Signs of Hope in Africa

▪ 1997

      by Kenneth Ingham

      In November 1996 the Mozambican government withdrew a draft law on defense and the armed forces from the business of the current session of the national assembly because the elected opposition had described it as unconstitutional. This apparently unremarkable act was not without significance in its African context. It would undoubtedly have met with the approval of the International Monetary Fund and other Western donors, which, for some time, have tried to make the grant of aid to African countries conditional not only upon stricter control of the economy but also upon the introduction of Western-style, multiparty democracy.

      The action of Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world, is significant because it is not wholly typical of events in other African countries, though this is not necessarily due to a lack of effort on their part. Several countries have tried to respond to the donors' demands, but with varying degrees of success. The case of Zambia offers a partial but important explanation. After free elections on a multiparty basis in 1991, the United National Independence Party, which had held office for many years, was defeated. It was then suggested that since the victorious Movement for Multiparty Democracy embraced a number of parties representing a wide spectrum of interests, any opposition party was unnecessary. One should hasten to say that no action was taken to pursue that idea. Three years later a government established with high hopes found itself accused by the opposition of corruption and inefficiency, faults that it tried to remedy with commendable speed but with uneven success.

      The task of reconciling Western-style democracy and strict control of the economy with the situation in Africa is a complex one. In the first place, Western-educated Africans have learned about multiparty democracy but have had little practical experience of it, either in colonial times or since independence. For the majority of Africans, brought up on the basis of consensus within smaller social groups, the concept of a formal opposition is still an alien one.

      Given the limited economic resources of most African countries, any prospect of wielding power, exercising patronage, or acquiring wealth other than through membership of the party in office is virtually inconceivable. In these circumstances governments are unlikely to cherish opposition parties that are capable of replacing them. In addition, with the disappearance of Marxism-Leninism and African socialism as ideological forces, any idea of alternative governments in waiting, anxious to promote different political philosophies, has evaporated.

      To these factors must be added a fourth. The relative, and in some cases acute, poverty of most African countries means that if members and supporters of the government acquire more than their fair share of wealth, others will suffer. Given the importance of the extended family in African culture, the benefits and disadvantages of this inequality will probably be determined by ethnic considerations. In this situation anyone wishing to challenge the government will be tempted to play upon tribal loyalties and rivalries to win support. Therefore, if not always justifiably, accusations are leveled against tribalism as the source of Africa's problems. The exception to this rule occurs when control of the armed forces lies outside the government. In those cases the temptation to intervene in the political morass and to enjoy the benefits of political power can prove irresistible, as many senior officers have discovered in various parts of the continent.

 Should the West then not press quite so urgently for the introduction of Western concepts into Africa? Should Africa be allowed to move at a more leisured pace? Signs of hope in a number of countries suggest that this might be the strategy to adopt. (See Map—>.)

      While both Tanzania and Senegal have opposition parties, neither can as yet be said to enjoy full, Western-style democracy, and neither has overcome its economic problems. In more than 40 years since independence, however, neither has had a military government, and, with the exception of a brief skirmish with a mutinous army soon after Tanzania became independent, both countries have been at peace. In each nation the same party remained in office, winning regular elections with widespread popular support, but the personnel of government changed, not only with the changing generations but also in response to the demands of a free electorate. Moreover, both countries survived the resignation of a charismatic leader, who guided them to independence and provided the unifying factor needed to triumph over the pitfalls of ethnic diversity. Each, it is true, had its "offshore problem"—in Tanzania's case, literally, the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and in the case of Senegal the secessionist movement in the southern, virtually isolated, province of Casamance. In both instances the problem was genuinely one of physical as well as of historical and cultural separation rather than of the failure of contemporary government. In neither country had this problem weakened the cohesion of the "mainland" or delayed its slow but steady response to outside pressures for economic growth, tempered by local needs.

      Zimbabwe, too, after a traumatic civil war between blacks and whites, achieved a measure of stability in spite of searing drought and repeated threats by Pres. Robert Mugabe to seize white-owned land to distribute among the black population. Once again a single party has dominated the political scene after several elections, yet the Marxist-Leninist hankering of the president has been quietly curbed, and a gradual move is taking place in the direction of a market economy.

      Events in South Africa since 1990 have shed new light on the possibilities of change on the African continent, but South Africa is not truly representative of the rest of Africa. Like Tanzania, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, its politics are effectively dominated by a single party with widespread support. Unlike the other countries, it has considerable wealth and powerful economic pressure groups that are not wholly controlled by the government. Consequently, the prospect of South Africa's approximating to the pattern of Western political and economic systems is far greater than in other parts of the continent.

      It is a little early to assess the prospects for success in Eritrea, which emerged from a 30-year struggle for independence only in 1993. The alacrity with which the victorious Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) converted itself into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice and set up a commission to draft a new constitution by June 1996 was an indicator of good intentions, even though the transitional government, which is to remain in office for four years, is still the EPLF in civilian guise. The willingness of the transitional government to contemplate multiparty democracy, coupled with its wariness of political parties based solely upon ethnic or religious affiliations, also augurs well for a balanced society. Revitalization of the economy is desperately needed after such a lengthy period of conflict, but the foundations must be secure in the economic as well as in the political sphere.

      In a region that has had more than its share of civil wars and military dictatorships there are, nevertheless, other areas—Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire among them—that fit neither the blueprint that donor countries would like to see nor yet the patterns created by Tanzania, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. But they have achieved a measure of stability accompanied by the prospect, however distant, of economic growth. In each of these countries, innovations have been introduced as modifications of a traditional pattern, and, if economic growth is slow, it proceeds at a pace with which the people can keep in step. Moreover, where nepotism remains a problem, it is at least one that the people understand, even if those who lose out do not approve.

      Kenneth Ingham is professor emeritus of history at the University of Bristol, Eng., and the author of Politics in Modern Africa: The Uneven Tribal Dimensions.

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