scandal had spread far beyond China as melamine-containing products ranging from fertilizer to chocolate candies were found in countries in the region.

Foreign Relations.
      Direct talks between China and Taiwan resumed in June after having been suspended for nearly a decade. The talks, held in Beijing, came a month after Ma Ying-jeou took office as the new Taiwanese president while vowing to establish better relations with China. The development raised concerns in the U.S. that Taiwan, a traditional U.S. ally, was tilting too much toward China. In that context the administration of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush announced $6.5 billion in weapon sales to Taiwan in October. China reacted angrily to the deal, declaring that it would cause “harm to Chinese interests and Sino-U.S. relations” and canceling several planned military as well as diplomatic exchanges with the U.S. Historic agreements on expansion of direct flights and trade between Taiwan and China were signed at a second round of talks, held in Taipei in November.

      Some tensions arose in China's relations with Russia as well. The Chinese foreign-policy establishment was dismayed by the Russian invasion of Georgia in August and Russia's diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, since these acts could create precedents for the diplomatic recognition of Tibet or Taiwan as independent countries. Nonetheless, China and Russia resolved a long-running border dispute in October when Russia handed over 340 sq km (131 sq mi) of territory to China on the border of China's Heilongjiang province.

      Relations with other countries were generally cordial. In March China opened the last link in a new paved highway connecting Yunnan province to northern Thailand. In May President Hu made a state visit to Japan that contributed to the general thaw in Sino-Japanese relations in the years since anti-Japanese riots occurred in China in 2005. Relations with India became somewhat more difficult when China raised objections to a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in September to lift a nuclear trade embargo on India. The decision was expected to pave the way for the approval of a U.S.-India pact that would allow India access to civilian nuclear technology. This was followed in October by an unsuccessful round of talks on the disputed Sino-Indian border.

      Farther afield, Chinese ties with Africa continued to expand, with bilateral trade hitting $100 billion during the year. Relations with France, however, were marred by Chinese boycotts of the French supermarket chain Carrefour following protests against the Olympic torch relay in Paris and threats by French Pres. Nicolas Sarkozy to boycott the Olympic Games because of Chinese policies in Tibet.

Michael R. Fahey

▪ 2008

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2007 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,317,925,000
Chief of state:
President Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premier Wen Jiabao

Domestic Politics.
      In China the notable political events of 2007 were the holding of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 10th National People's Congress in March and the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October. The former was the scene of some breaks with convention and a shift toward populist politics, while the October congress was widely seen as having failed to achieve the complete consolidation of power by Pres. Hu Jintao that most Chinese and foreign observers had expected.

      The March National People's Congress was attended by representatives from China's provinces and municipalities. In a first, foreign journalists were given unrestricted access to People's Congress members. Premier Wen Jiabao's government report for 2006 was seen as a departure from the norm insofar as it addressed populist issues. Heading the bill were pressing domestic issues such as health care, education, and rural poverty, but the report also dwelled at some length on more-sensitive issues such as the environment and corruption, particularly in relationship to real estate—an area that had seen large-scale collusion between business and local political interests. (See Special Report (Perils of China's Explosive Growth ).)

      Wen paid particular attention in his report to the Three Rural Issues, or san nong, which referred to agriculture, rural communities, and peasants. He made a commitment to provide funding for infrastructure and new technologies to aid China's more than 800 million rural dwellers, whose living standards and incomes dragged significantly behind China's increasingly affluent urban population. Other issues addressed by Wen included the virtual absence of rural insurance and a new plan to provide basic rural health care. In terms of education, Wen made a commitment to abolish all tuition fees for rural children. In a rare hint at possible future political reform, Wen also spoke briefly of the need for “government transparency” and “public participation” in politics.

      Perhaps of most significance at the Fifth Plenary Session, however, was the passing of the Property Law of the People's Republic of China, which had failed to pass in seven readings since 2002 owing to content disputes. The law covered the creation, transfer, and ownership of property and was widely seen as an important development in the creation of a market economy and a civil code. Falling short of abolishing the constitutional right of the government to own all land, the law nevertheless provided new protections for owners of private homes, for businesses, and for farmers with long-term leases on land. The law, which covered both state and private ownership, had long been mired in controversy; more-conservative party members were critical of the legislation because it seemed to erode the fundamental principle that state ownership came first.

      Hints at the need for political reform in the National People's Congress came amid some unusually public debate on the subject in 2007. In a widely publicized speech in June, President Hu followed up on Wen's March comments by acknowledging growing public demand for a say in political decisions. Although the president did not set an agenda for changes leading to increased participatory politics, he did say that changes should be expanded in an “orderly way.” In late September, in the Beijing magazine China Across the Ages, Li Rui, a 90-year-old former secretary to Mao Zedong, called for expanded citizens' rights and limits to party power. Li argued that democratization needed to keep apace of market reforms if China was to maintain stability. His comments appeared on the eve of the CPC National Congress.

      In the months ahead of the party congress, in which the CPC set government agenda for the next five years, an Internet crackdown was carried out. Across the country, police shut down IDCs (Internet data centres), the computers that Web sites rent to host their content. Meanwhile, ISPs (Internet service providers) voluntarily disabled forums and chat rooms that were possibly unacceptable to authorities. These moves came amid international criticism that Beijing was violating a commitment to the International Olympics Committee that it was prepared to make substantial improvements in human rights ahead of the 2008 Olympics.

      The CPC National Congress began on October 15 in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. It voted in a new Central Committee, which endorsed a new Political Bureau and Political Bureau Standing Committee, the innermost circle of power in China. The Central Committee elevated four new members to the Political Bureau Standing Committee, but only one of them, Li Keqiang, party secretary of Liaoning province, owed his promotion to Hu's patronage. Shanghai party boss Xi Jinping also joined the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Outranking Li, he was considered more likely to succeed Hu in 2012 as chief of state. Hu's retired predecessor, Jiang Zemin, was said to have had broad influence ahead of the National Congress in the negotiations on the new leadership lineup.

      A reshuffle of the People's Liberation Army top brass, with older officers retiring in favour of a younger lineup, reflected Hu's dominance as chairman of the Central Military Commission. Of particular note was that Hu promoted a number of generals with Taiwan-affairs experience—most prominently a new chief of general staff, Gen. Chen Bingde, who had previously served as head of the Nanjing Military Region, which had direct responsibility for the Taiwan Strait.

      The promotions were a sign of increasingly icy relations with Taiwan ahead of a Taipei referendum to enlist support for a UN membership bid under the name Taiwan rather than the Republic of China. Under the leadership of Taiwanese Pres. Chen Shui-bian, the self-ruled island in 2007 continued to make no concessions to China's claims of sovereignty, failing to open up Taiwan to Chinese tourism and refusing to allow the Olympic torch to pass through Taiwan on its way to Beijing.

The Economy.
      In 2007 China's economy continued its meteoric rise. GDP grew at around 11%; the trade surplus approached $260 billion at year's end; foreign exchange reserves were up a spectacular $135.7 billion in the first quarter of 2007 from year's end 2006; and the Chinese renminbi continued to appreciate against the U.S. dollar at an annual rate of about 5%. In late September the Chinese government launched Asia's biggest state-owned investment company—a $200 billion sovereign wealth fund—after massive trade surpluses boosted the country's currency reserves to a record $1.33 trillion. Such good news came, however, amid a rising tide of voices warning of risks and challenges. The main areas of concern were surging inflation—which reached a 10-year high in 2007—an emerging stock-market bubble, the environmental fallout from China's fast-growing economy, and corruption.

      In August consumer-price inflation surged to 6.5%, while fixed-asset investment in urban areas jumped 26.7% in the first half of 2007 year on year, prompting China's highest leadership to call on officials at all levels to take steps to stop the economy from overheating. The call followed a warning in May by the National Bureau of Statistics that the economy was “at risk of going from rapid growth to overheating.” Beijing responded at midyear by raising benchmark interest rates for the fourth time since April 2006 and raising banks' reserve ration requirement for the eighth time since July 2006. Meanwhile, China's benchmark Shanghai Composite index continued to reach record highs throughout 2007, having surged more than 400% in the past two years despite government attempts to cool the market by imposing transaction taxes and higher interest rates.

 Chinese exporters struggled to redeem their image after a succession of product recalls of tainted goods. Safety scares emerged over Chinese shipments of dangerous and toxic lead-tainted toys as well as toxic toothpaste, seafood, and automotive tires, among other goods. Early in the year, more than 100 pet-food products were pulled from American shelves, and toy manufacturer Mattel, Inc., recalled nearly 20 million Chinese-made products, most of which contained lead-tainted paint. In July the former head of China's State Food and Drug Administration was executed for having taken $850,000 in bribes from eight pharmaceutical companies and for having approved fake drugs during his tenure (1998–2005). In September the government appointed Vice-Premier Wu Yi to head a panel tasked with overseeing a four-month war on tainted food, drugs, and exports.

       Corruption hit the headlines with the prosecution in late July of former Shanghai party chief Chen Liangyu. Chen had been the subject of a high-profile one-year investigation after some $390 million was found to be missing from Shanghai's pension fund. Another 20 local officials were implicated. For some observers the prosecution was evidence that China was doing more to combat what was seen as an endemic problem, but for others the Chen case was simply the tip of the iceberg, and his prosecution was seen, at least in some quarters, as being politically motivated by his association with the so-called Shanghai clique, political rivals to President Hu and Premier Wen.

      The environmental consequences of China's economic boom came under increased government scrutiny. Reports emerged showing that just 1% of China's approximately 560 million urban residents were breathing air considered safe by the European Union, and some 500 million people lacked access to clean drinking water. A 2007 World Bank report said that some 500,000 Chinese died annually as a result of pollution. Meanwhile, China was expected to become the global leader in terms of greenhouse emissions by the end of 2007. This toxic side effect of China's economic success story was thought to be behind thousands of incidents of social unrest across the country, and in July the head of China's environmental agency, Zhou Shengxian, called for a “struggle” against polluters. Most such incidents passed unreported, owing to a muzzled media, but in May thousands of people in Xiamen, Fujian province, took to the streets to protest a dirty petrochemical plant. Another sign of China's growing environmental crisis was an outbreak of toxic cyanobacteria in Lake Tai in the Yangtze River delta; water supplies for nearly two million people were poisoned. 

Foreign Relations.
      There were signs in 2007 that China was moderating its foreign policy—possibly ahead of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008—so as to be more of a global “team player,” particularly in its most contentious foreign policy alignments: North Korea, Myanmar (Burma), and The Sudan. 

      China had long been North Korea's most important ally, but after a test explosion of a nuclear device by North Korea in October 2006, China worked hard to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Six-country negotiations early in 2007 succeeded in achieving a solution that saw North Korea agree to dismantle its nuclear program in return for compensation. China's foreign policy came under intense pressure when monk-led protests erupted in Myanmar in September. Although China helped arrange for a UN envoy to visit Myanmar during the crisis and called on the government and demonstrators to show restraint, Beijing resisted calls for sanctions in keeping with its policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Despite Beijing's opposition, additional sanctions were imposed by the U.S. and the EU independently of the UN as the crisis continued into October, and China increasingly came to be seen as Myanmar's major backer despite the fact that India, Russia, and Thailand also had important relationships with the ruling junta in Yangon. For China, the long-term significance of the crisis was that its support for the Myanmar government was seen as support for other countries with controversial human rights records.

      China also continued to oppose international sanctions against the Sudanese government but allowed UN Security Council Resolution 1769, authorizing the deployment of peacekeepers to The Sudan, and helped persuade the Sudanese government to accept them. Like Myanmar, The Sudan was an important source of natural resources, and China imported 7% of its oil supplies from there. In a sign of the close relations between the Sudanese government and China, President Hu visited The Sudan in February. China also committed to investing $20 billion in Africa in 2007. This commitment brought China closer to Zimbabwean Pres. Robert Mugabe, whose regime was increasingly dependent on Chinese aid.

      Relations with the U.S. got off to a rocky start after China shot down a weather satellite during an unannounced test, demonstrating the country's military-space capabilities. Continuing trade tensions led U.S. lawmakers to introduce legislation intended to force China to revalue its currency. While attending the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in September, U.S. Pres. George W. Bush accepted an invitation by Hu to attend the 2008 Olympics, but in October Bush angered Beijing by appearing in public with the Dalai Lama as the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader received a Congressional Gold Medal at a ceremony in Washington, D.C. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi condemned the appearance, stating that it “seriously wounded the feelings of the Chinese people and interfered with China's internal affairs.”

      Relations between Germany and China were also strained over the Dalai Lama after German Chancellor Angela Merkel met the spiritual leader in Berlin. In response to the meeting, China canceled human rights talks with Germany scheduled for December.

      Sino-Japanese relations thawed as Premier Wen visited Japan in April and agreed to hold talks on disputes over territorial waters. The sudden resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in September  elevated Yasuo Fukuda, who succeeded Abe. Fukuda's moderate views on China promised to help improve relations between the two economic giants. Fukuda also indicated that as prime minister he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine (where Japan's war dead, notably those of World War II, are enshrined); trips by Japanese leaders to the memorial had proved a perennial irritant in Sino-Japanese relations.

Michael R. Fahey

▪ 2007

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2006 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,311,381,000
Chief of state:
President Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premier Wen Jiabao

Domestic Politics.
      In 2006 another reshuffling of leadership in China saw Chen Liangyu removed from the office of Shanghai party secretary and from the Politburo for corruption. He was seen as a heavyweight member of the “Shanghai clique,” associates of former president Jiang Zemin. Other high-ranking officials who lost their jobs included the deputy mayor of Beijing, the deputy governor of Anhui, the executive vice- chairman of the Jiangsu People's Congress, the deputy party secretary of Hunan, the director general of the Shanghai bureau of labour and social welfare, the director general of the Tianjin public-security bureau, and the director general of the Fujian bureau of industry and commerce. In addition to having dismissed 44,738 corrupt members from the party in 2005, the central government hit hard on corruption in the military. For example, the deputy chief of the navy, Wang Shouye, who kept five mistresses, received a death sentence.

      The resulting vacancies in the government were filled by former functionaries of the Chinese Communist Youth League, which Pres. Hu Jintao had led. These new leaders included interim Shanghai party secretary Han Zheng, Tibet party secretary Zhang Qingni, Helongjiang governor Qian Yunlu, Hunan deputy party secretary Zhou Qiang, and interim Shaanxi governor Yuan Chunqing. In addition, President Hu promoted 10 generals, including Liu Yongzhi and Sun Zhongtong of the People's Liberation Army's General Political Department.

      The policy debate in Beijing evolved from a yearlong critique of various reform programs into a rethinking of the reform directions and finally, at the National People's Congress in March, into an ideological debate over socialism and capitalism. One group pointed to the social problems that the reforms had brought, such as social injustice, official corruption, income disparity, and social unrest, and argued that the reforms had exhausted public resources without achieving sustainable development. For example, 60% of recent land deals were illegal, according to one government report. The other group argued that such problems would phase out as the reforms continued. Such debate derailed the passage of what would have been a landmark bill protecting private-property rights, although leaders expressed their “unshakable” commitment to the reforms.

      Two political ideas started to emerge: intraparty democratization and increasing independence of the judicial system. For the first time in history, three scholars were appointed to high posts in the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Party scholars and advisers started to entertain certain democratic ideas, which included competitive elections for party positions and nomination privileges to be expanded to the People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference. As a pilot project, competitive elections of party secretaries had already been held at the village and township levels. Sichuan province dispatched six senior officials to the United States to job-shadow their American counterparts for eight months.

      Changes also took place in other areas. After an explosion at a chemical plant in northeastern China in 2005 that spilled toxic matter into the Songhua River and contaminated the drinking water of millions of people, the government earmarked $3.3 billion to improve water quality by 2010. China's State Environmental Protection Administration revealed that the state was to spend $175 billion in environmental protection from 2006 to 2010. This was the first serious response to environmental problems resulting from rapid industrialization such as deforestation, land degradation, and pollution.

      China introduced 17 new laws and regulations concerning trademarks, copyrights, patents, and customs. In the first half of the year, the national bureau of customs handled 1,076 cases of intellectual- property-rights violations. In Chinese courts the international brands LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton, Chanel, Burberry, Gucci, Prada, and Adidas won trademark-infringement lawsuits. Luxury-goods company LVMH won a lawsuit against its fellow French business Carrefour in a Beijing court over counterfeiting. In late 2005 Société Jas Hennessy, an LVMH unit, had won a piracy case in a Shanghai court against two Chinese winemakers. Pfizer also won an intellectual-property-rights case involving a Chinese version of Viagra. When the government tightened regulations on karaoke bars, however, many questioned whether what was being protected was intellectual-property rights or monopoly.

      Other milestones of the year included completion of the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, the defeat of a bill that would have punished selective abortion based on the fetus's sex, establishment of trade unions in Wal-Mart stores in China when the retail giant planned to hire 150,000 additional staff, and the announcement that China had already exceeded UNICEF's goal for 2015 for improvement of children's health.

The Economy.
      In 2006 the Chinese economy was setting records at every turn. Tax revenue climbed to $385 billion; the trade surplus tripled and broke $100 billion; domestic tourism hit 1.2 billion trips; and businesses brought in $18.9 billion in Hong Kong alone—all by the new year of 2006. Individual savings exceeded $1.75 billion at the beginning of 2006, and real-estate investment rocketed to $660 billion over five years. There were at least 320,000 millionaires in China. Foreign-exchange reserves stood at $853 billion in February 2006 (China surpassed Japan to become the world's largest reserve holder) and reached $954 billion in July. GDP growth rate was 10.5% for 2006, another year of fast growth.

      Since the currency reform in 2005, China had used an average of quotes from 13 international banks to determine the daily core rate for the yuan, which continued to climb against the U.S. dollar, from 8.0696 in January to 7.8998 in September. China's financial reform had brought in significant international investment. In 2005 alone the China Banking Regulatory Commission approved 19 foreign investments, in stakes as high as 20% of 16 Chinese local banks. The Bank of China gave up control of 16.85% of its stocks to four foreign banks for $3 billion in addition to $11.2 billion worth of stocks sold on the Hong Kong market. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group invested $110 million in Tianjin City Commercial Bank as a way to get access to the Chinese financial market. British petroleum company BP paid $44 million in exchange for a 20% stake in China's main jet-fuel importer, China Aviation Oil. SEB of France acquired 61% of Zhejiang Supor Cookware, the biggest Chinese producer of kitchen appliances. South Korea's Telecom bought $1 billion in bonds, a 6.7% stake, in China Unicom to tap the world's largest wireless market. The target of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group in 2006 was to double their spending on China's hot real estate to $7 billion, and in June Citigroup said it wanted to increase its investment in real estate in China to $800 million over three years. International Hotel Group opened four new hotels in one month, increasing its ownership to 57 hotels in China. It planned to build 125 hotels by the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

      Such unprecedented openness of the financial sector received widespread criticism in China as a part of the debate between socialism and capitalism, and arguments sometimes took on a nationalist tinge. The trend worried many Chinese—especially after Goldman Sachs bought a 60.72% stake in a major Chinese company—because foreigners seemed to be buying Chinese assets on the cheap, profiting at the expense of domestic labour and lessening government control of strategic national resources. The Chinese regulatory agency defended its handling of foreign investments by pointing to its stringent rules of entry and lower costs of financial-sector restructuring. Another $350 million quota was granted to Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.

      The Chinese automobile industry was especially hot. There were 34 million registered motor vehicles in China, and this number was expected to jump to 60 million in five years. In 2006 Volvo became the latest Western automaker to produce vehicles in China, aiming at 10,000 cars a year. In March Bosch, the world's number one automotive supplier, started a two-year plan to increase production capacity in China. Ferarri inaugurated sales, and Harley-Davidson opened a dealership in Beijing. Meanwhile, Chinese carmakers Geely, Chery, and Lifan increased their domestic-market share to 28.7% vis-à-vis Japan (27.8%), Europe (19%), the U.S. (14%), and South Korea (10.3%). In 2006 for the first time, China exported more cars than it imported. After having bought MG Rover in 2005, Nanjing Automobile planned to build MG-brand cars in Oklahoma; it would be the first Chinese assembler in the U.S.

Special Administrative Regions and Tibet.
      The Hong Kong legislature passed a controversial Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance, which allowed authorities to obtain a judge's permission to monitor private communications with telephone wiretaps, e-mail scans, and other covert techniques. Critics feared an erosion of civic freedoms, even though there was a precedent: the Police Special Branch had monitored suspected communists in Hong Kong under British rule during the 1960s and 1970s.

      Following the initial success of casinos in Macao, the Chinese authorities started to crack down on public officials engaging in gambling. More than 8,740 Communist Party members had been punished by the new year. On the other hand, as more casinos were built, the average earnings of a gambling table dropped to $9,000, about half of the take in 2002. The overall annual earnings rate remained steady at 14%, however; the tax revenue exceeded $2 billion; and the casinos employed 40,000 workers at year's end.

 Over the past five years, China had spent $1.81 billion on building and upgrading roads and highways in Tibet. In 2006 it invested $713 million in 21 highways and 9 other major new roads. The first railway in Tibet opened during the year, running 1,139 km (708 mi) from Lhasa to Qinghai and costing $4 billion. Critics feared increased centralized control of the area and erosion of Tibetan culture. The Dalai Lama's envoy to China, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, held a round of talks with Beijing, the fifth since 2002, and expressed the Buddhist leader's wish “to see for myself the changes and developments” in China. In recent years the Dalai Lama had adapted his strategy from a fight for independence to self-rule and genuine autonomy for Tibet, within the provisions of the Chinese constitution, and to the preservation of Tibetan cultural identity.

Foreign Relations.
      China tried to follow a foreign-policy doctrine of mutual benefit and peaceful development. At a top-level meeting on foreign affairs in August, Beijing set its international priorities on “peace, development, and cooperation.” The meeting required officials to create “a sound internal environment and favourable external conditions” for China's continued economic development.

      Since the time of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's pilgrimage to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine in October 2005, the relationship between China and Japan had been fraught. The shrine honoured Japan's war dead, including 14 convicted Class-A war criminals who were linked to atrocities committed during World War II. Koizumi's New Year's speech poured salt on the wound and deepened the rift between the two countries when he accused Chinese (and South Korean) criticism of his shrine visit of being interference in Japan's domestic matters. Public opinions in the two countries polarized, but Beijing decided to seek better ties when the new Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, took office in September.

      In March, Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law, Jang Song Thaek, led a delegation of 30 North Korean economists and visited China's economic-development zones. Although Beijing increased grain donations, China openly criticized North Korea after it conducted a nuclear test and pressured Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear program. China also offered “no-strings” loan packages of $600 million to Cambodia and $2 billion each year for the next three years to the Philippines. Beijing also offered $66 million in loans to Ghana. The Chinese peacekeeping force in Lebanon was increased to 1,000, mostly engaged in clearing land mines.

      After an initial period of silence, China's notion of peaceful development began to be embraced by the United States. The two countries exchanged high-level military visits, which included the vice-chairman of China's Military Commission and the commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's speech to the annual Asian security conference in Singapore marked a softening of the U.S. tone on China. Before President Hu's visit to the United States in April, Beijing warned Washington not to make China a scapegoat for American economic problems. During a visit by Vice-Premier Wu Yi in early April, the signing of 107 contracts with American companies valued at $16.2 billion was announced. Hu's visit later than month was largely intended to show the Americans that China was not a threat. He visited technology giants Microsoft and Boeing and made his first official visit to the White House. The Chinese president focused on finding economic common ground rather than on political differences. He and U.S. Pres. George W. Bush also pledged to cooperate more closely on nuclear nonproliferation and on trade balances.

      Cheng Siwei, a deputy parliamentary chief, called for China to trim its holdings of U.S. debt and to stop buying dollar bonds as the value of the U.S. dollar dropped against the euro and yen and U.S. government bond prices slipped. China was a leading financier of the U.S. current-account deficit and held the world's largest foreign-exchange reserves. New U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, a former Goldman Sachs chairman and a pioneering trader in the Chinese market, laid out a new China strategy that emphasized the need to take a “generational” view of the bilateral relationship.

      Because China was consuming 8% of the world's energy, the security of energy resources for economic production continued to be a focal point of Beijing's diplomacy. After his U.S. visit, President Hu made stops in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Kenya. Premier Wen Jiabao later traveled to seven other African countries, including Angola, the continent's second largest oil producer. The China National Offshore Oil Corp. took a 45% stake in the Nigerian Oil Mining License (OML) 130 oil field near the Niger Delta in Nigeria. Hu signed an agreement with visiting Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin to build gas pipelines from Russia to China, and China National Petroleum Corp., the largest Chinese oil company, bought a $500 million stake in the newly listed Russian petroleum giant Rosneft. Russian oil exports to China in 2006 nearly doubled from the previous year. China also expressed interest in Iran's oil and Australia's uranium and had started building a 900-km (560-mi) oil pipeline through Myanmar (Burma).

      As China and India, the world's two most populous countries, continued their rapid development, a new word, Chindia, drew the world's attention to their strategic economic partnership, begun in 2005. The two countries continued border talks and signed an agreement to reopen an ancient trade route that had been closed 44 years earlier over border disputes. Two state-owned oil companies, China's Sinopec and India's ONGC, each purchased a 25% interest in Omimex de Colombia. The two countries also started discussions on science and technology cooperation.

Xiaobo Hu

▪ 2006

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2005 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,304,369,000
Chief of state:
President Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premier Wen Jiabao

Domestic Politics.
      Chinese Pres. Hu Jintao consolidated his power in 2005 through a series of political maneuvers and policies. Under Hu's leadership, the Communist Party of China (CPC) launched a campaign early in the year to “preserve the vanguard character” of the party. A program was undertaken to engage all of the CPC's 69 million members in six months of workshops and evaluations. By midyear some 14 million CPC members had gone through this process aimed at strengthening their beliefs and commitment to the party.

      Hu also continued to wage a high-profile campaign against institutional corruption, which many feared had begun to erode governmental authority. A spate of financial scandals led to a crackdown on corruption in banking and other industries. Zhang Enzhao, president of China Construction Bank—one of the leading state-owned commercial banks in China—resigned in March over allegations that he had taken bribes from an American contractor. He was the latest of four high-ranking banking officials who had been removed from their posts. The China Banking Regulatory Commission concluded its investigation of the four major state-run banks, the “Big Four,” and claimed to have saved $61 million from being lost to fraud. One branch manager of the Bank of China had embezzled about $102 million from several bank accounts before fleeing abroad. Among government officials arrested or sentenced for corruption during the year were the deputy governor of Sichuan province, the deputy party secretary of Shanxi province, the transportation bureau chiefs in Henan, Heilongjiang, and Yunnan provinces, and the deputy mayor of Suzhou. Quite a few others who lost their jobs over corruption charges had been promoted by Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin. These included Zhang Enzhao, Lanzhou's Mayor Zhang Zhiyin, and Li Yizhen, the deputy party secretary of Shenzhen. China also took steps in 2005 to join the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, an intergovernmental body established to counter the manipulation of financial systems by criminals.

      In a departure from the previous administration, the government began to take active measures to ease rural poverty. The widening wealth gap in Chinese society had prompted social protests and distrust in government. The Gini coefficient (a measure of income distribution in a society by which 0 = perfect equality and 1 = perfect inequality) in China had already exceeded the 0.4 threshold—widely viewed as an indicator of potential serious social disruption and instability. While the country's economy had been on the fast track in recent years, a significant portion of its rural population had not been lifted from poverty. Toward this end the People's National Congress in March moved to eliminate most of the basic agricultural taxes imposed on rural families and to increase agricultural subsidies for grain production. Agricultural reforms, however, fell short of granting peasants greater control over their land.

      The government also kept a vigilant eye on public health issues during the year. It pledged to control the spread of AIDS and took aggressive measures to curb the threat posed by avian influenza (bird flu), including a plan to vaccinate all 14 billion of its poultry. The drastic move was intended to impede the spread of avian influenza and hopefully reduce human exposure to the virus. The world's largest poultry-producing nation, China had by year's end reported at least 30 outbreaks of bird flu in poultry in 2005 and at least three cases of bird-to-human infections, two of which resulted in death. Other antiflu measures taken by the government included the establishment of warning networks across the country and the stockpiling of antiviral drugs and other emergency supplies.

      One interesting phenomenon that had developed in China in the early 21st century was the rapidly increasing number of Chinese returning from abroad. Most of the estimated 200,000 Chinese who had returned in recent years had obtained academic degrees or concluded short-term academic training outside the country. Some of these had begun to assume prominent government and business positions in China. Among a long list of notable returnees were the People's Bank of China governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, and Education Minister Zhou Ji from the U.S.; the Chinese Academy of Sciences president, Lu Yongxiang, from Germany; and Science and Technology Minister Xu Guanhua from Sweden. Three foreign affairs vice ministers, Yang Jiechi, Zhang Yesui, and Zhou Wenzhong, had also returned from the U.K. These officials, all of whom were young and poised to take up challenges, were expected to have a broader worldview and greater practical knowledge of the West as well as to be generally more open to reform than the previous generation of leaders.

The Economy.
      China's economy continued to grow impressively, at 9.4% in the first quarter of 2005 and at more than 9% overall for the third consecutive year. There were still no ready answers, however, to the long-term energy shortage that China faced. As economic growth greatly boosted demand for electricity, the country experienced a third straight year of crippling power blackouts. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission reported a 25,000-MW shortfall during the summer, when electricity consumption typically peaked—though this was a marginal improvement over the 30,000-MW shortfall experienced the previous summer. Forecasts also indicated that China's demand for petroleum could rise 8% every year for the next quarter of a century. Although China accelerated oil and gas production in Xingjiang and other areas—and although PetroChina planned a $3.3 billion refinery expansion—close to half of the country's oil consumption continued to be met by imports.

      China searched for energy resources from East Africa to Central and Southeast Asia. China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. (Sinopec) signed a $300 million deal to develop natural gas resources in Saudi Arabia, near the huge Ghawar oil and gas field in the eastern region of the country. China also concluded a $70 billion deal with Iran to buy 250 million tons of natural gas over 30 years. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) purchased the Iranian subsidiary of Sheer Energy of Canada for $121 million, which gave CNPC a 49% stake in the Masjed Soleyman oil field. It also purchased PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian-owned company, for $4 billion. President Hu himself traveled to Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines on missions that were focused largely on securing energy supplies. China provided $6 billion to Russia in hopes of securing oil, and in May it signed a $600 million agreement on energy cooperation with Uzbekistan.

 After much speculation on the outside and preparation on the inside, the central bank made two significant currency reforms. One was to enlarge the span of currency fluctuation and allow the yuan to appreciate by more than 2%. The other was to adopt a new formula to valuate the yuan against a basket of foreign currencies instead of just the U.S. dollar. These foreign currencies included the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the South Korean won. The currencies of Singapore, Britain, Malaysia, Russia, Australia, Canada, and Thailand were also considered in setting the yuan's foreign exchange rate. As a result, the yuan was revaluated on July 21 to 8.11 per dollar from a long-standing trading point of 8.278 per dollar. The revaluation was preceded by a 20-minute floating of the yuan on April 29 and by Hong Kong's loosening its currency peg on May 19. China hitherto had had no experience of a floating yuan. Although the central bank might broaden the span of currency fluctuation in the future, currency liberalization was not on its reform agenda.

      In addition to these significant currency changes, China pressed ahead with reforms of its troubled banking system and markedly opened the door to foreign investment in its financial institutions. State-run banks were encouraged to list their shares abroad. Bank of Communications became the second Chinese bank—following the Bank of China—to list its operations on the Hong Kong exchange market. Bank of America acquired a 9% stake in the country's third largest lender, China Construction Bank. Dutch bank ING Group and British bank HSBC bought a 19.9% stake and a 20% stake, respectively, in the Bank of Beijing. An investor group led by the Royal Bank of Scotland and Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $3.1 billion to acquire a 10% stake in the Bank of China. American Express and a group of investors led by Goldman Sachs and Allianz Group signed a $3 billion deal to purchase a stake in Industrial & Commercial Bank of China. General Electric bought a 7% stake in Shenzhen Development Bank for $100 million, and Citigroup planned to raise its stake in Shanghai Pudong Development Bank to 20%.

      China continued to reform its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by planning to close down more than 2,000 debt-ridden SOEs in the next four years and transferring a limited number of state-held shares to the private market. In early May the government picked 4 companies for the pilot project of selling off state-held shares and then expanded that to 42 additional companies, including some of the country's largest. The number of private companies in China had increased tremendously since 1993, growing by an annual rate of 24% on average. In 2004 there were more than three million private companies in the country employing some 47 million workers.

Special Administrative Regions and Tibet.
       Macau's gaming industry continued to see explosive growth. Building upon his previous year's profits, gaming tycoon Stanley Ho, who controlled 15 of Macau's 17 casinos, planned to expand his operation by as much as 30%. Gaming revenue in Macau was forecast to rise 20% over the next four years as banks rushed to finance additional casino projects. Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers led the new round of financing. At least one project was expected to run up to $2.5 billion in loans and bond sales.

       Hong Kong democracy advocate Martin Lee continued his calls for the Chinese government to set a timetable for full democracy in the special administrative region. Lee voiced his concerns during trips to Europe and to the U.S., where he had a closed-door meeting in November with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He warned the secretary of state that “democracy is limping” in Hong Kong and that “we are not making any headway at all.” According to her spokesman, Rice told Lee that while the U.S. supported democracy and universal suffrage for Hong Kong, it would be up to the people of Hong Kong to “determine the pace and scope of political reform in accordance with the Basic Law.”

      In August the Chinese government held celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region. While members of a government delegation sent to Lhasa for a parade in the regional capital trumpeted the “tremendous changes” that had taken place in Tibet under Chinese rule, human rights activists decried policies in the region and labeled the celebrations a “major propaganda opportunity” for the government.

Foreign Relations.
 China strengthened regional cooperation (see Sidebar (China's Relations with Its Neighbours )) and expanded its economic diplomacy during the year. The second Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit was held in Kunming on July 4–5, with government leaders from China, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam participating. China agreed to lend Vietnam more than $1 billion for a series of projects. China promoted GMS cooperation as a first step toward building a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. President Hu visited Indonesia and signed nine agreements on April 25 to establish a “strategic partnership” and engage in more trade, investment, and maritime cooperation. During another year of active diplomacy, Hu also paid visits to Brunei, the Philippines, Russia, Kazakhstan, the U.K., the U.S., Canada, Mexico, North Korea, Vietnam, Germany, Spain, and South Korea.

      Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April and signed an agreement aimed at resolving a long-running dispute over the countries' shared Himalayan border, a territory that covered some 130,000 sq km (50,000 sq mi). The agreement followed a model of successful resolution between China and Russia over the eastern sector of their border that had been under dispute until 2004. Cooperation between China and Russia continued in 2005 in the form of joint military exercises beginning in August. Although the two states had participated in multilateral military exercises in the past, this was the first time that they had conducted bilateral drills. India also extended an invitation to China for joint military exercises.

      Beijing hosted the 2005 Korea-China Economic Conference, aimed at fostering “super economic cooperation in East Asia.” China and Australia launched free-trade negotiations in late May, while China continued to work on a free-trade agreement with New Zealand. China also signed a free-trade agreement with Chile in November.

      Joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 had bound China irreversibly in a global supply chain for industrial products. In the wake of its entry into the WTO, China experienced a considerable increase in its textile exports. China and the U.S. concluded protracted negotiations over restrictions on such exports during the year. Trade between China and South Korea surpassed $100 billion in 2005, and robust economic growth in both Russia and China was expected to lead to increased trade between those countries.

      Although China became Japan's number one trading partner, Sino-Japanese relations delved to perhaps their lowest point in 30 years. Early in 2005 Japan approved a set of new middle-school textbooks that in the eyes of many Asians justified and glorified its wartime wrongs. The textbooks offered little or no coverage of Japan's wartime atrocities. In addition, top Japanese leaders continued to make pilgrimages to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, where some two million of Japan's war dead were honoured, including 14 convicted Class A war criminals linked to atrocities committed during World War II. Mass protests were staged in all major cities in China. In August, as it joined 110 UN member states in blocking Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council, China charged that Japan was not mature enough to take leadership responsibilities in international affairs. Earlier in the year, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura had called China's criticism of visits to the war shrine “absurd” and accused China of ignoring Japan's pacifist record.

      U.S. Pres. George W. Bush paid a two-day visit to Beijing in November during a multicountry tour that included attendance at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit in Pusan, S.Kor. Although he called for greater human rights in China, Bush struck a generally conciliatory tone during his visit, reiterating the “one-China” policy of the U.S. government and focusing much of his discussions on economic matters. For its part China expressed its commitment to continuing to reform its currency, taking serious measures to crack down on violations of intellectual property rights, and pressuring North Korea to return to the six-party nuclear disarmament talks that it had abandoned in February.

      Among the Chinese politicians and government officials who died during the year were former vice president Rong Yiren , former mayor of Shanghai Wang Daohan , noted government reformer Ren Zhongyi , and Gang of Four member Yao Wenyuan . Death also claimed one of China's most famous writers, Ba Jin , prominent journalist and dissident Liu Binyan , and Roman Catholic cleric Zhang Bairen . (See Obituaries.)

Xiaobo Hu

▪ 2005

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2004 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,298,848,000
Chief of state:
President Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premier Wen Jiabao

      Three major questions dominated Chinese politics and economics in 2004: Could China complete its first peaceful transfer of political power? Could it successfully achieve a soft economic landing? Could the country play a constructive role in international politics? The Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided an indicator of how well the power transition had been completed. Economic indicators were scrutinized, with caution, to see how the national economy was faring. Success in international relations was mixed.

Domestic Politics.
      The transition of power from the third to the fourth generation of CPC leadership had begun with the 16th party Congress, when Jiang Zemin passed his title of CPC general secretary to party Political Bureau member and Vice Pres. Hu Jintao. In March 2003 Hu became president when Jiang retired, yet Jiang retained the key position of chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, or de facto head of the armed forces.

      Jiang and his associates were actively promoting old policies, which made for some confusion in Beijing. The policies and political styles of Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao were quite different from Jiang's. Jiang, for example, favoured rapid accumulation of national wealth, while Hu and Wen tended to pay more attention to a fair distribution of wealth. Because Chinese politics still operated in a “black box” environment, the security of the new leaders' jobs was not at all certain, and it was difficult for outsiders to ascertain who was really in power, since Jiang seemed to have maintained overall control over the military and possibly over state affairs generally. Some believed that Jiang had packed the membership of the Military Commission with his protégés, which could have gravely undermined the authority of the new leadership. In the event, however, the Fourth CC Plenum in September completed the transfer of power; Jiang resigned the Military Commission post; and Hu assumed control over the military. These events were remarkable in the history of Communist China in that they represented the first peaceful leadership succession. Party, state, and military power were all now securely in Hu's hands.

      In March the People's National Congress adopted landmark revisions to the 1982 constitution that would protect private property for the first time since the Communists took power in 1949—and thereby apparently abandoned one of the key pillars of communism. In other new text the state committed itself to respecting human rights. Weak and ambiguous wording, however, such as “A citizen's lawful private property is inviolable” and “The state respects and preserves human rights” did not lead one to believe these would now be the government's top priorities. Rather, the administration's immediate attention was given to problems in the countryside and to widespread official corruption.

      From 1998 to 2003 net income per capita increased 9% in urban areas but only 4.3% in rural areas. The government took steps to reduce farmers' taxes and rein in overinvestment that took away arable land from the farmers. Township and village administration were merged in order to reduce redundant layers, and 7,400 local government units were eliminated. After some 8,371 corrupt functionaries had fled the country in the first half of 2003, the government cracked down on other high-ranking officials, including the governor of Hubei province and the former minister of land and resources. Strengthening the party's governing capacity—even above administrative or political reform—was the central theme of Hu's first moves after Jiang's retirement. Hu claimed that by improving the selection and oversight of party officials, corrupt and incompetent officials could be kept out of office.

The Economy.
      China's quickly expanding but energy-poor economy was another serious challenge facing the new leadership. Much attention was given to the question of how to ensure a soft landing for the economy and improve the energy supply. Although China enjoyed a robust 9.1% GDP growth rate in 2003, it had to import about 50% of its crude oil to fuel the overheated manufacturing sector and residential demand. The demand for oil grew by 9% in 2003, double the 1992 level, and net oil imports in 2003 were more than twice the 1998 level. Oil imports rose by nearly 40% year-on-year in the first eight months of 2004. Even so, 24 out of 31 provinces, municipalities, and regions suffered from power blackouts in the first half of the year. Fiscal policy was tightened through a series of administrative regulations that were aimed at cooling investment, especially in such sectors as property development, automotive, steel, aluminum, and cement. More than 4,800 industrial development zones were shut down, and more than 1,300 sq km (500 sq mi) of land were returned to agricultural use. Investment grew 26% year-on-year in August, down from a 43% growth in the first quarter. Although the economic growth was as high as 9.8% in the first quarter and 9.6% in the second quarter, the government was expected to bring the overall figure for the year close to 8%. The growth in retail sales—especially in telecommunications equipment and household furniture—would ease the pressure on the economic austerity, and a soft landing was projected in 2005.

      To ensure smooth development, a long-overdue reform of the banking system was needed. At the beginning of 2004, the State Council injected $45 billion into the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank to encourage corporate reconstruction by transferring assets into stocks. The goal was to introduce hard budget constraint to the banking system and, among other results, to implement more fully the central “financial retrenchments” policy.

      GDP per capita exceeded $1,000 in 2004, and China faced a new growing pain; as the economy entered a “golden era of development,” social conflicts were expected to increase considerably. On the one hand, the better-developed coastal areas started to lose cheap labour and affordable land; on the other, increased wages put higher demand on housing, automobiles, education, leisure life, health care, and environmental protection. The increasing disparity between the advantaged and the disadvantaged in recent years had induced conflicting goals in government policies. The state had found it more difficult to satisfy different interest groups.

      A quarter century of economic reform had produced a sizable middle class. A report of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated that 19% of the population had entered the middle-level income stratum, with family income between 150,000 and 300,000 yuan (about $18,000 to $36,000). This group had steadily increased by 1% annually in recent years. Those who first entered the stratum included business people in science-and-technology-oriented sectors; professionals in legal, financial, security, insurance, and accounting services; managers and executives in multinational corporations; and successful private businessmen. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security launched a new plan of training 500,000 “blue-collar high-tech experts” in the coming three years in order to meet the rising demand for labour in the manufacturing and services sectors. This group would also join the middle class in the near future.

      Nonetheless, the labour market continued to face challenges from unemployment and the withering of the state economic sector. Reforms in the state sector continued to create surplus workers. The registered unemployment rate increased from 3.1% in 1998 to 4.2% in 2003. Among the 27.8 million workers laid off during this period of time, only 18.5 million had found new jobs. Under World Trade Organization regulations, the import of cheaper agricultural products would further reduce farmers' income and job opportunities in rural areas. It was estimated that there were 150 million rural workers who did not have full-time jobs, and these people continued to migrate to the cities and the south, where the economy was better.

Special Administrative Regions and Tibet.
      Vigourous new development in the gaming industry boosted revenue and employment in Macao. Beijing expected some $1.1 billion in tax revenues from the industry in 2004. When the government deregulated gambling, foreign investors were able to compete with local hotel and casino owners, and a plan was unveiled by Galaxy, a U.S.- Hong Kong syndicate, in December 2003 to build a $1.1 billion resort complex. Experts predicted that in the next few years, the 26.8-sq-km (10.3-sq-mi) area would attract $3.8 billion investment in the gaming industry, which was enjoying a high degree of autonomy under China's principle of “one country, two systems.” Elections in Hong Kong, however, ostensibly organized under the same “one country, two systems” principle, showed more controversy than freedom of choice. Beijing was accused of trying to influence the outcome, using tactics such as recruiting Chinese Olympic medalists to appear at events just before the election to present a positive image of the central government. In the event, the pro-Beijing camp won 34 out of 60 seats.

      Progress was made on resolving the status of Tibet. The Dalai Lama openly acknowledged that Tibet was a part of China and sent high-level envoys to Beijing in September to discuss the possibiliity of the Buddhist leader's return home.

Foreign Relations.
      A good relationship with the United States and a peaceful regional environment had been critical to China's rapid economic development. Ironically, however, the very pace of China's growth raised international concerns, which had the potential to undermine those very important pillars of Chinese foreign relations. In November 2003, speaking to the Boao Forum—an international symposium on the global economic future—Zheng Bijian, head of the Central Party School and senior adviser to President Hu, outlined a vision of China and Asia rising together in peace and prosperity. Premier Wen, visiting Harvard University a month later, introduced this “peaceful rise” concept to the American audience. Wen said that China “must more fully and more consciously depend on [its] own structural innovation, on constantly expanding the domestic market, on converting the huge savings of [its] citizens into investment, and on improving the quality of the population and scientific and technological progress to solve the problems of resources and the environment.” This strategy, Wen continued, was the “essence of China's relative peaceful rise and development.” Then President Hu, in his speech marking Mao Zedong's 110th birthday in December 2003 and, later, at a February 2004 “collective study” session held for the CCP Political Bureau, started to promote “peaceful development” as a state policy. At the annual United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) meeting in Shanghai in April 2004, Vice Pres. Zeng Qinghong explained to the participants that China would pursue grand cooperation and mutual benefits with other countries as its peaceful development strategy.

      Chinese scholars had conducted many systematic studies of historical precedents of rising powers—including the cases of pre- and post-World War II Japan and Germany—and determined how conflicts with other countries might be avoided. Government advisers emphasized the goal of a peaceful and cooperative China that would coordinate its own rapid economic growth with the needs of its neighbours in order to avoid drastic dislocations. According to this vision, China would promote an interdependent, rather than a competitive, relationship with its neighbours and the world. This notion aroused much skepticism in other countries, where analysts wondered how the world order could fail to be upset by rapid development in China. In reponse, many Chinese scholars maintained that China had already risen peacefully from its economic situation of a quarter century ago without military confrontation with any major powers.

      Foreign policy is always an extension of domestic politics, and a policy shift to “peaceful development” could certainly be expected to precipitate a political struggle in Beijing. Jiang and his associates sought to make the Taiwan case an exception to “peaceful development” and, more important, believed that no new policy was needed at all, since his thoughts on the “Three Represents doctrine” adequately addressed the themes of peaceful development. In mid-May, Jiang called for either a ban on the new concept or a redefinition of it along his old policy line.

      The new concept did present a significant shift in domestic and foreign policy. Jiang's group relied on nationalism and stressed the military need to ensure a prosperous and strong state. They also focused on the relationship with the U.S. to such an extent that it preempted comprehensive relations with other countries. With “peaceful development,” however, Hu and Wen aimed at gaining acceptance first from neighbouring countries. They had expended much energy on developing closer political, economic, and military relationships with other Asian powers, notably a joint military exercise to be held with Russia in 2005, dialogues and trade with Central Asian countries, and collective and bilateral regional agreements with Association of South East Asian Nations countries (an open-market agreement with ASEAN was signed on November 29).

      Although China had made a point of explaining how its growing economic strength would benefit the countries around it and once its border disputes with India, Vietnam, and Russia had been resolved, potentially serious territorial disputes emerged with Japan and the two Koreas. After Japan arrested seven Chinese activists who had landed on Diaoyu Island (known as Senkaku to the Japanese; about 300 km [180 mi] northeast of Taiwan), China called the arrest a violation of its sovereignty and demanded their immediate release. The ancient Koguryo kingdom flourished between 37 BC and AD 668 along the Yalu River, straddling what is now the Sino–North Korean border. Koguryo was considered the birthplace of the Korean nation but was claimed by China as a subordinate state that fell under the jurisdiction of the ancient Chinese dynasties.

      On two occasions in 2004, China made efforts to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. Not much progress was made, and the fourth round scheduled for the end of September was aborted owing to reluctance of North Korea and policy uncertainty in a presidential election year in the U.S.

      Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi met with U.S. Commerce Secretary Donald Evans in an effort to resolve a series of mutual trade problems. Agreement was reached on protection of intellectual property rights, high-technology transfers, and acceleration of plans to facilitate U.S. companies' exporting and selling directly to China. In addition, the two countries set up six working groups under the framework of the Sino-U.S. Joint Trade Commission on Commerce and Trade to study the Chinese market economy, Sino-U.S. trade resolutions, inspection of agricultural products, textile trade, intellectual property rights, and trade statistics. Newly appointed Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai also encouraged Chinese investment in foreign countries. The government considered making its foreign-exchange rates more flexible, which was one of the issues discussed at the Group of Seven summit in September 2004, the first time China had been invited to participate.

Xiaobo Hu

▪ 2004

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2003 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,288,892,000
Chief of state:
Presidents Jiang Zemin and, from March 15, Hu Jintao
Head of government:
Premiers Zhu Rongji and, from March 16, Wen Jiabao

      A new era in Chinese politics and economic development began in 2003. Three major domestic events highlighted the rough beginning of the leadership turnover. First, at the 10th National People's Congress in March, former Communist Party of China (CPC) general secretary Jiang Zemin passed the post of state presidency to CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao but retained the top military post. Second, the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic originated in China and quickly spread out of control, not only threatening public health worldwide but also wreaking political and economic havoc in China. Third Zhou Zhengyi, a business tycoon who had close ties with senior Shanghai officials, was arrested and placed under investigation for economic crimes. Internationally, the new leaders engaged in a fresh round of diplomatic visits and generally showed more involvement in international affairs.

Domestic Politics.
      As expected, Jiang Zemin stepped down from the Chinese presidency at the 10th National People's Congress in March 2003, although he kept control over the country's military authority and maneuvered to keep or put his protégés in key positions. Five men on the nine-member Political Bureau Standing Committee were close Jiang associates: Vice Pres. Zeng Qinghong, Chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo, State Council Vice-Premier Huang Ju, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin, and Li Changchun, the former CPC secretary of Guangdong province.

      Accordingly, the political events for much of the year were interpreted as a postsuccession struggle between Hu and Jiang and their respective protégés. Hu was typically cast as a progressive and a reformer, while Jiang's forces were seen as opposed to any political change. Hu and new Premier Wen Jiabao were believed to be practical men who favoured economic reforms to better the people's standard of living, while Jiang and his allies were viewed as doctrinaires who sought economic reforms that favoured the business elite.

      Hu worked to set his policy line apart from Jiang's. In December 2002 he took three opportunities to address issues that had been much neglected by his predecessor. During Hu's participation in the celebration of the 20th anniversary of China's constitution, he emphasized the authoritativeness of the constitution and the rule of law. In the following two days, Hu sought to establish his credentials as the champion of the poor when he paid a visit to Xibaipo, the site of a historical 1949 speech to the party faithful by Mao Zedong on the importance of serving the masses. Later in the month, he hosted the first study session of the Political Bureau to study the constitution. Hu reinterpreted Jiang's policy of “three represents”—that the CPC should represent the interests of all the people, including the business class, rather than just the working class—by emphasizing Mao's dictum “to be close to the masses.” For such public gestures intended to identify him with the old-time communist virtues of self-sacrifice and devotion to the downtrodden, Hu won praise from the party faithful and the public as well as from many intellectuals.

      The significance of the arrest of Shanghai business tycoon Zhou Zhengyi was multifaceted. It signaled that Shanghai upstarts were not immune from criminal prosecution and that the Shanghai proteges of former president Jiang might no longer be exempt from investigations into corruption and criminal misdeeds. The new administration sought to portray itself as a government for the masses. During the year the CPC Central Discipline and Inspection Commission sentenced or removed 10 senior government and party officials, ranging from governors to ministers. Two of them were sentenced to death and two others to life in prison.

      At midyear a senior labour-union official called for direct elections of local union bosses by factory workers, an arrangement that had not been seriously discussed for years. Moreover, a group of senior party officials wrote letters that urged Jiang to step down from all his positions. In June the main CPC publication, Seeking Truth, included an article calling for more democracy within the party. This would mean more transparency in decision making and more leeway for CPC cadres to pick leaders such as provincial and municipal party bosses. It was also regarded as a first step toward democracy for the whole country. In late July the same periodical carried another piece calling for democratic reform within the party through the setting up of standing committees at municipal and county levels to which CPC secretaries would report between annual party congresses. A few cities in Sichuan province experimented with regular meetings of party congresses, where deputies could exercise some form of supervision over party authorities.

      At about the same time, six articles that called for political reform ran in Study Times, a CPC publication put out by the Central Party School, and in early August an article appeared that called for party committees to stop influencing government agencies, an idea that had last been promoted before Jiang came to power.

      Wu Bangguo, the chairman of the National People's Congress, chaired a special committee on constitutional reform that considered two main additions to the current constitution—one a provision protecting private property and the other an enshrining of Jiang's “three represents.” If the “three represents” were to be written into the constitution, Jiang's legacy (and the influence of his group) would be secured, and he would be accorded a status almost equivalent to that of the other two paramount Chinese leaders, Mao and Deng Xiaoping. In late June leading academics and a few government officials held a conference on constitutional reform, openly criticizing the “three represents.” In late summer, after having given the intellectuals some latitude in discussing these reforms, the CPC ordered a cessation of the discussions. At the end of the year the CPC formally called for protection of private property and the theory of the “three represents” to be included in the constitution.

      In September the authorities announced cuts of 200,000 troops, including 200 generals, within the next two years in order to reduce the size of the army to about 2.3 million. The reform was said to be needed in order to accelerate the modernization of the army. As chairman of the Central Military Commission, Jiang described the move as part of a worldwide trend in military reform in which the focus was shifting from mechanized warfare to information warfare. The announcement came after China had announced a 10% increase in its annual defense budget in March. On December 15 China issued a terrorist list that included 4 Muslim separatist groups in Xinjiang province and 11 individuals.

Hong Kong.
      Political turmoil engulfed Hong Kong in 2003 when the territory's chief executive had to postpone a vote in the legislature over a controversial security bill. The most objectionable provision would have allowed the government to ban in Hong Kong groups that had links to any organization that for national security reasons Beijing had prohibited from operating in the rest of China. Mass popular demonstrations, with more than 500,000 participants in one instance, the resignation from the cabinet of the leader of a pro-government political party, and the big victory for pro-democracy candidates in the November local elections underlined the seriousness of the issues and the determination of the Hong Kong populace to have a voice in the territory's governance.

SARS and the Economy.
      The new leaders faced their first major test when SARS broke out, first in Guangdong and Hong Kong and later spreading to the entire country and many parts of the world. The first cases of SARS were detected at the end of 2002, but the Chinese government underestimated the severity of the disease and then, during the national political conferences, tried to cover up its own inaction. Hu and Wen were forced to take up the challenge by themselves. Partially as a result of the initial cover-up, the total death toll in China reached 349. (See Health and Disease: Special Report (What's Next After SARS? ).)

      SARS caused political and economic casualties as well. Zhang Wenkang, the minister of health and Jiang's longtime personal physician, and Meng Xuenong, the newly elected mayor of Beijing, were sacked. By the end of May, some 1,000 officials nationwide had been removed from their posts for negligence or incompetence. The economic effects of SARS were devastating; airline earnings were in free fall, with April–June earnings only 20% of second-quarter 2002 figures. According to estimates by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in early June, more than one million jobs were lost, especially in transportation, wholesale and retail trade, and food services. The national tourist bureau reported the first decrease in tourism since 1989 and estimated that in 2003 China would lose $8.8 billion in tourism revenue from foreign sources and an additional $24.5 billion from domestic sources. One additional suspected SARS case in late December elicited a quick response from Chinese officials.

      Recurring natural disasters added to Beijing's economic woes. The flooding of the Huai River, traditionally one of China's problem waterways, affected the lives of 100 million people in 16 provinces and caused the death of more than 300 people as well as some $2.2 billion in damages.

      At the national level, for the first time the Chinese government openly acknowledged the problem of the disparity in the population's income distribution. It was reported that the Gini coefficient (a measure of income distribution in a society by which 0 = perfect equality and 1 = perfect inequality) in China was 0.282 in 1991, 0.456 in 1998, 0.457 in 1999, and 0.458 in 2000; the ratio had increased 1.62 times within a decade and seemed to be steadily rising.

      Facing the economic slowdown caused by the outbreak of SARS and other potentially explosive economic problems, the State Council took five new measures to advance economic development. These focused on troubled industries, smaller enterprises, and the less-privileged population and sought to stimulate domestic demand, expand exports, and revitalize the traditional industrial base. The proclamation of a new ordinance regarding asset management in state-owned enterprises set the stage for a new round of economic reform.

      In early July the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a leading research institution, reported that a GDP growth rate of 8% was still possible. It predicted a 14.5% increase in fixed-assets investment, a 7.9% rise in urban personal income, and a 3.7% increase in rural personal income. The consumer price index was expected to rise only 0.3%, with exports up 14.1% and revenue growth of 15.8%. The academy's optimism was confirmed in November by the IMF, which predicted GDP growth of 8.5%. In addition, the successful launch of the Shenzhou V manned spaceship marked a new era of progress and self-confidence for China.

Foreign Relations.
      Active diplomacy characterized Chinese foreign relations during the year. Hu and U.S. Pres. George W. Bush met at international events in France (June 1) and Thailand (October 19), and they exchanged views on northeastern Asian security, the war on terrorism, bilateral trade, and the Taiwan issue. Much to the satisfaction of China, during both meetings Bush upheld the “one-China” policy of the U.S. government, although he also reiterated the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. Amid Taiwan's call for a “defensive referendum” against the mainland's display of missiles, Prime Minister Wen's visit to the U.S. in December reconfirmed Bush's support of mainland China's position. Both governments seemed satisfied that bilateral political relations were as good as they had been in 30 years.

      China-U.S. trade relations were not so rosy, however. China received a frontal attack from the U.S. on its rigid foreign-currency exchange rates, which the U.S. considered unfair terms of trade. Washington first insisted that Beijing float its exchange rates but later softened its demands. There were some indications that not all American businesses supported an inflexible U.S. trade policy toward China. In accordance with World Trade Organization regulations, China lowered its wall against American cars and car parts; imports of 15,000 cars and trucks as well as more than $1 billion in parts from Big-Three American automakers were to be allowed. In addition, China dispatched three “shopping” delegations to the U.S. and purchased American products worth more than $6 billion, including Boeing planes, airplane engines, and automobiles. At the end of the year, however, after the U.S. imposed more trade restrictions on Chinese textiles, a planned fourth shopping spree, which was to include the purchase of soybeans, cotton, fertilizers, and electronics, was canceled.

      As the nuclear crisis in North Korea intensified in the spring, China offered assistance in resolving the skirmish between the U.S. and North Korea. China suspended crucial oil shipments to North Korea, sent high-level envoys to Pyongyang, and arranged tripartite talks in Beijing. Amid deepening pessimism, Beijing took the further step of hosting high-level six-party talks involving a dialogue between North Korea and the U.S., Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China. China's worries included both a nuclear North Korea and hawks in Washington, but it wanted to play “honest broker” in the crisis. After the first rounds of talks, Chinese officials shuttled between Pyongyang and Washington to guarantee that the dialogue would continue.

      The two largest Asian states, historical adversaries, took steps to put 40 years of distrust and diplomatic stalemate behind them. In June, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. India officially accepted China's definition of Tibet as a part of China and agreed not to permit “anti-China activities” by Tibetans who were living in India (notably the Dalai Lama, who resided with his entourage at Dharamsala, India). China in turn agreed to open trade with India's northeastern region via Sikkim, a development that India viewed as an affirmation of its sovereignty over the mountainous border state. Later that month Vajpayee called for India to form a partnership with China in the information-technology industry. Trade between India and China had grown apace in recent years but remained at modest levels in comparison with China's trade with the U.S., Japan, and the European Union. Finally, the two countries made naval history in 2003 by launching their first-ever joint naval exercises, off the coast of Shanghai.

      China continued to craft good relationships with all five former Soviet Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The Shanghai Group forum, comprising Russia and all of those countries except Turkmenistan, met in China, and all but Uzbekistan participated in joint military exercises on the China-Kazakhstan border.

Xiaobo Hu

▪ 2003

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2002 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau): 1,284,211,000
Chief of state:
President Jiang Zemin
Head of government:
Premier Zhu Rongji

      The year 2002 was a critical one for China. Domestically, it was a year of political transition to a new generation of leaders; internationally, significant changes in geopolitical alignments had major repercussions for the country. The 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), after some delay, was convened in early November. China's “Three Represents” doctrine was affirmed, and the recruitment of private business owners into the party gained acceptance. Three Represents referred to the CPC's stated mission to represent three essential concerns: the development needs of the country, China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the Chinese people. In February, U.S. Pres. George W. Bush traveled to Beijing—his second trip to China within four months. His visit marked the 30th anniversary of the first U.S. presidential visit to China, which had begun the normalization of relations between the two countries. China reciprocated with two heavyweight visits to the U.S., first by Vice Pres. Hu Jintao (see Biographies (Hu Jintao )) and then by Pres. Jiang Zemin.

Politics and the Economy.
      The months before the start of the 16th Congress were filled with speculation regarding the anticipated political transition in China. Three officials were considered as possible successors to Jiang: Hu, Zeng Qinghong, and Li Ruihuan. Hu was considered the preeminent figure among the next generation of Chinese leaders. He had been promoted by legendary paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (who had also promoted Jiang to the top leadership position in the wake of the military crackdown on the 1989 student-led pro-democracy movement). Hu held three pivotal positions; he was a standing member of the CPC Political Bureau and the first vice-chairman of the CPC Central Military Affairs Commission as well as the Chinese vice president. Like Hu, Zeng was seen as one of Jiang's political protégés, but he held only an alternate membership in the Political Bureau—two ranks below the standing members. Li had been chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and was a longtime standing member of the Political Bureau. In terms of his background, Li belonged to Jiang's generation of leaders, but he was “young enough”—69 years of age—to serve for another term in office. Working against Li, however, was his reported opposition to some of Jiang's major policies.

      Although Hu was widely regarded as Jiang's designated successor, a rumour circulated at the beginning of the year that Jiang would not, in fact, step down at the upcoming Congress. Apparently as a prelude to taking control upon Jiang's retirement, Hu had inserted followers in top positions in Shanghai and Guangdong. Upon learning of this maneuver, Jiang was reportedly upset and told his close aides that he would not step down that year.

      The party Congress, usually scheduled every five years and held in September, was postponed until early November in part because of the difficulties that the top leaders had in reaching a consensus on succession. As November approached, there was a strange absence of public promotion of Hu's leadership.

      The result of the party Congress surprised some but not others. Jiang ensured that the Congress's proceedings were carefully scripted to focus on his achievements in the 13 years since he became party chief. As Jiang stepped down from the position of party general secretary, Hu was elected to succeed him. The new Political Bureau consisted of only those younger than 70 years old and was dominated by technocrats—18 of 25 full and alternate members were engineers and 5 of them had received degrees from China's premier scientific and technological institution, Tsinghua University. Li retired from the party's Central Committee. The standing committee of the Political Bureau was expanded from seven members to nine, and Hu was the only remaining member of the previous standing committee. Among the eight new standing members, six were believed to be Jiang's protégés, including Zeng.

      More important, Jiang maintained his position as the chairman of the CPC Central Military Affairs Commission. During the 1980s Deng had been able to exercise his power over the party's general secretary by holding just this position after he had given up all other official titles. Such a decision clearly pointed more toward continuity than toward change. If changes were to be made, they would fall within Jiang's framework.

      Though not all expectations were met, fundamental changes did take place at the Congress. The Three Represents doctrine was included in the party constitution, and some liberal programs were initiated at lower levels within the party structure. The pronouncements issued during the Congress suggested that the party indeed remained committed to a middle-class agenda: maintaining high growth and social stability, encouraging private enterprises, breaking up government monopolies, and respecting private rights. The party was expected to be ever more pro-private business.

      In 1997 the 15th Congress of the CPC had concluded with expectations that the 16th Congress would be much more open-minded in regard to political and economic reform. The new leadership that emerged in 2002, however, would be cautious in its transformation of Chinese politics because it first had to consolidate its power base before launching any substantial programs. Nonetheless, the new leaders were presented with a historic opportunity to pursue further political and economic reform at home and engage in promoting international peace abroad.

      Along with a changing of the guard in the party leadership, the CPC itself continued to search for what it stood for. Responding to a mounting identity crisis that had swept through its ranks in the past few years, the CPC had begun searching aggressively for a new set of principles to define its future and for reforms to ensure its relevance and survival in an increasingly market-oriented, pluralistic society.

      Encouraging private business ranked high among those reforms. The number of private enterprises in China had reached more than two million by the beginning of 2002. At the annual People's Political Consultative Conference in March, China's Chamber of Commerce reiterated its call for the constitutional protection of private properties. The Three Represents doctrine justified the inclusion of capitalists—private owners—in the CPC.

      Efforts continued at all levels of government to crack down on corruption and on the activities of the outlawed spiritual movement Falun Gong. Institutional corruption was considered a threat to party rule from the inside, while Falun Gong was viewed as a threat from the outside. In the first six months of 2002, according to one Chinese newspaper, 555 government officials were arrested on corruption charges, including one banking chief suspected of having laundered some $730 million—the largest amount in any single money-laundering case in China's history. A new campaign to discredit Falun Gong also got under way, with authorities accusing it of being an “evil cult” that posed a challenge to “modern civilization.” Authorities were particularly incensed by an incident on March 5 in which Falun Gong members hijacked state television broadcasts to air antigovernment messages. Fifteen members were charged in the incident and received prison sentences of between 4 and 20 years.

      China's economy enjoyed another year of strong growth, with the gross domestic product rate surpassing government forecasts to reach 7.9% after the first three quarters. Chinese exports were up nearly 20% at that time, while foreign investment was up 22.6%. These numbers helped confirm China as Asia's fastest-growing economy. On the negative side, however, economic reforms had produced more than six million laid-off workers, and it was estimated that—following China's accession to the World Trade Organization—there would be another five million workers terminated from their jobs in five years. As a control mechanism over the macro economy, the state limited the freedom of newly privatized enterprises to lay off workers. This was a new paradox for China. On the one hand, without such state intervention, the new enterprises would improve their productivity by firing surplus labour, which could increase the chance of social unrest—which in turn would worsen the environment for investment and development. On the other hand, such intervention rendered privatization incomplete; private owners and investors wondered how far the state would go in order to maintain a “healthy environment” for investment at the expense of a sound property rights system.

Foreign Relations.
      China began the year with active diplomacy. Within the first month of 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited two countries, while President Jiang had talks with the heads of an additional six states. Aside from his visit to the U.S., Jiang also visited six more countries in June, and Li Peng, chairman of the National People's Congress, made visits to multiple foreign countries as well.

      Contrary to the rocky relationship the previous year between China and the U.S., the two countries seemed to find some common ground amid mutual suspicion in 2002. While the post-September 11 American economy continued its downward slide, U.S. investment in China remained the largest among all foreign direct investments. Some 300 of the 500 largest American companies had investments in China. The two-way trade between China and the U.S. surged 11.7% during the first half of the year.

      With an extensive national border and 15 neighbouring countries, China had been long afraid of encirclement by other powers. Such a fear was reinforced by the reaction of the U.S. to the events of Sept. 11, 2001. American efforts against terrorism had included the establishment of bases in several Central Asian states adjacent to Afghanistan. China worried that these temporary bases might stretch into a long-term presence that would prevent China from normalizing relations with these states. Beijing's uneasiness was compounded when the Bush administration announced that the war against terrorism would be expanded to such countries as North Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

      Perceptions that the post-September 11 campaign against terrorism was being used as an excuse for imposing American hegemony worldwide were exacerbated by a classified U.S. Department of Defense document leaked to the Los Angeles Times in March. The document recommended a contingency plan for nuclear strikes in which seven countries, including China, were possible targets. Another irritant was the visit of Taiwan's defense minister to a conference in Florida, again in March, where he met with the U.S. deputy secretary of defense. As far as was publicly known, this constituted the highest-level defense contact between the U.S. and Taiwan since Washington broke formal relations with Taipei in 1979. In addition, the media reported on the likelihood of increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Shortly after assuming office in 2001, President Bush had stated that he would do “whatever it took” to help the island repel an invasion by the mainland. China remained determined on reunification with Taiwan.

      China had indicated to the U.S. that, in the campaign against international terrorism, the best way for China to contribute was to fight on its own domestic front—i.e., against Muslim separatists in its northwestern regions. Washington downplayed the threat from Chinese Muslim separatists at first but later added the group to its list of foreign terrorist organizations.

      Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's April 21 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo—the site dedicated to more than two million military personnel lost since the 1850s—infuriated Beijing. China's Foreign Ministry issued a statement vehemently denouncing the visit to the shrine, “which honours Class A war criminals” and was “a symbol of militarism.” It was Koizumi's second visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in a year. Beijing promptly summoned Japan's ambassador to China to criticize “the erroneous action that damages ties” between the two nations. The incident alone could prevent the two neighbouring countries from developing a closer, more productive relationship. The fact that Japan was talking about participating in a joint missile defense program with the U.S. also aroused suspicion. China worried that these developments pointed to a revival of Japanese militarism.

      Later in the year there were signs of a possible settlement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama regarding the latter's relationship with Tibet. Representatives of the exiled leader made a visit to Beijing in September; the trip marked the first formal contact between the two sides since 1993. There was no immediate word on whether the subject of reopening official ties had been broached during the visit.

Xiaobo Hu

▪ 2002

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan and the special autonomous regions of Hong Kong and Macau
(2001 est., excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau): 1,274,915,000
Chief of state:
President Jiang Zemin
Head of government:
Premier Zhu Rongji

      Three external events diverted the attention of the Chinese government and people from their primary focus on domestic affairs in 2001. The first was a contretemps with the U.S. in April over the crash of a Chinese military jet after a midair collision with an American surveillance plane over the South China Sea. The second was the International Olympic Committee's decision in July to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing. The third was the cataclysmic September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. that presented China with an opportunity to get in step with the global campaign to combat terrorism. For the most part, however, China focused inward on the formidable task of maintaining domestic prosperity, the indispensable precondition for stability in a system perennially threatened by social divisions, ethnic fragmentation, endemic corruption, and political fatigue. As the global economy slowed even before September 11, China managed to sustain a still-impressive rate of economic growth, though it was lower than in previous years.

Politics and the Economy.
      The ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) continued to prepare for its 16th Congress in 2002 , at which time Pres. Jiang Zemin, National People's Congress head Li Peng, and Premier Zhu Rongji were slated to retire from their party posts. The 75-year-old Jiang was almost certain to retain his chairmanship of the vital Central Military Commission, however, and to wield considerable behind-the-scenes influence over his designated successor, Hu Jintao, as long as he remained in good health. Meanwhile, Political Bureau member Li Ruihuan, a relative moderate who was several years younger than the members of the ruling troika, successfully resisted pressure from party conservatives to join Jiang, Li, and Zhu in retirement.

      For 20 years, while brooking no organized political opposition, the CPC had struggled to regain the authority and prestige it once enjoyed. The party's internal corruption and the effects of rapid social and economic change in Chinese society had called into question the CPC's leading role and eroded its legitimacy. In order to bring in new blood, on July 1, the CPC's 80th anniversary, Jiang called on the party to open its ranks to the once-reviled capitalists, who had been responsible for most of China's economic growth since the mid-1980s. Old-guard party members, faithful to Karl Marx's dictum that communist parties were the political instrument of the proletariat (working class), gagged at this bold initiative to recruit members of the “class enemy,” but Jiang brushed aside all objections and shut down an orthodox party theoretical journal that dared to question his decision. In September the Central Committee dutifully endorsed Jiang's proposal to revise the party constitution and thereby opened the door for capitalists to enter the CPC. Many were eager to join because of the enhanced political access party membership conferred.

      Earlier in the year the first CPC Work Conference since 1988—attended by 2,000 top officials—endorsed the leadership's campaign to suppress the Falun Gong and reaffirmed once again the leadership's decision 12 years earlier to crush the spring 1989 student-led democracy movement. This may have been in response to the publication, first in English in the U.S. and later in Chinese in Hong Kong, of The Tiananmen Papers. Edited by American scholars Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, this documentary collection was the authenticated secret record of high-level CPC discussions that culminated in the decision to use lethal force against unarmed demonstrators on June 3–4, 1989 (the Tiananmen Square massacre). The book cast many of the party's old guard, including then premier Li Peng and paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, in a particularly unflattering light. Additional secret evidence concerning this still-controversial decision leaked out in the course of the year and fed Beijing's paranoia that Washington was trying to split the CPC and overturn communism in China. In December 2000 the defection of a senior Chinese military officer, Col. Xu Junping, to the U.S. caused Beijing additional embarrassment.

      After four years as a special administrative region of China, Hong Kong felt the collar of Chinese control tighten ever so slowly around its neck. Such at least was the perception among that section of Hong Kong public opinion concerned with defending the autonomy promised at the time of the handover in 1997. In July, Hong Kong's Legislative Council, chosen in elections that favoured elite occupational groups over direct popular representation, voted by a 2–1 margin to give Beijing the right to fire the chief executive. This seemingly small action enhanced the power of Chinese central authorities responsible for selecting Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, who had proved to be a faithful, if locally unpopular, executor of Beijing's wishes.

      Like an indelible stain on the fabric of Chinese society, the reality of Chinese human rights abuses continued to resist Beijing's detergent action. In late November 2000, during a visit by Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who was openly critical of China's human rights record, China signed an agreement providing for UN advice and assistance to upgrade its criminal justice system, including the police, legal procedures, courts, and prisons. The effects, if any, of this and similar prior expressions of China's intention to bring its human rights practices into conformity with international norms and practices were not evident during 2001. In February, Amnesty International, the bellwether international human rights organization, issued a report alleging that China was stepping up its use of torture in police interrogations of dissidents, Tibetan nationalists, migrants, and other criminal defendants. As always, Chinese authorities rejected this report, as they did the U.S. State Department's annual review of human rights that said the human rights situation in China was getting worse. To deal with rising social discontent, Beijing instructed Chinese municipal authorities to beef up their antiriot police units, which, along with the million-strong People's Armed Police, were the instruments of first choice to deal with the contingency of urban riots, worker and student strikes, and other threats to public order. The police and paramilitary assault on the village of Yuntang in Jiangxi province demonstrated that such preparations were more than contingency planning. Villagers in Yuntang, unable to get relief from exorbitant taxes levied by local officials, seized and held control of their village until overwhelmed by lethal force from outside. Such popular indignation was widespread, and the default response of authorities was more likely to be the application of force than the satisfaction of grassroots demands for equity and social justice.

      For several years Beijing had targeted pervasive networks of corruption that linked venal local officials with unscrupulous entrepreneurs. Despite massive arrests and numerous well-publicized public executions, corruption persisted and exacted not only an economic cost but also a heavy toll on ordinary workers. For example, when safety inspectors ignored hazardous working conditions and failed to enforce safety standards in unsafe local mines, thousands of miners paid with their lives, as happened again in 2001. Children were also victimized. In a case that drew international attention and provoked some soul-searching on the part of Premier Zhu Rongji, 42 people, including 38 schoolchildren, were killed in an explosion in a Fanglin township (Jiangxi province) primary school whose pupils were forced to make fireworks as part of their regular activities. (See Disasters .)

      In their ongoing campaign against Falun Gong, the eclectic Buddhist-influenced meditation and exercise association that was outlawed in 1999 as a supposed threat to public order, Chinese authorities added psychiatric internment—an old Soviet tactic for dealing with dissidents—to their familiar repertoire of arrests, beatings, incarceration, torture, and coercive reeducation. On June 20 at least 14 Falun Gong prisoners either hanged themselves or were tortured to death in a prison camp in northern Heilongjiang province. The apparent effect of President Jiang's quixotic but brutal campaign to destroy the Falun Gong had been to weaken the organization considerably and drive it underground. There it was likely to survive in the minds of the hardcore faithful who were condemned to wait for a more propitious time to affirm and practice their faith in public.

      The arrest and detention of American permanent resident Gao Zhan, a sociologist, and Li Shaomin, a naturalized American citizen teaching in Hong Kong, on charges of revealing state secrets indicated the bureaucratic power of China's Ministry of State Security. Their detention sent a chill through the large community of overseas Chinese students and scholars, particularly in the U.S. Under pressure from the U.S. government and Western scholars, Gao and Li were expelled from China after being convicted in dubious trials. Less fortunate was Stanford research scholar Hua Di, who—though his 15-year prison sentence on similar charges was overturned—was retried and received a 10-year sentence.

      Environmental concerns commanded the attention of policy makers and the public in a country whose huge population and rapid industrialization had pressed against the limits of natural resources, particularly water, wood, and air. China made some progress in curbing emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and nitrous oxide. The switchover from coal to natural gas and the ongoing conversion of Beijing's bus and taxi fleet from diesel fuel and gasoline to liquefied petroleum gas contributed to the amelioration of the air in the capital city. Beijing announced plans to address the severe water shortage affecting all of northern China by encouraging less-water-intensive agricultural practices, shutting factories that polluted groundwater and surface water, and constructing new sewage-treatment plants.

      The determination of national and municipal officials to improve Beijing's environment was motivated in part by the desire to show the city's best face to the world. The new bicycle under the Christmas tree that China had long been hoping for finally arrived in the form of a decision by the International Olympic Committee, meeting in Moscow in July, to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing. Upon receiving the news, jubilant Communist Party and government leaders as well as ordinary citizens joined in a rare spontaneous mass celebration in Tiananmen Square. In this connection Beijing unveiled plans to invest $34 billion in new stadiums, parks, transportation systems, housing, and pollution-abatement measures.

      According to official statistics, China's gross domestic product grew by 7.9% in the first half of the year, with domestic demand, accounting for fully 93% of growth, the primary engine of expansion. At the end of the third quarter, consumer prices had risen a modest 1%, and foreign exchange reserves stood at $195.8 billion. China's currency was stable, but its trade balance, while still positive, declined by $5.6 billion compared to the previous year at that point. Long-standing problems of liquidity and bad loans in the banking system and the mammoth task of converting state-owned enterprises into profitable firms remained mostly unresolved. However, these problems loomed ever larger as the World Trade Organization finally certified China for membership following 15 years of difficult multilateral negotiations that culminated in agreement in mid-September.

Foreign Relations.
      A decade earlier Chinese leaders had greatly valued the pragmatism of then U.S. president George H.W. Bush, who cooperated with them to stabilize Sino-American relations after the shock of Tiananmen. They were understandably leery, however, of the new U.S. president, George W. Bush. The younger Bush not only lacked foreign policy experience but also had surrounded himself with advisers who for the most part viewed China as a strategic adversary that threatened American interests and the U.S.'s friends in Asia, including Taiwan. An unfortunate aerial confrontation over the South China Sea on April 1 near China's southernmost province of Hainan sorely tested Sino-American relations just three months into the new Bush administration. While on a routine patrol over international waters off the South China coast, a lumbering, propeller-driven American EP-3 surveillance plane, crammed with sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment, collided with one of two Chinese jet fighters that were shadowing its flight. Washington claimed that the daredevil Chinese pilot had approached too closely and struck the American craft; Beijing countered that the U.S. plane had deliberately veered into the path of the Chinese fighter. Badly damaged, the EP-3 made an arguably unauthorized emergency landing at a Chinese military airfield on Hainan Island, where the 24-person crew was taken into custody by Chinese authorities. The Chinese F-8 jet involved in the collision crashed into the sea. The Chinese government and media immediately transformed the missing pilot, Wang Wei, into a national hero who had sacrificed his life for the motherland. As Chinese anti-American sentiment reached fever pitch, expressed, among other ways, in vituperative postings on Chinese Internet chat rooms, Beijing demanded that Washington admit responsibility for the incident and offer a public apology before it would release the sequestered crew members. American public opinion was equally incensed. After a shaky start, Chinese and American officials eventually agreed on a carefully worded official U.S. statement whose linguistic legerdemain enabled Beijing to claim it was an American apology and Washington to deny that it was anything of the sort. After 11 days of detention, the crew was released in good condition, and the disassembled U.S. plane, which Chinese intelligence officers had carefully examined, was eventually returned to its home base. Tempers abated, but many Chinese criticized their government for caving in to the Americans.

      Later in April Beijing again had occasion to censure Washington for President Bush's decision to supply Taiwan with many, though not all, of the items on its high-tech military shopping list deemed necessary to preserve a rough military balance of power across the Taiwan Strait in the face of Beijing's military modernization and offensive ballistic-missile buildup. Speaking extemporaneously, President Bush said the U.S. “would do whatever it took” to defend Taiwan, although his advisers quickly asserted that there had been no change in the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity regarding what Washington would do in the event of a Chinese attack on the island, which Beijing claimed as its inalienable territory. In an August interview with executives of the New York Times, President Jiang tried to defuse tension by speaking soothingly of the bright prospects for good relations with the U.S. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, China expressed condolences and offered verbal support to the U.S.-led antiterrorist coalition. The reduction or elimination of Islamic fundamentalist terror networks in Central Asia would help ease Beijing's worries regarding the vast northwestern province of Xinjiang, where small groups of Uighur militants, supported from across the border, had challenged Chinese power.

      These ups and downs in Sino-American relations bracketed a major Chinese effort to consolidate its relations with Russia. Beijing and Moscow shared a common strategic interest in containing the further extension of American power, and China was Russia's largest customer for high-performance Russian military aircraft and other equipment. At a summit meeting in Moscow in July, Jiang and Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin signed a new “strategic partnership” that fell well short of a military alliance but nevertheless enhanced cooperation between the two countries. Among other things, Russia agreed to sell China 38 SU-30 ground attack fighters worth $2 billion.

Steven I. Levine

▪ 2001

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan (See Taiwan, (Taiwan ) below.)
(2000 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,265,207,000
Chief of state:
President Jiang Zemin
Head of government:
Premier Zhu Rongji

      China entered the year 2000 encumbered with a 19th-century ideology and a mid-20th-century industrial plant but was nevertheless determined to become one of the world's leading powers in the 21st century. There was good reason to suppose that such an ambitious goal lay within reach. During the course of the year, however, the Chinese government found itself struggling with a number of long-standing problems. Among them were managing the increasingly complex economy, curbing corruption, maintaining domestic order, keeping pressure on Taiwan, and preventing further deterioration in relations with the U.S. Even as Pres. Jiang Zemin focused on establishing his historical legacy, the celebratory mood of 1999—when the Communist Party of China (CPC) marked its 50th year in power—gave way to more sober, though still mostly optimistic, assessments of the future.

Politics and the Economy.
      Since Deng Xiaoping's break with the Maoist command economy in the 1980s, pervasive corruption had been the handmaiden of economic reform in China. Rejecting the approach afforded by an open press and a competitive political system, the government and the CPC renewed their joint assault on corruption through a series ofhigh-profile trials that targeted officials just below the top echelons of power. In September, Cheng Kejie, former Guangxi provincial governor and vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, was executed after being convicted of having accepted nearly $5 million in bribes and having illegally sold state land. His mistress, Li Ping, received a life sentence for her role in the scandal. The official People's Daily newspaper thundered, “There is no place for corrupt elements to hide in the party,” and “all citizens are equal before the law.” Each of these propositions had yet to be consistently demonstrated.

      An even more massive corruption scandal involving billions of dollars and some 200 officials wound its way through the courts of coastal Fujian province. The former vice-minister of public security, Li Jizhou, and the former police chief, vice-mayor, and head of the customs service in Xiamen city were among the accused. Earlier, the former vice-governors of Jiangxi and Guangxi provinces were executed for corruption. In May, Mou Qizhong, once publicly lauded as a leading Chinese entrepreneur, was sentenced to life imprisonment for financial fraud. The National Audit Office instituted a new policy of routinely inspecting the accounts of all retiring high-ranking officials for evidence of financial improprieties. At the popular level, an exhibition showcasing successful government efforts to combat corruption drew large crowds in Beijing. These campaigns signified renewed strength within the CPC of old- and new-guard leftists who viewed corruption as an inevitable consequence of Deng-era capitalist reforms, of which they disapproved.

      Two years before his scheduled retirement from the state presidency in 2003, Jiang Zemin, who also doubled as CPC general secretary and chair of the party's Central Military Commission, attempted to burnish his reputation as a party theorist by enunciating the so-called Three Represents. Jiang asserted that the CPC had always represented three essential concerns: China's development needs, the country's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the Chinese people. This was an unsubtle expression of Jiang's determination to justify the party's exclusive hold on power in a society that in so many ways had already outgrown the restrictive framework of party rule. While further promoting Hu Jintao as his designated successor, Jiang also favoured CPC Organization Department chief Zeng Qinghong, who was expected to become a member of the inner Political Bureau Standing Committee in 2002. Meanwhile, Jiang appointed three younger generals, Cao Gangchuan, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou, to take over day-to-day management of the armed forces from the elderly Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian.

      Political and religious repression continued to be a hallmark of Jiang's administration. Beneath their facade of self-assurance, government officials were anxious about social stability. For years one locus of unrest had been Xinjiang province, where a militant minority among the nine million Uygurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim people, had resorted to force in their campaign to overturn Chinese rule. With sporadic violence continuing in Xinjiang, Beijing initiated a massive effort in March to accelerate the economic development of China's vast western region, including not only Xinjiang but also Tibet, Sichuan province, and several other economically depressed provinces. The western development project shifted state investment priorities away from the prosperous coastal provinces to the lagging interior, where poverty remained a major problem. Even if these long-term efforts succeeded, they would not necessarily undercut separatist appeals, which fed on religious and cultural grievances no less than on economic ones. Meanwhile, Tibet continued to bear the brunt of heavy-handed Chinese rule as restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture were tightened. The Dalai Lama charged that Beijing was pursuing a policy of cultural genocide. In January Beijing suffered a major humiliation with the spectacular flight to India of the young Karmapa Lama, who was received by the Dalai Lama and allowed to remain in India despite Chinese protests. Beijing had counted on the previously docile Karmapa Lama to help it implement its Tibetan policy.

      Beijing's crackdown on Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that blended elements of Buddhism and Taoism with meditation and exercise, continued into its second year. Braving certain arrest, groups of Falun Gong followers periodically practiced their faith in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and were quickly taken into custody. Human rights groups estimated that at least 57 Falun Gong members had died in prison. The government also proscribed the activities of similar groups, including Zhong Gong, whose charismatic leader, Zhang Hongbao, sought political asylum in the American territory of Guam, from which Beijing sought unsuccessfully to extradite him on criminal charges. Evangelical Christians and Roman Catholics loyal to the Vatican were other targets of repression. Eighty-one-year-old Bishop Zeng Jingmu, released in 1998 after 30 years in prison, was rearrested in September for his continued refusal to recognize the authority of the state-controlled Roman Catholic Church. Beijing, reacting sourly to the Vatican's intention to canonize 130 Chinese Catholics martyred between 1648 and 1930, charged that most of them had been imperialist agents and deserved to die. In sum, a rising tide of religious faith lapped at the porous foundations of communist rule as a significant portion of the population looked to a variety of homegrown and domesticated foreign religions for spiritual fulfillment. The arrest, in separate incidents, of two visiting U.S.-based Chinese intellectuals—Song Yongyi, a research librarian, and Bei Ling, a well-known poet and editor—provoked twin storms of international criticism. Both were released and allowed to return to the U.S.

      Chinese authorities wrestled too with the question of how to control traffic on the information highway as the number of Internet users in China, doubling every six months, rose to 15 million by midyear. In addition to blocking the World Wide Web sites of overseas human rights organizations and selected foreign newspapers, the Ministry of State Security shut down the New Culture Forum, a dissident Web site. The ministry also arrested Huang Qi, founder of China's first human rights Web site, and Jiang Shihua, operator of an Internet cafe in Sichuan, for having posted articles critical of the CPC.

      As China's population—growing by 10 million annually—approached the 1.3 billion mark, authorities reaffirmed the one-child policy, which, they claimed, had prevented at least 250 million births over the past 20 years. Widespread evasion of this policy persisted in rural areas, although not in the cities. The difficulty of policing the vast rural reaches of China was underscored by a campaign to stop the selling of rural women and girls into prostitution. Tens of thousands of such unfortunates were kidnapped annually or hoodwinked with false promises of urban factory employment. Thousands of boys were likewise kidnapped and coerced into becoming pickpockets under the harsh control of professional criminals. According to its own experts, China had been slow to address the growing problem of AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, which had been increasing at an annual rate of 30% for a few years. Sex education was still very limited, and few resources had been invested in promoting safe sexual practices. Lax procedures for collecting and processing blood donations had contributed to the spread of AIDS, as had widespread addiction to opiates and needle-sharing among drug addicts.

      Both an immediate and a long-term threat to China's prosperity was the country's growing water crisis. China was endowed with only one-quarter of the world's per capita average of water resources, and the demands that agriculture, industry, and a growing urban population put on water supplies had already led to severe depletion of groundwater levels, conflicts between upstream and downstream consumers, and theft of water by desperate farmers. Perhaps a fifth or more of the country's water supply was wasted through inefficient irrigation systems, antiquated delivery systems, and the lack of realistic pricing systems for water resources.

      Spurred once again by large-scale state investment in infrastructure development and robust export performance, the economy did better than expected, growing at around 8.1% through the first half of the year. This was one percentage point higher than the growth of 1999. In March Beijing announced its renewed intention to run a large deficit in order to stimulate the economy. The proceeds from a $12.5 billion bond issue were to be allocated to infrastructural development, 70% of which would go to the underdeveloped west; expenditures on social welfare would double.

      Slack consumer demand persisted as the reduction or termination of government housing, medical, and education subsidies to urban dwellers caused people to focus on long-term security rather than on current spending. Nevertheless, the two-year-plus deflationary period came to an end, and the consumer price index showed a modest 0.1% rise by midyear. In Shanghai, Beijing, and other major cities, the more affluent urbanites invested in privately owned apartments, co-ops, and consumer durables. Foreign currency reserves increased to $158.4 billion at midyear from $150.6 billion a year earlier. Significant growth occurred in e-commerce as young Chinese entrepreneurs, handsomely bankrolled by foreign investors, explored the possibilities of the new economic frontier.

      The strains of transition away from an economy dominated by state-owned enterprises to a competitive market economy were manifested in numerous, sometimes violent, protests by workers who had gone unpaid for months or were facing layoffs. In February 20,000 factory workers rioted in Liaoning province after a molybdenum mine was shut down, and in August irate workers briefly took six American managers hostage when their factory was threatened with closure. Similarly, thousands of farmers in Jiangxi violently protested low commodity prices and high taxes, smashing local government offices and attacking the homes of the rich. In a number of cases, troops were called out to put down protests.

Foreign Relations.
      China's campaign to earn membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) took a giant step forward in 2000. After prolonged wrangling across partisan lines, the U.S. Congress approved the granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China. The administration of Pres. Bill Clinton and the American business community strongly supported PNTR; labour, human rights, and environmental groups opposed them. In China, as in the U.S. and elsewhere, critics of economic globalization decried the loss of national economic sovereignty and claimed that membership in the WTO—which they viewed as an instrument of foreign, particularly American, capitalism—would harm domestic interests. Nevertheless, China was expected to join the WTO in 2001.

      U.S.-China relations recovered partially from the crisis occasioned by the May 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugos., but mutual suspicion remained the keynote. The victory of Chen Shui-bian (see Biographies), a pro-independence candidate, in Taiwan's March 2000 presidential election renewed the question of what position Washington would take in the event of a direct clash between Beijing and Taipei. China strongly warned the U.S. to keep out of its domestic affairs, including management of the Taiwan issue. Beijing refused Chen's olive branch of unconditional discussions, insisting that he first pledge unequivocal support for Beijing's version of the One China principle. This Chen refused to do. While issuing numerous threats, Beijing did not, however, resort to military exercises or missile tests, as it had four years earlier during Taiwan's first direct presidential election.

      Prior to the June 2000 North-South Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang, Beijing welcomed North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for three days of consultation with President Jiang, National People's Congress Chairman Li Peng, Premier Zhu Rongji, and other top leaders. The meetings were viewed as an indication of China's interest in a peaceful resolution to the intra-Korean conflict. Relations with Japan remained barely satisfactory as Japanese officials complained about Chinese maritime maneuvers and seabed exploration in Japanese territorial waters. In October Premier Zhu Rongji made an official six-day visit to Japan. In July Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin visited Beijing, where he and Jiang jointly condemned U.S. proposals for national and Asian theatre missile defense systems, which the Russians and Chinese perceived as violations of the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty. China threatened to significantly upgrade its own nuclear weapons program if Washington went ahead with the proposals. President Clinton opted in September to leave the matter in the hands of his successor, a decision that placated Beijing in the short run. Meanwhile, Beijing pursued an active agenda in the Middle East as well as in Asia and Europe via trade, diplomatic dialogue, and high-level visits. A narrow loser in its earlier bid to host the 2000 Summer Games, China renewed its effort to bring the Olympics to Beijing, setting its sights on 2008. Beijing made the International Olympic Committee's five-city shortlist, and Chinese officials had high hopes for taking the prize. Authorities in Beijing undertook the “greenification” of their dusty and polluted metropolis by expanding park space, planting trees and grass, and banning the use of coal for cooking and heating. The first positive results were already in evidence by year's end.

Steven I. Levine

▪ 2000

9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan (See Taiwan , below.)
(1999 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,251,238,000
Chief of state:
President Jiang Zemin
Head of government:
Premier Zhu Rongji

      On Oct. 1, 1999, Pres. Jiang Zemin and leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) celebrated the 50th anniversary of communist rule in China with a massive military parade through downtown Beijing. When Mao Zedong had proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) half a century earlier, China was just emerging from a long and bloody civil war. Few observers suspected that it was entering upon an even bloodier era of revolutionary violence, political repression, arbitrary power, and famine. By the time Mao died in 1976, communist rule in China had claimed more than 50 million lives. Deng Xiaoping, who ruled China between 1977 and the late 1990s, rescued the CPC by repudiating Maoism and initiating a period of rapid economic growth, social transformation, and relative political stability. Jiang, a lesser figure than Mao or Deng, saw himself as third in the line of communist dynasts. By 1999 the country over which he presided was vastly more wealthy and powerful than the China of 50 years before, but it still faced a daunting set of problems. (See Special Report (China: Asia's Emerging Superpower ).)

Politics and the Economy.
      China's basic recipe for political stability over the past decade had been two measures of economic progress mixed with one measure of liberalization and several large pinches of repression. The exact proportions varied from year to year, but the recipe worked. It was put to the test again on April 25, 1999, when CPC leaders were presented with what they perceived as a unique challenge to their authority. More than 10,000 members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, which blended elements of Buddhism and Taoism with meditation and exercise, gathered at the walled compound housing the offices and homes of top CPC leaders in a silent, peaceful protest against the government's refusal to accord them official recognition. Under the charismatic leadership of its founder, Li Hongzhi (see Biographies (Li Hongzhi )), who had lived in New York City since 1992, Falun Gong, a loosely knit organization, had developed rapidly since its beginnings in 1992 and claimed a worldwide membership of 100 million persons in more than 30 countries, including the U.S. Estimates of the number of its Chinese followers ranged from 2 million to 20 million. The spiritual vacuum in China created by the collapse of revolutionary idealism and nourished by social change had created fertile soil for the renascence of traditional indigenous and foreign religions as well as new ones. Perhaps mindful of the role that “heretical sects” and secret societies played in antidynastic rebellions during the imperial age, the CPC banned Falun Gong on July 22 and initiated a massive crackdown against it. Hundreds of leaders were arrested and thousands of followers sent to reeducation camps. Falun Gong members in the CPC and the army were forced to engage in self-criticism and to repudiate their beliefs. The government accused Falun Gong of “advocating superstition, spreading fallacies and hoodwinking people” and also of “inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability.” Its real crime was that it was a popular organization outside the orbit of CPC control in a political system intolerant of dissent. CPC leaders dismissed Li Hongzhi's assertion that Falun Gong was apolitical, ignored his call for a reversal of the ban, and rejected international criticism of their blatant violation of the right to freedom of belief and assembly. The party's anachronistic attempt to kindle a Maoist-style campaign against Falun Gong during an era of political disillusionment failed to make much headway. Its parallel efforts to revive its own moribund ideology through a campaign of promoting the study of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism seemed equally doomed. Another instance of the government's campaign against religious sects occurred in October when Liu Jiaguo, the founder of the Master of God cult, which numbered some 10,000 persons, was executed on charges of having raped several female believers and engaged in fraud. This was a case of killing the chicken to scare the monkey, as the Chinese proverb goes—i.e., punishing one to warn others.

      The CPC's authoritarian reflex and political paranoia had already been manifested in the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of leaders of the fledgling China Democracy Party, beginning in December 1998 and continuing well into 1999. The run-up to the 10th anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre revived memories of the student-led pro-democracy movement that preceded it. The authorities preempted any commemoration of the massacre by closing Tiananmen Square for renovation, and the anniversary passed quietly inside China. In Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China since 1997, a crowd of 70,000 gathered to mark the anniversary. From his place of exile in the U.S., Wang Dan, a student leader of the 1989 democracy movement, mounted an international petition campaign to pressure Beijing into “reversing the verdict” on June 4. Inside China, Bao Tong, a former top aide to Zhao Ziyang, issued a similar call that was likewise ignored by CPC leaders.

      The political situation inside China was marked by stability. There were no major shake-ups and only one high-level purge among China's governing elite in 1999. The triumvirate of President Jiang, National People's Congress Chairman Li Peng, and Premier Zhu Rongji remained in control. The 50th anniversary of the PRC became the occasion for the apotheosis of Jiang, who completed his 10th year at the helm of the party and the state. The celebration of the virtues and accomplishments of this Chinese everyman—a kind of Chinese version of Harry Truman—reached its apogee on October 1 when Jiang's giant portrait joined those of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the National Day parade. Waiting in the wings for Jiang's scheduled retirement in 2002 as CPC general secretary was the man Jiang had apparently tapped as his successor, Hu Jintao, a 56-year-old member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau who ranked fifth in China's power hierarchy. After graduating with a degree in engineering from Qinghua University, Beijing, in 1965, Hu had followed the career trajectory of a typical successful party apparatchik. He had served as provincial party secretary in Guizhou and then Tibet in the late 1980s during a period of heightened Chinese repression of Tibetan nationalists. He became a member of the CPC Central Committee in 1982 and of the Political Bureau Standing Committee 10 years later. At the Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee (Sept. 19–22, 1999), Hu was appointed vice-chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, a key post in the edifice of power. Meanwhile, Xu Yunhong, municipal party secretary of Ningbo, was deprived of his alternate membership on the Central Committee and expelled from the Communist Party after being charged with having embezzled state funds and with corruption. At every level in the party and state apparatus, corruption remained a major problem that had hardly been affected by periodic campaigns to combat it. At the Fourth Plenum, the party reaffirmed its commitment to the difficult long-term problem of restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs), calling it the central task in the ongoing reform of the national economy. The core objective of this restructuring, scheduled to be completed in 2010, was to make SOEs less of a burden on the state budget by increasing their responsiveness to the market, reducing subsidies, and enhancing their competitiveness by upgrading management and technology.

      Weak domestic demand continued to be a problem, and mild deflation persisted for a third straight year. As in previous years, the government resorted to massive state investment in infrastructural projects to stimulate the economy. Even the educational sector played a role as universities, which charged substantial tuition and fees, expanded their enrollments. Toward the end of the year, an annual growth rate of 7.6% was claimed, but not a few observers questioned the accuracy of China's official statistics, which, they claimed, probably overstated the growth rate by several percentage points. For a third straight year, China suffered mild deflation as the consumer price index fell by 1.3%. China's hard currency reserves topped $154 billion, compared with $145 billion in 1998. Meanwhile, a leading Chinese scholar in the West estimated that as much as 4% of China's gross domestic product may have been wasted through corruption that had been endemic throughout the country for most of the past 20 years. Foreign direct investment in China was estimated at $30 billion–38 billion, and foreign trade with China's top trading partners was $255 billion through the third quarter with exports up 2% and imports up 1% over 1998. China's trade surplus with the U.S. increased to a projected $30 billion, but despite serious problems in the Sino-American relationship (see below), the U.S. Congress extended China's normal trading status for another year. On November 15 China and the U.S. culminated 13 years of hard bargaining with a landmark trade deal that opened the door to China's membership in the World Trade Organization, which was likely to occur in 2000. The agreement would almost certainly have a profound impact on China's domestic economy, stimulating reform while causing considerable hardships as inefficient producers experienced the impact of international competition. On the eve of China's 50th anniversary celebrations, Fortune magazine served as host to a Shanghai forum called “China: The Next 50 Years,” at which 300 executives from the world's largest multinational corporations sought to curry Jiang's favour.

Foreign Relations.
      NATO's decision to bomb Yugoslavia in order to stop Yugoslav Pres. Slobodan Milosevic's campaign of terror in Kosovo elicited a spirited Chinese denunciation of U.S.-led NATO aggression. Enunciating a classical doctrine of state sovereignty, Beijing rejected NATO's humanitarian justification for military intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign Yugoslav state. China feared the precedent that such intervention established, worrying that the international community, or a U.S.-led portion thereof, might in the future assert an unwelcome interest in Tibet, an autonomous region of the PRC, or in Taiwan, a de facto independent state, which the PRC claimed as part of its national territory. In his annual address to the UN General Assembly in September, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan refuted Secretary-General Kofi Annan's attempt to articulate a strategy for humanitarian intervention on the part of the international community. Denouncing a lingering Cold War mentality as well as hegemonism and power politics, Tang repeated China's long-standing support for the principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect for state sovereignty, and noninterference in the internal affairs of foreign nations.

      A crisis in U.S.–China relations was precipitated when, owing to an egregious U.S. intelligence failure, NATO inadvertently bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugos., on May 7. The bombing killed 3 Chinese diplomats, injured 20, and caused major damage to the embassy building. Beijing rejected Washington's explanation for the tragedy and claimed that the attack was retribution for China's opposition to the NATO bombing. (Had the Kosovo matter been taken to the UN Security Council, China and Russia would certainly have exercised their veto power to block collective action on behalf of the ethnic Albanians.) China eventually approved a U.S. payment of $4.5 million to the victims' families plus compensation for damages to the embassy.

      China's response to the embassy bombing was not limited to officialdom. An upwelling of popular nationalism was expressed in the form of anti-American protests by thousands of Chinese students and others at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, which became the target of bottle- and rock-throwing demonstrators. Students who had lionized President Clinton on his trip to China in mid-1998 now likened him to Adolf Hitler. Party cadres played an important role in organizing these demonstrations, which were abruptly terminated after their point had been made, but the expressions of anger at the U.S., a country many Chinese perceived as arrogant and meddlesome, were no doubt genuine. By September, however, Jiang, who had rebuffed Clinton's initial attempts at apology after the bombing, held a cordial meeting with the U.S. president during the annual summit meeting of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in New Zealand.

      Another, even more troubling, issue arose in U.S.–China relations as the U.S. Congress pressed the Clinton administration to admit that over a period of years China had stolen highly classified information concerning advanced nuclear weapons design from the Los Alamos (N.M.) National Laboratory and other sites. A congressional committee headed by Rep. Christopher Cox issued a 700-page report detailing alleged Chinese nuclear espionage while the press pilloried Taiwan-born scientist Wen-ho Lee, who was alleged to have passed critical information to the PRC, a charge he vehemently denied. Beijing dismissed assertions that it had engaged in nuclear espionage as the ravings of inveterate enemies of China. On December 10 Lee was indicted on 59 counts of mishandling classified information but not of espionage.

      It was in this feverish atmosphere that Taiwanese Pres. Lee Teng-hui startled the world in early July with his announcement that relations between Taiwan and the PRC should be considered as a kind of “special state-to-state relations.” Beijing, which persisted in maintaining that Taiwan was an errant Chinese province that had to return to the fold, correctly interpreted this as a further step toward Taiwan independence, an outcome it had repeatedly threatened to prevent by force if necessary. Chinese leaders again denounced Lee as they had during the previous crisis over Taiwan in 1995–96. Washington reiterated its long-standing commitment to a one-China policy but coupled it with warnings to Beijing against the use of force against Taiwan. In the aftermath of Taiwan's devastating earthquake on September 21, Jiang renewed China's commitment to the peaceful reunification of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Lee's démarche provided Beijing with an excuse to postpone the long-awaited October meeting between Koo Chen-fu, head of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, and Wang Daohan, head of China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. These quasi-official organizations handled relations between the two sides, which continued to have extensive commercial and economic ties notwithstanding the ebb and flow of political tensions. China won another round in its battle with Taiwan when Papua New Guinea, which extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan on July 5, quickly reversed itself under pressure from Beijing.

      On December 20 China resumed control of the Portuguese territory of Macau on terms similar to those that applied to the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. (See Dependent States: Sidebar (Macau's Return to China ).)

Steven I. Levine

▪ 1999

      Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan (See Taiwan , below.)

      Population (1998 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,242,980,000

      Capital: Beijing

      Chief of state: President Jiang Zemin

      Head of government: Premiers Li Peng and, from March 17, Zhu Rongji

      Two series of waves battered China in 1998, causing deep concern to China's leaders and the public alike. First were the waves of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) and the Nen and Songhua rivers, whose overflowing waters brought large-scale devastation and significant loss of life to central and northeastern China. Second were the waves of the Asian financial crisis, which threatened the stability of China's currency, eroded the rate of economic growth, and, by extension, posed a threat to the social and political order. Spurred by the latter danger, China's leaders finally tackled the monumental problem of reforming the country's state-owned enterprises and banking system, intensified the fight against official corruption, and attempted—with only partial success—to sustain a high rate of economic growth. The overthrow of President Suharto in Indonesia gave Chinese leaders an object lesson about the risks that soft authoritarian regimes face when times turn bad. In the international arena China basked in the glow of U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton's nine-day state visit at midyear. Meanwhile, relations with Taiwan came out of the deep freeze. Thus, compared with most of its Asian neighbours, China came through the year in remarkably good shape.

Domestic Affairs.
      An expected reshuffling of the government leadership took place at the meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC) in March. Li Peng, having completed his second and final term as premier, became the head of the NPC, replacing Qiao Shi. The latter, a rival of Pres. Jiang Zemin (see BIOGRAPHIES (Jiang Zemin )), had been ousted from the top leadership at the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 1997. Li was replaced as premier on March 17 by Zhu Rongji, who, as deputy premier, had been in overall command of China's economy for several years. A career technocrat and protégé of the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, Zhu was a former mayor and party boss of Shanghai. Although noted for having persuaded Shanghai demonstrators to disperse peacefully during the nationwide pro-democracy student protests in 1989, in contrast to the violent suppression of protests in Beijing, he had shown little interest in political reform.

      Two other significant leadership changes occurred in 1998. Deputy Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was promoted to the top spot in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He replaced Qian Qichen, who was elevated to deputy premier. Wu Yi, the top-ranking woman in the government, was promoted to state councillor, and her position as minister of foreign trade and economic development was assumed by her deputy, Shi Guangsheng. Jiang, who doubled as CPC general secretary, appeared secure at the top of the political hierarchy.

      In a bold challenge to his erstwhile colleagues, Zhao Ziyang, under house arrest since his ouster from the premiership during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, sent an open letter to the CPC Central Committee in June calling upon the CPC to acknowledge its error in perpetrating the Tiananmen Square massacre and asking the party to accelerate the process of democratization. His appeal elicited no public response. Freed after nearly a decade of imprisonment and probation, Bao Tong, Zhao's former chief aide, echoed Zhao's call for democratization in interviews with foreign journalists. Ordered to hold his tongue, he declined. Meanwhile, Jiang quietly fostered a somewhat more open political climate in which intellectuals and researchers in official think tanks were allowed to explore alternative political forms and ideas. Organized opposition of any sort remained out of bounds, however. When, in conformance with existing state regulations, small groups of Chinese democrats in several cities tried to register their proposed China Democratic Party as a civic organization, their applications were rejected and they were harassed, detained, and threatened with further punishment if they persisted. Unlike Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang, which had allowed the formation of an opposition party in 1986, the CPC oligarchy remained unwilling to risk any challenge to its power. In a public relations gesture before President Clinton's visit to China, Beijing released imprisoned student leader Wang Dan on medical parole to the U.S., but it continued to crack down hard on numerous lower-profile dissenters as well as on ethnic nationalists in Tibet and Xinjiang.

      Jiang surprised many observers by having Chen Xitong, former Beijing party boss and Political Bureau member, sentenced to a 16-year prison term for engaging in massive corruption and embezzlement of public funds. In so doing, Jiang signaled his willingness to hunt big tigers as well as small game. Jiang, who had spent much of the past decade cultivating military support, went after the largest game of all when he ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to divest itself of its nondefense assets. Since the 1970s the PLA had acquired a parallel economic empire in fields such as electronics, real estate (including hotels and even brothels), pharmaceuticals, transportation, and foreign trade. Jiang ordered the military to concentrate on its national security objectives. Meanwhile, PLA Chief of Staff Fu Quanyou stressed the need for the PLA to acquire high-tech weapons. Savings from a proposed reduction in PLA force by 500,000 troops were expected to be used to upgrade military technology.

      In his inaugural speech as premier, Zhu announced a radical restructuring of the government bureaucracy, targeting the elimination or merger of 15 ministries, including those of coal, labour, metallurgy, machine building, and chemicals, as well as the paring of 4 million of the 33 million government jobs. Expansion and contraction of the government bureaucracy had occurred periodically since the 1950s but never before when the state sector was diminishing as a share of the national economy and the government was actively promoting privatization. Zhu also announced a three-year timetable for the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a move foreshadowed in Jiang's report to the 15th Congress of the CPC. The government wanted to accelerate the transformation, merger, or elimination of debt-ridden and noncompetitive industrial behemoths of the old command economy days. Furloughs, reductions in force, and cutbacks in hours and pay had affected an estimated 20 million-30 million workers by 1998. State-run labour exchanges or reemployment centres had only begun to address the serious problems of unemployment and underemployment. Small-scale protests by laid-off workers increased in frequency and intensity but posed little threat to the authorities in the absence of independent trade union organizations, which were strictly prohibited.

      The banking industry, too, was in serious straits as a result of many years during which government directives and personal connections rather than economic rationality dictated loan policy. Chinese banking authorities claimed that only 5-6% of outstanding loans were unrecoverable, but outside estimates ranged much higher. In February Beijing announced that it would recapitalize the four largest state banks, which accounted for 90% of all loans, via an infusion of $33 billion. Meanwhile, the head of the People's Bank of China floated a plan to reorganize China's central banking system along the lines of the U.S. Federal Reserve system. Zhu and other top officials earned the gratitude of world leaders by pledging not to devalue China's currency, the yuan. It was widely feared that devaluation of the Chinese currency would set off another round of devaluation in Asian countries—Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in particular—that were struggling to recover from the financial crisis. It was uncertain how long China could afford to maintain the yuan at its current rate of exchange, however. Meanwhile, plans to make the yuan a fully convertible currency were shelved.

      After years of inflation in the early 1990s, China experienced a mild deflation in 1998 as the retail price index fell by 2.1% in the first half of the year. Despite an inflow of $27 billion in foreign investment and a foreign trade surplus of more than $30 billion, China's foreign exchange holdings held steady at $140 billion. This suggested an unauthorized capital outflow estimated in the tens of billions of dollars annually. In order to stem this tide, alarmed Chinese authorities tightened controls on foreign exchange transactions.

      An even greater worry for the government was the slowdown in the rate of economic growth caused by shrinking Asian export markets, diminishing foreign investment, and slackened domestic consumer spending. In 1997 gross domestic product had grown at a rate of 8.8%. Chinese leaders set a 1998 growth target of 8%, an ambitious figure in light of the brewing global economic crisis. Toward this goal Beijing announced a three-year domestic economic stimulus package of $1.2 trillion focused on developing China's infrastructure. Highway and railroad construction, bridge building, electric power generation, and water conservancy projects were among those slated to receive significant infusions of capital. Another high-priority area was urban housing, where a great backlog of demand existed. In another radical departure from past practice, the government announced the phasing out of highly subsidized housing, which many Chinese had come to expect as a birthright. In its place, apartment and home ownership was encouraged, and banks began to provide mortgage loans to China's expanding new middle class. With all these efforts, the economy grew 7.2% during the first nine months of 1998—short of the government's target but still much better than any of its Asian neighbours.

      Massive flooding, which had been a major problem in China since ancient times, occurred in July-August in the middle reaches of the Chang Jiang in central China and, more unusually, along the Nen and Songhua rivers in northeastern China. More than 3,000 people died in the floods, millions of rural homes were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of flood victims were forced to camp out for many weeks on the roofs of their houses or on the tops of levees. (See DISASTERS.) The relief system proved inadequate to the task and gave rise to widespread criticism. Chinese scientists and engineers also faulted the government for its long-term failure to allocate sufficient funds for strengthening dikes as well as for its having turned a blind eye to such practices as the clear-cutting of timber along the upper reaches of the rivers. In order to protect the imperiled metropolises of Wuhan on the Chang Jiang and Harbin on the Songhua, many small towns and rural communities were sacrificed to the floodwaters as their sheltering dikes were dynamited to divert the raging waters. Some 275,000 PLA troops were mobilized to fight the floods, the largest peacetime mobilization in China's history. Media images of valiant soldiers battling chest-high waters and rescuing civilians helped erase the stigma of corruption and smuggling that had become attached to the PLA. Ultimately, the impact of the flooding, which caused an estimated $20 billion in damages, was more local than national.

Hong Kong.
      Hong Kong, which had become a special administrative region of China on July 1, 1997, was much more severely hit by the Asian financial crisis than the rest of China. Both imports and exports declined, and the economy, in recession, shrank 7% in the third quarter. Unemployment rose to its highest level in 15 years, and the bellwether Hang Seng stock index declined sharply. In a departure from previous laissez-faire practice, Hong Kong authorities intervened in currency markets to defend the Hong Kong dollar, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar, against currency speculators. In order to halt plummeting land prices, the authorities announced a moratorium on sales of government real estate until March 1999.

      In May elections for the Legislative Council, Hong Kong voters expressed overwhelming support for the democratic parties and political leaders whom Beijing had excluded from the interim Hong Kong legislature it appointed in 1996. The electoral system, constructed to deny a popular majority, nevertheless delivered an equal number of seats to Martin Lee's Democratic Party, which garnered about 42% of the vote, and to pro-Beijing parties, which gained 3%.

Taiwan and International Relations.
      Anxious about the growing strength of Taiwan's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, China ended its nearly three-year moratorium on contact with Taiwan, which had been instituted to protest Taiwan Pres. Lee Teng-hui's June 1995 visit to the U.S. In April China's quasi-official Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait welcomed a delegation from its Taiwanese counterpart, the Straits Exchange Foundation. Negotiations began for a high-level meeting between the heads of the two organizations.

      The political turmoil in Indonesia that led to President Suharto's resignation resulted in mob violence against Chinese-Indonesians. Rioters attacked and destroyed countless Chinese-owned businesses and raped hundreds of ethnic Chinese women. After a diplomatic silence that incensed public opinion in China, Beijing lodged protests with Indonesia. University students in Beijing delivered a protest petition to the Indonesian embassy, and students and women activists conducted an unauthorized demonstration in front of the embassy as well.

      China criticized India's series of nuclear tests in May and vigorously rejected the Indian government's claim that a nuclear-armed China posed a serious threat to India's security. Until this development, relations between the two had been slowly improving. Beijing issued only a pro forma expression of regret over the nuclear tests of its ally Pakistan, whose nuclear program had been greatly facilitated by infusions of Chinese technology and know-how.

      Relations with the U.S. took centre stage in China's dealings with the outside world. In the face of contrary evidence, China continued to deny it had channeled illegal campaign contributions to the Democratic Party during the 1996 U.S. elections. Congressional Republicans also shined the spotlight on alleged improper dealings between China's aerospace industry, which was closely linked to China's military establishment, and American contractors. Human rights organizations had difficulty focusing attention on China's human rights problems in the face of the Clinton administration's apparent indifference to these concerns. As noted above, the release of imprisoned dissident Wang was timed to maximize the impression that China was making progress in the area of human rights, a perspective echoed by the U.S. government. An interfaith group of American religious leaders returned from a brief visit to China to offer a generally positive assessment of the state of religious freedom there, a point of view vigorously contested by American evangelical Christians and human rights groups.

      Reciprocating Jiang's successful state visit to the U.S. in October 1997, President Clinton paid an extended state visit to China in late June-early July. The Clinton entourage first visited the ancient capital of Xian to view its cultural relics before proceeding to Beijing, Shanghai, Guilin, and Hong Kong. Many Chinese felt that the Clinton visit represented an affirmation of China's emergence as a global power. In a surprise move, Jiang allowed Clinton to talk directly to the Chinese public via television and radio, and he engaged Clinton in a debate of sorts on sensitive issues, including Tibet, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and the human rights situation in China. Clinton in turn praised Jiang as a wise statesman who was the right man to lead China toward a bright future. To a skeptical, hand-picked student audience at Beijing University, Clinton preached the virtues of American-style democracy. Clinton-Jiang pronouncements on regional and global affairs were not welcomed in India, among other places, where an emerging Sino-American axis of global leadership was deemed both presumptuous and dangerous. Nevertheless, China made real progress in 1998 toward its long-term goal of recognition as a global power.


▪ 1998

      Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan below.) (Taiwan )

      Population (1997 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,227,740,000

      Capital: Beijing

      Chief of state: President Jiang Zemin

      Head of government: Premier Li Peng

      China formally entered a new era in 1997. On February 19 paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, one of China's key statesmen in the 20th century, died at the age of 92. .) (Deng Xiaoping ) At the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in September, Deng's designated successor, Jiang Zemin, further consolidated his authority and initiated an effort to solve the nagging problem of China's deficit-ridden state-owned enterprises. The Chinese economy continued to hum along at a better than 9% growth rate, with work continuing on the huge Three Gorges Dam. ) (Three Gorges Dam ) China's difficult relations with the U.S. improved modestly as Jiang paid his first state visit to Washington, D.C., in late October.

Politics and the Economy.
      After years of declining health, Deng, who had joined the Chinese communist movement in the early 1920s, finally succumbed to Parkinson's and lung disease. In economic and social terms, the China he left behind had changed more rapidly during his 18-year reign than during any other period in modern history. There was no mistaking Deng's impact on his country. While maintaining a tight grip on power and ruthlessly suppressing any real or perceived challenges to the authority of the CPC, Deng liberated China from the fetters of Mao Zedong's economic policies and feudal social restrictions. Facilitating market-opening reforms in China, Deng also allowed a considerable measure of personal autonomy to Chinese citizens as long as they refrained from trespassing into the forbidden zone of politics. Deng was a tough-minded pragmatist who had little patience for the niceties of Marxist-Leninist theory. He was perhaps best known for his anti-ideological aphorism that it does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice. Deng's last political initiative had come in early 1992 when he restarted the sputtering engine of economic reform by extolling the policies of opening to the world and promoting market socialism that his conservative critics had faulted. Among Deng's other major accomplishments were the normalization of relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Sino-British agreement regarding the handover of Hong Kong, and the transfer of power to a successor generation. Deng's responsibility for the June 4, 1989, massacre in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and his absolute intolerance for dissent were consistent with his reputation as a CPC hatchet man during the earlier stages of his revolutionary career.

      Among Deng's conservative critics had been Peng Zhen (see OBITUARIES (Peng Zhen )), another tough-minded first-generation revolutionary who survived the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) to become a leading hard-liner in the 1980s. As head of the National People's Congress (NPC), Peng was a modern incarnation of the ancient Chinese Legalist tradition, in which the law was viewed as an instrument of authoritarian rule. In January, Sun Yaoting, the last of the once-powerful fraternity of eunuchs who served the Chinese imperial court, died at the age of 93. One after the other, the mooring lines that had secured China to its imperial and revolutionary pasts were fraying and breaking.

      The prolonged deathwatch over Deng, who had gradually yielded his authority to Jiang over a number of years, provided time for his successor to consolidate his power. Considered a bantamweight when he vaulted from the leadership of Shanghai to that of the CPC in 1989, Jiang had proved the skeptics wrong by demonstrating considerable skills as a political infighter as well as a statesman. In 1997 Jiang successfully passed four tests of leadership, beginning with Deng's death and concluding with his state visit to the U.S. that left him at year's end in a significantly stronger political position. First, like the hapless Hua Guofeng who briefly succeeded Mao in 1976, Jiang wrapped himself in the mantle of his departed predecessor. At Deng's public memorial, Jiang pledged to continue the policies of reform that Deng had initiated in 1978. Unlike Hua at the time of his patron's demise, however, Jiang had already enjoyed nearly eight years at the helm of the CPC by the time Deng died. Second, Jiang was centre stage at the ceremony in Hong Kong that marked the handover of the British colony to China, an important milestone in the historical process of national reintegration. (See Hong Kong's Return to China. (Hong Kong's Return to China ))

      The third, and the most important of Jiang's tests, came at the Congress of the CPC. There he succeeded both in ousting one of his chief rivals, Qiao Shi, from the seven-person Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the inner sanctum of political power, and in seeding the 22-member Political Bureau as well as the CPC Central Committee with his supporters. The forced retirement of Qiao, the head of the NPC, caught most observers by surprise. Qiao, who earlier had served as China's public security chief, had gradually built up the NPC as his power base in the name of strengthening the rule of law in China. Under his leadership the NPC became a forum where limited debate and circumscribed dissent from government policies were allowed. This role might soon come to an end, however, if Qiao was replaced as head of the NPC by Li Peng, who, according to China's constitution, had to step down in March 1998 when he completed his second term as premier. Waiting in the wings to replace Li was Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, an economic specialist ranked third in the CPC hierarchy. Jiang also ousted the elderly Gen. Liu Huaqing from the Standing Committee, which left the People's Liberation Army without a uniformed representative in that body, although Gen. Chi Haotian and Gen. Zhang Wannian joined the Political Bureau along with six other new members. This was a considerable turnover although not a complete sweep.

      In his report to the 15th Congress, Jiang finally addressed the issue of how to reform China's roughly 300,000 deficit-ridden state-owned enterprises, which were a running financial sore on the Chinese body politic. Avoiding the ideologically unacceptable concept of privatization, Jiang sketched the gradual transformation of all but a few thousand of the core state enterprises into joint stock companies in which the public would be able to invest. Such prospective ownership provided a socialist fig leaf of "public ownership" for what was essentially a divestment of state assets. The details remained to be worked out. The CPC would somehow have to cushion the potentially explosive problem of widespread urban unemployment if money-losing factories were shut down as well as try to block avaricious Communist Party officials from transforming state firms into their own private assets. The CPC had made little headway in stemming the rising tide of corruption, although it finally decided to prosecute Chen Xitong on charges of corruption more than two years after the former Beijing CPC boss was removed from power. The lurid story of Chen's depravity formed the basis for an underground Chinese best-seller, Wrath of Heaven (1997), published under a pseudonym by an unknown author and packed with scenes of money scheming, blackmail, and illicit sex.

      Although Jiang appeared to have things well in hand in Beijing, CPC control in the farther reaches of China was another matter. Growing worker and farmer protests over economic issues and continuing ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang underlay the CPC's preoccupation with stability and its resort to repression. One of the larger protests, involving tens of thousands of unemployed workers, took place in July in the city of Mianyang in Sichuan province, where the police arrested scores of demonstrators. In early February Turkic-speaking Uygur nationalists, protesting what they said was China's execution of 30 fellow Muslim activists, rioted in Yining in the northwestern province of Xinjiang, which led to further crackdowns and arrests as China's Islamic neighbours in Central Asia watched uneasily from across their borders. An internal CPC document in May 1996 identified national separatism and illegal religious activities as integral threats to Beijing's authority in Xinjiang, where terrorist bombings in the provincial capital of Urumqi and assassinations of local officials by Islamic separatists prompted Chinese officials to make thousands of arrests. An explosion on a municipal bus in Beijing in early March that killed two persons raised the spectre of ethnic violence in the capital itself, home to large numbers of Uygurs and other Turkic-speaking minorities.

      Chinese authorities remained unwilling to engage the Dalai Lama in a genuine dialogue or to countenance meaningful Tibetan autonomy. Among other acts, they sentenced Tibetan musicologist Ngawang Choepel, a Fulbright scholar, to 18 years in prison on charges of spying for the U.S. and Chatral Rinpoche, a senior Tibetan lama, to six years on charges of maintaining illegal contacts with the Dalai Lama. Foreign interest in the fate of Tibet, which China had invaded in 1950, was fueled by two Hollywood films sympathetic to the Dalai Lama. The U.S. Congress forced the State Department to appoint a special coordinator on Tibet, a move denounced by Beijing, and chapters of Students for a Free Tibet sprung up on American college campuses.

      Meanwhile, the voice of Wei Jingsheng, China's best-known political prisoner, was heard in other countries through the publication of The Courage to Stand Alone (1997), a collection of his prison writings. In mid-November, soon after Jiang's official visit to the United States, Wei was medically paroled and went into exile in the U.S. This did not appear to indicate a change in China"s human rights policy, however, as many other lesser-known opponents of the regime remained in prison.

      Ever since Deng's reforms hollowed out Chinese Marxism, the legitimacy of the CPC had rested on economic performance. In 1997 China's gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of 9.6%, the highest of any less-developed country. Industrial production was up 11%, whereas consumer prices increased only a modest 2%. China's foreign currency reserves of $128 billion (July) were second only to Japan's. Although the Hong Kong stock market rode a roller coaster in the last quarter of the year, Chinese stock markets, which climbed sharply in the first half of the year, were scarcely affected by global vicissitudes. An estimated 25 million-30 million Chinese invested in the stock market in 1997, a number that could increase sharply if Jiang's plan to sell off the majority of state-owned enterprises was implemented. In May Zhou Daojiong, the chairman of the Securities Regulatory Commission, was replaced in an effort to strengthen state control over the stock market.

      China's prosperity drew strength from its export-oriented industries, in which average monthly wages were only a small fraction of those in Taiwan and South Korea, to say nothing of developed countries like Japan and the U.S. This was the main reason foreign investment continued to flow into China in 1997. In 1996, the last year for which figures were available, China attracted more than a third of total global foreign investment in manufacturing, or $42 billion, far ahead of the $6.4 billion invested in second-place Mexico. Beijing used its new economic clout toward political ends, awarding a $1.5 billion aircraft contract to Europe's Airbus Industrie on the occasion of French Pres. Jacques Chirac's visit to Beijing in May and sweetening Jiang's state visit to the U.S. with a multibillion-dollar contract to the Boeing Co.

Foreign Relations.
      China's burgeoning trade surplus with the U.S., expected to top $40 billion in 1997, was on the agenda when Jiang held a summit meeting with U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton during his eight-day state visit to the U.S. It was the first China-U.S. summit in eight years, and the visit represented the fourth of Jiang's major tests in 1997. Greeted everywhere by demonstrators protesting China's policies on human rights and Tibet, Jiang hobnobbed with top executives of American corporations, rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange, and paid visits to Pearl Harbor, Williamsburg, Va. (where he toured the restored colonial area and donned a three-cornered hat), and the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia. He allowed himself to be lectured on human rights by President Clinton and U.S. congressional leaders but defended China's record with considerable skill, asserting China's priority of "social and political stability" and declaring that China had responded correctly to what he termed the "political disturbance" in Tiananmen Square in 1989. On the subject of Tibet, Jiang likened China's policy toward the region to the emancipation of slaves in the U.S., saying that China had freed some one million Tibetan "serfs and slaves." In return for a pledge to stop providing nuclear assistance to Iran and other states, Jiang secured a U.S. commitment to lifting the sanctions that had prohibited the export of American nuclear power technology to China, to the delight of the floundering American nuclear power industry. A midyear report by the CIA identified China as a major supplier of missile technology and chemical warfare equipment to Iran and Pakistan, and it remained to be seen whether Beijing would honour its new pledge. Notwithstanding China's ambivalence toward the U.S., which it viewed as a hegemonic power attempting to obstruct China's rise, Jiang and the leaders of the CPC saw the summit meeting with the U.S. president as an important indicator of international recognition that China was now a world power that no country, not even the U.S., could afford to ignore. In that sense, Jiang's state visit to Washington was, from China's perspective, a notable success.

      Playing the world statesman, Jiang visited Moscow in April, solidifying a rhetorical alignment with Russia that was based on mutual suspicion of the U.S. as well as Chinese purchases of advanced Russian military technology, particularly jet aircraft. In November, Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin met with Jiang in Beijing, and the two leaders agreed on the final demarcation of the eastern sector of their border.

      Renewing its warnings about the supposed dangers of Japanese militarism, China objected to the new guidelines announced by Tokyo and Washington governing U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Beijing's economic diplomacy, in which the lure of the China market was the trump card of visiting Chinese leaders, had muted most European criticism of Chinese human rights abuses and thereby enabled China once again to defeat U.S. efforts in the UN Commission on Human Rights to subject China's record to international scrutiny.

      China eased its pressure on Taiwan in 1997 after its sabre rattling of the previous two years, but it continued to oppose any efforts by Taiwan to gain official recognition by foreign countries or international organizations. The next test of China's policy toward Taiwan would come if Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang lost its parliamentary majority and was forced into a coalition with overtly or covertly pro-independence oppositionists. Once the Portugese-ruled enclave of Macau returned to China's sovereignty in 1999, political pressures in Beijing should force CPC leaders to step up their campaign "to return Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland."

      Mao's death in 1976 had been heralded by the devastating Tangshan earthquake, which killed at least 200,000 people—a small fraction, to be sure, of the some 30 million lives claimed by the famine of 1959-61. In 1977 the Great Helmsman's embalmed body was laid in the mausoleum where it still resided. Within weeks of Mao's death, however, his successors began to dismantle his legacy. Deng's death scarcely created a ripple among the Chinese people, for whom politics was no longer in command as in Mao's day. The difference in the modes of exit of these two men was instructive. The increasingly smaller shadows cast by China's top leaders in the succession from Mao to Deng to Jiang boded well for the Chinese people, who in 1997 focused on the task that Deng had legitimized, namely, working to improve their daily lives in a society where the political struggles of the past were a fading memory.


▪ 1997

      The People's Republic of China is situated in eastern Asia, with coastlines on the Yellow Sea and the East and South China seas. Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan. (See Taiwan, below.) Pop. (1996 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,218,700,000. Cap.: Beijing. Monetary unit: renminbi yuan, with (Oct. 11, 1996) a free rate of 8.30 yuan to U.S. $1 (13.07 yuan = £1 sterling). President in 1996, Jiang Zemin; premier, Li Peng.

      An upsurge of popular nationalism, tinged with antiforeign sentiments, swept China in 1996. As Beijing prepared for the peaceful takeover of Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, Chinese leaders used a display of military force to warn Taiwan against drifting toward formal independence. Deng Xiaoping, frail and ailing, turned 92 in August, but the once paramount leader was no longer a player in the political game. It seemed unlikely that he would be able to visit Hong Kong in 1997 to celebrate the end of British rule, which he had successfully negotiated in 1984. As Chinese leaders continued to jockey for position in the post-Deng era, they had to contend with the economic, social, and political consequences of Deng's reforms. Meanwhile, China's economy continued to hum along at a 10% growth rate. Inflation, moreover, was finally brought under control. The tension in Sino-U.S. relations eased somewhat in the second half of the year as Beijing directed its anger at Japan, which it accused of harbouring ambitions of regional domination. Chinese leaders traded on their country's growing global economic strength to enhance their leverage on issues that they considered vital to Chinese security, particularly in respect to Taiwan and Tibet.

Domestic Affairs.
      Pres. Jiang Zemin dominated the Chinese political stage in 1996 in his triple capacity as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), head of state, and chairman of the CPC's Central Military Commission. A cautious centrist rather than a bold innovator, Jiang continued to rule by consensus, undertaking no policy initiatives that might cause his colleagues to unite against him. There were no significant changes in the top leadership in 1996. Major Gen. Ba Zhongtan, head of the People's Armed Police, resigned following the murder in February of Li Peiyao, vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, during a bungled burglary. Beijing Mayor Li Qiyan, who had been implicated in the 1995 scandal that led to the purge of Political Bureau member Chen Xitong, was demoted to secretary of the CPC's Committee of the Ministry of Labour. Wang Li, one of the last of the Cultural Revolution radicals, died at age 75.

      A popular best-seller, The China That Can Say No, authored by Song Qiang and two other youthful writers, angrily denounced the U.S. for subverting the national aspirations of the Chinese and poisoning the wellsprings of their culture with Hollywood films and Western fast food. Popular nationalism complemented official nationalism but also challenged it to be more active in defending Chinese interests. Jiang wrapped himself tightly in the banner of Chinese nationalism while promoting the rather amorphous concept of socialist spiritual civilization. This was the main theme of his address to the October plenum of the CPC Central Committee. The communiqué affirmed economic reform as the central task of the CPC but stressed that the party had yet to solve the problem of promoting ideological, educational, ethical, and cultural progress. Energetic campaigns were launched to curb such national bad habits as spitting, littering, smoking, and cursing in public. Otherwise, socialist spiritual civilization seemed to be a euphemism for domestic law-and-order policies and the maintenance of tight controls over culture, literature, and the arts. For example, Wang Shuo, the popular novelist who chronicled Beijing lowlife, was criticized for decadence. The CPC deferred any serious initiatives to grapple with major economic and social issues at least to its 15th Congress, which would convene in late 1997 in the afterglow of the recovery of Hong Kong.

      Lacking a distinctive vision for the future, the CPC reveled in its revolutionary past, glorifying the heroism of the famous Long March, the 60th anniversary of which was widely celebrated on stage and screen and in song. Jiang used the occasion to reemphasize a favourite theme, the loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the CPC. Jiang's neoconservative nationalism presented the CPC as indispensable in holding Chinese society together and guiding China toward prosperity and greatness.

      The CPC stepped up its campaign against rampant corruption, criticizing cadres (government and party officials) for wasting public funds by such means as extravagant banquets and unessential travel. In October Chinese prosecutors filed criminal charges against Zhou Beifang and 29 others, including two ex-Beijing officials. Zhou, who reportedly paid millions in bribes to corrupt officials in return for favours, was the son of the former chairman of Capital Iron and Steel Corp. and a confidant of Deng. The Central Committee for Discipline Inspection called for harsher punishment of corrupt officials while declaring that ethical and cultural progress should not be sacrificed in the name of economic development. This was one of several implicit criticisms of Deng's reforms. A thorough critique of the reforms was contained in the unpublished but widely circulated "Ten Thousand Character Essay," attributed to the conservative ideologue Deng Liqun. The tract, which warned that the CPC's hold on power was seriously threatened by the rise of a new Chinese bourgeoisie, revived the old Maoist emphasis on class struggle. This viewpoint was challenged by Cao Siyuan, a leading reformer who had been purged in 1989. In an article published in an obscure provincial economics journal, he argued that reform was the only way the CPC could retain power, but it would do so only if it stopped meddling in all aspects of social life. Authorities forbade republication of the article.

      In April Beijing launched a new and well-publicized campaign called yanda ("strike hard") against violent crime, which shot up 13% in 1995. Within the first two months, according to estimates by Amnesty International, 100,000 illegal firearms were seized nationwide, tens of thousands of alleged criminals arrested, and 1,000 executed. On the information front Chinese leaders ordered stepped-up monitoring of computer bulletin boards and blocked access to numerous sites on the World Wide Web. These included those operated by foreign newspapers, human rights groups, overseas dissidents, and the Voice of America.

      Chinese leaders were equally determined to root out the vestiges of domestic dissent. They brushed aside international criticism of the 14-year prison term imposed in 1995 on Wei Jingsheng, who received the European Union's prestigious Andrey Sakharov Prize for Human Rights. In October Wang Dan, a student leader of the 1989 democracy movement, was sentenced to 11 years in prison on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government. The specific charges included publishing critical articles in foreign newspapers, raising money abroad for needy dissidents, and accepting a scholarship from the University of California. Another Chinese democrat, Liu Xiaobo, was sentenced to three years in a labour camp. Along with Wang Xizhe, he had drafted a letter critical of Jiang and called on the CPC to honour political and human rights. Wang Xizhe managed to escape from China and was granted political asylum in the U.S. After his release from prison in May, Bao Tong was kept in seclusion outside Beijing. He had been the top aide to Zhao Ziyang, the CPC chief purged in 1989. As a small gesture to the U.S. on the eve of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's November visit to Beijing, China released dissident Chen Ziming, who was suffering from cancer. Chinese leaders also put Hong Kong on notice that freedom of the press, as well as free speech and assembly, would be curtailed after 1997, solemn promises to the contrary notwithstanding. Hong Kong papers, for example, would be forbidden to advocate independence for Taiwan or to engage in political advocacy.

      In January, Human Rights Watch/Asia, a U.S. organization, using information supplied by a former staff physician at Shanghai's largest orphanage, charged officials there with deliberately starving unwanted orphans to death. China acknowledged an unusually high infant mortality rate at the orphanage but angrily denied the allegations, branding them part of an ongoing effort to besmirch China's international reputation.

      Trouble again flared in Tibet. In May monks at the Ganden monastery attacked Chinese police and officials after the imposition of a ban on photographs of the Dalai Lama. The police stormed the monastery, shot 2 monks, and arrested 100 others. Beijing threatened economic reprisals against such countries as Australia, whose leaders disregarded Chinese warnings by meeting with the Dalai Lama. The Tibet Daily, the CPC's mouthpiece in the region, urged Tibetans to embrace atheism in order to counter the influence of the Dalai Lama. This was tantamount to asking Tibetans to renounce their cultural identities. In September Premier Li Peng reminded restive Muslims in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region that they had to obey the law and support socialism. Violent clashes erupted between Muslim separatists and Chinese authorities, and in May China tightened border controls to curb arms smuggling from Central Asia.

The Economy.
      The Chinese economy performed well in 1996, although massive socioeconomic problems remained unsolved. Gross domestic product grew by about 10%, while the inflation rate dropped to just 6%, four points below the government's target. Industrial output increased 13.2% in the first six months, paced by small and medium township and village enterprises. The easing of inflation was mostly due to the drop in exports, which at $90.6 billion during the January-August period were down 4% from 1995. Exports picked up in the second half of the year, however, and the overall trade surplus for the year was expected to be $6 billion. Foreign investment, the engine of economic growth, grew 20% in the first half of 1996. With the economy having made a soft landing after several years of dizzying growth, the government slightly eased lending rates while keeping a tight hand on the growth of the money supply. The steady march toward convertibility of China's currency, the renminbi yuan, continued as foreign companies operating in China were given permission to convert the yuan freely into dollars or Japanese yen.

      After a record grain harvest of 466 million metric tons in 1995, another record crop of 475 million metric tons was expected in 1996. This yield was anticipated despite torrential summer rains throughout China that flooded 3,250,000 ha (8 million ac) of cropland, caused thousands of deaths, left millions homeless, and cost billions of yuan in damage. The Yellow River crested at its highest recorded level, inspiring fears of a catastrophic dike breach. Nevertheless, over the past 50 years, natural disasters on average had reduced China's harvests by just 1% annually. Work proceeded on the world's largest flood-control and hydroelectric project, the controversial Three Gorges Dam on the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) above Yichang. Chinese planners were considering huge water-diversification projects to channel excess water from the Chang Jiang to arid northern regions.

      Compared with the early 1990s, the CPC was now promoting slower growth, reasserting strong central control over the economy, and trying to redirect investments from the prosperous coastal provinces to the more slowly developing interior, especially the mountainous western provinces, where most of China's hard-core poor lived. China estimated that 65 million people, or just over 5% of the population, fell below a poverty line defined as an income of 5 yuan (60 cents) per day. The World Bank, using 8 yuan (96 cents) per day as the poverty line, estimated that 350 million (well over one-quarter of the Chinese population) fell below this line. Recalculating China's per capita income, the World Bank estimated China's 1992 per capita income at $1,800, compared with $1,210 for India, $2,970 for Indonesia, and $5,250 for Brazil. The calculations took into account the prices of goods on the various domestic markets.

      Unemployment, real and prospective, cast a huge shadow over the Chinese economy. The Ministry of Labour forecast that the number of rural jobless would rise to 140 million by the year 2000 because the economy was expected to generate only 70 million new jobs for the 210 million rural workers who would be seeking employment at that time. Large state-owned enterprises continued to struggle under mountains of debt. After years of decline these firms, employing some 115 million persons (70% of the industrial workforce) accounted for only one-third of China's industrial output and generated only 1% of industrial profits while absorbing three-quarters of industrial investments. The medium-sized and small state firms were experimenting with various ways to increase their profitability and orient themselves to a market economy, but no solutions were in sight for the industrial dinosaurs of the old state socialist economy. Many workers in state-run enterprises were given extended vacations, furloughed, simply not paid, or paid months in arrears.

      The Bank of China was admitted to the Swiss-based Bank for International Settlements (the so-called bankers' bank), in recognition of China's growing international importance. China's admission to the World Trade Organization was still blocked, however, by foreign, particularly U.S., insistence on various market-opening and statistical conditions that China still had not met. This increased Chinese resentment against the U.S.

Foreign Affairs.
      Beijing's concern that Taiwan was drifting toward independence was heightened by Taiwan Pres. Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the U.S. in June 1995. In February-March 1996 Chinese leaders stepped up their campaign of psychological warfare vis-à-vis Taiwan that had begun in July 1995 with large-scale military exercises and missile firings into international waters near Taiwan. As the Republic of China prepared for its first direct presidential elections in March, the People's Liberation Army practiced amphibious landings and fired live missiles off Taiwan's northern and southern coasts in an attempt to intimidate voters on the island. Beijing's belligerence boosted Lee's popularity and triggered the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier groups to international waters off Taiwan, an unmistakable signal of U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security. After its strategy of intimidation backfired, Beijing refused to resume talks with Taipei, but it invited Taiwan to establish direct air and shipping links with the mainland in order to facilitate further integration of the island's economy with that of mainland China.

      China's relations with Japan became strained over control of a group of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks off Taiwan's northeast coast that the Chinese call Diaoyu and the Japanese call Senkaku. When right-wing Japanese nationalists erected a flimsy aluminum lighthouse on the main islet, nationalist outrage erupted in China, Taiwan, and even Hong Kong. A flotilla of eight small boats from Hong Kong and Taiwan carried patriotic Chinese toward the Diaoyu islands in vain attempts to wrest sovereignty from Japan, but its coast guard repelled the miniarmada. While tongue-lashing Japan, Beijing banned anti-Japanese protests by campus nationalists, perhaps fearing that hotheads might turn their anger against cautious CPC leaders who had no desire to rupture relations with Japan, one of China's major economic partners. Jiang ordered students to calm down, reassuring them that the matter would be solved through diplomacy. The waters surrounding the islands were believed to overlie extensive oil and natural gas deposits. The U.S. and several Southeast Asian states quietly informed Beijing that they would not respect China's unilateral May 1996 declaration extending its territorial waters by some 2.5 million sq km (965,000 sq mi) in the South China Sea. Indonesia planned to conduct its largest-ever war games to warn China away from its Natuna Islands oil project.

      In late July China conducted the second of two nuclear explosions, then declared a moratorium on further testing and supported the worldwide Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Its implementation could depend on India, which had thus far refused to sign the agreement. According to authoritative sources, China's defense expenditures, an estimated $32 billion, were second in Asia only to Japan's. China continued to investigate overseas markets for advanced weapons system, possibly including an aircraft carrier. It concluded an agreement with Russia, its main overseas arms supplier, to purchase 72 SU-27 fighter jets and to build additional jets in China under a licensing agreement. According to defense experts, such acquisitions would not alter the regional balance of power.

      Sino-American relations, badly strained over Taiwan, marginally improved in the second half of the year. A last-minute agreement over the protection of intellectual property rights averted a threatened trade war between the two nations. The U.S. Congress again voted not to link unrelated issues with the granting of most-favoured-nation trade status to China. In the summer of 1996, China overtook Japan as the country with the largest surplus in trade with the U.S. Shortly after Pres. Bill Clinton's reelection, retiring secretary of state Warren Christopher visited Beijing to set up a 1997 summit meeting between Clinton and Jiang, and in December China's defense minister visited the U.S.

      Chinese leaders continued their globetrotting to countries near and far. When Jiang toured Africa in May, he dispensed aid to needy governments, and in November he became the first Chinese head of state to visit India. Li Peng visited Paris, where he awarded a large commercial airliner contract to the European Airbus consortium; in November he traveled to Brazil. The usual steady stream of major and minor state dignitaries, headed by Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin, visited Beijing. Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson was one of the few who raised the sensitive issue of human rights in China, such as the case of dissident Wang Dan. (STEVEN I. LEVINE)

▪ 1996

      The People's Republic of China is situated in eastern Asia, with coastlines on the Yellow Sea and the East and South China seas. Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan. (See Taiwan .) Pop. (1995 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,206,600,000. Cap.: Beijing. Monetary unit: renminbi yuan, with (Oct. 6, 1995) a free rate of 8.32 yuan to U.S. $1 (13.15 yuan = £ 1 sterling). President in 1995, Jiang Zemin; premier, Li Peng.

      In the midnight hour of Deng Xiaoping's reign, the political contours of the era that would follow the 91-year-old patriarch's passing began to emerge a little more clearly during 1995. Displaying an unwonted boldness, Pres. Jiang Zemin decisively strengthened his political position. China pursued an assertive foreign policy that could presage its global role in the 21st century. The economy continued to grow by nearly 9%, benefiting the urban middle and upper classes in particular, but none of the basic economic and social problems that a decade and a half of rapid growth had created seemed any closer to solution. Until Deng's successor was firmly in charge, those favouring liberalization would be challenged by those attempting to restore a quasi-centralized authoritarianism. Underlying China's continuing preparation for the post-Deng era was a peculiar generational division of labour between the young and the old. While the dynamic nonstate sector of the economy rocked to the beat of young entrepreneurs and workers, the shuffle step of superannuated politicians sounded in the corridors of power. The ancient would be replaced by the elderly.

Domestic Affairs.
      When Deng's youngest daughter acknowledged in January that her father was fading, official media were quick to contradict her. Nevertheless, Deng's capacity to intervene in politics was severely diminished, though even his occasional word still resonated. In April Deng's long-time rival Chen Yun, an opponent of radical reform and patron of conservative Premier Li Peng, died at the age of 89. Deng and 87-year-old Yang Shangkun were the only survivors among the top first-generation communist revolutionaries.

      The major political development of the year was the purge of Chen Xitong, a powerful member of the Political Bureau and Beijing first party secretary. A major corruption scandal that implicated top officials of the municipally owned Capital Iron and Steel Corp. and dozens of Beijing city officials precipitated Chen's fall from grace. In April Vice-Mayor Wang Baosen, who reportedly embezzled $37 million in government funds, committed suicide, and shortly thereafter Chen was forced to resign. At the 14th Central Committee's Fifth Plenum in September, Chen was officially ousted from the Political Bureau and placed under house arrest while undergoing investigation. By engineering the purge of Chen, despised by many Chinese for his role in the bloody June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre of democracy activists, Jiang not only eliminated a potential rival but also demonstrated his commitment to the faltering anticorruption campaign. The elevation of Defense Minister Chi Haotian and chief of staff Zhang Wannian to vice-chairmen of the Communist Party of China's (CPC's) Central Military Commission, a key organ of power, demonstrated Jiang's success in garnering support from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). That success, however, depended upon his acquiescence to an ever-growing political role for the military, which was dominated by conservative nationalists.

      Nevertheless, Jiang's position was still not impregnable, one indication being his inability to appoint one of his own stalwarts as Beijing's new party boss, a position filled by Wei Jianxing, a follower of Qiao Shi, head of the National People's Congress (NPC). An uncharismatic figure who lacked his own political compass, the president frequently tacked in the direction of China's neoconservatives such as Xiao Gongqin, Wang Huning, and Chen Yuan. Decrying the liberalizing and centrifugal effects of the reform era, they argued that Dengist rule had brought China perilously close to the brink of social anarchy and political disintegration. They yearned for a new strongman to rebuild centralized state authority.

      If Jiang relied on the party apparatus and the PLA, his rivals possessed their own bases of support. At the March meeting of the national congress, more than one-third of the representatives abstained or openly voted against the nomination of Jiang's choice for two vice-premiers. Qiao Shi, former chief of China's intelligence services turned legal and institutional reformer, continued to boost the law-making role of the NPC, the foundation of his authority. Although the NPC was still far from being an effective parliament, it had the potential to become one. Meanwhile, the increasing number of contested local elections in which voters exercised genuine if limited choice suggested that ordinary citizens possessed a political capacity that elitist neoconservative theorists were reluctant to acknowledge. Be that as it may, the perhaps temporary ascendancy of Jiang and his allies had dimmed the once bright political prospects of economic reformer Zhu Rongji, who, like Li, was at least partially overshadowed.

      In February and March the first major stirrings of political dissent since the Tiananmen democracy movement emerged. A dozen leading intellectuals called on the NPC to investigate official corruption and halt the abuse of police power. On May 15, just three weeks before the sixth anniversary of the Tiananmen affair, 45 leading intellectuals and scientists addressed a political petition drafted by venerable physicist Xu Liangying to Jiang and Qiao. Counterposing the Western legacy of freedom to China's heritage of repression, the petitioners called upon party leaders to adopt "a spirit of tolerance" toward ideology, political thought, and religious belief; to release prisoners of conscience; and to end China's "ignominious tradition of literary inquisitions." In so doing, the petitioners politely but boldly challenged the foundations of CPC rule.

      These daring initiatives elicited only hostile responses. Signers of the petitions were called in for questioning and otherwise harassed. In June Beijing arrested U.S. citizen Harry Wu (see BIOGRAPHIES (Wu, Harry Hongda )), a human rights activist, on trumped-up charges of espionage. A 19-year veteran of China's political prisons, Wu had infuriated Beijing authorities with his widely publicized exposés of human rights abuses in China. After sentencing Wu to 15 years in prison, China immediately expelled him to relieve enormous international pressure. Wei Jingsheng, China's leading democracy activist, was released from prison in September 1993 after having served 14 1/2 years for challenging Deng Xiaoping's authority. He resumed his peaceful political activity but was rearrested on April 1, 1994. After a closed trial he was sentenced to 14 years in prison. This harsh warning against political dissent evoked condemnation around the world. A host of lesser-known dissidents and democrats, including Tibetan supporters of the Dalai Lama, continued to languish in Chinese prisons. Seeking to undermine the Dalai Lama's authority, Beijing compelled leading Tibetan clerics to reject the exiled leader's designation of a new Panchen Lama, Tibet's second most important religious leader, in favour of China's own choice.

The Economy.
      Underlying the political dynamics of contemporary China and posing difficult policy choices for the country's leaders were the immense economic and social changes that the Dengist era had produced. Many changes had been for the better. Even though the political system stifled open dissent, most Chinese enjoyed an unprecedented degree of personal mobility and freedom. The standard of living of most Chinese had improved substantially. The number of rural poor had declined from 200 million to 80 million in a decade. Fifteen years of rapid economic growth had transformed the face of urban and rural China, creating unprecedented prosperity for many while widening the gap between rich and poor. The continuing influx of tens of millions of rural Chinese into coastal and interior boom towns in search of employment and a better life followed the pattern of other less developed countries. Such migrants overburdened municipal services, drove up the crime rate, and contributed to a growing sense of social disorder that had translated into support for leaders who promised stability at any price. Among other negative phenomena was the growing illegal drug problem. A burgeoning trade in heroin, manufactured from opium poppies in Myanmar (Burma), had entered the world market via southwestern China. Rising rates of addiction plagued Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. Drug use was growing among young urban sophisticates. As elsewhere, violent crime accompanied the drug trade. A commodity culture heavily influenced by the West, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan was supplanting values associated with communitarian socialism.

      China's economy remained a hybrid in which thriving capitalist limbs had been grafted onto an anemic state socialist body. At its Fifth Plenum in September, the party's Central Committee ratified the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), which envisioned an 8-9% growth rate. In recent years China's growth, most of it outside the state sector, had exceeded government estimates, although the five-year projection was almost identical with the 8.9% rate achieved during the first three quarters of 1995. Viewing balanced growth as the key to achieving social and political stability, the CPC endorsed economic reform and underscored the importance of the electronics, petrochemical, motor vehicle, machinery, and building materials industries. Again no solution was offered to the perennial problem of heavily subsidized and debt-ridden state enterprises that continued to employ the majority of China's industrial workers. China's state-dominated banking industry had to absorb the annual loss of billions of yuan in bad loans to insolvent state-owned enterprises, which were kept afloat for essentially political reasons. Understandably, no one in power was willing to risk the serious social instability that mass layoffs might entail. Moreover, because state-owned enterprises constituted the economic essence of state socialism, they also embodied the CPC's resolve to prevent the final victory of a market economy with its concomitant threat to party rule.

      Since gaining power in 1949, the CPC had had to face the nightmare of inflation, which had accelerated the downfall of its Nationalist predecessors. In 1995 inflation was cut nearly in half to just over 13% as China slowed the growth of its money supply. Now one of the world's top trading nations, China enjoyed a $20.3 billion trade surplus through September, and its foreign-exchange reserves nearly doubled to $64.2 billion, the sixth highest in the world. Nevertheless, a number of economic problems continued to plague China's relations with the industrialized world. In late February, after the U.S. and China had initiated trade sanctions against each other, China finally acceded to U.S. pressure by pledging to curb the rampant pirating of U.S. software and audio- and videocassettes. The ballooning of the U.S. trade deficit with China, projected to reach $38 billion in 1995 (according to U.S. statistics), further soured Sino-American relations, already strained by political factors. At the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November, Beijing promised to slash import tariffs in 1996 by 30% on more than 4,000 kinds of imported goods as one concrete step toward the 25-year goal of an Asia-Pacific free-trade zone. The U.S.-led Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development stipulated further changes that China would have to undertake to secure admission to the World Trade Organization.

      Rapid sustained economic growth had been the key to China's coming of age as a global power. China continued to attract substantial foreign investment in 1995, with particular interest being shown in such massive infrastructural projects as energy, telecommunications, and highways. The U.S.-based auto giant General Motors received the coveted partnership it sought to develop a mass-produced people's car. As work progressed on the approximately $30 billion Three Gorges Dam, the administration of U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton directed the U.S. Export-Import Bank to withhold financing for U.S. companies engaging in the project, widely criticized by Chinese as well as foreign environmentalists. On the whole, however, Chinese leaders were able to rely on their country's enormous potential for investment, trade, and economic cooperation as an effective buffer against unwelcome intervention by foreign governments.

Foreign Affairs.
      The terms on which China related to the world had been in flux for more than a century and a half. China's rapidly growing economic achievements and military muscle lent a new urgency to this question. A cooperative China integrated into global and regional economic and security institutions would be a major force for stability and progress. An uncooperative or even obstreperous China could sabotage international agreements, bully its neighbours, and threaten regional security. Resurgent nationalism, expressing pride in Chinese identity and recent accomplishments, was encouraged by government leaders, who saw in nationalism an effective substitute for moribund Marxism-Leninism.

      China's growing assertiveness expressed itself in 1995 in several ways. Most important was a prolonged contretemps with the U.S. over the issue of Taiwan. Yielding to overwhelming congressional pressure, the Clinton administration granted Lee Teng-hui, president of the Republic of China in Taiwan, permission for a private visit in June to give a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Beijing hardliners, already convinced of U.S. hostility toward China, treated the visit as a major provocation requiring a firm response. Claiming that Washington had reneged on its promise to deny Lee a visa, Beijing discerned a U.S. plot to bolster Taiwan's international status notwithstanding Washington's assurances, first given by Pres. Richard Nixon in 1972, that it viewed Taiwan as a Chinese province. Beijing recalled its ambassador, backed out of arms control talks, arrested Harry Wu, and denounced the U.S. for perfidy.

      In a crude attempt at military intimidation, China carried out two series of missile and naval artillery tests in the East China Sea just north of Taiwan and practiced joint combat exercises involving air and naval forces. Beijing's message about Taiwan's vulnerability was unmistakable. PLA leaders also publicly discussed the circumstances under which China might seize Taiwan by force. Although Taiwan's stock market temporarily dipped, Beijing failed to erode political support for Lee, whom it accused of covertly supporting Taiwanese independence.

      This latest in a series of bumpy stretches in Sino-American relations smoothed out after Beijing's expulsion of Harry Wu, which cleared the way for Hillary Rodham Clinton to attend the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. In her address, however, she blasted China for human rights abuses with undiplomatic forthrightness. Meanwhile, the Chinese government had angered many of those taking part in a concurrent nongovernmental women's forum by severely limiting contact between foreign participants and Chinese women. (See Sidebar (UNITED NATIONS: Fourth World Conference on Women ).) The resumption in the fall of U.S.-China military exchanges and a brief October meeting in New York between Jiang and Clinton signaled the end of the contretemps. Washington stopped just short of categorically promising it would never again grant Lee permission to visit the U.S., but the price of risking Chinese ire was now clearly marked on the ticket. In the final analysis, Beijing again demonstrated its willingness to speak its mind.

      For more than two decades, China had been systematically pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea through a strategy that wrapped incremental military encroachment in a cloak of diplomatic flexibility. In February the Chinese navy established a presence on Mischief Reef, one of the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines, whose minuscule navy retaliated by dismantling Chinese territorial markers and structures and detaining Chinese fishing vessels in adjacent waters. (See The Spat over the Spratlys (Spotlight: The Spat over the Spratlys ).) Chinese actions risked antagonizing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), four of whose members—the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam—asserted claims in the Spratlys along with China and Taiwan. At the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in July, China reiterated both its own claim to sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and its willingness to seek a peaceful resolution of competing claims while engaging in joint development of maritime resources in the area. Throughout Asia there was a growing awareness shading into anxiety about the implications for regional security of China's growing military strength, and quiet discussions about how to counterbalance it took place. China took another step toward control of Hong Kong by naming in December the committee that would oversee the transition.

      At the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty review conference in April-May, China, a nuclear weapons state, echoed Third World criticism of the treaty but nonetheless endorsed its indefinite extension. Seeking to deflect criticism of its own nuclear weapons tests, Beijing condemned the other nuclear weapons states, and especially the U.S., for developing high-tech missile defense systems and promoting overseas arms sales.

      The 50th anniversary of the end of World War II provided an opportunity for China to join fellow victims in condemning Japanese wartime aggression and chastising Tokyo for its reluctance to accept full responsibility for its transgressions. This theme was sounded again by Jiang during his November visit to Seoul, the first state visit to South Korea by China's president. Relations with India and Russia continued to improve, although in the long term strong elements of rivalry overshadowed the cooperative dimension, particularly with respect to Sino-Indian relations.

      China's future remained impossible to forecast with confidence even for the relatively near term. In part this was attributable to its size and complexity, but it also reflected the political uncertainties of a transition period and the unresolved choices in domestic and foreign affairs that awaited either the consolidation of Jiang's power in a post-Deng era or his replacement at the apex of power by one or another of his rivals. Although unlikely, the fragmentation of the country or even the collapse of the regime could not be ruled out entirely. Whatever scenario one envisioned, the problem of governing this huge, unwieldy country undergoing rapid economic and social transformation was a challenge of staggering proportions. But governing China had never been a simple matter. (STEVEN I. LEVINE)

▪ 1995

      The People's Republic of China is situated in eastern Asia, with coastlines on the Yellow Sea and the East and South China seas. Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan. (See Taiwan, below.) Pop. (1994 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,192,300,000. Cap.: Beijing (Peking). Monetary unit: renminbi yuan, with (Oct. 7, 1994) an interbank rate of 8.53 yuan to U.S. $1 (13.57 yuan = £ 1 sterling). President in 1994, Jiang Zemin (Chiang Tse-min); premier, Li Peng (Li P'eng).

      As contradictory political, economic, and social trends pulled China, a country of nearly 1.2 billion people, in opposite directions in 1994, it was difficult to discern a coherent pattern in the government's policies. At the beginning of the year, China's leaders proclaimed a period of comprehensive reforms, but these were nowhere in evidence at year's end apart from the introduction of a new tax system. Two conflicting images of China were unmistakable. The first was that of a rapidly developing economic powerhouse, playing an increasingly important international role and vigorously asserting its interests on the stage of Asian and world politics. The second was that of a country with decreasing internal cohesion, beset by intractable social and economic problems and indifferently governed by Communist Party veterans mainly interested in clinging to power. Ample evidence supported both of these images. China seemed to be a vessel adrift at high speed, its destination unknowable.

Domestic Affairs.
      This situation stemmed in part from the continuing deathwatch over senior leader Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), which preoccupied the top leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), notably Pres. Jiang Zemin (Chiang Tse-min), Premier Li Peng (Li P'eng), and the chairman of the National People's Congress, Qiao Shi (Ch'iao Shih). (See BIOGRAPHIES (Qiao Shi ).) Deng, who celebrated his 90th birthday on August 22, was reportedly suffering from Parkinson's disease and various other illnesses. He appeared in public just once, on television, at the Chinese New Year's reception in Shanghai.

      In political as well as economic terms, Shanghai's star rose in 1994. Former mayor Jiang, chosen by Deng in 1989 as the core of China's new leadership, further strengthened his position as general secretary of the CPC, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and president. In September the fourth plenum of the 14th Central Committee elevated Shanghai Mayor Huang Ju (Huang Chü), a Jiang ally, to the Political Bureau of the CPC, and leading economic reformers Wu Bangguo (Wu Pang-kuo) and Jiang Chunyun (Chiang Ch'un-yün) to the Secretariat. Jiang continued to cultivate the military, promoting 19 generals in the course of the year. His greatest political asset, should he stumble badly, was that Deng was probably too feeble to dismiss him, as the senior leader had done to earlier designated successors Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang) in 1989.

      Given its numerous problems, China could ill afford a post-Deng succession struggle. The collective leadership of Jiang, Li, and Qiao would probably work together, at least in the initial stage of the post-Deng period. Deng's generation was all but gone, and the reputation of the late Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) was further tarnished with the publication in the West of The Private Life of Chairman Mao. These intimate memoirs by Mao's longtime personal physician, Li Zhisui (Li Chih-sui), portrayed the supposed exemplar of revolutionary virtue as a cruel and depraved monster, a despot who took pleasure in destroying his political adversaries, and a satyr with an insatiable appetite for young women. Estimates by respected scholars had suggested that as many as 60 million to 80 million Chinese may have died as a result of Mao's policies between 1949 and 1976. China's leaders, nonetheless, continued to honour Mao as a great patriot and national hero.

      The results of the CPC's fourth plenum suggested disagreement within the leadership over how to tackle the nation's economic and social problems. The emphasis of the third plenum (November 1993) had been economic reform. The fourth plenum focused on ways to strengthen the influence of the CPC, which had been considerably attenuated by 15 years of capitalist-style reforms. "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning Some Major Issues on Strengthening Party Building" called for improving the system of "democratic centralism," choosing able and honest officials, and rebuilding the party's rural branches. Given the growing economic gap between urban and rural China, however, and the leadership's anxiety about the spectre of growing rural unrest, such a program was not difficult to understand. The party also sought to rekindle ideological fervour through a nationwide Program for Implementation of Education in Patriotism. In this connection Li Ruihuan (Li Jui-huan), fourth-ranking member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, told an international conference on Confucianism that it was the duty of every Chinese to enhance the study of Confucianism. Having abandoned Karl Marx in all but name, the CPC sought moral salvation from the Chinese sage it had vilified not long before.

      That Confucius was presented as an authoritarian taskmaster rather than the apostle of Chinese humanism was evident from the party's intolerance of political dissent. Even before international pressure eased on China, the government displayed a hard-edged attitude toward human rights and political opposition. The outspoken democratic activist Wei Jingsheng (Wei Ching-sheng), released in 1993 after serving nearly 15 years in prison, was rearrested in April 1994. U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton's decision in late May to delink U.S.-China trade from human rights considerations made China's democrats and dissenters vulnerable to intensified state repression. Among the many sentenced to labour camps were Yang Zhou (Yang Chou), spokesman for the Chinese Human Rights Association, and Shanghai democracy activists Bao Ge (Pao Ke) and Yang Qinheng (Yang Ch'in-heng). Journalists Xi Yang (Hsi Yang) and Gao Yu (Kao Yü) were among those imprisoned on spurious charges of publishing state secrets. Leaders of China's tiny Labour Alliance, an embryonic free-trade union, were arrested or forced underground, and 14 dissidents were tried in July, the largest number in a political trial since 1989. In December nine pro-democracy activists were jailed; three of the dissidents were sentenced to more than 15 years. Nonconforming religious leaders and worshipers were another target of state repression.

      All these arrests were part of a systematic effort to implement the 1993 State Security Law, which, among other things, sought to sever ties between dissidents and their international supporters. Human Rights Watch/Asia, a human rights organization with excellent sources of information on China, reported that Chinese physicians were "harvesting" kidneys and other organs from condemned prisoners, sometimes under anesthesia before their actual execution, to use in organ transplants for high-ranking Chinese officials or for sale to foreigners; the going price for a kidney was $30,000. This report was confirmed by the on-site investigations of Harry Wu, a former prisoner in the Chinese gulag.

The Economy.
      CPC leaders, however, had reason to believe that their political sins would be overlooked by the outside world as long as the Chinese economy continued to grow and foreigners were given a piece of the action. In March, Li, fearing inflation and budgetary overruns, forecast a 9% gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in 1994, down considerably from 1993's torrid 13.5%. This target proved too modest, however, because less than half of China's GDP was being produced by the state sector, and 9% growth was considered sluggish by booming coastal provinces such as Guangdong (Kuang-tung). In fact, the economy continued to expand at an 11.8% clip.

      The most worrisome effect of high growth was an upwardly spiraling inflation rate. The consumer price index shot up 27.4% in the first three quarters of the year, with food responsible for about half the increase. (The average Chinese spent 50% of personal income on food.) Grain prices soared owing to sharp increases in the amount the state paid farmers for their grain, as well as disastrous floods, the imposition of a 17% value-added tax on goods, loose credit policies, the effects of price reforms in 1993, and excessive demand. Overall, increases in per capita income outpaced inflation, but the income gap between the urban nouveaux riches and the mass of ordinary workers and farmers continued to widen, with disturbing social consequences.

      In the first half of 1994, crime soared 20% as new waves of rural migrants contributed to an accelerating breakdown of social order in the cities. Authorities cracked down on illegal firearms possession and struggled to control the activities of rapidly proliferating criminal gangs, many with international connections. In September the deadly rampage of a lone gunman in downtown Beijing (Peking) was a powerful symbol of growing lawlessness. Among the measures the authorities used to combat crime was the profligate application of the death penalty, making China responsible for more than 60% of the world's state-ordered executions. Officials estimated that there were 140 million "surplus labourers" in China—more than the entire population of Japan—a figure that could rise substantially as the shutdown of unprofitable state enterprises produced massive unemployment. During the first half of the year, 43% of state-run industries lost money. Any slowdown in urban and national infrastructure construction would further exacerbate a problem for which there appeared to be no solution other than long-term population control. The State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation released a list of 210 major capital construction projects for the period 1993-2000. Concentrated in the fields of energy, transportation, and agriculture, they were intended to act as a magnet for foreign capital and facilitate the transformation of China into a modern industrial power.

      The State Council announced a pilot program to provide one-time cash payments to workers who lost their jobs as a result of plant closings, but the absence of a comprehensive state system of social security, including unemployment insurance, caused government leaders to shy away from radical solutions to the problem. Yet pressure from insolvent enterprises for additional government subsidies made it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the tight-credit policy needed to control inflation. The money supply grew by 37% in the first three quarters, rather than the planned 25% increase. China's foreign trade approached $234 billion in 1994, with exports up 30% to $120 billion and imports up 10% to $114 billion. The projected $6 billion surplus reversed the previous year's deficit. China's foreign-exchange reserves, bolstered by $22.7 billion from foreign direct investment in the first three quarters of the year, increased to $43.7 billion, more than double the level of a year earlier. Beijing's efforts to reenter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and become a founding member of the World Trade Organization (which was to replace GATT on Jan. 1, 1995) were blocked by the U.S. and European countries because of China's reluctance to fully open its domestic market to international competition. The U.S., irritated by China's slow crackdown on the rampant piracy of U.S. computer software and compact discs, temporarily suspended trade talks in December. At the beginning of the year, China abolished its dual currency system by withdrawing Foreign Exchange Certificates from circulation and moving toward a freely convertible yuan.

      China was the largest borrower from the World Bank in 1994, with over $3 billion in loans. These included $925 million in soft loans from the International Development Association. In Hubei (Hu-pei) province ground was broken on Li's controversial pet project, the gargantuan Three Gorges Dam, scheduled for completion in the year 2009 at an official cost of $11.2 billion. It was designed to generate 84 billion kw-hr of electricity annually and to control flooding. China also unveiled plans for a huge North-South Water Diversion Project, which included a shift of water from the upper Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) to China's arid northwestern provinces. The World Bank and other international lenders shied away from such mammoth projects, however, because of doubts about their feasibility, efficacy, and human costs. Despite prevailing optimism about China's economic future, the difficulties many foreign companies faced in collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in loans that had been guaranteed by the government raised significant questions in the international business community about China's creditworthiness.

      Nevertheless, numerous foreign companies vied for the privilege of coproducing with the Chinese automobile industry a "people's car" that would be within the financial reach of tens of millions of Chinese. The environmental impact of the "automobilization" of China would certainly be substantial.

Foreign Affairs.
      The question of whether the United States would extend China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) status, providing China normal access to the vital U.S. market, dominated the first half of the year. In May 1993 Clinton had threatened to withdraw China's MFN status if it failed to make substantial progress in the area of human rights. Gambling that pressure from U.S. business interests would force Clinton to back down, Chinese leaders called his bluff and won.

      Continuing a policy initiated in September 1993, Clinton sent a stream of top officials to Beijing, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, and Secretary of Defense William Perry. Christopher, preaching human rights prior to Clinton's MFN decision, was rebuffed. Brown and Perry, pursuing contracts and contacts after the MFN decision, were warmly greeted. However, Chinese leaders, angered that Washington had broken the long-standing taboo on direct contact between high-ranking U.S. and Taiwan officials, deferred a late-year trip by Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña, who had earlier visited Taipei. Clinton and Jiang met again at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bogor, Indon. Jiang outlined several principles for good U.S.-China relations, which Clinton endorsed. The Chinese angled for a prestigious presidential visit, but it seemed unlikely that Clinton, down on his political fortunes, would risk such a trip. In January the U.S. and China narrowly averted a confrontation over trade with an 11th-hour agreement on textile imports. In October China pledged once more to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime and banned the sale or transfer of certain surface-to-surface missiles. In exchange the U.S. lifted sanctions that prohibited the export of certain U.S. high-technology satellites to China. Beijing supported Washington's efforts to settle the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful means and endorsed the accord that obliged North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in return for modern nuclear power technology and financial incentives. Despite these efforts, an undercurrent of mutual suspicion continued to pervade official Chinese-U.S. relations, particularly after the U.S. announced in September that it would seek to upgrade official ties with Taiwan.

      China's version of dollar diplomacy, successful vis-à-vis the U.S., worked elsewhere as well. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien visited China in November and returned with $6.6 billion in trade deals. The prime ministers of France, Japan, Australia, and Israel were among the many other influential figures who visited China.

      Jiang and Li were active on the diplomatic front. Jiang visited Russia, Ukraine, and France in September. In Moscow he and Russian Pres. Boris Yeltsin signed military cooperation agreements. In Paris he dispensed $2.5 billion in commercial largesse, exacting in return a French pledge to engage in no further arms sales to Taiwan. In November Jiang visited Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In Hanoi he signed an agreement pledging peaceful negotiations with Vietnam over territorial issues and abstention from the threat or use of force.

      Li ventured into Central Asia in April, visiting Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan, where he signed a border-delimitation agreement with Pres. Nursultan Nazarbayev. In July Li visited Austria, Germany, and Romania. In Germany, China's largest European trading partner, he encountered hostile demonstrations because of his role in the 1989 Tiananmen (T'ien-an-men) Square massacre. Chinese-South Korean relations, grounded in economic and security concerns, were bolstered by an exchange of visits between Li and Pres. Kim Young Sam. The death of longtime North Korean president Kim Il Sung in July deprived China of an irritating friend and elevated his enigmatic son Kim Jong Il to power. Because China sought stability in the Korean peninsula, it opposed North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons. (See East Asia and the Transition in North Korea (Spotlight: East Asia and the Transition in North Korea ).)

      Brushing aside international criticism, China conducted two more nuclear tests in 1994 and announced it would continue testing until a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty came into effect, possibly in 1996. Analysts believed the tests were designed to perfect China's submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Amphibious landing exercises by China's military and close-in naval patrols off the Taiwan coast raised anxieties in Taipei. Chinese media, however, argued that the country's low military expenditures disproved alarmist claims that China posed a military threat to its neighbours.

      As the year drew to a close, the Chinese people, or at least many of those living in the booming coastal provinces, were more prosperous than before. Serious questions remained, however, as to whether the current leadership would be able to reawaken in the Chinese people concern for society as a whole and lessen their preoccupation with the individual and family moneymaking, which was dominating the last days of the Deng era. (STEVEN I. LEVINE)

▪ 1994

      The People's Republic of China is situated in eastern Asia, with coastlines on the Yellow Sea and the East and South China seas. Area: 9,572,900 sq km (3,696,100 sq mi), including Tibet and excluding Taiwan. (See Taiwan, below.) Pop. (1993 est., excluding Taiwan): 1,179,467,000. Cap.: Beijing (Peking). Monetary unit: renminbi yuan, with (Oct. 4, 1993) an official rate of 5.78 yuan to U.S. $1 (8.76 yuan = £ 1 sterling). Presidents in 1993, Yang Shangkun (Yang Shang-k'un) and, from March 27, Jiang Zemin (Chiang Tse-min); premier, Li Peng (Li P'eng).

      As the era of Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) was drawing to a close, the contradictions associated with the profound social transformation of the past 15 years threatened to undermine national unity and the political stability that many Chinese felt was the foundation of the nation's rapid economic growth and rising international stature. Toward the end of 1993, the Communist Party of China (CPC) unveiled an economic reform program aimed at accelerating the transformation of China into a market economy without threatening the prosperity, power, and privileged position of the central and local Communist Party elite. At almost the same time, a diplomatic initiative undertaken by the new administration of U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton presented China's leaders with an opportunity to work together with the U.S. to reverse a troublesome downward spiral in Sino-American relations. Nonetheless, Clinton made it clear that a renewal of China's most-favoured-nation trade status depended on an improvement in its observance of human rights. China's international reputation had been damaged by its poor human rights record, a fact brought forcefully home in September when the International Olympic Committee awarded the summer Olympic Games in the year 2000 to Sydney, Australia, rather than to Beijing (Peking).

Politics and the Economy.
      In early 1992, Deng personally reenergized China's economic reform program by touring booming coastal southeastern China and lauding its progress. On November 2 the publication of volume 3 of Deng's selected works marked a further step in his apotheosis from an 89-year-old political leader into a textual deity of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Earlier in the year, Deng's youngest daughter, Deng Rong (Teng Jung), softened and humanized the portrait of the tough-minded and unsentimental politician in an admiring biography.

      Deng's waning energy focused attention on the still unresolved problem of political succession. A heart attack suffered by 64-year-old Premier Li Peng (Li P'eng) in April, not long after his reelection in office by the National People's Congress (NPC) in March, sidelined him for seven weeks, but by early summer he had resumed a full schedule of activities. An indication of Li's unpopularity was evident when 300 NPC delegates failed to support his reelection. In June, Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (Chu Jung-chi), a no-nonsense technocrat much admired in the West, replaced Li Guixian (Li Kuei-hsien) as governor of the Bank of China, the country's central bank. His immediate task was to cool off China's overheated economy.

      Jiang Zemin (Chiang Tse-min) improved his paper credentials as Deng's main putative successor by adding the title of state president to his positions as CPC general secretary and chairman of the party's Central Military Commission. His actual sphere of domestic political power, however, was restricted to propaganda and general political exhortation. It was Jiang, for example, who kicked off the party's midsummer anticorruption campaign, inveighing against officials who charged fees for what were supposed to be free public services and for establishing businesses from which they profited by abusing their authority. So vast was the scale of corruption that even the application of the death sentence to particularly venal officials was unlikely to have more than a marginal effect. Jiang's credentials as a world statesman were slightly improved by his attendance at the Seattle, Wash., summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November, where he also met privately with Clinton. The two men reportedly discussed China's growing trade surplus with the U.S., its observance of human rights, and its sale of weapons to other countries. Serious doubts persisted, however, about Jiang's influence over Chinese military leaders, a substantial number of whom apparently viewed him as a weak and ineffectual leader. Qiao Shi (Ch'iao Shih), a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee and one who also hoped to inherit Deng's mantle, acquired some international exposure by touring Southeast Asia in his capacity as head of the NPC.

      The decorous jostling for political position among China's central party and governmental leaders was partially overshadowed by the ongoing devolution of power from the centre to the provinces, counties, and municipalities, a result of China's continuing economic and social transformation. When the centre supported further economic reform in early 1992 by relaxing controls, there was a renewed pell mell rush toward market-driven prosperity in the dynamic coastal provinces. Periodic attempts to reassert central control to dampen inflation and protect tax revenues threatened growth. The localities thus functioned as the engine of growth and the centre as the brake. As a result, China's forward motion over a dozen years had been rapid but often herky-jerky.

      In his report to the NPC in March, Li Peng announced a plan to restructure the State Council by cutting government staff by 25% over a three-year period and by reducing the number of government ministries and commissions from 86 to 59. Earlier attempts to put the Chinese state on a diet had proved futile. The state bureaucracy of nearly 40 million persons had increased by one million annually, much faster than the rate of population growth. Administrative expenditures consumed 40% of the central government's revenues.

      China's protracted war against political opposition continued during the year. Well-known political prisoners were treated as a valuable commodity to be released in carefully calibrated quantities to satisfy Western (primarily U.S.) demands for visible progress in human rights. Freed from prison in February after serving most of a four-year sentence, Tiananmen (T'ien-an-men) student leader Wang Dan (Wang Tan) expressed a desire to make money because he viewed prosperity as a prerequisite for the democratization of China. On the eve of the annual U.S. debate over China's trade status, Beijing released Xu Wenli (Hsü Wen-li), who had served 12 years for his role in the democracy movement of 1978-79. China's most famous political prisoner, 43-year-old Wei Jingsheng (Wei Ching-sheng), was released in September on the eve of the International Olympic Committee vote. Wei, unbowed and unrepentant, planned to write his prison memoirs, but he was warned that publication of such material was forbidden. Meanwhile, new prisoners took the place of the old. Veteran human rights activist Fu Shenqi (Fu Shen-ch'i) was sentenced to three years for speaking to foreign reporters. Bai Weiji (Pai Wei-chi), his wife, Zhao Lei (Chao Lei), and others were given long sentences for leaking documents to a Western journalist. In most other countries the material would never have been considered state secrets. Chinese officials sought to refute Western critics of their harsh penal system by depicting Chinese prison conditions as almost cushy. They also accused the U.S. of gross hypocrisy in attacking China for exporting goods made by prison labour because a number of U.S. states, notably California, were vigorously promoting prison exports.

      More worrisome to the CPC were demonstrations in Lhasa, Tibet, in late May. As many as a thousand protesters chanting anti-Chinese, pro-independence slogans had to be silenced by a show of force. The Tibet issue was so sensitive that China felt compelled to block the Dalai Lama from addressing the UN-sponsored World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June. Muslim discontent surfaced in October in remote Qinghai (Tsinghai) province when crowds in the provincial capital of Xining (Hsi-ning) attacked government offices and police over the publication of a book they considered offensive to their faith. In addition, worker strikes and some 200 small-scale but occasionally violent peasant protests against corrupt and rapacious local officials reportedly occurred in more than a dozen Chinese provinces. Rural discontent over a widening gap between urban and rural living standards accelerated migration to urban areas. Perhaps 100 million unregistered job hunters crowded into the cities, straining the resources and capacity of municipal governments. None of these developments signaled an imminent social explosion, but they justified high-level anxiety. Acknowledging a multiplicity of rural problems, Jiang pledged that the CPC would rebuild its disintegrated network of local party organizations in the countryside. Chinese society was also being stratified in other ways. The older Communist elite discreetly enjoyed their special privileges behind curtained car windows, in unmarked special stores, and in off-limits resorts. The new class of affluent urban entrepreneurs, as well as officials on the take, flaunted their wealth, indulging in an overtly bourgeois lifestyle that contrasted sharply with that of ordinary workers and salaried professionals. Sexual mores that questioned traditional values and concepts, sharply rising suicide rates, and increased incidence of mental illness accompanied social change.

      Unable to do much more than shake their fists at the rising tide, China's cultural commissars nevertheless sought to guard public morals. They banned public showing of Chen Kaige's (Ch'en K'ai-ke's; see BIOGRAPHIES (Chen Kaige )) politically subversive homoerotic film Farewell, My Concubine, which shared the Palme d'Or at the Cannes Film Festival, but reluctantly reversed themselves under international pressure. Actually, the literary and political writings of dissidents as well as video and audio cassettes continued to circulate rather freely inside China.

      Deng generally favoured high economic growth with the attendant risk of instability over the more cautious approach preferred by some of his colleagues. In the first half of 1993, China's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at the phenomenal rate of 13.9%. Industrial production increased by over 25%; imports soared; and the money supply expanded by nearly 50%, while the Chinese yuan-U.S. dollar exchange rate fell from 7.4 to 10.6 on China's foreign currency swap markets. The budgetary deficit grew as government spending increased by 12.5% while revenues increased only 3.5%.

      It was in this context that the Central Committee issued a 16-point document aimed at cooling down the economy. Zhu Rongji was entrusted with its implementation. In his take-charge style, Zhu quickly moved to tighten the money supply by restricting credit, cutting back on government spending, increasing savings through compulsory government bond purchases, slashing capital purchases, and strengthening price controls that still remained. The effects on property prices and construction activity were immediate and dramatic. In Hainan province real-estate prices quickly fell 50%. Before the full effects of this austerity program could take hold, however, the party leadership reversed itself, opting for growth over stability. At its third plenum, in November, the 14th Central Committee adopted a comprehensive resolution entitled "CPC Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Questions Regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System." Among the changes envisioned in the lengthy document were the economic modernization of state-owned enterprises and their gradual conversion into joint-stock companies, the establishment of a modern tax system based on income and value-added taxes to guarantee adequate revenue for the central state apparatus, the creation of an effective central banking system capable of regulating the economy by means of macroeconomic monetary and financial policies rather than by state administrative orders, and the establishment of a comprehensive system of social security to cushion the shock of large-scale urban unemployment as inefficient state industries merged or folded. The new tax plan was scheduled to go into effect on Jan. 1, 1994.

      China's dynamic economic growth attracted foreign investment at a rate several times greater than in 1992. In the first three quarters, contracts totaling $83 billion in direct foreign investment were signed. Several hundred million dollars' worth of Chinese bonds were snapped up on the New York and London bond markets, and corporate and institutional money managers hastened to add Chinese investments to their portfolios. According to Chinese statistics, foreign trade shot up 17.7% between January and September, with imports surging 29.9% to $68.2 billion and exports growing at a more modest 6.6% to $61.2 billion. China consequently faced its first foreign-trade deficit since 1989.

      As if to confirm that China had come of age economically, the International Monetary Fund asserted in its 1993 World Economic Outlook that China's economy was far larger than had previously been calculated and that in absolute terms it was surpassed only by the U.S. and Japan. The upward revaluation of China's GDP by a factor of seven came about through comparison of the purchasing power of the local currency in a local setting with the purchasing power of other currencies in their local settings—instead of calculation of GDP in U.S. dollars on the basis of market exchange rates. Under this newer method, called purchasing power parity, China's GDP in 1992 exceeded $2.8 trillion instead of the previously accepted $440 billion, and its per capita GDP was $2,470 instead of $370.

Foreign Relations.
      China continued the generally successful courtship of its Asian neighbours, playing its economic trump card to expand trade and investment with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations states as well as South Korea and Japan. The latter became China's major trading partner, surpassing Hong Kong, which was a special case. China bitterly denounced Hong Kong Gov. Chris Patten for proposing what were actually quite moderate changes in the British colony's electoral system before China's takeover in 1997, but it continued to discuss with the British how to structure the legislative elections in 1995.

      During his September visit to Beijing, Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Li Peng signed a landmark agreement to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control in the long-disputed border areas pending a final disposition of the conflicting claims. It seemed likely that the eventual territorial settlement would leave things pretty much as they were. Both sides pledged to refrain from the use or threat of force, to provide prior notification of military exercises, and to open up additional border passes to trade. The danger of a Sino-Indian war was at its lowest point in 35 years.

      Shortly after the signing of the Middle East peace accords between Israel and various Palestinian organizations, China played host to Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. China and Israel had a long history of covert cooperation in military technology transfers, although the value and content of such exchanges were in dispute. Elsewhere in the Middle East, China signed a deal to build a 300-MW nuclear power plant in Iran, and it maintained an active interest in the strife-torn neighbouring post-Soviet republics of Central Asia.

      The November visit to Beijing of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev produced a five-year military cooperation agreement that would increase Chinese capabilities in such fields as rocketry and antisubmarine warfare. Russia's hopes of maintaining even a weak position in Asia depended on good neighbourly relations with China.

      The U.S. remained a very large thorn in China's side. In May, Clinton extended China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) status for another year, but he attached a series of human rights conditions that China had to meet before renewal in 1994. MFN was, in fact, a misnomer because all but a very few countries enjoyed the status. In August, Washington banned the export of certain high-technology equipment to China, alleging that the Chinese export of M-11 missile components to Pakistan violated provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which Beijing had promised to respect. China rejected the charge. In August the U.S. shadowed a Chinese freighter that was reportedly transporting precursor chemicals for mustard and nerve gas to Iran. After a search of the ship's cargo failed to uncover evidence of such chemicals, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Ch'ien Ch'i-ch'en) blasted the U.S. for acting like "a self-styled world cop who tramples upon international law and norms of international relations." China also denounced the U.S. Congress for opposing the selection of Beijing as an Olympic site. On July 26, at the urging of Rep. Tom Lantos, the House had opposed the selection of Beijing by a vote of 287-99. Washington also threatened to slash quotas for Chinese textile imports unless Beijing curbed cheating via third-country reexports.

      Clinton's reassessment of U.S. policy toward China in September held out some hope of arresting negative developments. High-level contacts between U.S. and Chinese officials, which the U.S. had cut off after the Tiananmen massacre, were restored late in the year. The November meeting between Jiang and Clinton in Seattle was brief and not immediately consequential. Even the resumption of Sino-American dialogue on diverse matters, including military-security affairs and human rights, promised no early resolution of differences. Nonetheless, discussions were better than mutual denunciations.

      Chinese leaders calculated that U.S. economic interests in China would weigh heavier in the balance than concern about democracy, human rights, or Tibet. They eagerly courted the U.S. business community, which wanted a large slice of the China pie. But it would take considerable legerdemain for Clinton to circumvent his own human rights criteria for extending MFN status. A burgeoning U.S. trade deficit with China, on the order of $23 billion, did not make things easier.

      In sum, uncertainties about the political succession, growing rifts between coastal and interior China, social tensions, and the vacuum of values left by the decay of Marxism-Leninism continued to cloud China's future. But the bright lights of the booming cities and the unprecedented prosperity enjoyed by the adaptable Communist elite and the proto-capitalist nouveaux riches diverted attention away from the stormy passage that China was still likely to traverse on its voyage from a dying socialism to an as yet unknowable and unnameable new system. (STEVEN I. LEVINE)

* * *

Chinese (Pinyin)  Zhonghua  or  (Wade-Giles)  Chung-hua , officially  People's Republic of China , Chinese (Pinyin)  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo  or  (Wade-Giles)  Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo 
China, flag of   country of East Asia. It is the largest of all Asian countries and has the largest population of any country in the world. Occupying nearly the entire East Asian landmass, it occupies approximately one-fourteenth of the land area of the Earth. Among the major countries of the world, China is surpassed in area by only Russia and Canada, and it is almost as large as the whole of Europe.

 China has 33 administrative units directly under the central government; these consist of 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities (Chongqing (Chungking), Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), and 2 special administrative regions ( Hong Kong and Macau). The island province of Taiwan, which has been under separate administration since 1949, is discussed in the article Taiwan. Beijing (Peking), the capital of the People's Republic, is also the cultural, economic, and communications centre of the country. Shanghai is the main industrial city; Hong Kong is the leading commercial centre and port.

      Within China's boundaries exists a highly diverse and complex country. Its topography encompasses the highest and one of the lowest places on Earth, and its relief varies from nearly impenetrable mountainous terrain to vast coastal lowlands. Its climate ranges from extremely dry, desertlike conditions in the northwest to tropical monsoon in the southeast, and China has the greatest contrast in temperature between its northern and southern borders of any country in the world.

      The diversity of both China's relief and its climate has resulted in one of the world's widest arrays of ecological niches, and these niches have been filled by a vast number of plant and animal species. Indeed, practically all types of Northern Hemisphere plants, except those of the polar tundra, are found in China, and, despite the continuous inroads of humans over the millennia, China still is home to some of the world's most exotic animals.

      Probably the single most identifiable characteristic of China to the people of the rest of the world is the size of its population. Some one-fifth of humanity is of Chinese nationality. The great majority of the population is Chinese (Han), and thus China is often characterized as an ethnically homogeneous country, but few countries have as wide a variety of indigenous peoples as does China. Even among the Han there are cultural and linguistic differences between regions; for example, the only point of linguistic commonality between two individuals from different parts of China may be the written Chinese language. Because China's population is so enormous, the population density of the country is also often thought to be uniformly high, but vast areas of China are either uninhabited or sparsely populated.

      With more than 4,000 years of recorded history, China is one of the few existing countries that also flourished economically and culturally in the earliest stages of world civilization. Indeed, despite the political and social upheavals that frequently have ravaged the country, China is unique among nations in its longevity and resilience as a discrete politico-cultural unit. Much of China's cultural development has been accomplished with relatively little outside influence, the introduction of Buddhism from India constituting a major exception. Even when the country was penetrated by such “barbarian” peoples as the Manchu, these groups soon became largely absorbed into the fabric of Han Chinese culture.

      This relative isolation from the outside world made possible over the centuries the flowering and refinement of the Chinese culture, but it also left China ill prepared to cope with that world when, from the mid-19th century, it was confronted by technologically superior foreign nations. There followed a century of decline and decrepitude, as China found itself relatively helpless in the face of a foreign onslaught. The trauma of this external challenge became the catalyst for a revolution that began in the early 20th century against the old regime and culminated in the establishment of a communist government in 1949. This event reshaped global political geography, and China has since come to rank among the most influential countries in the world.

      Central to China's long-enduring identity as a unitary country is the province, or sheng (“secretariat”). The provinces are traceable in their current form to the Tang dynasty (AD 618–907). Over the centuries, provinces gained in importance as centres of political and economic authority and increasingly became the focus of regional identification and loyalty. Provincial power reached its peak in the first two decades of the 20th century, but, since the establishment of the People's Republic, that power has been curtailed by a strong central leadership in Beijing. Nonetheless, while the Chinese state has remained unitary in form, the vast size and population of China's provinces—which are comparable to large and midsize nations—dictate their continuing importance as a level of subnational administration.

 China stretches for about 3,250 miles (5,250 km) from east to west and 3,400 miles (5,500 km) from north to south. Its land frontier is about 12,400 miles (20,000 km) in length, and its coastline extends for some 8,700 miles (14,000 km). The country is bounded by Mongolia to the north; Russia and North Korea to the northeast; the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea to the east; the South China Sea to the southeast; Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), India, Bhutan, and Nepal to the south; Pakistan to the southwest; and Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to the west. In addition to the 14 countries that border directly on it, China also faces South Korea and Japan, across the Yellow Sea, and the Philippines, which lie beyond the South China Sea.

Relief (China)
 Broadly speaking, the relief of China is high in the west and low in the east; consequently, the direction of flow of the major rivers is generally eastward. The surface may be divided into three steps, or levels. The first level is represented by the Plateau of Tibet (Tibet, Plateau of), which is located in both the Tibet Autonomous Region (Tibet) and the province of Qinghai (Tsinghai) and which, with an average elevation of well over 13,000 feet (4,000 metres) above sea level, is the loftiest highland area in the world. The western part of this region, the Qiangtang, has an average height of 16,500 feet (5,000 metres) and is known as the “roof of the world.”

      The second step lies to the north of the Kunlun (Kunlun Mountains) and Qilian (Qilian Mountains) mountains and (farther south) to the east of the Qionglai and Daliang ranges. There the mountains descend sharply to heights of between 6,000 and 3,000 feet (1,800 and 900 metres), after which basins intermingle with plateaus. This step includes the Mongolian Plateau, the Tarim (Tarim River) Basin, the Loess Plateau (loess is a yellow-gray dust deposited by the wind), the Sichuan Basin, and the Yunnan-Guizhou (Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau) (Yungui) Plateau.

      The third step extends from the east of the Dalou, Taihang (Taihang Mountains), and Wu (Wu Mountains) mountain ranges and from the eastern perimeter of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau to the China Sea. Almost all of this area is made up of hills and plains lying below 1,500 feet (450 metres).

      The most remarkable feature of China's relief is the vast extent of its mountain chains; the mountains, indeed, have exerted a tremendous influence on the country's political, economic, and cultural development. By rough estimate, about one-third of the total area of China consists of mountains. China has the world's tallest mountain and the world's highest and largest plateau, in addition to possessing extensive coastal plains. The five major landforms—mountain, plateau, hill, plain, and basin—are all well represented. China's complex natural environment and rich natural resources are closely connected with the varied nature of its relief.

      The topography of China is marked by many splendours. Mount Everest (Everest, Mount) (Qomolangma Feng), situated on the border between China and Nepal, is the highest peak in the world, at an elevation of 29,035 feet (8,850 metres; see Researcher's Note: Height of Mount Everest). By contrast, the lowest part of the Turfan Depression in the Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang—Lake Ayding—is 508 feet (155 metres) below sea level. The coast of China contrasts greatly between South and North. To the south of the bay of Hangzhou, the coast is rocky and indented with many harbours and offshore islands. To the north, except along the Shandong (Shandong Peninsula) and Liaodong (Liaodong Peninsula) peninsulas, the coast is sandy and flat.

      China is prone to intense seismic activity throughout much of the country. The main source of this geologic instability is the result of the constant northward movement of the Indian tectonic plate beneath southern Asia, which has thrust up the towering mountains and high plateaus of the Chinese southwest. Throughout its history China has experienced hundreds of massive earthquakes (earthquake) that collectively have killed millions of people. Two in the 20th century alone—in eastern Gansu province (1920) and in the city of Tangshan, eastern Hebei province (1976)—caused some 250,000 deaths each, and a quake in east-central Sichuan province in 2008 killed tens of thousands and devastated a wide area.

      China's physical relief has dictated its development in many respects. The civilization of Han Chinese originated in the southern part of the Loess Plateau, and from there it extended outward until it encountered the combined barriers of relief and climate. The long, protruding corridor, commonly known as the Gansu, or Hexi, Corridor, illustrates this fact. South of the corridor is the Plateau of Tibet, which was too high and too cold for the Chinese to gain a foothold. North of the corridor is the Gobi Desert (Gobi), which also formed a barrier. Consequently, Chinese civilization was forced to spread along the corridor, where melting snow and ice in the Qilian Mountains provided water for oasis farming. The westward extremities of the corridor became the meeting place of the ancient East and West.

      Thus, for a long time the ancient political centre of China was located along the lower reaches of the Huang He (Yellow River). Because of topographical barriers, however, it was difficult for the central government to gain complete control over the entire country, except when an unusually strong dynasty was in power. In many instances the Sichuan Basin—an isolated region in southwestern China, about twice the size of Scotland, that is well protected by high mountains and is self-sufficient in agricultural products—became an independent kingdom. A comparable situation often arose in the Tarim Basin in the northwest. Linked to the rest of China only by the Gansu Corridor, this basin is even remoter than the Sichuan, and, when the central government was unable to exert its influence, oasis states were established; only the three strong dynasties—the Han (Han dynasty) (206 BC–AD 220), the Tang (Tang dynasty) (AD 618–907), and the Qing (Qing dynasty), or Manchu (1644–1911/12)—were capable of controlling the region.

      Apart from the three elevation zones already mentioned, it is possible—on the basis of geologic structure, climatic conditions, and differences in geomorphologic development—to divide China into three major topographic regions: the eastern, northwestern, and southwestern zones. The eastern zone is shaped by the rivers, which have eroded landforms in some parts and have deposited alluvial plains in others; its climate is monsoonal (characterized by seasonal rain-bearing winds). The northwestern region is arid and eroded by the wind; it forms an inland drainage basin. The southwest is a cold, lofty, and mountainous region containing intermontane plateaus and inland lakes.

      The three basic regions may be further subdivided into second-order geographic divisions. The eastern region contains 10 of these, the southwest contains two, and the northwest contains three. Below is a brief description of each division.

The eastern region

 The Northeast Plain (also known as the Manchurian Plain and the Sung-liao Plain) is located in China's Northeast, the region formerly known as Manchuria. It is bordered to the west and north by the Da Hinggan (Da Hinggan Range) (Greater Khingan) Range and to the east by the Xiao Hinggan (Xiao Hinggan Range) (Lesser Khingan) Range. An undulating plain split into northern and southern halves by a low divide rising from 500 to 850 feet (150 to 260 metres), it is drained in its northern part by the Sungari River and tributaries and in its southern part by the Liao River. Most of the area has an erosional rather than a depositional surface, but it is covered with a deep soil. The plain has an area of about 135,000 square miles (350,000 square km). Its basic landscapes are forest-steppe, steppe, meadow-steppe, and cultivated land; its soils are rich and black, and it is a famous agricultural region. The river valleys are wide and flat with a series of terraces formed by deposits of silt. During the flood season the rivers inundate extensive areas.

      To the southeast of the Northeast Plain is a series of ranges comprising the Changbai, Zhangguangcai, and Wanda mountains, which in Chinese are collectively known as the Changbai (Changbai Mountains) Shan, or “Forever White Mountains”; broken by occasional open valleys, they reach elevations mostly between 1,500 and 3,000 feet (450 and 900 metres). In some parts the scenery is characterized by rugged peaks and precipitous cliffs. The highest peak is the volcanic cone of Mount Baitou (9,003 feet [2,744 metres]), which has a beautiful crater lake at its snow-covered summit. As one of the major forest areas of China, the region is the source of many valuable furs and famous medicinal herbs. Cultivation is generally limited to the valley floors.

      Comparable in size to the Northeast Plain, most of the North China Plain lies at elevations below 160 feet (50 metres), and the relief is monotonously flat. It was formed by enormous sedimentary deposits brought down by the Huang He and Huai River from the Loess Plateau; the Quaternary deposits alone (i.e., those from the past 1.8 million years) reach thicknesses of 2,500 to 3,000 feet (760 to 900 metres). The river channels, which are higher than the surrounding locality, form local water divides, and the areas between the channels are depressions in which lakes and swamps are found. In particularly low and flat areas, the underground water table often fluctuates from 5 to 6.5 feet (1.5 to 2 metres), forming meadow swamps and, in some places, resulting in saline soils. A densely populated area that has long been under settlement, the North China Plain has the highest proportion of land under cultivation of any region in China.

 This vast plateau of some 154,000 square miles (400,000 square km) forms a unique region of loess-clad hills and barren mountains between the North China Plain and the deserts of the west. In the north the Great Wall of China forms the boundary, while the southern limit is the Qin Mountains in Shaanxi province. The average surface elevation is roughly 4,000 feet (1,200 metres), but individual ranges of bedrock are higher, reaching 9,825 feet (2,995 metres) in the Liupan Mountains. Most of the plateau is covered with loess to thicknesses of 165 to 260 feet (50 to 80 metres). In northern Shaanxi and eastern Gansu provinces, the loess may reach much greater thicknesses. The loess is particularly susceptible to erosion by water, and ravines and gorges crisscross the plateau. It has been estimated that ravines cover approximately half the entire region, with erosion reaching depths of 300 to 650 feet (90 to 200 metres).

The Shandong Hills
      These hills are basically composed of extremely ancient crystalline shales and granites of early Precambrian age (i.e., older than about 2.5 billion years) and of somewhat younger sedimentary rocks dating to about 540–420 million years ago. Faults have played a major role in creating the present relief, and, as a result, many hills are horsts (blocks of the Earth's crust uplifted along faults), while the valleys have been formed by grabens (blocks of the Earth's crust that have been thrust down along faults). The Jiaolai Plain divides this region into two parts. The eastern part is lower, lying at elevations averaging below 1,500 feet (450 metres), with only certain peaks and ridges rising to 2,500 feet and (rarely) to 3,000 feet (900 metres); the highest point, Mount Lao, reaches 3,714 feet (1,132 metres). The western part is slightly higher, rising to 5,000 feet (1,524 metres) at Mount Tai (Tai, Mount), one of China's most sacred mountains. The Shandong Hills meet the sea along a rocky and indented shoreline.

      The Qin (Qin Mountains) (conventional Tsinling) Mountains in Shaanxi province are the greatest chain of mountains east of the Plateau of Tibet. The mountain chain consists of a high and rugged barrier extending from Gansu to Henan; geographers use a line between the chain and the Huai River to divide China proper into two parts—North and South. The elevation of the mountains varies from 3,000 to 10,000 feet (900 to 3,000 metres). The western part is higher, with the highest peak, Mount Taibai, rising to 12,359 feet (3,767 metres). The Qin Mountains consist of a series of parallel ridges, all running roughly west-east, separated by a maze of ramifying valleys whose canyon walls often rise sheer to a height of 1,000 feet (300 metres) above the valley streams.

      This is one of the most attractive geographical regions of China. The Sichuan Basin is surrounded by mountains, which are higher in the west and north. Protected against the penetration of cold northern winds, the basin is much warmer in the winter than are the more southerly plains of southeast China. Except for the Chengdu Plain, the region is hilly. The relief of the basin's eastern half consists of numerous folds, forming a series of ridges and valleys that trend northeast to southwest. The lack of arable land has obliged farmers to cultivate the slopes of the hills, on which they have built terraces that frequently cover the slopes from top to bottom. The terracing has slowed down the process of erosion and has made it possible to cultivate additional areas by using the steeper slopes—some of which have grades up to 45° or more.

The southeastern mountains
      Southeastern China is bordered by a rocky shoreline backed by picturesque mountains. In general, there is a distinct structural and topographic trend from northeast to southwest. The higher peaks may reach elevations of some 5,000 to 6,500 feet (1,500 to 2,000 metres). The rivers are short and fast-flowing and have cut steep-sided valleys. The chief areas of settlement are on narrow strips of coastal plain where rice is produced. Along the coast there are numerous islands, where the fishing industry is well developed.

Plains of the middle and lower Yangtze (Yangtze Plain)
      East of Yichang, in Hubei province, a series of plains of uneven width are found along the Yangtze River (Chang Jiang). The plains are particularly wide in the delta area and in places where the Yangtze receives its major tributaries—including large areas of lowlands around Dongting (Dongting Lake), Poyang (Poyang, Lake), Tai (Tai, Lake), and Hongze (Hongze Lake) lakes, which are all hydrologically linked with the Yangtze. The region is an alluvial plain, the accumulation of sediment laid down by the rivers throughout long ages. There are a few isolated hills, but in general the land is level, lying mostly below 160 feet (50 metres). Rivers, canals, and lakes form a dense network of waterways. The surface of the plain has been converted into a system of flat terraces, which descend in steps along the slopes of the valleys.

      The Nan Mountains (Nan Ling) are composed of many ranges of mountains running from northeast to southwest. These ranges form the watershed between the Yangtze to the north and the Pearl (Zhu) River to the south. The main peaks along the watershed are above 5,000 feet, and some are more than 6,500 feet. But a large part of the land to the south of the Nan Mountains is also hilly; flatland does not exceed 10 percent of the total area. The Pearl River Delta is the only extensive plain in this region and is also the richest part of South China. The coastline is rugged and irregular, and there are many promontories and protected bays, including those of Hong Kong and Macau. The principal river is the Xi River (Xi River system), which rises in the highlands of eastern Yunnan and southern Guizhou.

The southwest

      This region comprises the northern part of Yunnan and the western part of Guizhou; its edge is highly dissected. Yunnan is more distinctly a plateau and contains larger areas of rolling uplands than Guizhou, but both parts are distinguished by canyonlike valleys and precipitous mountains. The highest elevations lie in the west, where Mount Diancang (also called Cang Shan) rises to 13,524 feet (4,122 metres). In the valleys of the major rivers, elevations drop to about 1,300 to 1,600 feet (400 to 490 metres). Particularly sharp differences in elevation and the greatest ruggedness of relief occur in the western part of the region, in the gorges of the large rivers. In the eastern part, karst processes (creating sinks, ravines, and underground streams in the limestone landscape) have developed very strongly. Scattered throughout the highlands are small lake basins, separated by mountains.

The Plateau of Tibet (Tibet, Plateau of)
 This great upland massif occupies about one-fourth of the country's area. A large part of the plateau lies at elevations above 13,000 to 16,500 feet (4,000 to 5,000 metres). The border ranges of the plateau (the Kunlun Mountains and the Himalayas) are even higher, with individual peaks rising to heights of 23,000 to 26,000 feet (7,000 to 8,000 metres) and higher. As a rule, the interior (i.e., Tibet-side) slopes of these border mountains are gentle, while the exterior slopes are precipitous. The plateau's eastern and southern periphery is the source of many of the world's great rivers, including the Yangtze, Huang He, Mekong, Salween, Indus, and Brahmaputra. Only in the low valleys, chiefly along the Brahmaputra valley, are there centres of human settlement.

      The Qaidam (Tsaidam) Basin (Qaidam Basin), occupying the northwestern portion of the Plateau of Tibet, is the largest, as well as the lowest, depression in the plateau. The broad northwestern part of the basin lies at elevations between approximately 8,800 and 10,000 feet (2,700 and 3,000 metres), and the narrow southeastern part is slightly lower. Gravel, sandy and clay deserts, semideserts, and salt wastes predominate within the basin.

The northwest

The Tarim Basin
 North of the Plateau of Tibet and at the much lower elevation of about 3,000 feet (900 metres) lies the Tarim Basin. It is hemmed in by great mountain ranges: the Tien Shan (Tian Shan; “Celestial Mountains”) on the north, the Pamirs on the west, and the Kunlun Mountains on the south. Glacier-fed streams descend from these heights only to lose themselves in the loose sands and gravels of the Takla Makan Desert, which occupies the centre of the basin. The Takla Makan is one of the most barren of the world's deserts; only a few of the largest rivers—such as the Tarim and Hotan (Khotan)—cross the desert, but even their flow is not constant, and they have water throughout their entire courses only during the flood period. The area of the basin is about 215,000 square miles (557,000 square km), and its elevations range from 2,500 to 4,600 feet (750 to 1,400 metres) above sea level. Its surface slants to the southeast, where Lop Nur (a salt-encrusted lake bed) is situated.

      North of the Tarim Basin is another large depression, the Junggar (Dzungarian) Basin (Junggar Basin). It is enclosed by the Tien Shan on the south, while to the northeast it is cut off from Mongolia by the Altai Mountains. The surface of the basin is flat, with a gentle slope to the southwest. The larger portion of the land lies at elevations between about 1,000 and 1,500 feet (300 and 450 metres), and in the lowest part the elevation drops to just below 650 feet (200 metres). In general the main part of the basin is covered by a broad desert with barchans (crescent-shaped sand dunes that move); only in certain parts are dunes retained by vegetation.

 The Chinese (eastern) part of the Tien Shan consists of a complex system of ranges and depressions divided into two major groups of ranges: the northern and the southern. The groups are separated by a strip of intermontane depressions that itself is broken up by the interior ranges. Ancient metamorphic rock constitutes the larger portion of the ranges in the interior zone; Paleozoic (i.e., about 250 to 540 million years old) sedimentary and igneous sedimentary beds form its northern and southern chains, while Mesozoic (about 65 to 250 million years old) sandstones and conglomerates fill the intermontane depressions in the interior zone and constitute the foothill ridges. The height of the main Chinese chains of the Tien Shan is between 13,000 and 15,000 feet (4,000 and 4,600 metres), with individual peaks exceeding 16,000 feet (4,900 metres); the interior chains reach 14,500 feet (4,400 metres). In the western part, where precipitation is adequate, large glaciers are formed, reaching a length of more than 20 miles (32 km). Large rivers with heavy flows, such as the Ili (Yili) River and its tributaries, begin their courses there, and the predominantly alpine meadow steppe is one of the best grazing lands of China.

 China has more than 50,000 rivers with individual drainage areas exceeding 40 square miles (100 square km). Of the total annual runoff, about 95 percent drains directly into the sea (more than 80 percent into the Pacific Ocean, 12 percent into the Indian Ocean, and less than 1 percent into the Arctic Ocean) and 5 percent disappears inland.

      The three principal rivers of China, all of which flow generally from west to east, draining into the China Sea, are the Huang He, the Yangtze, and the Xi. The Huang He, which rises in the Kunlun Mountains, is the northernmost of the three; it drains into the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli), north of the Shandong Peninsula. The Yangtze (Yangtze River), the longest river in the country, rises in the Tibetan Highlands and flows across central China, draining into the East China Sea north of Shanghai. The Xi River (Xi River system), the southernmost of the three, rises in the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau and empties into the South China Sea via the Pearl River Delta at Guangzhou (Canton) (Canton).

      The distribution of surface water in China is extremely uneven. Only a small part of the country has sufficient quantities year-round. Much of the country has abundant runoff but only during the rainy summer, when enormous surpluses of water are received. From the southeast to the northwest, the surface water decreases as the relief becomes more mountainous. A vast area of the northwest lacks water throughout the year. North China (north of the Qin Mountains–Huai River line), with its flat relief and long history of agriculture, contains almost two-thirds of China's cultivated land; paradoxically, because of scanty and erratic precipitation, the average annual runoff in the North accounts for only about one-sixth of the total for the country as a whole.

      The mountains of the southeast and the mountainous Hainan (Hai-nan) Island have the most abundant surface water. Over the year they receive more than 60 inches (1,500 mm) of precipitation (in some places even more than 80 inches [2,000 mm]), of which almost two-thirds constitutes the runoff, so that a dense drainage network has developed. The amount of runoff is highest in the southeast, exceeding 40 inches (1,000 mm). It gradually diminishes toward the west and north, so that in the true deserts of the northwest it is usually less than 0.4 of an inch (10 mm). The arid climate of the northwest is reflected in the landscape of the dry steppes, which is characterized by richer grasses in the east, while in the west the landscape gradually changes to bare deserts.

      In the lower reaches of the Yangtze, the Pearl River Delta, and the Chengdu Plain a dense network of waterways has been developed. In the North China Plain and the Northeast Plain most of the rivers have a linear flow, and tributaries are few and unconnected. In the inland drainage area there are very few rivers because of scanty precipitation. Extensive areas such as the Tarim Basin and northeastern Gansu province are often completely devoid of runoff. In those regions the rivers depend on melted snow and ice; in consequence, they are mostly small and are found only in mountains and mountain foothills. As they drain increasingly farther away from the mountains, most of them eventually disappear in the desert, while some form inland lakes. Because the northern part of the Plateau of Tibet is a cold desert, the rate of evaporation is slow, so that a denser network of rivers has developed; most of these, however, run into glaciated depressions, forming numerous lakes.

      China, with its vast and diverse climatic conditions, has a wide variety of soils (pedology). Indeed, all the soil types of the Eurasian continent, except the soils of the tundra and the highly leached podzolic-gley soils of the northern taiga (boreal forest), are found in China. As a result of the climatic differences between the drier and cooler North and the wetter and hotter South, soils may be grouped into two classifications. Generally speaking, the soils north of the Qin Mountains–Huai River line are pedocals (calcareous) and are neutral to alkaline in reaction; those south of this line are pedalfers (leached noncalcareous soils), which are neutral to acid.

      Apart from the great plateaus and high mountains to the southwest, marked soil zones are formed in China according to differences in climate, vegetation, and distance from the sea. The east and southeast coastal region is covered by the forest zone associated with a humid and semihumid climate, while the north and northwest inland regions belong mostly to the steppe zone, as well as to the semidesert and desert zone associated with a semiarid and arid climate. Between these two broad soil zones lies a transitional zone—the forest-steppe zone, where forest soils merge gradually with steppe soils.

      Between the pedocals of the North and the pedalfers of the South lie the neutral soils. The floodplain of the Yangtze below the Three Gorges (the point where the river cuts through the Wu Mountains to empty onto the Hubei Plain) is overlain with a thick cover of noncalcareous alluvium. These soils, sometimes classified as paddy (rice-growing) soils, for the most part are exceedingly fertile and of good texture. The paddy soil is a unique type of cultivated soil, formed over a long period of time under the specific conditions of intensive rice cultivation.

      Along the coast of North China are belts of saline and alkaline soil. They are associated with a combination of poor drainage and aridity, where precipitation is insufficient either to dissolve or to carry away the salts in solution.

      The adverse effects of nature on the soil have been further intensified by centuries of concentrated cultivation, which has resulted in an almost universal deficiency of nitrogen and organic matter. The shortage of organic matter is primarily because farmers habitually remove crop stalks and leaves for livestock feed and fuel. The animal and human waste used for fertilizer contains too small an amount of organic matter to compensate for the loss of nutrients in the soil. The soils are also often deficient in phosphorus and potassium, but these deficiencies are neither so widespread nor so severe as that of nitrogen.

      At one time, half of the territory of present-day China may have been covered by forests, but now less than one-tenth of the country is forested. Extensive forests in central and southern China were cleared for farmlands, resulting in the inevitable erosion of soils from the hillsides and their deposition in the valleys. Farmers have constructed level terraces (terrace cultivation), supported by walls, in order to hold back water for rice fields, thus effectively controlling erosion. Wherever elaborate terraces have been built, soil erosion is virtually absent, and stepped terraces have become one of the characteristic features of the rural landscape.

      Excessive grazing and other practices that destroy the grass cover have also produced soil loss. When its valuable crumb structure is broken down and its porosity is lost, the topsoil is easily washed away through erosion in the rainy season; the wind produces the same effect in dry regions. The Loess Plateau, constantly buffeted by rain and wind, is especially vulnerable to soil erosion, which results in a distinctive landscape. Deep, steep-sided gullies cut the plateau into fantastic relief. The damage done by heavy rain in summer includes not only topsoil loss but also frequent flooding by silt-laden rivers.

The air masses
      The vast and topographically varied landmass of China lies in Asia, the world's largest continent, and faces the Pacific, the world's largest ocean, along an extensive shoreline. The country's climate is thus heavily influenced by the seasonal movement of large air masses between the Pacific and the Chinese mainland. The polar continental air mass (Siberian anticyclone), originating to the north in Siberia, dominates a large part of China during the winter; likewise, the tropical Pacific air mass exerts its influence during the summer. The sharply varied climatic conditions prevailing in summer and in winter are a direct result of the interaction of these two air masses, which are entirely different in nature.

      The Siberian air mass, which is quite stable, is extremely cold and dry and often has marked layers of temperature inversion. After crossing the Mongolian Plateau, the air mass spreads southward and begins to invade North China, where it undergoes a series of rapid changes; its temperature rises slightly, and its stability decreases. During the day the air there may be quite warm, but at night or in shaded places the cold is often unbearable. In general, the diurnal (daily) range of temperature is more than 18 °F (10 °C); in extreme cases it may exceed 45 °F (25 °C). Because North China is affected by this air mass most of the time, it is dry, with clear weather and an abundance of sunshine during the winter months.

      The prevailing winter wind blows from November through March, but it changes direction as it moves to the south. In northern and northeastern China its direction is from the northwest, in eastern China it comes from the north, and on the southeastern coasts it is from the northeast. The height of the winter wind belt usually does not exceed 13,000 feet (4,000 metres). As it moves to the south, the height decreases; in Nanjing (Nanking) it is about 6,500 feet (2,000 metres), and in South China it is less than 5,000 feet (1,500 metres). The Qin Mountains become an effective barrier to the advance of the cold waves to the south, particularly in the western section, where the average elevation of the mountains is mainly between 6,500 and 9,000 feet (2,000 and 2,700 metres).

      In China the tropical Pacific air mass is the chief source of summer rainfall. When it predominates, it may cover the eastern half of China and penetrate deep into the border areas of the Mongolian Plateau and onto the eastern edge of the Plateau of Tibet. In summer the Siberian air mass retreats to the western end of Mongolia, although it occasionally penetrates southward and sometimes may reach the Huai River valley, which constitutes a summertime battleground between the tropical Pacific and Siberian air masses.

      The movement of the two air masses is of immense significance to the climate of central and North China. In summer, when the tropical air mass predominates, the frontal zone between the two shifts northward; as a result, North China receives heavier rainfall. When the southeastern monsoon slackens, however, the frontal zone moves southward, and central China receives more rainfall, which can cause flooding. The activity of the tropical Pacific air mass in winter is confined to the southeast coastal areas; during that season, therefore, it frequently drizzles in the hilly areas south of the Nan Mountains, and morning fog is common.

      Besides these two air masses, three other air masses also influence China's climate: the equatorial continental air mass (a highly unstable southwest monsoon), the polar maritime air mass, and the equatorial maritime air mass. Furthermore, because China is so vast and has such complex topography, the interaction between the air masses and relief produces a wide range of climatic conditions.

      Temperatures generally decrease from south to north. The mean annual temperature is above 68 °F (20 °C) in the Pearl River valley. It decreases to between 59 and 68 °F (15 and 20 °C) in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze, to about 50 °F (10 °C) in North China and the southern part of Xinjiang, and to 41 °F (5 °C) in the southern area of the Northeast, the northern part of Xinjiang, and places near the Great Wall. It drops below 32 °F (0 °C; i.e., freezing) in the northern part of Heilongjiang. The annual range of temperature between the extreme south and north is about 86 °F (48 °C). With few exceptions, January is the coldest month and July is the hottest.

      South of the Qin Mountains–Huai River line, the mean January temperature increases progressively, rising from freezing to 72 °F (22 °C) on the southern coast of Hainan Island. Snow rarely falls, and the rivers do not freeze. North of this line, the temperature drops from freezing to −18 °F (−28 °C) in the northern part of Heilongjiang.

      In April the mean temperature is above freezing for the whole of China, with the exception of extreme northern Heilongjiang. During that time the mean temperature for the Northeast Plain is between 36 and 46 °F (2 and 8 °C), and for the extensive plain between Beijing and Shanghai it is between 54 and 59 °F (12 and 15 °C). South of the Nan Mountains the mean temperature is considerably higher than 68 °F (20 °C). Along the coast of southern Guangdong, willows start to bud in late January, but in Beijing the budding of willows comes as late as early April.

      In summer the temperature range between North and South China is quite small. In July the difference in temperature between Guangzhou and Beijing is only about 5 °F (3 °C), and the isotherms in July are roughly parallel to the coastline. In July the isotherm of 82 °F (28 °C) marks an extensive area. The hottest places in China are found along the valleys of the middle and lower Yangtze. The mean July temperature of Nanchang and Changsha is well above 84 °F (29 °C), and in many years it exceeds 86 °F (30 °C).

      In North China autumn is generally cooler than spring. The mean October temperature in Beijing is about 55 °F (13 °C), and in April it is about 57 °F (14 °C). In South China the reverse is true. The mean October temperature in Guangzhou is 75 °F (24 °C), but in April it is only about 70 °F (21 °C).

      The middle and lower reaches of the Huang He are where China's civilization and agriculture first developed. There the seasonal rhythm is well marked, and the duration of each season is evenly spaced. In other parts of China, however, the duration as well as the starting and closing dates of each season vary among different regions. Summer is nonexistent in northern Heilongjiang, while there is no winter in southern Guangdong. At Kunming, in the Yunnan uplands, the climate is mild throughout the year, with only brief summer and winter periods.

      In general, south of the Qin Mountains–Huai River line the mean daily temperature seldom falls below freezing, so that farming can be practiced year-round. In the Yangtze valley two crops are usually grown annually, but north of the Great Wall only one crop per year is possible.

      Precipitation in China generally follows the same pattern as temperatures, decreasing from the southeast to the northwest. The annual total of certain areas along the southeastern coast amounts to more than 80 inches (2,000 mm). The Yangtze valley receives about 40 to 45 inches (1,000 to 1,150 mm). Farther north, in the Huai River valley, the annual rainfall decreases to some 35 inches (880 mm). In the lower reaches of the Huang He, only 20 to 25 inches (500 to 650 mm) falls annually. The Northeast generally receives more precipitation than the North China Plain, with upwards of 40 or more inches falling in the Changbai Mountains.

      The southeast monsoon loses much of its moisture by the time it reaches the northern part of the Loess Plateau, where the annual precipitation is reduced to between 12 and 20 inches (300 and 500 mm). Northwest of a line linking the Da Hinggan (Greater Khingan), Yin (Yin Mountains), Lang (Lang Mountains), Qilian, and Altun ranges, the annual precipitation is less than 10 inches (250 mm). Because these regions are far from the sea, high mountains prevent the southern monsoon from reaching them, and only grasslands are found there. In western Inner Mongolia, the Gansu Corridor, and the Tarim Basin, the annual precipitation drops to 4 inches (100 mm) or less. These are areas of true desert, where sometimes not a single drop of moisture is received for several years.

      The Junggar Basin and the Ili River valley of northern Xinjiang are open to the influences of the westerlies, and precipitation is heavier there. Precipitation on the Plateau of Tibet, following the national pattern, decreases from southeast to northwest. More than 40 inches falls annually in the valleys in the southeastern part of the plateau, and the eastern edge receives 20 inches. However, in the enclosed Qaidam Basin in the north, the yearly total is only 4 to 10 inches.

      The high variability of precipitation is another characteristic of China's climate. Usually, variability increases as annual amounts decrease, a circumstance that is closely connected with the country's high frequency of drought and flood. Spring rain is of immense significance to Chinese farmers, but spring is also the season with the highest variability. In South China the variability exceeds 40 percent, along the Yangtze it is about 45 percent, and in North China it is more than 50 percent. The variability of a vast area in North China exceeds 70 percent in some places; east of Beijing, for example, the rainfall variability in spring may even exceed 80 percent, as it also does in the central parts of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau.

      Rain falls mostly in the summer months, when plants need water the most. This is an important asset for farmers, but summer rainfall is usually too intense. In July, when the frontal zone shifts northward, cyclones (circulation of winds around centres of low atmospheric pressure) are much more active in North China than in South China, and North China begins to receive heavier rainfall. More than half the area of the North China Plain records 0.8 inch (20 mm) of rainfall daily, and in some places it may reach as much as 1 inch (25 mm) or more daily. During that time, areas south of the Yangtze are covered by the tropical Pacific air mass, so that the weather becomes comparatively stable, the amount of rainfall usually decreases, and the average rainfall intensity is less than that of June. The intensity of August rainfall is in general less than that of July.

      In the southeastern coastal regions, around Fuzhou and Shantou, (Shantou) the maximum daily rainfall may even approach 12 inches (300 mm). Such accumulations are directly related to the high frequency of typhoons (tropical cyclones (tropical cyclone)) striking that part of the coast, usually during the period from May to November; July, August, and September are the three months when typhoons are the most frequent.

      In May, typhoons usually strike the coast south of Shantou. Later in June they shift northward, arriving between Shantou and Wenzhou, and after July they invade areas north of Wenzhou. August has the highest frequency of typhoon invasions, when more than one-third of the typhoons reaching China arrive. After September the frequency of typhoons decreases, and the pattern again shifts southward. In October, typhoons usually land south of Wenzhou; the late typhoons arriving in November and December strike south of Shantou.

Plant and animal life
 China's great topological and climatic diversity has produced a vast array of natural vegetation types. The country's total number of seed-plant species is approximately 30,000, representing some 2,700 genera; more than 200 of these genera are endemic to China. There are about 2,500 species of forest trees, including some 95 percent of the known broad-leaved types. Many of these trees are of economic importance, such as tung trees, camphor trees, varnish trees (Rhus verniciflua), star anise (which yields an oil used as a flavouring additive), and glossy privet (Ligustrum lucidum).

      Contributing to the variety and intermixture of tropical and temperate plants in China are such factors as the lack of insurmountable topographic barriers, such as large stretches of desert, between the tropical, temperate, and subalpine zones; wind systems that alternate in winter and summer; and the frequent occurrence of cyclones. If, for example, the vegetation of Heilongjiang province in the North and of Guangdong province in the South are compared, it is hardly possible to find a single common plant species, with the exception of certain weeds. In the taiga (boreal forest) zone of China's northern border region or in the high mountains, on the other hand, there are many plant species that are also found in the lands within the Arctic Circle, while in the Chinese tropics there are species that also grow south of the Equator. However, from the ecological point of view, the tropical forests of South China generally do not differ greatly from those of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, and the desert and steppe vegetation of northwestern China is closely akin to that found in Mongolia or Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the Chinese taiga terrain of the frontier area adjoining Russia is essentially the same as that of Siberia.

      A traveler in China may encounter practically all types of natural vegetation indigenous to the Northern Hemisphere, the exception being species of the polar tundra. There are mangrove swamps along the shores of the South China Sea; rainforests on Hainan Island and in southern Yunnan; and deserts, steppes, meadows, and savannas elsewhere, as well as regions where tropical and temperate coniferous and evergreen and deciduous broad-leaved plants prevail.

      China may be divided—roughly along a diagonal from the southwest to the northeast—into two sharply different vegetation zones: the dry northwest and the humid southeast. The tropical area, adjoining the humid southeast, is geographically related more to Southeast Asia. In the northwest, where desertlike conditions prevail, are vast areas of sparse drought-resistant vegetation; within these areas, in the low-lying land and depressions, are patches of salt-tolerant plants, notably in the Junngar, Qaidam, and Gobi regions. Skirting the southern edge of the Gobi is a wide belt of grassland.

Animal life
 The profusion of vegetation types and a variety of relief have allowed a great diversity of animal life to develop and have permitted animals to survive there that elsewhere are extinct. Notable among such survivals are the great paddlefish of the Yangtze, the species of small alligator in eastern and central China, and the giant salamander (related to the Japanese giant salamander and the American hellbender) in western China. The diversity of animal life is perhaps greatest in the ranges and valleys of Tibet and Sichuan, the latter province being renowned as the home of the giant panda. The takin (a type of goat antelope), numerous species of pheasants, and a variety of laughing thrushes are found in all Chinese mountain ranges. China seems to be one of the chief centres of dispersal of the carp family and also of old-world catfishes.

      The regional affinities of Chinese animal life are complex. Resemblances in the Northeast are to the fauna of the Siberian forests. Animals from Central Asia inhabit suitable steppe areas in northern China. The life of the great mountain ranges is Palearctic (relating to a biogeographic region that includes Europe, Asia north of the Himalayas, northern Arabia, and Africa north of the Sahara) but with distinctively Chinese species or genera. To the southeast the lowlands and mountains alike permit direct access to the eastern region. This part of China presents a complete transition from temperate-zone Palearctic life to the wealth of tropical forms distinctive of southeastern Asia. Tropical types of reptiles, amphibians, birds, and mammals predominate in the southernmost Chinese provinces.

People (China)

Ethnic groups
  China is a multinational country, with a population composed of a large number of ethnic and linguistic groups. The Han (Chinese), the largest group, outnumber the minority groups or minority nationalities in every province or autonomous region except Tibet and Xinjiang. The Han, therefore, form the great homogeneous mass of the Chinese people, sharing the same culture, the same traditions, and the same written language. For this reason, the general basis for classifying the country's population is largely linguistic rather than ethnic. Some 55 minority groups are spread over approximately three-fifths of the country's total area. Where these minority groups are found in large numbers, they have been given some semblance of autonomy and self-government; autonomous regions of several types have been established on the basis of the geographic distribution of nationalities.

      The government takes great credit for its treatment of these minorities; it has advanced their economic well-being, raised their living standards, provided educational facilities, promoted their national languages and cultures, and raised their literacy levels, as well as introduced a written language where none existed previously. It must be noted, however, that some minorities (e.g., Tibetans (Tibetan)) have been subject to varying degrees of repression. Still, of the 50-odd minority languages, only 20 had written forms before the coming of the communist regime in 1949; and only relatively few written languages—e.g., Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh (Hasake), Dai, and Korean (Chaoxian)—were in everyday use. Other written languages were used chiefly for religious purposes and by a limited number of people. Educational institutions for national minorities are a feature of many large cities, notably Beijing, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Lanzhou.

Languages (Chinese languages)
      Several major language families are represented in China. By far the largest groups are speakers of Sino-Tibetan (Sino-Tibetan languages) and Altaic (Altaic languages) languages, with considerably smaller numbers speaking Indo-European (Indo-European languages), Austroasiatic (Austroasiatic languages), and Tai (Tai languages) languages.

      The Sino-Tibetan family, both numerically and in the extent of its distribution, is by far the most prominent; within this family, Han Chinese is the most widely spoken language. Although unified by their tradition—the written ideographic characters of their language as well as many other cultural traits—the Han speak several mutually unintelligible dialects (dialect) and display marked regional differences. By far the most important Chinese tongue is Mandarin (Mandarin language), or putonghua, meaning “ordinary language” or “common language.” There are three variants of Mandarin. The first of these is the northern variant, of which the Beijing dialect, or Beijing hua, is typical and which is spoken to the north of the Qin Mountains–Huai River line; as the most widespread Chinese tongue, it has officially been adopted as the basis for a national language. The second is the western variant, also known as the Chengdu or Upper Yangtze variant; this is spoken in the Sichuan Basin and in adjoining parts of southwestern China. The third is the southern variant, also known as the Nanjing or Lower Yangtze variant, which is spoken in northern Jiangsu and in southern and central Anhui. Some authorities also recognize a fourth variant, Northwestern, which is used in most of northwestern China. Related to Mandarin are the Hunan, or Xiang (Xiang language), language, spoken by people in central and southern Hunan, and the Gan (Gan language) dialect. The Huizhou language, spoken in southern Anhui, forms an enclave within the southern Mandarin area.

      Less intelligible to Mandarin speakers are the dialects of the southeast coastal region, stretching from Shanghai to Guangzhou (Canton). The most important of these is the Wu (Wu language) language, spoken in southern Jiangsu and in Zhejiang. This is followed, to the south, by the Fuzhou, or Northern Min (Min languages), language of northern and central Fujian and by the Xiamen-Shantou (Amoy-Swatow), or Southern Min, language of southern Fujian and easternmost Guangdong. The Hakka (Hakka language) language of southernmost Jiangxi and northeastern Guangdong has a rather scattered pattern of distribution. Probably the best known of these southern dialects is Yue, particularly Cantonese (Cantonese language), which is spoken in central and western Guangdong, Hong Kong, and in southern Guangxi—a dialect area in which a large proportion of overseas Chinese originated.

      In addition to the Han, the Manchu and the Hui (Chinese Muslims (Islāmic world)) also speak Mandarin and use the Chinese writing system. The Hui, firm adherents of Islam, are descendants of Persian and Central Asian Muslims who traveled to China as merchants, soldiers, and scholars and intermarried with several Chinese nationalities. They are intermingled with the Han throughout much of the country and are distinguished as Hui only in the area of their heaviest concentration, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia. Other Hui communities are organized as autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou) in Xinjiang and as autonomous counties (zizhixian) in Qinghai, Hebei, Guizhou, and Yunnan. Increasingly, the Hui have been moving from their scattered settlements into the area of major concentration, possibly in order to facilitate intermarriage with other Muslims.

      The Manchu claim that they are descendants of the Manchu warriors who invaded China in the 17th century and founded the Qing dynasty (1644–1911/12). Manchu is virtually a dead language—though it is closely related to Sibo (or Xibe), which is still vital—and the Manchu have been completely assimilated into Han Chinese culture. They are found mainly in North China and the Northeast, but they form no separate autonomous areas above the commune level.

      The Zhuang (Zhuangjia) are China's largest minority group. Most of them live in the Zhuang Autonomous Region of Guangxi. They are also found in national autonomous areas in neighbouring Yunnan and Guangdong. They depend mainly on rice cultivation for their livelihood. In religion the Zhuang are animists, worshipping particularly the spirits of their ancestors. Members of the Buyi (Buyei) (Zhongjia) group are concentrated in southern Guizhou, where they share an autonomous prefecture with the Miao (Hmong) group. The Dong people are settled in small communities in Guangxi and Guizhou; they share with the Miao group an autonomous prefecture set up in southeast Guizhou in 1956.

      Tibetans (Tibetan) are distributed over the entire Qinghai-Tibetan highland region. Outside Tibet, Tibetan minorities are found in five Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Qinghai, two in Sichuan, and one each in Yunnan and Gansu. The Tibetans still maintain their tribal characteristics, but few of them are nomadic. Though essentially farmers, they also raise livestock and, like other tribal peoples in the Chinese far west, hunt to supplement their food supply. The major religion of Tibet has been Tibetan Buddhism since about the 17th century; before 1959 the social and political institutions of this region were still based largely on that faith. Many of the Yi (Lolo) are concentrated in two autonomous prefectures—one in southern Sichuan and another in northern Yunnan. They raise crops and sometimes keep flocks and herds.

      The Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien languages) (Hmong-Mien) peoples, with their major concentration in Guizhou, are distributed throughout the central south and southwestern provinces and are found also in some small areas in eastern China. They are subdivided into many rather distinct groupings. Most of them have now lost their traditional tribal practices through the influence of the Han, and it is only their language that serves to distinguish them. Two-thirds of the Miao are settled in Guizhou, where they share two autonomous prefectures with the Dong and Buyi groups. The Yao (Mien) people are concentrated in the Guangxi-Guangdong-Hunan border area.

      In some areas of China, especially in the southwest, many different ethnic groups are geographically intermixed. Because of language barriers and different economic structures, these peoples all maintain their own cultural traits and live in relative isolation from one another. The Han are active in the towns and fertile river valleys of some of these locales, while the minority peoples continue to base their livelihood on more-traditional forms of agriculture or on grazing their livestock on hillsides and mountains. The vertical distribution of these peoples is in zones—usually the higher they live, the less complex their way of life. In former times they did not mix well with one another, but now, with highways penetrating deep into their settlements, they have better opportunities to communicate with other groups and have benefited from improved living conditions.

      While the minorities of the Sino-Tibetan language family are thus concentrated in the south and southwest, the second major language family—the Altaic—is represented entirely by minorities in northwestern and northern China. The Altaic family falls into three branches: Turkic (Turkic languages), Mongolian (Mongolian languages), and Manchu-Tungus (Manchu-Tungus languages). The Turkic (Turkic languages) language branch is by far the most numerous of the three Altaic branches. The Uighur, who are Muslims, form the largest Turkic-speaking minority. They are distributed over chains of oases in the Tarim and Junggar basins of Xinjiang and mainly depend on irrigated agriculture for a livelihood. Other Turkic minorities in Xinjiang are splinter groups of nationalities living in neighbouring countries of Central Asia, including the Kazakhs (Kazakh) and the Kyrgyz, all being adherents of Islam. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are pastoral nomadic peoples who still show traces of tribal organization. The Kazakhs live mainly as herders in northwestern and northern Xinjiang (notably in the Ili River region), tending flocks in summer pastures and retiring to camps in the valleys during the winter. The Kyrgyz are high-mountain pastoralists and are concentrated mainly in the westernmost part of Xinjiang.

      The Mongolians (Mongol), who are by nature a nomadic people, are the most widely dispersed of the minority nationalities of China. Most of them are inhabitants of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Small Mongolian and Mongolian-related groups of people are scattered throughout the vast area from Xinjiang through Qinghai and Gansu and into the provinces of the Northeast (Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning). In addition to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Mongolians are established in two autonomous prefectures in Xinjiang, a joint autonomous prefecture with Tibetans and Kazakhs in Qinhai, and several autonomous counties in the western area of the Northeast. Some Mongolians retain their tribal divisions and are pastoralists, but large numbers practice sedentary agriculture, and others combine crop growing with herding. Those who depend on animal husbandry travel each year around the pastureland—grazing sheep, goats, horses, cattle, and camels—and then return to their point of departure. A few engage in hunting and fur trapping to supplement their income. Mongolian (Mongolian languages) languages are sometimes divided into a western group (including Oyrat and Kalmyk) and an eastern group (including Buryat and Mongol), but their subclassification is controversial. Religion is the main unifying force, and most Mongolians profess Tibetan Buddhism.

Other languages
      A few linguistic minorities in China belong to neither the Sino-Tibetan nor the Altaic language family. The Tajiks (Tajik) of westernmost Xinjiang are related to the people of Tajikistan, and their language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. The Kawa (Wa) people of the border area adjacent to Myanmar (Burma) speak a tongue of the Mon-Khmer branch of the Austroasiatic family. Speakers of languages in the Tai family are concentrated in southern Yunnan, notably in two autonomous prefectures—one whose population is related most closely to the Thai of northern Thailand and another whose Tai speakers are related to the Shan people of Myanmar. The Li of Hainan Island form a separate group whose dialects are related to the Tai and Austronesian languages. They share with the Miao people a district in the southern part of the island. A significant number of Koreans are concentrated in an autonomous prefecture in eastern Jilin along the North Korean border.

 China is one of great centres of world religious thought and practices. It is known especially as the birthplace of the religio-philosophical schools of Confucianism and Daoism (Taoism), belief systems that formed the basis of Chinese society and governance for centuries. Buddhism came to China perhaps as early as the 3rd century BC and was a recognized presence there by the 1st century AD. The country became an incubator for many of the great present-day Buddhist sects, including Zen (Chan) and Pure Land (Pure Land Buddhism), and, by its extension into Tibet, the source of Tibetan Buddhism. In addition, hundreds of animist, folk, and syncretic religious practices developed in China, including the movement that spawned the Taiping Rebellion of the mid-19th century.

      The political and social upheavals in China during the first half of the 20th century had a disintegrating effect on Confucianism, Daoism, and (outside Tibet) Buddhism, and traditional observances of these were greatly weakened. From 1949 the country became officially atheist, although state-monitored religious practices continued to be allowed. However, some religions were persecuted, notably Tibetan Buddhism after China assumed military control of Tibet in 1959. The Chinese government has gradually relaxed many of its earlier restrictions on religious institutions and practices, but it still curtails those it considers threats to the social and political order (e.g., the spiritual exercise discipline called Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa).

 About two-fifths of China's people claim they are nonreligious or atheist. Adherents to various indigenous folk religions, collectively more than one-fourth of the total population, comprise the largest group of those professing a belief. Members of non-Han minorities constitute the bulk of those following Buddhism and Islam. Christians are a small but significant and growing minority, many of them converts to Evangelical Protestant denominations.

Settlement patterns
Rural areas
      An overwhelming majority of rural settlements in China consist of sizable compact (nucleated) villages, except in mountainous and hilly terrain where such compaction is not possible. The formation of such rural settlements is related not only to the increasing population and to a long historical background but also to water supply (the practice of drilling deep wells, for instance) and to defense (especially, in former days, against attack by bandits). Many of the large villages have no urban atmosphere at all, even with populations of several thousand. Frequent markets may be held between such settlements to enable the peasants to barter their agricultural produce.

      On the North China Plain, villages are fairly evenly distributed and are connected with one another by footpaths and cart tracks. Houses are built close together and are mostly made of sun-dried brick or pounded earth. Many of the market towns or even large villages are surrounded by walls. The number and length of the streets depend on the town's size and the nature of the terrain; some streets are merely narrow lanes.

      Rural landscapes of central and southern China are dominated by rice fields. The Yangtze River delta has almost every type of human settlement, from the single farmstead to the fairly large market town. Villages to the south and east of Lake Tai in Jiangsu province are generally located 1 to 2 miles (1.6 to 3 km) apart, and since the 1980s many of these have been developed into small towns. Villages in central China, particularly on the lower Yangtze, are larger than those of North China; many have a few shops that serve not only the villagers but also the dispersed residents nearby. In the centre of dozens of such villages is a market town, which collects rural produce and distributes manufactured goods. Communication among the villages is mainly by boat, along the dense net of waterways. The most elegant structures in the landscape are the numerous stone bridges that span streams and canals. In the Chengdu Plain of the Sichuan Basin, a large part of the population lives in isolated farmsteads or scattered hamlets, surrounded by thickets of bamboo and broad-leaved trees.

       cave dwellings are another distinctive feature of the Chinese rural landscape. They are common on the Loess Plateau and particularly in northern Shaanxi, western Shanxi, and southeastern Gansu, where the loess cover is thick and timber is scarce. A cave dwelling has the advantage of being naturally insulated, making it cooler in summer and warmer in winter.

      The economic reforms initiated in China from the late 1970s had a profound impact on rural settlement. Improvements in agricultural productivity created a vast pool of surplus labour. Many of these rural workers went to the cities in search of factory jobs, but a large number stayed behind, where they engaged in a growing system of rural industrial production termed “township enterprise.” Usually engaged in light manufacturing for both domestic and export markets, these enterprises helped transform thousands of villages into partially urbanized towns and raised the standard of living for millions of peasants. The new towns thus served as a link between the city and the countryside and became a significant factor in the rapidly growing rural economy.

  Urbanization and industrialization often have been closely related in China. The first major post-1949 urbanization push began in the mid-1950s, as the government intensified its efforts to convert the country into an industrial power. Urban growth accelerated even more rapidly from the mid-1980s, with China's serious entry onto the global economic stage.

      Thus, the rapid development of modern manufacturing industries and of communications in China produced a dramatic change in the urban landscape. Many new towns and cities have been built around manufacturing and mining centres. In the remoter areas of China, the first appearance of railways and highways contributed to the rapid growth of some entirely new towns, such as Shihezi in northern Xinjiang and Shiquanhe in western Tibet. Among larger cities, Ürümqi (Urumchi; capital of Xinjiang), Lanzhou (capital of Gansu), and Baotou (in Inner Mongolia) are examples where expansion has been extremely rapid. Lanzhou lies midway between southeastern and northwestern China. Baotou, formerly a bleak frontier town of traders, artisans, and immigrant farmers, has become one of the country's largest steel centres.

      Some two-fifths of China's population is urban, up from less than one-fourth in 1975. While the urban-rural proportion is relatively low compared with more highly industrialized countries, it represents an enormous number of people—comparable to the total population of North America. Some four dozen cities have populations of more than 1,000,000, and the populations of several other dozen are between 500,000 and 1,000,000. The distribution of China's large cities mirrors the national population distribution, with heavy concentrations in the eastern coastal provinces, lesser but still significant numbers in the central provinces, and considerably fewer in western regions.

Demographic trends
Population growth
      Historical records show that as long ago as 800 BC, in the early part of the Zhou dynasty, China was already inhabited by about 13.7 million people. Until the last years of the Xi (Western) Han dynasty, about AD 2, comparatively accurate and complete registers of population were kept, and the total population in that year was given as 59.6 million. This first Chinese census was intended mainly as a preparatory step toward the levy of a poll tax. Many people, aware that a census might work to their disadvantage, managed to avoid reporting, which explains why for centuries all subsequent population figures were unreliable. In 1712 the Qing emperor Kangxi declared that an increased population would not be subject to tax; population figures thereafter gradually became more accurate.

      During the later years of the Bei (Northern) Song dynasty, in the early 12th century, when China was already in the heyday of its economic and cultural development, the total population began to exceed 100 million. Later, uninterrupted and large-scale invasions from the north reduced the country's population. When national unification returned with the advent of the Ming dynasty, the census was at first strictly conducted. The population of China, according to a registration compiled in 1381, was quite close to the one registered in AD 2.

      From the 15th century onward the population increased steadily, growth being interrupted by wars and natural disasters in the mid-17th century and slowed by the internal strife and foreign invasions in the century that preceded the communist takeover in 1949. During the 18th century China enjoyed a lengthy period of peace and prosperity, characterized by continual territorial expansion and an accelerating population increase. In 1762 China had a population of more than 200 million, and by 1834 that population had doubled. It should be noted that during that period the amount of cultivable land did not increase concomitantly, and land hunger became a growing problem from that time on.

      After 1949, sanitation and medical care greatly improved, epidemics were brought under control, and subsequent generations enjoyed progressively better health. Public hygiene also improved, and, as a result, the death rate declined faster than the birth rate, and the population growth rate increased. China's population reached 1 billion in the early 1980s and had surpassed 1.3 billion early in the 21st century.

      The continually growing population has been a major problem for the government. In 1955–58, with the country struggling to obtain an adequate food supply and saddled with a generally low standard of living, the authorities sponsored a major birth-control (birth control) drive. A second attempt at population control began in 1962, when the main initiatives were programs promoting late marriages and the use of contraceptives. The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 interrupted this second family-planning drive, but in 1970 a third and much stricter program was initiated. The attempt this time was to make late marriage and family limitation obligatory, and it culminated in 1979 in efforts to implement a policy of one child per family.

      Other developments affected the rate of population growth more than the first two official family-planning campaigns, notably the disastrous effects of Chinese leader Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward economic program of 1958–60. The policies of the Great Leap caused a massive famine in China, the death rate surpassed the birth rate, and by 1960 the overall population was declining. By 1963 the country was recovering from the famine, and, even though the second birth-control campaign had already begun, a soaring birth rate produced an annual population growth rate of more than 3 percent, the highest since 1949.

      Since 1970, however, when the third family-planning program was launched, state efforts have been much more effective. China's population growth rate is now among the lowest for a developing country, although, because its population is so huge, annual net population growth is still considerable.

Population distribution
      China's complex natural conditions have produced an unevenly distributed population. Population density varies strikingly, with the greatest contrast occurring between the eastern half of China and the lands of the west and the northwest. Exceptionally high population densities occur in the Yangtze delta, the Pearl River Delta, and on the Chengdu Plain of the western Sichuan Basin. Most of the high-density areas are coterminous with the alluvial plains on which intensive agriculture is centred.

      In contrast, the isolated, extensive western and frontier regions, which are much larger than any European country, are sparsely populated. Extensive uninhabited areas include the extremely high northern part of Tibet, the sandy wastes of the central Tarim and eastern Junggar basins in Xinjiang, and the barren desert and mountains east of Lop Nur.

      In the 1950s the government became increasingly aware of the importance of the frontier regions and initiated a drive for former members of the military and young intellectuals to settle there. New railways and highways were constructed to traverse the wasteland, and this has spurred population growth and the development of a number of small mining and industrial towns.

Internal migration (human migration)
      Great population movements have been a recurring theme throughout Chinese history. Typically, some disastrous event such as famine or political upheaval would depopulate an area already intensively cultivated, after which people in adjacent crowded regions would move in to occupy the deserted land. A peasant rebellion in Sichuan in the 1640s caused great loss of life there, and people from neighbouring Hubei and Shaanxi then entered Sichuan to fill the vacuum; this migration pattern continued until the 19th century. Three centuries later the Taiping Rebellion caused another large-scale disruption of population. Many people in the lower Yangtze valley were massacred by the opposing armies, and the survivors suffered from starvation. After the rebellion was defeated, people from Hubei, Hunan, and Henan moved into the depopulated areas of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang, where farmland was lying abandoned and uncultivated. Similar examples include the Nian Rebellion in the Huai River region in the 1850s and '60s, the Muslim rebellions in Shaanxi and Gansu in the 1860s and '70s, and the great Shaanxi and Shanxi famine of 1877–78.

      The most significant internal population movement in modern Chinese history was that of the Han to Manchuria (now known as the Northeast). Even before the Qing (Manchu) dynasty was established in 1644, Manchu soldiers had launched raids into North China and captured Han labourers, who were then obliged to settle in Manchuria. An imperial decree in 1668 closed the area to further Han migration, but this ban was never effectively enforced. By 1850, Han colonizing settlers had become dominant in Manchuria. The ban was later partially lifted, partly because the Manchu rulers were harassed by disturbances in China proper and partly because the Russian Empire continually tried to invade sparsely populated and thus weakly defended Manchuria. The ban was finally removed altogether in 1878, but settlement was encouraged only after 1900.

      The influx of people into Manchuria was especially pronounced after 1923, and incoming farmers rapidly brought a vast area of virgin grassland under cultivation. About two-thirds of the immigrants entered Manchuria by sea, and one-third came overland. Because the region's winter weather was so severe, migration in the early stage was highly seasonal, usually starting in February and continuing through the spring. After the autumn harvest a large proportion of the farmers returned south. As Manchuria developed into the principal industrial region of China, however, large urban centres arose there, and the nature of the migration changed. No longer was the movement primarily one of agricultural resettlement, and instead it became essentially a rural-to-urban movement of interregional magnitude.

      After 1949 the new government's efforts to foster planned migration into interior and border regions produced noticeable results. Although the total number of people involved in such migrations is not known, it has been estimated that by 1980 between one-fourth and one-third of the population of such regions and provinces as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, and Qinghai consisted of recent migrants, and migration had raised the proportion of Han in Xinjiang to about two-fifths of the total. Efforts to control the growth of large cities led to the resettlement in the countryside of some 20 million urbanites after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and of nearly the same number of urban-educated youths in the decade after 1968. However, most of these “rusticated youths” subsequently returned to the cities.

      The economic reforms begun in the late 1970s have unleashed a tidal wave of both rural-to-urban and west-to-east migration, reversing trends of the previous three decades. This has further exacerbated the country's uneven population distribution, bringing enormous influxes to the urban areas of the eastern provinces and further depleting the population in the western regions. However, tens of millions of rural people who go to the cities to find jobs also return home for periods of time during the year. These individuals have tended to group themselves according to their native area for mutual benefit, much as ethnic groups have done in other major world cities. However, the unregulated influx of so many migrants and the instability of their lives and work have put considerable strain on the host cities, notably the environment and public security.


General considerations
      Despite China's size, the wealth of its resources, and the fact that about one-fifth of the world's population lives within its borders, its role in the world economy was relatively small until late in the 20th century. However, since the late 1970s China has dramatically increased its interaction with the international economy, and it has become a dominant figure in world trade. Both China's foreign trade and its gross national product (GNP) have experienced sustained and rapid growth, especially since foreign-owned firms began using China as an export platform for goods manufactured there.

      The Chinese economy thus has been in a state of transition since the late 1970s as the country has moved away from a Soviet-type economic system. Agriculture has been decollectivized, the nonagricultural private sector has grown rapidly, and government priorities have shifted toward light and high-technology, rather than heavy, industries. Nevertheless, key bottlenecks have continued to constrain growth. Available energy has not been sufficient to run all of the country's installed industrial capacity, the transport system has remained inadequate to move sufficient quantities of such critical commodities as coal, and the communications system has not been able to meet the needs of a centrally planned economy of China's size and complexity.

      China's underdeveloped transport system—combined with important differences in the availability of natural and human resources and in industrial infrastructure—has produced significant variations in the regional economies of China. The three wealthiest regions are along the southeast coast, centred on the Pearl (Zhu) River Delta; along the east coast, centred on the lower Yangtze River; and near the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli), in the Beijing-Tianjin-Liaoning region. It is the rapid development of these areas that is having the most significant effect on the Asian regional economy as a whole, and Chinese government policy is designed to remove the obstacles to accelerated growth in these wealthier regions. At the same time, a major priority of the government is the economic development of the interior of the country to help it catch up with the more-prosperous coastal regions.

      China is the world's largest producer of rice and is among the principal sources of wheat, corn (maize), tobacco, soybeans, peanuts (groundnuts), and cotton. The country is one of the world's largest producers of a number of industrial and mineral products—including cotton cloth, tungsten, and antimony—and is an important producer of cotton yarn, coal, crude oil, and a number of other products. Its mineral resources are probably among the richest in the world but are only partially developed. China has acquired some highly sophisticated production facilities through foreign investment and joint ventures with foreign partners. The technological level and quality standards of many of its industries have improved rapidly and dramatically.

      The labour force and the pricing system are still areas of concern. Underemployment is common in both urban and rural areas, and there is a strong fear of the disruptive effects that widespread unemployment could cause. The prices of some key commodities, especially of industrial raw materials and major industrial products, are still determined by the state, although the proportion of these commodities under state control continues to decline. A major exception is energy, which the government continues to regulate. China's increasing contact with the international economy and its growing use of market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem. Over the years, large subsidies were built into the price structure, and these subsidies grew substantially from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, when subsidies began to be eliminated. A significant factor was China's acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which carried with it stipulations about further economic liberalization and government deregulation.

The role of the government
      China has been a socialist country since 1949, and, for nearly all of that time, the government has played a predominant role in the economy (economic planning). In the industrial sector, for example, the state long owned outright nearly all of the firms producing China's manufacturing output. The proportion of overall industrial capacity controlled by the government has gradually declined, although heavy industries have remained largely state owned. In the urban sector the government has set the prices for key commodities, determined the level and general distribution of investment funds, prescribed output targets for major enterprises and branches, allocated energy resources, set wage levels and employment targets, run the wholesale and retail networks, and controlled financial policy and the banking system. The foreign trade system became a government monopoly in the early 1950s. In the countryside from the mid-1950s, the government prescribed cropping patterns, set the level of prices, and fixed output targets for all major crops.

      By the early 21st century much of the above system was in the process of changing, as the role of the central government in managing the economy was reduced and the role of both private initiative and market forces increased. Nevertheless, the government continued to play a dominant role in the urban economy, and its policies on such issues as agricultural procurement still exerted a major influence on performance in the rural sector.

      The effective exercise of control over the economy requires an army of bureaucrats and a highly complicated chain of command, stretching from the top down to the level of individual enterprise. The Chinese Communist Party reserves the right to make broad decisions on economic priorities and policies, but the government apparatus headed by the State Council assumes the major burden of running the economy. The State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance also are concerned with the functioning of virtually the entire economy.

      The entire planning process involves considerable consultation and negotiation. The main advantage of including a project in an annual plan is that the raw materials, labour, financial resources, and markets are guaranteed by directives that have the force of law. In fact, however, a great deal of economic activity goes on outside the scope of the detailed plan, and the tendency has been for the plan to become narrower rather than broader in scope.

      There are three types of economic activity in China: those stipulated by mandatory planning, those done according to indicative planning (in which central planning of economic outcomes is indirectly implemented), and those governed by market forces. The second and third categories have grown at the expense of the first, but goods of national importance and almost all large-scale construction have remained under the mandatory planning system. The market economy generally involves small-scale or highly perishable items that circulate within local market areas only. Almost every year brings additional changes in the lists of goods that fall under each of the three categories.

      Operational supervision over economic projects has devolved primarily to provincial, municipal, and county governments. In addition, enterprises themselves are gaining increased independence in a range of activity. Overall, therefore, the Chinese industrial system contains a complex mixture of relationships. In general, the State Council exercises relatively tight control over resources deemed to be of core importance for the performance of the entire economy. Less-important aspects of the system are devolved to lower levels for detailed decisions and management. In all spheres, moreover, the need to coordinate units that are in different bureaucratic hierarchies produces a great deal of informal bargaining and consensus building.

      Although the state controlled agriculture in the 1950s and '60s, rapid changes were made in the system from the late 1970s. The major vehicles for dictating state priorities—the people's communes and their subordinate teams and brigades—have been either abolished or vastly weakened. Peasant incentives have been raised both by price increases for state-purchased agricultural products and by permission to sell excess production on a free market. Greater freedom is permitted in the choice of what crops to grow, and peasants are allowed to contract for land that they will work, rather than simply working most of the land collectively. The system of procurement quotas (fixed in the form of contracts) is being phased out, although the state can still buy farm products and control surpluses in order to affect market conditions.

Economic policies
      The First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) emphasized rapid industrial development, partly at the expense of other sectors of the economy. The bulk of the state's investment was channeled into the industrial sector, while agriculture, which occupied more than four-fifths of the economically active population, was forced to rely on its own meagre capital resources for a substantial part of its fund requirements. Within industry, iron and steel, electric power, coal, heavy engineering, building materials, and basic chemicals were given first priority; in accordance with Soviet practice, the aim was to construct large, sophisticated, and highly capital-intensive plants. A great many of the new plants were built with Soviet technical and financial assistance, and heavy industry grew rapidly.

      As the Second Five-Year Plan—which resembled its predecessor—got under way in 1958, the policy of the Great Leap Forward was announced. In agriculture this involved forming communes (commune), abolishing private plots, and increasing output through greater cooperation and greater physical effort. In industry the construction of large plants was to continue, but it was to be supplemented by a huge drive to develop small industry, making use of a large number of small, simple, locally built and locally run plants. A spectacular drop in agricultural production ensued. Meanwhile, the indiscriminate backyard production drive failed to achieve the desired effects and yielded large quantities of expensively produced substandard goods. These difficulties were aggravated when Soviet aid and technicians were withdrawn. By late 1960 the country faced an economic crisis of the first order.

      The authorities responded with a complete about-face in policy. Private plots were restored, the size of the communes was reduced, and greater independence was given to the production team. There was also a mass transfer of the unemployed industrial workers to the countryside, and industrial investment was temporarily slashed in order to free resources for farm production. The agricultural situation improved immediately, and by 1963 some resources were being redirected to the capital goods industry.

      The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began in 1966, but, unlike the Great Leap, it did not have an explicit economic philosophy. Nevertheless, industrial production was badly affected by the ensuing decade of confusion and strife, which also left some difficult legacies for the Chinese economy. In industry, wages were frozen and bonuses canceled. Combined with the policies of employing more workers than necessary to soak up unemployment and of never firing workers once hired, this action essentially eliminated incentives to work hard. In addition, technicians and many managers lost their authority and could not play an effective role in production in the wake of the movement. Overall output continued to grow, but capital-to-output ratios declined. In agriculture, per capita output in 1977 was no higher than in 1957.

      Rural economic reform initiated after Mao Zedong began with major price increases for agricultural products in 1979. By 1981 the emphasis had shifted to breaking up collectively tilled fields into land that was contracted out to private families to work. During that time the size of private plots (land actually owned by individuals) was increased, and most restrictions on selling agricultural products in free markets were lifted. In 1984 much longer-term contracts for land were encouraged (generally 15 years or more), and the concentration of land through subleasing of parcels was made legal. In 1985 the government announced that it would dismantle the system of planned procurements with state-allocated production quotas in agriculture. Peasants who had stopped working the land were encouraged to find private employment in the countryside or in small towns. They did not obtain permission to move to major cities, however.

      The basic thrusts of urban economic reform were toward integrating China more fully with the international economy; making enterprises responsible for their profits and losses; reducing the state's role in directing, as opposed to guiding, the allocation of resources; shifting investment away from the metallurgical and machine-building industries and toward light and high-technology industries, while retaining an emphasis on resolving the energy, transportation, and communications bottlenecks; creating material incentives for individual effort and a consumer ethos to spur people to work harder; rationalizing the pricing structure; and putting individuals into jobs for which they have specialized training, skills, or talents. At the same time, the state has permitted a private sector to develop and has allowed it to compete with state firms in a number of service areas and, increasingly, in such larger-scale operations as construction.

      A number of related measures were established to enhance the incentives for enterprise managers to increase the efficiency of their firms. Replacement of the profit-remission system with tax and contracting systems was designed to reward managers by permitting firms to retain a significant portion of increases in production. Managerial authority within firms was strengthened, and bonuses were restored and allowed to grow to substantial proportions. Managers also were given enhanced authority to hire, fire, and promote workers. Reductions in central government planning were accompanied by permission for enterprises to buy and sell surplus goods on essentially a free-market basis, and the prices thus obtained often were far higher than for goods produced to meet plan quotas. The state plan was also used to redirect some resources into the light industrial sector. The state, for example, has given priority in energy consumption to some light industrial enterprises that produce high-quality goods.

      The reduction in the scope of mandatory planning is based on the assumption that market forces can more efficiently allocate many resources. This assumption in turn requires a rational pricing system that takes into account any and all extant technologies and scarcities. Because extensive subsidies were built into the economic system, however, price reform became an extremely sensitive issue. The fear of inflation also served as a constraint on price reform. Nevertheless, the fact that products produced in excess of amounts targeted in the plan can be sold, in most cases, at essentially free-market prices has created a two-tiered price system that is designed to wean the economy from the administratively fixed prices of an earlier era.

      Efforts to create a freer labour market are also part of the overall stress on achieving greater efficiency. As with price reform, tampering with a system that keeps many citizens living more comfortably and securely than would an economically more rational system risks serious repercussions in relations with the public. Changes have proceeded slowly in this sensitive area.

      A decision was made in 1978 to permit direct foreign investment in several small “special economic zones (special economic zone)” along the coast. These zones were later increased to 14 coastal cities and three coastal regions. All of these places provided favoured tax treatment and other advantages for the foreign investor. Laws on contracts, patents, and other matters of concern to foreign businesses were also passed in an effort to attract international capital to aid China's development. The largely bureaucratic nature of China's economy, however, has posed inherent problems for foreign firms that want to operate in the Chinese environment, and China gradually has had to add more incentives to attract foreign capital.

      The changes in China's economic thinking and strategy since 1978 have been so great—with the potential repercussions for important vested interests so strong—that actual practice inevitably has lagged considerably behind declaratory policy. Notable during this period have been the swings in economic policy between an emphasis on market-oriented reforms and a return to at least partial reliance on centralized planning.

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
Farming and livestock
 As a result of topographic and climatic features, the area suitable for cultivation is small: only about 10 percent of China's total land area. Of this, slightly more than half is unirrigated, and the remainder is divided roughly equally between paddy fields and irrigated areas; good progress has been made in improving water conservancy. In addition, the quality of the soil in cultivated regions varies around the country, and environmental problems such as floods, drought, and erosion pose serious threats in many areas. Nevertheless, about two-thirds of the population lives in the countryside, and until the 1980s a large proportion of them made their living directly from farming. Since then many have been encouraged to leave the fields and pursue other activities, such as handicrafts, commerce, factory work, and transport; and by the mid-1980s farming had dropped to less than half of the value of rural output. Although the use of farm machinery has been increasing, for the most part the Chinese peasant depends on simple, nonmechanized farming implements.

      Western China, comprising Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai, has little agricultural significance except for areas of oasis farming and cattle raising. Rice, China's most important crop, is dominant in the southern provinces, many of which yield two harvests per year. In North China wheat is of the greatest importance, while in the central provinces wheat and rice vie with each other for the top place. Millet and kaoliang (a variety of grain sorghum) are grown mainly in the Northeast and some central provinces, which—together with some northern areas—also produce considerable quantities of barley. Most of the soybean crop is derived from the North and the Northeast, and corn (maize) is grown in the centre and the North. Tea comes mainly from the hilly areas of the southeast. Cotton is grown extensively in the central provinces, but it is also found to a lesser extent in the southeast and in the North. Tobacco comes from the centre and parts of the South. Other important crops are potatoes, sugar beets, and oilseeds.

      Animal husbandry constitutes the second most important component of agricultural production. China is the world's leading producer of pigs, chickens, and eggs, and it also has sizable herds of sheep and cattle. Since the mid-1970s, greater emphasis has been placed on increasing the livestock output.

Forestry and fishing
      Wholesale destruction of China's accessible forests over a long period of time gave way to an energetic reforestation program that has proved to be inadequate; forest resources are still fairly meagre. The principal forests are found in the Qin (Tsinling) Mountains and the central mountain ranges and in the uplands of Sichuan and Yunnan. Because they are inaccessible, the Qin forests are not worked extensively, and much of the country's timber comes from Heilongjiang, Jilin, Sichuan, and Yunnan.

 China has a long tradition of ocean and freshwater fishing (commercial fishing) and of aquaculture, and it is the world's leading producer in both categories. The bulk of the catch comes from Pacific fisheries, with nearly all of the remainder from inland freshwater sources. Pond raising has always been important and has been increasingly emphasized to supplement coastal and inland fisheries threatened by overfishing and to provide valuable export commodities such as prawns. Aquaculture surpassed capture, in terms of overall tonnage, in the early 1990s.

Resources and power
      China is well endowed with mineral resources, and more than three dozen minerals have proven economically important reserves. The country has rich overall energy potential, but most of it remains to be developed. In addition, the geographical distribution of energy places most of these resources far from their major industrial users. Basically, the Northeast is rich in coal and petroleum, the central part of North China has abundant coal, and the southwest has great hydroelectric potential. However, the industrialized regions around Guangzhou (Canton) and the lower Yangtze region around Shanghai have too little energy, while there is little industry located near major energy resource areas other than in the southern part of the Northeast. Thus, although energy production has expanded rapidly, it has continued to fall short of demand, and China has been purchasing increasing quantities of foreign petroleum and natural gas.

       mining accounts for a small portion of China's overall gross domestic product (GDP) and employs only a tiny fraction of the country's workforce. It likewise represents a small—though significant—part of the annual value of industrial output. However, several problems have also emerged regarding mineral extraction. One concern is that finds of new proven reserves have fallen short of the country's long-term development needs. In addition, productivity has been low in a great majority of mining operations through mismanagement and the use of obsolete equipment, and the recovery ratio of commodity to ore has been low in many cases, resulting in considerable waste. The environment has been adversely affected both by the vast accumulations of waste rock and other mining debris that have been left on huge tracts of land and by the great volume of polluted wastewater produced by mining operations, which has fouled rivers and farm fields.

 China's most important mineral resources are hydrocarbons, of which coal is the most abundant. Although deposits are widely scattered (some coal is found in every province), most of the total is located in the northern part of the country. The province of Shanxi is thought to contain about half of the total; other important coal-bearing provinces include Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, and Shandong. Apart from these northern provinces, significant quantities of coal are present in Sichuan, and there are some deposits of importance in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou. A large part of the country's reserves consists of good bituminous coal, but there are also large deposits of lignite. Anthracite is present in several places (especially Liaoning, Guizhou, and Henan), but overall it is not significant.

      At the government's instigation, hundreds of small, locally run mines have been developed throughout China in order to ensure a more even distribution of coal supplies and to reduce the strain on the country's inadequate transport network. These operations produce about two-fifths of the country's coal, although their output typically is expensive and used largely for local consumption.

      China's onshore petroleum resources are located mainly in the Northeast—notably at the Daqing oil field— and in the northwestern provinces of Xinjiang (particularly in the Tarim Basin), Gansu, and Qinghai; there are also reserves in Sichuan, Shandong, and Henan provinces. Shale oil is found in a number of places, especially at Fushun in Liaoning, where the deposits overlie the coal reserves, as well as in Guangdong. Light oil of high quality has been found in the Pearl River estuary of the South China Sea, the Qaidam Basin in Qinghai, and the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. China contracted with Western oil companies to jointly explore and develop oil deposits in the China Sea, Yellow Sea, Gulf of Tonkin, and Bo Hai. The country consumes the bulk of its oil output and imports but does export some crude oil and oil products.

      The true extent of China's natural gas reserves is unknown. It has proven reserves of some 42 trillion cubic feet (1.2 trillion cubic metres), but estimates have ranged as high as 187 trillion cubic feet (5.3 trillion cubic metres). Exploration for natural gas, long at only modest levels, has been increasing. Sichuan province accounts for almost half of the known reserves and production. Most of the rest of China's natural gas is associated gas produced in the Northeast's major oil fields, especially Daqing. Other gas deposits have been found in Inner Mongolia, the Qaidam Basin, Shaanxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang and offshore to the southwest of Hainan Island.

      Iron (iron processing) ore reserves are also extensive and are found in most provinces, with Hainan, Gansu, Guizhou, southern Sichuan, and Guangdong having the richest deposits. The largest mined reserves are located north of the Yangtze River and supply neighbouring iron and steel enterprises. With the exception of nickel, chromium, and cobalt, China is well supplied with ferroalloys and manganese. Reserves of tungsten are also known to be fairly large. Copper resources are moderate, and high-quality ore is present only in a few deposits. Discoveries have been reported from the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia. Lead and zinc are available, and bauxite resources are thought to be plentiful. China's antimony reserves are the largest in the world. Tin resources are plentiful, and there are fairly rich deposits of gold. There are important deposits of phosphate rock in a number of areas. Pyrites occur in several places, the most important of which are found in Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi. China also has large resources of fluorite (fluorspar), gypsum, asbestos, and cement.

      In addition, China produces a fairly wide range of nonmetallic minerals. One of the most important of these is salt, which is derived from coastal evaporation sites in Jiangsu, Hebei, Shandong, and Liaoning, as well as from extensive salt fields in Sichuan, Ningxia, and the Qaidam Basin.

Hydroelectric potential
 China's extensive river network and mountainous terrain provide ample potential for the production of hydroelectric power. Most of the total hydroelectric capacity is in the southwest—notably in Sichuan, Yunnan, Tibet, and Hubei—where coal supplies are poor but demand for energy is rapidly growing. The potential in the Northeast is fairly small; however, it was there that the first hydroelectric stations were built (by the Japanese). As a result of considerable seasonal fluctuations in rainfall, the flow of rivers tends to drop during the winter, forcing many power stations to operate at less than normal capacity, while in the summer, on the other hand, floods often interfere with production. The massive Three Gorges project on the Yangtze River east of Chongqing, involving the construction of a dam and reservoir (underway since 1994), began limited hydroelectric production in 2003.

Energy production
      China's energy production has grown rapidly since 1980, but it has continued to fall considerably short of demand. This is partly because energy prices were long held so low that industries had few incentives to conserve. Increasingly, however, demand has outstripped supply. In addition, it has often been necessary to transport fuels (notably coal) great distances from points of production to consumption. Coal provides about two-thirds of China's energy consumption, although its proportion is slowly declining. Petroleum production, which grew rapidly from an extremely low base in the early 1960s, has increased much more gradually from 1980. Natural gas production still constitutes only a small (though increasing) fraction of overall energy production, but gas is supplanting coal as a domestic fuel in the major cities.

      China's electric-generating capacity has expanded dramatically since 1980, and the proportion allocated to domestic consumption also has grown considerably. Some four-fifths of all power generated is at thermal plants, with nearly all the rest at hydroelectric installations; only a tiny proportion is from nuclear energy, from plants located near Shanghai and Guangzhou.

 The development of industry has been given considerable attention since the advent of the communist regime. Overall industrial output often has grown at an annual rate of more than 10 percent, and China's industrial workforce probably exceeds the combined total for all other developing countries. Industry has surpassed all other sectors in economic growth and degree of modernization. Most heavy industries and products deemed to be of national strategic importance remain state-owned, but an increasing proportion of lighter and consumer-oriented manufacturing firms are privately held or are private-state joint ventures.

      Among the various manufacturing branches, the metallurgical and machine-building industries have received high priority. These two branches alone now account for about two-fifths of the total gross value of industrial output. In these, as in most other areas of state-owned industry, however, innovation has generally suffered at the hands of a system that has rewarded increases in gross output rather than improvements in variety and quality. China, therefore, still imports significant quantities of specialized steels. Much of the country's steel output comes from a small number of producing centres, the largest being Anshan in Liaoning.

      The principal preoccupation of authorities in chemical and petrochemical manufacturing is to expand the output of chemical fertilizers, plastics, and synthetic fibres. The growth of this industry has placed China among the world's leading producers of nitrogenous fertilizers. In the consumer goods sector the main emphasis is on textiles, clothing, shoes, processed foods, and toys, all of which also form an important part of China's exports. textile production, a rapidly growing proportion of which consists of synthetics, continues to be important, but less so than before. The industry tends to be scattered throughout the country, but there are a number of important textile centres, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Harbin.

      The pace of industrialization quickened and diversified after 1990. Notable were the development of automobile, aircraft, and aerospace manufacturing. In addition, China expanded rapidly into the production of electronics, semiconductors, software, and precision equipment, often in conjunction with foreign firms.

      Overall, the distribution of industry has remained uneven, despite serious efforts from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s to build up manufacturing in the interior at the cost of the major cities on the east coast. While percentage growth of industry in the interior provinces generally greatly exceeded that of the coastal areas, the far larger initial industrial base of the latter meant that a few coastal regions have continued to dominate China's industrial economy. The establishment of special economic zones in coastal areas only enhanced this disparity. Thus, Shanghai alone produces about 10 percent of China's gross value of industrial output, and the east coast accounts for about 60 percent of the national manufacturing output.

      China's financial institutions are owned by the state. The principal instruments of fiscal and financial control are the People's Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance, both subject to the authority of the State Council. The People's Bank, which replaced the Central Bank of China in 1950 and gradually took over private banks, fulfills many of the functions of Western central and commercial banks. It issues the renminbi (yuan; the national currency), controls circulation, and plays an important role in disbursing budgetary expenditures. Furthermore, it handles the accounts, payments, and receipts of government organizations and other bodies, which enables it to exercise detailed supervision over their financial and general performance in the light of the state's economic plans.

      The People's Bank is also responsible for foreign trade and other overseas transactions (including remittances by overseas Chinese), but these functions are exercised through the Bank of China, which maintains branch offices in a number of European and Asian countries.

      Other important financial institutions include the People's Construction Bank of China, responsible for capitalizing a portion of overall investment and for providing capital funds for certain industrial and construction enterprises; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which conducts ordinary commercial transactions and acts as a savings bank for the public; the Agricultural Bank of China, which serves the agricultural sector; and the China Investment Bank, which handles foreign investment. Many foreign banks maintain offices in China's larger cities and the special economic zones.

      China's economic reforms greatly increased the economic role of the banking system. Whereas virtually all investment capital was previously provided on a grant basis in the state plan, policy has shifted to a loan basis through the various state financial institutions. More generally, increasing amounts of funds are made available through the banks for economic purposes. Enterprises and individuals can go to the banks to obtain loans outside the state plan, and this has proved to be a major source of financing both for new firms and for the expansion and modernization of older enterprises.

      Foreign sources of capital also have become increasingly important. China has received loans from the World Bank and several United Nations programs, as well as from several countries (particularly Japan) and from commercial banks. Hong Kong and Taiwan have become major conduits for—as well as sources of—this investment. Stock exchanges have been operating at Shanghai and Shenzen since 1990, and the government began allowing the first foreign firms to trade in the market in 2003.

      Trade has become an increasingly important part of China's overall economy, and it has been a significant tool used for economic modernization. The direction of China's foreign trade has undergone marked changes since the early 1950s. In 1950 some three-fourths of the total was accounted for by trade with noncommunist countries, but by 1954—one year after the end of hostilities during the Korean War—the situation was completely reversed, and communist countries accounted for about three-fourths. During the next few years, the communist world lost some of its former importance, but it was only after the Sino-Soviet breach of 1960—which resulted in the cancellation of Soviet credits and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians—that the noncommunist world began to see a rapid improvement in its position. In 1965 China's trade with other socialist countries made up only about one-third of the total.

      A significant part of China's trade with the developing countries has been financed through credits, grants, and other forms of assistance. At first, from 1953 to 1955, aid went mainly to North Korea and North Vietnam and some other communist states; but from the mid-1950s large amounts—mainly grants and long-term interest-free loans—were promised to politically uncommitted developing countries. The principal efforts were made in Asia—especially to Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Pakistan, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka)—but large loans were also granted in Africa (Ghana, Algeria, Tanzania) and in the Middle East (Egypt). After Mao Zedong's death in 1976, however, the Chinese scaled back such efforts.

      During the 1980s and '90s, China's foreign trade came full cycle. Trade with all communist countries diminished to insignificance, especially with the demise of most socialist states. By contrast, trade with noncommunist developed and developing countries became predominant. In general, China has had a positive balance of trade with its trading partners since 1990. Hong Kong became one of China's major partners prior to its reincorporation into the country; it remains prominent in domestic trade, notably in its reliance on the mainland for agricultural products. Taiwan also has become an important trading partner.

      Most of China's imports consist of machinery and apparatus (including semiconductors, computers, and office machines), chemicals, and fuels. The main import sources are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the countries of the European Union (EU), and the United States. Regionally, almost half of China's imports come from East and Southeast Asia, and some one-fourth of its exports go to the same countries.

      The great bulk of China's exports consists of manufactured goods, of which electrical and electronic machinery and equipment and clothing, textiles, and footwear are by far the most important. Agricultural products, chemicals, and fuels are also significant exports. The United States, Japan, EU countries, and South Korea are the principal export destinations.

      The service sector constitutes about one-third of China's annual GDP, second only to manufacturing; likewise, only agriculture employs a larger share of the workforce than services. However, its proportion of GDP is still low compared with the ratio in more-developed countries. Public administration has long been a main component of the sector, as has wholesale and retail trade. Tourism has become a significant factor in employment and as a source of foreign exchange.

Labour and taxation
      Agriculture has remained the largest employer, though its proportion of the workforce has steadily declined; between 1991 and 2001 it dropped from three-fifths to two-fifths of the total. The manufacturing labour force has also shrunk at a slower rate, in part because of reforms implemented at many of the state-run enterprises. Such reforms and other factors have increased unemployment and underemployment in both urban and rural areas. Women have been a major labour presence in China since the People's Republic was established. Some two-fifths of all women over age 15 are employed.

      Chinese trade unions (organized labour) are organized on a broad industrial basis. Membership is open to those who rely on wages for the whole or a large part of their income—a qualification that excludes most agricultural workers. In theory, membership is not compulsory, but in view of the unions' longtime role in distributing social benefits, the economic pressure to join is considerable. The lowest unit is the enterprise union committee. Individual trade unions also operate at the provincial level, and there are trade union councils that coordinate all union activities within a particular area and operate at county, municipal, and provincial levels. At the top of the movement is the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which discharges its functions through a number of regional federations.

      In theory the appropriate trade union organizations have been consulted on the level of wages as well as on wage differentials, but in practice their role in these and similar matters has been insignificant. They have not engaged in collective bargaining—not at all surprising, since their principal duties have included assisting the party and promoting production. In fulfilling these tasks, they have had a role in enforcing labour discipline. From the point of view of the membership, the most important activities have concerned the social and welfare services. Thus, the unions have looked after industrial safety; organized social and cultural activities; provided services such as clinics, rest and holiday homes, hostels, libraries, and clubs; and administered old-age pensions, workers' insurance, disability benefits, and other welfare schemes. More recently, however, reforms of the social security system have involved moving the responsibility for pensions and other welfare to the provinces.

      From the 1950s to the '80s, the central government's revenues derived chiefly from the profits of the state enterprises, which were remitted to the state. Some government revenues also came from taxes, of which the most important was the general industrial and commercial tax. The trend, however, has been for remitted profits of the state enterprises to be replaced with taxes on those profits. Initially, this tax system was adjusted so as to allow for differences in the capitalization and pricing situations of various firms, but more-uniform tax schedules were introduced in the early 1990s. In addition, personal income and value-added taxes were implemented at that time.

Transportation and telecommunications
      Great emphasis has been placed on developing the country's transport infrastructure because it is so closely related to developing the national economy, consolidating the national defense system, and strengthening national unification. Nevertheless, China's domestic transport system continues to constitute a major constraint on economic growth and the efficient movement of goods and people. Railroads, some still employing steam locomotives, provide the major means for freight haulage, but their capacity cannot meet demand for the shipment of coal and other goods. In addition, roads and waterways are providing an increasing proportion of China's overall transport.

      Since 1949 China's transport and communications policies, influenced by political, military, and economic considerations, have experienced changes of emphasis in different periods. Thus, just after 1949 the primary concern was to repair existing lines of communication, to give priority to military transport needs, and to strengthen political control. During most of the 1950s, new lines were built, while at the same time old lines were improved. During the Great Leap Forward much of the improvement of regional transportation became the responsibility of the general population, and many small railways were constructed. After 1963, emphasis was placed on developing transportation in rural, mountainous, and, especially, forested areas in order to help promote agricultural production; simultaneously the development of international communications was energetically pursued, and the scope of ocean transport was broadened considerably.

      Initially, as China's railways and highways were mostly concentrated in the coastal regions, access to the interior was difficult. This situation has been improved considerably, as railways and highways have been built in the remote border areas of the northwest and southwest. All parts of China, except certain remote areas of Tibet, are accessible by rail, road, water, or air.

Railways (railroad)
      Railway construction began in China in 1876. Because railways can conveniently carry a large volume of goods over long distances, they are of especial importance in China's transportation system. All trunk railways in China are under the administration of the Ministry of Railways. The central government operates a major rail network in the Northeast built on a base constructed by the Russians and Japanese during the decades before 1949 and an additional large system inside (that is, to the south or east of) the Great Wall. The framework for the railways inside the wall consists of several north-south and east-west lines.

      Apart from those operated by the central government, there is also a network of small, state-owned local railways that link mines, factories, farms, and forested areas. The construction of these smaller railways is encouraged by the central government, and technical assistance is provided by the state railway system when it is thought that the smaller railways can stimulate regional economic development.

      Coal has long been the principal railway cargo. The rather uneven distribution of coalfields in China makes it necessary to transport coal over long distances, especially between the North and South. The increase in the production of petroleum and natural gas has made necessary the construction of both pipelines and additional railways.

      Since the late 1950s there has been a change in railway-construction policy. Prior to that time, most attention was paid to the needs of the eastern half of China, where most of the coal network is found; but since then, more emphasis has been given to extending the rail system into the western provinces and improving the original railway system, including such measures as building bridges, laying double tracks, and using continuous welded rail. In addition, certain important rail links have been electrified.

      Since 1960 hundreds of thousands of workers have been mobilized to construct major lines in the northwest and southwest. In the 1970s new lines were extended into previously unopened parts of the country. In the 1980s new regions in the northwest were linked to the national market and opened up for development. The best example was the line built from Lanzhou in Gansu province westward into the oil fields of the Qaidam Basin. These projects, which were coordinated on a national level, contrast to the pattern prevailing before World War II, when foreign-financed railroads were built in different places without any attempt to coordinate or standardize the transport and communications system.

      Even greater effort has been made since 1990 to speed up new railway construction and improve the existing network. A major new line runs southward from Beijing to Kowloon (Hong Kong) via Fuyang and Nanchang and eases strain on the other north-south trunk lines. The main east-west trunk line from Lianyungang on the east coast to Lanzhou now extends northwestward through Ürümqi (Urumchi) to the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan border, linking China to Central Asia and Russia. A third line, constructed southeastward from Kunming in Yunnan to the port of Beihai in Guangxi, greatly improves southwestern China's access to the sea, as does a new line that connects Lhasa in Tibet with Qinghai province. In addition, upgrades to track and equipment have facilitated high-speed passenger rail service between Beijing and Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Harbin.

Road networks
      The first modern highway in China was built in 1913 in Hunan province. The highways of China may be divided into three categories: state, provincial, or regional highways of political, economic, or military importance; local highways of secondary importance, operated by counties or communes; and special-purpose highways, mostly managed by factories, mines, state farms, forestry units, or the military forces.

      The most striking achievement in highway construction has been the road system built on the cold and high Qinghai-Tibetan plateau (Tibet, Plateau of). Workers, after overcoming various physical obstacles, within a few years built three of the highest and longest highways in the world, thus markedly changing the transport pattern in the western border regions of China and strengthening the national defense system. Of the three highways, one runs westward across Sichuan into Tibet; another extends southwestward from Qinghai to Tibet; and the third runs southward from Xinjiang to Tibet.

      Another early objective was to build a rural road network in order to open up commercial routes to the villages and to facilitate the transport of locally produced goods. The wide dispersion and seasonal and variable nature of agricultural production, as well as the large numbers of relatively small shipments involved, explain why trucks are preferred for shipping. Similarly, trucks best bring consumer goods, fertilizers, and farm machinery and equipment to rural areas.

      From the 1980s and especially since 1990, the emphasis has shifted to creating a nationwide network of major highways. Thousands of miles of multilane express highways have been constructed in and around the largest cities, and older two-lane roads have been widened to accommodate multiple lanes of traffic. Overall road mileage has roughly doubled since the early 1980s. Nonetheless, motor vehicle use has expanded much more rapidly than road construction, particularly in the major cities. In addition, a large proportion of China's road network is either unpaved or badly in need of reconstruction.

      Large-scale highway construction spurred China to develop its motor vehicle industry (automotive industry). The first vehicle manufacturing plant dates to the mid-1950s, and by 1970 localized production was widespread in the country. The basis of the early industry was generally simple, usually an extension of repair shops in which vehicles of various types were produced to serve the needs of the locality. Vehicles produced by large state automotive factories generally were distributed only to state enterprises and military units. By the 1980s many vehicles, especially automobiles, were imported. Domestic automobile manufacture grew rapidly after 1990 as individual car ownership became increasingly possible, and it emerged as one of China's major industries. Several foreign companies have established joint ventures with Chinese firms.

 Since ancient times, inland water transport has played a major role in moving goods and commodities from production sources to consumption destinations. Railways and roads, though increasingly important to modern China's transport network, cannot entirely supplant waterways. The high cost of construction prevents railways from being built extensively, and rail transport conditions are often congested. Freight volume carried by highways is limited, and highways are not suitable for moving bulk goods. China's water transport potential is great, but it is still far from being fully developed. Nonetheless, China has more than 75,000 miles (some 125,000 km) of navigable inland waterways, the most extensive system of any country in the world. The distribution of waterways is chiefly within central and South China, except for a few navigable streams in the Northeast.

      One of the first goals of the communist government after it took power in 1949 was to establish a national network of waterways. It also initiated a program to build and refurbish port facilities and to dredge river channels. By 1961 some 15 principal waterways had been opened to navigation, focused on the Yangtze, Pearl (Zhu), Huai, and Han rivers, the Huang He (Yellow River), and the Grand Canal. Water transport development has subsequently received considerable emphasis. Dredging and other improvements to inland waterways have been important to economic reconstruction, while capital and maintenance costs for water transport have been much lower than those for railway transport.

      The Yangtze (Yangtze River), the most important artery in China's waterway network, is also one of the most economically significant rivers in the world. Together with its tributaries, it accounts for almost half of the country's waterway mileage, while the volume of the freight it carries represents about one-third of the total volume carried by river transport. Work undertaken in the mid-1950s to improve the middle course of the Yangtze allowed it to become navigable throughout the year from its mouth to Yibin in Sichuan. When the Yangtze is high in summer, it is navigable from its mouth to as far as Chongqing for ships of up to 5,000 tons. Many cable-hauling stations had been established at rapids on the upper course of the Yangtze and of its major tributaries, such as the Wu River. Boats sailing against the current are hauled over the rapids with strong steel cables attached to fixed winches, thus augmenting their loading capacity, increasing speed, and saving time. Such improvements have permitted regular passenger and cargo services to be operated on the Yangtze.

      The Xi River (Xi River system) is second in importance only to the Yangtze, being the major water transport artery of South China. Ships of 1,000 tons can sail up the Xi to Wuzhou, while smaller craft can sail up its middle and upper courses as well as up the Bei and Dong rivers and the tributaries of all these streams. The Yangtze and the Xi are not icebound in winter. The Sungari (Songhua) River (Sungari River), flowing across the Manchurian Plain, is navigable for half of its course; it is icebound from November through March and crowded with traffic the other months of the year. The Amur (Heilong), Sungari, and Ussuri (Wusuli) rivers with their tributaries form a network of waterways totaling about 12,500 miles (20,100 km) in length. In the past the Huang He was little navigated, especially on its middle and lower courses, but mechanized junks now operate along the middle course in Henan.

      The Grand Canal, the only major Chinese waterway running from north to south, passes through the basins of the Hai, Huang, Huai, Yangtze, and Qiantang rivers in its 1,100-mile (1,800-km) course from Beijing to Hangzhou. One of the greatest engineering projects in China, equal in fame to the Great Wall, it is the world's longest artificial waterway; some of its sections follow the natural course of a river, while other parts are hand-dug. Work on the canal began as early as the 4th century BC and was completed by the end of the 13th century AD. It forms a north-south communications and transport link between the most densely populated areas in China. From the latter part of the 19th century, however, because of political corruption, mismanagement, and flooding from the Huang He, the canal gradually became silted up, and the higher section in Shandong became blocked. Since 1958, efforts have been made to reopen the Grand Canal to navigation, this time also by larger modern craft. The canal is important in the north-south transport of bulk cargoes, thus facilitating the nationwide distribution of coal and foodstuffs.

Port facilities and shipping
 China's 8,700-mile- (14,000-km-) long coastline is indented by some 100 large and small bays and has some 20 deepwater harbours, most of which are ice-free throughout the year. Coastal shipping is divided into two principal navigation zones, the northern and southern marine districts. The northern district extends north from Amoy to the North Korean border, with Shanghai as its administrative centre. The southern district extends south from Amoy to the Vietnamese border, with Guangzhou as the administrative centre. Most of the oceangoing routes begin from the ports of Dalian, Qinghuangdao, Tanggu, Qingdao (Tsingtao), Shanghai, Huangpu, Zhanjiang, or Hong Kong. Shanghai, the leading port of China from the early 19th century, was eclipsed by Hong Kong when the latter was reincorporated into the country in 1997.

      In 1961 China established a state-run marine shipping company and subsequently signed shipping agreements with many countries, laying the foundation for developing the country's ocean transport. That organization developed into the present-day China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), one of the world's largest shipping corporations. The Chinese government also invested heavily in water transport infrastructure, constructing new ports and rebuilding and enlarging older facilities. A major effort has also been made to increase mechanization and containerization at major international ports. In addition, China has become one of the world's premier shipbuilding countries, satisfying domestic demand and exporting ships and oil-drilling platforms worldwide.

      Air travel is particularly suited to China, with its vast territory and varied terrain. Chinese civil aviation has two major categories: air transport, which mainly handles passengers, cargoes, and mail, traveling on both scheduled and nonscheduled routes; and special-purpose aviation, which mainly serves industrial and agricultural production, national defense, and scientific and technological research. The aims of civil aviation in China have been primarily to extend air routes; to strengthen the link between Beijing and other important cities, as well as remote border and interior areas; to develop special-purpose flights serving the needs of agriculture, forestry, and geologic prospecting; and to increase the number of large transport airplanes.

      In the 1950s international aviation depended mainly on Soviet (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) support, and all principal international air routes originally passed through Moscow using Soviet planes. As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1950s, China began to open direct air routes to other places as well. Thus, in addition to the original routes between China and the Soviet Union, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Burma (now Myanmar), air routes were opened to several of China's neighbouring countries, the United States, western Asia, Europe, and Africa. After 1980 the number of air routes grew markedly; the addition of Hong Kong's international air traffic in 1997 constituted another significant increase.

      Chinese civil air efforts were carried out solely by the state-run General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) from 1949 until the mid-1980s. In an effort to improve efficiency and service, regional airlines were then introduced in competition with the airlines operated by the CAAC. In the early 21st century the CAAC's airline-operating responsibilities were being shifted to semiprivate companies.

      Airport construction has increased greatly since Beijing's first modern civilian airport was built in 1958; that facility was replaced in 1980 by Capital Airport. Major projects since 1990 include new facilities at Macau (1995), Hong Kong (1998), Shanghai (2000), and Guangzhou (2004) . The Chinese Air Force controls a large number of airfields; retired Air Force personnel have been the major source of civilian pilots. Airplanes, including various types of military aircraft, have long been made by China. Civil airliners for long-distance flights, however, are still mostly purchased abroad.

Posts and telecommunications
      Posts and telecommunications were established rapidly in the 1950s and '60s. By 1952 the principal posts and telecommunications network centred on Beijing, and links to all large cities had been established. Great progress was made in improving the postal service under the First Five-Year Plan. Postal service was also developed in the rural areas. Besides extending rural postal routes, the problem of delivering mail to places below the county level was solved by enlisting the aid of the population. From 1954 onward a system of mail delivery by rural postal workers was tried in agricultural cooperatives, and in 1956 this system was extended throughout the country. By 1959 the national postal network was complete.

      When the People's Republic was established in 1949, China had only a rudimentary telecommunications system, limited largely to the eastern coastal cities, the Nanjing region, and a few interior cities. Work quickly got under way to repair and expand the system, and from 1956 telecommunications routes were extended more rapidly. The same lines were used for both telegraphic and telephone service to increase the efficiency of the communication system, and Teletype and television broadcast services were also added. By 1963 telephone wire linked Beijing to the large cities and the capitals of all provinces and autonomous regions, and capitals in turn were connected to the administrative seats of the counties, smaller municipalities, and larger market towns.

      By the 1970s, radio telecommunications equipment was beginning to replace wire lines, and microwave and satellite transmissions were soon introduced; China launched its first television-broadcast satellite in 1986. The pace of telecommunications growth and technology upgrading increased even more rapidly after 1990, especially as fibre-optics systems and digital technology were installed. China's telecommunications services were further enhanced from 1997, when Hong Kong's highly advanced systems were acquired. In the late 1990s, foreign companies were allowed to invest in the country's telecommunications sector, further encouraging growth. Notable has been the tremendous increase in cellular phone use; China became the world leader in the early 21st century, in terms of number of subscribers.

      Despite these advances, China's telecommunications infrastructure has not been able to keep up with demand. A large proportion of the country's population still has little or no access even to basic telephone service. Although the number of cellular phones has grown enormously, surpassing that for standard (i.e., landline) telephones in 2003, the overall ratio of phones per capita has nonetheless remained much smaller than it is for the developed countries. Internet use has also increased dramatically.

Cheng-Siang Chen Kenneth G. Lieberthal Ed.

Government and society

Parallel structure
      Despite its size, the People's Republic of China is organized along unitary rather than federal principles. Both the government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP; (Chinese Communist Party) Pinyin: Zhongguo Gongchan Dang; Wade-Giles romanization: Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang), moreover, operate “from the top down,” arrogating to the “Centre” all powers that are not explicitly delegated to lower levels. To run the country, the government and the CCP have established roughly parallel national bureaucracies (bureaucracy) extending from Beijing down to local levels. These bureaucracies are assisted by various “mass organizations”—e.g., trade unions, a youth league, women's associations, and writers' and other professional associations—that encompass key sectors of the population. These organizations, with their extremely large memberships, have generally served as transmission lines for communicating and uniformly implementing policies affecting their members. No voluntary associations are permitted to function that are wholly independent of CCP and government leadership.

      The CCP and government bureaucracies themselves are organized along territorial and functional lines. The territorial organization is based on a number of administrative divisions, with both a CCP committee and a “people's government” in charge of each. These territorial divisions include the national level in Beijing (the Centre), 33 provincial-level units (4 directly administered cities, 5 autonomous regions, the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions, and 22 provinces, excluding Taiwan), some 330 prefectural bodies, more than 2,850 county-level entities, and numerous cities, towns, and townships. Some larger cities are themselves divided into urban wards and counties. This territorial basis of organization is intended to coordinate and lend coherence to the myriad policies from the Centre that may affect any given locale.

      The functionally based political organization is led on the government side by ministries and commissions under the State Council and on the CCP side by Central Committee departments. These central-level functional bodies sit atop hierarchies of subordinate units that have responsibility for the sector or issue area under concern. Subordinate functional units typically are attached to each of the territorial bodies.

      This complex structure is designed to coordinate national policy (such as that toward the metallurgical industry), assure some coordination of policy on a territorial basis, and enable the CCP to keep control over the government at all levels of the national hierarchy. One unintended result of this organizational approach is that China employs more than 10 million officials—a number that exceeds the populations of many of the world's countries.

      There are tensions among these different goals, and thus a great deal of shifting has occurred since 1949. During the early and mid-1950s the government's functional ministries and commissions at the Centre were especially powerful. The Great Leap Forward, starting in 1958, shifted authority toward the provincial- and lower-level territorial CCP bodies. During the Cultural Revolution, starting in 1966, much of the political system became so disrupted that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was called in and assumed control. When the PLA fell under a political cloud, the situation became remarkably fluid and confused for much of the 1970s.

      Since then the general thrust has been toward less-detailed CCP supervision of the government and greater decentralization of government authority where possible. But the division of authority between CCP and government and between territorial and functional bodies has remained in a state of flux, as demonstrated by a trend again toward centralization at the end of the 1980s and subsequent efforts toward decentralization since the late 1990s. The Chinese communist political system still has not become institutionalized enough for the distribution of power among important bodies to be fixed and predictable.

Constitutional framework
      The fourth constitution of the People's Republic of China was adopted in 1982. It vests all national legislative power in the hands of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. The State Council and its Standing Committee, by contrast, are made responsible for executing rather than enacting the laws. This basic division of power is also specified for each of the territorial divisions—province, county, and so forth—with the proviso in each instance that the latitude available to authorities is limited to that specified by law.

      All citizens 18 years of age and older who have not been deprived of their political rights are permitted to vote, and direct popular suffrage is used to choose People's Congress members up to the county level. Above the counties, delegates at each level elect those who will serve at the People's Congress of the next higher level. Were this constitution an accurate reflection of the real workings of the system, the People's Congresses and their various committees would be critical organs in the Chinese political system. In reality, though, they are not.

      Actual decision-making authority in China resides in the state's executive organs and in the CCP. At the national level the top government executive organ is the State Council, which is led by the premier. The constitution permits the appointment of vice-premiers, a secretary-general, and an unspecified number of councillors of state and heads of ministries and commissions. The premier, vice-premiers, state councillors, and secretary-general meet regularly as the Standing Committee, in which the premier has the final decision-making power. This Standing Committee of the State Council exercises major day-to-day decision-making authority, and its decisions de facto have the force of law.

      While it is not so stipulated in the constitution, each vice-premier and councillor assumes responsibility for the work of one or more given sectors or issues, such as education, energy policy, or foreign affairs. The leader concerned then remains in contact with the ministries and the commissions of the State Council that implement policy in that area. This division of responsibility permits a relatively small body such as the Standing Committee of the State Council (consisting of fewer than 20 people) to monitor and guide the work of a vast array of major bureaucratic entities. When necessary, of course, the Standing Committee may call directly on additional expertise in its deliberations. The National People's Congress meets roughly annually and does only a little more than to ratify the decisions already made by the State Council.

      Parallel to the State Council system is the central leadership of the CCP. The distribution of power among the various organs at the top of the CCP—the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo), the Political Bureau itself, and the Secretariat—has varied a great deal, and from 1966 until the late 1970s the Secretariat did not function at all. There is in any case a partial overlap of membership among these organs and between these top CCP bodies and the Standing Committee of the State Council. In addition, formally retired elder members of the party have often exercised decisive influence on CCP decision making.

Political process
Role of the CCP
      According to the CCP constitution of 1982, the National Party Congress is the highest decision-making body. Since the Party Congress typically convenes only once in five years, the Central Committee is empowered to act when the Congress is not in session. Further, the Political Bureau can act in the name of the Central Committee when the latter is not in session, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau guides the work of the Political Bureau. The Secretariat is charged with the daily work of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The general secretary of the party presides over the Secretariat and also is responsible for convening the meetings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The Secretariat works when necessary through several departments (the department for organization, for example, or the department for propaganda) under the Central Committee.

      Until 1982 the CCP had a chairmanship that was unique among ruling communist parties. Mao Zedong held this office until his death in 1976, and Hua Guofeng was chairman until his removal from office in 1981. Hu Yaobang then served as party chairman until the post was abolished in 1982. The decision to redefine the position was part of the effort to reduce the chances of any one leader's again rising to a position above the party, as Mao had done. China's government still has a chairmanship, but the office has only limited power and is largely ceremonial.

      The division of power among the leading CCP organs and between them and the State Council is constantly shifting. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau as a whole have the authority to decide on any issue they wish to take up. The Secretariat has also at times played an extremely powerful and active role, meeting more frequently than either the Political Bureau or its Standing Committee and making many important decisions on its own authority. Similarly, the State Council has made many important decisions, but its power is always exercised at the pleasure of the CCP leadership.

      Since the late 1970s China has taken a number of initiatives to move toward a more institutionalized system in which the office basically determines the power of its incumbent rather than vice versa, as has often been the case. Thus, for example, the CCP and state constitutions adopted in 1982 (and subsequently amended somewhat) for the first time stipulated a number of positions that confer membership status on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. These positions are the head of the Party Military Affairs Commission, the general secretary of the CCP, the head of the Central Advisory Committee, and the head of the Central Discipline Commission. In addition, for the first time under the stipulations of the constitution, limits of two consecutive terms were placed on the government offices of premier, vice-premier, and state councillor. There were no similar constitutional restrictions on the tenure of incumbents to top CCP positions.

      In theory, the CCP sets major policy directions and broadly supervises the implementation of policy to ensure that its will is not thwarted by the state and military bureaucracies. The CCP also assumes major responsibility for instilling proper values in the populace. The government, according to the theory, is responsible for carrying out CCP policy, making the necessary decisions as matters arise. Of course, this clear division of labour quickly becomes blurred for a number of reasons. For example, only since the late 1970s has a concerted effort been made to appoint different people to the key executive positions in the CCP and the government. Prior to that time, the same individual would head both the CCP committee and the government body in charge of any given area. At the highest levels the premier of the government and the chairman of the party continue to sit on the CCP Political Bureau.

      More fundamentally, it is often impossible to clearly separate policy formation and implementation in a huge, complex set of organizations charged with a multiplicity of tasks. The tendency has been for CCP cadres to become increasingly involved in day-to-day operations of the government, until some major initiative was taken by the top national leadership to reverse the trend. While the distinction between the CCP and the government is of considerable significance, therefore, the ruling structure in China can also be viewed from the functional point of view mentioned above. The careers of individual officials may shift among posts in both the CCP and the government, but for most officials all posts are held within one area of concern, such as economics, organization or personnel, security, propaganda, or culture.

      A hierarchy of organization and personnel has been embedded in virtually all CCP and government bodies. Even on the government side, all officials in these personnel departments are members of the CCP, and they follow rules and regulations that are not subject to control by the particular bodies of which they are formally a part. This system has been used to assure higher-level CCP control over the appointments to all key positions in the CCP, government, and other major organizations (enterprises, universities, and so forth).

      For much of the period between 1958 and 1978, these personnel departments applied primarily political criteria in making appointments. They systematically discriminated against intellectuals, specialists, and those with any ties or prior experience abroad. From 1978 to 1989, however, official policy was largely the reverse, with ties abroad being valued because of China's stress on “opening the door” to the international community. A good education became an important asset in promoting careers, while a history of political activism counted for less or could even hinder upward mobility. A partial reversion to pre-1978 criteria was decreed in 1989, followed by periods of shifting between the two policies.

      Two important initiatives have been taken to reduce the scope of the personnel bureaucracies. First, during 1984 the leaders of various CCP and government bodies acquired far greater power to appoint their own staffs and to promote from among their staffs on their own initiative. The leaders themselves still must be appointed via the personnel system, but most others are no longer fully subject to those dictates. Second, a free labour market has been encouraged for intellectuals and individuals with specialized skills, a policy that could further reduce the power of the personnel bodies.

      The legal apparatus that existed before the changes made during the Cultural Revolution was resurrected in 1980. The State Council again has a Ministry of Justice, and procuratorial organs and a court system were reestablished. The legal framework for this system was provided through the adoption of various laws and legal codes. One significant difference was that for the first time the law provided that there should be no discrimination among defendants based on their class origin. China also reestablished a system of lawyers.

      The actual functioning of this legal apparatus, however, has continued to be adversely affected by a shortage of qualified personnel and by deeply ingrained perspectives that do not accord the law priority over the desires of political leaders. Thus, for example, when the top CCP (Chinese Communist Party) leadership ordered a severe crackdown on criminal activity in 1983, thousands were arrested and executed without fully meeting the requirements of the newly passed law on criminal procedures. That law was subsequently amended to conform more closely with the actual practices adopted during the crackdown. Subsequently, similar campaigns have been mounted against criminal activity.

      The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the unified organization of all Chinese land, sea, and air forces. The history of the PLA is officially traced to the Nanchang Uprising of Aug. 1, 1927, which is celebrated annually as PLA Day. The PLA is one of the world's largest military forces, with in excess of two million members. Military service is compulsory for all men who attain the age of 18; women may register for duty in the medical, veterinary, and other technical services. Demobilized servicemen are carried in a ready reserve, which is reinforced by a standby reserve of veterans and by the militia.

      The PLA is formally under the command of the Central Military Commission of the CCP; there is also an identical commission in the government, but it has no clear independent functions. The CCP commission is far more powerful than the Ministry of National Defense, which operates under the State Council, and it assures continuing CCP control over the armed forces. The political leadership has made a concerted effort to create a professional military force restricted to national defense and to the provision of assistance in domestic economic construction and emergency relief. This conception of the role of the PLA requires the promotion of specialized officers who can understand modern weaponry and handle combined arms operations. Troops around the country are stationed in seven military regions and more than 20 military districts. Despite the drive to modernize the PLA, limited military budgets and other constraints have caused the sophistication of conventional military armaments and of logistics and command-and-control systems to lag behind that of other major military powers.

      The role of the Public Security forces of China began to change in the late 1970s. The definition and designation of what poses a threat to security, for example, were narrowed, and there was a decline in the scope of activities of the security forces. The practice of political suppression, the victims of which once numbered in the tens of millions, was reduced, and in the late 1970s a large (but unknown) number of people were released from labour or other camps run by the Public Security forces. Also, during the 1980s the “open-door” policy toward the outside world led to the adoption of a more-relaxed attitude by the Public Security forces regarding their efforts to control and restrict the activities of foreigners in China. From 1990, however, the trend was generally toward a stricter policy and tighter controls.

      Specific organizational and policy initiatives also have affected the role of the Public Security forces. The trend toward creating a body of codified law and toward establishing a legal system that operates according to that law has in itself reduced the arbitrary power once exercised by the Public Security system. (By the 1970s that system had effectively acquired the power to arrest, convict, sentence, and detain any individual without interference from any other “outside” body.) The Public Security Ministry also has relinquished administrative control over counterespionage and economic crimes, which was transferred to a Ministry of State Security.

Health and welfare
      The Chinese government faces a mammoth task in trying to provide medical and welfare services adequate to meet the basic needs of the immense number of citizens spread over a vast area. Although China's overall affluence has grown dramatically since the mid-1980s—per capita income has increased many times over, and caloric intake has become comparable to that for western Europe—a great many of its people live at socioeconomic levels far below the national average. The medical system, moreover, labours under the tension of whether to stress quality of care or to spread scarce medical resources as widely as possible. In addition, there has been repeated debate over the relative balance that should be struck between the use of Western and traditional Chinese medicine. While the Cultural Revolution pushed the balance toward widespread minimum care with great attention paid to traditional medicine, policy after the late 1970s moved in the other direction on both issues; by the late 1980s the proportion of doctors of Western medicine had exceeded those of traditional practices. The Ministry of Public Health of the State Council oversees the health services system, which includes a substantial rural collective sector but almost no private sector. All the major medical facilities are run by the government.

      The health of the Chinese populace has improved considerably since 1949. Average life expectancy has increased by about three decades and now ranks nearly at the level of that in advanced industrial societies. Many communicable diseases, such as plague, smallpox, cholera, and typhus, have either been wiped out or brought under control. In addition, the incidences of malaria and schistosomiasis have declined dramatically since 1949.

      As evaluated on a per capita basis, China's health facilities remain unevenly distributed. Only about half of the country's medical and health personnel work in rural areas, where approximately three-fifths of the population resides. The doctors of Western medicine, who constitute about one-fourth of the total medical personnel, are even more concentrated in urban areas. Similarly, about two-thirds of the country's hospital beds are located in the cities.

      China has a health insurance system that provides virtually free coverage for people employed in urban state enterprises and relatively inexpensive coverage for their families. The situation for workers in the rural areas or in urban employment outside the state sector is far more varied. There are some cooperative health care programs, but their voluntary nature produced a decline in membership from the late 1970s.

      The severest limitation on the availability of health services, however, appears to be an absolute lack of resources, rather than discrimination in access on the basis of the ability of individuals to pay. An extensive system of paramedical (paramedical personnel) care has been fostered as the major medical resource available to most of the rural population, but the care has been of uneven quality. The paramedical system feeds patients into the more-sophisticated commune-level and county-level hospitals when they are available.

      Changes in the leading causes of death reflect the longer life span and improved living conditions that have developed in China since 1949. For some time, the major causes have been pulmonary and cerebrovascular diseases, malignant tumours, and cardiac disease. Severe environmental pollution has become a major health hazard in several parts of the country.

      Because a large proportion of what in the West would be considered public welfare obligations is in China the responsibility of factories, offices, and rural collectives and families, the real level of “welfare” spending and the strengths and weaknesses of the welfare system are difficult to gauge. However, statistical information gradually has become more available. The state provides pensions for retirees from state enterprises and official service, but this includes only a small percentage of the total workforce. The state's welfare resources are heavily concentrated in the urban areas, where they include subsidies for housing, medical care, education, and some foods. In the cities the level of subsidized services, though, depends largely on the nature and conditions of the unit in which a person works. Unemployed individuals are typically taken care of by their working relatives, and all Chinese citizens have a legal obligation to care for their elderly (old age) parents. There is a small number of old-age homes for the elderly who have no children or other relatives to support them.

      In the rural areas much of the responsibility for welfare was left to the local collective units, the resources of which have declined since the late 1970s as the collectives have been disbanded. Thus, the actual level of services now varies greatly depending on both the financial standing of the locality and the inclinations of the villagers. The Chinese government does allocate emergency relief to areas that have suffered from natural disasters (including crop failures). Generally, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the State Council assumes primary responsibility for administering the government's portion of China's welfare system.

      The educational system in China is a major vehicle for both inculcating values in and teaching needed skills to its people. Traditional Chinese culture attached great importance to education as a means of enhancing a person's worth and career. In the early 1950s the Chinese communists worked hard to increase the country's rate of literacy, an effort that won them considerable support from the population. By the end of that decade, however, the government could no longer provide jobs adequate to meet the expectations of those who had acquired some formal schooling. Other pressing priorities squeezed educational budgets, and the anti-intellectualism inherent in the more-radical mass campaign periods affected the status and quality of the educational effort. These conflicting pressures made educational policy a sensitive barometer of larger political trends and priorities. The shift to rapid and pragmatic economic development as the overriding national goal in the late 1970s quickly affected China's educational system.

      The Chinese educational structure provides for six years of primary school, three years each of lower secondary school and upper secondary school, and four years in the standard university (higher education) curriculum. All urban schools are financed by the state, while rural schools depend more heavily on their own financial resources. Official policy stresses scholastic achievement, with particular emphasis on the natural sciences. A significant effort is made to enhance vocational training opportunities for students who do not attend a university. The quality of education available in the cities generally has been higher than that in the countryside, although considerable effort has been made to increase enrollment in rural areas at all education levels.

      The traditional trend in Chinese education was toward fewer students and higher scholastic standards, resulting in a steeply hierarchical educational system. Greater enrollment at all levels, particularly outside the cities, is gradually reversing that trend. Primary-school enrollment is now virtually universal, and nearly all of those students receive some secondary education; about one-third of lower-secondary graduates enroll in upper-secondary schools. The number of university students is increasing rapidly, though it still constitutes only a small fraction of those receiving primary education. For the overwhelming majority of students, admission to a university since 1977 has been based on competitive nationwide examinations, and attendance at a university is usually paid for by the government. In return, a university student has had to accept the job provided by the state upon graduation. A growing number of university students are receiving training abroad, especially at the postgraduate level.

      The system that developed in the 1950s of setting up “key” urban schools that were given the best teachers, equipment, and students was reestablished in the late 1970s. The inherently elitist values of such a system put enormous pressure on secondary-school administrators to improve the rate at which their graduates passed tests for admission into universities. In addition, dozens of elite private schools have been established since the early 1990s in China's major cities.

      Six universities, all administered directly by the Ministry of Education in Beijing, are the flagships of the Chinese higher educational system. Three are located in Beijing: Peking University (Beijing Daxue), the leading nontechnical institution; Tsinghua (Qinghua) University, which is oriented primarily toward science and engineering; and People's University of China, the only one of the six founded after 1949. The three outside Beijing are Nankai University in Tianjin, which is especially strong in the social sciences; Fudan University, a comprehensive institution in Shanghai; and Sun Yat-sen (Zhongshan) University in Guangzhou (Canton) (Canton), the principal university of South China. In addition, every province has a key provincial university, and there are hundreds of other technical and comprehensive higher educational institutions in locations around the country. The University of Hong Kong (founded 1911) is the oldest school in Hong Kong.

      The damage done to China's human capital by the ravages of the Great Leap Forward and, especially, by the Cultural Revolution was so great that it took years to make up the loss. After the 1970s, however, China's educational system increasingly trained individuals in technical skills so that they could fulfill the needs of the advanced, modern sector of the economy. The social sciences and humanities also receive more attention than in earlier years, but the base in those disciplines is relatively weak—many leaders still view them with suspicion—and the resources devoted to them are thin.

Kenneth G. Lieberthal Ed.

Cultural life
      China is one of the great cradles of world civilization, and its culture is remarkable for its duration, diversity, and influence on other cultures, especially those of its East Asian neighbours. Following is a survey of Chinese culture; in-depth discussions of specific cultural aspects are found in the article Chinese literature and in the sections on Chinese visual arts (arts, East Asian), music (arts, East Asian), and dance and theatre (arts, East Asian) of the article arts, East Asian.

Cultural milieu
 Skeletal remains and stone implements date to the Paleolithic stage of cultural development, from the 29th to the 17th millennium BC. Decorated artifacts, primarily marked pottery vessels, have been found in dozens of Incipient Neolithic and Neolithic (Neolithic Period) sites, dating from the 12th to the 2nd millennium BC. Chinese Neolithic pottery shapes and types are mostly classified into two families: the earlier Yangshao ware from the central Zhongshan region, characterized by geometric painted decorations, and the later Longshan (Longshan culture) ware, primarily from the Northeast but also found in the Zhongshan area. Longshan ware is unpainted and is elevated from the ground on a circular foot or tripod legs.

      The Bronze Age includes the first historically verified dynasty, the Shang (Shang dynasty) (c. 1600–1046 BC), and China's first written records. The late Shang is well known from oracle bones recovered from the site of the last Shang capital, near Anyang. The bones are turtle plastrons and ox scapulae with inscribed texts, used by the Shang kings in a highly regularized system of ritual divination and sacrifice aimed at securing the support of the ruler's deceased ancestors. Through their use, writing became linked to authority in a way that endured throughout premodern Chinese (Chinese writing) history. During the Shang and Zhou (Zhou dynasty) (1046–256 BC) dynasties the art of bronze casting became highly developed. Finely cast and richly decorated pieces included cooking and serving vessels, bells, drums, weapons, and door fittings.

      The written language is central to China's culture. Scholars have identified ideographic inscriptions on pottery dating to about 4000 BC, and written Chinese has developed continuously since the late Shang period. Chinese culture is inextricably bound up with the writing system in three ways. First, writing is the medium for the preservation and dissemination of culture. Indeed, the Chinese word for culture (wenhua) means “to become literate.” Second, command of the writing system distinguishes the Chinese and their culture, seen as the centre of the world, from all non-Chinese peoples, categorized by the Chinese as “barbarians.” Third, culture and the writing system are inseparably linked to statecraft in that a command of writing and knowledge of the written tradition were for millennia necessary and requisite skills for holding office. Thus, from the Shang dynasty oracle bones to the products of the modern printing press, culture in the form of written works has been a key instrument in the development of political thought and a tool of governance.

The arts
      During the Cultural Revolution an enormous number of cultural treasures of inestimable value were seriously damaged or destroyed, and the practice of many arts and crafts was prohibited. Since the early 1980s, however, official repudiation of those policies has been complemented by vigorous efforts to renew China's remarkable cultural traditions. Loosening many of the earlier restrictions has also rejuvenated many art forms previously devoted almost exclusively to propaganda. China's “Fifth Generation Cinema,” for example, is known for such outstanding film directors as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, who have highlighted themes of social and political oppression.

      The Shijing (“Classic of Poetry”), an anthology of poetry given definitive form about 500 BC, is one of China's oldest classics and contains 305 folk songs and ritual psalms. Although the Tang dynasty (AD 618–907) is called the Golden Age of Chinese poetry, having produced the poets Du Fu and Li Bai, poets of renown were present in every dynasty, and the writing of poetry was practiced by most well-educated Chinese for both personal and social reasons.

      China's tradition of historical narrative is also unsurpassed in the world. Twenty-five dynastic histories (historiography) preserve a unique record from the unverified Xia (Xia dynasty) dynasty (c. 2070–1600 BC) to the Qing (Qing dynasty) (AD 1644–1911/12), and sprawling historical romances have been a mainstay in the reading of the educated since the spread of printing in the 11th and 12th centuries AD.

      The May Fourth Movement (1917–21) attacked much of this great literary and cultural tradition, viewing it as a source of China's weakness. Students and faculty at Peking University abandoned the literary language and created a new popular fiction, written in a more-accessible colloquial language on themes from ordinary life. Literary culture continued to be a subject of intense debate. Mao Zedong, who composed poetry in both contemporary and traditional styles, dictated that art must serve politics in his talks at Yan'an in 1942. Throughout the following decades, writers received both admiration and ridicule. Indeed, the fate of most important writers was closely linked to the vicissitudes of national politics from the 1950s onward. Only in the mid-1980s did writers again begin to enjoy some official tolerance of “art for art's sake.”

 Painting (painting, Western) and calligraphy, like poetry, were the domain of the elite, and most educated Chinese traditionally boasted of some competence in them. There are early anonymous and folk-oriented paintings on tomb and cave walls, and many works are known from the Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220). Fine-art painters are known by name from as early as the 6th century AD from historical records and serially copied versions of their works. Chinese painting is predominantly of landscapes, done in black pine-soot ink on fine paper or silk, occasionally with the addition of faint colour washes. The most vigorous period for landscape painting spanned the years from the Song (Song dynasty) (960–1279) to the Ming (Ming dynasty) (1368–1644) dynasty.

      Calligraphy rivals painting as a fine art in China, and paintings are often captioned with artfully written poems. Calligraphy reveals the great fondness the Chinese have for their written characters, and it ranges in style from meticulously and laboriously scribed “seal” characters to flamboyant and unconstrained “grass” characters. Calligraphy, as painting, is prized for a number of abstract aesthetic qualities, described by such terms as balance, vitality, energy, bones, wind, and strength.

      Painting has undergone numerous style changes since the beginning of the 20th century. Before 1949, painters such as Qi Baishi (1863–1957) developed distinct new styles that internationalized traditional Chinese aesthetics. After 1949, pressure for a form of socialist realism made painters shift their focus to such subjects as factory scenes, peasant villages, and convoys of tour buses. But, with the liberalization of the arts that followed Mao's death in 1976, more-traditional values reasserted themselves.

 Sculpture (Western sculpture) and carving date to the Zhou dynasty or earlier. Tombs frequently contained burial dolls, said to have been made to replace live sacrificial victims, and many early jade carvings are related to burial practices and include body orifice stoppers and bangle bracelets. Of all the arts, sculpture received the greatest boost from the introduction of Buddhism to China during the Han dynasty and from the spread of Buddhism during the Six Dynasties (AD 220–589) and Tang periods. Statues and carved reliefs of buddhas and bodhisattvas were made by the thousands; along with cave paintings, they represent the pinnacle of Chinese religious art. One of the most notable sites is the Mogao Caves (“Caves of a Thousand Buddhas”) complex near Dunhuang in Gansu province, designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1987.

 The oldest art forms in China are music (arts, East Asian) and dance. A 5,000-year-old pottery bowl from Qinghai province is painted with a ring of 15 dancers adorned in headdresses and sashes and stepping in unison. Music played an important role in early Chinese ritual and statecraft. Bronze bells (bell) were instruments of investiture and reward. A bronze bell set from a tomb in the ancient state of Zeng in Hubei province, interred about 430 BC, contains 64 bells, each of which produces two distinct, tuned strike notes. More than 120 instruments were unearthed from the same tomb, including stringed zithers, mouth organs, flutes, drums, and stone chimes. Music and related rituals helped to provide a structure for activities in the courts of rulers at all levels in the feudal hierarchy.

      Theatre, once the most important popular art form in China, remains important for some. However, it has been eclipsed in popularity by television dramas, especially serials. Chinese theatre originated in early religious dances, performed at festivals to exorcise demons, reenact important historical events, or prepare for harvest, hunting, or warfare. Urban storytelling and theatrical genres are well documented from the Song dynasty but are known to have matured during the Yuan dynasty (1206–1368). Yuan dramas—or operas, as they are more accurately called—consisted of virtuoso song and dance organized around plots on historical or contemporary themes. The operas were performed in special theatres, with elegant costumes and decorated stages. From Yuan drama, later forms developed, including contemporary jingxi (Peking opera) and other regional forms, which feature song and dance, elaborate costumes and props, and displays of martial arts and acrobatics.

Cultural institutions
 Beijing remains China's cultural centre, home to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and numerous major research institutes. Notable repositories there include the National Library of China (housed in the Beijing Library), the Central Archives of China, and the libraries of the academy and of the city's three major universities; libraries in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Changsha in Hunan province also have important collections. Paramount among China's museums is the Palace Museum, which occupies the former imperial palaces of the Forbidden City in central Beijing.

      Chinese art and artifacts have found their way into various collections around the world. The most important collection of fine arts is in the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan, the bulk of the superb traditional palace collection having been ferried across the Taiwan Strait when the Nationalists abandoned the mainland in 1948–49. Excellent collections of Chinese painting, calligraphy, and bronzes are also found in such museums as the Freer Gallery of Art of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., and the Museum of Fine Arts, (Fine Arts, Museum of) Boston. Significant collections remain in major museums in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Wuhan.

 Since the 1950s, new archaeological discoveries have filled China's provincial and local museums with fabulous treasures, and new facilities have been constructed to study and display these artifacts. Especially notable is the renowned Qin tomb near Xi'an, in Shaanxi province, which preserves the life-size terra-cotta army of the first Qin emperor, Shihuangdi. The army, complete with soldiers, horses, and chariots, was discovered in 1974. Since then much of the site has been excavated, and many of its figures have been painstakingly removed and placed on public display.

Daily life, sports, and recreation
      Chinese culture can also be understood through the vehicle of food. Chinese cuisine, like Chinese philosophy, is organized along Daoist principles of opposition and change: hot is balanced by cold, spicy by mild, fresh by cured. The cooking of Sichuan province in central China is distinguished by the use of hot peppers. The lush southern interior of the country prizes fresh ingredients; Cantonese cuisine in particular is a symphony of subtle flavours from just-picked vegetables and lightly cooked meats. No matter what the region, foods of all kinds are viewed as an accompaniment to grains, the staple of the Chinese diet.

 China observes a number of national holidays, including New Year's Day, the Spring Festival (lunar new year), Youth Day (May 4), and National Day (October 1). Notable festivals are the Lantern Festival (late winter), Tomb Sweep Day (April 4 or 5), and the Mid-Autumn Festival (October). Scores of local festivals are also held at various times throughout the country.

      Physical exercise is a staple of Chinese culture. Millions gather daily at dawn to practice martial arts (notably tai chi chuan [taijiquan]), wield swords in a graceful ballet, or (among women) perform a synchronized dance of pliés and turns. acrobatics are especially popular and have enjoyed a new surge of interest since 1950, when the China Acrobatic Troupe was organized in Beijing; from it have grown satellite companies in Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Dalien (Lüda). Imported sports such as basketball, baseball, and football (soccer) have become hugely popular, drawing millions of participants and spectators. Of China's indigenous forms of sport, the martial arts (martial art) have the longest history by far. Their origin dates to at least two thousand years ago, to a period in which contending warlords, bandits, and foreign invaders controlled large portions of China and forbade the populace to own weapons.

 China has become one of the dominant countries in international sports competitions since it began participating regularly in the Olympic Games, at the 1980 Winter Games. Since then the country's finest Olympic moment came at the 2004 Summer Games. Chinese athletes took a total of 63 medals, dominating the badminton, diving, table tennis, and weightlifting events and making strong showings in a variety of others, including shooting and women's judo. Beijing was chosen to host the 2008 Summer Games.

Media and publishing
      Dozens of daily newspapers are published in China, nearly all of the major ones in Beijing. The principal national paper is Renmin Ribao (“People's Daily”), the organ of the Chinese Communist Party; other papers with large circulations include Guangming Ribao (“Brightness Daily”) and Gongren Ribao (“Workers' Daily”). China Daily is the leading English-language paper. The chief news service is the government-run New China News Agency (Xinhuashe). Beijing remains the centre of China's publishing industry.

      Broadcasting is state-run. Domestic radio broadcasting is provided by China National Radio, while China Radio International is the foreign service. China Central Television broadcasts on several channels, each of which offers a distinct feature (e.g., news or sports programming). Government-operated companies also offer cable and satellite television service.

Kenneth J. DeWoskin Ed.


Archaeology in China
 The practice of archaeology in China has been rooted in modern Chinese history. The intellectual and political reformers of the 1920s challenged the historicity of the legendary inventors of Chinese culture, such as Shennong (Shen Nung), the Divine Farmer, and Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor. At the same time, scientific study of the prehistoric period was being sponsored by Western archaeologists and paleoanthropologists. The establishment of the Academia Sinica (Chinese Academy of Sciences) in 1928 enabled Chinese scholars to study Chinese archaeology for themselves, and preparations were made for large-scale excavations. Notable work was done under the direction of archaeologist Li Ch (Li Chi)i (Li Ji) at Anyang, in Henan province, but this was suspended with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The civil war of the late 1940s and the subsequent social disruptions further delayed any resumption of systematic archaeological excavation and publication. However, as the Cultural Revolution waned in the mid-1970s, work began again in earnest, and the China Association of Archaeology was established in 1979. A modernizing nation began to produce scholarship, increasingly informed by scientific analysis, in a quantity and quality commensurate with its size and its traditions of learning.

Early humans
 The fossil record in China promises fundamental contributions to the understanding of human origins. There is considerable evidence of Homo erectus by the time of the Lower Paleolithic (the Paleolithic Period [Old Stone Age] began about 2,500,000 years ago and ended 10,000 years ago) at sites such as Lantian, Shaanxi; Hexian, Anhui; Yuanmou, Yunnan; and, the most famous, that of “ Peking man” at Zhoukoudian, Beijing municipality. The Lower Cave at Zhoukoudian has yielded evidence of intermittent human use from about 460,000 to 230,000 years ago. Many caves and other sites in Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanxi and Shaanxi in northern China and in Guizhou and Hubei in the south suggest that H. erectus achieved wide distribution in China. Whether H. erectus pekinensis intentionally used fire and practiced ritual cannibalism are matters under debate.

      Significant Homo sapiens (human being) cranial and dental fragments have been found together with Middle Paleolithic artifacts. Such assemblages have been unearthed at Dingcun, Shanxi; Changyang, Hubei; Dali, Shaanxi; Xujiayao, Shanxi; and Maba, Guangdong. Morphological characteristics such as the shovel-shaped incisor, broad nose, and mandibular torus link these remains to modern Asians. Few archaeological sites have been identified in the south.

      A number of widely distributed H. erectus sites dating from the early Pleistocene Epoch (i.e., about 1.8 million years ago) manifest considerable regional and temporal diversity. Upper Paleolithic sites are numerous in northern China. Thousands of stone artifacts, most of them small (called microliths), have been found, for example, at Xiaonanhai, near Anyang, at Shuoxian and Qinshui (Shanxi), and at Yangyuan (Hebei); these findings suggest an extensive microlith culture in northern China. hematite, a common iron oxide ore used for colouring, was found scattered around skeletal remains in the Upper Cave at Zhoukoudian (c. 10th millennium BC) and may represent the first sign of human ritual.

      The complex of developments in stone tool technology, food production and storage, and social organization that is often characterized as the “Neolithic Revolution” was in progress in China by at least the 6th millennium BC. Developments during the Chinese Neolithic (Neolithic Period) Period (New Stone Age) were to establish some of the major cultural dimensions of the subsequent Bronze Age.

Climate and environment
      Although the precise nature of the paleoenvironment is still in dispute, temperatures in Neolithic China were probably some 4 to 7 °F (2 to 4 °C) warmer than they are today. Precipitation, although more abundant, may have been declining in quantity. The Qin (Tsinling) Mountains (Qin Mountains) in north-central China separated the two phytogeographical zones of northern and southern China, while the absence of such a mountain barrier farther east encouraged a more uniform environment and the freer movement of Neolithic peoples about the North China Plain. East China, particularly toward the south, may have been covered with thick vegetation, some deciduous forest, and scattered marsh. The Loess Plateau north and west of the Qin Mountains is thought to have been drier and even semiarid, with some coniferous forest growing on the hills and with brush and open woodland in the valleys.

Food production
      The primary Neolithic crops, domesticated by the 5th millennium BC, were drought-resistant millet (usually Setaria italica), grown on the eolian and alluvial loess soils of the northwest and the north, and glutenous rice (Oryza sativa), grown in the wetlands of the southeast. These staples were supplemented by a variety of fruits, nuts, legumes, vegetables, and aquatic plants. The main sources of animal protein were pigs, dogs, fish, and shellfish. By the Bronze Age, millet, rice, soybeans, tea, mulberries, hemp, and lacquer had become characteristic Chinese crops. That most if not all of these plants were native to China indicates the degree to which Neolithic culture developed indigenously. The distinctive cereal, fruit, and vegetable complexes of the northern and southern zones in Neolithic and early historic times suggest, however, that at least two independent traditions of plant domestication may have been present.

      The stone tools (stone-tool industry) used to clear and prepare the land reveal generally improving technology. There was increasing use of ground and polished edges and of perforation. Regional variations of shape included oval-shaped axes (ax) in central and northwest China, square- and trapezoid-shaped axes in the east, and axes with stepped shoulders in the southeast. By the Late Neolithic a decrease in the proportion of stone axes to adzes suggests the increasing dominance of permanent agriculture and a reduction in the opening up of new land. The burial in high-status graves of finely polished, perforated stone and jade tools such as axes and adzes with no sign of edge wear indicates the symbolic role such emblems of work had come to play by the 4th and 3rd millennia.

Major cultures and sites
 There was not one Chinese Neolithic but a mosaic of regional cultures whose scope and significance are still being determined. Their location in the area defined today as China does not necessarily mean that all the Neolithic cultures were Chinese or even proto-Chinese. Their contributions to the Bronze Age civilization of the Shang, which may be taken as unmistakably Chinese in both cultural as well as geographical terms, need to be assessed in each case. In addition, the presence of a particular ceramic (pottery) ware does not necessarily define a cultural horizon; transitional phases, both chronological and geographical, are not discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

Incipient Neolithic
      Study of the historical reduction of the size of human teeth suggests that the first human beings to eat cooked food did so in southern China. The sites of Xianrendong in Jiangxi and Zengpiyan in Guangxi have yielded artifacts from the 10th to the 7th millennium BC that include low-fired, cord-marked shards with some incised decoration and mostly chipped stone tools; these pots may have been used for cooking and storage. Pottery and stone tools from shell middens in southern China also suggest Incipient Neolithic occupations. These early southern sites may have been related to the Neolithic Bac Son culture in Vietnam; connections to the subsequent Neolithic cultures of northwestern and northern China have yet to be demonstrated.

6th millennium BC
      Two major cultures can be identified in the northwest: Laoguantai, in eastern and southern Shaanxi and northwestern Henan, and Dadiwan I—a development of Laoguantai culture—in eastern Gansu and western Shaanxi. The pots in both cultures were low-fired, sand-tempered, and mainly red in colour, and bowls with three stubby feet or ring feet were common. The painted bands of this pottery may represent the start of the Painted Pottery culture.

      In northern China the people of Peiligang (north-central Henan) made less use of cord marking and painted design on their pots than did those at Dadiwan I; the variety of their stone tools, including sawtooth sickles, indicates the importance of agriculture. The Cishan potters (southern Hebei) employed more cord-marked decoration and made a greater variety of forms, including basins, cups, serving stands, and pot supports. The discovery of two pottery models of silkworm chrysalides and 70 shuttlelike objects at a 6th-millennium-BC site at Nanyangzhuang (southern Hebei) suggests the early production of silk, the characteristic Chinese textile.

5th millennium BC
      The lower stratum of the Beishouling culture is represented by finds along the Wei and Jing rivers; bowls, deep-bodied jugs, and three-footed vessels, mainly red in colour, were common. The lower stratum of the related Banpo culture, also in the Wei River drainage area, was characterized by cord-marked red or red-brown ware, especially round and flat-bottomed bowls and pointed-bottomed amphorae. The Banpo inhabitants lived in partially subterranean houses and were supported by a mixed economy of millet agriculture, hunting, and gathering. The importance of fishing is confirmed by designs of stylized fish painted on a few of the bowls and by numerous hooks and net sinkers.

      In the east, by the start of the 5th millennium, the Beixin culture in central and southern Shandong and northern Jiangsu was characterized by fine clay or sand-tempered pots decorated with comb markings, incised and impressed designs, and narrow appliquéd bands. Artifacts include many three-legged, deep-bodied tripods, gobletlike serving vessels, bowls, and pot supports. Hougang (lower stratum) remains have been found in southern Hebei and central Henan. The vessels, some finished on a slow wheel, were mainly red-coloured and had been fired at high heat. They include jars, tripods, and round-bottomed, flat-bottomed, and ring-footed bowls. No pointed amphorae have been found, and there were few painted designs. A characteristic red band under the rim of most gray-ware bowls was produced during the firing process.

      Archaeologists have generally classified the lower strata of Beishouling, Banpo, and Hougang cultures under the rubric of Painted Pottery (or, after a later site, Yangshao) culture, but two cautions should be noted. First, a distinction may have existed between a more westerly culture in the Wei valley (early Beishouling and early Banpo) that was rooted in the Laoguantai culture and a more easterly one (Beixin and Hougang) that developed from the Peiligang and Cishan cultures. Second, since only 2 to 3 percent of the Banpo pots were painted, the designation Painted Pottery culture seems premature.

      In the region of the lower Yangtze River (Chang Jiang), the Hemudu site in northern Zhejiang has yielded caldrons, cups, bowls, and pot supports made of porous, charcoal-tempered black pottery. The site is remarkable for its wooden and bone farming tools, the bird designs carved on bone and ivory, the superior carpentry of its pile dwellings (a response to the damp environment), a wooden weaving shuttle, and the earliest lacquerware and rice remains yet reported in the world (c. 5000–4750 BC).

      The Qingliangang culture, which succeeded that of Hemudu in Jiangsu, northern Zhejiang, and southern Shandong, was characterized by ring-footed and flat-bottomed pots, gui (wide-mouthed vessels), tripods (common north of the Yangtze), and serving stands (common south of the Yangtze). Early fine-paste redware gave way in the later period to fine-paste gray and black ware. Polished stone artifacts include axes and spades, some perforated, and jade ornaments.

      Another descendant of Hemudu culture was that of Majiabang, which had close ties with the Qingliangang culture in southern Jiangsu, northern Zhejiang, and Shanghai. In southeastern China a cord-marked pottery horizon, represented by the site of Fuguodun on the island of Quemoy (Kinmen), existed by at least the early 5th millennium. The suggestion that some of these southeastern cultures belonged to an Austronesian complex remains to be fully explored.

4th and 3rd millennia BC
 A true Painted Pottery culture developed in the northwest, partly from the Wei valley and Banpo traditions of the 5th millennium. The Miaodigou I horizon, dated from the first half of the 4th millennium, produced burnished bowls and basins of fine red pottery, some 15 percent of which were painted, generally in black, with dots, spirals, and sinuous lines. It was succeeded by a variety of Majiayao cultures (late 4th to early 3rd millennium) in eastern Gansu, eastern Qinghai, and northern Sichuan. About one-third of Majiayao vessels were decorated on the upper two-thirds of the body with a variety of designs in black pigment; multiarmed radial spirals, painted with calligraphic ease, were the most prominent. Related designs involving sawtooth lines, gourd-shaped panels, spirals, and zoomorphic stick figures were painted on pots of the Banshan (Banshan ware) (mid-3rd millennium) and Machang (last half of 3rd millennium) cultures. Some two-thirds of the pots found in the Machang burial area at Liuwan in Qinghai, for example, were painted. In the North China Plain, Dahe culture sites contain a mixture of Miaodigou and eastern, Dawenkou vessel types (see below), indicating that a meeting of two major traditions was taking place in this area in the late 4th millennium.

      In the northeast the Hongshan culture (4th millennium and probably earlier) was centred in western Liaoning and eastern Inner Mongolia. It was characterized by small bowls (some with red tops), fine redware serving stands, painted pottery, and microliths. Numerous jade (Chinese jade) amulets in the form of birds, turtles, and coiled dragons reveal strong affiliations with the other jade-working cultures of the east coast, such as Liangzhu.

      In east China the Liulin and Huating sites in northern Jiangsu (first half of 4th millennium) represent regional cultures that derived in large part from that of Qingliangang. Upper strata also show strong affinities with contemporary Dawenkou sites in southern Shandong, northern Anhui, and northern Jiangsu. Dawenkou culture (mid-5th to at least mid-3rd millennium) is characterized by the emergence of wheel-made pots of various colours, some of them remarkably thin and delicate; vessels with ring feet and tall legs (such as tripods, serving stands, and goblets); carved, perforated, and polished tools; and ornaments in stone, jade, and bone. The people practiced skull deformation and tooth extraction. Mortuary (death rite) customs involved ledges for displaying grave goods, coffin chambers, and the burial of animal teeth, pig heads, and pig jawbones.

      In the middle and lower Yangtze River valley during the 4th and 3rd millennia, the Daxi and Qujialing cultures shared a significant number of traits, including rice production, ring-footed vessels, goblets with sharply angled profiles, ceramic whorls, and black pottery with designs painted in red after firing. Characteristic Qujialing ceramic objects not generally found in Daxi sites include eggshell-thin goblets and bowls painted with black or orange designs, double-waisted bowls, tall, ring-footed goblets and serving stands, and many styles of tripods. Admirably executed and painted clay whorls suggest a thriving textile industry. The chronological distribution of ceramic features suggests a transmission from Daxi to Qujialing, but the precise relationship between the two cultures has been much debated.

      The Majiabang culture in the Lake Tai basin was succeeded during the 4th millennium by that of Songze. The pots, increasingly wheel-made, were predominantly clay-tempered gray ware. Tripods with a variety of leg shapes, serving stands, gui pitchers with handles, and goblets with petal-shaped feet were characteristic. Ring feet were used, silhouettes became more angular, and triangular and circular perforations were cut to form openwork designs on the short-stemmed serving stands. A variety of jade ornaments, a feature of Qingliangang culture, has been excavated from Songze burial sites.

      Sites of the Liangzhu culture (from the last half of the 4th to the last half of the 3rd millennium) have generally been found in the same area. The pots were mainly wheel-made, clay-tempered gray ware with a black skin and were produced by reduction firing; oxidized redware was less prevalent. Some of the serving stand and tripod shapes had evolved from Majiabang prototypes, while other vessel forms included long-necked gui pitchers. The walls of some vessels were black throughout, eggshell-thin, and burnished, resembling those found in Late Neolithic sites in Shandong (see below). Extravagant numbers of highly worked jade bi disks and cong tubes were placed in certain burials, such as one at Sidun (southern Jiangsu) that contained 57 of them. Liangzhu farmers had developed a characteristic triangular shale plow for cultivating the wet soils of the region. Fragments of woven silk from about 3000 BC have been found at Qianshanyang (northern Zhejiang). Along the southeast coast and on Taiwan, the Dapenkeng corded-ware culture emerged during the 4th and 3rd millennia. This culture, with a fuller inventory of pot and tool types than had previously been seen in the area, developed in part from that of Fuguodun but may also have been influenced by cultures to the west and north, including Qingliangang, Liangzhu, and Liulin. The pots were characterized by incised line patterns on neck and rim, low, perforated foot rims, and some painted decoration.

Regional cultures of the Late Neolithic
 By the 3rd millennium BC, the regional cultures in the areas discussed above showed increased signs of interaction and even convergence. That they are frequently referred to as varieties of the Longshan culture (c. 2500–2000 BC) of east-central Shandong—characterized by its lustrous, eggshell-thin black ware—suggests the degree to which these cultures are thought to have experienced eastern influence. That influence, diverse in origin and of varying intensity, entered the North China Plain from sites such as Dadunzi and Dawenkou to the east and also moved up the Han River from the Qujialing area to the south. A variety of eastern features are evident in the ceramic objects of the period, including use of the fast wheel, unpainted surfaces, sharply angled profiles, and eccentric shapes. There was a greater production of gray and black, rather than red, ware; componential construction was emphasized, in which legs, spouts, and handles were appended to the basic form (which might itself have been built sectionally). Greater elevation was achieved by means of ring feet and tall legs. Ceramic objects included three-legged tripods, steamer cooking vessels, gui pouring pitchers, serving stands, fitted lids, cups and goblets, and asymmetrical beihu vases for carrying water that were flattened on one side to lie against a person's body. In stone and jade objects, eastern influence is evidenced by perforated stone tools and ornaments such as bi disks and cong tubes used in burials (burial). Other burial customs involved ledges to display the goods buried with the deceased and large wooden coffin chambers. In handicrafts an emphasis was placed on precise mensuration in working clay, stone, and wood. Although the first, primitive versions of the eastern ceramic types may have been made on occasion in the North China Plain, in virtually every case these types were elaborated in the east and given more-precise functional definition, greater structural strength, and greater aesthetic coherence. It was evidently the mixing in the 3rd and 2nd millennia of these eastern elements with the strong and extensive traditions native to the North China Plain—represented by such Late Neolithic sites as Gelawangcun (near Zhengzhou), Wangwan (near Luoyang), Miaodigou (in central and western Henan), and Taosi and Dengxiafeng (in southwest Shanxi)—that stimulated the rise of early Bronze Age culture in the North China Plain and not in the east.

Religious beliefs and social organization
      The inhabitants of Neolithic China were, by the 5th millennium if not earlier, remarkably assiduous in the attention they paid to the disposition and commemoration of their dead. There was a consistency of orientation and posture, with the dead of the northwest given a westerly orientation and those of the east an easterly one. The dead were segregated, frequently in what appear to be kinship groupings (e.g., at Yuanjunmiao, Shaanxi). There were graveside ritual offerings of liquids, pig skulls, and pig jaws (e.g., Banpo and Dawenkou), and the demanding practice of collective secondary burial, in which the bones of up to 70 or 80 corpses were stripped of their flesh and reburied together, was extensively practiced as early as the first half of the 5th millennium (e.g., Yuanjunmiao). Evidence of divination using scapulae (shoulder blades) dating from the end of the 4th millennium (from Fuhegoumen, Liaoning) implies the existence of ritual specialists. There was a lavish expenditure of energy by the 3rd millennium on tomb ramps and coffin chambers (e.g., Liuwan [in eastern Qinghai] and Dawenkou) and on the burial of redundant quantities of expensive grave goods (e.g., Dafanzhuang in Shandong, Fuquanshan in Shanghai, and Liuwan), presumably for use by the dead in some afterlife.

      Although there is no firm archaeological evidence of a shift from matrilineal to patrilineal society, the goods buried in graves indicate during the course of the 4th and 3rd millennia an increase in general wealth, the gradual emergence of private or lineage property, an increase in social differentiation and gender distinction of work roles, and a reduction in the relative wealth of women. The occasional practice of human sacrifice or accompanying-in-death from scattered 4th- and 3rd-millennium sites (e.g., Miaodigou I, Zhanglingshan in Jiangsu, Qinweijia in Gansu, and Liuwan) suggests that ties of dependency and obligation were conceived as continuing beyond death and that women were likely to be in the dependent position. Early forms of ancestor worship, together with all that they imply for social organization and obligation among the living, were deeply rooted and extensively developed by the Late Neolithic Period. Such religious belief and practice undoubtedly served to validate and encourage the decline of the more egalitarian societies of earlier periods.

The first historical dynasty: the Shang (Shang dynasty)
The advent of bronze casting
  The 3rd and 2nd millennia were marked by the appearance of increasing warfare, complex urban settlements, intense status differentiation, and administrative and religious hierarchies that legitimated and controlled the massive mobilization of labour for dynastic work or warfare. The casting of bronze (Bronze Age) left the most-evident archaeological traces of these momentous changes, but its introduction must be seen as part of a far-larger shift in the nature of society as a whole, representing an intensification of the social and religious practices of the Neolithic.

      A Chalcolithic Period (Chalcolithic Age) (Copper Age; i.e., transitional period between the Late Neolithic and the Bronze Age) dating to the mid-5th millennium may be dimly perceived. A growing number of 3rd-millennium sites, primarily in the northwest but also in Henan and Shandong, have yielded primitive knives, awls, and drills made of copper and bronze. Stylistic evidence, such as the sharp angles, flat bottoms, and strap handles of certain Qijia clay pots (in Gansu; c. 2250–1900 BC), has led some scholars to posit an early sheet- or wrought-metal tradition possibly introduced from the west by migrating Indo-European peoples, but no wrought-metal objects have been found.

      The construction and baking of the clay cores and sectional piece molds employed in Chinese bronze casting of the 2nd millennium indicate that early metalworking in China rapidly adapted to, if it did not develop indigenously from, the sophisticated high-heat ceramic technology of the Late Neolithic potters, who were already using ceramic molds and cores to produce forms such as the hollow legs of the li cooking caldron. Chinese bronze casting represents, as the continuity in vessel shapes suggests, an aesthetic and technological extension of that ceramic (pottery) tradition rather than its replacement. The bronze casters' preference for vessels elevated on ring feet or legs further suggests aesthetic links to the east rather than the northwest.

      The number, complexity, and size—the Simuwu tetrapod weighed 1,925 pounds (875 kg)—of the Late Shang ritual vessels reveal high technological competence married to large-scale, labour-intensive metal production. Bronze casting of this scale and character—in which large groups of ore miners, fuel gatherers, ceramists, and foundry workers were under the prescriptive control of the model designers and labour coordinators—must be understood as a manifestation, both technological and social, of the high value that Shang culture placed on hierarchy, social discipline, and central direction in all walks of life. The prestige of owning these metal objects must have derived in part from the political control over others that their production implied.

      Chinese legends of the 1st millennium BC describe the labours of Yu (Ta Yü), the Chinese “Noah” who drained away the floods to render China habitable and established the first Chinese dynasty, called Xia (Xia dynasty). Seventeen Xia kings are listed in the Shiji, a comprehensive history written during the 1st century BC, and much ingenuity has been devoted to identifying certain Late Neolithic fortified sites—such as Wangchenggang (“Mound of the Royal City”) in north-central Henan and Dengxiafeng in Xia county (possibly the site of Xiaxu, “Ruins of Xia”?), southern Shanxi—as early Xia capitals. Taosi, also in southern Shanxi, has been identified as a Xia capital because of the “royal” nature of five large male burials found there that were lavishly provided with grave goods. Although they fall within the region traditionally assigned to the Xia, particular archaeological sites can be hard to identify dynastically unless written records are found. The possibility that the Xia and Shang were partly contemporary, as cultures if not as dynasties, further complicates site identifications. A related approach has been to identify as Xia an archaeological horizon that lies developmentally between Late Neolithic and Shang strata.

The Shang dynasty
      The Shang dynasty—the first Chinese dynasty to leave historical records—is thought to have ruled from about 1600 to 1046 BC. (Some scholars date the Shang from the mid-18th to the late 12th century BC.) One must, however, distinguish Shang as an archaeological term from Shang as a dynastic one. Erlitou, in north-central Henan, for example, was initially classified archaeologically as Early Shang; its developmental sequence from about 2400 to 1450 BC documents the vessel types and burial customs that link Early Shang culture to the Late Neolithic cultures of the east. In dynastic terms, however, Erlitou periods I and II (c. 1900 BC?) are now thought by many to represent a pre-Shang (and thus, perhaps, Xia) horizon. In this view, the two palace foundations, the elite burials, the ceremonial jade blades and sceptres, the bronze axes and dagger axes, and the simple ritual bronzes—said to be the earliest yet found in China—of Erlitou III (c. 1700–1600 BC?) signal the advent of the dynastic Shang.

      The archaeological classification of Middle Shang is represented by the remains found at Erligang (c. 1600 BC) near Zhengzhou, some 50 miles (80 km) to the east of Erlitou. The massive rammed-earth fortification, 118 feet (36 metres) wide at its base and enclosing an area of 1.2 square miles (3.2 square km), would have taken 10,000 people more than 12 years to build. Also found were ritual bronzes, including four monumental tetrapods (the largest weighing 190 pounds [86 kg]; palace foundations; workshops for bronze casting, pot making, and bone working; burials; and two inscribed fragments of oracle bones. Another rammed-earth fortification, enclosing about 450 acres (180 hectares) and also dated to the Erligang period, was found at Yanshi, about 3 miles (5 km) east of the Erlitou III palace foundations. These walls and palaces have been variously identified by modern scholars—the identification now favoured is of Zhengzhou as Bo, the capital of the Shang dynasty during the reign of Tang, the dynasty's founder—and their dynastic affiliations are yet to be firmly established. The presence of two large, relatively close contemporary fortifications at Zhengzhou and Yanshi, however, indicates the strategic importance of the area and considerable powers of labour mobilization.

       Panlongcheng in Hubei, 280 miles (450 km) south of Zhengzhou, is an example of Middle Shang expansion into the northwest, northeast, and south. A city wall, palace foundations, burials with human sacrifices, bronze workshops, and mortuary bronzes of the Erligang type form a complex that duplicates on a smaller scale Zhengzhou. A transitional period spanning the gap between the Late Erligang phase of Middle Shang and the Yinxu phase of Late Shang indicates a widespread network of Shang cultural sites that were linked by uniform bronze-casting styles and mortuary practices. A relatively homogeneous culture united the Bronze Age elite through much of China around the 14th century BC.

      The Late Shang period is best represented by a cluster of sites focused on the village of Xiaotun, west of Anyang in northern Henan. Known to history as Yinxu, “the Ruins of Yin” (Yin was the name used by the succeeding Zhou dynasty for the Shang), it was a seat of royal power for the last nine Shang kings, from Wuding to Dixin. According to the “short chronology” used in this article, which is based on modern studies of lunar eclipse records and reinterpretations of Zhou annals, these kings would have reigned from about 1250 to 1046 BC. (One version of the traditional “long chronology,” based primarily on a 1st-century-BC source, would place the last 12 Shang kings, from Pangeng onward, at Yinxu from 1398 to 1112 BC.) Sophisticated bronze, ceramic, stone, and bone industries were housed in a network of settlements surrounding the unwalled cult centre at Xiaotun, which had rammed-earth temple-palace foundations. And Xiaotun itself lay at the centre of a larger network of Late Shang sites, such as Xingtai to the north and Xinxiang to the south, in southern Hebei and northern Henan.

Royal burials (burial)
 The royal cemetery lay at Xibeigang, only a short distance northwest of Xiaotun. The hierarchy of burials at that and other cemeteries in the area reflected the social organization of the living. Large pit tombs, some nearly 40 feet (12 metres) deep, were furnished with four ramps and massive grave chambers for the kings. Retainers who accompanied their lords in death lay in or near the larger tombs, members of the lesser elite and commoners were buried in pits that ranged from medium size to shallow, those of still lower status were thrown into refuse pits and disused wells, and human and animal victims of the royal mortuary cult were placed in sacrificial pits. Only a few undisturbed elite burials have been unearthed, the most notable being that of Fuhao, a consort of Wuding. That her relatively small grave contained 468 bronze objects, 775 jades, and more than 6,880 cowries suggests how great the wealth placed in the far-larger royal tombs must have been.

      The light chariot, with 18 to 26 spokes per wheel, first appeared, according to the archaeological and inscriptional record, about 1200 BC. Glistening with bronze, it was initially a prestigious command car used primarily in hunting. The 16 chariot burials found at Xiaotun raise the possibility of some form of Indo-European contact with China, and there is little doubt that the chariot, which probably originated in the Caucasus, entered China via Central Asia and the northern steppe. Animal-headed knives, always associated with chariot burials, are further evidence of a northern connection.

      Late Shang culture is also defined by the size, elaborate shapes, and evolved decor of the ritual bronzes, many of which were used in wine offerings to the ancestors and some of which were inscribed with ancestral dedications such as “Made for Father Ding.” Their surfaces were ornamented with zoomorphic and theriomorphic elements set against intricate backgrounds of geometric meanders, spirals, and quills. Some of the animal forms—which include tigers, birds, snakes, dragons, cicadas, and water buffalo—have been thought to represent shamanistic familiars or emblems that ward away evil. The exact meaning of the iconography, however, may never be known. That the predominant taotie monster mask—with bulging eyes, fangs, horns, and claws—may have been anticipated by designs carved on jade cong tubes and axes from Liangzhu culture sites in the Yangtze delta and from the Late Neolithic in Shandong suggests that its origins are ancient. But the degree to which pure form or intrinsic meaning took priority, in either Neolithic or Shang times, is hard to assess.

Late Shang divination and religion (ritual)
 Although certain complex symbols painted on Late Neolithic pots from Shandong suggest that primitive writing was emerging in the east in the 3rd millennium, the Shang divination inscriptions that appear at Xiaotun form the earliest body of Chinese writing yet known. In Late Shang divination as practiced during the reign of Wuding (c. 1250–1192 BC), cattle scapulae or turtle plastrons, in a refinement of Neolithic practice, were first planed and bored with hollow depressions to which an intense heat source was then applied. The resulting T-shaped stress cracks were interpreted as lucky or unlucky. After the prognostication had been made, the day, the name of the presiding diviner (some 120 are known), the subject of the charge, the prognostication, and the result might be carved into the surface of the bone. Among the topics divined were sacrifices, campaigns, hunts, the good fortune of the 10-day week or of the night or day, weather, harvests, sickness, childbearing, dreams, settlement building, the issuing of orders, tribute, divine assistance, and prayers to various spirits. Some evolution in divinatory practice and theology evidently occurred. By the reigns of the last two Shang kings, Diyi and Dixin (c. 1101–1046 BC), the scope and form of Shang divination had become considerably simplified: prognostications were uniformly optimistic, and divination topics were limited mainly to the sacrificial schedule, the coming 10 days, the coming night, and hunting.

State and society
      The ritual schedule records 29 royal ancestors (king) over a span of 17 generations who, from at least Wuding to Dixin, were each known as wang (“king”). Presiding over a stable politico-religious hierarchy of ritual specialists, officers, artisans, retainers, and servile peasants, they ruled with varying degrees of intensity over the North China Plain and parts of Shandong, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, mobilizing armies of at least several thousand men as the occasion arose.

      The worship of royal ancestors was central to the maintenance of the dynasty. The ancestors were designated by 10 “stem” names (jia, yi, bing, ding, etc.) that were often prefixed by kin titles, such as “father” and “grandfather,” or by status appellations, such as “great” or “small.” The same stems were used to name the 10 days (or suns) of the week, and ancestors received cult on their name days according to a fixed schedule, particularly after the reforms of Zujia. For example, Dayi (“Great I,” the sacrificial name of Tang, the dynasty founder) was worshiped on yi days, Wuding on ding days. The Shang dynastic group, whose lineage name was Zi (according to later sources), appears to have been divided into 10 units corresponding to the 10 stems. Succession to the kingship alternated on a generational basis between two major groupings of jia and yi kings on the one hand and ding kings on the other. The attention paid in the sacrificial system to the consorts of “great lineage” kings—who were themselves both sons (possibly nephews) and fathers (possibly uncles) of kings—indicates that women may have played a key role in the marriage alliances that ensured such circulation of power.

      The goodwill of the ancestors, and of certain river and mountain powers, was sought through prayer and offerings of grain, millet wine, and animal and human sacrifice. The highest power of all, with whom the ancestors mediated for the living king, was the relatively remote deity Di, or Shangdi, “the Lord on High.” Di controlled victory in battle, the harvest, the fate of the capital, and the weather, but, on the evidence of the oracle bone inscriptions, he received no cult. This suggests that Di's command was too inscrutable to be divined or influenced; he was in all likelihood an impartial figure of last theological resort, needed to account for inexplicable events.

      Although Marxist historians have categorized the Shang as a slave (slavery) society, it would be more accurate to describe it as a dependent society. The king ruled a patrimonial state in which royal authority, treated as an extension of patriarchal control, was embedded in kinship and kinshiplike ties. Despite the existence of such formal titles as “the many horses” or “the many archers,” administration was apparently based primarily on kinship alliances, generational status, and personal charisma. The intensity with which ancestors were worshipped suggests the strength of the kinship system among the living; the ritualized ties of filiation and dependency that bound a son to his father, both before and after death, are likely to have had profound political implications for society as a whole. This was not a world in which concepts such as freedom and slavery would have been readily comprehensible. Everybody, from king to peasant, was bound by ties of obligation—to former kings, to ancestors, to superiors, and to dependents. The routine sacrificial offering of human beings, usually prisoners from the Qiang tribe, as if they were sacrificial animals and the rarer practice of accompanying-in-death, in which 40 or more retainers, often of high status, were buried with a dead king, suggest the degree to which ties of affection, obligation, or servitude were thought to be stronger than life itself. If slavery existed, it was psychological and ideological, not legal. The political ability to create and exploit ties of dependency originally based on kinship was one of the characteristic strengths of early Chinese civilization.

      Such ties were fundamentally personal in nature. The king referred to himself as yu yiren, “I, the one man,” and he was, like many early monarchs, peripatetic. Only by traveling through his domains could he ensure political and economic support. These considerations, coupled with the probability that the position of king circulated between social or ritual units, suggest that, lacking a national bureaucracy or effective means of control over distance, the dynasty was relatively weak. The Zi should above all be regarded as a politically dominant lineage that may have displaced the Si lineage of the Xia and that was in turn to be displaced by the Ji lineage of the Zhou. But the choices that the Shang made—involving ancestor worship, the politico-religious nature of the state, patrimonial administration, the mantic role of the ruler, and a pervasive sense of social obligation—were not displaced. These choices endured and were to define, restrict, and enhance the institutions and political culture of the full-fledged dynasties yet to come.

David N. Keightley

The Zhou and Qin dynasties
The history of the Zhou (Zhou dynasty) (1046–256 BC)
 The vast time sweep of the Zhou dynasty—encompassing some eight centuries—is the single longest period of Chinese history. However, the great longevity of the Ji lineage was not matched by a similar continuity of its rule. During the Xi (Western) Zhou (1046–771 BC), the first of the two major divisions of the period, the Zhou court maintained a tenuous control over the country through a network of feudal states. This system broke down during the Dong (Eastern) Zhou (770–256 BC), however, as those states and new ones that arose vied for power. The Dong Zhou is commonly subdivided into the Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn (Spring and Autumn Period)) period (770–476 BC) and the Zhanguo ( Warring States) period (475–221 BC), the latter extending some three decades beyond the death of the last Zhou ruler until the rise of the Qin in 221.

      The origin of the Zhou royal house is lost in the mists of time. Although the traditional historical system of the Chinese contains a Zhou genealogy, no dates can be assigned to the ancestors. The first ancestor was Houji (Hou Chi), literally translated as “Lord of Millet.” He appears to have been a cultural hero and agricultural deity rather than a tribal chief. The earliest plausible Zhou ancestor was Danfu, the grandfather of Wenwang. Prior to and during the time of Danfu, the Zhou people seem to have migrated to avoid pressure from powerful neighbours, possibly nomadic people to the north. Under the leadership of Danfu, they settled in the valley of the Wei River in the present province of Shaanxi. The fertility of the loess soil there apparently made a great impression on these people, who had already been engaged in farming when they entered their new homeland. A walled city was built, and a new nation was formed. Archaeological remains, including ruins of courtyards surrounded by walls and halls on platforms, confirm literary evidence of a Zhou state.

Zhou and Shang
      The name Zhou appears often in the oracle bone inscriptions of the Shang kingdom, sometimes as a friendly tributary neighbour and at other times as a hostile one. This pattern is confirmed by records found at the Zhou archaeological site. Marriages were occasionally made between the two ruling houses. The Zhou also borrowed arts such as bronze casting from their more cultivated neighbour. The Zhou royal house, however, had already conceived the idea of replacing Shang as the master of China—a conquest that took three generations. Although the conquest was actually carried out by his sons, Wenwang should be credited with molding the Zhou kingdom into the most formidable power west of the Shang. Wenwang extended the Zhou sphere of influence to the north of the Shang kingdom and also made incursions to the south, thus paving the way for the final conquest by Wuwang.

      In Chinese historical tradition Wenwang was depicted as intelligent and benevolent, a man of virtue who won popularity among his contemporaries and expanded the realm of the Zhou. His son Wuwang, though not as colourful as his father, was always regarded as the conqueror. In fact, Wu, his posthumous name, means “Martial.” However, the literary records indicate that the Zhou actually controlled two-thirds of all China at the time of Wenwang, who continued to recognize the cultural and political superiority of the Shang out of feudal loyalty. There is not enough evidence either to establish or to deny this. A careful historian, however, tends to take the Zhou subjugation to the Shang as a recognition of Shang strength. It was not until the reign of the last Shang ruler, Zhou, that the kingdom exhausted its strength by engaging in large-scale military campaigns against nomads to the north and against a group of native tribes to the east. At that time Wuwang organized the first probing expedition and reached the neighbourhood of the Shang capital. A full-scale invasion soon followed. Along with forces of the Zhou, the army was made up of the Jiang, southern neighbours of the Zhou, and of eight allied tribes from the west. The Shang dispatched a large army to meet the invaders. The pro-Zhou records say that, after the Shang vanguard defected to join the Zhou, the entire army collapsed, and Wuwang entered the capital without resistance. Yet Mencius, the 4th-century-BC thinker, cast doubt on the reliability of this account by pointing out that a victory without enemy resistance should not have been accompanied by the heavy casualties mentioned in the classical document. One may speculate that the Shang vanguard consisted of remnants of the eastern tribes suppressed by the Shang ruler Zhou during his last expedition and that their sudden defection caught the Shang defenders by surprise, making them easy prey for the invading enemy. The decisive battle took place in 1111 BC (as tabulated by Dong Zuobin, although it is traditionally dated at 1122; other dates have also been suggested, including 1046, which has been adopted for this article). Wuwang died shortly after the conquest, leaving a huge territory to be consolidated. This was accomplished by one of his brothers, Zhougong, who served as regent during the reign of Wu's son, Chengwang.

      The defeated Shang could not be ruled out as a potential force, even though their ruler, Zhou, had immolated himself. Many groups of hostile “barbarians” were still outside the sphere of Zhou power. The Zhou leaders had to yield to reality by establishing a rather weak control over the conquered territory. The son of Zhou was allowed to organize a subservient state under the close watch of two other brothers of Wuwang, who were garrisoned in the immediate vicinity. Other leaders of the Zhou and their allies were assigned lands surrounding the old Shang domain. But no sooner had Zhougong assumed the role of regent than a large-scale rebellion broke out. His two brothers, entrusted with overseeing the activities of the son of Zhou, joined the Shang prince in rebellion, and it took Zhougong three full years to reconquer the Shang domain, subjugate the eastern tribes, and reestablish the suzerainty of the Zhou court.

      These three years of extensive campaigning consolidated the rule of the Zhou over all of China. An eastern capital was constructed on the middle reach of the Huang He (Yellow River) as a stronghold to support the feudal lords in the east. Several states established by Zhou kinsmen and relatives were transferred farther east and northeast as the vanguard of expansion, including one established by the son of Zhougong. The total number of such feudal states mentioned in historical records and later accounts varies from 20 to 70; the figures in later records would naturally be higher, since enfeoffment might take place more than once. Each of these states included fortified cities. They were strung out along the valley of the Huang He between the old capital and the new eastern capital, reaching as far as the valleys of the Huai and Han rivers in the south and extending eastward to the Shandong Peninsula and the coastal area north of it. All these colonies mutually supported each other and were buttressed by the strength of the eastern capital, where the conquered Shang troops were kept, together with several divisions of the Zhou legions. Ancient bronze inscriptions make frequent mention of mobilizing the military units at the eastern capital at times when the Zhou feudal states needed assistance.

The Zhou feudal (feudalism) system
      The feudal states were not contiguous but rather were scattered at strategic locations surrounded by potentially dangerous and hostile lands. The fortified city of the feudal lord was often the only area that he controlled directly; the state and the city were therefore identical, both being guo, a combination of city wall and weapons. Satellite cities were established at convenient distances from the main city in order to expand the territory under control. Each feudal state consisted of an alliance of the Zhou, the Shang, and the local population. A Chinese nation was formed on the foundation of Zhou feudalism.

      The scattered feudal states gradually acquired something like territorial solidity as the neighbouring populations established closer ties with them, either by marriage or by accepting vassal status; the gaps between the fortified cities were thus filled by political control and cultural assimilation. This created a dilemma for the Zhou central court: the evolution of the feudal network buttressed the structure of the Zhou order, but the strong local ties and parochial interests of the feudal lords tended to pull them away from the centre. Each of these opposing forces became at one time or another strong enough to affect the history of the Zhou order.

      For about two centuries Zhou China enjoyed stability and peace. There were wars against the non-Zhou peoples of the interior and against the nomads along the northern frontier, but there was little dispute among the Chinese states themselves. The southern expansion was successful, and the northern expansion worked to keep the nomads away from the Chinese areas. The changing strength of the feudal order can be seen from two occurrences at the Zhou court. In 841 BC the nobles jointly expelled Liwang, a tyrant, and replaced him with a collective leadership headed by the two most influential nobles until the crown prince was enthroned. In 771 BC the Zhou royal line was again broken when Youwang was killed by invading barbarians. The nobles apparently were split at that time, because the break gave rise to two courts, headed by two princes, each of whom had the support of part of the nobility. One of the pretenders, Pingwang, survived the other (thus inaugurating the Dong [Eastern] Zhou period), but the royal order had lost prestige and influence. The cohesion of the feudal system had weakened. Thereafter, it entered the phase traditionally known as Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn (Spring and Autumn Period)).

 The familial relationship among the nobles gradually was diluted during the Chunqiu period. A characteristic of the Zhou feudal system was that the extended family and the political structure were identical. The line of lordship was regarded as the line of elder brothers, who therefore enjoyed not only political superiority but also seniority in the family line. The head of the family not only was the political chief but also had the unique privilege of offering sacrifice to and worshipping the ancestors, who would bestow their blessings and guarantee the continuity of the mandate of heaven. After the weakening of the position of the Zhou king in the feudal structure, he was not able to maintain the position of being the head of a large family in any more than a normal sense. The feudal structure and familial ties fell apart, continuing in several of the Chunqiu states for various lengths of time, with various degrees of modification. Over the next two centuries the feudal-familial system gradually declined and disappeared.

      In the first half of the Chunqiu period, the feudal system was a stratified society, divided into ranks as follows: the ruler of a state; the feudal lords who served at the ruler's court as ministers; the shi (roughly translated as “gentlemen”) who served at the households of the feudal lords as stewards, sheriffs, or simply warriors; and, finally, the commoners and slaves. The state ruler and the ministers were clearly a superior class, and the commoners and slaves were an inferior class; the class of shi was an intermediate one in which the younger sons of the ministers, the sons of shi, and selected commoners all mingled to serve as functionaries and officials. The state rulers were, in theory, divided into five grades; in reality, the importance of a ruler was determined by the strength of his state. The ministerial feudal lords, however, often had two or three grades among themselves, as determined by the lord-vassal relationship. In general, each state was ruled by a group of hereditary feudal lords who might or might not be of the same surname as the state ruler. The system was not stable in the Chunqiu period, and everywhere there were changes.

      The first important change occurred with the advent of interstate leadership. For several decades after 722 BC, the records chiefly show battles and diplomatic maneuvers among the states on the central plain and in the middle and lower reaches of the Huang He valley. These states, however, were too small to hold the leadership and too constricted in the already crowded plain to have potentiality for further development. The leadership was soon taken over by states on the peripheral areas.

      The first to achieve this leadership was Huangong (reigned 685–643 BC), the ruler of the state of Qi on the Shandong Peninsula. He successfully rallied around him many other Chinese states to resist the pressure of non-Chinese powers in the north and south. While formally respecting the suzerainty of the Zhou monarchy, Huangong adopted a new title of “overlord” (ba). He convened interstate meetings, settled disputes among states, and led campaigns to protect his followers from the intimidation of non-Chinese powers.

      After his death the state of Qi failed to maintain its leading status. The leadership, after a number of years, passed to Wengong of Jin (Jin dynasty) (reigned 636–628 BC), the ruler of the mountainous state north of the Huang He. Under Wengong and his capable successors, the overlordship was institutionalized until it took the place of the Zhou monarchy. Interstate meetings were held at first during emergencies caused by challenges from the rising southern state of Chu. States answering the call of the overlord were expected to contribute and maintain a certain number of war chariots. Gradually the meetings became regular, and the voluntary contribution was transformed into a compulsory tribute to the court of the overlord. The new system of states under the leadership of an overlord developed not only in northern China under Jin but also in the south under Chu. Two other states, Qin (Qin dynasty) and Qi, though not commanding the strength of the formidable Jin and Chu, each absorbed weaker neighbours into a system of satellite states. A balance of power thus emerged among the four states of Qi, Qin, Jin, and Chu. The balance was occasionally tipped when two of them went to war, but it was subsequently restored by the transference of some small states from one camp to another.

      A further change began in the 5th century BC, when the states of Wu and Yue far to the south suddenly challenged Chu for hegemony over the southern part of China, at a time when the strong state of Jin was much weakened by an internecine struggle among powerful magnates. Wu got so far as to claim overlordship over northern China in an interstate meeting held in 482 BC after defeating Chu. But Wu's hegemony was short-lived; it collapsed after being attacked by Yue. Yue held the nominal overlordship for only a brief period; Jin, Qin, and Qi were weakened by internal disturbances (Jin split into three contending powers) and declined; and a series of defeats paralyzed Chu. Thus, the balance-of-power system was rendered unworkable.

      A half century of disorder followed. Small states fell prey to big ones, while in the big states usurpers replaced the old rulers. When the chaos ended, there were seven major powers and half a dozen minor ones. Among the seven major powers, Zhao, Han, and Wei had formerly been parts of Jin; the Qi ruling house had changed hands; and Qin was undergoing succession problems. The only “old” state was Chu. Even Chu, a southern state, had become almost completely assimilated to the northern culture (except in art, literature, and folklore). The minor powers had also changed: some had retained only small portions of their old territories, some had new ruling houses, and some were new states that had emerged from non-Chinese tribes. The long interval of power struggle that followed (475–221 BC) is known as the Zhanguo ( Warring States) period.

Social, political, and cultural changes (Zhou dynasty)
      The years from the 8th century BC to 221 BC witnessed the painful birth of a unified China. It was a period of bloody wars and also of far-reaching changes in politics, society, and intellectual outlook.

The decline of feudalism
      The most obvious change in political institutions was that the old feudal structure was replaced by systems of incipient bureaucracy under monarchy. The decline of feudalism took its course in the Chunqiu period, and the rise of the new order may be seen in the Zhanguo period. The Zhou feudalism suffered from a continual dilution of authority. As a state expanded, its nobility acquired vassals, and these in turn acquired their own vassals. The longer this went on, the more diluted the family tie became and the more dependent the ruler became on the combined strength of the vassals. At a certain point, the vassals might acquire an advantageous position, and the most dominant figures among them might eclipse the king. The Zhou royal house perhaps reached the turning point earlier than the other feudal states. As a result, the Zhou royal domain and its influence shrank when Pingwang moved his court to the east. The ruling houses of other states suffered the same fate. Within a century after the Zhou court had moved to the east, the ruling houses in most of the feudal states had changed. In some cases a dominating branch replaced the major lineage, and in others a powerful minister formed a strong vassaldom and usurped the authority of the legitimate ruler. Bloody court intrigues and power struggles eliminated many established houses. The new power centres were reluctant to see the process continue and therefore refused to allow further segmentation and subinfeudation. Thus, the feudal system withered and finally collapsed.

      Simultaneous with the demise of feudalism was a rise in urbanization. Minor fortified cities were built, radiating out from each of the major centres, and other towns radiated from the minor cities. From these cities and towns orders were issued, and to them the resources of the countryside were sent. The central plain along the Huang He was the first to be saturated by clusters of cities. This is probably the reason why the central states soon reached the maximum of their influence in the interstate power struggle: unlike the states in peripheral areas, they had no room to expand.

      The period of urbanization was also a time of assimilation. The non-Zhou population caught in the reach of feudal cities could not but feel the magnetic attraction of the civilization represented by the Zhou people and Zhou feudalism. The bronze inscriptions of the Xi Zhou period (1046–771 BC) refer to the disturbances of the barbarians, who could be found practically everywhere. They were the non-Zhou groups scattered in the open spaces. The barbarians in inland China were forced to integrate with one or another of the contenders in the interstate conflicts. Their lands were annexed, and their populations were moved or absorbed. The strength of the large states owed much to their success at incorporating these non-Chinese groups. By the time of the unification of China in the 3rd century BC, there was virtually no significant concentration of non-Chinese groups north of the Yangtze River valley and south of the steppe. Bronze pieces attributable to non-Zhou chiefs in the late Chunqiu period show no significant difference in writing system and style from those of the Chinese states.

      Zhou civilization was not assimilated so easily in the south, where the markedly different Chu culture flourished. For some centuries, Chu was the archenemy of the Chinese states, yet the nobles of the Chu acquired enough of the northern culture to enable their envoy to the courts of the north to cite the same verses and observe the same manners. The Chu literature that has survived is the fruit of these two distinctive heritages.

      To the north were the nomadic peoples of the steppe. As long as they remained divided, they constituted no threat; however, when they were under strong leaders, able to forge a united nomadic empire challenging the dominance of the Chinese, there were confrontations. The “punitive” action into the north during the reign of Xuanwang (827–782 BC) does not seem to have been very large in scope; both sides apparently had little ambition for territorial aggrandizement. Cultural exchange in the northern frontier region was far less than the assimilation that occurred in the south along the Yangtze valley, and it was mainly concerned with techniques of cavalry warfare.

The rise of monarchy
      Internal political changes also took place as states grew in population and area. The most basic of these was in the pattern of power delegation. Under feudalism, authority had been delegated by the lord to the vassal. The new state rulers sought ways of maintaining and organizing their power.

      In the state of Jin the influence of kinsmen of the ruling house had been trimmed even before Wengong established his overlordship. Wengong reorganized the government, installing his most capable followers in the key posts. He set up a hierarchical structure that corresponded to the channels of military command. Appointments to these key positions came to be based on a combination of merit and seniority, thus establishing a type of bureaucracy that was to become traditional in Chinese government.

      The Chu government was perhaps the oldest true monarchy among all the Chunqiu states. The authority of the king was absolute. Chu was the only major state in which the ruling house survived the chaotic years of the Zhanguo period.

      Local administration went through a slow evolution. The prefecture system developed in both Jin and Chu was one innovation. In Jin there were several dozen prefects across the state, each having limited authority and tenure. The Jin prefect was no more than a functionary, in contrast to the feudal practice. Similar local administrative units grew up in Chu. New lands taken by conquest were organized into prefectures governed by ranking officials who were evidently appointed by the king. The prefecture system of Jin and Chu was to become the principal form of local administration in the Zhanguo period.

      By that time, practically all the major states had chancellors, who acted as leaders of the courts, which were composed of numerous officials. Whereas in the feudal state the officials had been military officers, the more functionally differentiated court of the Zhanguo period usually had a separate corps of civil service personnel. Local administration was entrusted to prefects, who served limited terms. Prefects were often required to submit annual reports to the court so that the ruler could judge their performance. Regional supervisors were sometimes dispatched to check the work of the prefects, a system developed by the later Chinese imperial government into the “censor” system. Fiefs of substantial size were given to only a few people, usually close relatives of the ruler. There was little opportunity for anyone to challenge the sovereignty of the state. The majority of government employees were not relatives of the ruler, and some of them might not even have been citizens of the state. Officials were paid in grain or perhaps in a combination of cash and grain. Archives were kept by scribes on wooden blocks and bamboo strips. These features combined indicate the emergence of some form of bureaucracy.

      The new pattern was the result of the efforts of many reformers in different states. Both practical men and theoreticians helped to form the emerging structure, which, though still crude, was the forerunner of the large and complex bureaucracy of later Chinese dynasties.

      Military technique also underwent great changes in the Zhanguo period. In the feudal era, war had been a profession of the nobles. Lengthy training was needed to learn how to drive and shoot from a chariot drawn by horses. There was also an elaborate code of behaviour in combat. The nature of war had already changed by the late Chunqiu period, as the nobility had given way to professional warriors and mercenaries. In some states, special titles of nobility were created for successful warriors, regardless of their origin. Foot soldiers were replacing war chariots as the main force on the battlefield: the expansion of the major states into mountainous areas and the rise of the southern powers in an area of swamps, lakes, and rivers increased the importance of the infantry.

      Battles were fought mostly by hordes of foot soldiers, most of them commoners, aided by cavalry units; war chariots apparently served only auxiliary roles, probably as mobile commanding platforms or perhaps as carriers. All of the Zhanguo powers seem to have used conscription systems to recruit able-bodied male citizens. The organization, training, and command of the infantry required experts of a special type, and professional commanders emerged who conducted battles involving several thousand men along lines extending hundreds of miles. A few treatises on the principles of warfare still survive, including Bingfa (The Art of War) by Sunzi. Cavalry warfare developed among the northern states, including Qin, Zhao, and Yan. The Qin cavalrymen were generally drawn from the northern and northwestern border areas, where there were constant contacts with the steppe peoples. The rise of Yan from a rather obscure state to a major power probably owed much to its successful adoption of cavalry tactics, as well as to its northern expansion.

 Important changes occurred in agriculture (agriculture, origins of). Millet had once been the major cereal crop in the north, but wheat gradually grew in importance. Rice, imported from the south, was extended to the dry soil of the north. The soybean, in a number of varieties, proved to be one of the most important crops. Chinese farmers gradually developed a kind of intensive agriculture. Soil was improved by adding manure and night soil. Planting fields in carefully regulated rows replaced the fallow system. Great importance was placed on plowing and seeding at the proper time (especially in the fine-grained loess soil of northern China). Fields were weeded frequently throughout the growing season. Farmers also knew the value of rotating crops to preserve the fertility of the soil, and soybeans were often part of the rotation. Although iron was used to cast implements in the 5th century BC (probably even as early as the 8th century BC), those early examples discovered by archaeologists are of rather inferior quality.

      Irrigation (irrigation and drainage) became necessary as population pressure forced cropland to be expanded, and irrigation works were constructed in many states beginning in the late Chunqiu period. These projects were built to drain swampy areas, leach out alkaline soil and replace it with fertile topsoil, and, in the south and in the Sichuan Basin, to carry water into the rice paddies. The irrigation systems unearthed by archaeologists indicate that these were small-scale works carried out for the most part by state or local authorities.

      Another significant change in the economic sphere was the growth of trade among regions. Coins excavated in scattered spots show by their great variety that active trade had expanded into all parts of Zhou China. Great commercial centres had arisen, and the new cities brought a demand for luxuries. The literary records as well as the archaeological evidence show that wealthy persons had possessions made of bronze and gold, silver inlays, lacquer, silk, ceramics, and precious stones. The advancement of ferrous metallurgy led to the earliest recorded blast furnace and the earliest steel. The Chinese had been casting bronze for more than a millennium; turning to iron, they became highly skilled at making weapons and tools. The Han historian Sima Qian (writing c. 100 BC) told of individuals making fortunes in the iron industry.

      As the old feudal regimes collapsed and were replaced by centralized monarchies during the Zhanguo period, the feudal nobility fell victim to power struggles within the states and to conquest by stronger states. During the Chunqiu period these parallel processes drastically reduced the numbers of the nobility.

      A new elite class arose in the late Chunqiu, composed of the former shi class and the descendants of the old nobility. The members of this class were distinguished by being educated, either in the literary tradition or in the military arts. The shi provided the administrators, teachers, and intellectual leaders of the new society. The philosophers Confucius (551–479 BC), Mencius (c. 372–289 BC), Mozi (Mo-tzu; 5th century BC), and Xunzi (Hsün-tzu) (Hsün-tzu; c. 300–c. 230 BC) were members of the shi class, as was also a large proportion of high-ranking officials and leaders of prominence. The interstate competition that drove rulers to select the most capable and meritorious individuals to serve in their courts resulted in an unprecedented degree of social mobility.

      The populace, most of whom were farmers, also underwent changes in status. In feudal times the peasants had been subjects of their lords. They owned no property, at most being permitted to till a piece of the lord's land for their own needs. The ancient texts tell of the “well-field (well-field system)” system, under which eight families were assigned 100 mu (15 acres, or 6 hectares) each of land to live on while collectively cultivating another 100 mu as the lord's reservation. Individual ownership grew as farming became more intensive, and, increasingly, farmers were taxed (taxation) according to the amount of land they “owned.” The land tax had become a common practice by Zhanguo times. By paying taxes, the tiller of the field acquired the privilege of using the land as his own possession, which perhaps was the first step toward private ownership. As states expanded and new lands were given to cultivation, an increasing number of “free” farmers were to be found tilling land that had never been part of a lord's manor. With the collapse of the feudal structure, farmers in general gradually ceased to be subjects of a master and became subjects of a state.

      A similar transformation occurred among the merchants and artisans, who gradually passed from being household retainers of a lord to the status of independent subjects. Thus, the feudal society was completely reshaped in the two centuries preceding the Qin unification.

Cultural change
      These great political and socioeconomic changes were accompanied by intellectual ferment, as the people tried to adjust themselves to a rapidly changing world. Ideas about the proper relationships between members of society were naturally questioned when the old feudal order was shaken, and in that period the great teacher Confucius elaborated the social concepts that henceforth became normative for Chinese civilization. In place of rigid feudal obligations, he posited an order based on more-universal human relationships (such as that between father and son) and taught that ability and moral excellence rather than birth were what fitted a person for leadership.

      The great thinkers who came after Confucius, whether or not they agreed with his views, were conditioned by his basic assumptions. Mozi, originally a Confucian, based his system on a concept of universal love that was largely an extension of the Confucian idea of humanity; the “worthy man” Mozi recommended as the ideal leader was a development of Confucius's notion of excellence, combining virtue and ability. Even the individualist thinkers known as Daoists (Taoists), who did not follow Confucius, formulated their teachings as a rebuttal to the Confucian system.

      Confucius and other pre-Qin thinkers viewed the traditional political institutions of China as bankrupt and tried to devise a rationale for something to replace them. Some, such as Confucius, put their main emphasis on the quality of the ruling elite group; others, such as Shang Yang (died 338 BC) and Hanfeizi (Han Feizi) (died 233 BC), regarded a well-organized governing mechanism as the only way to an orderly society. The development of the new centralized monarchical state after the middle of the Chunqiu period is not only the embodiment of the ideas of these various thinkers but also the working premise in the context of which they elaborated their theories. The high degree of social and political consciousness that characterized most of the pre-Qin philosophical schools set the pattern for the close association of the intellectual with government and society in later China.

      The burgeoning commercial life of the period also influenced other spheres, especially in the prevalence of contractual relationships. Thus, a minister would roam from one court to another, “selling” his knowledge and service to the most accommodating prince, and the quality of his service was determined by the treatment he received. This kind of contractual relationship remained common in China until the tide of commercialism was ended by the restriction of commercial activity under the Han emperor Wudi in the 2nd century BC.

      The local cultures of China were blended into one common civilization during Chunqiu times. Through contacts and interchanges, the gods and legends of one region became identified and assimilated with those of other regions. Local differences remained, but, from that time on, the general Chinese pantheon took the form of a congregation of gods with specific functions, representing a celestial projection of the unified Chinese empire with its bureaucratic society.

      Bold challenges to tradition have been rare in Chinese history, and the questioning and innovating spirit of the Chunqiu period was to have no parallel until the ferment of the 20th century, after two millennia had elapsed under the domination of Confucian orthodoxy.

The Qin (Qin dynasty) empire (221–207 BC)

The Qin state
 The history of the Qin dynasty may be traced to the 8th century BC. According to the Qin historical record, when the Zhou royal house was reestablished at the eastern capital in 770 BC, the Qin ruling house was entrusted with the mission of maintaining order in the previous capital. This may be an exaggeration of the importance of the Qin rulers, and the Qin may have been only one of the ruling families of the old states that recognized Zhou suzerainty and went to serve the Zhou court. The record is not clear. In the old annals Qin did not appear as a significant power until the time of Mugong (reigned 659–621 BC), who made Qin the main power in the western part of China. Although Qin attempted to obtain a foothold in the central heartland along the Huang He, it was blocked by the territories of Jin. Qin failed several times to enter the eastern bloc of powers and had to limit its activities to conquering, absorbing, and incorporating the non-Chinese tribes and states scattered within and west of the big loop of the Huang He. Qin's success in this was duly recognized by other powers of the Chunqiu period, so that the two superpowers Chu and Jin had to grant Qin, along with Qi, the status of overlord in its own region. The eastern powers, however, regarded Qin as a barbarian state because of the non-Chinese elements it contained.

      Qin played only a supporting role in the Chunqiu power struggle; its location made it immune to the cutthroat competition of the states in the central plain. Qin, in fact, was the only major power that did not suffer battle within its own territory. Moreover, being a newly emerged state, Qin did not have the burden of a long-established feudal system, which allowed it more freedom to develop its own pattern of government. As a result of being “underdeveloped,” it offered opportunity for eastern-educated persons; with the infusion of such talent, it was able to compete well with the eastern powers, yet without the overexpanded ministerial apparatus that embarrassed other rulers. This may be one reason why Qin was one of the handful of ruling houses that survived the great turmoil of the late Chunqiu period.

      A period of silence followed. Even the Qin historical record that was adopted by the historian Sima Qian yields almost no information for a period of some 90 years in the 5th century BC. The evidence suggests that Qin underwent a period of consolidation and assimilation during the years of silence. When it reemerged as an important power, its culture appeared to be simpler and more martial, perhaps because of the non-Chinese tribes it had absorbed.

Struggle for power
      Until the 5th century BC, China was dominated by the central-plain power Wei, a successor to Jin, and by the eastern power Qi, a wealthy state with a new ruling house. Qin remained a secondary power until after the great reforms of Xiaogong (361–338 BC) and Shang Yang (Wei Yang).

      Shang Yang, a frustrated bureaucrat in the court of Wei, went westward seeking a chance to try out his ideas. In the court of Qin he established a rare partnership with the ruler Xiaogong and created the best-organized state of their time. Shang Yang first took strong measures to establish the authority of law and royal decree. The law was to be enforced impartially, without regard to status or position. He convinced Xiaogong that the rank of nobility and the privileges attached to it should be awarded only to those who rendered good service to the state, especially for valour in battle. This deprived the existing nobility of their titles and privileges, arousing much antagonism in the court.

      One of his most influential reforms was that of standardizing local administration. It was a step toward creating a unified state by combining various localities into counties, which were then organized into prefectures under direct supervision of the court. This system was expanded to all of China after unification in 221 BC.

      Another measure taken by Shang Yang was that he encouraged production, especially in agriculture. Farmers were given incentive to reclaim wasteland, and game and fishing reserves were also opened to cultivation. A shortage of labour was met by recruiting the able-bodied from neighbouring states, especially from Han, Zhao, and Wei. This policy of drawing workers to Qin had two consequences: it increased production in Qin, and manpower was lost in the neighbouring states. In order to increase incentives, the Qin government levied a double tax on any male citizen who was not the master of a household. The result was a breakdown of the extended-family system, since younger children were forced to move out and establish their own households. The nuclear family became the prevalent form in Qin thereafter. As late as the 2nd century BC, Han scholars were still attacking the Qin family structure as failing to observe the principle of filial piety, a cardinal virtue in the Confucian moral code. Shang Yang also standardized the system of weights and measures, a reform of some importance for the development of trade and commerce.

      Qin grew wealthy and powerful under the joint labours of Xiaogong and Shang Yang. After Xiaogong's death, Shang Yang was put to death by enemies at the Qin court. Tablets of the Qin law substantiate the survival of Shang Yang's policies after his death.

      What remained of the Zhou royal court still survived, ruling over a fragmentary domain—poor, weak, and totally at the mercy of the contending powers. It was commonly felt that China ought to be unified politically, although the powers disagreed as to how it was to be done and who would be the universal king. Huiwang, son of Xiaogong, claimed the royal title in 325 BC. The adoption of the royal title by Qin was of course a challenge to Qi and Wei. Qin pursued a strategy of dividing its rivals and individually defeating them. Qin appealed to the self-interest of other powers in order to keep them from intervening in any military action it was taking against one of its neighbours. It befriended the more distant states while gradually absorbing the territories of those close to it.

      Within half a century, Qin had acquired undisputed predominance over the other contending powers. It continued maneuvering in order to prevent the others from uniting against it. A common topic of debate in the courts of the other states was whether to establish friendly relations with Qin or to join with other states in order to resist Qin's expansion. The Qin strategists were ruthless: all means, including lies, espionage, bribery, and assassination, were pressed into the service of their state.

      For a time, the eastern power Qi had seemed the most likely to win. It defeated Wei, crushed Yan in 314 BC, and annexed Song in 286 BC. But Qi was overturned by an allied force of five states, including Qin. Zhao, the power with extensive territory in the northern frontier, succeeded Qi as the most formidable contender against Qin. In 260 BC a decisive battle between Qin and Zhao destroyed Zhao's military strength, though Qin was not able to complete its conquest of Zhao for several decades.

The empire
      When Qin succeeded in unifying China in 221 BC, its king claimed the title of “First Sovereign Emperor,” Shihuangdi. He was a strong and energetic ruler, and, although he appointed a number of capable aides, the emperor remained the final authority and the sole source of power.

      Shihuangdi made a number of important reforms. He abolished the feudal system completely and extended the administration system of prefectures and counties, with officials appointed by the central government sent into all of China. Circuit inspectors were dispatched to oversee the local magistrates. China was divided into some 40 prefectures. The empire created by Shihuangdi was to become the traditional territory of China. In later eras China sometimes held other territories, but the Qin boundaries were always considered to embrace the indivisible area of China proper. In order to control this vast area, Shihuangdi constructed a network of highways to facilitate moving his troops. Several hundred thousand workers were conscripted to connect and strengthen the existing walls (Great Wall of China) along the northern border. The result was a complex of fortified walls, garrison stations, and signal towers extending from near the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli) westward across the pastureland of what is today Inner Mongolia and through the fertile loop of the Huang He to what is now northwestern Gansu province. This defense line, known as the Great Wall (Great Wall of China), marked the frontier where the nomads of the great steppe and the Chinese farmers on the loess soil confronted each other. Yet the emperor failed in another great project: digging a canal across the mountains in the south to link the southern coastal areas with the main body of China. Shihuangdi, with his capable chancellor Li Si, also unified and simplified the writing system and codified the law.

      All of China felt the burden of these 11 or 12 years of change. Millions of people were dragooned to the huge construction jobs, many dying on the long journey to their destination. Wealthy and influential men in the provinces were compelled to move to the capital. Weapons were confiscated. Hundreds of intellectuals were massacred for daring to criticize the emperor's policies. Books dealing with subjects other than law, horticulture, and herbal medicine were kept out of public circulation because the emperor considered such knowledge to be dangerous and unsettling. These things have contributed to make Shihuangdi appear the arch tyrant of Chinese history.

      Some of the accusations leveled against him by historians are perhaps exaggerated, such as the burning of books and the indiscriminate massacre of intellectuals. Shihuangdi himself claimed in the stone inscriptions of his time that he had corrected the misconduct of a corrupted age and given the people peace and order. Indeed, his political philosophy did not deviate much from that already developed by the great thinkers of the Zhanguo period and adopted later by the Han emperors, who have been generally regarded as benevolent rulers.

      Shihuangdi was afraid of death. He did everything possible to achieve immortality. Deities were propitiated, and messengers were dispatched to look for an elixir of life. He died in 210 BC while on a tour of the empire. Excavation of his tomb, near modern Xi'an (ancient Chang'an), revealed more than 6,000 life-size statues of soldiers still on guard.

      His death led to the fall of his dynasty. The legitimate heir was compelled to commit suicide when his younger brother usurped the throne. Capable and loyal servants, including Li Si and Gen. Meng Tian, were put to death. Ershidi, the second emperor, reigned only four years. Rebellion broke out in the Yangtze River area when a small group of conscripts led by a peasant killed their escort officers and claimed sovereignty for the former state of Chu. The uprising spread rapidly as old ruling elements of the six states rose to claim their former titles. Escaped conscripts and soldiers who had been hiding throughout the land emerged in large numbers to attack the imperial armies. The second emperor was killed by a powerful eunuch minister, and in 206 BC a rebel leader accepted the surrender of the last Qin prince.

Cho-yun Hsu

 The Han dynasty was founded by Liu Bang (best known by his temple name, Gaozu), who assumed the title of emperor in 202 BC. Eleven members of the Liu family followed in his place as effective emperors until AD 6 (a 12th briefly occupied the throne as a puppet). In AD 9 the dynastic line was challenged by Wang Mang, who established his own regime under the title of Xin. In AD 25 the authority of the Han dynasty was reaffirmed by Liu Xiu (posthumous name Guangwudi), who reigned as Han emperor until 57. Thirteen of his descendants maintained the dynastic succession until 220, when the rule of a single empire was replaced by that of three separate kingdoms. While the entire period from 206 (or 202) BC to AD 220 is generally described as that of the Han dynasty, the terms Xi (Western) Han (also called Former Han) and Dong (Eastern) Han (also called Later Han) are used to denote the two subperiods. During the first period, from 206 BC to AD 25, the capital city was situated at Chang'an (modern Xi'an), in the west; in the second period, from AD 25 to 220, it lay farther east at Luoyang.

      The four centuries in question may be treated as a single historical period by virtue of dynastic continuity, for, apart from the short interval of 9–25, imperial authority was unquestionably vested in successive members of the same family. The period, however, was one of considerable changes in imperial, political, and social development. Organs of government were established, tried, modified, or replaced, and new social distinctions were brought into being. Chinese prestige among other peoples varied with the political stability and military strength of the Han house, and the extent of territory that was subject to the jurisdiction of Han officials varied with the success of Han arms. At the same time, the example of the palace, the activities of government, and the growing luxuries of city life gave rise to new standards of cultural and technological achievement.

      China's first imperial dynasty, that of Qin, had lasted barely 15 years before its dissolution in the face of rebellion and civil war. By contrast, Han formed the first long-lasting regime that could successfully claim to be the sole authority entitled to wield administrative power. The Han forms of government, however, were derived in the first instance from the Qin dynasty, and these in turn incorporated a number of features of the government that had been practiced by earlier kingdoms. The Han empire left as a heritage a practical example of imperial government and an ideal of dynastic authority to which its successors aspired. But the Han period has been credited with more success than is its due; it has been represented as a period of 400 years of effective dynastic rule, punctuated by a short period in which a pretender to power usurped authority, and it has been assumed that imperial unity and effective administration advanced steadily with each decade. In fact, there were only a few short periods marked by dynastic strength, stable government, and intensive administration. Several reigns were characterized by palace intrigue and corrupt influences at court, and on a number of occasions the future of the dynasty was seriously endangered by outbreaks of violence, seizure of political power, or a crisis in the imperial succession.

Dynastic authority and the succession of emperors

Xi (Western) Han
      Since at least as early as the Shang dynasty, the Chinese had been accustomed to acknowledging the temporal and spiritual authority of a single leader and its transmission within a family, at first from brother to brother and later from father to son. Some of the early kings had been military commanders, and they may have organized the corporate work of the community, such as the manufacture of bronze tools and vessels. In addition, they acted as religious leaders, appointing scribes or priests to consult the oracles and thus to assist in making major decisions covering communal activities, such as warfare and hunting expeditions. In succeeding centuries the growing sophistication of Chinese culture was accompanied by demands for more-intensive political organization and for more-regular administration; as kings came to delegate tasks to more officials, so was their own authority enhanced and the obedience that they commanded the more widely acknowledged. Under the kingdoms of Zhou, an association was deliberately fostered between the authority of the king and the dispensation exercised over the universe by heaven, with the result that the kings of Zhou and, later, the emperors of Chinese dynasties were regarded as being the sons of heaven.

Prelude to the Han
      From 403 BC onward seven kingdoms other than Zhou constituted the ruling authorities in different parts of China, each of which was led by its own king or duke. In theory, the king of Zhou, whose territory was by now greatly reduced, was recognized as possessing superior powers and moral overlordship over the other kingdoms, but practical administration lay in the hands of the seven kings and their professional advisers or in the hands of well-established families. Then in 221 BC, after a long process of expansion and takeover, a radical change occurred in Chinese politics: the kingdom of Qin succeeded in eliminating the power of its six rivals and established a single rule that was acknowledged in their territories. According to later Chinese historians, this success was achieved and the Qin empire was thereafter maintained by oppressive methods and the rigorous enforcement of a harsh penal code, but this view was probably coloured by later political prejudices. Whatever the quality of Qin imperial government, the regime scarcely survived the death of the first emperor in 210 BC. The choice of his successor was subject to manipulation by statesmen, and local rebellions soon developed into large-scale warfare. Gaozu, whose family had not thus far figured in Chinese history, emerged as the victor of two principal contestants for power. Anxious to avoid the reputation of having replaced one oppressive regime by another, he and his advisers endeavoured to display their own empire—of Han—as a regime whose political principles were in keeping with a Chinese tradition of liberal and beneficent administration. As yet, however, the concept of a single centralized government that could command universal obedience was still subject to trial. In order to exercise and perpetuate its authority, therefore, Gaozu's government perforce adopted the organs of government, and possibly many of the methods, of its discredited predecessor.

      The authority of the Han emperors had been won in the first instance by force of arms, and both Gaozu and his successors relied on the loyal cooperation of military leaders and on officials who organized the work of civil government. In theory and to a large extent in practice, the emperor remained the single source from whom all powers of government were delegated. It was the Han emperors who appointed men to the senior offices of the central government and in whose name the governors of the commanderies (provinces) collected taxes, recruited men for the labour corps and army, and dispensed justice. And it was the Han emperors who invested some of their kinsmen with powers to rule as kings over certain territories or divested them of such powers in order to consolidate the strength of the central government.

The imperial succession
 The succession of emperors was hereditary, but it was complicated to a considerable extent by a system of imperial consorts and the implication of their families in politics. Of the large number of women who were housed in the palace as the emperor's favourites, one was selected for nomination as the empress; while it was theoretically possible for an emperor to appoint any one of his sons heir apparent, this honour, in practice, usually fell on one of the sons of the empress. Changes could be made in the declared succession, however, by deposing one empress and giving the title to another favourite, and sometimes, when an emperor died without having nominated his heir, it was left to the senior statesmen of the day to arrange for a suitable successor. Whether or not an heir had been named, the succession was often open to question, as pressure could be exerted on an emperor over his choice. Sometimes a young or weak emperor was overawed by the expressed will of his mother or by anxiety to please a newly favoured concubine.

      Throughout the Xi Han and Dong Han periods, the succession and other important political considerations were affected by the members of the imperial consorts' families. Often the father or brothers of an empress or concubine were appointed to high office in the central government; alternatively, senior statesmen might be able to curry favour with their emperor or consolidate their position at court by presenting a young female relative for the imperial pleasure. In either situation the succession of emperors might be affected, jealousies would be aroused between the different families concerned, and the actual powers of a newly acceded emperor would be overshadowed by the women in his entourage or their male relatives. Such situations were particularly likely to develop if, as often happened, an emperor was succeeded by an infant son.

      The imperial succession was thus frequently bound up with the political machinations of statesmen, particularly as the court grew more sophisticated and statesmen acquired coteries of clients engaged in factional rivalry. On the death of the first emperor, Gaozu (195 BC), the palace came under the domination of his widow. Outliving her son, who had succeeded as emperor under the title of Huidi (reigned 195–188), the empress dowager Gaohou arranged for two infants to succeed consecutively. During that time (188–180 BC) she issued imperial edicts under her own name and by virtue of her own authority as empress dowager. She set a precedent that was to be followed in later dynastic crises—e.g., when the throne was vacant and no heir had been appointed. In such cases, although statesmen or officials would in fact determine how to proceed, their decisions were implemented in the form of edicts promulgated by the senior surviving empress.

      Gaohou appointed a number of members of her own family to highly important positions of state and clearly hoped to substitute her own family for the reigning Liu family. But these plans were frustrated on her death (180) by men whose loyalties remained with the founding emperor and his family. Liu Heng, better known as Wendi (Wen Ti), reigned from 180 to 157. He soon came to be regarded (with Gaozu and Wudi) as one of three outstanding emperors of the Xi Han. He was credited with the ideal behaviour of a reigning monarch according to later Confucian doctrine; i.e., he was supposedly ready to yield place to others, hearken to the advice and remonstrances of his statesmen, and eschew personal extravagance. It can be claimed that his reign saw the peaceful consolidation of imperial power, successful experimentation in operating the organs of government, and the steady growth of China's material resources.

From Wudi to Yuandi
      The third emperor of the Xi Han to be singled out for special praise by traditional Chinese historians was Wudi (reigned 141–87 BC), whose reign was the longest of the entire Han period. His reputation as a vigorous and brave ruler derives from the long series of campaigns fought chiefly against the Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu; northern nomads) and in Central Asia, though Wudi never took a personal part in the fighting. The policy of taking the offensive and extending Chinese influence into unknown territory resulted not from the emperor's initiative but from the stimulus of a few statesmen, whose decisions were opposed vigorously at the time. Thanks to the same statesmen, manpower was more intensively used and natural resources more heavily exploited during Wudi's reign, which required more active administration by Han officials. Wudi participated personally in the religious cults of state far more actively than his predecessors and some of his successors. And it was during his reign that the state took new steps to promote scholarship and develop the civil service.

      From about 90 BC it became apparent that Han military strength had been overtaxed, leading to a retrenchment in military and economic policies. The last few years of the reign were darkened by a dynastic crisis arising out of jealousies between the empress and heir apparent on the one hand and a rival imperial consort's family on the other. Intense and violent fighting erupted in Chang'an in 91, and the two families were almost eliminated. A compromise was reached just before Wudi's death, whereby an infant—known by his posthumous name Zhaodi (reigned 87–74)—who came from neither family was chosen to succeed. The stewardship of the empire was vested in the hands of a regent, Huo Guang, a shrewd and circumspect statesman who already had been in government service for some two decades; even after Huo's death (68 BC), his family retained a dominating influence in Chinese politics until 64 BC. Zhaodi had been married to a granddaughter of Huo Guang; his successor, who was brought to the throne at the invitation of Huo and other statesmen, proved unfit and was deposed after a reign of 27 days. Huo, however, was able to contrive a replacement candidate (posthumous name Xuandi) whom he could control or manipulate. Xuandi (reigned 74–49/48), who began to take a personal part in government after Huo Guang's death, had a predilection for a practical rather than a scholastic approach to matters of state. While his reign was marked by a more rigorous attention to implementing the laws than had heretofore been fashionable, his edicts paid marked attention to the ideals of governing a people in their own interests and distributing bounties where they were most needed. The move away from the aggressive policies of Wudi's statesmen was even more noticeable during the next reign ( Yuandi; 49/48–33).

From Chengdi to Wang Mang
      In the reigns of Chengdi (33–7 BC), Aidi (7–1 BC), and Pingdi (1 BC–AD 6) the conduct of state affairs and the atmosphere of the court were subject to the weakness or youth of the emperors, the lack of an heir to succeed Chengdi, and the rivalries between four families of imperial consorts. It was also a time when considerable attention was paid to omens. Changes that were first introduced in the state religious cults in 32 BC were alternately countermanded and reintroduced in the hope of securing material blessings by means of intercession with different spiritual powers. To satisfy the jealousies of a favourite, Chengdi went so far as to murder two sons born to him by other women. Aidi took steps to control the growing monopoly exercised by other families over state affairs. It was alleged at the time that the deaths of both Chengdi, who had enjoyed robust health, and Pingdi, not yet 14 years old when he died, had been arranged for political reasons.

      In the meantime the Wang family had come to dominate the court. Wang Zhengjun, who had been the empress of Yuandi and mother of Chengdi, exercised considerable powers not only in her own capacity but also through several of her eight brothers. From 33 to 7 BC five members of the family were appointed in succession to the most powerful position in the government, and the status of other members was raised by bestowing titles of nobilities. The empress dowager lived until AD 13, surviving the decline of the family's influence under Aidi, who sought to restore a balance at court by honouring the families of other consorts (the Fu and Ding families). Wang Mang, nephew of the empress dowager Wang, restored the family's position during the reign of Pingdi. After the latter died and an infant succeeded to the throne, Wang Mang was appointed regent, but in AD 9 he assumed the imperial position himself, under the dynastic title of Xin. Insofar as he took imperial power from the Liu family, Wang Mang's short reign from 9 to 23 may be described as an act of usurpation. His policies were marked by both traditionalism and innovation. In creating new social distinctions, he tried to revert to a system allegedly in operation before the imperial age, and some of his changes in the structure of government were similarly related to precedents of the dim past. He appealed to the poorer classes by instituting measures of relief, but his attempts to eliminate private landholding and abolish private slaveholding antagonized the more wealthy members of society. Experiments in new types of coinage and in controlling economic transactions failed to achieve their purpose of increasing state resources, which were depleted by enormously costly preparations for campaigns against the Xiongnu. The last years of his reign were dislocated by the rise of dissident bands in a number of provinces; several leaders declared themselves emperor in different regions, and, in the course of the fighting, Chang'an was entered and damaged. Later it was captured by the Red Eyebrows, one of the most active of the robber bands, and Wang Mang was killed in a scene of violence played out within the palace buildings.

      The Han house was restored by Liu Xiu, better known as Guangwudi, who reigned from AD 25 to 57. His claim had been contested by another member of the Liu house—Liu Xuan, better known as Liu Gengshi—who had been actually enthroned for two years, until his death in the course of turbulent civil fighting. Chang'an had been virtually destroyed by warfare, and Guangwudi established his capital at Luoyang.

      The new emperor completed defeating rival aspirants to the throne in 36. As had occurred in Xi Han, dynastic establishment was followed by a period of internal consolidation rather than expansion. Guangwudi resumed the structure of government of the Xi Han emperors, together with the earlier coinage and system of taxation. The palace once more promoted the cause of scholarship. Eunuchs had come to the fore in the Han palace during Yuandi's reign, and several had succeeded in reaching powerful positions. Guangwudi's policy was to rid the government of such influences, together with that of the families of imperial consorts. Under Mingdi (57–75) and Zhangdi (75–88), China was once more strong enough to adopt a positive foreign policy and set Chinese armies on the march against the Xiongnu. To prevent incursions by the latter, and possibly to encourage the growth of trade, Han influence was again brought to bear in Central Asia. Chinese prestige reached its zenith around 90 and fell markedly after 125.

      Dynastic decline can be dated from the reign of Hedi (88–105/106), when the court once more came under the influence of consorts' families and eunuchs. The succession of emperors became a matter of dexterous manipulation designed to preserve the advantages of interested parties. The weakness of the throne can be judged from the fact that, of the 14 emperors of Dong Han, no less than 8 took the throne as boys aged between 100 days and 15 years. Factions gradually increased in number, and their members, like the families of imperial consorts and like the eunuchs, tended to place their own interests above those of the state.

      During the last 50 years of Dong Han, northern China became subject to invasion from different sides, and, as was observed by several philosopher-statesmen, the administration became corrupt and ineffective. Powerful regional officials were able to establish themselves almost independently of the central government. Rivalry between consorts' families and eunuchs led to a massacre of the latter in 189, and the rebel bands that arose included the Yellow Turbans, who were fired by beliefs in supernatural influences and led by inspired demagogues. Soldiers of fortune and contestants for power were putting troops in the field in their attempts to establish themselves as emperors of a single united China. By 207 the great Han general Cao Cao had gained control over the north, and, had he not been defeated by Sun Quan at the battle of the Red Cliff, which later became famous in Chinese literature, he might well have succeeded in establishing a single dynastic rule. Other participants in the fighting included Dong Zhou, Liu Bei, and Zhuge Liang. The situation was resolved in 220 when Cao Pi, son of Cao Cao, accepted an instrument of abdication from Xiandi, last of the Han emperors (acceded 189). Cao Pi duly became emperor of a dynasty styled Wei, whose territories stretched over the northern part of China and whose capital was at Luoyang. A year later, in 221, Liu Bei was declared emperor of the Shu-Han dynasty, thereby maintaining the fiction that as a member of the Liu family he was continuing its rule of the Han dynasty, albeit in the restricted regions of Shu in the southwest (capital at Chengdu). In the southeast there was formed the third of the Sanguo (Three Kingdoms (Three Kingdoms period)), as the period from 220 to 280 has come to be described. This was the kingdom of Wu, with its capital at Jianye, under the initial dispensation of Sun Quan.

The administration of the Han empire

The structure of government

The civil service
      One of the main contributions of the Han dynasty to the future of imperial China lay in the development of the civil service (Chinese civil service) and the structure of central and provincial government. The evolutionary changes that subsequently transformed Han polity beyond recognition were not directed at altering the underlying principles of government but at applying them expediently to the changing dynastic, political, social, and economic conditions of later centuries. One of the problems faced by Han governments was recruiting able and honest men to staff the civil service of an empire; those individuals eventually became known in the West as mandarins. Although the Chinese writing system had recently been reformed, which facilitated drafting documents, officials still needed considerable training before they attained sufficient competence. Much of the training occurred in local-level bureaus, where aspirants for imperial appointments served the equivalent of apprenticeships. Meritorious young men advanced from clerical positions to head various local bureaus. Having proved themselves in these positions, they were then eligible for recommendation or sponsorship, the standard means by which civil servants were recruited. Officials were invited to present candidates who possessed suitable qualities of intelligence and integrity, usually established in their service in local bureaus, and at certain regular intervals provincial units were ordered to send a quota of men to the capital. At times candidates were required to submit answers on questions of policy or administration. They might then be kept at the palace to act as advisers in attendance, or they might be given appointments in the central government or in the provinces, depending on their success. However, at that time there was no regular system of examination and appointment akin to what evolved during the Sui and Tang dynasties.

      The recruitment system was important for two reasons directly related to the nature and development of Han society. First, the apprenticeship system assured that entry into the imperial bureaucracy was based on administrative merit. Thus, men of little wealth could enter clerical positions and support themselves while preparing for higher-level careers. (This recruitment system differed strikingly from the later examination system that often required years of study in order to master the Confucian Classics and to develop writing skills.) Second, powerful families, increasingly in the Dong Han period, were able to dominate the clerical and other positions in the local bureaus, thereby limiting to those powerful families the candidates for imperial bureaucratic service. Control of local positions in turn strengthened the powerful families by allowing them to manipulate tax and census registers. Such families created the social milieu from which the aristocratic families of the post-Han period were to emerge.

      There was a total of 12 grades in the Han civil service, ranging from that of clerk to the most senior minister of state. No division in principle existed between men serving in the central offices or the provincial units. Promotion could be achieved from one grade of the service to the next, and in theory a man could rise from the humblest to the highest post. In theory and partly in practice, the structure of Han government was marked by an adherence to regular hierarchies of authority, by the division of specialist responsibilities, and by a duplication of certain functions. It was hoped that these measures would keep individual officials from accumulating excessive amounts of power. The uppermost stratum of officials or statesmen comprised the chancellor, the imperial counselor, and, sometimes, the commander in chief. These men acted as the emperor's highest advisers and retained final control over the activities of government. Responsibility was shared with nine ministers of state, who cared for matters such as religious cults, security of the palace, adjudication in criminal cases, diplomatic dealings with foreign leaders, and the collection and distribution of revenue. Each minister of state was supported by a department staffed by directors and subordinates. There were a few other major agencies, which ranked slightly below the nine ministries and were responsible for specialist tasks. Functions were duplicated so as to check the growth of power. Occasionally, for example, two chancellors were appointed concurrently. Similarly, financial matters were controlled by two permanent ministries: the Department of Agriculture and Revenue and the Privy Treasury.

      The foregoing structure of regular organs of government was known as the Outer Court. With the passage of time, it became balanced by the growth of a secondary seat of power known as the Inner Court. This grew up from members of the secretariat and had started as a subordinate agency in the Privy Treasury. The secretariat officials had acquired direct access to the emperor and could thus circumvent the more formal approaches that protocol required of other officials. The secretariat rose to prominence during the latter part of the 1st century BC and was at times staffed by eunuchs. Its members were sometimes distinguished by receiving privileged titles that conveyed a mark of imperial favour without specific administrative responsibility. The highest of these titles was that of supreme commander, and, when this title was accompanied by the right or the imperial instruction to assume leadership of the secretariat, the powers of the incumbent outweighed those of the highest ministers of the Outer Court. An official thus named could effectively control decisions of state, to the discomfiture of senior officials such as the chancellor. It was in this capacity that Wang Mang and his four predecessors had been able to assert their power without fear of check.

Provincial government
      At the outset of the Han dynasty, vast areas were entrusted as kingdoms to the emperor's kinsmen, while the central government administered the interior provinces as commanderies. But by about 100 BC the imperial government had deprived the kingdoms of their strength, and most of their lands had been incorporated as commanderies under the central government. Although the kingdoms survived in a much-reduced form until the end of the period, their administration came to differ less and less from that of the commanderies, which formed the regular provincial units. Each commandery was controlled by two senior officials, the governor and the commandant, who were appointed by the central government. Commanderies could be established at will: by dividing larger into smaller units, by taking over the lands of the kings, or by establishing organs of government in regions only recently penetrated by Chinese officials. Provincial government was not necessarily pervasive throughout the lands where commandery offices existed, but there was a steady advance in provincial government during the Han period. During Gaozu's reign 16 commanderies existed, but by the end of the Xi Han there were 83 commanderies and 20 kingdoms.

      Each of the commanderies consisted of some 10 or 20 prefectures, the size of which corresponded to that of English counties. The prefect's headquarters were situated in a walled town, from which his administration was extended and his officials were sent to collect taxes, settle disputes, or recruit able-bodied men for service. The prefectures were themselves subdivided into districts. The commanderies included a number of nobilities, the holders of which enjoyed a noble title and income from the taxes collected in them by central government officials. The nobles exercised no administrative, judicial, or other power over their nobilities. The number of nobilities varied considerably, sometimes totaling several hundred. The system was used as a political instrument for reducing the power of the kings, rewarding military officers and civil officials, and treating surrendered enemy leaders. Special arrangements were instituted for provincial government at the periphery of the empire. Agencies of a specialist nature were set up both there and in the provinces of the interior, with responsibilities for such matters as supervision of the salt and iron industries, manufacture of textiles, fruit growing, and sponsored agriculture, as well as control of passage in and out of the frontier.

      From 106 BC the government tried to supervise the work of provincial officials more directly. A total of 13 regional inspectors were appointed, with orders to visit the commanderies and kingdoms of a specified area and to report to the central government on the efficiency of officials, the degree of oppression or corruption, and the state of popular affection or disaffection. Although the arrangement was not yet tantamount to the creation of a limited number (about 20) of large provinces, such as came about from about the 13th century, it may have facilitated the establishment of separatist provincial regimes at times of dynastic decline.

The armed forces
 The command of the armed forces was also arranged so as to avoid giving excessive powers to a single individual. Officers equivalent to generals were usually appointed in pairs, and, in times of emergency or when a campaign was being planned with a defined objective, those officers were appointed for a specific task; when their mission was fulfilled, their commands were brought to a close. Beneath that level was a complement of colonels whose duties consisted of smaller-scale activities. In addition, the governors and commandants of the commanderies were sometimes ordered to lead forces. The commandants were also responsible for training conscript soldiers and setting them to maintain internal discipline and to man the static lines of defense in the north and northwest.

      The Han armies drew their recruits from conscripts, volunteers, and convicts. Conscripts, who formed the majority, were obliged to serve for two years, either under training or on active service. This duty devolved on all able-bodied males other than those who had acquired privileges of rank or those who could pay for substitutes. The latter practice was probably rare. In addition, men were liable for recall to the armed forces in times of emergency. Volunteers were the sons of privileged families and probably served as cavalrymen, and convicts were sometimes drafted to work out their terms of sentence in the army. There is ample evidence to show that Han commanders used to draw on Central Asian tribesmen as recruits, and the tribesmen were particularly valuable as skilled cavalrymen. A number of foreigners also served with distinction as officers. While little is known of the organization of armies on campaign, garrison forces were divided into separate commands consisting of perhaps four companies. Each company had a strength of some 40 or 50 sections, each of which comprised one officer and up to five men.

The practice of government
      As the final arbiter of power, the emperor—and at times the empress dowager—issued edicts declaring the imperial will. Such instructions often took the form of repeating officials' proposals with a note of approval. Some edicts were couched as comments on the current situation and called in general terms for an improvement in the quality of government or for more-vigorous attempts to achieve a just administration. The emperor also issued formal deeds of investiture to kings or noblemen and letters of appointment for senior officials. Edicts were circulated to the relevant authorities for action, together with books of other regulations such as the statutes and ordinances, laying down entitlements for services rendered to the state and penalties for infringing its prohibitions. Officials could suggest methods of government by submitting written memorials, and there were occasions when an emperor called a conference of senior statesmen and asked their views on topical problems.

      The Han governments regularly issued calendars to enable the court to follow a cosmically correct ritual schedule and officials to maintain their records correctly. Regular means of transport were kept for the use of officials traveling on business and for the conveyance of official mail from one office to another. Provincial and local officials were responsible for two regular counts without which government could not proceed: the census of the population and the register of the land and its production. Returns, which were submitted for the number of households and individuals and for land under cultivation, eventually found their way to the capital. One count that has been preserved records the existence of some 12,233,000 households and 59,595,000 individuals in AD 2. Two other main forms of revenue collection were the land tax (taxation) and the poll tax. The land tax was levied in kind at a 30th (sometimes a 15th) part of the produce, the assessment depending partly on the quality of the land. Poll tax was usually paid in cash and varied with the age and sex of the members of the household. Other taxes were levied in respect to wealth and by means of property assessments.

      In addition to service in the army, able-bodied males were expected to provide one month's service annually in the state labour corps; tasks included building palaces and imperial mausoleums, transporting staple goods such as grain and hemp, and constructing roads and bridges. Sometimes conscript labour was used to repair breaches in riverbanks or dikes, and men were sent to work in the salt and iron industries after these were taken over by the state.

      The establishment of state monopolies for salt and iron was one of several measures taken in Wudi's reign to bring China's resources under the control of the government. Agencies were set up about 117 BC to supervise mining, manufacturing, and distribution and to raise revenue in the process. The measure was criticized on the grounds of both principle and expedience and was withdrawn for three years from 44 BC, and by the mid-1st century AD the industries had in practice reverted to private hands. Final measures to standardize the coinage (coin) and to limit minting to state agencies were taken in 112 BC, and, with the exception of Wang Mang's experiments, the copper coin of a single denomination, minted from Wudi's reign onward, remained the standard medium of exchange. Little is known of the work of other agencies established in Xi Han to stabilize the prices of staple commodities and to regulate their transport. Such measures had been the answer of Wudi's government to the problem of moving goods from an area of surplus to one of shortage.

      The government ordered migrations of the population for several reasons. At times, such a migration was intended to populate an area artificially—the city of Xianyang during the Qin dynasty, for example, and the state-sponsored farms of the borderlands. Alternatively, if the defense of the periphery was impractical, the population was sometimes moved away from danger, and distressed folk were moved to areas where they could find a more prosperous way of life.

      From about 100 BC it was evident to some statesmen that great disparities of wealth existed and that this was most noticeable in respect of landownership. Some philosophers looked back nostalgically to an ideal state in which land was said to have been allotted and held on a basis of equality, thereby eliminating the wide differences between rich and poor. It was only in Wang Mang's time that an attempt was made to abolish private landownership and private slaveholding. But the attempt failed because of powerful economic and social opposition, and the accumulation of land continued during Dong Han. In the last half century or so of the dynasty, country estates acquired retainers and armed defenders, almost independently of the writ of government. The great families thus came to exercise more power than appointed officials of state.

      The Han government, like the Qin, ruled by dispensing rewards for service and exacting punishment for disobedience and crime. Rewards consisted of exemptions from tax; bounties of gold, meat, spirits, or silk; amnesties for criminals; and orders of honour. The latter were bestowed either individually or to groups. There was a ranked scale of 20 degrees, and, after receiving several of these awards cumulatively, one could rise to the eighth place in the scale. The more-senior orders were given for specified acts of valour, charity, or good administration, usually to officials, and the highest order was the rank of nobility. In addition to conferring social status, the orders carried with them legal privileges and freedom from some tax and service obligations.

      In theory, the laws (law code) of Han were binding on all members of the population, and some incidents testify to the punishment of the highest in the land. But some privileged persons were able to get their sentences mitigated. Nobles, for example, could ransom themselves from most punishments by forfeiting their nobilities. Han laws specified a variety of crimes, including those of a social nature such as murder or theft, those that infringed the imperial majesty, and those that were classed as gross immorality. There was a regular procedure for impeachment and trial, and some difficult cases could be referred to the emperor for a final decision. The punishments to which criminals were sentenced included exile, hard labour, flogging, castration, and death. In the most heinous cases the death sentence was carried out publicly, but senior officials and members of the imperial family were usually allowed to avoid such a scene by committing suicide. When the death penalty was invoked, a criminal's goods, including members of his family, were confiscated by the state. Such persons then became slaves of the state and were employed on menial or domestic tasks in government offices. Government slaves were sometimes given as rewards to meritorious officials.

Relations with other peoples
 Simultaneously with the rise of the Qin and Han empires, some of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia, known as the Xiongnu, succeeded in achieving a measure of unity under a single leader. As a result, while the Chinese were consolidating their government, the lands lying to the north of the empire—and the northern provinces themselves—became subject to incursion by Xiongnu horsemen. One of the achievements of the Qin dynasty had been the unification of the several lines of defense into a single system of fortification, the Great Wall (Great Wall of China). By keeping that wall, or line of earthworks, manned, the Qin dynasty had been free of invasion. With the fall of Qin and China's subsequent weakness, the wall fell into a state of disrepair and lacked a garrison. Until about 135 BC, Han governments were obliged to seek peaceful relations with the Xiongnu at the price of gold, silk, and even the hand of a Chinese princess. However, as Wudi's governments began establishing strong policies, China took the offensive in an attempt to throw back the Xiongnu to Central Asia and to free the northern provinces from the threat of invasion and violence. By 119 BC, campaigns fought to the north of Chinese territory had attained this objective, and after a short interval it was possible to send Han armies to advance in the northeast (present-day North Korea), the south (present-day Vietnam), and the southwest. As a result of the campaigns fought from 135 BC onward, 18 additional commanderies were founded, and organs of Han provincial government were installed as outposts among peoples who were unassimilated to a Chinese way of life.

      Chinese government was by no means universally accepted in those outlying regions. But despite large losses and expenditures incurred in fighting the Xiongnu, the Chinese were able to mount expeditions into Central Asia from about 112 BC. The defensive walls were repaired and remanned, and by about 100 they were extended to the northwest as far as Dunhuang. Chinese travelers, whether diplomats or merchants, were thus protected as far as the Takla Makan Desert. It was at about that time that trade routes skirting the desert were established and came to be known collectively as the Silk Road.

      The success of Chinese arms in those remote areas was short-lived. Long lines of communication made it impossible to set up garrisons or colonies in the forbidding country to the west of Dunhuang. Diplomatic moves were made to implant Chinese prestige more firmly among the communities that were situated around the Takla Makan Desert and that controlled the oases; it was necessary for the Chinese to win those peoples' support, thus denying it to the Xiongnu. In a few cases the Chinese resorted to violence or plots to remove a leader and to replace him with a candidate known to favour the Han cause. More commonly, one of the alien leaders was married to a Chinese princess, with the intention that he should in time be succeeded by an heir who was half-Chinese. These endeavours and the military ventures met with partial success. While the Chinese position in Central Asia was subject to question, relations with the Xiongnu leaders varied. The visit of a Xiongnu leader to Chang'an in 51 BC was hailed as a mark of Chinese success, but the ensuing decades were not free from fighting. Chinese prestige declined toward the end of the Xi Han and recovered only during the reigns of Mingdi and Zhangdi, when the Han government was once more strong enough to take the field. Ban Chao's campaigns in Central Asia (from AD 94) reestablished the Chinese position, but again the full strength of Chinese prestige lasted for only a few decades. During the Dong Han, China suffered invasion from the northeast as well as from the north. The settlement of Xiongnu peoples south of the wall was a disruptive factor in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, to the detriment of imperial unity.

      The Han expansion into Central Asia has been represented by the Chinese as a defensive measure designed to weaken the Xiongnu and to free China from invasion. Allowance must also be made for commercial motives. Some of Wudi's statesmen were well aware of the advantages of exporting China's surplus products in return for animals and animal products from Central Asia, and there is evidence that Chinese silk was exported at this time. No attempt can be made to estimate the volume of trade, and, as the transactions were conducted through Parthian middlemen, no direct contact was made by this means between Han China and the world of Rome and the Mediterranean. China's export trade was sponsored by the government and not entrusted to private merchants.

      The Great Wall formed a boundary separating the Chinese provinces from the outside world. Traffic was controlled at points of access, not only to check incoming travelers to China but also to prevent the escape of criminals or deserters. At the same time, a ban was imposed on the export of certain goods such as iron manufactures and weapons of war. The wall also formed a protected causeway for travelers to the west. Watch stations were erected in sight of each other to signal the approach of the enemy, and the garrison troops were highly trained and disciplined. Meticulous records were kept to show how government stores were expended and rations issued; routine signals were relayed along the line and daily patrols were sent out to reconnoitre.

      As a result of the campaigns and diplomatic activity, China's immediate contacts with other peoples grew more brisk. Many of the Xiongnu and other neighbouring leaders who had surrendered to Han arms were given nobilities and settled in the interior of the empire. Zhang Qian was a pioneer who had set out about 130 BC to explore the routes into Central Asia and northern China, and, as a result of his report and observations, Han advances were concentrated in the northwest. In AD 97 Chinese envoys were frustrated in an attempt to visit the western part of the world, but a mission from Rome (ancient Rome) reached China by ship in 166. The first record of official visitors arriving at the Han court from Japan is for the year AD 57.

Cultural developments
 The Han emperors and governments posed as having a temporal dispensation that had received the blessing of heaven together with its instructions to spread the benefits of a cultured life as widely as possible. By a cultured life the Chinese had in mind a clear distinction between their own settled agriculture and the delights of the cities, as opposed to the rough and hardy life spent in the saddle by the nomads of Central Asia. The growth of Han government both depended on and encouraged the development of literary accomplishment, scholastic competence, religious activity, scientific discovery, and technological achievement.

      Han administration required detailed record keeping, which generated a proliferation of documents. Official returns were sometimes kept in duplicate, and each agency kept running files to record its business. Following a reform of the script that had evolved before the Han period, a new style of writing was developed that was suited to compiling official documents. These were written mostly on bulky and fragile wooden strips; silk was also used as a writing medium. A major development in world history occurred in China in AD 105 when officials reported to the throne the manufacture of a new substance. Although archaeological evidence indicates the existence of paper for more than a century before this incident, the earlier materials were not completely superseded until some three or four centuries later. In the meantime, the written vocabulary of the Chinese had increased in response to the demands of a growing civilization. The first Chinese dictionary, completed in AD 121, included more than 9,000 separate ideograms (characters), with explanations of their meanings and the variant forms used in writing.

      In an attempt to break with earlier tradition, the Qin government had taken certain steps to proscribe literature and learning. Han governments stressed their desire to promote these causes as part of their mission. In particular, they displayed a veneration for works with which Confucius had been associated, either as a collector of texts or as an editor. Beginning during the reign of Wendi, orders were given to search for books lost during the previous dynasty. Knowledge of texts such as the Shijing (“Classic of Poetry”), the Shujing (“Classic of History”), the Yijing (“Classic of Changes”), and the Chunqiu (“Spring and Autumn”) annals became a necessary accomplishment for officials and candidates for the civil service. To support an argument laid before the throne, statesmen would find a relevant quotation from these works; already in the 1st century BC the tradition was being formed whereby the civil service of imperial China was nurtured on a Classical education. On two occasions (51 BC and AD 79) the government ordered official discussions about interpreting texts and the validity of differing versions; in AD 175 work was completed on a project that inscribed an approved version on stone tablets, so as to allay scholastic doubts in the future. In the meantime—and still before the invention of paper—a collection of literary texts had been made for the imperial library. The catalog of this collection, which dates from the early 1st century AD, was prepared after comparing different copies and eliminating duplicates. The list of titles has been preserved and constitutes China's first bibliographical list. The works are classified according to subject, but many have been lost. The importance of these measures lies both in their intrinsic achievement and in the example they set for subsequent dynasties.

      The prose style (Chinese literature) of Han writers was later taken as a model of simplicity, and, as a reaction to the literary embellishments and artificialities introduced in the 5th and 6th centuries, deliberate attempts were made to revert to its natural elegance. Examples of this direct prose may be seen in the imperial edicts, the memorials ascribed to statesmen, and, above all, the text of the standard histories themselves, in which such documents of state were incorporated. Compiling the standard histories was a private undertaking in Han times, but it already received imperial patronage and assistance. History was written partly to justify the authority and conduct of the contemporary regime and partly as a matter of pride in Chinese achievement. Further examples of prose writing are the descriptions of protocol for the court. One of the earliest acts of the Han government (c. 200 BC) had been to order the formulation of such modes of behaviour as a means of enhancing the dignity of the throne, and one of the latest compilations (c. AD 175) that still survives is a list of such prescriptions, drawn up at a time when the dynasty was manifestly losing its majesty and natural authority. Some of the emperors were themselves composers of versified prose; their efforts have also been preserved in the standard histories.

      The emperor was charged with the solemn duty of securing the blessings of spiritual powers for mankind. One of the nine ministries of state existed to assist in this work of mediation, but from the time of Wudi onward the emperor himself began to play a more active part in worship and sacrifice. The cults were initially addressed to the Five Elements (fire, water, earth, wood, and metal), to the Supreme Unity, and to the Lord of the Soil. In 31 BC these cults were replaced by sacrifices dedicated to heaven and earth. The sites of worship were transferred to the southern and northern outskirts of Chang'an, and a new series of altars and shrines was inaugurated. The Han emperor occasionally paid his respects to supreme powers and reported on the state of the dynasty at the summit of Mount Tai. Wudi's desire for immortality and for quickening his deceased favourites led him to patronize a number of intermediaries who claimed to possess the secret of making contact with the world of the immortals. From such beliefs and from a fear of the malevolent influences that the unappeased souls of the dead could wreak on humanity, a few philosophers such as Wang Chong (AD 27–c. 100) reacted by propounding an ordered and rational explanation of the universe. But their skepticism received little support. Sometime during the 1st century AD, Buddhism reached China, propagated in all probability by travelers who had taken the Silk Road from northern India. Shortly thereafter Buddhist foundations were established in China, as well as the first official patronage of the faith. From the 2nd century AD there arose a variety of beliefs, practices, and disciplines from which alchemy and scientific experiment were to spring and which were to give rise to Daoism.

      Most of the cultural attainments of the Han period derived from imperial encouragement and the needs of officials. A textbook of mathematical problems was probably compiled to assist officials in work such as land assessment; fragments of a medical casebook were concerned with the care of troops and horses serving on the northwestern frontier. Water clocks and sundials were used to enable officials to complete their work on schedule. The palace demanded the services of artists and craftsmen to decorate imperial buildings with paintings and sculptures and to design and execute jades, gold and silver wares, and lacquer bowls for use at the imperial table. Intricate patterns in multicoloured silks were woven on looms in the imperial workshops. On a more mundane level, technology served the cause of practical government. The state's ironwork factories produced precision-made instruments and weapons of war, and the state's agencies for the salt industry supervised the recovery of brine from deep shafts cut in the rocks of western China. Water engineers planned the construction of dikes to divert the flow of excess waters and the excavation of canals to serve the needs of transport or irrigation, and in many parts of the countryside there could be seen a sight that remained typical of the Chinese landscape up to the 20th century—a team of two or three peasants sitting astride a beam and pedaling the lugs of the “dragon's backbone” that raised water from the sluggish channels below to the upper levels of the cultivated land.

Jack L. Dull Ed.

Political developments

The division of China

Sanguo ( Three Kingdoms; AD 220–280)
      By the end of the 2nd century AD the Han empire had virtually ceased to exist. The repression of the Daoist rebellions of the Yellow Turbans and related sects marked the beginning of a period of unbridled warlordism and political chaos, from which three independent centres of political power emerged. In the north all authority had passed into the hands of the generalissimo and “protector of the dynasty,” Cao Cao; in AD 220 the last puppet emperor of the Han officially ceded the throne to Cao Cao's son, who thereby became the legitimate heir of the empire and the first ruler of the Wei dynasty. Soon afterward, two competing military leaders proclaimed themselves emperor, one in the far interior (Shu-Han dynasty, in the present-day Sichuan province) and one in the south, behind the formidable barrier of the Yangtze River (the empire of Wu, with its capital at Jianye, present-day Nanjing (Nanking)). The short and turbulent period of these “ Three Kingdoms” (Sanguo), filled with bloody warfare and diplomatic intrigue, has ever since been glorified in Chinese historical fiction as an age of chivalry and individual heroism.

      In fact, even Wei, the strongest of the three, hardly represented any real political power. The great socioeconomic changes that had started in the Dong (Eastern) Han period had transformed the structure of society to such an extent that all attempts to reestablish the centralized bureaucratic state—the ideal of the Qin and Han dynasties—were doomed to failure. While central authority declined, the great families—aristocratic clans of large landowners—survived the decades of civil war on their fortified estates under the protection of their private armies of serfs and clients and even increased their power. These conditions were to remain characteristic of medieval China. The Han system of recruiting officials on the basis of talent was replaced by a network of personal relations and patronage. The hierarchy of state officials and government institutions was never abolished, but it became monopolized by a few aristocratic clans who filled the highest offices with their own members and the minor posts with their clients.

      Wei succeeded in conquering Shu-Han in 263/264, but two years later a general of the dominant Sima clan overthrew the house of Wei (265/266) and in 265 founded the first of two dynasties under the name Jin (Jin dynasty): the Xi (Western) Jin (Xi Jin). Wu, however, was able to maintain itself until 280, when it was overrun by the Jin armies.

      The role of Wu was extremely important: it marked the beginning of the progressive Sinicization of the region south of the Yangtze River, which before that time had been a frontier area inhabited mainly by non-Chinese tribal peoples. The rise of Jianye (renamed Jiankang during Jin times) as a great administrative and cultural centre on the lower Yangtze paved the way for future developments: after the north was lost to barbarian invaders (311), it was to become the capital of Chinese successor states and an important locus of Chinese culture for more than 250 years.

The Xi (Western) Jin (AD 265–316/317)
      The Xi Jin was a period of relative order and prosperity, a short interlude between the turbulent age of the Sanguo and the devastating barbarian invasions. The empire had been nominally reunited (AD 280), and for a short time the central government attempted important fiscal and political reforms, mainly intended to curb the great families that threatened the ruler's authority. Contacts with the oasis kingdoms of Central Asia and the Indianized states of the far south (Funan and Champa) were resumed, and in 285 the Jin court even sent an envoy to distant Fergana in Central Asia to confer the title of king on its ruler—a grand imperial gesture reminiscent of the great days of Han. But this ghost of the Han empire disappeared almost as soon as it had been evoked. Within two decades the Jin disintegrated through the struggles of rival clans. There followed an internecine war between the various Sima princes, collapse of the central government, decentralized military control of the provinces, famine, large-scale banditry, and messianic peasant movements.

The era of barbarian invasions and rule
      For the first time the power vacuum was filled by non-Chinese forces. In 304 a Sinicized Xiongnu chieftain, Liu Yuan, assumed the title of king of Han and started the conquest of northern China. Operating from bases in western and southern Shanxi, the Xiongnu armies, supported by local Chinese rebels, conquered the ancient homeland of Chinese civilization; the fall and destruction of the two capitals, Luoyang (311) and Chang'an (316), ended Chinese dynastic rule in the north for centuries. Although in the far northeast, in present-day Gansu, and in the inaccessible interior (Sichuan), Chinese local kingdoms did occasionally succeed in maintaining themselves for some time, the whole North China Plain itself became the scene of a bewildering variety of barbarian states, collectively known in Chinese historiography as the Shiliuguo (Sixteen Kingdoms).

The Dong (Eastern) Jin (Dong Jin) (317–420) and later dynasties in the south (420–589)
      During the entire medieval period the lower Yangtze region—the former territory of Wu—remained the stronghold of a series of “legitimate” Chinese dynasties, with Jiankang as their capital. In 317 a member of the Jin imperial family had set up a refugee regime at Jiankang, consisting mainly of members of the exiled northern aristocracy. From the beginning the Jin court was completely at the mercy of the great landowning families. Government in the Chinese south became a kind of oligarchy exercised by ever-changing groups and juntas of aristocratic clans. The so-called Six Dynasties were politically and militarily weak and constantly plagued by internal feuds and revolts. (The six were actually five—Dong Jin, 317–420; Liu-Song, 420–479; Nan [Southern] Qi, 479–502; Nan Liang, 502–557; and Nan Chen, 557–589—and all but Dong Jin are also known as Nanchao [ Southern Dynasties] in Chinese history; the earlier kingdom of Wu, 222–280, is counted as the sixth dynasty.) Their annihilation (in 589) was postponed only by the internal division of the north and by the protection afforded by the Yangtze. To the very end, their opposition to the north remained alive, but occasional attempts to reconquer the ancient homeland were doomed to failure. The final reunification of China was to start from the northern plains, not from Jiankang.

      Although politically insecure, these dynasties were characterized by cultural brilliance: in literature, art, philosophy, and religion, they constituted one of the most creative periods in Chinese history. They reached their highest flowering under the long and relatively stable reign of the great protector of Buddhism, Wudi (reigned 502–549), the first emperor of the Nan Liang dynasty.

The Shiliuguo (Sixteen Kingdoms) in the north (303–439)
 The term Sixteen Kingdoms traditionally denotes the plethora of short-lived non-Chinese dynasties that from 303 came to rule the whole or parts of northern China. Many ethnic groups were involved, including ancestors of the Turks (such as the Xiongnu, possibly related to the Huns of late Roman history, and the Jie), the Mongolians (Xianbei), and the Tibetans (Di and Qiang). Most of these nomadic peoples, relatively few in number, had to some extent been Sinicized long before their ascent to power. Some of them—notably the Qiang and the Xiongnu—actually had been allowed to live in the frontier regions within the Great Wall since late Han times.

      The barbarian rulers thus set up semi-Sinicized states, in which the foreign element constituted a military aristocracy and the nucleus of the armed forces. Since they lacked experience in administrative matters and since their own tribal institutions were not adapted to the complicated task of ruling a large agrarian society, they had to make use of traditional Chinese ways of government. In doing so, they faced the dilemma that has ever since confronted foreign rulers on Chinese soil: the tension that existed between the need to preserve their own ethnic identity (and their position as herrenvolk) on the one hand and on the other the practical necessity of using Chinese literati and members of prominent Chinese families in order to rule at all. In spite of various and sometimes highly interesting experiments, most of these short-lived empires did not survive this tension. Significantly, the only one that proved to have more lasting power and that was able to unify the whole of northern China—the Tuoba, or Bei (Northern) Wei (Wei dynasty) (386–534/535)—was largely Sinicized within a century. In the late 5th century the court even forbade the use of the original Tuoba language, dress, customs, and surnames. This policy of conscious acculturation was further symbolized by the transfer of the Bei Wei capital from the northern frontier region to the ancient imperial residence of Luoyang.

      Thus, toward the end of the period of division, the north had become more homogeneous as the result of a long process of adaptation. The most important factor in this process may have been the rehabilitation of the Chinese agrarian economy under the Bei Wei, stimulated by fiscal reform and redistribution of land (c. AD 500). The landed gentry again became the backbone of society, and the rulers of nomadic origin simply had to conform to their way of life. Another factor was the perceived intrinsic superiority of Chinese upper-class culture: in order to play the role of the “son of heaven,” the leaders of the barbarian court had to adopt the complicated rules of Chinese ritual and etiquette. Likewise, in order to surround themselves with an aura of legitimacy, the foreign conquerors had to express themselves in terms of Chinese culture. In doing so, they invariably lost their own identity. History has constantly repeated itself: in this respect the 4th- and 5th-century Jie and Tuoba were but the forerunners of the Qing, or Manchu, rulers in the 19th century.

      In the early 6th century the Wei was divided between the Sinicized court and a faction of the nobility desperate to preserve its Tuoba identity. Soon after 520 the Wei empire disintegrated into rival northeastern and northwestern successor states. Northern China again became a battlefield for several decades. The Bei (Northern) Zhou (557–581), strategically based in the rich basin of the Wei River, reunified the north (577). Four years later Yang Jian (better known by his posthumous name, Wendi), a general of mixed Chinese and barbarian descent (but claiming to be a pure-blooded Chinese), usurped the throne and founded the Sui dynasty. In 589, having consolidated his regime, he crossed the Yangtze River and overthrew the last of the Chinese dynasties at Jiankang. After almost four centuries of division and political decay, China was again united under one central government, which, in spite of its short duration, would lay the foundation of the great Tang empire.

Intellectual and religious trends

Confucianism and philosophical Daoism
      The social and political upheaval of the late 2nd and the 3rd century AD was accompanied by intense intellectual activity. During the Han period, Confucianism had been slowly adopted as an ideology and had gradually come to provide the officially accepted norms, morals, and ritual and social behaviour regulating the relations between ruler and subject.

      By the beginning of the 3rd century, however, Confucianism had lost its prestige: it had obviously failed to save the empire from disintegration or to safeguard the privileges of the ruling elite. Disappointed members of the scholar-official class started to look elsewhere. Thus, various all-but-forgotten schools of thought were revived in the 3rd century: Legalism, with its insistence on harsh measures, intended to reestablish law and order; Mohism and the ancient school of Logicians (Dialecticians); and, above all, a renewed interest in Daoism and its earliest philosophers, Laozi and Zhuangzi. In general, this movement did not mean a return to ancient Daoist quietism and consequently a rejection of Confucianism. With the breakdown of the elaborate scholastic doctrine that had formed the official Han ideology, Confucianism had been deprived of its metaphysical superstructure, and this vacuum was now filled by a whole set of philosophical ideas and speculations, largely of Daoist provenance.

      Within this movement, two trends came to dominate the intellectual life of the cultured minority. One of these was closely related to the practical affairs of government and stressed the importance of social duties, ritual, law, and the study of human characteristics. This mixture of Confucian and Legalist notions was called mingjiao, “the doctrine of names” (“names” in ancient Confucian parlance designating the various social functions—father, ruler, subject, etc.—that an individual could have in society). The other trend was marked by a profound interest in ontological and metaphysical problems: the quest for a permanent substratum (called ti, “substance”) behind the world of change (called yong, “function”). It started from the assumption that all temporally and spatially limited phenomena—anything “nameable”; all movement, change, and diversity; in short, all “being”—is produced and sustained by one impersonal principle, which is unlimited, unnameable, unmoving, unchanging, and undiversified. This important movement, which found its scriptural support both in Daoist and in drastically reinterpreted Confucian sources, was known as Xuanxue (“Dark Learning”); it came to reign supreme in cultural circles, especially at Jiankang during the period of division, and represented the more abstract, unworldly, and idealistic tendency in early medieval Chinese thought.

      The proponents of Xuanxue undoubtedly still regarded themselves as true Confucians. To them, Confucius was not simply the great teacher who had fixed the rules of social behaviour for all time but was the enlightened sage who had inwardly recognized the ultimate reality but had kept silent about it in his worldly teachings, knowing that these mysteries could not be expressed in words. Hence, his doctrine was supposed to be an expedient, a mere set of ad hoc rules intended to answer the practical needs of the times. This concept of “hidden saintliness” and the “expedient” character of the canonical teachings came to play a very important role in upper-class Buddhism.

      Xuanxue is sometimes referred to by the term Neo-Daoism, but this confuses the issue. It was both created by and intended for literati and scholar-officials—not Daoist masters and hermits. The theories of such thinkers as Ji Kang (224–262)—who, with their quest for immortality and their extreme antiritualism, were much nearer to the spirit of Daoism—hardly belong to the sphere of Xuanxue, and the greatest Daoist author of this period, Ge Hong (Ko Hung) (c. 283–343), was clearly opposed to these mystic speculations.

      The popularity of Xuanxue was closely related to the practice of “pure conversation” (qingtan), a special type of philosophical discourse much in vogue among the cultured upper class from the 3rd century onward. In the earliest phase, the main theme of such discussion—a highly formalized critique of the personal qualities of well-known contemporaries—still had a concrete function in political life (“characterization” of persons was the basis of recommendation of clients for official posts and had largely taken the place of the earlier methods of selection of officials by court examinations). By the 4th century, however, qingtan meetings had evaporated into a refined and highly exclusive pastime of the aristocratic elite, a kind of salon in which “eloquent gentlemen” expressed some philosophical or artistic theme in elegant and abstruse words. It is obvious that much of Xuanxue had become divorced from the realities of life and afforded an escape from it.

      True Confucianism had thus lost much of its influence. In the north the not-yet-Sinicized barbarian rulers were interested in Confucianism mainly as a system of court ritual; ideologically, they were more attracted by the magical powers of Buddhist and Daoist masters. In the south the disillusioned aristocratic exiles, doomed by circumstances to lead a life of elegant inactivity, had little use for a doctrine that preached the duties of government and the regulation of human society as its highest goals, although many families preserved Confucian learning and clung to Confucian mores. In this period of internal division and political weakness, Confucianism had to hibernate; soon after the Sui had reunited the empire, it would wake up again.

      The suppression of the Yellow Turbans and other Daoist religious movements in AD 184 had left Daoism decapitated. With the elimination of its highest leadership, the movement had fallen apart into many small religious communities, each led by a local Daoist master (daoshi), assisted by a council of wealthy Daoist laity. Under such circumstances, local Daoist masters could easily become leaders of independent sectarian movements. They could also, in times of unrest, use their charismatic power to play a leading part in local rebellions. In the early medieval period, Daoism at the grassroots level continued to play this double role: it had an integrating function by providing spiritual consolation and ritualized forms of communal activity, but it could also be a disintegrating factor as a potential source of subversive movements. The authorities naturally were well aware of this. Daoist rebellions periodically broke out during this time, and, although some masters occasionally became influential at court, the governments, both northern and southern, maintained a cautious reserve toward the Daoist religion. It was never stimulated and patronized to an extent comparable to Buddhism.

      It would be wrong to speak of Daoism as a popular religion. Daoism counted its devotees even among the highest nobility. In view of the expensive ceremonies, the costly ingredients used in Daoist alchemy (notably cinnabar), and the almost unlimited amount of spare time required from the serious practitioner, one may assume that only the well-to-do were able to follow the road toward salvation. But they were mostly individual seekers; in the 3rd and 4th centuries a distinction gradually grew between individual (and mainly upper-class) Daoism and the popular, collective creed of the simple devotees. In fact, Daoism has always been a huge complex of many different beliefs, cults, and practices. Most of these can be traced to Dong Han times, and after the 3rd century they were influenced increasingly by Buddhism.

      The basic ideal of Daoist religion—the attainment of bodily immortality in a kind of indestructible “astral body” and the realization of the state of xian (hsien), or Daoist “immortal”—remained alive. It was to be pursued by a series of individual practices: dietary control, gymnastics, good deeds, and meditation and visualization of the innumerable gods and spirits that were supposed to dwell inside the microcosmos of the body. Renowned literati, such as the poet Ji Kang and the calligrapher Wang Xizhi (c. 303–c. 361), devoted much of their lives to such practices. They combined various methods, ranging from mystic self-identification with the all-embracing Dao to the use of charms and experiments in alchemy.

      The development of Daoism seems to have reached a new stage during the 4th century. An ancient school of esoteric learning already existed at that time in southern China, exemplified by Ge Hong. The retreat of the Jin to southern China in the early 4th century brought to that region the organized religion and priesthood that had arisen in the north and west during the Dong Han. In that context, new priestly cults arose in the south. Their teachings were connected with a series of revelations, the first through Yang Xi, which led to the formation first of the Shangqing sect and later to the rival Lingbao sect. By the end of the period of division, Daoism had its own canons of scriptural writings, much influenced by Buddhist models but forming a quite independent religious tradition.

      The other, collective, and more popular form of Daoism, practiced in the communities throughout the country, was characterized by communal ceremonies (ritual) (zhai, “fasting sessions,” and chu, “banquets”) held by groups of Daoist families under the guidance of the local master, both on fixed dates and on special occasions. The purpose of such meetings was to collectively eliminate sins (evil deeds being considered as the main cause of sickness and premature death) through incantations, deafening music, fasting, and by displaying penance and remorse. The gatherings sometimes lasted several days and nights, and, according to the indignant reports of their Buddhist adversaries, they were ecstatic and sometimes even orgiastic. The allegation of sexual excesses and promiscuity may have been stimulated by the fact that both men and women took part in Daoist meetings, a practice unknown in Confucian and Buddhist ritual.

      The Daoist community as an organization and the daoshi who led it relied on two sources of income: the gifts made by devotee families at ceremonial gatherings and the regular “heavenly tax,” or yearly contribution of five bushels of rice, which every family was expected to pay on the seventh day of the seventh month. The office of daoshi was hereditary, within one family; in the early centuries Daoist priests usually married. Because Buddhist influence also increased at this humble level, however, the daoshi increasingly came to resemble the Buddhist clergy, especially since most Daoist priests, at least from the 5th century onward, went to live in Daoist monasteries with their wives and children. In the 6th century, when Buddhism became paramount, some Daoist leaders introduced celibacy; in Sui times the unmarried state had become general, and the Daoist clergy with its monks and nuns had evolved into a counterpart of the Buddhist sangha. Unlike Buddhist monasteries, the Daoist monasteries and clergy never developed great economic power.

      In spite of their resemblance to each other—or perhaps because of it—the two creeds were bitterly opposed throughout the period. Daoist masters were often involved in anti-Buddhist propaganda and persecution. As an answer to Buddhist claims of superiority, Daoist masters even developed the curious theory that the Buddha had been only a manifestation of Laozi, who had preached to the Indians a debased form of Daoism, which naturally should not be reintroduced into China; this theme can be traced in Buddhist and Daoist polemic literature from the 4th to the 13th century.

      The Buddhist age of China began in the 4th century. Several factors contributed to the extraordinary expansion and absorption of the foreign religion after about 300, both in the Chinese south and in the occupied north. A negative factor was the absence of a unified Confucian state, which naturally would have been inclined to suppress a creed whose basic tenets (notably, the monastic life and the pursuit of individual salvation outside family and society) were clearly opposed to the ideals of Confucianism. The popularity of Xuanxue was a positive and powerful factor. Especially in the south, Mahayana Buddhism, thoroughly amalgamated with Xuanxue, was preached by cultured monks in the circles of the Jiankang aristocracy, where it became extremely popular.

      Another stimulus for the growth of Buddhism was the relative security and prosperity of monastic life. In a countryside devastated by war and rebellion, innumerable small peasants preferred to give up their independence and to avoid the scourges of heavy taxation, forced labour, and deportation by joining the large estates of the nobility as serfs, where they would get at least a minimum of protection. This process of tax evasion that consequently extended the manorial system also stimulated the growth of Buddhist monasteries (monastery) as landowning institutions, peopled with both monks and families of hereditary temple serfs. By the beginning of the 6th century, the monasteries had become an economic power of the first order, which, moreover, enjoyed special privileges (e.g., exemption from taxes). This, indeed, became a main source of tension between clergy and government (church and state) and occasionally led to anti-Buddhist movements and harsh restrictive measures imposed on Buddhism (446–452 and again in 574–578).

      The monastic life attracted many members of the gentry as well. In these times of turmoil, the official career was beset with dangers, and the monastery offered a hiding place to literati who tried to keep clear of the intrigues and feuds of higher official circles; thus, the ancient Chinese ideal of the retired scholar merged with the new Buddhist ideal of the monastic life. Many large monasteries thereby became centres of learning and culture and so became even more attractive to members of minor gentry families, for whom the higher posts in government in any event would be unattainable. Buddhist institutions offered a kind of “internal democracy”—a fact of great social importance in the history of class-ridden medieval China.

      Finally, Buddhism was patronized by most of the barbarian rulers in the north. At first they were attracted mainly by the pomp and magical power of Buddhist ritual. Later other motivations were added to this. Unwilling to rely too much on Chinese ministers, with their following of clan members and clients, they preferred to make use of Buddhist masters, who as unmarried individuals totally depended on the ruler's favour. Ideologically, Buddhism was less “Chinese” than Confucianism, especially in the north, where the connections with Central Asia constantly reinforced its international and universalistic character. This peculiar “Sino-barbarian” nature of northern Buddhism, with its foreign preachers and its huge translation projects, strongly contrasts with the south, where Buddhism in the 4th century was already fully domesticated.

      Because of all these circumstances, the large-scale development of Chinese Buddhism started only after the barbarian invasions of the early 4th century. In the 3rd century the picture basically was not any different from Han times—there are indications that Buddhism was still largely a religion of foreigners on Chinese soil (apart from some activity involving the translation of Buddhist scriptures)—but by the 4th century the situation was changing. At the southern Chinese court in Jiankang a clerical elite was forming of Chinese monks and propagators of a completely Sinicized Buddhism, strongly amalgamated with Xuanxue, and their sophisticated creed was being spread among the southern gentry. Starting at Jiankang and in northern Zhejiang (the Hangzhou region), this trend was further developed in the late 4th and the early 5th century in other centres throughout the middle and lower Yangtze basin. The highest flowering of this uniquely “Chinese” type of Buddhism took place in the early 5th century.

      In the north the climax of Buddhist activity and imperial patronage occurred under the Wei (Wei dynasty), especially after the beginning of their policy of conscious Sinicization. The Tuoba court and the great families vied with each other in building temples and granting land and money to the monasteries; the monumental cave temples at Yungang (Yungang caves) and Longmen (Longmen caves) are lasting proof of this large-scale imperial protection. There was also a dark side: in the north the Buddhist clergy became closely tied with secular government, and the government's lavish treatment of the temples was counterbalanced by repeated attempts at government control. It may also be noted that the north remained open to influences brought by traveling monks from Central Asia, and an enormous body of Indian Buddhist texts of all schools and eras was translated.

      Little is known of the beginnings of popular Buddhism. Among the masses there was, to judge from Daoist materials, an intense mingling of Buddhist and popular Daoist notions and practices, such as communal festivals and the worship of local Daoist and Buddhist saints. At that level, simple devotionalism was no doubt far more influential than the scriptural teachings. It is also possible that the oral recital of Buddhist scriptures (mainly edifying tales) had already inspired the development of vernacular literature. In any event, the constant amalgamation of Buddhism, Daoism, and the innumerable local cults whose history dated to high antiquity continued for centuries, eventually producing an amorphous mass of creeds and practices collectively known as Chinese popular religion.

Erik Zürcher Denis C. Twitchett

      The Sui dynasty (581–618), which reunified China after nearly four centuries of political fragmentation during which the north and south had developed in different ways, played a part far more important than its short span would suggest. In the same way that the Qin rulers of the 3rd century BC had unified China after the Zhanguo (Warring States) period, so the Sui brought China together again and set up many institutions that were to be adopted by their successors, the Tang. Like the Qin, however, the Sui overstrained their resources and fell. And also as in the case of the Qin, traditional history has judged the Sui somewhat unfairly, stressing the harshness of the Sui regime and the megalomania of its second emperor and giving too little credit for its many positive achievements.

       Wendi (reigned 581–604), the founder of the Sui dynasty, was a high-ranking official at the Bei (Northern) Zhou court, a member of one of the powerful northwestern aristocratic families that had taken service under the successive non-Chinese royal houses in northern China and had intermarried with the families of their foreign masters. In 577 the Bei Zhou had reunified northern China by conquering the rival northeastern dynasty of Bei Qi. However, political life in the northern courts was extremely unstable, and the succession of an apparently deranged and irresponsible young emperor to the Zhou throne in 578/579 set off a train of court intrigues, plots, and murders. Wendi was able to install a child as puppet emperor in 579 and seize the throne for himself two years later.

      In control of all of northern China and in command of formidable armies, he immediately set about establishing order within his frontiers. He built himself a grand new capital, Daxing (Chang'an), close to the site of the old Qin and Han capitals, a city erected quickly with a prodigal use of compulsory labour. This great city remained (later under the name Chang'an) the capital of the Sui and Tang dynasties and the principal seat of government until the beginning of the 10th century.

      Wendi also took quick action to protect the frontiers of his new state. China during the 6th century had a formidable northern neighbour in the Turks (Tujue), who controlled the steppe from the borders of Manchuria to the frontiers of the Byzantine and Sāsānian empires. At the time of Wendi's seizure of power, the Turks were splitting into two great empires, an eastern one dominating the Chinese northern frontier from Manchuria to Gansu and a western one stretching in a vast arc north of the Tarim Basin into Central Asia. Wendi encouraged this split by supporting the khan (ruler) of the western Turks, Tardu. Throughout his reign Wendi also pursued a policy of encouraging factional strife among the eastern Turks. At the same time, he strengthened his defenses in the north by repairing the Great Wall. In the northwest in the area around the Koko Nor (Qinghai Hu; “Blue Lake”), he defeated the Tuyuhun people, who from time to time raided the border territories.

      By the late 580s Wendi's state was stable and secure enough for him to take the final step toward reunifying the whole country. In 587 he dethroned the emperor of the Hou (Later) Liang, the state that had ruled the middle Yangtze valley as a puppet of the Bei Zhou since 555. In 589 he overwhelmed the last southern dynasty, the Chen, which had put up only token resistance. Several rebellions against the Sui regime subsequently broke out in the south, but these were easily quelled. Wendi now ruled over a firmly reunited empire.

Wendi's institutional reforms
      Wendi achieved much more than strengthening and reunifying the empire. He provided it with uniform institutions and established a pattern of government that survived into the Tang dynasty and beyond. A hardworking administrator, he employed a number of extremely able ministers who combined skill in practical statecraft with a flexible approach to ideological problems. They revived the Confucian state rituals to win favour with the literati and to establish a link with the empire of the Han, and, at the same time, they fostered Buddhism, the dominant religion of the south, attempting to establish the emperor's image as an ideal Buddhist saint-king.

      Wendi's lasting success, however, was in practical politics and institutional reforms. In the last days of the Bei Zhou, he had been responsible for a revision of the laws (law code), and one of his first acts on becoming emperor was to promulgate a penal code, the New Code of 581. In 583 his ministers compiled a revised code, the Kaihuang Code, and administrative statutes. These were far simpler than the laws of the Bei Zhou and were more lenient. Considerable pains were taken to ensure that local officials studied and enforced the new laws. Toward the end of Wendi's reign, when neo-Legalist political advisers gained ascendancy at court, the application of the laws became increasingly strict. The Kaihuang code and statutes have not survived, but they provided the pattern for the Tang code, the most influential body of law in the history of East Asia.

      The central government under Wendi developed into a complex apparatus of ministries, boards, courts, and directorates. The conduct of its personnel was supervised by another organ, the censorate (censor). The emperor presided over this apparatus, and all orders and legislation were issued in his name. He was assisted by the heads of the three central ministries who acted as counselors on state affairs (yiguozheng). That system later provided the basic framework for the central government of the early Tang.

      Even more important, he carried out a sweeping reform and rationalization of local government. The three-level system of local administration inherited from Han times had been reduced to chaos during the 5th and 6th centuries by excessive subdivision; there were innumerable local districts, some of them extremely small and dominated by single families. Wendi created a simplified structure in which a much reduced number of counties was directly subordinated to prefectures. He also rationalized the chaotic rural administrative units into a uniform system of townships (xiang). Appointments to the chief offices in prefectures and counties were now made by the central government rather than filled by members of local influential families, as had been the practice. This reform ensured that local officials would be agents of the central government. It also integrated local officials into the normal pattern of bureaucratic promotion and in time produced a more homogeneous civil service.

      Since the registration of population had fallen into chaos under the Bei Zhou, a careful new census was carried out during the 580s. It recorded the age, status, and landed possessions of all the members of each household in the empire, and, based on it, the land allocation system employed under the successive northern dynasties since the end of the 5th century was reimposed. The tax (taxation) system also followed the old model of head taxes levied in grain and silk at a uniform rate. The taxable age was raised, and the annual period of labour service to which all taxpayers were liable was reduced.

      Wendi's government, in spite of his frontier campaigns and vast construction works, was economical and frugal. By the 590s he had accumulated great reserves, and, when the Chen territories were incorporated into his empire, he was in a position to exempt the new population from 10 years of taxes to help ensure their loyalty.

      The military system likewise was founded on that of the northern dynasties, in which the imperial forces were organized into militias. The soldiers served regular annual turns of duty but lived at home during the rest of the year and were largely self-supporting. Many troops were settled in military colonies on the frontiers to make the garrisons self-sufficient. Only when there was a campaign did the costs of the military establishment soar.

Integration of the south
      The second Sui emperor, Yangdi (reigned 604–617/618), has been depicted as a supreme example of arrogance, extravagance, and personal depravity who squandered his patrimony in megalomaniac construction projects and unwise military adventures. This mythical Yangdi was to a large extent the product of the hostile record written of his reign shortly after his death. His reign began well enough, continuing the trends begun under Wendi; a further revision of the law code that generally reduced penalties was carried out in 607.

      Yangdi's principal achievement was the integration of the south more firmly into a unified China. There is little evidence that the south was ever completely brought into line with all the administrative practices of the north; the land allocation system seems unlikely to have been enforced there, and it is probable that the registration of the population, the essential foundation for the whole fiscal and military system, was only incompletely carried out in the old Chen territories. However, Yangdi himself was personally heavily involved with the south. Married to a princess from the southern state of Liang, he had spent 591–600 as viceroy for the southern territories; their successful integration into the Sui empire after the initial wave of risings was largely because of his administration and the generally clement policies employed in the former Chen territories.

      His identification with the southern interest was one of the reasons he began establishing an examination system, based upon the Confucian Classical curriculum, as a means of drawing into the bureaucracy scholars from the southern and northeastern elites who had preserved traditions of Confucian learning. Hitherto, the court had been dominated by the generally less cultivated aristocratic families of mixed ancestry from northwestern China.

      Yangdi also attempted to weaken the predominance of the northwest by building a second great capital city at Luoyang, on the border of the eastern plains. This capital was not only distant from the home territories of the northwestern aristocrats but also easily provisioned from the rich farmlands of Hebei and Henan. The new city was constructed in a great hurry, employing vast numbers of labourers both in building and in transporting the timber and other materials required. Yangdi also built new palaces and an immense imperial park, again with a prodigal use of labour.

 Another grandiose plan aimed at unifying the empire was to develop still further the canal (canals and inland waterways) system his father had begun in the metropolitan region and to construct a great waterway, the Bian Canal, linking Luoyang with the Huai River and with the southern capital, Jiangdu (present-day Yangzhou), on the Yangtze. Much of this route followed existing rivers and ancient canals, but it was still an immense undertaking that employed masses of forced labourers working under appalling conditions. In 605 the canal system was opened between the capital at Luoyang and the Yangtze, and in 610 it was extended south of the Yangtze to Hangzhou as part of a general effort to rehabilitate and lengthen the Grand Canal. At the same time, in preparation for campaigns in Manchuria and on the Korean frontier, another great canal was built northward from Luoyang to the vicinity of modern Beijing. By 611 the entire eastern plain had a canal system linking the major river systems of northern China and providing a trunk route from the Yangtze delta to the northern frontier. The construction of these waterways was inordinately expensive, caused terrible suffering, and left a legacy of widespread social unrest, but in the long term the transportation system was to be a most important factor for maintaining a unified empire. Further hardship was caused by the mass levies of labour required to rebuild and strengthen the Great Wall in Shanxi in 607 and 608 as a precaution against the resurgent eastern Turks.

Foreign affairs under Yangdi
      In addition to these farsighted construction works, Yangdi also pursued an active foreign policy. An expedition to the south established sovereignty over the old Chinese settlement in Tongking and over the Champa state of Lin-yi in central Nam Viet (present-day Vietnam). Several expeditions were sent to Taiwan, and relations with Japan were opened. Tuyuhun people were driven out of Gansu and Qinghai, and Sui colonies were established along the great western trade routes. The rulers of the various petty local states of Central Asia and the king of Gaochang (Turfan) became tributaries. A prosperous trade with Central Asia and the West emerged.

      The principal foreign threat was still posed by the Turks. By the early 7th century, these peoples had been completely split into the eastern Turks, who occupied most of the Chinese northern frontier, and the immensely powerful western Turks, whose dominions stretched westward to the north of the Tarim Basin as far as Sāsānian Persia and Afghanistan. During the early part of Yangdi's reign, the western Turks, whose ruler, Chuluo, was half-Chinese, were on good terms with the Sui. In 610, however, Yangdi supported a rival, Shegui, who drove out Chuluo. The latter took service, with an army of 10,000 followers, at Yangdi's court. When Sui power began to wane after 612, the western Turks under Shegui gradually replaced the Sui garrisons in Central Asia and established control over the states of the Tarim Basin. The eastern Turks had remained on good terms with the Sui, their khans being married to Chinese princesses. In 613 Pei Ju, Yangdi's principal agent in dealing with the foreign states of the north, attempted unsuccessfully to dethrone the eastern Turkish khan and split up his khanate. Relations with the Turks rapidly deteriorated, and in the last years of his reign Yangdi had to contend with a hostile and extremely powerful neighbour.

      His most costly venture was a series of campaigns in Korea. At that time Korea was divided into three kingdoms, of which the northern one, Koguryŏ, was the most important and powerful. It was hostile to the Chinese and refused to pay homage to Yangdi. Yangdi made careful preparations for a punitive campaign on a grand scale, including construction of the Yongjiqu Canal from Luoyang to Beijing. In 611 the canal was completed; a great army and masses of supplies were collected, but terrible floods in Hebei delayed the campaign.

      During 612, 613, and 614 Yangdi campaigned against the Koreans. The first two campaigns were unsuccessful and were accompanied by the outbreak of many minor rebellions in Shandong and southern Hebei. The severe repression that followed led to outbreaks of disorder throughout the empire. In 614 yet another army was sent into Korea and threatened the capital at P'yŏngyang, but it had to withdraw without a decisive victory. These futile campaigns distracted Yangdi's attention from the increasingly vital internal problems of his empire, involved an immense loss of life and matériel, and caused terrible hardships among the civilian population. They left the Sui demoralized, militarily crippled, and financially ruined.

      At that point, Yangdi decided to secure his relations with his northern neighbours. His envoy, Pei Ju, had continued to intrigue against the eastern Turkish khan, in spite of the fact that the Sui were no longer in a position of strength. When in the summer of 615 Yangdi went to inspect the defenses of the Great Wall, he was surrounded and besieged by the Turks at Yanmen; he was rescued only after a month of peril.

      Rebellions and uprisings soon broke out in every region of the empire. Late in 616 Yangdi decided to withdraw to his southern capital of Jiangdu, and much of northern China was divided among rebel regimes contending with one another for the succession to the empire. Yangdi remained nominally emperor until the spring of 618, when he was murdered by members of his entourage at Jiangdu. However, by 617 the real powers in China had become the various local rebels: Li Mi in the area around Luoyang, Dou Jiande in the northeast, Xue Ju in the far northwest, and Li Yuan (Gaozu) (who remained nominally loyal but had established a local position of great power) in Shanxi. At the beginning of 617, Li Yuan inflicted a great defeat on the eastern Turks and thus consolidated his local power in the impregnable mountainous area around Taiyuan. In the summer of 617 he raised an army and marched on the capital with the aid of the Turks and other local forces; Chang'an fell at year's end. Xue Ju's northwestern rebels were crushed, and the armies of Li Yuan occupied Sichuan and the Han River valley. A Sui prince, Gongdi, was enthroned as “emperor” in 617, while Yangdi was designated “retired emperor.” In the summer of 618, after Yangdi's death, Li Yuan (known by his temple name, Gaozu) deposed his puppet prince and proclaimed himself emperor of a new dynasty, the Tang, which was to remain in power for nearly three centuries.

Early Tang (618–626)
 When Gaozu became emperor (reigned 618–626), he was still only one among the contenders for control of the empire of the Sui. It was several years before the empire was entirely pacified. After the suppression of Xue Ju and the pacification of the northwest, the Tang (Tang dynasty) had to contend with three principal rival forces: the Sui remnants commanded by Wang Shichong at Luoyang, the rebel Li Mi in Henan, the rebel Dou Jiande in Hebei, and Yuwen Huaji, who had assassinated the previous Sui emperor Yangdi and now led the remnants of the Sui's southern armies. Wang Shichong set up a grandson of Yangdi at Luoyang as the new Sui emperor. Yuwen Huaji led his armies to attack Luoyang, and Wang Shichong persuaded Li Mi to return to his allegiance with the Sui and help him fight Yuwen Huaji. Li Mi defeated Yuwen Huaji's armies but seriously depleted his own forces. Wang Shichong, seeing the chance to dispose of his most immediate rival, took over Luoyang and routed Li Mi's forces. Li Mi fled to Chang'an and submitted to the Tang. In the spring of 619 Wang Shichong deposed the puppet Sui prince at Luoyang and proclaimed himself emperor.

      The Tang armies gradually forced him to give ground in Henan, and by 621 Gaozu's son Li Shimin (Taizong) was besieging him in Luoyang. At that time Wang Shichong attempted to form an alliance with Dou Jiande, the most powerful of all the Sui rebels, who controlled much of Hebei and who had completed the defeat of Yuwen Huaji's forces in 619. He held the key area of southern Hebei, where he had successfully resisted both the Tang armies and the forces of Wang and Li Shimin. Dou now agreed to come to the aid of the beleaguered Wang, but in the spring of 621 Li Shimin attacked his army before it could lift the siege, routed it, and captured Dou. Wang then capitulated. The Tang had thus disposed of its two most powerful rivals and extended its control over most of the eastern plain, the most populous and prosperous region of China.

      This was not the end of resistance to the Tang conquest. Most of the surrendered rebel forces had been treated leniently, and their leaders were often confirmed in office or given posts in the Tang administration. Dou and Wang, however, were dealt with severely, Dou being executed and Wang murdered on his way into exile. At the end of 621 Dou's partisans in the northeast again rebelled under Liu Heita and recaptured most of the northeast. He was finally defeated by a Tang army under the crown prince Jiancheng at the beginning of 623. The prolonged resistance in Hebei and the comparatively harsh Tang conquest of the region were the beginning of resistance and hostility in the northeast that continued to some degree throughout the Tang dynasty.

      Resistance was not confined to the northeast. Liu Wuzhou in far northern Shanxi, who had been a constant threat since 619, was finally defeated and killed by his former Turkish allies in 622. In the south during the confusion at the end of the Sui, Xiao Xian had set himself up as emperor of Liang, controlling the central Yangtze region, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Annam (Vietnam). The Tang army descended the Yangtze from Sichuan with a great fleet and defeated Xiao Xian's forces in two crucial naval battles. In 621 Xiao Xian surrendered to the Tang, who thus gained control of the central Yangtze and the far south. The southeast was occupied by another rebel, Li Zitong, based in Zhejiang. He too was decisively defeated near present-day Nanjing at the end of 621. As had been the case with Xiao Xian's dominions, the southeast was incorporated into the Tang empire with a minimum of fighting and resistance. A last southern rebellion by Fu Gongtuo, a general who set up an independent regime at Danyang (Nanjing) in 624, was speedily suppressed. After a decade of war and disorder, the empire was completely pacified and unified under the Tang house.

Administration of the state
      The Tang unification had been far more prolonged and bloody than the Sui conquest. That the Tang regime lasted for nearly three centuries rather than three decades, as with the Sui, was largely the result of the system of government imposed on the conquered territories. The emperor Gaozu's role in the Tang conquest was understated in the traditional histories compiled under his successor Taizong (Li Shimin; reigned 626–649), which portrayed Taizong as the prime mover in the establishment of the dynasty. Taizong certainly played a major role in the campaigns, but Gaozu was no figurehead. Not only did he direct the many complex military operations, but he also established the basic institutions of the Tang state, which proved practicable not only for a rapidly developing Chinese society but also for the first centralized states in societies as diverse as those of Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the southwestern kingdom of Nanzhao.

      The structure of the new central administration (bureaucracy) resembled that of Wendi's time, with its ministries, boards, courts, and directorates. There was no radical change in the dominant group at court. Most of the highest ranks in the bureaucracy were filled by former Sui officials, many of whom had been the new emperor's colleagues when he was governor in Taiyuan, or by descendants of officials of the Bei Zhou, Bei Qi, or Sui or of the royal houses of the northern and southern dynasties. The Tang were related by marriage to the Sui royal house, and a majority of the chief ministers were related by marriage to either the Tang or Sui imperial family. The emperor's court was composed primarily of men of similar social origins. At that level the Tang in its early years, like the Sui before it, continued the pattern of predominantly aristocratic rule that had dominated the history of the northern courts.

      Gaozu also continued the pattern of local administration established under the Sui and maintained the strict control exercised by the central government over provincial appointments. In the first years after the Tang conquest, many prefectures and counties were fragmented to provide offices for surrendered rebel leaders, surrendered Sui officials, and followers of the emperor. But these new local districts were gradually amalgamated and reduced in number, and by the 630s the pattern of local administration closely resembled that under the Sui. The merging of the local officials into the main bureaucracy, however, took time; ambitious men still looked upon local posts as “exile” from the main current of official promotion at the capital. Until well into the 8th century many local officials continued to serve for long terms, and the ideal of a regular circulation of officials prevailed only gradually.

      Local government in early Tang times had a considerable degree of independence, but each prefecture was in direct contact with the central ministries. In the spheres of activity that the administration regarded as crucial—registration, land allocation, tax collection, conscription of men for the army and for corvée duty, and maintenance of law and order—prefects and county magistrates were expected to follow centrally codified law and procedure. They were, however, permitted to interpret the law to suit local conditions. Local influences remained strong in the prefectures and counties. Most of the personnel in these divisions were local men, many of them members of families of petty functionaries.

Fiscal and legal system
      Gaozu had inherited a bankrupt state, and most of his measures were aimed at simple and cheap administration. His bureaucracy was small, at both the central and local levels. The expenses of government were largely met by land endowments attached to each office, the rents from which paid office expenses and salaries, by interest on funds of money allocated for similar purposes, and by services of taxpayers who performed many of the routine tasks of government as special duties, being exempted from tax in return.

      Land (land reform) distribution followed the equal-allocation system used under the northern dynasties and the Sui. Every taxable male was entitled to a grant of land—part of which was to be returned when he ceased to be a taxpayer at age 60 and part of which was hereditary. The disposal of landed property was hedged around with restrictive conditions. Great landed estates were limited to members of the imperial clan and powerful officials, various state institutions, and the Buddhist foundations. Although some land was hereditary, and more and more passed into the hereditary category with the passage of time, the lack of primogeniture meant that landholdings were fragmented among all the sons in each generation and thus tended to be small. It is unlikely that the system was ever enforced to the letter in any region, and it was probably never enforced at all in the south. But as a legal system governing registration of landed property and restricting its disposal, it remained in force until An Lushan's rebellion in the 8th century.

      The tax (taxation) system based on this land allocation system was also much the same as that under the Sui and preceding dynasties. Every adult male annually paid a head tax in grain and cloth and was liable to 20 days of work for the central government (normally commuted into a payment in cloth) and to a further period of work for the local authorities. Revenues were collected exclusively from the rural population—the trade sector and the urban communities being exempt—and the system bore more heavily on the poor, since it ignored the taxpayer's economic status.

      The Sui had made a somewhat desultory attempt to provide China with a unified coinage (coin). Gaozu set up mints and began the production of a good copper currency that remained standard throughout the Tang era. But cash was in short supply during most of the 7th century and had to be supplemented by standard-sized lengths of silk. Counterfeiting was rife, particularly in the Yangtze valley, where the southern dynasties had supported a more highly monetized economy and where the governments had exploited commerce as a source of revenue.

      Gaozu also undertook a new codification of all centralized law (law code), completed in 624. It comprised a code that embodied what were considered basic, unchanging normative rules, prescribing fixed penalties for defined offenses; statutes, comprising the general body of universally applicable administrative law; regulations, or codified legislation supplementary to the code and statutes; and ordinances, detailed procedural laws supplementing the statutes and issued by the departments of the central ministries. Under the early Tang this body of codified law was revised every 20 years or so. The systematic effort to maintain a universally applicable codification of law and administrative practice was essential to the uniform system of administration that the Tang succeeded in imposing throughout its diverse empire. The Tang code proved remarkably durable: it was still considered authoritative as late as the 14th century and was used as a model by the Ming. It was also adopted, with appropriate modifications, in Japan in the early 8th century and by the Koreans and the Vietnamese at a much later date.

      Gaozu thus laid down, at the outset of the 7th century, institutions that survived until the mid-8th century. These provided strong central control, a high level of administrative standardization, and highly economical administration.

The period of Tang power (626–755)
      Two of Gaozu's sons were rivals for the succession: the crown prince Jiancheng and Li Shimin (Taizong), the general who had played a large part in the wars of unification. Their rivalry, and the factional strife it generated, reached a peak in 625–626, when it appeared that Jiancheng was likely to succeed. In a military coup, Li Shimin murdered Jiancheng and another of his brothers and forced his father to abdicate in his favour. He succeeded to the throne in 626 and is known by his temple name, Taizong.

The “era of good government”
 The reign of Taizong (626–649), known traditionally as the “era of good government of Zhenguan,” was not notable for innovations in administration. Generally, his policies developed and refined those of his father's reign. The distinctive element was the atmosphere of his administration and the close personal interplay between the sovereign and his unusually able team of Confucian advisers. It approached the Confucian ideal of a strong, able, energetic, yet fundamentally moral king seeking and accepting the advice of wise and capable ministers, advice that was basically ethical rather than technical. Some important changes in political organization were begun during his reign and were continued throughout the 7th century. The court remained almost exclusively the domain of men of aristocratic birth. But Taizong attempted to balance the regional groups among the aristocracy so as to prevent any single region from becoming dominant. They comprised the Guanlong group from the northwest, the Daibei group from Shanxi, the Shandong group from Hebei, and the southern group from the Yangtze valley. The most powerful Hebei clans were excluded from high office, but Taizong employed members of each of the other groups and of the lesser northeastern aristocracy in high administrative offices as well as in his consultative group of scholars.

      A second change was the use of the examination system on a large scale. The Sui examinations had already been reestablished under Gaozu, who had also revived the Sui system of high-level schools (higher education) at the capital. Under Taizong the schools were further expanded and new ones established. Measures were taken to standardize their curriculum, notably completing an official orthodox edition of the Classics with a standard commentary in 638. The schools at the capital were mostly restricted to the sons of the nobility and of high-ranking officials. Other examination candidates, however, came from the local schools. The examinations were in principle open to all, but they provided relatively few new entrants to the bureaucracy. Most officials still entered service by other means—hereditary privilege as sons of officials of the upper ranks or promotion from the clerical service or the guards. The examinations demanded a high level of education in the traditional curriculum and were largely used as an alternative method of entry by younger sons of the aristocracy and by members of lesser families with a scholar-official background. Moreover, personal recommendation, lobbying examiners, and often a personal interview by the emperor played a large part. Even in late Tang times, not more than 10 percent of officials were recruited by the examinations. The main effect of the examination system in Tang times was to bring into being a highly educated court elite within the bureaucracy, to give members of locally prominent clans access to the upper levels of the bureaucracy, and in the long term to break the monopoly of political power held by the upper aristocracy. Employing persons dependent for their position on the emperor and the dynasty, rather than on birth and social standing, made it possible for the Tang emperors to establish their own power and independence.

      In the early years there was a great debate as to whether the Tang ought to reintroduce the feudal system used under the Zhou and the Han, by which authority was delegated to members of the imperial clan and powerful officials and generals who were enfeoffed with hereditary territorial jurisdictions. Taizong eventually settled on a centralized form of government through prefectures and counties staffed by members of a unified bureaucracy. The Tang retained a nobility, but its “fiefs of maintenance” were merely lands whose revenues were earmarked for its use and gave it no territorial authority.

      Taizong continued his father's economic policies, and government remained comparatively simple and cheap. He attempted to cut down the bureaucratic establishment at the capital and drastically reduced the number of local government divisions. The country was divided into 10 provinces, which were not permanent administrative units but “circuits” for occasional regional inspections of the local administrations; these tours were carried out by special commissioners, often members of the censorate, sent out from the capital. This gave the central government an additional means of maintaining standardized and efficient local administration. Measures to ensure tax relief for areas stricken by natural disasters, and the establishment of relief granaries to provide adequate reserves against famine, helped to ensure the prosperity of the countryside. Taizong's reign was a period of low prices and general prosperity.

      Taizong was also successful in his foreign policy. In 630 the eastern Turks were split by dissension among their leadership and by the rebellion of their subject peoples. Chinese forces invaded their territories, totally defeated them, and captured their khan, and Taizong was recognized as their supreme sovereign, the “heavenly khan.” A large number of the surrendered Turks were settled on the Chinese frontier, and many served in the Tang armies. A similar policy of encouraging internal dissension was later practiced against the western Turks, who split into two separate khanates for a while. In 642–643 a new khan reestablished a degree of unified control with Chinese support and agreed to become a tributary of the Chinese. To seal the alliance, Taizong married him to a Chinese princess.

      The eclipse of Turkish power enabled Taizong to extend his power over the various small states of the Tarim Basin. By the late 640s a Chinese military administration had extended westward even beyond the limits of present-day Xinjiang. To the north, in the region of the Orhon River and to the north of the Ordos (Mu Us) Desert, the Tang armies defeated the Xueyantou (Syr Tardush), former vassals of the eastern Turks, who became Tang vassals in 646. The Tuyuhun in the region around Koko Nor caused considerable trouble in the early 630s. Taizong invaded their territory in 634 and defeated them, but they remained unsubdued and invaded Chinese territory several times.

      The Chinese western dominions now extended farther than in the great days of the Han. Trade developed with the West, with Central Asia, and with India. The Chinese court received embassies from Sāsānian Persia and from the Byzantine Empire. The capital was thronged with foreign merchants and foreign monks and contained a variety of non-Chinese communities. The great cities had Zoroastrian, Manichaean, and Nestorian temples, along with the Buddhist monasteries that had been a part of the Chinese scene for centuries.

      Taizong's only failure in foreign policy was in Korea. The northern state of Koguryŏ had sent tribute regularly, but in 642 there was an internal coup; the new ruler attacked Silla, another Tang vassal state in southern Korea. Taizong decided to invade Koguryŏ, against the advice of most of his ministers. The Tang armies, in alliance with the Khitan in Manchuria and the two southern Korean states Paekche and Silla, invaded Koguryŏ in 645 but were forced to withdraw with heavy losses. Another inconclusive campaign was waged in 647, and the end of Taizong's reign was spent in building a vast fleet and making costly preparations for a final expedition.

      Taizong's last years were also marked by a decline in the firm grasp of the emperor over politics at his court. In the 640s a bitter struggle for the succession developed when it became clear that the designated heir was mentally unstable. The court split into factions supporting various candidates. The final choice, Li Zhi, prince of Jin (reigned 649–683; temple name Gaozong) was a weak character, but he had the support of the most powerful figures at court.

Rise of the empress Wuhou
      Gaozong was 21 years old when he ascended the throne. In his first years he was dominated by the remaining great statesmen of Taizong's court, above all by the emperor's uncle Zhangsun Wuji. However, real power soon passed from Gaozong into the hands of the empress Wuhou, one of the most remarkable women in Chinese history. Wuhou had been a low-ranking concubine of Taizong. She was taken into Gaozong's palace and, after a series of complex intrigues, managed in 655 to have the legitimate empress, Wang, deposed and herself appointed in her place. The struggle between the two was not simply a palace intrigue. Empress Wang, who was of noble descent, had the backing of the old northwestern aristocratic faction and of the great ministers surviving from Taizong's court. Wuhou came from a family of lower standing from Taiyuan. Her father had been one of Gaozu's original supporters, her mother a member of the Sui royal family. She seems to have been supported by the eastern aristocracy, by the lesser gentry, and by the lower-ranking echelons of the bureaucracy.

      But her success was largely the result of her skill in intrigue, her dominant personality, and her utter ruthlessness. The deposed empress and another imperial favourite were savagely murdered, and the next half century was marked by recurrent purges in which she hounded to death one group after another of real or imagined rivals. The good relationship between the emperor and his court, which had made Taizong's reign so successful, was speedily destroyed. Political life became precarious and insecure, at the mercy of the empress's unpredictable whims. The first victims were the elder statesmen of Taizong's reign, who were exiled, murdered, or driven to suicide in 657–659. In 660 Gaozong suffered a stroke. He remained in precarious health for the rest of his reign, and Wuhou took charge of the administration.

      Although utterly unscrupulous in politics, she backed up her intrigues with policies designed to consolidate her position. In 657 Luoyang was made the second capital. The entire court and administration were frequently transferred to Luoyang, thus removing the centre of political power from the home region of the northwestern aristocracy. Ministries and court offices were duplicated, and Luoyang had to be equipped with all the costly public buildings needed for a capital. After Gaozong's death, Wuhou took up permanent residence there.

      Gaozong and Wuhou were obsessed by symbolism and religion, with one favourite magician, holy man, or monk following another. State rituals were radically changed. For symbolic reasons the names of all offices were altered, and the emperor took the new title of “heavenly emperor.”

      The bureaucracy was rapidly inflated to a far-greater size than in Taizong's time, many of the new posts being filled by candidates from the examination system who now began to attain the highest offices and thus to encroach on what had been the preserves of the aristocracy. Another blow at the aristocracy was struck by the compilation in 659 of a new genealogy of all the empire's eminent clans, which ranked families according to the official positions achieved by their members rather than by their traditional social standing. Needless to say, the first family of all was that of Wuhou. The lower ranks of the bureaucracy, among whom the empress found her most-solid support, were encouraged by the creation of new posts, greater opportunities for advancement, and salary increases.

      The Chinese were engaged in foreign wars throughout Gaozong's reign. Until 657 they waged continual war against the western Turks, finally defeating them and placing their territories as far as the valley of the Amu Darya under a nominal Chinese protectorate in 659–661. The Tang also waged repeated campaigns against Koguryŏ in the late 650s and the 660s. In 668 the Tang forces took P'yŏngyang (the capital), and Koguryŏ was also placed under a protectorate. However, by 676 rebellions had forced the Chinese to withdraw to southern Manchuria, and all of Korea became increasingly dominated by the rapidly expanding power of the southern Korean state of Silla. The eastern Turks, who had been settled along the northern border, rebelled in 679–681 and were quelled only after they had caused widespread destruction and had inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese forces.

      The most serious foreign threat in Gaozong's reign was the emergence of a new and powerful force to the west, the Tibetans (Tibetan) (Tubo), a people who had exerted constant pressure on the northern border of Sichuan since the 630s. By 670 the Tibetans had driven the Tuyuhun from their homeland in the Koko Nor basin. The northwest had to be increasingly heavily fortified and garrisoned to guard against their repeated raids and incursions. After a series of difficult campaigns, they were finally checked in 679.

      When Gaozong died in 683, he was succeeded by the young Zhongzong, but Wuhou was made empress dowager and immediately took control over the central administration. Within less than a year she had deposed Zhongzong, who had shown unexpected signs of independence, and replaced him with another son and puppet emperor, Ruizong, who was kept secluded in the Inner Palace while Wuhou held court and exercised the duties of sovereign.

      In 684 disaffected members of the ruling class under Xu Jingye raised a serious rebellion at Yangzhou in the south, but this was speedily put down. The empress instituted a reign of terror among the members of the Tang royal family and officials, employing armies of agents and informers. Fear overshadowed the life of the court. The empress herself became more and more obsessed with religious symbolism. She manipulated Buddhist scripture to justify her becoming sovereign and in 688 erected a Ming Tang (“Hall of Light”)—the symbolic supreme shrine to heaven described in the Classics—a vast building put up with limitless extravagance. In 690 the empress proclaimed that the dynasty had been changed from Tang to Zhou. She became formally the empress in her own right, the only woman sovereign in China's history. Ruizong, the imperial heir, was given her surname, Wu; everybody with the surname Wu in the empire was exempted from taxation. Every prefecture was ordered to set up a temple in which the monks were to expound the notion that the empress was an incarnation of Buddha. Luoyang became the “holy capital,” and the state cult was ceremoniously transferred there from Chang'an. The remnants of the Tang royal family who had not been murdered or banished were immured in the depths of the palace.

      Destructive and demoralizing as the effects of her policies must have been at the capital and at court, there is little evidence of any general deterioration of administration in the empire. By 690 the worst excesses of her regime were past. In the years after she had proclaimed herself empress, she retained the services and loyalty of a number of distinguished officials. The court was still unstable, however, with unending changes of ministers, and the empress remained susceptible to the influence of a series of worthless favourites. After 700 she gradually began to lose her grip on affairs.

      The external affairs of the empire had meanwhile taken a turn for the worse. The Tibetans renewed their warfare on the frontier. In 696 the Khitan in Manchuria rebelled against their Chinese governor and overran part of Hebei. The Chinese drove them out, with Turkish aid, in 697. The Chinese reoccupied Hebei under a member of the empress's family and carried out brutal reprisals against the population. In 698 the Turks in their turn invaded Hebei and were driven off only by an army under the nominal command of the deposed emperor Zhongzong, who had been renamed heir apparent in place of Ruizong. The military crisis had forced the empress to abandon any plan to keep the succession within her own family.

      The expenses of the empire made it necessary to impose new taxes (taxation). These took the form of a household levy—a graduated tax based on a property assessment on everyone from the nobility down, including the urban population—and a land levy collected on an acreage basis. These new taxes were to be assessed based on productivity or wealth, rather than a uniform per capita levy. Some tried to evade taxes by illegally subdividing their households to reduce their liabilities. There was a large-scale migration of peasant families fleeing from oppression and heavy taxation in the Hebei and Shandong area. This migration of peasants, who settled as unregistered squatters on vacant land in central and southern China and no longer paid taxes, was accelerated by the Khitan invasion in the late 690s. Attempts to stop it were ineffectual.

      By 705 the empress, who was now 80 years old, had allowed control of events to slip from her fingers. The bureaucratic faction at court, tired of the excesses of her latest favourites, forced her to abdicate in favour of Zhongzong. The Tang was restored.

      Zhongzong, however, also had a domineering wife, the empress Wei, who initiated a regime of utter corruption at court, openly selling offices. When the emperor died in 710, probably poisoned by her, she tried to establish herself as ruler as Wuhou had done before her. But Li Longji, the future Xuanzong, with the aid of Wuhou's formidable daughter, Taiping, and of the palace army, succeeded in restoring his father, Ruizong (the brother of Zhongzong), to the throne. The princess now attempted to dominate her brother, the emperor, and there followed a struggle for power between her and the heir apparent. In 712 Ruizong ceded the throne to Xuanzong but retained in his own hands control over the most crucial areas of government. A second coup, in 713, placed Xuanzong completely in charge and resulted in Ruizong's retirement and the princess Taiping's suicide.

Prosperity and progress
 Xuanzong's reign (712–756) was the high point of the Tang dynasty. It was an era of wealth and prosperity that was accompanied by institutional progress and a flowering of the arts. Political life was at first dominated by the bureaucrats recruited through the examination system who had staffed the central government under Wuhou. But a gradual revival of the power of the great aristocratic clans tended to polarize politics, a polarization that was sharpened by the emperor's employment of a series of aristocratic specialists who reformed the empire's finances from 720 onward, often in the teeth of bureaucratic opposition.

      After 720 a large-scale re-registration of the population greatly increased the number of taxpayers and restored state control over vast numbers of unregistered families. The new household and land taxes were expanded. In the 730s the canal system, which had been allowed to fall into neglect under Wuhou and her successors, was repaired and reorganized so that the administration could transport large stocks of grain from the Yangtze region to the capital and to the armies on the northern frontiers. The south was at last financially integrated with the north. By the 740s the government had accumulated enormous reserves of grain and wealth. The tax and accounting systems were simplified, and taxes and labour services were reduced.

      Some important institutional changes accompanied these reforms. The land registration, reorganization of transport, and coinage reform were administered by specially appointed commissions holding extraordinary powers, including the authority to recruit their own staff. These commissions were mostly headed by censors (censor), and they and the censorate became centres of aristocratic power. The existence of these new offices reduced the influence of the regular ministries, enabling the emperor and his aristocratic advisers to circumvent the normal channels and procedures of administration.

      After 736 the political dominance of the aristocracy was firmly reestablished. An aristocratic chief minister, Li Linfu, became a virtual dictator, his powers increasing as Xuanzong in his later years withdrew from active affairs into the pleasures of palace life and the study of Daoism. In the latter part of his reign, Xuanzong, who had previously strictly circumscribed the power of the palace women to avoid a recurrence of the disasters of Wuhou's time and who had also excluded members of the royal family from politics, faced a series of succession plots. In 745 he fell deeply under the influence of a new favourite, the imperial concubine Yang Guifei. In 751–752 one of her relatives, Yang Guozhong, thanks to her influence with the emperor, rapidly rose to rival Li Linfu for supreme power. After Li's death in 752 Yang Guozhong dominated the court. However, he had neither Li's great political ability nor his experience and skill in handling people.

Military reorganization
      The most important new development in Xuanzong's reign was the growth in the power of the military commanders. During Gaozong's reign the old militia system had proved inadequate for frontier defense and had been supplemented by the institution of permanent armies and garrison forces quartered in strategic areas on the frontiers. These armies were made up of long-service veterans, many of them non-Chinese cavalry troops, settled permanently in military colonies. Although these armies were adequate for small-scale operations, for a major campaign an expeditionary army and a headquarters staff had to be specially organized and reinforcements sent in by the central government. This cumbersome system was totally unsuitable for dealing with the highly mobile nomadic horsemen on the northern frontiers.

      At the beginning of Xuanzong's reign, the Turks again threatened to become a major power, rivaling China in Central Asia and along the borders. Kapghan (Mochuo), the Turkish khan who had invaded Hebei in the aftermath of the Khitan invasion in the time of Wuhou and had attacked the Chinese northwest at the end of her reign, turned his attention northward. By 711 he controlled the steppe from the Chinese frontier to Transoxiana and appeared likely to develop a new unified Turkish empire. When he was murdered in 716, his flimsy empire collapsed. His successor, Bilge (Pijia), tried to make peace with the Chinese in 718, but Xuanzong preferred to try to destroy his power by an alliance with the southwestern Basmil Turks and with the Khitan in Manchuria. Bilge, however, crushed the Basmil and attacked Gansu in 720. Peaceful relations were established in 721–722. Bilge's death in 734 precipitated the end of Turkish power. A struggle among the various Turkish subject tribes followed, from which the Uighurs (Uighur) emerged as victors. In 744 they established a powerful empire that was to remain the dominant force on China's northern border until 840. Unlike the Turks, however, the Uighurs pursued a consistent policy of alliance with the Tang. On several occasions Uighur aid, even though offered on harsh terms, saved the dynasty from disaster.

      The Tibetans were the most dangerous foe during Xuanzong's reign, invading the northwest annually from 714 on. In 727–729 the Chinese undertook large-scale warfare against them, and in 730 a settlement was concluded. But in the 730s fighting broke out again, and the Tibetans began to turn their attention to the Tang territories in the Tarim Basin. Desultory fighting continued on the border of Gansu until the end of Xuanzong's reign. From 752 onward the Tibetans acquired a new ally in the Nanzhao state in Yunnan, which enabled them to exert a continuous threat along the entire western frontier.

      In the face of these threats, Xuanzong organized the northern and northwestern frontiers from Manchuria to Sichuan into a series of strategic commands or military provinces under military governors who were given command over all the forces in a large region. This system developed gradually and was formalized in 737 under Li Linfu. The frontier commanders controlled enormous numbers of troops: nearly 200,000 were stationed in the northwest and Central Asia and more than 100,000 in the northeast; there were well in excess of 500,000 in all. The military governors soon began to exercise some functions of civil government. In the 740s a non-Chinese general of Sogdian and Turkish origin, An Lushan, became military governor first of one and finally of all three of the northeastern commands, with 160,000 troops under his orders. An Lushan had risen to power largely through the patronage of Li Linfu. When Li died, An became a rival of Yang Guozhong. As Yang Guozhong developed more and more of a personal stranglehold over the administration at the capital, An Lushan steadily built up his military forces in the northeast. The armed confrontation that followed nearly destroyed the dynasty.

      During the 750s there was a steady reversal of Tang military fortunes. In the far west the overextended imperial armies had been defeated by the Arabs in 751 on the Talas River. In the southwest a campaign against the new state of Nanzhao had led to the almost total destruction of an army of 50,000 men. In the northeast the Chinese had lost their grip on the Manchuria-Korea border with the emergence of the new state of Parhae in place of Koguryŏ, and the Khitan and Xi peoples in Manchuria constantly caused border problems. The Tibetans in the northwest were kept in check only by an enormously expensive military presence. The principal military forces were designed essentially for frontier defense.

      Thus, the end of Xuanzong's reign was a time when the state was in a highly unstable condition. The central government was dangerously dependent on a small group of men operating outside the regular institutional framework, and an overwhelming preponderance of military power was in the hands of potentially rebellious commanders on the frontiers, against whom the emperor could put into the field only a token force of his own and the troops of those commanders who remained loyal.

Late Tang (755–907)
      The rebellion of An Lushan in 755 marked the beginning of a new period. At first the rebellion had spectacular success. It swept through the northeastern province of Hebei, captured the eastern capital, Luoyang, early in 756, and took the main Tang capital, Chang'an, in July of the same year. The emperor fled to Sichuan, and on the road his consort Yang Guifei and other members of the Yang faction who had dominated his court were killed. Shortly afterward the heir apparent, who had retreated to Lingwu in the northwest, himself usurped the throne. The new emperor, Suzong (reigned 756–762), was faced with a desperately difficult military situation. The rebel armies controlled the capital and most of Hebei and Henan. In the last days of his reign, Xuanzong had divided the empire into five areas, each of which was to be the fief of one of the imperial princes. Prince Yong, who was given control of the southeast, was the only one to take up his command; during 757 he attempted to set himself up as the independent ruler of the crucially important economic heart of the empire in the Huai and Yangtze valleys but was murdered by one of his generals.

      An Lushan himself was murdered by a subordinate early in 757, but the rebellion was continued, first by his son and then by one of his generals, Shi Siming, and his son Shi Chaoyi; it was not finally suppressed until 763. The rebellion had caused great destruction and hardship, particularly in Henan. The final victory was made possible partly by the employment of Uighur mercenaries, whose insatiable demands remained a drain on the treasury well into the 770s, partly by the failure of the rebel leadership after the death of the able Shi Siming, and partly by the policy of clemency adopted toward the rebels after the decisive campaign in Henan in 762. The need for a speedy settlement was made more urgent by the growing threat of the Tibetans (Tibetan) in the northwest. The latter, allied with the Nanzhao kingdom in Yunnan, had exerted continual pressure on the western frontier and in 763 occupied the whole of present-day Gansu. Late in 763 they actually took and looted the capital. They continued to occupy the Chinese northwest until well into the 9th century. Their occupation of Gansu signaled the end of Chinese control of the region.

Provincial separatism
      The post-rebellion settlement not only pardoned several of the most powerful rebel generals but also appointed them as imperial governors in command of the areas they had surrendered. Hebei was divided into four new provinces, each under surrendered rebels, while Shandong became the province of An Lushan's former garrison army from Pinglu in Manchuria, which had held an ambivalent position during the fighting. The central government held little power within these provinces. The leadership was decided within each province, and the central government in its appointments merely approved faits accomplis. Succession to the leadership was frequently hereditary. For all practical purposes, the northeastern provinces remained semi-independent throughout the later part of the Tang era. They had been among the most populous and productive parts of the empire, and their semi-independence was not only a threat to the stability of the central government but also represented a huge loss of revenue and potential manpower.

      Provincial separatism also became a problem elsewhere. With the general breakdown of the machinery of central administration after 756, many of the functions of government were delegated to local administrations. The whole empire was now divided into provinces (dao), which formed an upper tier of routine administration. Their governors had wide powers over subordinate prefectures and counties. The new provincial governments were of two main types.

      In northern China (apart from the semiautonomous provinces of the northeast, which were a special category) most provincial governments were military, their institutions closely modeled on those set up on the northern frontier under Xuanzong. The military presence was strongest in the small frontier-garrison provinces that protected the capital, Chang'an, from the Tibetans in Gansu and in the belt of small, heavily garrisoned provinces in Henan that protected China—and the canal from the Huai and Yangtze valleys, on which the central government depended for its supplies—from the semiautonomous provinces. Military governments were also the rule in Sichuan, which continued to be menaced by the Tibetans and Nanzhao, and in the far south in Lingnan.

      In central and southern China, however, the provincial government developed into a new organ of the civil bureaucracy. The civil governors of the southern provinces were regularly appointed from the bureaucracy, and it became customary to appoint to these posts high-ranking court officials who were temporarily out of favour.

      All the new provinces had considerable latitude of action, particularly during the reigns of Suzong and Daizong, when central power was at a low ebb. There was a general decentralization of authority. The new provinces had considerable independence in the fields of finance, local government, law and order, and military matters.

      Under Daizong (Taizong) (reigned 762–779) the court was dominated by the emperor's favourite, Yuan Zai, and by the eunuchs (eunuch) who now began to play an increasing role in Tang politics. A succession of eunuch advisers not only rivaled in influence the chief ministers but even exerted influence over the military in the campaigns of the late 750s and early 760s. Under Daizong many of the regular offices of the administration remained unfilled, while the irregularities encouraged by Yuan Zai and his clique in the appointment of officials led to an increasing use of eunuchs in secretarial posts and to their increasing dominance over the emperor's private treasury.

      The central government did achieve some success in finance. The old fiscal system with its taxes and labour services had been completely disrupted by the breakdown of authority and by the vast movements of population. The revenues increasingly came to depend on additional taxes levied on cultivated land or on property, and the government attempted to raise more revenue from the urban population. But its survival depended on the revenues it drew from central China, the Huai valley, and the lower Yangtze. Those revenues were sent to the capital by means of a reconstructed and improved canal system maintained out of the new government monopoly on salt. By 780 the salt monopoly was producing a major part of the state's central revenues, in addition to maintaining the transportation system. The salt and transportation administration was controlled by an independent commission centred in Yangzhou, near the mouth of the Yangtze, and this commission gradually took over the entire financial administration of southern and central China.

      The weak Daizong was succeeded by a tough, intelligent activist emperor, Dezong (reigned 779–805), who was determined to restore the fortunes of the dynasty. He reconstituted much of the old central administration and decided on a showdown with the forces of local autonomy. As a first step, in 780 he promulgated a new system of taxation, under which each province was assessed a quota of taxes, the collection of which was to be left to the provincial government. This was a radical measure, for it abandoned the traditional concept of head taxes levied at a uniform rate throughout the empire and also began the assessment of taxes in terms of money.

      Those in the semi-independent provinces of the northeast saw this as a threat to their independence, and, when it became apparent that Dezong was determined to carry out consistently tough policies toward the northeast—reducing their armies and even denying them the right to appoint their own governors—the Hebei provinces rebelled. From 781 to 786 there was a wave of rebellions not only in the northeastern provinces but also in the Huai valley and in the area of the capital itself. These events brought the Tang even closer to disaster than had the An Lushan rising. The situation was saved because at a crucial moment the rebels fell out among themselves and because the south remained loyal. In the end, the settlement negotiated with the governors of Hebei virtually endorsed the preceding status quo, although the court made some marginal inroads by establishing two small new provinces in Hebei.

      After that disaster, Dezong pursued a much more careful and passive policy toward the provinces. Governors were left in office for long periods, and hereditary succession continued. Nonetheless, the latter part of Dezong's reign was a period of steady achievement. The new tax system was gradually enforced and proved remarkably successful; it remained the basis of the tax structure until Ming times. Revenues increased steadily, and Dezong left behind him a wealthy state. Militarily, he was also generally successful: the Tibetan threat was contained, Nanzhao was won from its alliance with the Tibetans, and the garrisons of the northwest were strengthened. At the same time, Dezong built up large new palace armies, giving the central government a powerful striking force—numbering some 100,000 men by the end of his reign. Command was given to eunuchs considered loyal to the throne. The death of Dezong in 805 was followed by the brief reign of Shunzong, an invalid monarch whose court was dominated by the clique of Wang Shuwen and Wang Pei. They planned to take control of the palace armies from the eunuchs but failed.

The struggle for central authority
      Under Xianzong (reigned 805–820) the Tang regained a great deal of its power. Xianzong, a tough and ruthless ruler who kept a firm hand on affairs, is notable chiefly for his successful policies toward the provinces. Rebellions in Sichuan (806) and the Yangtze delta (807) were quickly put down. After an abortive campaign (809–810) that was badly bungled by a favourite eunuch commander, the court was again forced to compromise with the governors of Hebei. A fresh wave of trouble came in 814–817 with a rebellion in Huaixi, in the upper Huai valley, that threatened the canal route. That uprising was crushed and the province divided up among its neighbours. The Pinglu army in Shandong rebelled in 818 and suffered the same fate. Xianzong thus restored the authority of the central government throughout most of the empire. His success was based largely upon the palace armies. The fact that these were controlled by eunuchs placed a great measure of power in the emperor's hands. Under his weak successors, however, the eunuchs' influence in politics proved a disaster.

      Xianzong's restoration of central authority involved more than military dominance. It was backed by a series of institutional measures designed to strengthen the power of the prefects and county magistrates, as against their provincial governors, by restoring to them the right of direct access to central government and giving them some measure of control over the military forces quartered within their jurisdiction. In an important financial reform, the provincial government no longer had first call on all the revenue of the province, as some revenue went directly to the capital. The government also began the policy, continued throughout the 9th and 10th centuries, of cutting down and fragmenting the provinces. It strengthened its control over the provincial administrations through a system of eunuch army supervisors, who were attached to the staff of each provincial governor. These eunuchs played an increasingly important role, not merely as sources of information and intelligence but as active agents of the emperor, able to intervene directly in local affairs.

      The balance of power within the central government had also been considerably changed. The emperor Dezong had begun to delegate a great deal of business, in particular the drafting of edicts and legislation, to his personal secretariat, the Hanlin Academy. Although the members of the Hanlin Academy were handpicked members of the bureaucracy, their positions as academicians were outside the regular official establishment. This eventually placed the power of decision and the detailed formulation of policy in the hands of a group that depended entirely on the emperor, thus threatening the authority of the regularly constituted ministers of the court.

      The influence of the eunuchs had also begun to be formalized and institutionalized in the palace council; this provided the emperor with another personal secretariat, which controlled the conduct of official business and had close links with the eunuchs' command of the powerful palace armies. The eunuchs' influence in politics steadily increased. Xianzong was murdered by some of his eunuch attendants, and henceforth the chief eunuchs of the palace council and the palace armies were a factor in nearly every succession to the Tang throne; in some cases they had their own candidates enthroned in defiance of the previous emperor's will. The emperor Wenzong (reigned 827–840) sought to destroy the dominance of the eunuchs; his abortive schemes only demoralized the bureaucracy, particularly after the Sweet Dew (Ganlu) coup of 835, which misfired and led to the deaths of several ministers and a number of other officials. But the apogee of the eunuchs' power was brief, ending with the accession of Wuzong in 840. Wuzong and his minister, Li Deyu, managed to impose some restrictions on the eunuchs' power, especially in the military.

      In the second half of the 9th century the central government became progressively weaker. During Yizong's reign (859–873) there was a resurgence of the eunuchs' power and a constant fratricidal strife between eunuchs and officials at court. From the 830s onward the first signs of unrest and banditry had appeared in the Huai valley and Henan, and trouble spread to the Yangtze valley and the south beginning in 856. Major uprisings were led by Kang Quantai in southern Anhui in 858 and Qiu Fu in Zhejiang in 859. The situation was complicated by a costly war against the Nanzhao kingdom on the borders of the Chinese protectorate in Annam, which later spread to Sichuan and dragged on from 858 until 866. After the invaders had been suppressed, part of the garrison force that had been sent to Lingnan mutinied and, under its leader, Pang Xun, fought and plundered its way back to Henan, where it caused widespread havoc in 868 and 869, cutting the canal linking the capital to the loyal Yangtze and Huai provinces. In 870 war broke out again with Nanzhao.

      Yizong was succeeded by Xizong (reigned 873–888), a boy of 11 who was the choice of the palace eunuchs. Prior to his ascension, Henan had repeatedly suffered serious floods. In addition, a wave of peasant risings began in 874, following a terrible drought. The most formidable of them was led by Huang Chao, who in 878 marched south and sacked Guangzhou (Canton) and then marched to the north, where he took Luoyang in late 880 and Chang'an in 881. Although Huang Chao attempted to set up a regime in the capital, he proved cruel and inept. Hemmed in by loyal armies and provincial generals, in 883 he was forced to abandon Chang'an and withdraw to Henan and then to Shandong, where he died in 884. His forces were eventually defeated with the aid of Shatuo Turks, and the Tang court was left virtually powerless, its emperor a puppet manipulated by rival military leaders. The dynasty lingered on until 907, but the last quarter century was dominated by the generals and provincial warlords. With the progressive decline of the central government in the 880s and 890s, China fell apart into a number of virtually independent kingdoms. Unity was not restored until long after the Song dynasty was established.

Cultural developments

The influence of Buddhism
 The Tang emperors officially supported Daoism because of their claim to be descended from Laozi, but Buddhism continued to enjoy great favour and lavish imperial patronage through most of the period. The famous pilgrim Xuanzang, who went to India in 629 and returned in 645, was the most learned of Chinese monks and introduced new standards of exactness in his many translations from Sanskrit. The most significant development in this time was the growth of new indigenous schools that adapted Buddhism to Chinese ways of thinking. Most prominent were the syncretistic Tiantai school, which sought to embrace all other schools in a single hierarchical system (even reaching out to include Confucianism), and the radically anti-textual, antimetaphysical southern Chan ( Zen) school, which had strong roots in Daoism. The popular preaching of the salvationist Pure Land (Pure Land Buddhism) sect was also important. After the rebellion of An Lushan, a nationalistic movement favouring Confucianism appeared, merging with the efforts of Tiantai Buddhism to graft Buddhist metaphysics onto Classical doctrine and lay the groundwork for the Neo-Confucianism of the Song era.

      In 843–845 the emperor Wuzong, a fanatical Daoist, proceeded to suppress Buddhism. One of his motives was economic. China was in a serious financial crisis, which Wuzong and his advisers hoped to solve by seizing the lands and wealth of the monasteries. The suppression was far-reaching: 40,000 shrines and temples—all but a select few—were closed, 260,000 monks and nuns were returned to lay life, and vast acreages of monastic lands were confiscated and sold and their slaves manumitted. The suppression was short-lived, but irreparable damage was done to Buddhist institutions. Buddhism had already begun to lose intellectual momentum, and this attack on it as a social institution marked the beginning of its decline in China.

      Several types of monastic (monastery) communities existed at the time. Official temples set up by the state had large endowments of land and property and large communities of monks who chose their own abbot and other officers. There were vast numbers of small village temples, shrines, and hermitages; these were often privately established, had little property, and were quite vulnerable to state policies. In addition, private temples or “merit cloisters” were established by great families, often to allow the family to donate its property and have it declared tax-exempt.

 A monastic community was free of all obligations to the state. It was able to hold property without the process of division by inheritance that made the long-term preservation of individual and family fortunes almost impossible in Tang times. It acquired its wealth from those taking monastic vows, from gifts of pious laypersons, and from grants of lands by the state. The lands were worked by monastic slaves, dependent families, lay clerics who had taken partial vows but lived with their families, and tenants. Monasteries also operated oil presses and mills, and they were important credit institutions, supplying loans at interest and acting as pawnshops. They provided lodgings for travelers, operated hospitals and infirmaries, and maintained the aged. One of their most important social functions was offering primary education. The temples maintained their own schools, training the comparatively large proportion of the male population, which, although not educated to the standards of the Confucian elite or the clergy, was nevertheless literate.

Trends in the arts
      In literature (Chinese literature) the greatest glory of the Tang period was its poetry. By the 8th century, poets had broken away from the artificial diction and matter of the court poetry of the southern dynasties and achieved a new directness and naturalism. The reign of Xuanzong (712–756)—known as Minghuang, the Brilliant Emperor—was the time of such great figures as Li Bai, Wang Wei, and Du Fu. The rebellion of An Lushan and Du Fu's bitter experiences during it brought a new note of social awareness to his later poetry. This appears again in the work of Bai Juyi (772–846), who wrote verse in clear and simple language. Toward the end of the dynasty a new poetic form, the ci, in a less regular metre than the five-word and seven-word lushi and meant to be sung, made its appearance. The guwen, or “ancient style,” movement grew up after the rebellion of An Lushan, seeking to replace the euphuistic pianwen (“parallel prose”) then dominant. It was closely associated with the movement for a Confucian revival. The most prominent figures in it were Han Yu and Liu Zongyuan. At the same time came the first serious attempts to write fiction, the so-called chuanqi, or “tales of marvels.” Many of these Tang stories later provided themes for the Chinese drama.

      The patronage of the Tang emperors and the general wealth and prosperity of the period encouraged the development of the visual arts. Though few Tang buildings remain standing, contemporary descriptions give some idea of the magnificence of Tang palaces and religious edifices and the houses of the wealthy. Buddhist sculpture shows a greater naturalism than in the previous period, but there is some loss of spirituality. Few genuine originals survive to show the work of Tang master painters such as Wu Daoxuan, who worked at Xuanzong's court. As a landscape painter, the poet Wang Wei was a forerunner of the wenren, or “literary man's,” school of mystical nature painting of later times. The minor arts of Tang, including ceramics, metalwork, and textiles, give expression to the colour and vitality of the life of the period. printing appeared for the first time during Tang. Apparently invented to help disseminate Buddhist scriptures, it was used by the end of the dynasty for such things as calendars, almanacs, and dictionaries.

Decline of the aristocracy
      By the late Tang period a series of social changes had begun that did not reach their culmination until the 11th century. The most important of these was the change in the nature of the ruling class. Although from early Tang times the examination system had facilitated recruiting into the higher ranks of the bureaucracy of persons from lesser aristocratic families, most officials continued to come from the established elite. social mobility increased after the An Lushan rebellion: provincial governments emerged, their staffs in many cases recruited from soldiers of lowly social origins, and specialized finance commissions were established, a large part of their personnel often recruited from the commercial community. The contending factions of the 9th-century court also employed irregular appointments to secure posts for their clients and supporters, many of whom also came from comparatively lowly backgrounds.

      Although the old aristocracy retained a grip on political power until very late in the dynasty, its exclusiveness and hierarchical pretensions were rapidly breaking down. It was finally extinguished as a separate group in the Wudai (Five Dynasties) period (907–960), when the old strongholds of aristocracy in the northeast and northwest became centres of bitter military and political struggles. The aristocratic clans that survived did so by merging into the new official-literati class; this class was based not on birth alone but on education, office holding, and the possession of landed property.

      At the same time, there was a return to semiservile relationships at the base of the social pyramid. Sheer economic necessity led many peasants either to dispose of their lands and become tenants (tenant farming) or hired labourers of rich neighbours or to become dependents of a powerful patron. Tenancy, which in early Tang times had most often been a temporary and purely economic agreement, now developed into a semipermanent contract requiring some degree of personal subordination from the tenant.

      The new provincial officials and local elites were able to establish their fortunes as local landowning gentry largely because after 763 the government ceased to enforce the system of state-supervised land allocation. In the aftermath of the An Lushan and later rebellions, large areas of land were abandoned by their cultivators; other areas of farmland were sold off on the dissolution of the monastic foundations in 843–845. The landed estate managed by a bailiff and cultivated by tenants, hired hands, or slaves became a widespread feature of rural life. Possession of such estates, previously limited to the established families of the aristocracy and the serving officials, now became common at less-exalted levels.

Population movements
      Censuses taken during the Sui and Tang dynasties provide some evidence as to population changes. Surviving figures for 609 and 742, representing two of the most complete of the earlier Chinese population registrations, give totals of some 9 million households, or slightly more than 50 million persons. Contemporary officials considered that only about 70 percent of the population was actually registered, so the total population may have been as much as 70 million.

      Between 609 and 742 a considerable redistribution of population took place. The population of Hebei and Henan fell by almost one-third because of the destruction suffered at the end of the Sui era and in the invasions of the 690s and because of epidemics and natural disasters. The population of Hedong (present-day Shanxi) and of Guanzhong and Longyou (present-day Shaanxi and Gansu, respectively) also fell, though not so dramatically. The population of the south, particularly the southeastern region around the lower Yangtze, took a leap upward, as did that of Sichuan.

      Whereas under the Sui the population of the Great Plain (Hebei and Henan) had accounted for more than half of the empire's total, by 742 this had dropped to about one-third. The Huai-Yangtze area, which had contained only about 8 percent of the total in 609, now contained one-fourth of the entire population, and Sichuan's share jumped from 4 percent to 10 percent of the total, exceeding the population of the metropolitan province of Guanzhong. The increase in the south was almost entirely concentrated in the lower Yangtze valley and delta and in Zhejiang.

      The revolt of An Lushan and Shi Siming and his son Shi Chaoyi (755–763) precipitated more population movements from north to south, with some of these migrants penetrating into what is now southern Hunan and beyond. These shifts then and later in the Tang considerably redistributed China's population: the south became more populous than the north, and the populations among regions in the south became more balanced.

      There are no reliable population figures from the late Tang era, but the general movement of population toward the south certainly continued, notably in the area south of the Yangtze, in present-day Jiangxi and Hunan, and in Hubei. The chaos of the last decades of the Tang dynasty completed the ruin of the northwest. After the destruction of the city of Chang'an in the Huang Chao rebellion, no regime ever again established its capital in that region.

Growth of the economy
      The 8th and 9th centuries were a period of growth and prosperity. The gradual movement of the population away from the north, with its harsh climate and dry farming, into the more fertile and productive south meant a great proportional increase in productivity. The south still had large areas of virgin land. Fujian, for example, was still only marginally settled along the coastline at the end of Tang times. During the latter half of the Tang, the Huai and lower Yangtze became a grain-surplus area, replacing Hebei and Henan. From 763 to the mid-9th century, great quantities of grain were shipped from the south annually as tax revenue. New crops, such as sugar and tea, were grown widely. The productivity of the Yangtze valley was increased by double-cropping land with rice and winter wheat and by developing new varieties of grain. After the An Lushan rebellion, silk production began to increase rapidly in Sichuan and the Yangtze delta region, whereas in early Tang times the chief silk-producing areas had been in the northeast.

      A boom in trade soon followed. The merchant class threw off its traditional legal restraints. In early Tang times there had been only two great metropolitan markets (market), in Chang'an and Luoyang. Now every provincial capital became the centre of a large consumer population of officials and military, and the provincial courts provided a market for both staple foodstuffs and luxury manufactures. The diversification of markets was still more striking in the countryside. A network of small rural market towns, purely economic in function and acting as feeders to the county markets, grew up. At these periodic markets, held at regular intervals every few days, traveling merchants and peddlers dealt in the everyday needs of the rural population. By the end of the Tang period these rural market centres had begun to form a new sort of urban centre, intermediate between the county town, with its administrative presence and its central market, and the villages.

      The growth of trade brought an increasing use of money. In early Tang times silk cloth had been commonly employed as currency in large transactions. When the central government lost control of the major silk-producing region in Hebei and Henan, silk was replaced in this use by silver. The government neither controlled silver production nor minted a silver coinage. Silver circulation and assay were in the hands of private individuals. Various credit and banking institutions began to emerge: silversmiths took money on deposit and arranged for transfers of funds; a complex system of credit transfers arose by which tea merchants would pay the tax quota for a district, sometimes even for a whole province, out of their profits from the sale of the crop at Chang'an and receive reimbursement in their home province.

      The increasing use of money and silver also affected official finance and accounting. Taxes began to be assessed in money. The salt monopoly was collected and accounted for entirely in money. The government also began to look to trade as a source of revenue—to depend increasingly on taxes from commercial transactions, levies on merchants, transit taxes on merchandise, and sales taxes.

      The most prosperous of the merchants were the great dealers in salt, the tea merchants from Jiangxi, the bankers of the great cities and particularly of Chang'an, and the merchants engaged in overseas trade in the coastal ports. Foreign trade (international trade) was still dominated by non-Chinese merchants. Yangzhou and Guangzhou had large Arab trading communities. The northern coastal traffic was dominated by the Koreans. Overland trade to Central Asia was mostly in the hands of Sogdian and, later, Uighur merchants. Central Asian, Sogdian, and Persian merchants and peddlers carried on much local retail trade and provided restaurants, wine shops, and brothels in the great cities. Only in the 9th century did the foreign influence in trade begin to recede.

      In the late Tang many officials began to invest their money (and official funds entrusted to them) in commercial activities. High officials took to running oil presses and flour mills, dealing in real estate, and providing capital for merchants. The wall between the ruling class and the merchants that had existed since the Han period was rapidly breaking down in the 9th century, and the growth of urbanization, which characterized the Song period (960–1279), had already begun on a wide scale.

Denis C. Twitchett

The Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms
 The period of political disunity between the Tang and the Song lasted little more than half a century, from 907 to 960. During that brief era, when China was truly a multistate system, five short-lived regimes succeeded one another in control of the old imperial heartland in northern China, hence the name Wudai ( Five Dynasties). During those same years, 10 relatively stable regimes occupied sections of southern and western China, so the period is also referred to as that of the Shiguo ( Ten Kingdoms).

      Most of the major developments of that period were extensions of changes already under way during the late Tang, and many were not completed until after the founding of the Song dynasty. For example, the process of political disintegration had begun long before Zhu Wen brought the Tang dynasty to a formal end in 907. The developments that eventually led to reunification, the rapid economic and commercial growth of the period, and the decline of the aristocratic clans had also begun long before the first Song ruler, Taizu, reconquered most of the empire, and they continued during the reigns of his successors on the Song throne.

The Wudai (Five Dynasties)
      None of the Wudai regimes that dominated northern China ever forgot the ideal of the unified empire. Each sought, with gradually increasing success, to strengthen the power of the central authorities. Even Zhu Wen, who began the Wudai by deposing the last Tang emperor in 907, sought to extend his control in the north. While consolidating his strength on the strategic plains along the Huang He (Yellow River) and connecting them with the vital transportation system of the Grand Canal, he made the significant choice of locating his base at Bian (present-day Kaifeng, in Henan); it later became the Bei (Northern) Song capital. Bian's lack of historical prestige was balanced by its proximity to the ancient capital, Luoyang, a short distance to the west, which was still China's cultural centre. Zhu Wen's short-lived Hou (Later) Liang dynasty, founded in 907, was superseded by the Hou Tang in 923, by the Hou Jin in 936, by the Hou Han in 947, and by the Hou Zhou in 951. These rapid successions of dynasties came to an end only with the rise in 960 of the Song dynasty, which finally succeeded in establishing another lasting empire and in taking over much, though not all, of the former Tang empire.

      Beneath the surface, however, were the continuous efforts to reintegrate the political process that heralded the coming of a new empire and helped to shape its political system. In this respect the successive rulers moved like a relay team along the tortuous road back to unification. These militarists expanded their personal power by recruiting peoples of relatively humble social origins to replace the aristocrats. Such recruits owed personal allegiance to their masters, on whose favours their political positions depended, thus presaging the rise of absolutism.

      Rather than being discarded, the Tang administrative form underwent expedient alterations so that the new types of officials, promoted because of merit from regional posts to palace positions, could use the military administration to supervise the nearby provinces and gradually bring them under direct control. Top priority went to securing fiscal resources from the salt monopoly, tribute transport, and in particular new tax revenues, without which military domination would have been hard to sustain and political expansion impossible. Eventually, a pattern of centralizing authority emerged. Fiscal and supply officials of the successive regimes went out to supervise provincial finances and the local administration. The minor militarists, heretofore the local governors in control of their own areas, were under double pressure to submit to reintegrating measures. They faced the inducement of political accommodation, which allowed them to keep their residual power, and the military threat of palace army units commanded by special commissioners, which were sent on patrol duty into their areas. The way was thus paved, in spite of occasional detours and temporary setbacks, for the ultimate unification.

      The seemingly chaotic period was in fact less chaotic than other rebellious times—except from the standpoint of the aristocrats, who lost their preeminent status along with their large estates, which were usually taken over piecemeal by their former managers. The aristocratic era in Chinese history was gone forever; a new bureaucratic era was about to begin.

The Shiguo ( Ten Kingdoms)
 From the time of the Tang dynasty until the Qing dynasty, which arose in the 17th century, China consisted of two parts: the militarily strong north and the economically and culturally wealthy south. Between 907 and 960, 10 independent kingdoms emerged in China, mainly in the south: the Wu (902–937), the Nan (Southern) Tang (937–975/976), the Nan Ping (924–963), the Chu (927–951), the Qian (Former) Shu (907–925), the Hou (Later) Shu (934–965), the Min (909–945), the Bei (Northern) Han (951–979), the Nan Han (917–971), and the Wu-Yue (907–978), the last located in China's most rapidly advancing area—in and near the lower Yangtze delta.

      Some of these separate regimes achieved relative internal stability, although none attained enough strength to strive to unify China. Nonetheless, the regional developments in southern China, in the upper Yangtze region in southwestern China, and in the lower Yangtze region in southeastern China were of great interest. In southern China the Min kingdom in modern Fujian and the Nan Han in present-day Guangdong and Guangxi reflected sharp cultural differences. Along the coast, sea trade expanded, promoting both urban prosperity and cultural diversity. On land, wave after wave of refugees moved southward, settling along rivers and streams and in confining plains and mountain valleys and using a frontier agriculture but with highly developed irrigation and land reclamation. Usually they pushed aside the aboriginal minorities, earlier settlers, and previous immigrant groups. This process turned southern China into a cultural chessboard of great complexity, with various subcultural pieces sandwiched between one another. Many eventually evolved along different lines.

      In southwestern China the valley of what is now Sichuan (Sichuan Basin) presented a notably different picture of continuous growth. Usually protected from outside disturbances and invasions by the surrounding mountains, it enjoyed peace and prosperity except for one decade of instability between the Qian Shu and Hou Shu. The beautiful landscape inspired poets, who infused a refreshing vitality into old-style poetry and essays. In this region, a stronghold of Daoist (Daoism) religion, the people inserted into Confucian scholarship an admixture of Daoist philosophy. Buddhism also flourished. These intellectual trends in Sichuan foreshadowed an eclectic synthesis of the three major teachings—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism.

      The Buddhist monasteries owned large estates and were usually among the first to introduce new and better technology. Growing commerce created a demand for money. The ensuing shortage of copper for coinage was met by an increasing output of iron through more-efficient methods and an elementary division of labour in production. When the limited number of copper coins could no longer meet the growing volume of trade, iron currency briefly went into circulation. With increasing commerce, various paper credit instruments were also developed, the best-known being drafts for transmitting funds called feiqian (“flying money”). Somewhat later the private assay shops in Sichuan began to issue certificates of deposit (certificate of deposit) to merchants who had left valuables at the shops for safekeeping. These instruments, which began to circulate, were the direct ancestors of the paper money that emerged in the early 11th century.

      During the Wudai, printing became common. The most famous and monumental cultural production of the period was the editing and printing of the Confucian Classics and the Buddhist Tipitaka, but a printing industry also emerged during the Wudai that produced works for private buyers. The best printing in the country during the Wudai and the Song dynasty came from the regions of Sichuan and Fujian.

      From the Wudai onward, southeastern China, especially its core region of the Yangtze delta, began to lead the country in both economic prosperity and cultural refinement. In this region, fertile soil, irrigation networks, and highly selected crops combined to create the best model of intensive farming. Interlocking streams, rivers, and lakes fed an ever-increasing number of markets, market towns, cities, and metropolitan areas, where many farm products were processed into an ever-expanding variety of consumer goods. Such development enhanced regional trade, stimulated other regions to adopt specialization, and promoted overseas commerce.

      The Song conquerors from the north recognized the high level of cultural development in this region. After the surrender of the last Nan Tang ruler, himself a renowned poet, the unexcelled royal library was moved to the north; along with it went many officials who were skilled in art, literature, and bibliography. The surrender of the Wu-Yue kingdom, slightly farther south, followed the same pattern. Moreover, refined culture developed away from the coast in such inland mountainous areas as present-day Jiangxi, which shortly thereafter produced internationally coveted porcelain and where many great artists and scholar-officials attained positions of cultural leadership. Thereafter, southeastern China retained its cultural excellence. At the end of the Bei Song period, the Nan Song based itself in the lower Yangtze delta and located its capital at Lin-an (present-day Hangzhou), the former capital of the Wu-Yue.

      As traditional histories stress, this period of disunity definitely had its dark side: militarism, wars, disintegration of the old order, and an inevitable lowering of moral standards. The dark side, however, stemmed largely from underlying changes that were transforming China into a new pattern that would last for nearly a millennium.

The barbarians: Tangut, Khitan, and Juchen
      On the frontier, the far-reaching influence of Tang culture affected various nomadic, seminomadic, and pastoral peoples.

The Tangut
      In the northwest the Tangut (Pinyin: Dangxiang), a Tibetan-speaking branch of the Qiang, inhabited the region between the far end of the Great Wall in present-day Gansu and the Huang He bend in Inner Mongolia. Their semi-oasis economy combined irrigated agriculture with pastoralism, and, by controlling the terminus of the famous Silk Road, they became middlemen in trade between Central Asia and China. They adopted Buddhism as a state religion, in government and education followed the Tang model, and devised a written script for their own language. This richly mixed culture blossomed, as evidenced by the storing at the Dunhuang caves of an unparalleled collection of more than 30,000 religious paintings, manuscripts, and books in Chinese, Tibetan, Uighur, and other languages. In 1038 the Tangut proclaimed their own kingdom of Xi (Western) Xia (Xi Xia), which survived for nearly two centuries with remarkable stability despite a series of on-and-off border clashes with the neighbouring states in northern China. The kingdom's end came at the hands of the Mongols, the first nomads to conquer all of China.

The Khitan
      To the north at the time of the Wudai rose the seminomadic but largely pastoral Khitan, who were related to the eastern Mongols. The word Khitan (or Khitai) is the source of Cathay, the name for northern China in medieval Europe (as reported by Marco Polo), and of Kitai, the Russian name for China. The Khitan founded the Liao (Liao dynasty) dynasty (907–1125) by expanding from the border of Mongolia into both southern Manchuria and the 16 prefectures south of the Great Wall. This area below the line of the Great Wall was to remain out of Chinese political control for more than 400 years. Its control by a non-Chinese state posed a dangerous security problem for the Bei (Northern) Song. More importantly in the long run, this region acted for centuries as a centre for the mutual exchange of culture between the Chinese and the northern peoples.

      The Liao made Yanjing (present-day Beijing) their southern capital, thus starting that city's history as a capital, and claimed to be the legitimate successors to the Tang. They incorporated their own tribes under respective chieftains and, with other subdued tribes in the area, formed a confederation, which they then transformed into a hereditary monarchy. Leadership always remained in the hands of the ruling tribe, the Yelü, who for the sake of stability shifted to the Chinese clan system of orderly succession.

      The Liao economy was based on horse and sheep raising and on agriculture. Millet was the main crop, and salt, controlled by government monopoly, was an important source of revenue. Other commodities included iron produced by smelters. The Liao employed an effective dual system of administration to guard against the danger of being absorbed by Sinicization. They had one administration for their own people that enforced tribal laws, maintained traditional rites, and largely retained the steppe style of food and clothing. The Liao deliberately avoided the use of Chinese and added to their particular branch of the Mongolian language two types of writing—a smaller one that was alphabetical and a larger one related to Chinese characters. A second administration governed the farming region using the old Tang system, with Tang official titles, an examination system, Chinese-style tax regulations, and the Chinese language. The laws of the second administration enforced the established way of life, including such practices as ancestral worship among the Chinese subjects. The status of Chinese subjects varied: some were free subjects who might move upward into the civil service, while others might be held in bondage and slavery.

      Though honouring the Confucian philosophy, the Liao rulers patronized Chinese Buddhism. Their achievements were generally military and administrative rather than cultural, but they did provide a model for their successors, the Jin, who in turn influenced the Mongols and, through them, succeeding Chinese dynasties.

The Juchen
      The Liao were eventually overthrown by the Juchen (Pinyin: Nüchen), another seminomadic and semipastoral people who originated in Manchuria, swept across northern China, ended the Bei Song, and established the Jin dynasty (1115–1234). This new and much larger empire in northern China followed the Liao pattern of dual government and of some acculturation but at a much higher cultural level.

      The Juchen, in establishing their Chinese-style Jin empire, occupied a broader geographic region in the farming country than had any previous nomadic or pastoral conquerors. The migration of their own people in large numbers notwithstanding, they were proportionally a smaller minority than were the Khitan, for the Jin ruled a much larger Chinese population. Because they formed a small minority in their own empire, their tribesmen were kept in a standing army (militia) that was always prepared for warfare. They were quartered among their farming subjects but were expected to respond to the command of their captains at short notice. In the military service the Juchen language was kept alive, and no Chinese-style names, clothing, or customs were permitted. They realized that protecting their separate ethnic and cultural identity was indispensable to maintaining military superiority.

      Politically, however, it was necessary for the Juchen rulers to familiarize themselves with the sophisticated culture of their Chinese subjects in order to manage state affairs. While limiting Chinese participation in the government, they shrewdly deflected the interests of their subjects toward the pursuit of such peaceful arts as printing, scholarship, painting, literature, and, significantly, the development of drama for widespread entertainment. (These trends continued under the Mongols and enriched Chinese culture.) In spite of the Juchen efforts, time was on the side of the majority culture, which gradually absorbed the minority. The transplanted tribesmen, after settling on farmland, could not avoid being affected by the Chinese way of life, particularly during long periods of peace.

      Economically, the Juchen were no match for the Chinese. In time a number of Juchen became tenants on Chinese-owned land; some were reduced to paupers. Their economic decline altered social relations. Eventually they were permitted to intermarry, usually with parties wealthier than themselves. Their military strength also declined. It became normal for military units to be undermanned. Captains of “hundreds” often could put no more than two dozen men into the field, and captains of “thousands” had no more than four or five such nominal “hundreds” under them. Their ruling class followed a parallel decline. The interests of the ruling group shifted from government affairs to Confucian studies, Chinese Classics, and Tang- and Song-style poetry. The rulers found little use for the two styles of Juchen script that their ancestors had devised. Eventually the Juchen, much weakened, were brought down by the Mongols, led by Genghis Khan and his successors.

Bei (Northern) Song (960–1127)
 The Bei Song (also known simply as the Song (Song dynasty)) was the last major Chinese dynasty to be founded by a coup d'état. Its founder, Zhao Kuangyin (known by his temple name, Taizu), the commander of the capital area of Kaifeng and inspector general of the imperial forces, usurped the throne from the Hou (Later) Zhou, the last of the Wudai.

      Though a militarist himself, Taizu ended militarism as well as usurpation. Even his own coup was skillfully disguised to make it appear that the popular acclaim of the rank and file left him with no choice. Taizu was masterful in political maneuvering, and as emperor (reigned 960–976) he did not destroy other powerful generals as had many previous founding rulers. Instead, he persuaded them to give up their commands in exchange for honorary titles, sinecure offices, and generous pensions—an unheard-of arrangement in Chinese history. The Song founder and his successors reduced the military power of the generals and used a variety of techniques to keep them weak, but Song rulers continued to support their social importance by frequently marrying members of the imperial clan to members of leading military families.

      With a shrewd appreciation of the war-weariness among the population, Taizu stressed the Confucian (Confucianism) spirit of humane administration and the reunification of the whole country. To implement this policy, he took power from the military governors, consolidated it at court, and delegated the supervision of military affairs to able civilians; no official was regarded as above suspicion. A pragmatic civil service (Chinese civil service) system evolved, with a flexible distribution of power and elaborate checks and balances. Each official had a titular office, indicating his rank but not his actual function, a commission for his normal duties, and additional assignments or honours. This seemingly confusing formula enabled the ruler to remove an official to a lower position without demotion of rank, to give an official a promotion in rank but an insignificant assignment, and to pick up a low-ranking talent and test him on a crucial commission. Councillors controlled only the civil administration because the division of authority made the military commissioner and the finance commissioner separate entities, reporting directly to the ruler, who coordinated all important decisions. In decision making, the emperor received additional advice from academicians and other advisers—collectively known as opinion officials—whose function was to provide separate channels of information and to check up on the administrative branches.

      Similar checks and balances existed in the diffused network of regional officials. The empire was divided into circuits, which were units of supervision rather than administration. Within these circuits, intendants were charged with overseeing the civil administration. Below these intendants were the actual administrators. These included prefects, whose positions were divided into several grades according to an area's size and importance. Below the prefects there were district magistrates (subprefects) in charge of areas corresponding roughly in size to counties. The duties of these subprefects were catholic, for they were supposed to see to all aspects of the welfare of the people in their area. This was the lowest level of major direct imperial rule (though there were some petty officials on levels below the district). Because the members of the formal civil service level of the government were so few, actual administration in the yamen, or administrative headquarters, depended heavily on the clerical staff. Beyond the yamen walls, control was in the hands of an officially sanctioned but locally staffed sub-bureaucracy.

      Following Confucian ideals, the founder of the Song dynasty lived modestly, listened to his ministers, and curbed excessive taxation. The rising prestige of his regime preceded his conquests. He also absorbed the best military units under his own command and disciplined them in the same Confucian style. His superior force notwithstanding, he embarked on a reunification program by mixing war with lenient diplomatic or accommodative terms that assured defeated rivals of generous treatment. A well-planned strategy first took Sichuan in the southwest in 965, the extreme south in 971, and the most prosperous lower Yangtze area in the southeast one year before his death, making the reunification nearly complete. The Wu-Yue, the sole survivor among the Shiguo (Ten Kingdoms) in the south, chose to surrender without a war in 978.

      The sudden death of the founder of the Song dynasty left a speculative legend of assassination, though it was probably caused by his heavy drinking. The legend stemmed from the fact that his young son was denied the orderly succession. Instead, the emperor's younger brother, who had acquired much experience at his side, seized the throne. With reunification accomplished in the south, the new emperor, Taizong (reigned 976–997), turned northward to attack and conquer Bei Han (979), the last remaining Shiguo. He continued to fight the Khitan (Liao dynasty) empire in the north, only to suffer a disastrous defeat in 986. Taizong's relative shortage of horses and grazing grounds to breed them, in contrast to the strong Khitan cavalries, was not the only reason for the defeat. It also resulted from a deliberate policy of removing generals from their armies, subordinating officers to civilians, concentrating strength in imperial units, and converting most provincial armies into labour battalions.

      The Song never achieved a military prowess comparable to that of the Han or the Tang. Despite the occasional bellicosity of its officials, the Song government failed to penetrate Indochina or to break the power of the Xi Xia of Gansu and Shaanxi. As a result, Song China became increasingly isolated, especially from Central Asia, whence much cultural stimulus had come under preceding dynasties. Combined with a natural pride in internal advancements, China's cultural ethnocentrism deepened.

      The Song achieved consolidation under the third emperor, Zhenzong (reigned 997–1022). A threatening Khitan offensive was directly met by the emperor himself, but a few battles assured neither side of victory. The two empires pledged peaceful coexistence in 1004 through an exchange (diplomacy) of sworn documents that foreshadowed modern international treaties. The Khitan gave up its claim to a disputed area it had once occupied south of the Great Wall, and the Song agreed to a yearly tribute: 100,000 units (a rough equivalent of troy ounces) of silver and 200,000 rolls of silk. It was a modest price for the Song to pay for securing the frontier.

      The emperor thereafter sought to strengthen his absolutist image by claiming a Daoist (Daoism) charisma. Prompted by magicians and ingratiating high officials, he proclaimed that he had received a sacred document directly from heaven. He ordered a grand celebration with elaborate rites, accompanied by reconstructed music of ancient times, and he made a tour to offer sacrifices at Mount Tai, following precedents of the Qin, Han, and Tang dynasties.

      After the emperor's death, friction arose between his widow—the empress dowager, who was acting as regent—and Renzong (reigned 1022–63), Zhenzong's teenage son by a palace lady of humble rank. Following the death of the empress dowager, Renzong divorced his empress, who had been chosen for him by and had remained in sympathy with the empress dowager. However, the divorce was unjustifiable in Confucian morality and damaged the imperial image.

      By that time the bureaucracy was more highly developed and sophisticated than it had been in the early Song. Well-regulated civil service examinations brought new groups of excellent scholar-officials who, though a numerical minority, dominated the higher policy-making levels of government. The sponsorship system, which discouraged favouritism by putting responsibility on the sponsors for the official conduct of their appointees, also ensured deserving promotions and carefully chosen appointments. Many first-rate officials—especially those from the south whose families had no previous bureaucratic background—upheld Confucian ideals. These new officials were critical not only of palace impropriety but also of bureaucratic malpractices, administrative sluggishness, fiscal abuses, and socioeconomic inequities. Respecting absolutism, they focused their attacks on a veteran chief councillor, whom the emperor had trusted for years. Factionalism developed because many established scholar-officials, mostly from the north, with long bureaucratic family backgrounds, stood by their leader, the same chief councillor.

      A series of crises seems to prove that the complaints of the idealists were justified. After half a century of complacency, peace and prosperity began to erode. This became apparent in the occurrence of small-scale rebellions near the capital itself, in the disturbing inability of local governors to restore order themselves, and in a dangerous penetration of the northwestern border by Xi Xia, which rejected its vassal status and declared itself an independent kingdom. The Khitan took advantage of the changing military balance by threatening another invasion. The idealistic faction, put into power under these critical circumstances in 1043–44, effectively stopped the Xi Xia on the frontier by reinforcing a chain of defense posts and made it pay due respect to the Song as the superior empire (though the Song no longer claimed suzerainty). Meanwhile, peace with the Khitan was again ensured when the Song increased its yearly tribute to them.

      The court also instituted administrative reforms, stressing the need for emphasizing statecraft problems in civil service examinations, eliminating patronage appointments for family members and relatives of high officials, and enforcing strict evaluation of administrative performance. It also advocated reducing compulsory labour, land reclamation and irrigation construction, organizing local militias, and thoroughly revising codes and regulations. Though mild in nature, the reforms hurt vested interests. Shrewd opponents undermined the reformers by misleading the emperor into suspecting that they had received too much power and were disrespectful of him personally. With the crises eased, the emperor found one excuse after another to send most reformers away from court. The more conventionally minded officials were returned to power.

      Despite a surface of seeming stability, the administrative machinery once again fell victim to creeping deterioration. Some reformers eventually returned to court, beginning in the 1050s, but their idealism was modified by the political lesson they had learned. Eschewing policy changes and tolerating colleagues of varying opinions, they made appreciable progress by concentrating on the choice of better personnel, proper direction, and careful implementation within the conventional system, but many fundamental problems remained unsolved. Mounting military expenditures did not bring greater effectiveness, and an expanding and more costly bureaucracy could not reverse the trend of declining tax yields. Income no longer covered expenditures. During the brief reign of Yingzong (1063–67), relatively minor disputes and symbolically important issues concerning ceremonial matters embroiled the bureaucracy in mutual and bitter criticism.

       Shenzong (reigned 1067–85) was a reform emperor. Originally a prince reared outside the palace, familiar with social conditions and devoted to serious studies, he did not come into the line of imperial succession until adoption had put his father on the throne before him. Shenzong responded vigorously (and rather unexpectedly, from the standpoint of many bureaucrats) to the problems troubling the established order, some of which were approaching crisis proportions. Keeping above partisan politics, he made the scholar-poet Wang Anshi his chief councillor and gave him full backing to make sweeping reforms. Known as the New Laws, or New Policies, these reform measures attempted drastic institutional changes. In sum, they sought administrative effectiveness, fiscal surplus, and military strength. Wang's famous “Ten Thousand Word Memorial” outlined the philosophy of the reforms. Contrary to conventional Confucian views, it upheld assertive governmental roles, but its ideal remained basically Confucian: economic prosperity would provide the social environment essential to moral well-being.

      Never before had the government undertaken so many economic activities. The emperor empowered Wang to institute a top-level office for fiscal planning, which supervised the Finance Commission, previously beyond the jurisdiction of the chief councillor. The government squarely faced the reality of a rapidly spreading money economy by increasing the supply of currency. The state became involved in trading, buying specific products of one area for resale elsewhere (thereby facilitating the exchange of goods), stabilizing prices whenever and wherever necessary, and making a profit itself. This did not displace private trading activities. On the contrary, the government extended loans (credit) to small urban and regional traders through state pawnshops—a practice somewhat like modern government banking but unheard-of at the time. Far more important, if not controversial, the government made loans at the interest rate, low for the period, of 20 percent to the whole peasantry during the sowing season, thus assuring their farming productivity and undercutting their dependency upon usurious loans from the well-to-do. The government also maintained granaries in various cities to ensure adequate supplies on hand in case of emergency need. The burden on wealthy and poor alike was made more equitable by a graduated tax (taxation) scale based on a reassessment of the size and the productivity of the landholdings. Similarly, compulsory labour was converted to a system of graduated tax payments, which were used to finance a hired-labour service program that at least theoretically controlled underemployment in farming areas. Requisition of various supplies from guilds was also replaced by cash assessments, with which the government was to buy what it needed at a fair price.

      Wang's reforms achieved increased military power as well. To remedy the Song's military weakness and to reduce the immense cost of a standing professional army, the villages were given the duty of organizing militias, under the old name of baojia, to maintain local order in peacetime and to serve as army reserves in wartime. To reinforce the cavalry, the government procured horses and assigned them to peasant households in northern and northwestern areas. Various weapons were also developed. As a result of these efforts, the empire eventually scored some minor victories along the northwestern border.

      The gigantic reform program required an energetic bureaucracy, which Wang attempted to create—with mixed results—by means of a variety of policies: promoting a nationwide state school system; establishing or expanding specialized training in such utilitarian professions as the military, law, and medicine, which were neglected by Confucian education; placing a strong emphasis on supportive interpretations of Classics, some of which Wang himself supplied rather dogmatically; demoting and dismissing dissenting officials (thus creating conflicts in the bureaucracy); and providing strong incentives for better performances by clerical staffs, including merit promotion into bureaucratic ranks.

      The magnitude of the reform program was matched only by the bitter opposition to it. Determined criticism came from the groups hurt by the reform measures: large landowners, big merchants, and moneylenders. Noncooperation and sabotage arose among the bulk of the bureaucrats, drawn as they were from the landowning and otherwise wealthy classes. Geographically, the strongest opposition came from the traditionally more conservative northern areas. Ideologically, however, the criticisms did not necessarily coincide with either class background or geographic factors. They were best expressed by many leading scholar-officials, some of whom were northern conservatives while others were brilliant talents from Sichuan. Both the emperor and Wang failed to reckon with the fact that, by its very nature, the entrenched bureaucracy could tolerate no sudden change in the system to which it had become accustomed. It also reacted against the over concentration of power at the top, which neglected the art of distributing and balancing power among government offices, the overexpansion of governmental power in society, and the tendency to apply policies relatively uniformly in a locally diverse empire.

      Without directly attacking the emperor, the critics attacked the reformers for deviating from orthodox Confucianism. It was wrong, the opponents argued, for the state to pursue profits, to assume inordinate power, and to interfere in the normal life of the common people. It was often true as charged that the reforms—and the resulting changes in government—brought about the rise of unscrupulous officials, an increase in high-handed abuses in the name of strict law enforcement, unjustified discrimination against many scholar-officials of long experience, intense factionalism, and resulting widespread miseries among the population—all of which were in contradiction to the claims of the reform objectives. Particularly open to criticism was the rigidity of the reform system, which allowed little regional discretion or desirable adjustment for differing conditions in various parts of the empire.

      In essence the reforms augmented growing trends toward both absolutism and bureaucracy. Even in the short run, the cost of the divisive factionalism that the reforms generated had disastrous effects. To be fair, Wang was to blame for his overzealous if not doctrinaire beliefs, his low tolerance for criticism, and his persistent support of his followers even when their errors were hardly in doubt. Nonetheless, it was Shenzong himself who was ultimately responsible. Determined to have the reform measures implemented, he ignored loud remonstrances, disregarded friendly appeals to have certain measures modified, and continued the reforms after Wang's retirement.

      The traditional historians, by studying documentary evidence alone, overlooked the fact that scholar-officials rarely openly criticized an absolutist emperor, and they generally echoed the critical views of the conservatives in assigning the blame to Wang—a revisionist Confucian in public, a profound Buddhist practitioner in his old age, and a great poet and essayist.

 Careful balancing of powers in the bureaucracy, through which the rulers acted and from which they received advice and information, was essential to good government in China. The demonstrated success of this principle in early Bei Song so impressed later scholars that they described it as the art of government. It became a lost art under Shenzong, however, in the reform zeal and more so in the subsequent eagerness to do away with the reforms.

      The reign of Zhezong (1085–1100) began with a regency under another empress dowager, who recalled the conservatives to power. An antireform period lasted until 1093, during which time most of the reforms were rescinded or drastically revised. Though men of integrity, the conservatives offered few constructive alternatives. They managed to relax tension and achieve a seeming stability, but this did not prevent old problems from recurring. Some conservatives objected to turning back the clock, especially by swinging to the opposite extreme, but they were silenced. Once the young emperor took control, he undid what the empress dowager had put in place; the pendulum swung once again to a restoration of the reforms, a period that lasted to the end of the Bei Song. In such repeated convulsions, the government could not escape dislocation, and the society became demoralized. Moreover, the restored reform movement was a mere ghost without its original idealism. Enough grounds were found by conservatives out of power to blame the reforms for the fall of the dynasty.

      Zhezong's successor, Huizong (reigned 1100–1125/26), was a great patron of the arts and an excellent artist himself, but such qualities did not make him a good ruler. Indulgent in pleasures and irresponsible in state affairs, he misplaced his trust in favourites. Those in power knew how to manipulate the regulatory system to obtain excessive tax revenues. At first, the complacent emperor granted more support to government schools everywhere; the objection that this move might flood the already crowded bureaucracy was dismissed, seeing the significant gains it would bring in popular support among scholar-officials. The emperor then commissioned the construction of a costly new imperial garden. When his extravagant expenditures put the treasury in deficit, he rescinded scholarships in government schools. Support for him among scholar-officials soon vanished.

      More serious was carelessness in war and diplomacy. The Song disregarded the treaty and coexistence with the Liao (Liao dynasty) empire, allied itself with the expanding Juchen from Manchuria, and made a concerted attack on the Liao. The Song commander, contrary to long-held prohibition, was a favoured eunuch; under him and other unworthy generals, military expenditures ran high, but army morale was low. The fall of Liao was cause for court celebration, but because the Juchen had done most of the fighting, they accused the Song of not doing its share and denied it certain spoils of the conquest. The Juchen soon turned on the Song. Huizong chose to abdicate at that point, giving himself the title of Daoist “emperor emeritus” and leaving affairs largely in the unprepared hands of his son, Qinzong (reigned 1125/26–1127), while seeking safety and pleasure himself by touring the Yangtze region.

      During that period the government became increasingly ineffective. The reform movement had enlarged both the size and duties of the clerical staff. The antireform period brought a cutback but also a confusion that presented manipulative opportunities to some clerks. Supervision was difficult because officials stayed only a few years, whereas clerks remained in office for long periods. Bureaucratic laxity spread quickly to the clerical level. Bribes for appointments went either to them or through their hands. It was they who made cheating possible at examinations, using literary agents as intermediaries between candidates and themselves.

      The Juchen swept across the Huang He plain and found the internally decayed Song an easy prey. During their long siege of Kaifeng (1126), they repeatedly demanded ransoms in gold, silver, jewels, other valuables, and general supplies. The court, whose emergency call for help brought only undermanned reinforcements and untrained volunteers, met the invaders' demands and ordered the capital residents to follow suit. Finally, an impoverished mob plundered the infamous imperial garden for firewood. The court remained convinced that financial power could buy peace, and the Juchen lifted the siege briefly. But once aware that local resources were exhausted and that the regime, even with the return of the emperor emeritus, no longer had the capability of delivering additional wealth from other parts of the country, the invaders changed their tactics. They captured the two emperors and the entire imperial house, exiled them to Manchuria, and put a tragic end to the Bei Song.

Nan (Southern) Song (1127–1279)
 The Juchen could not extend their conquest south of the Yangtze River. In addition, the Huai River valley, with its winding streams and crisscrossed marshlands, made cavalry operations difficult. Though the invaders penetrated this region and raided several areas below the Yangtze, they found the weather there too warm and humid for them. Moreover, the farther they went, the stronger the resistance they met, as they penetrated into areas that had been leading the country in productivity and population and therefore in defense capability. Besides, the Juchen felt concerned about the areas in the rear that they had already occupied: one after another of their puppet rulers there had failed to secure popular support, and the Juchen had been forced to consolidate control by setting up their own administration, following the Liao model of dual government.

Survival and consolidation
      Despite the fall of the Bei Song, the majority of scholar-officials refused to identify themselves with the alien conquerors. The same was generally true at the grassroots level, among numerous roving bands of former volunteer militias, army units that had disintegrated, and bandits who had arisen during the disorder. As time went on, both civilians and military men turned toward the pretender to the throne, Gaozong. He was the only son of the former emperor Huizong who had been absent from Kaifeng and thus spared captivity.

      As the founder of the Nan Song, Gaozong devoted his long reign (1127–62) to the arduous task of putting the pieces together. He rediscovered the lost arts of his ancestors: recruiting bureaucrats, securing fiscal resources, and extending centralized control. Because he started with no more than a few thousand troops, he had to place a much greater reliance on sophisticated politics, which he often artfully disguised. By praising the old, established ways of his predecessors, he pleased the conservatives who remained opposed to the reform system. In reality, he modified the system he had inherited where it had obviously failed and pragmatically retained the parts that were working. He honoured the scholar-officials who had refused to serve under the puppet rulers, but he was also glad to have those who had compromised their integrity in so serving. While he denounced the notorious favourites who had misled his father, he used the excuse of being broad-minded in picking many of their former subordinates for key positions, especially those experienced in raising tax revenues. A new network of officials called the fiscal superintendent generals was set up in each region, but they reported directly to court. Urban taxes were increased; they were easier to collect than rural revenues, and prosperous cities did not suffer much from the imposition. The high priority placed on fiscal matters, though not publicized as in the previous reform period in order to avoid a bad image, persisted throughout the Nan Song, which was a long era of heavy taxation.

      Some officials, anxious to recover the central plains, wished to have the capital located in Nanjing, or farther up the Yangtze in central China. Gaozong discreetly declined such advice because these locations were militarily exposed. Instead, he chose Hang (present-day Hangzhou), renaming it Lin'an (“Temporary Safety”), as it occupied a more defensible location. It was popularly referred to as the place of imperial headquarters (Xingzai), later known to Marco Polo as Quinsai. Economically, it had the advantage of being at the corner of the lower Yangtze delta, the wealthy core of the new empire.

      The Nan Song, through continuous development, eventually became wealthier than the Bei Song had been. Though its capital was near the sea—the only such instance among the Chinese empires—and international trade increased, the country was not sea-oriented. Gaozong maintained a defensive posture against periodic Juchen incursions from the north and meanwhile proceeded to restore imperial authority in the hinterland as far west as the strategic Sichuan and in parts of Shaanxi to its immediate north.

      No less important was the need for adequate military forces. Neither conscription nor recruitment would suffice. Because his position was militarily weak but financially strong, Gaozong adopted the zhao'an policy, which offered peace to the various roving bands. The government granted them legitimate status as regular troops, and it overlooked their minor abuses in local matters. Thus, the size of imperial forces swelled, and the problem of internal security was largely settled. The court then turned its attention to the control of these armies, which was inseparable from the issue of war or peace with the Juchen.

      Gaozong did not want to prolong the war; he valued most the security of his realm. A few minor victories did not convince him that he could hope to recover northern China. Rather, he saw war as a heavy drain on available resources, with the risk of eventual defeat. Nor did he feel comfortable with the leading generals, on whom he would have to rely in case the war went on. He had to get around the critics at court, however, who found the Juchen peace terms humiliating and unacceptable: in addition to an enormous yearly tribute, the Juchen demanded that the Nan Song formally admit, with due ceremonials, its inferior status as a vassal state. The shrewd emperor found an impeccable excuse for accepting the terms by claiming filial piety: he sought the return of his mother from captivity. To this no Confucian could openly object. Significantly, Gaozong refrained from asking the release of former emperor Qinzong, as such a move would have called into question the legitimacy of his succession.

      A dramatic crisis occurred in 1141. On the eve of concluding peace negotiations, Gaozong decided to strip the three leading generals of their commands. The generals, summoned to the capital on the pretext of rewarding their merits, were promoted to military commissioners, while their units were reorganized into separate entities directly under imperial control. Two of the generals reconciled themselves to the nominal honours and sizable pensions, but the third, Yue Fei, openly criticized the peace negotiations. He was put to death on a trumped-up charge of high treason. He later became the subject of a great legend, in which he was seen as a symbol of patriotism. At the time, however, his elimination signified full internal and external security for the court.

Relations with the Juchen
      In spite of Gaozong's personal inclination, his artful guiding hand, and the success of his efforts to consolidate the empire, the impulse remained strong among many idealistic Confucians to attempt to recover the central plains. Even when silenced, they were potentially critical of court policies. Gaozong eventually decided to abdicate, leaving the matter to his adopted heir, but he retained control from behind the throne. The new emperor, Xiaozong (reigned 1163–89), sympathetic to the idealists, appointed several of them to court positions and command posts. Information about a Juchen palace coup and alleged unrest in the Juchen empire, particularly in the parts recently occupied, led to a decision to resume the war. An initial Song attack was repulsed with such heavy losses that even regrouping took some time to accomplish. Sporadic fighting went on for nearly two years in the Huai valley, reflecting a military stalemate. The outcome, in 1165, was a significant change in the new peace formula: the vassal state designation was dropped, and the Nan Song attained a nearly equal footing with the Juchen, although it had to defer to the latter empire as the senior one.

      After the death of Gaozong in 1187, Xiaozong followed the precedent of abdicating. The international peace was kept during the brief reign of his son, Guangzong (reigned 1190–94), but it was broken again in 1205, during the reign of his grandson, Ningzong (reigned 1195–1224). The 40-year span of continuous peace dimmed the memory of difficulties in waging war. A new generation, nurtured by a flourishing Confucian education, tended to underestimate enemy strength and to think once more about recovering the central plains. The Nan Song again initiated a northward campaign, and again it met with defeat. The event left no doubt that the Juchen empire's hold over northern China was far beyond the military capability of the southern empire alone. It was also obvious that the Chinese population in northern China consisted of new generations brought up under alien domination and accustomed to it.

      The Juchen not only retained their military edge over the Nan Song but also revived their ambition of southward expansion. An offer was made to the governor of Sichuan, who decided to turn against the Song court in faraway Lin'an and to become king of a vassal state allied with the Juchen. The civilian officials around him, however, took quick action and ended his separatist rebellion. Though a passing danger, it highlighted the fact that the Nan Song consolidation was not entirely secure; peace was preferred.

The court's relations with the bureaucracy
      Gaozong set the style for all subsequent Nan Song emperors. The first two emperors in the Bei Song, both strong militarists, had towered above the relatively modest bureaucracy they had created; most of their successors had found little difficulty in maintaining a balance in the bureaucracy. The circumstances under which the Nan Song came into being, however, were quite different. Gaozong faced tough competition in building up a loyal bureaucracy, first with the two puppet rulers in the north and then from the dual administration the Juchen empire had set up. He became keenly aware that a cautious handling of bureaucrats was essential. Later, the attempted rebellion in Sichuan taught his successors the same lesson.

      Gaozong was an attentive student of history who consciously emulated the restoration by the Dong (Eastern) Han (AD 25–220) and defined his style as the “gentle approach.” This meant using bureaucratic tactics to deal with the bureaucrats themselves. The gentle approach proved helpful in maintaining a balance at court and thus in protecting councillors and imperial favourites from the criticism of “opinion-officials.” absolutism had grown since the middle of the Bei Song; the emperors had delegated much more power than before to a few ranking councillors. Similarly, imperial favourites—e.g., eunuchs, other personal attendants of the emperor, and relatives of the consorts—gained influence.

      The opinion-officials by virtue of their rank or conviction wished to speak against those who abused power and influence; as a result of the factionalism that had plagued the late Bei Song, their effectiveness had declined and never recovered. But as long as absolutism was qualified by Confucian values and the monarch cherished a Confucian image, he had to learn to deal with some adverse opinions, and he often resorted to sophisticated delaying tactics. Skilled at bureaucratic manipulation, the Nan Song emperors listened to criticism with ostensible grace, responded appreciatively, and made it known that they had done so, but they did not take concrete action. Sometimes an emperor would either order an investigation or express a general agreement with the criticism, thereby preventing the critics from making an issue of it by repeated remonstrances. On other occasions the emperors would listen to the critics and commend them for their courage, but, to avoid stirring up a storm, the court would explicitly forbid the circulating of private copies of the criticisms among other scholar-officials. More subtly, the court would sometimes announce an official version of such criticism, leaving out the most damaging part. Likewise, rectifying edicts that followed the acceptance of criticism often had little substance. Reconciliation at court was another technique: an emperor would deliberately, if not evasively, attribute criticism to probable misunderstanding, assemble the parties in dispute, ask them to compose their differences, caution those under attack to mend their ways, and suggest to the critics that their opinions, though valid, should be modified. The handling of severe critics who refused to change their stand required different tactics. Seemingly accepting their adverse opinion, the court might reward them by promotion to a higher position, whose functions did not include the rendering of further advice. Rarely did the court demote or punish opinion-officials, especially those with prestige; sometimes it would not even permit them to resign or to ask for a transfer. Any such move tended to damage the court's valuable Confucian image. On sensitive issues the emperors were likely to invoke their absolutist power, but this was usually handled gently, by quietly advising the opinion-officials to refrain from commenting on the issues again.

      Under this bureaucratized manipulation by the court, the institution of opinion-officials degenerated. Often the emperors appointed their own friends to such posts, but just as often, when the emperors hinted that they were displeased with certain ministers, the opinion-officials dutifully responded with unfavourable evidence, thus furnishing the court with grounds for dismissals. Such imperial manipulations served manifold purposes: safeguarding absolutist power and its delegation to various individuals, disguising absolutism, and keeping the bureaucracy in balance.

The chief councillors
      The later Nan Song emperors preferred not to take on the awesome burden of managing the huge and complex bureaucracy. Most of them were concerned chiefly with security and the status quo. The Nan Song court delegated a tremendous amount of power and thus had a series of dominant chief councillors; none of them, however, ever was a potential usurper. No bureaucrat during the Song era had a political base, a hereditary hold, or a personal following in any geographic area. In addition, the size of the bureaucracy and fluidity of its composition precluded anyone from controlling it. The tenure of chief councillor essentially depended on the sanction of the emperor. At times even the chief councillor had to reaffirm his loyalty along with other bureaucrats. Loyalty in absolutist terms being another name for submission, the court, bureaucratized as it was, retained its supreme position beyond challenge.

      Nevertheless, the history of Nan Song politics had much to do with powerful chief councillors, increasingly so as time went on. Gaozong at first had a rapid succession of ranking ministers, but none of them measured up to the difficult task at hand: seeking external security by maintaining peace with the northern empire and maintaining internal security by undermining the power of leading generals. Only the chief councillor Qin Kui (Qin Hui) did both; moreover, he increased tax revenues, strengthening the fiscal base of the court and enriching the private imperial treasury. For these merits, he was given full support to impose tight control over the bureaucracy as long as he lived. Powerful as he was, he avoided doing anything that might arouse imperial suspicion. He had many dissident scholar-officials banished from court, but only with imperial sanction. He accommodated many bureaucrats, even those who neither opposed nor followed him, but he made many of them jealous of his great power and of the rapid promotions he gave to his son and grandson. Qin Kui failed, however, to properly assess the wiles of his bureaucratized master, who turned out to be the more skillful politician. Upon Qin Kui's death, the emperor shifted all blame to him and recalled from banishment some of his opponents, thus restoring in time a balance in the bureaucracy.

      After his voluntary abdication, Gaozong retained his power by using Xiaozong more or less as a chief councillor. Xiaozong subsequently failed to find a firm hand among his successive ministers, and the great burden on himself was probably one reason that he chose to abdicate. His son, Guangzong, was mentally disturbed, unresponsive to bureaucratic consensus, and pathetically dominated by his consort. He turned against Xiaozong and even refused to perform state funeral rites when the retired emperor died—an unprecedented default that shocked the court. The solution was equally unprecedented: the empress dowager, the palace personnel, and the ranking ministers agreed to force his abdication and oversee the accession of Ningzong. Through the crisis, Han Tuozhou, who renewed the war against the Juchen, moved rapidly into power. Related originally to the empress dowager and again to a new consort, he received deferential treatment from Ningzong. He was made chief councillor but found it hard to control many bureaucrats who objected to his lack of scholarly qualifications, questioned his political ability, and criticized his nepotistic appointments. Reacting to the hostility, he made first a crucial mistake and then a fatal one. First, he banned a particular school of Confucian idealists, led by Zhu Xi (see below The rise of Neo-Confucianism (China)). This proved unpopular, even among neutral scholar-officials. After he rescinded the ban, he attempted to recruit support and to reunite the bureaucracy by initiating the war against the Juchen. After its defeat in the war, the Song executed him as a sacrifice in its search for peace.

      Shi Miyuan emerged as the dominant chief councillor. He came from a bureaucratic family background and understood the gentle approach and the importance of accommodating various kinds of bureaucrats in order to achieve a political balance. Promoting on merit and refraining from nepotism, he restored stability. He also recognized that the ideological prestige the followers of Zhu Xi had won had become a political factor, and he appointed some of their prominent leaders to highly respectable posts but without giving them real power. Like the emperors he served, Shi wanted to have both authority and a good political image. Ningzong had no son, and the chief councillor helped him adopt two heirs. When the emperor died without designating an heir apparent, Shi Miyuan arbitrarily decided in favour of the younger one, which was contrary to the normal order of succession but had the backing of palace-connected personnel.

      Both Lizong (reigned 1224/25–1264) and his successor Duzong (reigned 1264/65–1274) indulged excessively in pleasure, though much of it was carefully concealed from the public. Shortly after the death of Shi Miyuan, the role of chief councillor went to Jia Sidao, who, though he was denounced in history, actually deserves much credit. He dismissed many incompetents from the palace, court, bureaucracy, and army and curbed excessive corruption by instituting minor administrative reforms. His strict accounting made the generals personally liable for misappropriation of funds. A system of public fields was introduced, which cut into the concentration of landownership by requisitioning at a low price one-third of large estates beyond certain sizes and using the income for army expenditures when the government faced external danger and fiscal deficit. These measures, however, hurt the influential elements of the ruling class, making Jia unpopular. He too had failed to practice the gentle approach. He was denounced by those who had defected to the enemy and later reconciled their guilt by placing the blame on him.

      Except in name, the several dominant chief councillors were nearly actual rulers by proxy. They ran the civil administration, supervised both state finance and military affairs, and controlled most scholar-officials by some varying combination of gentle accommodation and high-handed pressure. The emperors, however, kept their separate imperial treasury—from which the government in deficit had to borrow funds—and their private intelligence systems to check on the chief councillors. Moreover, potential competitors always existed in the bureaucracy, ready to criticize the chief councillors whenever state affairs went badly enough to displease or disturb the emperors. The chief councillors had enormous power only by virtue of the imperial trust, and that lasted only as long as things went tolerably well.

The bureaucratic (bureaucracy) style
      Regular posts in the Nan Song civil service numbered about 20,000, without counting numerous sinecures, temporary commissions, and a slightly larger number of military officers. Besides eliminating most patronage privileges—by which high officials were entitled to obtain an official title for a son or other family member—the court occasionally considered a general reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, although vested interests always opposed it. Those who entered government service seldom dropped out or were thrown out. Meanwhile, new candidates waiting for offices came in waves from state examinations, extra examinations on special occasions, graduation from the National Academy, and special recommendations and unusual sponsorship; others gained official titles because their families contributed to famine relief or military expenditures. Thus, the ever-increasing supply of candidates far exceeded the vacancies.

      According to Confucian theory, any prosperity that made possible more books in print, more schools, and a better-educated elite was all for the good. But the original Confucian ideal intended to have the elite serve the society in general and the community in particular rather than flood the bureaucracy. Rising educational standards made the competition at examinations harder and perhaps raised the average quality of degree holders.

      Families with members in the bureaucracy responded in part by successfully increasing the importance of other avenues of entrance into government service, especially the “protection” privilege that allowed high officials to secure official rank for their protégés (usually junior family members). People outside the civil service responded by altering their goals and values and by reducing the stress on the importance of entering the bureaucracy. It was not accidental that Neo-Confucian academies spread during the era, emphasizing moral self-development—not success in examinations—as the proper goal of education.

      During the Song period, increased emphasis was placed on morals and ethics and a continuous development of the law. The early Song had adopted a legal code (law code) almost wholly traceable to an earlier Tang code, but Song circumstances differed from those of the Tang. As a result, there was a huge output of legislation in the form of imperial edicts and approved memorials that took precedence over the newly adopted code and soon largely displaced it in many areas of law. Song legal bureaucrats periodically compiled and edited the results of this outpouring of new laws. The new rules not only altered the content of the (largely criminal) sphere covered by the code but also legislated in the areas of administrative, commercial, property, sumptuary, and ritual law. There were literally hundreds of compilations of various sorts of laws.

      Perhaps as a result of the growth of this legal tangle from the late Bei Song onward, magistrates made increasing use of precedents (precedent), decisions by the central legal authorities on individual cases, in reaching legal decisions. The government sought to help its officials by instituting a variety of devices to encourage officials and prospective officials to learn the law and to certify that those in office did have some familiarity with things legal. There was an increase in the writing and publication of other sorts of works concerned with the law, including casebooks and the world's oldest extant book on forensic medicine. Despite the appearance of such works, which were intended to help them, officials were under strong pressure to rule in a conservative way and to avoid rocking the boat.

      Many scholar-officials sought simply to keep things quiet and maintain the appearance that there was no serious trouble. The bureaucratic style was to follow the accustomed ways in accordance with proper procedure, find expedient solutions based upon certain principles in spirit, make reasonable compromises after due consideration of all sides, and achieve smooth reconciliations of divergent views. To protect one's own career record it was essential to engage in time-consuming consultations with all appropriate offices and to report to all concerned authorities so that everyone else would have a share of responsibility. Anyone who criticized the bureaucratic style would be going against the prevalent mode of operation—namely, mutual accommodation. Even the emperor adopted the bureaucratic style.

      The picture was not entirely bleak. Evasions and deviations notwithstanding, the letter of the laws and the formalities of procedures had to be fulfilled. Definite limits were set on official negligence and misconduct. For example, suppressing evidence or distorting information were punishable offenses. Minor juggling of accounts went on, but outright embezzlement was never permissible. Expensive gifts were customary and even expected, but an undisguised bribe was unacceptable. The refined art of the bureaucratic style was not sophistry and hypocrisy alone; it required a circumspect adherence to the commonly accepted substandard norms, without which the maintenance of government would have been impossible.

The clerical staff
      The norms for the clerks were even lower, especially in local government. Some 300 clerks in a large prefecture or nearly 100 in a small one were placed under the supervision of a few officials. The clerks had numerous dealings with various other elements in the community, whereas the officials, being outsiders, rarely had direct contacts. Holding practically lifelong tenure after benefiting from the cumulative experience of their fathers and uncles before them, the clerks knew how to operate the local administrative machinery far better than did the officials, who served only brief terms before moving elsewhere. Clerks often received inadequate salaries and were expected to support themselves with “gifts” from those needing their services. The clerks under honest, strict, and hardworking magistrates would recoil, but only briefly, because such magistrates would soon either gain promotion for their remarkable reputations, or their strict insistence on clean government would become intolerable to their superiors, colleagues, subordinates, and influential elements in the community who had connections with high circles. Though all bureaucrats complained of clerical abuses, many connived with the clerks, and none had a viable alternative to the existing situation. One significant suggestion was to replace the clerks with the oversupply of examination candidates and degree holders, who presumably had more moral scruples. But that solution had no chance of being considered, because it implied a downgrading of the status of those who considered themselves to be either potential or actual members of the ruling class.

      The law did place definite limits on clerical misbehaviour. But when a clerk was caught in his wrongdoing, he knew enough to save himself—taking flight before arrest, getting a similar job elsewhere under a different name, defending himself through time-consuming procedures, appealing for leniency in sentencing, requesting a review, or applying for clemency on the occasion of imperial celebrations. What prevented clerical abuses from getting worse was not so much official enforcement of legal limits as it was the social convention in the community. For themselves as well as for their descendants, the clerks could ill afford to overstep the socially acceptable limits.

      The net result of a large bureaucracy and its supporting clerical staff, accommodating one another in various defaults, malfunctions, and misconduct within loose limits, was a declining tax yield, tax evasion by those who befriended colluding officials and clerks, and an undue shift of the tax burden onto those least able to pay.

The rise of Neo-Confucianism
 The rise of the particular school of Neo-Confucianism led by Zhu Xi takes on special meaning in this context. The Neo-Confucian upsurge beginning in the late Tang embraced many exciting extensions of the Classical vision. Noteworthy during the Bei Song was the emergence of a new Confucian metaphysics that was influenced by Buddhism and that borrowed freely from Daoist terminology while rejecting both religions. Of relevance to Nan Song political and social conditions was its continuous growth into a well-integrated philosophical system that synthesized metaphysics, ethics, social ideals, political aspirations, individual discipline, and self-cultivation.

      The best thinkers of the early Nan Song were disillusioned by the realization that previous Neo-Confucian attempts had failed. Reforms that had sought to apply statecraft had ended in abuses and controversies. The spread of education had not coincided with an uplifting of moral standards. The loss of the central plains was a great cultural shock, but to talk of recovering the lost territory was useless unless it was preceded by a rediscovery of the true meaning of Confucianism. To Zhu Xi and his followers, a state permeated by true Confucian practices would be so internally strong and would have such an attraction for outsiders that retaking the north would require only a minimal effort; a state lacking true Confucian practices would be so internally weak and unattractive that retaking the lost territories would be quite impossible.

      Moreover, threatened by the Juchen adoption of the same heritage, the Song felt driven to make an exclusive claim to both legitimacy and orthodoxy. Such a claim required that the new departures be interpreted as reaffirmation of ancient ideals. Thus, the intellectual trend that developed under Zhu Xi's leadership was referred to first as Daoxue (“School of True Way”) and later as Lixue (“School of Universal Principles”). Education, to the thinkers of this school, meant a far-deeper self-cultivation of moral consciousness, the ultimate extent of which was the inner experience of feeling at one with universal principles. These men, who might be described as transcendental moralists in Confucianism, also made a commitment to reconstruct a moral society—to them the only conceivable foundation for good government. With missionary-like zeal, they engaged in propagation of this true way and formed moral-intellectual fellowships. Zhu Xi, the great synthesizer, ranked the Classics in a step-by-step curriculum, interpreted his foremost choices, collectively known as the Sishu (“Four Books”), summed up a monumental history in a short version full of moralistic judgments, prepared other extensive writings and sayings of his own, and opened the way for an elementary catechism, titled the Sanzijing (“Three Character Classics”), that conveyed the entire value system of this school in simple language for what approximated mass education.

      Many idealistic scholars flocked to Zhu Xi, his associates, and his disciples. Frustrated and alienated by the prevalent conditions and demoralizing low standards, these intellectuals assumed a peculiar archaic and semireligious lifestyle. Prominent in scholarship, educational activities, and social leadership and filling some relatively minor government posts, they asserted their exclusive ideological authority with an air of superiority, much to the displeasure of many conventional Confucians. Though they were not keen about politics, the prestige they acquired was an implicit threat to those in power. The chief councillor Han Tuozhou was particularly alarmed when he found some of his political adversaries sympathetic to and even supporting this particular school. A number of other bureaucrats at various ranks shared Han's alarm; one after another, they accused the school of being similar to a subversive religious sect, calling it a threat to state security and attacking its alleged disrespect for the court. The school was proscribed as false learning and un-Confucian. Several dozen of its leaders, including Zhu Xi, were banished, some to distant places. Thenceforth, all state examination candidates had to declare that they had no connection with the school.

      Most historical accounts follow the view that the controversy was another example of factional strife, but that was not the case. The attackers were not a cohesive group, except for their common resentment toward the school, nor was the school itself an active group in politics. The conflict was in fact one between two polarized levels—political power and ideological authority. The nature of the Confucian state required that the two should converge if not coincide.

      The persecution boomeranged by making heroes out of its victims and arousing sympathy among neutral scholar-officials. Realizing his mistake a few years later, Han lifted the ban. Most historical accounts leave an erroneous impression that, once the ban was removed, the Zhu Xi school of Neo-Confucianism by its preeminence soon gained wide acceptance, which almost automatically raised it to the coveted status of official orthodoxy. But in reality the rise to orthodoxy was slow and achieved by political manipulation, occasioned by an internal crisis of imperial succession and then by the external threat of the Mongols. Shi Miyuan, the chief councillor who made Lizong emperor, created circumstances that forced the elder heir of Ningzong to commit suicide. This was damaging to the image of the court and to that of Shi himself. Mending political fences, he placed a few of the school's veteran leaders in prestigious positions in order to redress the balance of the bureaucracy.

      In 1233, the year before the Mongol (Yuan dynasty) conquest of Juchen, the Mongols honoured Confucius and rebuilt his temple in Beijing. In 1237 their emerging nomadic empire, already occupying a large portion of northern China, reinstituted a civil service examination, thus claiming that it too was a Confucian state. Threatened both militarily and culturally, the Nan Song made Zhu Xi's commentaries official, his school the state orthodoxy, and its claim the accepted version—that the true way of Confucius had been lost for more than a millennium and that the line of transmission was not resumed until, inspired by the early Bei Song masters, Zhu Xi reestablished it. This implied that whatever Confucianism the Mongols took over was but a pale imitation and without legitimacy.

Internal solidarity during the decline of the Nan Song
      Honouring the Zhu Xi school did not reinvigorate the Nan Song administration, but the military, despite some weaknesses, maintained an effective defense against the Mongols for four decades—the longest stand against Mongol invasions anywhere. The final Song defeat came in part because the Mongol forces, frustrated for many years in their attempts to break the main Song line of resistance, drove through territories to the west and outflanked the Song defenders. The Song capital, Lin'an, finally fell in 1276 without much fighting, all the high-ranking officials and officers having already fled. The empire itself came to an end in 1279, after its last fleet had been destroyed near Guangzhou, when a loyal minister with the boy pretender to the throne committed suicide by jumping into the sea.

      Later Chinese historians attempted to explain the fall of the Nan Song as the result of internal decay and abuses, and so they stressed the problems of heavy taxation, inflated paper currency, bureaucratic laxity, and clerical abuses. The absence of any large-scale uprisings among the peasantry, however, suggests that they overstated the seriousness of such problems. To explain this lack of popular discord, most historical accounts cite Chinese patriotism, the point being that the war against the Mongols was for cultural rather than merely dynastic survival. Though partly true, this was not the only reason. Other significant factors contributed to this high degree of internal solidarity: (1) the government mobilized the resources of the wealthiest region, that of the lower Yangtze, without overburdening other regions; (2) the tax burden and the emergency requisitions fell mostly on the prosperous urban sectors rather than on rural areas, the backbone of the empire; and (3) scholar-officials in many areas, in spite of their shortcomings, were sophisticated in the art of administration, moving quickly to put down small uprisings before they got larger or offering accommodative terms to induce some rebel leaders to come over while dividing the rest. Finally, the Neo-Confucian values had pervaded the country through more books, more schooling, and greater efforts by Neo-Confucians to promote moral standards, community solidarity, and welfare activities and through widespread Neo-Confucian roots planted at the local levels by half-literate storytellers, makeshift theatres, and traveling companies in various performing arts.

      The examination system itself played a major role in the Confucianization of Chinese society. Only a small percentage of the candidates actually passed the degree examinations and entered the civil service. The vast majority, thoroughly imbued with Confucian studies, returned to the larger society, often to serve as teachers to the next generation. Furthermore, the examination system reinforced the deeply Confucian character of the curriculum, from the lowest level of primary education to the highest level in the academies. Children began imbibing Confucian moral precepts when they began to read. These precepts stressed loyalty, and that in turn probably helped bolster the strength of the dynasty in the face of foreign invasion and helped limit internal disloyalty.

Song culture
 The Song was an era of great change in most facets of Chinese life. Some of these developments were the outgrowths of earlier patterns, while others were largely born under that dynasty. These developments often related to or were made possible by major changes in Chinese economic life.

      An agricultural (agriculture, origins of) revolution produced plentiful supplies for a population of more than 100 million—by far the largest in the world at the time. Acreages under cultivation multiplied in all directions, stretching across sandy lands, climbing uphill, and pushing back water edges. A variety of early ripening rice, imported during the 11th century from Champa (in present-day Cambodia), shortened the growing season to fewer than 100 days, making two crops per year the norm and three crops possible in the warm south. Among other new crops the most important was cotton, which was made into clothing for rich and poor alike; silk and hemp were also important. Improved tools, new implements, and mechanical devices that raised manpower efficiency were widely used and found their way into guidebooks used by the literate community leaders. The production of such minerals as gold, silver, lead, and tin also increased. Consumption of iron and coal grew at a faster rate from 850 to 1050 than it later did in England during the first two centuries of the Industrial Revolution. The Chinese, however, never developed technology that used these two resources to generate power mechanically.

       manufacturing made tremendous headway within the skill-intensive pattern but with the aid of new devices, better processing, a beginning of division of labour, and expertise. Chinese porcelain attained international fame. Though information on ordinary handicrafts was available in handbooks and encyclopaedias, advanced skills were guarded as trade secrets. As production and regional trade became specialized, this stimulated mutual growth.

      Transportation facilities improved, allowing production away from the sources of supplies and making products available to distant regions. The state maintained highways, with staffed stations, for official travel and a courier service network, the latter being an index of centralized government control. Along the highways and branching byways stood private hostels and inns frequented by private traders. Rivers carried tribute vessels and barges, private shipping, transfer crafts, fishing boats, and pleasure yachts. Large ships with multiple decks were propelled by fast-moving wheels paddled by manpower; many sailed on the high seas, aided by accurate compasses, charts, and instruments as well as by experience in distant navigation. The expanding sea trade (international trade), apart from that with Japan and Korea, moved southward and linked up with merchants from Persia and Arabia. Some Chinese merchants began to settle in Southeast Asia. For the first time in history, Chinese naval forces assumed a vital military role, though China had not become a sea power.

      An advanced money economy was everywhere in evidence. Many cultivated lands produced cash crops. By 1065 the Bei Song government was taking in annual cash tax payments that were 20 times what the Tang had received in 749. The income of the Nan Song consisted of more cash revenues than grain and textile receipts. The economy had progressed to such a state that it needed more means of exchange. Merchants used drafts called feiqian (“flying money”) and certificates of deposits made elsewhere. State monopoly agencies in salt and tea followed with their respective certificates, which were as good as money. The government first permitted printed paper money for limited regional circulation and then authorized it as nationwide legal tender. (China was the first country to do so.)

 Busy transactions approached a commercial revolution, carried on by rapid calculations on the abacus, a specialized service skill that remained unmatched until the appearance of adding machines and computers. Cities changed: the Tang pattern of walled-in blocks, each for a particular trade, broke down; stores appeared in various parts of cities; and trade guilds proliferated. Though official documents and scholarly essays adopted a downgrading tone toward commercial activities, Song China became a society of wholesalers, shippers, storage keepers, brokers, traveling salesmen, retail shopkeepers, and peddlers. Urban life reached a new intensity. The populations (population) of several metropolitan areas approached one million.

      Crowding was serious in the cities, and houses usually had narrow frontages. Fires were frequent and disastrous. Neighbourhood fire squads, with water containers at hand, could not prevent destruction, and some fires lasted several days. Nonetheless, prosperity was the keynote of urban life. Teahouses, wine shops, exquisite cuisines, and catering services for private parties existed in multitude and variety. Pleasure grounds provided daily amusement and festival merriment with acrobats, jugglers, wrestlers, sword swallowers, snake charmers, fireworks, gambling, performing arts of all sorts, puppet shows, storytellers, singing girls, and professionally trained courtesans. Upper-class families enjoyed higher culture, with diversions such as music, pets, intricate games, hobbies, calligraphy, painting, and poetry. Noticeably declining were hunting, horseback riding, and polo. Gentility displaced sportsmanship. The prosperous cities also provided easy prey for pickpockets and professional thieves. Inasmuch as pauperism appeared in cities, parallel to rural underemployment and unemployment, the government undertook relief and welfare measures such as orphanages, nursing homes for the aged poor, charitable graveyards, and state pharmacies.

      Knowledge expanded because of specialization. Medicine (medicine, history of) embraced skills such as acupuncture, obstetrics, dentistry, laryngology, ophthalmology, and treatment of rheumatism and paralysis. The demand for improved technology, aided by certain concerns of the Neo-Confucian philosophy, helped to promote numerous investigations that approached the use of scientific methods. Literacy spread with printing, which evolved from rubbing through block printing to the use of movable type that facilitated much larger-scale production at reduced cost. A great many scholars achieved high standing through Classical studies, newly developed archaeology, philosophical interpretations, statecraft ideas, Classical forms of poetry (Chinese literature), an evolving lyric poetry called ci, which had its origin in singing, and written versions of popular songs, called sanqu. Of greatest influence on scholar-officials in succeeding generations was a masterly prose style that was original and creative but was always used in the name of reviving ancient models. Diversified and specialized developments widened knowledge so much that scholars compiled voluminous histories, collected works, comprehensive handbooks, compendiums, and encyclopaedias. Fine arts also reached new heights.

      The term early modern has often been applied in describing Song culture, because it not only advanced beyond the earlier pattern in China and far ahead of the rest of the world at the time but also had many startlingly new features that approximated later developments in western Europe. This characterization, though helpful to highlight and appreciate the progress during Song times, is somewhat misleading, since this stage of development did not pave the way for more modernity later. On the contrary, the Song pattern attained cultural stability, giving rise to the myth of an unchanging China.

      These conflicting images stemmed from the cultural and regional diversity of the Song, in which modern-style advances existed alongside continuing older practices. In some areas, such as the delta lands immediately south of the Yangtze River, sizable estates grew up with a complicated social pattern characterized by tenant farming. Elsewhere, in areas less well-developed, owner-farmers constituted a greater proportion of the population, while in other regions the landlords tried to bind the tillers to the soil. The same confusion was reflected in the status of women. During the Song the notorious practice of foot binding first became common, clearly marking a fall in the status of women, but there is evidence that during the Nan Song (unlike any other Chinese dynasty) daughters as well as sons could inherit property in their own names. Furthermore, Song families tried in various ways to strengthen the ties created by the marriages of their daughters to other families.

      The extraordinarily rapid pace of economic and technological change that marked the Bei Song seems to have slowed during the Nan Song. For reasons that are not wholly clear, Chinese society did not break through its inherited patterns in any radically new ways. It may be that, with an abundance of inexpensive labour, economic rationality moved men to produce through increased amounts of labour rather than through innovation or capital investment. This disincentive to investment helped create a relatively stable economic and technological pattern that remained with little change for centuries thereafter. Despite this slowing of economic and technological development, however, the Song did give birth to changes. Not only did a new Confucian synthesis emerge but also the devices that spread the new ideas among the people at large. The urban and urbanized culture that arose in the Song was retained and developed in succeeding dynasties, when the early modern (or neo-traditional) pattern created in the Song provided both the model for and the basis of the gradual transformation of some aspects of Chinese life that belied the image of China as unchanging.

James T.C. Liu Brian E. McKnight

The Yuan (Yuan dynasty), or Mongol, dynasty
The Mongol conquest of China
       Genghis Khan rose to supremacy over the Mongol tribes in the steppe in 1206, and within a few years he attempted to conquer northern China. By securing in 1209 the allegiance of the Tangut state of Xi (Western) Xia in what are now Gansu, Ningxia, and parts of Shaanxi and Qinghai, he disposed of a potential enemy and prepared the ground for an attack against the Jin (Jin dynasty) state of the Juchen in northern China. At that time the situation of Jin was precarious. The Juchen were exhausted by a costly war (1206–08) against their hereditary enemies, the Nan (Southern) Song. Discontent among the non-Juchen elements of the Jin population (Chinese and Khitan) had increased, and not a few Chinese and Khitan nobles defected to the Mongol side. Genghis Khan, in his preparation for the campaign against Jin, could therefore rely on foreign advisers who were familiar with the territory and the conditions of the Jin state.

Invasion of the Jin state
      The Mongol armies started their attack in 1211, invading from the north in three groups; Genghis Khan led the centre group himself. For several years they pillaged the country; finally, in 1214 they concentrated on the central capital of the Jin, Zhongdu (present-day Beijing). Its fortifications proved difficult to overcome, so the Mongols concluded a peace and withdrew. Shortly afterward the Jin emperor moved to the southern capital at Bianjing (present-day Kaifeng). Genghis Khan considered this a breach of the armistice, and his renewed attack brought large parts of northern China under Mongol control and finally resulted in 1215 in the capture of Zhongdu (renamed Dadu in 1272). The Mongols had had little or no experience in siege craft and warfare in densely populated areas; their strength had been chiefly in cavalry attacks. The assistance of defectors from the Jin state probably contributed to this early Mongol success. In subsequent campaigns the Mongols relied even more on the sophisticated skills and strategies of the increased number of Chinese under their control.

      After 1215 the Jin were reduced to a small buffer state between the Mongols in the north and Song China in the south, and their extinction was but a matter of time. The Mongol campaigns against Xi Xia in 1226–27 and the death of Genghis Khan in 1227 brought a brief respite for Jin, but the Mongols resumed their attacks in 1230.

      The Song Chinese, seeing a chance to regain some of the territories they had lost to the Juchen in the 12th century, formed an alliance with the Mongols and besieged Bianjing in 1232. Aizong, the emperor of Jin, left Bianjing in 1233, just before the city fell, and took up his last residence in Cai prefecture (Henan), but that refuge was also doomed. In 1234 the emperor committed suicide, and organized resistance ceased. The southern border of the former Jin state—the Huai River—now became the border of the Mongol dominions in northern China.

Invasion of the Song state
 During the next decades an uneasy coexistence prevailed between the Mongols in northern China and the Song state in the south. The Mongols resumed their advance in 1250 under the grand khan Möngke and his brother Kublai Khan—grandsons of Genghis Khan. Their armies outflanked the main Song defenses on the Yangtze River and penetrated deeply into southwestern China, conquered the independent Dai (Tai) state of Nanzhao (in what is now Yunnan), and even reached present-day northern Vietnam. Möngke died in 1259 while leading an army to capture a Song fortress in Sichuan, and Kublai succeeded him. Kublai sent an ambassador, Hao Jing, to the Song court with an offer to establish peaceful coexistence. Hao did not reach the Song capital of Lin'an (now Hangzhou), however, but was interned at the border and regarded as a simple spy. The Song chancellor, Jia Sidao, considered the Song position strong enough to risk this affront against Kublai; he thus ignored the chance for peace offered by Kublai and instead tried to strengthen the military preparations against a possible Mongol attack. Jia secured military provisions by a land reform that included confiscating land from large owners, but this alienated the greater part of the landlord and official class. The Song generals, whom Jia distrusted, also had grievances, which may explain why a number of them later surrendered to the Mongols without fighting.

      From 1267 onward the Mongols, this time assisted by numerous Chinese auxiliary troops and technical specialists, attacked on several fronts. The prefectural town of Xiangyang (present-day Xianfan) on the Han River was a key fortress, blocking the access to the Yangtze River, and the Mongols besieged it for five years (1268–73). The Chinese commander finally surrendered in 1273, after he had obtained a solemn promise from the Mongols to spare the population, and he took office with his former enemies.

      Kublai Khan's warning to his forces not to engage in indiscriminate slaughter seems to have been heeded to a certain extent. Several prefectures on the Yangtze River surrendered; others were taken after brief fighting. In January 1276, Mongol troops reached Lin'an (Hangzhou). Last-minute attempts by the Song court to conclude a peace failed, and the Mongol armies took Lin'an in February. The reigning Song empress dowager and the nominal emperor—a boy—were taken to Dadu and granted an audience by Kublai Khan.

      National resistance in the Song state continued, however, and loyalists retreated with two imperial princes into the southern province of Fujian and from there to the region of Guangzhou (Canton). In 1277 the last remnants of the court left Guangzhou and eventually fled the mainland by boat. A faithful minister drowned himself and the last surviving imperial prince in the ocean in March 1279. When organized resistance ceased soon afterward, foreign invaders controlled the whole Chinese empire for the first time in history.

China under the Mongols

Mongol government and administration (bureaucracy)
 After their initial successes in northern China in 1211–15, the Mongols faced the problem of how to rule and extract material benefits from a largely sedentary population. They were assisted by Khitan and Chinese and even Juchen renegades; these defectors were treated as “companions” (nökör) of the Mongols and were given positions similar to the higher ranks of the steppe aristocracy. Their privileges included the administration and exploitation of fiefs considered as their private domain.

Early Mongol rule
      The government system during the early years of the Mongol conquest was a synthesis of Mongol military administration and a gradual return to Chinese traditions in those domains ruled by former subjects of the Jin state. The most important office or function in Mongol administration was that of the darughatchi (seal bearer), whose powers were at first all-inclusive; only gradually were subfunctions entrusted to specialized officials in accordance with Chinese bureaucratic tradition. This re-feudalization of northern China, along Mongol lines with a slight understructure of Chinese-type bureaucrats, lasted for many years.

      The central administration of Mongol China was largely the creation of Yelü Chucai, originally a Jin state official of Khitan extraction who had acquired a profound Chinese scholarship and who had become one of Genghis Khan's trusted advisers. Yelü continued to serve under Ögödei, who became grand khan in 1229, and persuaded him to establish a formal bureaucracy and to replace indiscriminate levies with a rationalized taxation system along Chinese lines. An important part of Yelü's reforms was the creation of the Central Secretariat (Zhongshu Sheng), which centralized the civilian administration and achieved some continuity. The territory was divided into provinces, and the provincial administrations were responsible for regularized taxation. The people had to pay a land tax and a poll tax, either in kind (textiles and grain) or in silver. Merchants had to pay a sales tax. Monopolies on wine, vinegar, salt, and mining products were also introduced. All this enabled the treasuries of the Mongol court to accumulate considerable wealth.

      In spite of the success of his economic policy, Yelü's influence decreased during his later years. One reason was bitter opposition from the Mongol feudatories and from those Chinese, Juchen, and Khitan nobles who were used to ruling independently in their appanages, which they exploited at will. Also, Ögödei himself apparently lost interest in the internal conditions of the Mongol dominion in China. During the 1230s Muslims from the Middle East had already begun to fill the higher positions at the Mongol court, and their ruthless exploitation of the Chinese created widespread resentment of Mongol rule. A relapse into feudal anarchism seemed inevitable, and Yelü's reforms fell into temporary abeyance. China was ruled more or less like a colony by the foreigners and their allies.

Changes under Kublai Khan and his successors
      Kublai Khan's ascendancy in 1260 marked a definite change in Mongol government practice. Kublai moved the seat of Mongol government from Karakorum in Mongolia to Shangdu (“Upper Capital”), near present-day Dolun in Inner Mongolia. In 1267 the official capital was transferred to Zhongdu (Beijing), where Kublai ordered the construction of a new walled city, replete with grand palaces and official quarters, that was renamed Dadu (“Great Capital”) before its completion. Under its Turkicized name, Cambaluc (Khan-baliq, “The Khan's Town”), the capital became known throughout Asia and even Europe. But, true to nomad traditions, the Mongol court continued to move between these two residences—Shangdu in summer and Dadu in winter. With the establishment of Dadu as the seat of the central bureaucracy, Mongolia and Karakorum no longer remained the centre of the Mongol empire. Mongolia began to fall back to the status of a northern borderland, where a nomadic way of life continued and where Mongol grandees, dissatisfied with the growing Sinicization of the court, repeatedly engaged in rebellions.

      Kublai, who even prior to 1260 had surrounded himself with Chinese advisers such as the eminent Buddho-Daoist Liu Bingzhong and several former Jin scholar-officials, was still the nominal overlord of the other Mongol dominions (ulus) in Asia. By then, however, his Chinese entourage had persuaded him to accept the role of a traditional Chinese emperor. A decisive step was taken in 1271 when the Chinese dominion was given a Chinese dynastic name—Da Yuan, the “Great Origin.” Before this the Chinese name for the Mongol state was Da Chao (“Great Dynasty”), introduced about 1217. It was a translation of the Mongol name Yeke Mongghol Ulus (“Great Mongol Nation”) adopted by Genghis Khan about 1206. The new name, however, was a departure from Chinese traditions. All earlier Chinese dynasties were named for ancient feudal states or geographic terms; even the Khitan and the Juchen had followed this tradition by naming their states Liao (for the Liao River in Manchuria) and Jin (“Gold,” for a river in Manchuria that had a Juchen name with that meaning). Yuan was the first nongeographic name of a Chinese dynasty since Wang Mang established the Xin dynasty (AD 9–25).

      During the 1260s the central bureaucracy and the local administration of the Chinese empire were remodeled on Chinese lines, with certain alterations introduced by the Jin state. The Central Secretariat remained the most important civilian authority, with specialized agencies such as the traditional six ministries of finance, war, officials, rites, punishments, and public works. The Shumiyuan (Military Council) was another institution inherited from previous dynasties. A Yushitai (Censorate (censor)) was originally created for remonstrations against the emperor and criticism of policies, but increasingly it became an instrument of the court itself and a tool to eliminate other members of the bureaucracy. In the main the territorial divisions followed Chinese models, but the degree of local independence was much smaller than it had been under the Song; the provincial administrations were actually branches of the Central Secretariat. The structures of the various provincial administrations throughout China were smaller replicas of the Central Secretariat. According to Chinese sources, in 1260–61 the lower echelons in the Central Secretariat were mostly Chinese; the high offices, however, even if they had traditional Chinese names, were reserved for non-Chinese. Surprisingly, Kublai Khan had few Mongols in high administrative positions; apparently suspicious of some of his tribal leaders, he preferred absolute foreigners. The military sphere was affected least by the attempts to achieve a synthesis between Chinese and native ways of life; there the Mongol aristocracy remained supreme.

      Too many antagonistic social and ethnic groups existed within the Yuan government to secure a stable rule. The traditional Chinese value system had largely disappeared, and no political ethics had replaced it. While personalized loyalty focused on the ruler, the companionship of nökör relations was not enough to amalgamate the heterogeneous ruling group into a stable body. This unbalanced system of government could function only under a strong ruler; under a weak or incompetent emperor, disintegration was certain, and a decline in efficiency resulted.

      The former scholar-officials of China remained to a great extent outside the governmental and administrative structure; only minor positions were open to them. The Mongols never made full use of the administrative potential of the scholar-officials, fearing their competence and abilities. The ruling foreign minority in China was more an elite of the colonialist type than a part of the Chinese social system.

      The unwillingness of the Mongols to assimilate with the Chinese is shown by their attempts to cement the inequalities of their rule. After the Song empire had been conquered, the population of China was divided into four classes. The first class was the Mongols themselves, a tiny but privileged minority. Next came the semuren (“persons with special status”), confederates of the Mongols such as Turks or Middle Eastern Muslims. The third group was called the hanren (a term that generally means Chinese but that was used to designate the inhabitants of only northern China); this class included the Chinese and other ethnic groups living in the former Jin state, as well as Xi Xia, Juchen, Khitan, Koreans, Bohai, and Tangut, who could be employed in some functions and who also formed military units under Mongol leadership. The last group was the nanren, or manzi, pejorative terms in Chinese, meaning “southern barbarian,” which designated the former subjects of Song China (about three-fourths of the Chinese empire). The lowest stratum in Yuan China was occupied by the slaves, whose numbers were quite considerable. Slave status was hereditary, and only under certain conditions could a slave be freed.

      More than four-fifths of the taxpayers came from the nanren group, which was generally barred from holding higher office (only rarely would one of them rise to some prominence). The Mongols and the semuren were tax-exempt and enjoyed the protection of the law to a higher degree than did the hanren and nanren.

      The formal distinction between various ethnic groups and the corresponding graded status was not a Mongol invention but a social differentiation inherited from the Jin state. In the same way, many institutions were taken over from the Jin. Law (law code) in Yuan China was based partly on the legislation of the Jin and partly on traditional Chinese law; Mongol legal practices and institutions also played a great role, particularly in penal law. The Yuan legal code has been preserved in the dynastic history, Yuanshi, as well as other sources. In addition, many rules, ordinances, and decisions of individual cases are collected in compilations such as Yuandianzhang, which throw much light not only on the legal system but also on social conditions in general.

      Mongol and Chinese dualism is also reflected in the problem of administrative documents and languages. Few of the ruling Mongols, even in the later years of the Yuan, knew Chinese, and the number who mastered the Chinese script was still smaller. On the other hand, only a few Chinese bothered to learn the language of their conquerors. Administration and jurisdiction therefore had to rely largely on interpreters and translators. Mongol was the primary language; most decisions, ordinances, and decrees were originally drafted in Mongol, and a Chinese interlinear version was added. This Chinese version was in the colloquial language instead of the formal documentary style, and it followed the Mongol word order so that it must have seemed barbaric to the native literati. Many of these Chinese versions have survived in collections such as Yuandianzhang.

      The Mongol conquest of the Song empire had, for the first time since the end of the Tang, reunified all of China. Song China had traded with its neighbours, the Liao and the Jin, but trade had been strictly controlled and limited to authorized border markets. The Mongol conquest therefore reintegrated China's economy. The Mongol administration, in its desire to utilize the resources of the former Song territory, the most prosperous part of China, tried to promote internal trade and aimed at a fuller integration of north and south. The region around the capital was dependent on grain transports from the south, and large quantities of food and textiles were needed to keep the Mongol garrisons. The Grand Canal, which had linked the river systems of the Yangtze, the Huai, and the Huang since the early 7th century, was repaired and extended to Dadu in 1292–93 with the use of corvée (unpaid labour) under the supervision of a distinguished Chinese astronomer and hydraulic engineer, Guo Shoujing—an action entirely within Chinese tradition. This was preceded, however, by another measure in the field of economic communications that was unorthodox in Chinese eyes: about 1280, concessions for grain transport overseas were granted to some private Chinese entrepreneurs from the southeastern coastal region (some Chinese government officials were traditionally antagonistic toward private trade and enterprise, an attitude that the ruling Mongols did not share). These private shipowners transported in their fleets grain from the lower Yangtze region to northern Chinese harbours and from there to the capital. Early in the 14th century, however, these private fleet owners, who had made huge fortunes, were accused of treason and piracy, and the whole action was abolished. The Mongol government never replaced them with government fleets.

      Another factor that contributed to the flourishing internal trade in China was standardized currency. The Song and Jin had issued paper money but only in addition to bronze coins, which had remained the basic legal tender. The Yuan government was the first to make paper money the only legal currency throughout the empire (1260). This facilitated financial transactions in the private sector as well as in the state treasuries. As long as the economy as such remained productive, the reliance on paper money as the basic currency had no detrimental effects. Only when the economy began to disintegrate under the last Mongol ruler did the paper money become gradually valueless and inflation set in. One reason for the paper currency might have been that much bronze and copper was used for the Buddhist cult and its statues, another that metal ores in China proper were insufficient to supply enough coins for some 80 million people.

Religious and intellectual life
      The Mongols did not try to impose their own religion (a cult of heaven, the forces of nature, and shamanistic practices) on their subjects. This gave comparative freedom to the existing religions in China, including what the Mongol rulers considered to be the sanjiao (“three teachings”): Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Both Daoism and Buddhism retained their distinctive identities and organizations; although they often rivaled each other, they were not mutually exclusive. The Neo-Confucianism of the Zhu Xi school enjoyed orthodox status after the 1310s, but adherents of the three teachings interacted philosophically and intellectually in a way that popularized the “amalgamation” of the three schools among the common people and the literati, if not the foreign residents, of China.

      Under the Jin dynasty several popular Daoist sects had flourished in northern China, and Genghis Khan had apparently been impressed by the Daoist patriarch Changchun (Ch'ang-ch'un). In 1223 Genghis Khan granted to Changchun and his followers full exemption from taxes and other duties demanded by the government; this was the first of a series of edicts granting special privileges to the clergy of the various religions in China.

      For some time it seemed as if Chinese Daoism would win favour with the Mongol rulers at the expense of Chinese Buddhism. The Buddhists, however, also profited from the open-minded attitude at the court; they tried to win influence within the imperial family, prompted by the fact that many Buddhist institutions had been occupied by the Daoists, who relied on Mongol favour. Under the grand khan Möngke, several discussions were held between the Daoist and Buddhist clergy (1255–58), ending in a ruling that the former Buddhist temples should be returned to their original purpose. Imperial orders also outlawed some apocryphal Daoist texts, in which Buddhism was presented as a branch of Daoism and the Buddha as a reincarnation of Laozi, the founder of Daoism. But Daoism as such continued to exist under the Yuan, and the fiscal privileges originally granted to the Daoist followers of Changchun were extended on principle to all clergies.

 The spokesmen of Chinese Buddhism under the early Mongol rulers came from the Chan ( Zen) sect (a discipline focused on meditation). Their high intellectuality and refined aestheticism, however, did not appeal to the Mongols, who felt more attracted by the mixture of magic practices, rather nebulous metaphysics, and impressive symbolism in the visual arts of Tibetan Buddhism. Kublai Khan appointed a young Tibetan lama known by the honorific name of 'Phags-pa as imperial preceptor (dishi); 'Phags-pa became the head of the Buddhist faith in all Mongol dominions, including China. A special government agency was established in 1264 to deal with Buddhism and served as a sort of bureau for the imperial preceptor; it was in charge not only of Buddhist affairs in general but also of Tibetan affairs, although Tibet remained outside the administration of China proper, and no Mongol garrisons were ever established in Tibet. Tibetan politicians had thus succeeded in winning over the Mongol court and in retaining a more-than-nominal independence.

      After the conquest of Song China, a special agency for the supervision of Buddhism in southern China was established and placed under the control of another Tibetan lama. There thus existed two supervisory offices for Buddhism—one in Dadu for northern China and Tibet and one in Lin'an for southern China. The southern office caused great resentment among Chinese Buddhists and the population at large by its brutal and avaricious procedures, property seizures, and extortions from the population. Throughout the Yuan dynasty, complaints continued against the arrogant behaviour of Tibetan lamas. (Under the last emperor, Togon-temür, Tibetan clerics introduced the court to sexual (sexual behaviour, human) rites calling for intercourse with consecrated females—practices not unfamiliar in Indian and Tibetan cultures but shocking to the Chinese elite.)

      Although Buddhism had won a victory among the ruling minority of China, it was a foreign rather than a Chinese Buddhism. The national varieties of Buddhism, especially Chan Buddhism, continued to exist, and monasteries in southern China sometimes became islands of traditional civilization where monks and lay Buddhists alike cultivated poetry, painting, and all the intellectual pastimes of the Chinese literati class, but, on the whole, Chinese Buddhism suffered from the general conditions in the Yuan empire. The exemption from taxes and corvée attracted many persons to monastic life for purely utilitarian reasons; the more society disintegrated, the more people sought refuge behind the monastery walls. About 1300 the number of monks throughout China was estimated at 500,000, and it must have grown during the last decades of Mongol rule. Monks played a great role in the rebellions to which the Yuan empire eventually succumbed; also, the first Ming emperor had been a monk for some time.

Foreign religions
      Tibetan Buddhism always remained outside Chinese civilization, as did other imported religions. A certain number of Muslims came to China, all from the Middle East or from Central Asia. The Turkic Öngüt tribe was largely Nestorian Christian. Many tombstones with a bilingual Turkic and Chinese inscription have been preserved, but none of these believers seems to have been Chinese by origin; a census taken about 1300 in Zhenjiang (in the present-day province of Jiangsu) lists the Nestorians together with foreign nationalities. The number of Nestorian Christians in China was so great that in 1289 a special agency for their supervision was established in Dadu. Manichaeism, which had spread to China under the Tang, became extinct as an organized religion under the Yuan, but some Manichaean communities were probably absorbed by messianic Buddhist sects, such as the White Lotus sect, a group that attracted many followers among the Chinese lower classes.

      Confucianism was perceived by the Mongols as a Chinese religion, and it had mixed fortunes under their rule. The teachings of the Neo-Confucian (Neo-Confucianism) school of Zhu Xi from the Song period were introduced to the Mongol court at Zhongdu in the late 1230s but were confined to limited circles there and in northern China. Confucian scholars enjoyed the benefits extended to the clergy of all religions, but they were dealt a strong blow when the literary examinations were discontinued following the Mongol conquest. For many centuries the examinations, based on Confucian texts, had been the basis for the selection of officials and for their privileged position within the state and society. After Kublai's accession, Confucianism had a more cordial reception at the Mongol court through the efforts of Chinese advisers such as Liu Bingzhong and the great Confucian master Xu Heng. Under their stewardship a certain Confucianization took place in government and education. Chinese rituals were performed for a while in the dynastic temple (taimiao), erected in Zhongdu in 1263. State sacrifices were offered to Confucius, and the study of the Classics was encouraged. However, many of the rites observed at the court that were either Tibetan Buddhist or inherited from the Mongol nomadic past were continued. The emperor Buyantu (reigned 1311–20), one of the most Sinicized Mongol rulers, reintroduced the examination system in 1313, but it remains doubtful how well the examinations functioned. They certainly did not guarantee an official career, as those under the Song and, to a certain extent, under the Jin had done.

      The system of the Yuan, as introduced in 1313, provided different types of curricula for Mongols, other foreigners (semuren), and Chinese; also, the requirements were different: Chinese had to show their complete mastery of the curriculum, whereas Mongols and other foreigners had to give only a mediocre performance. This inequality was even formalized for the candidates who were to be admitted to the state academy (guozijian). The first examinations were held in the presence of the emperor in 1315, and, of the 300 persons granted the title of doctor (jinshi), 75 were Mongols, 75 were other foreigners, 75 were northern Chinese (hanren), and 75 came from southern China; they all received official positions within the bureaucracy, Mongols the higher and Chinese the lower posts. The positions of power within the hierarchy remained in the hands of the Mongols and other foreigners.

      Under Buyantu, for the first time the interpretation and commentaries of the Neo-Confucian school were made obligatory. This cemented Neo-Confucian ideology not only among the Chinese literati who wished to pass an examination but also for future generations. Chinese Confucian orthodoxy from the 14th to the 19th century therefore rested largely on the foundations it had received under the Yuan. In spite of all this, Classical scholarship under the Yuan did not produce a single remarkable work but struggled under an adverse political and intellectual climate. Striving to preserve their sacred tradition, the Confucian scholars were content with expounding the doctrines laid down by the Song philosophers, seeking to harmonize the different philosophical issues and points of view rather than exploring new horizons.

      Chinese literature of the period also showed conservative tendencies. Poetry composition remained a favourite pastime of the educated class, including the Sinicized scholars of Mongol, Central Asian, and western Asian origins, but no great works or stylistic innovations were created. During the last chaotic decades of the Yuan, some notable poets emerged, such as the versatile Yang Weizhen and the bold and unconventional Gao Qi. Many prose works dealing with contemporary events and persons were written under the Yuan, but these are notable for their content, not their literary merit. Surprisingly harsh criticism and satire against the Mongols and also undisguised Song loyalism found open expression, presumably because the Mongols were uninterested in what the Chinese wrote in Chinese and, moreover, were mostly unable to read it. Some writers collected rare or interesting and piquant items and transmitted many aspects of Song culture to future generations. The lament for the refinement and grandeur of the Song is a constant theme in Yuan writings.

      During the early Yuan period, the traditional Chinese official historiography was restored under the charge of the Hanlin Academy, which sponsored the compilation of the official dynastic histories of the Song, Liao, and Jin states conquered by the Mongols and undertook the compilation of the reign chronicles (shilu) and other governmental compendiums. The major achievement of official historiography was the compilation (1329–33) of the Jingshi dadian, a repository of 800 juan (chapters) of official documents and laws; the text is now lost. Private historiography, especially works on the events of the Song, fared rather poorly under the Yuan because of the adverse political and intellectual climate. The most-distinguished contribution was written by Ma Duanlin and titled Wenxian tongkao (“General Study of the Literary Remains”): an encyclopaedic documentary history of Chinese institutions from the earliest times to the middle reign of the Nan Song dynasty.

      In urban society a literature in the vernacular language began to flourish, untrammeled by rigid norms of formalistic or ideological orthodoxy. Novels and stories were written for the amusement of a wide-reading public, and dramatic literature reached such a peak in Yuan China that later literary criticism regarded the Yuan as the classical age for operatic arias, or qu (a word that is also used for a full opera, with arias and chanted recitatives). The collection Yuanquxuan (“Selection from Yuan Operas”), with 100 opera librettos, and the storyteller “prompt books” for dramatized historical romances such as Sanguo (“Three Kingdoms”) give ample evidence for the creativity and vitality of Chinese dramatic literature. This phenomenon may perhaps be considered as evidence that under the Yuan a certain urbanization took place and something like a bourgeoisie emerged, because dramatic literature and colloquial novels found their clientele chiefly among the merchant and artisan classes.

      Foreigners, chiefly of Turkic or Persian origin, also contributed to Chinese literature under the Yuan. They wrote poetry and painted in the Chinese way in order to distinguish themselves in fields where they could gain prestige among the educated Chinese. All the foreigners who wrote in Chinese seem to have avoided any reference to their foreign origin or creed. Nothing, in fact, could be more Chinese than their productions. Even foreigners who, like the Persians, came from a country with a considerable literary tradition of its own never attempted to introduce their native forms, subject matter, or religions. No literary symbiosis seemed possible, and, although China was exposed to more external influences under the Yuan than ever before, Chinese literature shows little effect from such contacts with the outside world. It is perhaps symptomatic that under the Yuan no literary works from other civilizations were translated into Chinese and that practically no translations of Chinese Classical and historical works into Mongol have survived. There seemed to be only the alternatives of complete rejection of Chinese civilization, as practiced by most Mongols, or wholesale absorption by Chinese culture.

Herbert Franke Hoklam Chan

      Conservatism played a dominant role in the arts during the Mongol period. In sponsored arts such as sculpture and ceramics, the Mongols' desire to lay claim to the Chinese imperial heritage was not complemented by any strong artistic vision of their own, and conservatism meant mere perpetuation. Song, Liao, and Jin ceramic types were continued, often altered only by increased bulk, while the great artistic achievement of the era, blue-and-white ware, probably derived from non-imperial sources. Government-sponsored Buddhist sculpture often attained high artistic standards, preserving the realism and powerful expression of Tang and Song traditions, while in the finest sculpture of the time, such as the reliefs at Juyong Pass north of Dadu (1342–45), this was combined with a flamboyant surface decor and a striking dramatization better suited to foreign taste than to the increasingly restrained Chinese aesthetic.

 Conservatism also tempered the private arts of calligraphy and painting: the scholar-amateurs who produced them felt impelled to preserve their heritage against a perceived barbarian threat. Conservatism, however, often took the form of a creative revival that combed the past for sources of inspiration and then artistically transformed them into a new idiom. In calligraphy, Zhao Mengfu gave new impetus to the 4th-century style of Wang Xizhi, which then became a standard for Chinese writing and book printing for centuries. In painting, Zhao and his contemporary Qian Xuan helped to complete the development of a distinctively amateur style that ushered in a new phase in the history of Chinese painting. Their work did not continue that of the previous generation but ranged widely over the available past tradition, and past styles rather than observed objects became the subject of artistic interpretation. The naturalism of Song painting gave way to calligraphically inspired abstractions. Paintings became closely linked in style to the written inscriptions that appeared upon them with increasing frequency and prominence. Skillful professional techniques and overt visual attractiveness were avoided, replaced by deliberate awkwardness and an intellectualized flavour. Their works were done for private purposes, often displaying or concealing personal and political motives, to be understood only by fellow literati through the subtle allusions of their subject matter, stylistic references, or inscriptions.

 Naturalistic painting styles also continued in popularity throughout the first two-thirds of the period, painted by such important artists as Li Kan and Ren Renfa. Perpetuating northern traditions of the Tang and Song periods, these styles were practiced chiefly by scholar-officials associated with the court at the capital. Several members of the Mongol royal family became major patrons or collectors of such conservative styles, although imperial patronage remained slight in comparison with earlier periods.

      In the latter third of the dynasty, with a sharp decline in the practice of painting by scholar-officials and northerners, Yuan painting was increasingly represented by the innovative approach of Zhao Mengfu as practiced by reclusive scholars from the Suzhou-Wuxing area. Four of these—the landscape painters Huang Gongwang, Wu Zhen, Ni Zan, and Wang Meng—transformed and blended certain elements from the past into highly personal, easily recognizable styles and later came to be known as the Four Masters of the Yuan dynasty. In the early Ming period the Hongwu emperor decimated the Suzhou literati and with it Suzhou painting; by the end of the 15th century, however, Suzhou artists once again dominated Chinese painting, and the styles of the Four Masters became the most influential of all painting models in later Chinese history.

Jerome Silbergeld

Yuan China and the West
      As has been mentioned, Mongol rulers favoured trade in all their dominions. In China too they eliminated state trade controls that had existed under the Song and Jin, so that internal and external trade reached unprecedented proportions. It seems, however, that China's transcontinental trade with the Middle East (Middle East, ancient) and Europe was in the hands of non-Chinese (mainly Persians, Arabs, and Syrians). silk, the Chinese export commodity par excellence, reached the Middle East and even Europe via the caravan routes across Asia; Chinese ceramics were also exported, chiefly into the Islamic countries. The Asian countries concentrated their European trade largely with the Italian republics (e.g., Genoa, Venice). To the Italians, trade with the East was so important that the Practica della mercatura, a handbook on foreign trade, included the description of trade routes to China.

      Direct contacts between China and Europe were insignificant, however, even though China was part of an empire stretching from Dadu to southern Russia. Chinese historical and geographic literature had little to say about the European parts of the Mongol empire; in the official dynastic history of the Yuan, references to foreign countries are limited to countries such as Korea, Japan, Nam Viet, Myanmar (Burma), and Champa, with which China had carried on trade or tributary relations for centuries, and there are some scattered data on Russia. For some time a Russian guards regiment existed in Dadu, and some Russian soldiers were settled in military colonies in eastern Manchuria. As a whole, however, the civilizations of Europe and China did not meet, although contacts were made easy; Europe remained for the Chinese a vague region somewhere “beyond the Uighur.”

      More important were the contributions from the Islamic (Islāmic world) countries of the Middle East, chiefly in the fields of science and technology. During the reign of Kublai Khan, Arab-Persian astronomy and astronomical instruments were introduced into China, and the Chinese astronomer Guo Shoujing operated an observatory. Nevertheless, the basic conceptions of astronomy remained Chinese, and no attempt was made to adopt the Middle Eastern mathematical and theoretical framework. Similarly, Middle Eastern physicians and surgeons practiced successfully in China, but Chinese medical theory remained uninfluenced by Western practices. In geography a Chinese world map of the 14th century incorporates Arabic geographical knowledge into the Chinese worldview. It shows not only China and the adjacent countries but also the Middle East, Europe, and Africa; the African continent is already given in its actual triangular shape. But this knowledge probably never spread beyond a limited circle of professional geographers, and it is certain that the Sino-centric world conception continued unchallenged under the Yuan dynasty; no curiosity of what lay beyond the Chinese borders was aroused. For the countries to be reached by sea (such as Southeast Asian countries and India), Chinese works of the Yuan offer only a poor extract from the Song work Zhufanzhi (c. 1225; “Description of the Barbarians”).

      The situation was different regarding European knowledge of China. The Mongol advance into eastern Europe had given Europeans an acute awareness that actual people lived in regions hitherto shrouded in vague folkloric legends and myths. The Islamic world had similarly become a reality to Europeans with the first Crusades. It was, therefore, only natural that the Roman Catholic Church looked for potential converts among non-Muslim people of Asia. After Franciscan envoys brought back information on what was known as Cathay (northern China) in the mid-13th century, Pope Nicholas IV, a former Franciscan, dispatched a Franciscan mission to the court of the grand khan in Dadu (known in Europe as Cambaluc). The missionaries formed the nucleus of a Catholic hierarchy on Chinese soil: Cambaluc became the seat of an archbishopric, and in 1323 a bishopric was established in Quanzhou. A renowned Franciscan missionary was Odoric of Pordenone, who traveled in China in the 1320s; his reports, together with letters written by other Catholic missionaries, brought firsthand information on China to medieval Europe and today throw some light on the earliest missionary work in China. The Franciscan mission, which had to compete with the Nestorian clergy, was carried on more by the foreigners in China than by the Chinese themselves. The friars preached in Tatar (i.e., either Mongol or Turkic) and apparently won no Chinese converts. Significantly, no Chinese source mentions the activities of these missionaries; the Chinese probably regarded the Franciscans as one of the many strange, foreign sects, perhaps an outlandish variety of Buddhism. Archaeological evidence of the presence of Europeans and of Roman Catholicism has been discovered only in modern times; one example is from Yangzhou (in present-day Jiangsu), where the Latin inscription on a tombstone dated 1342 is a record of the death of an Italian lady whose name suggests some relation to a Venetian family engaged in trade with Asia.

      Only the last direct contact between the papal see and Yuan China can be corroborated by both Western and Chinese sources. In 1336 a group of Alani Christians in Dadu sent a letter to Pope Benedict XII, who sent John of Marignola (Marignolli, Giovanni dei) with a mission to the Mongol court. The mission reached the summer capital, Shangdu, in 1342. Chinese sources recorded the date of its audience as Aug. 19, 1342. The country the envoys came from is given by the Chinese source as Fulang, a Chinese version of the name Farang (Franks), which was used in the Middle East as a general term for Europeans. The arrival of envoys from what must have seemed the end of the world so impressed the court that an artist was commissioned to paint a portrait of the battle horse that Marignola had brought as a present; this portrait was still extant in the 18th century but is now lost. Chinese literati wrote many eulogies on the portrait of the horse; the country of Fulang, however, did not interest the Chinese poets, and the whole embassy of Marignola is invariably described in terms that point to an unbroken Sino-centric attitude. Thus, the contact between the pontiff and the Mongol court remained without further consequence.

      The end of Mongol rule over China and the strong nationalism of the Ming dynasty also doomed the Catholic missions of the 14th century. The reports of the Venetian adventurer Marco Polo (Polo, Marco), on the other hand, inaugurated for Europe the era of discoveries and created a new vision of the world, with China as a part.

      Although China as a separate cultural entity was realized only dimly and gradually in the European West, Chinese influences spread under the Yuan dynasty to other parts of Asia. Chinese medical treatises were translated into Persian, and Persian miniature painting in the 13th and 14th centuries shows many influences of Chinese art. Chinese-type administration and chancellery practices were adopted by various Mongol dominions in Central Asia and the Middle East. It has even been suggested that the invention of gunpowder and of printing in Europe was because of a sort of stimulus diffusion from China, although a direct influence from China cannot be proved.

      Chinese civilization itself remained very much what it had been before the Yuan dynasty, with a certain cultural isolationism a distinctive element. Neither the self-image of the Chinese nor China's position in the world changed very drastically. The change and challenges to which China was exposed under the Yuan, however, can explain many of the characteristic traits of Ming history.

The end of Mongol rule
      The basic dilemma of Mongol rule in China—the Mongols' inability to achieve a durable identification with Chinese civilian institutions and to modify the military and colonialist character of their rule—became more apparent under Kublai's successors and reached a maximum under Togon-temür, the last Yuan ruler. Togon-temür was not unfriendly toward Chinese civilization, but this could not alter the contempt of many leading Mongols for Chinese civilian institutions. For centuries China had known clique factionalism at court, but this was mostly fought with political means; Mongol factionalism usually resorted to military power. Militarization gradually spread from the Mongol ruling class into Chinese society, and not a few dissatisfied Chinese leaders established regional power based on local soldiery. The central administration headed by a weak emperor proved incapable of preserving its supremacy.

      Thus, the military character of Mongol rule paved the way for the success of Chinese rebels, some of whom came from the upper class, while others were messianic sectarians who found followers among the exploited peasantry. The Mongol court and the provincial administrations could still rely on a number of faithful officials and soldiers, and so the progress of the rebel movement in the 1350s and '60s remained slow. But the rebel armies who had chosen what is now Nanjing as their base took Dadu in 1368; the Mongol emperor fled, followed by the remnants of his overthrown government.

      The Mongols remained a strong potential enemy of China for the next century, and the Genghis Khan clan in Mongolia continued to regard itself as the legitimate ruler of China. The century of Mongol rule had some undesirable effects on the government of China: imperial absolutism and a certain brutalization of authoritarian rule, inherited from the Yuan, were features of the succeeding Ming government. Yet, Mongol rule lifted some of the traditional ideological and political constraints on Chinese society. The Confucian hierarchical order was not rigidly enforced as it had been under the Tang and Song, and the Mongols thereby facilitated the upward mobility of some social classes, such as the merchants, and encouraged extensive growth of popular culture, which had been traditionally downgraded by the literati.

Herbert Franke Hoklam Chan

Political history
      Ineptitude on the throne, bureaucratic factionalism at court, rivalries among Mongol generals, and ineffective supervision and coordination of provincial and local administration had gravely weakened the Yuan government by the 1340s. And in 1351 disastrous flooding of the Huang and Huai river basins aroused hundreds of thousands of long-oppressed Chinese peasants into open rebellion in northern Anhui, southern Henan, and northern Hubei provinces. Rebel movements, capitalizing on the breakdown of Yuan control, spread rapidly and widely, especially throughout central China. By the mid-1360s, large regional states had been created that openly flouted Yuan authority: Song in the Huai basin, under the nominal leadership of a mixed Manichaean-Buddhist secret-society leader named Han Lin'er; Han in the central Yangtze valley, under a onetime fisherman named Chen Youliang; Xia in Sichuan, under an erstwhile general of the rebel Han regime named Ming Yuzhen; and Wu in the rich Yangtze delta area, under a former Grand Canal boatman named Zhang Shicheng. A onetime salt trader and smuggler named Fang Guozhen had simultaneously established an autonomous coastal satrapy in Zhejiang. While Yuan chieftains contended with one another for dominance at the capital, Dadu (present-day Beijing), and in the North China Plain, these rebel states to the south wrangled for survival and supremacy. Out of this turmoil emerged a new native dynasty called Ming (1368–1644).

The dynasty's founder
 Zhu Yuanzhang (Hongwu), founder of the new dynasty, came from a family originally from northwestern Jiangsu province who by Yuan times had deteriorated into itinerant tenant farmers in northern Anhui province. Orphaned by famine and plague in 1344, young Zhu was taken into a small Buddhist monastery near Fengyang city as a lay novice. For more than three years he wandered as a mendicant through the Huai basin before beginning studies for the Buddhist priesthood in his monastery. In 1352, after floods, rebellions, and Yuan campaigns against bandits had devastated and intimidated the whole region, Zhu was persuaded to join a Fengyang branch of Han Lin'er's uprising. He quickly made himself the most successful general on the southern front of the rebel Song regime, and in 1356 he captured and set up his headquarters in Nanjing (Nanking), a populous and strategically located city on the Yangtze River. There he began assembling a rudimentary government and greatly strengthened his military power. Between 1360 and 1367, still nominally championing the cause of the Song regime, his armies gained control of the vast central and eastern stretches of the Yangtze valley, absorbing first the Han domain to the west of Nanjing and then the Wu domain to the east. He also captured the Zhejiang coastal satrap, Fang Guozhen. Zhu then announced his intention of liberating all of China from Mongol rule and proclaimed a new dynasty effective with the beginning of 1368. The dynastic name Ming, meaning “Brightness,” reflects the Manichaean influence in the Song-revivalist Han Lin'er regime under which Zhu had achieved prominence. Zhu came to be known by his reign name, the Hongwu (“Vastly Martial”) emperor.

      Vigorous campaigning in 1368 drove the Mongols out of Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi provinces and from Dadu itself, which was occupied by Ming forces on September 14, and simultaneously extended Ming authority through Fujian and Hunan into Guangdong and Guangxi provinces on the south coast. In 1369–70 Ming control was established in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia, and continued campaigning against the Mongols thereafter extended northwestward to Hami (1388), northeastward to the Sungari (Songhua) River in Manchuria (1387), and northward into Outer Mongolia beyond Karakorum, almost to Lake Baikal (1387–88). In operations to the west and southwest, Ming forces destroyed the rebel Xia regime in Sichuan in 1371, wiped out major Mongol and aboriginal resistance in Guizhou and Yunnan in 1381–82, and pacified aboriginal peoples on the border between China and Myanmar in 1398. Thus, by the end of the Hongwu emperor's 30-year reign in 1398, his new dynasty controlled the whole of modern China proper and dominated the northern frontier regions, from Hami through Inner Mongolia and into northern Manchuria.

The dynastic succession
      The Ming dynasty, which encompassed the reigns of 16 emperors, proved to be one of the stablest and longest ruling periods of Chinese history. Rulers of Korea, Mongolia, East Turkistan, Myanmar, Siam, and Nam Viet regularly acknowledged Ming overlordship, and at times tribute was received from as far away as Japan, Java and Sumatra, Sri Lanka and South India, the East African coast, the Persian Gulf region, and Samarkand. Modern Chinese honour the Ming emperors especially for having restored China's international power and prestige, which had been in decline since the 8th century. The Ming emperors probably exercised more far-reaching influence in East Asia than any other native rulers of China, and their attitude toward the representatives of Portugal, Spain, Russia, Britain, and Holland who appeared in China before the end of their dynasty was a condescending one.

      For the first time in Chinese history, the Ming rulers regularly adopted only one reign name (nianhao) each; the sole exception was the sixth emperor, who had two reigns separated by an interval of eight years. Because of this reign-name practice (which was perpetuated under the succeeding Qing dynasty), modern writers, confusingly but correctly, refer to the Wanli emperor, for example, by his personal name, Zhu Yijun; by his temple name, Shenzong; or sometimes, incorrectly but conveniently, simply as Wanli, as if the reign name were a personal name.

      The Ming dynasty's founder, the Hongwu emperor, is one of the strongest and most colourful personalities of Chinese history. His long reign established the governmental structure, policies, and tone that characterized the whole dynasty. After his death in 1398 his grandson and successor, the Jianwen emperor, trying to assert control over his powerful uncles, provoked a rebellion on the part of the prince of Yan and was overwhelmed in 1402. The prince of Yan took the throne as the Yongle emperor (reigned 1402–24) and proved to be vigorous and aggressive. He subjugated Nam Viet, personally campaigned against the reorganizing Mongols in the north, and sent large naval expeditions overseas, chiefly under the eunuch admiral Zheng He, to demand tribute from rulers as far away as Africa. He also returned the empire's capital to Beijing, giving that city its present-day name.

      For a century after the Yongle emperor, the empire enjoyed stability, tranquillity, and prosperity. But state administration began to suffer when weak emperors were exploitatively dominated by favoured eunuchs: Wang Zhen in the 1440s, Wang Zhi in the 1470s and '80s, and Liu Jin from 1505 to 1510. The Hongxi (reigned 1424–25), Xuande (1425–35), and Hongzhi (1487–1505) emperors were nevertheless able and conscientious rulers in the Confucian mode. The only serious disruption of the peace occurred in 1449 when the eunuch Wang Zhen led the Zhengtong emperor (first reign 1435–49) into a disastrous military campaign against the Oyrat (western Mongols). The Oyrat leader Esen Taiji ambushed the imperial army, captured the emperor, and besieged Beijing. The Ming defense minister, Yu Qian, forced Esen to withdraw unsatisfied and for eight years dominated the government with emergency powers. When the interim Jingtai emperor (reigned 1449–57) fell ill in 1457, the Zhengtong emperor, having been released by the Mongols in 1450, resumed the throne as the Tianshun emperor (1457–64). Yu Qian was then executed as a traitor.

      The Zhengde (reigned 1505–21) and Jiajing (1521–1566/67) emperors were among the less-esteemed Ming rulers. The former was an adventure-loving carouser, the latter a lavish patron of Daoist alchemists. For one period of 20 years, during the regime of an unpopular grand secretary named Yan Song, the Jiajing emperor withdrew almost entirely from governmental cares. Both emperors cruelly humiliated and punished hundreds of officials for their temerity in remonstrating.

      China's long peace ended during the Jiajiang emperor's reign. The Oyrat, under the vigorous new leadership of Altan Khan, were a constant nuisance on the northern frontier from 1542 on; in 1550 Altan Khan raided the suburbs of Beijing itself. During the same era, Japan-based sea raiders (piracy) repeatedly plundered China's southeastern coast. Such sea raiders, a problem in Yuan times and from the earliest Ming years, had been suppressed during the reign of the Yongle emperor, when Japan's Ashikaga shogunate offered nominal submission to China in exchange for generous trading privileges. However, changes in the official trade system eventually provoked new discontent along the coast, and during the 1550s corsair fleets looted the Shanghai-Ningbo region almost annually, sometimes sendin