military technology

military technology


      range of weapons, equipment, structures, and vehicles used specifically for the purpose of fighting. It includes the knowledge required to construct such technology, to employ it in combat, and to repair and replenish it.

      The technology of war may be divided into five categories. Offensive arms harm the enemy, while defensive weapons ward off offensive blows. Transportation technology moves soldiers and weaponry; communications coordinate the movements of armed forces; and sensors detect forces and guide weaponry.

      From the earliest times, a critical relationship has existed between military technology, the tactics of its employment, and the psychological factors that bind its users into units. Success in combat, the sine qua non of military organizations and the ultimate purpose of military technology, depends on the ability of the combatant group to coordinate the actions of its members in a tactically effective manner. This coordination is a function of the strength of the forces that bind the unit together, inducing its members to set aside their individual interests—even life itself—for the welfare of the group. These forces, in turn, are directly affected both by tactics and by technology.

      The influence of technology can be either positive or negative. The experience of the ancient Greek hoplite infantrymen is one example of positive influence. Their arms and armour were most effective for fighting in close formation, which led in turn to marching in step, which further augmented cohesion and made the phalanx a tactically formidable formation. The late medieval knight offers an example of the negative influence of technology. To wield his sword and lance effectively, he and his charger needed considerable space, yet his closed helmet made communication with his fellows extremely difficult. It is not surprising, then, that knights of the late Middle Ages tended to fight as individuals and were often defeated by cohesive units of less well-equipped opponents.

      This article traces the development of military technology by historical period, from prehistory to the 18th century. For a discussion of modern military technology, see small arm, artillery, rocket and missile system, nuclear weapon, chemical warfare (chemical weapon), biological warfare (biological weapon), fortification, tank, naval ship, submarine, military aircraft, warning system, and military communication.

      A general treatment of the actual waging of war is found in war, with more specific discussions appearing in such articles as strategy, tactics, and logistics. The social sciences of war, such as economics, law, and the theory of its origins, are also covered in that article. For a military history of World Wars I and II, see World War I and World War II.

      Warfare requires the use of technologies that also have nonmilitary applications. For descriptions of the propulsion systems used in military vehicles, ships, aircraft, and missiles, see energy conversion; for the manufacture of explosives, see explosives (explosive). The principles of radar, and its military applications, are covered in radar. For the principles of aircraft flight, see airplane.

John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

General considerations
      In the remote past, the diffusion of military technology was gradual and uneven. There were several reasons for this. First, transport was slow and its capacity small. Second, the technology of agriculture was no more advanced than that of war, so that, with most of their energy devoted to feeding themselves and with little economic surplus, people had few resources available for specialized military technology. Low economic development meant that even the benefits of conquest would not pay off a heavy investment in weaponry. Third, and most important, the absolute level of technological development was low. A heavy dependence on human muscle was the principal cause and a major effect of this low level of development. With human ingenuity bound by the constraints of the human body, both technology and tactics were heavily shaped by geography, climate, and topography.

      The importance of geographic and topographic factors, along with limited means of communication and transportation, meant that separate geographic regions tended to develop unique military technologies. Such areas are called military ecospheres. The boundaries of a military ecosphere might be physical barriers, such as oceans or mountain ranges; they might also be changes in the military topography, that combination of terrain, vegetation, and man-made features that could render a particular technology or tactic effective or ineffective.

      Until the late 15th century AD, when advances in transportation technology broke down the barriers between them, the world contained a number of military ecospheres. The most clearly defined of these were based in Mesoamerica, Japan, India–Southeast Asia, China, and Europe. (In this context, Europe includes all of the Mediterranean basin and the watershed of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.) With the appearance of the horse archer in late antiquity, the Eurasian Steppe became a well-defined military ecosphere as well.

      Those ecospheres with the most enduring impact on the technology of war were the European and Chinese. Though Japan possessed a distinctive, coherent, and effective military technology, it had little influence on developments elsewhere. India–Southeast Asia and Mesoamerica developed technologies that were well adapted to local conditions, but they were not particularly advanced. The Eurasian Steppe (Steppe, the) was a special case: usually serving as an avenue for a limited exchange of knowledge between Europe and China, in the late classical and medieval eras of Europe it developed an indigenous military technology based on the horse and composite recurved bow that challenged Europe and ultimately conquered China.

      Improved methods of transportation and warfare led to the eventual disappearance of the regional ecospheres and their absorption into the European ecosphere. This process began in the 12th century with the Mongol conquest of China and invasions of Europe, and it quickened and assumed a more pronounced European flavour in the 15th and 16th centuries with the development of oceangoing ships armed with gunpowder weapons.

      Because European methods of warfare ultimately dominated the world, and because the technology of war, with few exceptions, advanced first and fastest in Europe, this article devotes most of its attention to the European military ecosphere. It traces the technology of land war in that ecosphere from Stone Age weapons to the early guns. For reasons of continuity, warships from before the gunpowder era are discussed with modern naval ships and craft in the article naval ship.


The earliest military weapons (weapon)
      The earliest evidence for a specialized technology of war dates from the period before knowledge of metalworking had been acquired. The stone walls of Jericho, which date from about 8000 BC, represent the first technology that can be ascribed unequivocally to purely military purposes. These walls, at least 13 feet (4 metres) in height and backed by a watchtower or redoubt some 28 feet tall, were clearly intended to protect the settlement and its water supply from human intruders.

      When the defenses of Jericho were built, humans already had been using the weapons of the hunt for millennia; the earliest stone tools are hundreds of thousands of years old, and the first arrowheads date to more than 60,000 years ago. Hunting tools—the spear-thrower (atlatl), the simple bow, the javelin, and the sling—had serious military potential, but the first known implements designed purposely as offensive weapons were maces dating from the Chalcolithic Period or early Bronze Age. The mace was a simple rock, shaped for the hand and intended to smash bone and flesh, to which a handle had been added to increase the velocity and force of the blow.

      It is evident that the technical problems of hafting a stone onto a handle were not easily solved. Well-made maces were for a long time few in number and were, by and large, wielded only by champions and rulers. The earliest known inscription identifying a historical personage by name is on the palette of King Narmer, a small, low-relief slate sculpture dating from about 3100 BC. The palette depicts Menes, the first pharaoh of a unified Egypt, ritually smashing the forehead of an enemy with a mace.

      The advent of the mace as a purposely designed offensive weapon opened the door to the conscious innovation of specialized military technology. By the middle of the 3rd millennium BC, mace heads were being cast of copper, first in Mesopotamia and then in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. The copper mace head, yielding higher density and greater crushing power, represents one of the earliest significant uses of metal for other than ornamental purposes.

From precious metals to base metals
      The dividing line between the utilitarian and the symbolic in warfare has never been clear and unequivocal, and this line is particularly difficult to find in the design and construction of early weaponry. The engineering principles that dictated functional effectiveness were not understood in any systematic fashion, yet the psychological reality of victory or defeat was starkly evident. The result was an “unscientific” approach to warfare and technology, in which materials appear to have been applied to military purposes as much for their presumed mystical or magical properties as for their functional worth.

      This overlapping of symbolism and usefulness is most evident in the smith's choice of materials. Ornaments and ceremonial artifacts aside, metalworking was applied to the production of weaponry as early as, or earlier than, any other economically significant pursuit. Precious metals, with their low melting points and great malleability, were worked first; next came copper—at first pure, then alloyed with arsenic or tin to produce bronze—and then iron. A remarkable phenomenon was the persistence of weaponry made of the soft, rare metals such as gold, silver, and electrum (a naturally occurring alloy of gold and silver) long after mechanically superior materials had become available. Although they were functionally inferior to bronze or copper, precious metals were widely valued for their mystical or symbolic importance, and smiths continued to make weapons of them long after they had mastered the working of functionally superior base metals. Some of these weapons were plainly ceremonial, but in other cases they appear to have been functional. For example, helmets and body armour of electrum, which were probably intended for actual use, have been found in Egyptian and Mesopotamian burials dating from the 2nd and 3rd millennia BC.

Antiquity and the classical age, c. 1000 BC–AD 400
      From the appearance of iron weaponry in quantity during late antiquity until the fall of Rome, the means with which war was waged and the manner in which it was conducted displayed many enduring characteristics that gave the period surprising unity. Prominent features of that unity were a continuity in the design of individual weaponry, a relative lack of change in transportation technology, and an enduring tactical dominance of heavy infantry.

      Perhaps the strongest underlying technological feature of the period was the heavy reliance on human muscle, which retained a tactical primacy that contrasted starkly with medieval times, when the application of horse power became a prime ingredient of victory. (There were two major, if partial, exceptions to this prevailing feature: the success of horse archers in the great Eurasian Steppe during late classical times, and the decisive use in the 4th century BC of shock cavalry by the armies of Philip II of Macedon (Macedonia) and his son Alexander the Great. However, the defeat of Roman legions by Parthian horse archers at Carrhae in western Mesopotamia in 53 BC marked merely a shifting of boundaries between ecospheres on topographical grounds rather than any fundamental change within the core of the European ecosphere itself. Also, the shock cavalry of Philip and Alexander was an exception so rare as to prove the rule; moreover, their decisiveness was made possible by the power of the Macedonian infantry phalanx.) Heavy infantry remained the dominant European military institution until it was overthrown in the 4th century AD by a system of war in which shock cavalry played the central role.

      Classical technologists never developed an efficient means of applying animal traction to haulage on land, no doubt because agricultural resources in even the most advanced areas were incapable of supporting meaningful numbers of horses powerful enough to make the effort worthwhile. Carts were heavy and easily broken, and the throat-and-girth harness for horses, mules, and donkeys put pressure on the animals' windpipes and neck veins, severely restricting the amount they could pull. The yoke-and-pole harness for oxen was relatively efficient and oxen could pull heavy loads, but they were extremely slow. A human porter, on the other hand, was just as efficient as a pack horse in weight carried per unit of food consumed. The best recipe for mobility, therefore, was to restrict pack animals to the minimum needed for carrying bulky items such as essential rations, tents, and firewood, to use carts only for items such as siege engines that could be carried in no other way, and to require soldiers to carry all their personal equipment and some of their food.

      On the other hand, mastery of wood and bronze for military purposes reached a level during this period that was seldom, if ever, attained afterward. Surviving patterns for the Roman military boot, the caliga, suggest equally high standards of craftsmanship in leatherworking, and the standards of carpentry displayed on classical ships were almost impossibly high when measured against those of later eras.

Defensive weaponry
      The design and production of individual defensive equipment (armour) was restricted by the shape of the human form that it had to protect; at the same time, it placed heavy demands on the smith's skills. The large areas to be protected, restrictions on the weight that a combatant could carry, the difficulty of forging metal into the complex contours required, and cost all conspired to force constant change.

      The technology of defensive weapons was rarely static. Evidence exists of an ancient contest between offensive and defensive weaponry, with defensive weaponry at first leading the way. By 3000 BC Mesopotamian smiths had learned to craft helmets of copper-and-arsenic bronze, which, no doubt worn with a well-padded leather lining, largely neutralized the offensive advantages of the mace. By 2500 BC the Sumerians were making helmets of bronze, along with bronze spearheads and ax blades. The weapon smiths' initial response to the helmet was to augment the crushing power of the mace by casting the head in an ellipsoidal form that concentrated more force at the point of impact. Then, as technical competence increased, the ellipsoidal head became a cutting edge, and by this process the mace evolved into the ax. The contest between mace and helmet initiated a contest between offensive and defensive technology that continued throughout history.

      The helmet, though arguably the earliest focus of the armourer's craft, was one of the most demanding challenges. Forging an integral, one-piece dome of metal capable of covering the entire head was extremely difficult. The Corinthian Greek helmet, a deep, bowl-shaped helmet of carefully graduated thickness forged from a single piece of bronze, probably represented the functional as well as aesthetic apex of the bronze worker's art. Many classical Greek helmets of bronze were joined by a seam down the crown.

      Iron helmets followed the evolution of iron mail, itself a sophisticated and relatively late development. The legionnaire of the early Roman Republic wore a helmet of bronze, while his successor in the Empire of the 1st century AD wore one of iron.

      Shields were used for hunting long before they were used for warfare, partly for defense and partly for concealment in stalking game, and it is likely that the military shield evolved from that of the hunter and herdsman. The size and composition of shields varied greatly, depending on the tactical demands of the user. In general, the more effective the protection afforded by body armour, the smaller the shield; similarly, the longer the reach of the soldier's weapon, the smaller his shield. The Greek hoplite, a heavy infantryman who fought in closely packed formation, acquired his name from the hoplon, a convex, circular shield, approximately three feet (90 centimetres) in diameter, made of composite wood and bronze. It was carried on the left arm by means of a bronze strap that passed across the forearm and a rope looped around the inner rim with sufficient slack to be gripped in the fist. In the 4th century BC the soldier of the Roman Republic, who fought primarily with the spear, carried an oval shield, while the later imperial legionnaire, who closed in with a short sword, protected himself with the scutum, a large cylindrical shield of leather-clad wood that covered most of his body.

Body armour
      Padded garments, and perhaps armour of hardened leather, preceded edged metal weapons. It was then a logical, if expensive, step to cast or forge small metal plates and sew them onto a protective garment. These provided real protection against arrow, spear, or mace, and the small scales, perforated for attachment, were a far less demanding technical challenge than even the simplest helmet. Armour of overlapping scales of bronze, laced together or sewn onto a backing of padded fabric, is well represented in pictorial evidence and burial items from Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt from about 1500 BC, though its use was probably restricted to a small elite.

      By classical times, breastplates of bronze, at first beaten and then cast to the warrior's individual shape, were commonplace among heavy infantry and elite cavalry. Greaves, defenses for the lower leg, closely followed the breastplate. At first these were forged of bronze plates; some classical Greek examples were cast to such fine tolerances that they sprang open and could be snapped onto the calf. Defenses for more remote portions of the body, such as vambraces for the forearm and defenses for the ankle resembling spats, were included in Greek temple dedications, but they were probably not common in field service.

      Bronze was the most common metal for body defenses well into the Iron Age, a consequence of the fact that it could be worked in large pieces without extended hand forging and careful tempering, while iron had to be forged from relatively small billets.

      The first practical body armour of iron was mail, which made its appearance in Hellenistic times but became common only during the Roman Imperial period. (Bronze mail was impractical because of the insufficient strength of the alloy.) Mail, or chain mail, was made of small rings of iron, typically of one-half-inch diameter or less, linked into a protective fabric. The rings were fastened together in patterns of varying complexity depending on the degree of protection desired; in general, smaller, lighter rings fastened in dense, overlapping patterns meant lighter, better protection. The fabrication of mail was extremely labour-intensive. The earliest mail was made of hand-forged links, each individual link riveted together. Later, armourers used punches of hardened iron to cut rings from sheets: this reduced the labour involved and, hence, the cost.

      The earliest evidence of mail is depicted on Greek sculpture and friezes dating from the 3rd century BC, though this kind of protection might be considerably older (there was some evidence that it might be of Celtic origin). Little else is known about the use of mail by the Greeks, but the Roman legionnaire was equipped with a lorica hamata, a mail shirt, from a very early date. Mail was extremely flexible and provided good protection against cutting and piercing weapons. Its main disadvantage was its weight, which tended to hang from the shoulders and waist. In addition, strips of mail tended to curl at the edges; the Romans solved this problem by lacing mail shoulder defenses to leather plates. In the 1st century AD the legionnaire's mail shirt gave way to a segmented iron torso defense, the lorica segmentata.

Plate-iron armour
      While some early forged bronze armour was technically plate, the introduction of the lorica segmentata heralded the production of practical plate armour on a large scale. In general, the term plate would imply a uniform thickness of metal, and only iron could provide reasonably effective protection with uniform thickness without excessive weight.

      While the Republican legionnaire's lorica hamata hung to the midthigh, his imperial successor's lorica segmentata covered only the shoulders and torso. On the whole, classical plate armour probably provided better protection against smashing and heavy piercing blows, while a shirt of well-made mail covered more of the body and, hence, afforded better protection against slashing blows and missiles.

Offensive weaponry
      Development of the offensive technology of war was not as constrained by technological and economic limitations as was defensive weaponry. Every significant offensive weapon was widely available, while defensive equipment of high quality was almost always confined to the elite. Perhaps as a consequence, a wide variety of individual offensive weapons appeared in antiquity. One of the most striking facets of ancient military technology is the early date by which individual weapons attained their form and the longevity of early offensive weapons concepts. Some of the weapons of antiquity disappeared as practical military implements in classical and medieval times, and all underwent modification, but, with the exception of the halberd and crossbow, virtually every significant pre-gunpowder weapon was known in antiquity.

The ax
      Limitations on the strength of bronze and difficulties in casting and hafting restricted the ax at first to a relatively broad blade mortised into a handle at three points and secured with bindings or rivets. The hafting problem became acute as improvements in armour dictated longer, narrower blades designed primarily for piercing rather than cutting. This led to the development of socketed axes, in which the handle passed through a tubular hole cast in the ax head; both hole and head were tapered from front to rear to prevent the head from flying off. This far stronger hafting technique must have been accompanied by a significant improvement in the quality of the metal itself. The pace and timing of these developments varied enormously from place to place, depending on the local level of technology. Sumerian smiths were casting socketed ax heads with narrow piercing blades by 2500 BC, while simple mortise-and-tenon hafting was still being used in Egypt 1,000 years later.

The spear
      Though early man probably employed spears of fire-hardened wood, spearheads of knapped stone were used long before the emergence of any distinction between hunting and military weapons. Bronze spearheads closely followed the development of alloys hard enough to keep a cutting edge and represented, with the piercing ax, the earliest significant military application of bronze. Spearheads were also among the earliest militarily significant applications of iron, no doubt because existing patterns could be directly extrapolated from bronze to iron. Though the hafting is quite different, bronze Sumerian spearheads of the 3rd millennium BC differ only marginally in shape from the leaf-shaped spearheads of classical Greece.

      The spears of antiquity were relatively short, commonly less than the height of the warrior, and typically were wielded with one hand. As defensive armour and other weapons of shock combat (notably the sword) improved, spear shafts were made longer and the use of the spear became more specialized. The Greek hoplite's spear was about nine feet long; the Macedonian sarissa was twice that length in the period of Alexander's conquests and it grew to some 21 feet in Hellenistic times.

The javelin
      Javelins, or throwing spears, were shorter and lighter than spears designed for shock combat and had smaller heads. The distinction between javelin and spear was slow to develop, but by classical times the heavy spear was clearly distinguished from the javelin, and specialized javelin troops were commonly used for skirmishing. A throwing string was sometimes looped around the shaft and tied to the thrower's finger to impart spin to the javelin on release. This improved the weapon's accuracy and probably increased the range and penetrating power by permitting a harder cast.

      A significant refinement of the javelin was the Roman pilum. The pilum was relatively short, about five feet long, and had a heavy head of soft iron that made up nearly one-third of the weapon's total length. The weight of this weapon restricted its range but gave it greater impact. Its head of soft iron was intended to bend on impact, preventing an enemy from throwing it back.

      Like the spear, the javelin was relatively unaffected by the appearance of iron and retained its characteristic form until it was finally abandoned as a serious weapon in the 16th century.

The sling
      The sling was the simplest of the missile weapons of antiquity in principle and the most difficult in practice. It consisted of two cords or thongs fastened to a pouch. A small stone was placed in the pouch, and the slinger whirled the whole affair around to build up velocity before letting go of one of the cord ends to release the projectile. While considerable velocity could be imparted to a projectile in this way, the geometry of the scheme dictated that the release be timed with uncanny precision to achieve even rudimentary accuracy. Almost always wielded by tribal or regionally recruited specialists who acquired their skills in youth, the sling featured prominently in warfare in antiquity and classical times. It outranged the javelin and even—at least at some times and places—the bow (a point confirmed in the 4th century BC by the Greek historian Xenophon). By classical times, lead bullets, often with slogans or epigrams cast into them—“A nasty present!”—were used as projectiles.

      The sling vanished as a weapon of war in the Old World by the end of the classical period, owing mainly to the disappearance of the tribal cultures in which it originated. (In the New World, on the other hand, both the Aztecs and Incas used the sling with great effect against Spanish conquistadores in the 16th century.)

The sword
      The advantages of a long, sharp blade had to await advanced smelting and casting technology before they could be realized. By about 1500 BC the cutting ax had evolved into the sickle sword, a bronze sword with a curved, concave blade and a straight, thickened handle. Bronze swords with straight blades more than three feet long have been found in Greek grave sites; however, because this length exceeded the structural capabilities of bronze, these swords were not practical weapons. As a serious military implement, the sword had to await the development of iron forging, and the first true swords date from about 1200 BC.

      Swords in antiquity and classical times tended to be relatively short, at first because they were made of bronze and later because they were rarely called upon to penetrate iron armour. The blade of the classic Roman stabbing sword, the gladius, was only some two feet long, though in the twilight years of the empire the gladius gave way to the spatha, the long slashing sword of the barbarians.

The bow (bow and arrow)
      The bow was simple in concept, yet it represented an extremely sophisticated technology. In its most basic form, the bow consisted of a stave of wood slightly bent by the tension of a bowstring connecting its two ends. The bow stored the force of the archer's draw as potential energy, then transferred it to the bowstring as kinetic energy, imparting velocity and killing power to the arrow. The bow could store no more energy than the archer was capable of producing in a single movement of the muscles of his back and arms, but it released the stored energy at a higher velocity, thus overcoming the arm's inherent limitations.

      Though not as evident, the sophistication of arrow technology matched that of the bow. The effectiveness of the bow depended on the arrow's efficiency in retaining kinetic energy throughout its trajectory and then transforming it into killing power on impact. This was not a simple problem, as it depended on the mass, aerodynamic drag, and stability of the arrow and on the hardness and shape of the head. These factors were related to one another and to the characteristics of the bow in a complex calculus. The most important variables in this calculus were arrow weight and the length and stiffness of the bow.

      Assuming the same length of draw and available force, the total amount of potential energy that an archer could store in a bow was a function of the bow's length; that is, the longer the arms of the bow, the more energy stored per unit of work expended in the draw and, therefore, the more kinetic energy imparted to the string and arrow. The disadvantage of a long bow was that the stored energy had to serve not only to drive the string and arrow but also to accelerate the mass of the bow itself. Because the longer bow's more massive arms accelerated more slowly, a longer bow imparted kinetic energy to the string and arrow at a lower velocity. A shorter bow, on the other hand, stored less energy for the same amount of work expended in the draw, but it compensated for this through its ability to transmit the energy to the arrow at a higher velocity. In sum, the shorter bow imparted less total energy to the arrow, but it did so at a higher velocity. Therefore, in practice maximum range was attained by a short, stiff bow shooting a very light arrow, and maximum killing power at medium ranges was attained by a long bow driving a relatively heavy arrow.

The early bow
      The simple bow, made from a single piece of wood, was known to Neolithic hunters; it is clearly depicted in cave paintings of 30,000 BC and earlier. The first improvement was the reflex bow, a bow that was curved forward, or reflexively, near its centre so that the string lay close against the grip before the bow was drawn. This increased the effective length of the draw since it began farther forward, close to the archer's left hand.

The composite recurved bow
      The next major improvement, one that was to remain preeminent among missile weapons until well into the modern era, was the composite recurved bow. This development overcame the inherent limitations of wood in stiffness and tensile strength. The composite bow's resistance to bending was increased by reinforcing the rear, or belly, of the bow with horn; its speed and power in recoil were increased by overlaying the front of the bow with sinew, usually applied under tension. The wooden structure of this composite thus consisted of little more than thin wooden strips supporting the horn and sinew. The more powerful composite bows, being very highly stressed, reversed their curvature when unstrung. They acquired the name recurved since the outer arms of the bow curved away from the archer when the bow was strung, which imparted a mechanical advantage at the end of the draw. Monumental and artistic evidence suggest that the principle of the composite recurved bow was known as early as 3000 BC.

      A prime advantage of the composite bow was that it could be engineered to essentially any desired strength. By following the elaborate but empirically understood trade-off between length and stiffness referred to above, the bowyer could produce a short bow capable of propelling light arrows to long ranges, a long, heavy bow designed to maximize penetrative power at relatively short ranges, or any desired compromise between.

      Arrow design was probably the first area of military technology in which production considerations assumed overriding importance. As a semi-expendable munition that was used in quantity, arrows could not be evaluated solely by their technological effectiveness; production costs had to be considered as well. As a consequence, the materials used for arrowheads tended to be a step behind those used for other offensive technologies. Arrowheads of flint and obsidian, knapped to remarkably uniform standards, survived well into the Bronze Age, and bronze arrowheads were used long after the adoption of iron for virtually every other military cutting or piercing implement.

      Arrow shafts were made of relatively inexpensive wood and reed throughout history, though considerable labour was involved in shaping them. Remarkably refined techniques for fastening arrowheads of flint and obsidian to shafts were well in hand long before recorded history. (The importance of arrow manufacturing techniques is reflected in the survival in modern English of the given name Fletcher, the title of a specialist in attaching feathers to the arrow shaft.)

Mechanical artillery (artillery)
      In contrast to individual weaponry, there was little continuity from classical to medieval times in mechanical artillery. The only exception—and it may have been a case of independent reinvention—was the similarity of the Roman onager to the medieval catapult.

      Mechanical artillery of classical times was of two types: tension and torsion. In the first, energy to drive the projectile was provided by the tension of a drawn bow; in the other, it was provided by torsional energy stored in bundles of twisted fibres.

      The invention of mechanical artillery was ascribed traditionally to the initiative of Dionysius (Dionysius I) I, tyrant of Syracuse, in Sicily, who in 399 BC directed his engineers to construct military engines in preparation for war with Carthage. Dionysius' engineers surely drew on existing practice. The earliest of the Greek engines was the gastrophetes, or “belly shooter.” In effect a large crossbow, it received its name because the user braced the stock against his belly to draw the weapon. Though Greek texts did not go into detail on construction of the bow, it was based on a composite bow of wood, horn, and sinew. The potential of such engines was apparent, and the demand for greater power and range quickly exceeded the capabilities of tension. By the middle of the 3rd century BC, the bow had been replaced by rigid wooden arms constrained in a wooden box and drawn against the force of tightly twisted bundles of hair or sinew. The overall concept was similar to the gastrophetes, but the substitution of torsion for tension permitted larger and more powerful engines to be made. Such catapults (catapult) (from Greek kata, “to pierce,” and pelte, “shield”; a “shield piercer”) could throw a javelin as far as 800 yards (700 metres). The same basic principle was applied to large stone-throwing engines. The Jewish historian Josephus referred to Roman catapults used in the siege of Jerusalem in AD 70 that could throw a one-talent stone (about 55 pounds, or 25 kilograms) two stades (400 yards) or more.

      The terminology of mechanical artillery is confusing. Catapult is the general term for mechanical artillery; however, the term also narrowly applies to a particular type of torsion engine with a single arm rotating in a vertical plane. Torsion engines with two horizontally opposed arms rotating in the horizontal plane, such as that described above, are called ballistae (ballista). There is no evidence that catapults in the narrow sense were used by the Greeks; the Romans called their catapults onagers, or wild asses, for the way in which their rears kicked upward under the recoil force. The Romans used large ballistae and onagers effectively in siege operations, and a complement of carroballistae, small, wheel-mounted torsion engines, was a regular part of the legion. The onager and the medieval catapult were identical in concept, but ballistae were not used after the classical era.

Fortress design
      Fortifications in antiquity were designed primarily to defeat attempts at escalade, though cover was provided for archers and javelin throwers along the ramparts and for enfilade fire from flanking towers. By classical Greek times, fortress architecture had attained a high level of sophistication; both the profile and trace (that is, the height above ground level and the outline of the walls) of fortifications were designed to achieve overlapping fields of fire from ballistae mounted along the ramparts and in supporting towers. Roman fortresses of the 2nd century AD, largely designed for logistic and administrative convenience, tended to have square or rectangular outlines, and were situated along major communication routes. By the late 3rd century, their walls had become thicker and had flanking towers strengthened to support mechanical artillery. The number of gates was reduced, and the ditches were dug wider. By the late 4th and 5th centuries, Roman fortresses were being built on easily defensible ground with irregular outlines that conformed to the topography; clearly, passive defense had become the dominant design consideration.

      In general, the quality of masonry that went into permanent defensive works of the classical period was very high by later standards. Fortifications were almost exclusively of dressed stone, though by Roman times concrete mortar was used on occasion.

Field fortification
      The main purpose of early field fortifications, particularly among the Greeks, was to secure an advantage by standing on higher ground so that the enemy was forced to attack uphill. The Romans were especially adept at field fortifications, preparing fortified camps at the close of each day's march. The troops usually required three to four hours to dig a ditch around the periphery, erect a rampart or palisade from timbers carried by each man, lay out streets, and pitch tents. During extended campaigns the Romans strengthened the camps with towers and outlying redoubts, or small forts, and used the camps as bases for offensive forays into the surrounding territory.

Siege towers
      For breaching fortified positions, military engineers of the classical age designed assault towers that remain a wonder to modern engineers. So large was one siege tower used by Macedonians in an attack on Rhodes that 3,400 men were required to move it up to the city walls. Another 1,000 men were needed to wield a battering ram 180 feet (55 metres) long. The Romans constructed huge siege towers, one of which Caesar mentions as being 150 feet high. The lower stories housed the battering ram, which had either a pointed head for breaching or a ramlike head for battering. Archers in the upper stories shot arrows to drive the defenders from their ramparts. From the top of the tower, a hinged bridge might be lowered to serve a storming party. To guard the attackers against enemy missiles, the Romans used great wicker or wooden shields, called mantelets, which were sometimes mounted on wheels. In some cases the attackers might approach the fortress under the protection of wooden galleries.

Land transportation
      In antiquity and classical times the transportation technology of land warfare largely amounted to man's own powers of locomotion. This was due in part to limitations in the size, strength, and stamina of horses and in part to deficiencies in crucial supporting technologies, notably the inefficiency of harnesses for horses and nonpivoting front axles for wagons. A more basic underlying factor was the generally low level of economic development. The horse was an economically inefficient animal, consuming large quantities of food. Of more importance, keeping horses—let alone selectively breeding them for size, strength, and power—was a highly labour-intensive and capital-intensive enterprise for which the classical world was not organized. An efficient pulling harness for horses was unknown, and mules and donkeys fitted with carrying baskets, or panniers, balanced in pairs across the back, were the most common pack or dray animals. The ox, the heavy-duty dray animal of the Mediterranean world, was used for military purposes when heavy loads were involved and speed was not critical.

The horse
      Because it was not possible to maintain a breed of war-horses sufficiently powerful to sustain mounted shock action, the horse was restricted to a subsidiary role in warfare from the eclipse of the chariot in the middle of the 2nd millennium BC until the rise of the horse archer in the 4th century AD. Evidence as to the size of horses in classical times is equivocal. Greek vase paintings from the 7th century BC depict Scythians riding tall, apparently powerful horses with long, slender legs, implying speed; however, this breed evidently collapsed and disappeared. Later Mongolian steppe ponies, though tough and tractable, were probably considerably smaller.

      Horses were rarely if ever used for drayage. This was partly because their rarity and expense restricted them to combat roles, and partly because of the lack of a suitable harness. The prevalent harness consisted of a pole-and-yoke assembly, attached to the animal by neck and chest harness. This was developed for use with oxen, where the primary load was absorbed by the thrust of the animal's hump against the yoke. With a horse, most of the pulling load was borne by the neck strap, which tended to strangle the horse and constrict blood flow.

      The war elephant was first used in India and was known to the Persians by the 4th century BC. Though they accomplished little subsequently, their presence in Hannibal's army during its transit of the Alps into Italy in 218 BC underscored their perceived utility. The elephant's tactical importance apparently stemmed in large part from its willingness to charge both men and horses and from the panic that it inspired in horses.

      The chariot was the earliest means of transportation in combat other than man's own powers of locomotion. The earliest known chariots, shown in Sumerian (Sumer) depictions from about 2500 BC, were not true chariots but four-wheeled carts with solid wooden wheels drawn by a team of four donkeys or wild asses. They were no doubt heavy and cumbersome; lacking a pivoting front axle, they would have skidded through turns.

      Around 1600 BC Iranian (Iran) tribes introduced the war-horse into Mesopotamia from the north, along with the light two-wheeled chariot. The Hyksos apparently introduced the chariot into Egypt shortly thereafter, by which time it was a mature technology. By the middle of the 2nd millennium BC, Egyptian, Hittite, and Palestinian chariots were extraordinarily light and flexible vehicles, the wheels and tires in particular exhibiting great sophistication in design and fabrication. Light war chariots were drawn by either two or three horses, which were harnessed by means of chest girths secured by one or two poles and a yoke.

      That horses were long used for pulling chariots rather than for riding is probably attributable to the horse's inadequate strength and incomplete domestication. The chariot was subject to mechanical failure and, more importantly, was immobilized when any one of its horses was incapacitated. Moreover, the art of riding astride in cavalry fashion had been mastered long before the chariot's eclipse as a tactically dominant weapon. The decline of the chariot by the end of the 2nd millennium BC was probably related to the spread of iron weaponry, but it was surely related also to the breeding of horses with sufficient strength and stamina to carry an armed man. Chariots lingered in areas of slower technological advance, but in the classical world they were retained mainly for ceremonial functions.

The age of cavalry, c. AD 400–1350
      The beginning of the age of cavalry in Europe is traditionally dated to the destruction of the legions of the Roman emperor Valens by Gothic horsemen at the Battle of Adrianople in AD 378. The period that followed, characterized by the network of political and economic relationships called feudalism, was an age during which the mounted arm assumed an ascendancy that it began to relinquish only in the 14th century, with the appearance of infantry capable of taking the open field unsupported against mounted chivalry. Cavalry, however, was only part of the story of this era. However impressive the mounted knight may have been in battle, he required a secure place of replenishment and refuge. This was provided by the seigneurial fortress, or castle. In a military sense, European feudalism rested on a symbiotic relationship between armoured man-at-arms, war-horse, and castle.

      The tactical dominance in Europe of the heavy mounted elites had a number of complex causes. It is clear that a basic reorientation of the means of production and of the social distribution of the means of armed violence was involved. Horses (horse) required large quantities of grain, and in an agricultural economy where returns on seed grain were as little as 2 to 1, mounted shock action could not have solidified its dominance without improvements in agricultural production. Perhaps ironically, these improvements seem to have involved the development of a means of harnessing the horse to agricultural transport and the plow—particularly beginning in the 14th century, when seed-to-yield ratios began to improve.

      The age of heavy shock cavalry did not come on suddenly, ushered in by the stirrup or any other single invention. Improvements in the breeding of war-horses played a major and perhaps dominant role. The Germanic tribes that pressed against the boundaries of Rome from the 3rd century on may have made a breakthrough in horse breeding, and, in the Arab conquests of the 7th century and following, the superior breed of the Arabian horse was a major determinant of tactical success. The stirrup alone meant little without powerful war-horses and supporting technologies such as saddle, girth, and bridle.

      Using scattered artistic and archaeological evidence, historians have constructed an approximate chronology of technological innovation in medieval Europe. The war saddle with a single girth was introduced by the 6th century, and the iron stirrup was common by the 7th (having probably been known earlier in the East). The curb bit, vitally important for controlling a war-horse, probably dates from about the same time. According to literary evidence, iron horseshoes date from the end of the 9th century, and, based on pictorial evidence, spurs date from the 11th. By the 12th century the European knight was using a war saddle with high, wraparound cantle and pommel that protected the genitals and held him securely in his seat; the saddle itself was secured to the horse by a double girth that held it firmly in place fore and aft. These developments welded horse and rider into a single unit and enabled the knight to apply much of the force of his horse's charge to the point of the lance, held couched beneath the arm, without being driven over the horse's rump on impact. An associated development dating from the end of the 12th century was the incorporation of a rigid backplate into knightly armour; this, backed with several inches of padding, braced the man-at-arms against the shock of head-on impact and protected his kidneys from the cantle. These developments were accompanied, and in part caused, by increases in the size and power of war-horses and steady improvements in personal armour.

The war-horse
      The destrier, or medieval war-horse, was central to the tactical viability of European feudalism. This animal was a product of two great migrations of horses originating in Central Asia. One, moving westward, crossed into Europe and there originated the vast herds of primeval animals that eventually roamed almost the entire continent. The second flowed to the southwest and found its way into Asia Minor and the neighbouring lands of Persia, India, and Arabia. Ultimately it crossed into Egypt, then spread from that country along all of North Africa. At the same time it crossed from Asia Minor into Greece and spread along the northern shores of the Mediterranean.

      There were two channels through which the horses of Arabia and North Africa were distributed into northern Europe. One was through the conquest of the Romans across the Alps into France and the Low Countries, where, previously, descendants of the horses of Central Asia had constituted the equine population. The other channel led northward through Greece, Macedonia, and the Gothic countries into the land of the Vandals (Vandal). When these barbarian peoples invaded the empire, the vast number of horses that they possessed helped them to overthrow the Romans. The era that followed witnessed the collapse of the Roman breeds (animal breeding) and the gradual development—especially during the era of Charlemagne in the late 8th and early 9th centuries—of improved types, owing largely to the importation of Arabian (Arabian horse) stock. The most important of these was the “great horse,” which originated in the Low Countries; its size and strength were required to carry the heavy load of the armoured knight. These horses, the ancestors of modern draft breeds, were bred from the largest and most powerful of the northern European horses, but there was apparently an admixture of Arabian breeds as well.

      The Crusades of the 12th and 13th centuries took the nobility of Europe into the native land of the Arabian horse. The speed and agility of these light horses so impressed them that large numbers were imported into England and France. Over a long period of time the Moors took Arabian and North African horses into Spain, where they were crossed with the native stock and produced the superior breeds that were sought after by other nations. (Spanish horses were also taken to the New World, where they became the principal ancestors of the equine population of North and South America.)

      The breeding, care, and maintenance of medieval war-horses, and the mastering of the skills of mounted combat, required immense amounts of time, skill, and resources. Horses strong enough to be ridden did not exist everywhere, and European horses in particular tended to revert in a feral state to a small animal not much larger than a Shetland pony. On the other hand, the horse was genetically tractable, and breeders learned that hard inbreeding could produce larger, more powerful animals. Still, it was difficult to establish a breed, and only careful control of bloodlines could maintain one. While crossbreeding could produce size and power, it also promoted instability and was best abandoned as soon as the desired traits were “fixed.” This was not easy, particularly where the resources available to maintain a nonproductive breeding stock were limited. The net result was that breeds of large, powerful horses suitable for mounted combat were difficult to establish and expensive to maintain, and they were often lost in the turmoil of war. Even when herds were not dispersed or destroyed, a breed could be lost through indiscriminate breeding arising from a need for numbers.

Personal armour (armour)
      The availability to mounted warrior elites of iron armour of high quality, particularly mail, was instrumental in the fall of Rome and in the establishment of European feudalism. Until the 10th century, however, there was little qualitative difference between the body armour of the western European knight and the Roman legionnaire's lorica hamata. Then, during the 11th century, the sleeves of the knight's mail shirt, or byrnie, became longer and closer-fitting, extending downward from the middle of the upper arm to the wrist; at the same time, the hem of the byrnie dropped from just above to just below the kneecap. Knights began wearing the gambeson, a quilted garment of leather or canvas, beneath their mail for additional protection and to cushion the shock of blows. (Ordinary soldiers often wore a gambeson as their only protection.) Use of the surcoat, a light garment worn over the knight's armour, became general during this period. Both gambeson and surcoat may have been Arab imports, adopted as a result of exposure to Muslim technology during the Crusades.

      Norman men-at-arms were protected by a knee-length mail shirt called a hauberk, which was a later version of the Saxon byrnie that was split to permit the wearer to sit astride his horse. Though 11th-century men-at-arms probably did not have complete mail trousers, the hauberk apparently had inserts of cloth or leather, giving the same effect. It also included a hoodlike garment of mail worn over the head to protect the neck and throat; this had a hole for the face much like a modern ski cap. The hood was backed by padding of cloth or leather, and a pointed iron helmet with nasal (a vertical bar protecting the nose) was worn over it. The knight's defensive equipment was completed by a large, kite-shaped shield, nearly two-thirds the height of its owner. The size of this shield was testimony to the incomplete protection offered by the hauberk.

      During the 12th century the open helmet with nasal evolved into the pot helm, or casque. This was an involved process, with the crown of the helmet losing its pointed shape to become flat and the nasal expanding to cover the entire face except for small vision slits and breathing holes. The late 12th-century helm was typically a barrel-shaped affair; however, more sophisticated designs with hinged visors appeared as well. The helm was extremely heavy, and the entire weight was borne by the neck; for this reason it was only donned immediately before combat. Some knights preferred a mail coif, no doubt with heavy padding and perhaps an iron cap beneath. One 12th-century depiction shows an iron visor worn over a coif of mail.

      By the early 13th century European amourers had learned to make mail with a sufficiently fine mesh to provide protection to the hand. At first this was in the form of mittens with a leather-lined hole in the palm through which the knight could thrust his hand when out of action; by mid-century the armourer's skill had developed to the point of making complete gloves of mail.

      The earliest knightly plate armour appeared shortly after 1200 in the form of thin plates worn beneath the gambeson. External plate armour began to appear around the middle of the century, at first for elbows, kneecaps, and shins. The true plate cuirass appeared about 1250, though it was at first unwieldy, covering only the front of the torso and no doubt placing considerable stress on the underlying garments to which it was attached. Perhaps in part for this reason, the breastplate was followed shortly by the backplate. From the late 13th century, plate protection spread from the knees and elbows to encompass the extremities; square plates called ailettes, which protected the shoulder, made a brief appearance between about 1290 and 1325 before giving way to jointed plate defenses that covered the gap between breastplate and upper-arm defenses. Helmets with hinged visors appeared about 1300, and by mid-century armourers were constructing closed, visored helms that rested directly on the shoulder defenses. Plate armour, at first worn above mail as reinforcement, began to replace it entirely except in areas such as the crotch, the armpits, and the back of the knees, where the armourer's skill could not devise a sufficiently flexible joint. In response to this enhanced coverage, the knight's large, kite-shaped shield evolved into a much smaller implement.

 The first suits of full plate armour date from the first decades of the 15th century. By 1440 the Gothic style of plate armour was well developed, representing the ultimate development of personal armour protection (see Figure 1—>). Armourers were making gloves with individually jointed fingers, and shoulder defenses had become particularly sophisticated, permitting the man-at-arms full freedom to wield sword, lance, or mace with a minimum of exposure. Also during the 15th century the weight of personal armour increased, partly because of the importance of shock tactics in European warfare and partly because of the demands of jousting (joust), a form of mock combat in which two armoured knights, separated by a low fence or barrier, rode at each other head-on and attempted to unseat each other with blunted lances. As armour protection became more complete and heavier, larger breeds of horses appeared. Mail protection for horses became common in the 13th century; by the 15th, plate horse armour was used extensively.

      The unprecedented protection that plate armour gave the man-at-arms did not come without tactical, as well as economic, cost. A closed helm seriously interfered with vision and made voice communication in battle impossible. No doubt in response to this, heraldry emerged during this period and the armorial surcoat became a standard item of knightly dress. Ultimately, the thickness of iron needed to stop missiles—at first arrows and crossbow bolts, then harquebus and musket balls—made armour so heavy as to be impractical for active service. By the 16th century, armour was largely ceremonial and decorative, with increasingly elaborate ornamentation.

The castle
The motte-and-bailey castle
      The earliest distinctive European fortification characteristic of feudal patterns of social organization and warfare was the motte-and-bailey castle, which appeared in the 10th and 11th centuries between the Rhine and Loire rivers and eventually spread to most of western Europe. The motte-and-bailey castle consisted of an elevated mound of earth, called the motte, which was crowned with a timber palisade and surrounded by a defensive ditch that also separated the motte from a palisaded outer compound, called the bailey. Access to the motte was by means of an elevated bridge across the ditch from the bailey. The earliest motte-and-bailey castles were built where the ground was suitable and timber available, these factors apparently taking precedence over considerations such as proximity to arable land or trade routes. Later on, as feudal social and economic relationships became more entrenched, castles were sited more for economic, tactical, and strategic advantage and were built of imported stone. The timber palisade was replaced with a keep, or donjon, of dressed stone, and the entire enclosure, called the enceinte, was surrounded by a wall.

      The motte-and-bailey castle was not the only pattern of European fortification. There was, for example, a tradition of fortified towns, stemming from Roman fortification, that enjoyed a tenuous existence throughout the Dark Ages, particularly in the Mediterranean world.

Stone fortifications
      The greatest weakness of timber fortifications was vulnerability to fire; in addition, a determined attacker, given enough archers to achieve fire dominance over the palisade, could quickly chop his way in. A stone curtain wall, on the other hand, had none of these deficiencies. It could be made high enough to frustrate improvised escalade and, unlike a wooden palisade, could be fitted with a parapet and crenellated firing positions along the top to give cover to defending archers and crossbowmen. Stone required little maintenance or upkeep, and it suffered by comparison with timber only in the high capital investment required to build with it.

      Given walls high enough to defeat casual escalade, the prime threats to stone fortresses were the battering ram and attempts to pry chunks out of the wall or undermine it. Since these tactics benefited from an unprotected footing at the base of the wall, most of the refinements of medieval fortress architecture were intended to deny an undisturbed approach. Where terrain permitted, a moat was dug around the enceinte. Towers were made with massive, protruding feet to frustrate attempts at mining. Protruding towers also enabled defenders to bring flanking fire along the face and foot of the wall, and the towers were made higher than the wall to give additional range to archers and crossbowmen. The walls themselves were fitted with provisions for hoardings, which were overhanging wooden galleries from which arrows, stones, and unpleasant substances such as boiling tar and pitch could be dropped or poured on an attacker. Hoardings gave way to machicolations, permanent overhanging galleries of stone that became a distinctive feature of medieval European fortress architecture.

      Castle entrances, which were few and small to begin with, were protected by barbicans, low-lying outworks dominated by the walls and towers behind. Gates were generally deeply recessed and backed by a portcullis, a latticework grate suspended in a slot that could be dropped quickly to prevent surprise entry. The gate could also be sealed by means of a drawbridge. These measures were sufficiently effective that medieval sieges were settled more often by treachery, starvation, or disease than by breached walls and undermined towers.

Siege weapons
      The most basic means of taking a fortress were to storm the gate or go over the wall by simple escalade using ladders, but these methods rarely succeeded except by surprise or treachery. Beginning in the 9th century, European engineers constructed wheeled wooden siege towers, called belfroys. These were fitted with drawbridges, which could be dropped onto the parapet, and with protected firing positions from which the defending parapets could be swept by arrow fire. Constructing one of these towers and moving it forward against an active defense was a considerable feat of engineering and arms. Typically, the moat had to be filled and leveled, all under defensive fire, and attempts to burn or dismount the tower had to be prevented. The wooden towers were vulnerable to fire, so that their faces were generally covered with hides.

      Battering rams (battering ram) were capable of bringing down sections of wall, given sufficient time, manpower, and determination. Large battering rams were mounted on wheels and were covered by a mobile shed for protection from defensive fire.

      The most powerful method of direct attack on the structure of a fortress was mining, digging a gallery beneath the walls and supporting the gallery with wooden shoring. Once completed, the mine was fired to burn away the shoring; this collapsed the gallery and brought down the walls. Mining, of course, required suitable ground and was susceptible to countermining by an alert defender.

The trebuchet
      In general, the mechanical artillery of medieval times was inferior to that of the Classical world. The one exception was the trebuchet, an engine worked by counterpoise. Counterpoise engines appeared in the 12th century and largely replaced torsion engines by the middle of the 13th. The trebuchet worked something like a seesaw. Suspended from an elevated wooden frame, the arm of the trebuchet pivoted from a point about one-quarter of the way down its length. A large weight, or counterpoise, was suspended from the short end, and the long end was fitted with a hollowed-out spoonlike cavity or a sling. (A sling added substantially to the trebuchet's range.) The long end was winched down, raising the counterpoise; a stone or other missile was put into the spoon or sling, and the arm was released to fly upward, hurling the missile in a high, looping arc toward its target. Though almost anything could be thrown, spherical projectiles of cut stone were the preferred ammunition.

      Trebuchets might have a fixed counterpoise, a pivoted counterpoise, or a counterpoise that could be slid up and down the arm to adjust for range. Ropes were frequently attached to the counterpoise to be pulled on for extra power. Modern experiments suggest that a trebuchet with an arm about 50 feet (15 metres) long would have been capable of throwing a 300-pound (135-kilogram) stone to a distance of 300 yards (275 metres); such a trebuchet would have had a counterpoise of about 10 tons. Though the rate of fire was slow, and prodigious quantities of timber and labour were required to build and serve one, a large trebuchet could do serious damage to stone fortifications. The machines were apparently quite accurate, and small trebuchets were useful in sweeping parapets of archers and crossbowmen.

      Greek fire was a weapon that had a decisive tactical and strategic impact in the defense of the Byzantine Empire. It was first used against the Arabs at the siege of Constantinople of 673. Greek fire was a liquid that ignited on contact with seawater. It was viscous and burned fiercely, even in water. Sand and—according to legend—urine were the only effective means of extinguishing the flames. It was expelled by a pumplike device similar to a 19th-century hand-pumped fire engine, and it may also have been thrown from catapults in breakable containers. Although the exact ingredients of Greek fire were a Byzantine state secret, other powers eventually developed and used similar compositions. The original formula was lost and remains unknown. The most likely ingredients were colloidal suspensions of metallic sodium, lithium, or potassium—or perhaps quicklime—in a petroleum base.

      Greek fire was particularly effective in naval combat, and it constituted one of the few incendiary weapons of warfare afloat that were used effectively without backfiring on their users. It may have been used following the sack of Constantinople by Venetian-supported crusaders in 1204, but it probably disappeared from use after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453.

The horse archer
      The age of cavalry came to be viewed from a European perspective, since it was there that infantry was overthrown and there that the greatest and most far-reaching changes occurred. But it was by no means an exclusively European phenomenon; to the contrary, the mounted warrior's tactical supremacy was less complete in western Europe than in any other region of comparably advanced technology save Japan, where a strikingly parallel feudal situation prevailed. Indeed, from the 1st century AD nomadic horse archers had strengthened their hold over the Eurasian Steppes, the Iranian plateau, and the edges of the Fertile Crescent, and, in a series of waves extending through medieval times, they entered Europe, China, and India and even touched Japan briefly in the 13th century. The most important of these incursions into the European and Chinese military ecospheres left notable marks on the military technology of East Asia and the Byzantine Empire, as well as on the kingdoms of Europe.

The Huns (Hun) and Avars
      The first of the major horse nomad incursions into Europe were the Hunnish invasions of the 4th century. The Huns' primary significance in the history of military technology was in expanding the use of the composite recurved bow into the eastern Roman Empire. This important instance of technological borrowing constituted one of the few times in which a traditional military skill as physiologically and economically demanding as composite archery was successfully transplanted out of its original cultural context.

      The Avars (Avar) of the 6th and 7th centuries were familiar with the stirrup, and they may have introduced it into Europe. Some of the earliest unequivocal evidence of the use of the stirrup comes from Avar graves.

The Byzantine (Byzantine Empire) cataphract
      Although they continued to make effective use of both shock and missile infantry, the Byzantines turned to cavalry earlier and more completely than did the western Roman Empire. After an extended period of dependence on Teutonic and Hunnish mercenary cavalry, the reforms of the emperors Maurice and Heraclius in the 6th and 7th centuries developed an effective provincial militia based on the institution of pronoia (pronoia system), the award of nonhereditary grants of land capable of supporting an armoured horse archer called a cataphract. Pronoia, which formed the core of the Byzantine army's strength during the period of its greatest efficiency in the 8th through 10th centuries, entailed the adoption of the Hunnish composite recurved bow by native troopers.

      The Byzantine cataphract was armed with bow, lance, sword, and dagger; he wore a shirt of mail or scale armour and an iron helm and carried a small, round, ironbound shield of wood that could be strapped to the forearm or slung from the waist. The foreheads and breasts of officers' horses and those of men in the front rank were protected with frontlets and poitrels of iron. The militia cataphracts were backed by units of similarly armed regulars and mercenary regiments of Teutonic heavy shock cavalry of the imperial guard. Mercenary horse archers from the steppe continued to be used as light cavalry.

The Turks (Turkic peoples)
      The infiltration of Turkish tribes into the Eurasian military ecosphere was distinguished from earlier steppe nomad invasions in that the raiders were absorbed culturally through Islāmization. The long-term results of this wave of nomadic horse archers were profound, leading to the extinction of the Byzantine Empire.

      Turkish horse archers, of whom the Seljuqs (Seljuq) were representative, were lightly armoured and mounted but extremely mobile. Their armour generally consisted of an iron helmet and, perhaps, a shirt of mail or scale armour (called brigandine). They carried small, light, one-handed shields, usually of wicker fitted with an iron boss. Their principal offensive arms were lance, sabre, and bow. The Turkish bow developed in response to the demands of mounted combat against lightly armoured adversaries on the open steppe; as a consequence, it seems to have had greater range but less penetrative and knockdown power at medium and short ranges than its Byzantine equivalents. Turkish horses, though hardy and agile, were not as large or powerful as Byzantine chargers. Therefore, Turkish horse archers could not stand up to a charge of Byzantine cataphracts, but their greater mobility generally enabled them to stay out of reach and fire arrows from a distance, wearing their adversaries down and killing their horses.

The Mongols (Mongol)
      The 13th-century Mongol armies (Yuan dynasty) of Genghis Khan and his immediate successors depended on large herds of grass-fed Mongolian ponies, as many as six or eight to a warrior. The ponies were relatively small but agile and hardy, well-adapted to the harsh climate of the steppes. The Mongol warrior's principal weapon was the composite recurved bow, of which he might carry as many as three. Characteristically, each man carried a short bow for use from the saddle and a long bow for use on foot. The former, firing light arrows, was for skirmishing and long-range harassing fire; the latter had the advantage in killing power at medium ranges. The saddle bow was probably capable of sending a light arrow more than 500 yards; the heart of the long bow's engagement envelope would have been about 100–350 yards, close to that of the contemporary English longbow. Each warrior carried several extra quivers of arrows on campaign. He also carried a sabre or scimitar, a lasso, and perhaps a lance. Personal armour included a helmet and breastplate of iron or lacquered leather, though some troops wore shirts of scale or mail.

      Mongol armies were proficient at military engineering and made extensive use of Chinese technology, including catapults and incendiary devices. These latter probably included predecessors of gunpowder, of which the Mongols were the likely vehicle of introduction into western Europe.

The infantry revolution, c. 1200–1500
      The appearance of the crossbow as a serious military implement along the northern rim of the western Mediterranean at about the middle of the 9th century marked a growing divergence between the technology of war in Europe and that of the rest of the world. It was the first of a series of technological and tactical developments that culminated in the rise of infantry elites to a position of tactical dominance. This infantry revolution began when the crossbow spread northward into areas that were peripheral to the economic, cultural, and political core of feudal Europe and where the topography was unfavourable for mounted shock action and the land too poor to support an armoured elite. Within this closed military topography, the crossbow soon proved itself the missile weapon par excellence of positional and guerrilla warfare.

      The reasons for the crossbow's success were simple: crossbows were capable of killing the most powerful of mounted warriors, yet they were far cheaper than war-horses and armour and were much easier to master than the skills of equestrian combat. Also, it was far easier to learn to fire a crossbow than a long bow of equivalent power. Serious war bows had significant advantages over the crossbow in range, accuracy, and maximum rate of fire, but crossbowmen could be recruited and trained quickly as adults, while a lifetime of constant practice was required to master the Turkish or Mongol composite bow or the English longbow.

      The crossbow directly challenged the mounted elite's dominance of the means of armed violence—a point that the lay and ecclesiastical authorities did not miss. In 1139 the second Lateran Council banned the crossbow under penalty of anathema as a weapon “hateful to God and unfit for Christians,” and Emperor Conrad III of Germany (reigned 1138–52) forbade its use in his realms. But the crossbow proved useful in the Crusades against the infidel and, once introduced, could not be eradicated in any event. This produced a grudging acceptance among the European mounted elites, and the crossbow underwent a continuous process of technical development toward greater power that ended only in the 16th century, with the replacement of the crossbow by the harquebus and musket.

      An independent, reinforcing, and almost simultaneous development was the appearance of the English longbow as the premier missile weapon of western Europe. The signal victory of an outnumbered English army of longbowmen and dismounted men-at-arms over mounted French chivalry supported by mercenary Genoese crossbowmen at Crécy (Crécy, Battle of) on Aug. 26, 1346, marked the end of massed cavalry charges by European knights for a century and a half.

      Another important and enduring discovery was made by the Swiss. At the Battle of Morgarten (Morgarten, Battle of) in 1315, Swiss eidgenossen, or “oath brothers,” learned that an unarmoured man with a seven-foot (200-centimetre) halberd could dispatch an armoured man-at-arms. Displaying striking adaptability, they replaced some of their halberds with the pike, an 18-foot spear with a small, piercing head. No longer outreached by the knight's lance, and displaying far greater cohesion than any knightly army, the Swiss soon showed that they could defeat armoured men-at-arms, mounted or dismounted, given anything like even numbers. With the creation of the pike square tactical formation, the Swiss provided the model for the modern infantry regiment.

      The idea of mounting a bow permanently at right angles across a stock that was fitted with a trough for the arrow, or bolt, and a mechanical trigger to hold the drawn string and release it at will was very old. Crossbows were buried in Chinese (China) graves in the 5th century BC, and the crossbow was a major factor in Chinese warfare by the 2nd century BC at the latest. The Greeks used the crossbow principle in the gastrophetes, and the Romans knew the crossbow proper as the manuballista, though they did not use it extensively. The European crossbow of the Middle Ages differed from all of these in its combination of power and portability.

      In Europe, crossbows were progressively developed to penetrate armour of increasing thicknesses. In China, on the other hand, crossbow development emphasized rapidity of fire rather than power; by the 16th century, Chinese artisans were making sophisticated lever-actuated rapid-fire crossbows that carried up to 10 bolts in a self-contained magazine. These, however, were feeble weapons by contemporary European standards and had relatively little penetrating power.

      Mechanical cocking aids freed the crossbow from the limitations of simple muscular strength. If the bow could be held in a drawn state by a mechanical trigger, then the bow could be drawn in progressive stages using levers, cranks, and gears or windlass-and-pulley mechanisms, thereby multiplying the user's strength. The power of such a weapon, unlike that of the bow (bow and arrow), was thus not limited by the constraints of a single muscular spasm.

      The crossbowman, unlike the archer, did not have to be particularly strong or vigorous, and his volume of fire was not as limited by fatigue. Nevertheless, the crossbow had serious tactical deficiencies. First, ordinary crossbows for field operations (as opposed to heavy siege crossbows) were outranged by the bow. This was because crossbow bolts were short and heavy, with a flat base to absorb the initial impact of the string. The flat base and relatively crude leather fins (crossbow bolts were produced in volume and were not as carefully finished as arrows) were aerodynamically inefficient, so that velocity fell off more quickly than that of an arrow. These factors, combined with the inherent lack of precision in the trigger and release mechanism, made the ordinary military crossbow considerably shorter-ranged and less accurate than a serious military bow in the hands of a skilled archer. Also, the advantage of the crossbow's greater power was offset by its elaborate winding mechanisms, which took more time to use. The combination of short range, inaccuracy, and slow rate of fire meant that crossbowmen in the open field were extremely vulnerable to cavalry.

      The earliest crossbows had a simple bow of wood alone. However, such bows were not powerful enough for serious military use, and by the 11th century they gave way to composite bows of wood, horn, and sinew. The strength of crossbows increased as knightly armour became more effective, and, by the 13th century, bows were being made of mild steel. (The temper and composition of steel used for crossbows had to be precisely controlled, and the expression “crossbow steel” became an accepted term designating steel of the highest quality.) Because composite and steel crossbows were too powerful to be cocked by the strength of the arms alone, a number of mechanical cocking aids were developed. The first such aid of military significance was a hook suspended from the belt: the crossbowman could step down into a stirrup set in the front of the bow's stock, loop the bowstring over the hook, and by straightening up use the powerful muscles of his back and leg to cock the weapon. The belt hook was inadequate for cocking the steel crossbows required to penetrate plate armour, and by the 14th century military crossbows were being fitted with removable windlasses and rack-and-pinion (rack and pinion) winding mechanisms called cranequins. Though slow, these devices effectively freed the crossbow from limitations on its strength: draw forces well in excess of 1,000 pounds became common, particularly for large siege crossbows.

The English longbow
      The longbow evolved during the 12th century in response to the demands of siege and guerrilla operations in the Welsh Marches, a topographically close and economically marginal area that was in many ways similar to the regions in which the crossbow had evolved three centuries earlier. It became the most effective individual missile weapon of western Europe until well into the age of gunpowder and was the only foot bow since classical times to equal the composite recurved bow in tactical effectiveness and power.

      While it was heavily dependent on the strength and competence of its user, the longbow in capable hands was far superior to the ordinary military crossbow in range, rate of fire, and accuracy. Made from a carefully cut and shaped stave of yew or elm, it varied in length, according to the height of the user, from about five to seven feet. The longbow had a shorter maximum range than the short, stiff composite Turkish or Mongol saddle bows of equivalent draw force, but it could drive a heavy arrow through armour with equal efficiency at medium ranges of 150–300 yards. Each archer would have carried a few selected light arrows for shooting at extreme ranges and could probably have reached 500 yards with these.

      The longbow's weakness was that of every serious military bow: the immense amounts of time and energy needed to master it. Confirmation of the extreme demands placed on the archer was found in the skeletal remains of a bowman who went down with the English ship Mary Rose, sunk in Portsmouth Harbour in 1545. The archer (identified as such by a quiver, its leather strap still circling his spine) exhibited skeletal deformations caused by the stresses of archery: the bones of his left forearm showed compression thickening, his upper backbone was twisted radially, and the tips of the first three fingers of his right hand were markedly thickened, plainly the results of a lifetime of drawing a bow of great strength. The longbow was dependent upon the life-style of the English yeomanry (yeoman), and, as that life-style changed to make archery less remunerative and time for its practice less available, the quality of English archery declined. By the last quarter of the 16th century there were few longbowmen available, and the skill and strength of those who responded to muster was on the whole well below the standards of two centuries earlier. An extended debate in the 1580s between advocates of the longbow and proponents of gunpowder weapons hinged mainly on the small numbers and limited skills of available archers, not around any inherent technical deficiency in the weapon itself.

Halberd and pike
      The halberd was the only significant medieval shock weapon without classical antecedents. In its basic form, it consisted of a six-foot shaft of ash or another hardwood, mounted by an ax blade that had a forward point for thrusting and a thin projection on the back for piercing armour or pulling a horseman off balance. The halberd was a specialized weapon for fighting armoured men-at-arms and penetrating knightly armour. With the point of this weapon, a halberdier could fend off a mounted lancer's thrusts and, swinging the cutting edge with the full power of his arms and body, could cleave armour, flesh, and bone. The halberd's power was counterbalanced by the vulnerability of taking a full swing with both arms; once committed, the halberdier was totally dependent upon his comrades for protection. This gave halberd fighting a ferocious all-or-nothing quality and placed a premium on cohesion.

The pike
      While the halberd could penetrate the best plate armour, allowing infantrymen to inflict heavy casualties on their mounted opponents, the lance's advantage in length meant that men-at-arms could inflict heavy casualties in return. The solution was the pike, a staff, usually of ash, that was twice the length of the halberd and had a small piercing head about 10 inches (25 centimetres) long. Sound infantry armed with the pike could fend off cavalry with ease, even when outnumbered. As with the halberd, effectiveness of shock action with the pike was heavily dependent upon the cohesion and solidity of the troops wielding it. The pike remained a major factor in European warfare until, late in the 17th century, the bayonet gave missile-armed infantry the ability to repel charging cavalry.

The gunpowder revolution, c. 1300–1650
      Few inventions have had an impact on human affairs as dramatic and decisive as that of gunpowder. The development of a means of harnessing the energy released by a chemical reaction in order to drive a projectile against a target marked a watershed in the harnessing of energy to human needs. Before gunpowder, weapons were designed around the limits of their users' muscular strength; after gunpowder, they were designed more in response to tactical demand.

      Technologically, gunpowder bridged the gap between the medieval and modern eras. By the end of the 19th century, when black powder was supplanted by nitrocellulose-based propellants, steam power had become a mature technology, the scientific revolution was in full swing, and the age of electronics and the internal combustion engine was at hand. The connection between gunpowder and steam power is instructive. Steam power as a practical reality depended on the ability to machine iron cylinders precisely and repetitively to predetermined internal dimensions; the methods for doing this were derived from cannon-boring techniques.

      Gunpowder bridged the gap between the old and the new intellectually as well as technologically. Black powder was a product of the alchemist's art, and although alchemy presaged science in believing that physical reality was determined by an unvarying set of natural laws, the alchemist's experimental method was hardly scientific. Gunpowder was a simple mixture combined according to empirical recipes developed without benefit of theoretical knowledge of the underlying processes. The development of gunpowder weapons, however, was the first significant success in rationally and systematically exploiting an energy source whose power could not be perceived directly with the ordinary senses. As such, early gunpowder technology was an important precursor of modern science.

Early gunpowder
      Chinese alchemists discovered the recipe for what became known as black powder in the 9th century AD; this was a mixture of finely ground potassium nitrate (also called saltpetre), charcoal, and sulfur in approximate proportions of 75:15:10 by weight. The resultant gray powder behaved differently from anything previously known; it exploded on contact with open flame or a red-hot wire, producing a bright flash, a loud report, dense white smoke, and a sulfurous smell. It also produced considerable quantities of superheated gas, which, if confined in a partially enclosed container, could drive a projectile out of the open end. The Chinese used the substance in rockets, in pyrotechnic projectors much like Roman candles, in crude cannon, and, according to some sources, in bombs thrown by mechanical artillery. This transpired long before gunpowder was known in the West, but development in China stagnated. The development of black powder as a tactically significant weapon was left to the Europeans, who probably acquired it from the Mongols in the 13th century (though diffusion through the Arab Muslim world is also a possibility).

Chemistry and internal ballistics
      Black powder differed from modern propellants and explosives in a number of important particulars. First, only some 44 percent by weight of a properly burned charge of black powder was converted into propellant gases, the balance being solid residues. The high molecular weights of these residues limited the muzzle velocities of black-powder ordnance to about 2,000 feet (600 metres) per second. Second, unlike modern nitrocellulose-based (nitrocellulose) propellants, the burning rate of black powder did not vary significantly with pressure or temperature. This occurred because the reaction in an exploding charge of black powder was transmitted from grain to grain at a rate some 150 times greater than the rate at which the individual grains were consumed and because black powder burned in a complex series of parallel and mutually dependent exothermal (heat-producing) and endothermal (heat-absorbing) reactions that balanced each other out. The result was an essentially constant burning rate that differed only with the grain size of the powder; the larger the grains, the less surface area exposed to combustion and the slower the rate at which propellant gases were produced.

      Nineteenth-century experiments revealed sharp differences in the amount of gas produced by charcoal burned from different kinds of wood. For example, dogwood charcoal decomposed with potassium nitrate was found to yield nearly 25 percent more gas per unit weight than fir, chestnut, or hazel charcoal and some 17 percent more than willow charcoal. These scientific observations confirmed the insistence of early—and thoroughly unscientific—texts that charcoal from different kinds of wood was suited to different applications. Willow charcoal, for example, was preferred for cannon powder and dogwood charcoal for small arms—a preference substantiated by 19th-century tests. (A preference for urine instead of water as the incorporation agent might have had some basis in fact because urine is rich in nitrates; so might the view that a beer drinker's urine was preferable to that of an abstemious person and a wine drinker's urine best of all.) For all this, the empirically derived recipe for gunpowder was fixed during the 14th century and hardly varied thereafter. Subsequent improvements were almost entirely concerned with the manufacturing process and with the ability to purify and control the quality of the ingredients.

Serpentine powder
      The earliest gunpowder was made by grinding the ingredients separately and mixing them together dry. This was known as serpentine. The behaviour of serpentine was highly variable, depending on a number of factors that were difficult to predict and control. If packed too tightly and not confined, a charge of serpentine might fizzle; conversely, it might develop internal cracks and detonate. When subjected to vibration, as when being transported by wagon, the components of serpentine separated into layers according to relative density, the sulfur settling to the bottom and the charcoal rising to the top. Remixing at the battery was necessary to maintain the proper proportions—an inconvenient and hazardous procedure producing clouds of noxious and potentially explosive dust.

Corned powder
      Shortly after 1400, smiths learned to combine the ingredients of gunpowder in water and grind them together as a slurry. This was a significant improvement in several respects. Wet incorporation was more complete and uniform than dry mixing, the process “froze” the components permanently into a stable grain matrix so that separation was no longer a problem, and wet slurry could be ground in large quantities by water-driven mills with little danger of explosion. The use of waterpower also sharply reduced cost.

      After grinding, the slurry was dried in a sheet or cake. It was then processed in stamping mills, which typically used hydraulically tripped wooden hammers to break the sheet into grains. After being tumbled to wear the sharp edges off the grains and impart a glaze to their surface, they were sieved. The grain size varied from coarse—about the size of grains of wheat or corn (hence the name corned powder)—to extremely fine. Powder too fine to be used was reincorporated into the slurry for reprocessing. Corned powder burned more uniformly and rapidly than serpentine; the result was a stronger powder that rendered many older guns dangerous.

Refinements in ballistics
      Late medieval and early modern gunners preferred large-grained powder for cannon, medium-grained powder for shoulder arms, and fine-grained powder for pistols and priming—and they were correct in their preferences. In cannon the slower burning rate of large-grained powder allowed a relatively massive, slowly accelerating projectile to begin moving as the pressure built gradually, reducing peak pressure and putting less stress on the gun. The fast burning rate of fine-grained powders, on the other hand, permitted internal pressure to peak before the light, rapidly accelerating projectile of a small arm had exited the muzzle. But the early modern gunner had no provable rationale for his preferences, and in the 18th century European armies standardized on fine-grained musket powder for cannon as well as small arms.

      Then, beginning in the late 18th century, the application of science to ballistics began to produce practical results. The ballistic pendulum, invented by the English mathematician Benjamin Robins (Robins, Benjamin), provided a means of measuring muzzle velocity and, hence, of accurately gauging the effective power of a given quantity of powder. A projectile was fired horizontally into the pendulum's bob (block of wood), which absorbed the projectile's momentum and converted it into upward movement. Momentum is the product of mass and velocity, and the law of conservation (energy, conservation of) of momentum dictates that the total momentum of a system is conserved, or remains constant. Thus the projectile's velocity, v, may be determined from the equation mv = (m + M)V, which gives

where m is the mass of the projectile, M is the mass of the bob, and V is the velocity of the bob and embedded projectile after impact.

      The initial impact of science on internal ballistics was to show that traditional powder charges for cannon were much larger than necessary. Refinements in the manufacture of gunpowder followed. About 1800 the British introduced cylinder-burned charcoal—that is, charcoal burned in enclosed vessels rather than in pits. With this method, wood was converted to charcoal at a uniform and precisely controlled temperature. The result was greater uniformity and, since fewer of the volatile trace elements were burned off, more powerful powder. Later, powder for very large ordnance was made from charcoal that was deliberately “overburned” to reduce the initial burning rate and, hence, the stress on the gun.

      Beginning in the mid-19th century, the use of extremely large guns for naval warfare and coastal defense pressed existing materials and methods of cannon construction to the limit. This led to the development of methods for measuring pressures (pressure) within the gun, which involved cylindrical punches mounted in holes drilled at right angles through the barrel. The pressure of the propellant gases forced the punches outward against soft copper plates, and the maximum pressure was then determined by calculating the amount of pressure needed to create an indentation of equal depth in the copper. The ability to measure pressures within a gun led to the design of cannon made thickest where internal pressures were greatest—that is, near the breech. The resultant “soda bottle” cannon of the mid- to late 19th century, which had fat breeches curving down to short, slim muzzles, bore a strange resemblance to the very earliest European gun of which a depiction survives, that of the Walter de Millimete manuscript of 1327.

The development of artillery
      The earliest known gunpowder weapons vaguely resembled an old-fashioned soda bottle or a deep-throated mortar and pestle. The earliest such weapon, depicted in the English de Millimete manuscript, was some three feet long with a bore diameter of about two inches (five centimetres). The projectile resembled an arrow with a wrapping around the shaft, probably of leather, to provide a gas seal within the bore. Firing was apparently accomplished by applying a red-hot wire to a touchhole drilled through the top of the thickest part of the breech. The gun was laid horizontally on a trestle table without provision for adjusting elevation or absorbing recoil—a tribute to its modest power, which would have been only marginally greater than that of a large crossbow.

      The breakthrough that led to the emergence of true cannon derived from three basic perceptions. The first was that gunpowder's propellant force could be used most effectively by confining it within a tubular barrel. This stemmed from an awareness that gunpowder's explosive energy did not act instantaneously upon the projectile but had to develop its force across time and space. The second perception was that methods of construction derived from cooperage could be used to construct tubular wrought-iron gun barrels. The third perception was that a spherical ball was the optimal projectile. The result was modern artillery.

Wrought-iron muzzle-loaders
      The earliest guns (gun) were probably cast from brass or bronze. Bell- founding techniques would have sufficed to produce the desired shapes, but alloys of copper, tin, and zinc were expensive and, at first, not well adapted to the containment of high-temperature, high-velocity gases. Wrought iron solved both of these problems. Construction involved forming a number of longitudinal staves into a tube by beating them around a form called a mandrel and welding them together. (Alternatively, a single sheet of iron (ironwork) could be wrapped around the mandrel and then welded closed; this was particularly suitable for smaller pieces.) The tube was then reinforced with a number of rings or sleeves (in effect, hoops). These were forged with an inside diameter about the same as the outside of the tube, raised to red or white heat, and slid into place over the cooled tube, where they were held firmly in place by thermal contraction. The sleeves or rings were butted against one another and the gaps between them sealed by a second layer of hoops. Forging a strong, gastight breech presented a particular problem that was usually solved by welding a tapered breech plug between the staves.

      Hoop-and-stave construction permitted the fabrication of guns far larger than had been made previously. By the last quarter of the 14th century, wrought-iron siege bombards were firing stone cannonballs of 450 pounds (200 kilograms) and more. These weapons were feasible only with projectiles of stone. Cast iron has more than two and a half times the density of marble or granite, and gunners quickly learned that a cast-iron cannonball with a charge of good corned powder behind it was unsafe in any gun large enough for serious siege work.

Wrought-iron breechloaders
      Partly because of the difficulties of making a long, continuous barrel, and partly because of the relative ease of loading a powder charge into a short breechblock, gunsmiths soon learned to make cannon in which the barrel and powder chamber were separate. Since the charge and projectile were loaded into the rear of the barrel, these were called breechloaders. The breechblock was mated to the barrel by means of a recessed lip at the chamber mouth. Before firing, it was dropped into the stock and forced forward against the barrel by hammering a wedge into place behind it; after the weapon was fired, the wedge was knocked out and the block was removed for reloading. This scheme had significant advantages, particularly in the smaller classes of naval swivel guns and fortress wallpieces, where the use of multiple breechblocks permitted a high rate of fire. Small breechloaders continued to be used in these ways well into the 17th century.

      The essential deficiency of early breechloaders was the imperfect gas seal between breechblock and barrel, a problem that was not solved until the advent of the brass cartridge late in the 19th century. Hand-forging techniques could not produce a truly gastight seal, and combustion gases escaping through the inevitable crevices eroded the metal, causing safety problems. Wrought-iron cannon must have required constant maintenance and care, particularly in a saltwater environment.

      Wrought-iron breechloaders were the first cannon to be produced in significant numbers. Their tactical viability was closely linked to the economics of cannonballs of cut stone, which, modern preconceptions to the contrary, were superior to cast-iron projectiles in many respects. Muzzle velocities of black-powder weapons were low, and smoothbore cannon were inherently inaccurate, so that denser projectiles of iron had no advantage in effective range. Cannon designed to fire a stone projectile were considerably lighter than those designed to fire an iron ball of the same weight; as a result, stone-throwing cannon were for many years cheaper. Also, because stone cannonballs were larger than iron ones of the same weight, they left larger holes after penetrating the target. The principal deficiency of stone-throwing cannon was the enormous amount of skilled labour required to cut a sphere of stone accurately to a predetermined diameter. The acceleration of the wage–price spiral in the 15th and 16th centuries made stone-throwing cannon obsolete in Europe.

Cast bronze (bronze work) muzzle-loaders
      The advantages of cast bronze for constructing large and irregularly shaped objects of a single piece were well understood from sculpture and bell founding, but a number of problems had to be overcome before the material's plasticity could be applied to ordnance. Most important, alloys had to be developed that were strong enough to withstand the shock and internal pressures of firing without being too brittle. This was not simply a matter of finding the optimal proportions of copper and tin; bronze alloys used in cannon founding were prone to internal cavities and “sponginess,” and foundry practices had to be developed to overcome the inherent deficiencies of the metal. The essential technical problems were solved by the first decades of the 15th century, and, by the 1420s and '30s, European cannon founders were casting bronze pieces that rivaled the largest of the wrought-iron bombards in size.

      Developments in foundry practice were accompanied by improvements in weapon design. Most notable was the practice of casting cylindrical mounting lugs, called trunnions, integral with the barrel. Set just forward of the centre of gravity, trunnions provided the principal point for attaching the barrel to the carriage and a pivot for adjusting the vertical angle of the gun. This permitted the barrel to be adjusted in elevation by sliding a wedge, or quoin, beneath the breech. At first, trunnions were supplemented by lifting lugs cast atop the barrel at the centre of gravity; by the 16th century most European founders were casting these lugs in the shape of leaping dolphins, and a similarly shaped fixture was often cast on the breech of the gun.

      Toward the end of the 15th century, French (France) founders combined these features with efficient gun carriages for land use. French carriage design involved suspending the barrel from its trunnions between a pair of heavy wooden side pieces; an axle and two large wheels were then mounted forward of the trunnions, and the rear of the side pieces descended to the ground to serve as a trail. The trail was left on the ground during firing and absorbed the recoil of the gun, partly through sliding friction and partly by digging into the ground. Most important, the gun could be transported without dismounting the barrel by lifting the trail onto the limber, a two-wheeled mount that served as a pivoting front axle and point of attachment for the team of horses. This improved carriage, though heavy in its proportions, would have been familiar to a gunner of Napoleonic times. Sometime before the middle of the 16th century, English smiths developed a highly compact four-wheeled truck carriage for mounting trunnion-equipped shipboard ordnance, resulting in cannon that would have been familiar to a naval gunner of Horatio Nelson's day.

      By the early 1500s, cannon founders throughout Europe had learned to manufacture good ordnance of cast bronze. Cannon were cast in molds of vitrified clay, suspended vertically in a pit. Normally, they were cast breech down; this placed the molten metal at the breech under pressure, resulting in a denser and stronger alloy around the chamber, the most critical point. Subsequent changes in foundry practice were incremental and took effect gradually. As founders established mastery over bronze, cannon became shorter and lighter. In about 1750, advances in boring machines and cutting tools made it possible for advanced foundries to cast barrels as solid blanks and then bore them out. Until then cannon were cast hollow—that is, the bore was cast around a core suspended in the mold. Ensuring that the bore was precisely centred was a particularly critical part of the casting process, and small wrought-iron fixtures called chaplets were used to hold the core precisely in place. These were cast into the bronze and remained a part of the gun. Boring produced more accurate weapons and improved the quality of the bronze, since impurities in the molten metal, which gravitate toward the centre of the mold during solidification, were removed by the boring. But, while these changes were important operationally, they represented only marginal improvements to the same basic technology. A first-class bronze cannon of 1500 differed hardly at all in essential technology and ballistic performance from a cannon of 1850 designed to shoot a ball of the same weight. The modern gun would have been shorter and lighter, and it would have been mounted on a more efficient carriage, but it would have fired its ball no farther and no more accurately.

      In 1543 an English (United Kingdom) parson, working on a royal commission from Henry VIII, perfected a method for casting reasonably safe, operationally efficient cannon of iron. The nature of the breakthrough in production technology is unclear, but it probably involved larger furnaces and a more efficient organization of resources. Cast-iron cannon were significantly heavier and bulkier than bronze guns firing the same weight of ball. Unlike bronze cannon, they were prone to internal corrosion. Moreover, when they failed, they did not tear and rupture like bronze guns but burst into fragments like a bomb. They possessed, however, the overwhelming advantage of costing only about one-third as much. This gave the English, who alone mastered the process until well into the 17th century, a significant commercial advantage by enabling them to arm large numbers of ships. The Mediterranean nations were unable to cast significant quantities of iron artillery until well into the 19th century.

Early use of artillery
Terminology and classification
      Early gunpowder artillery was known by a bewildering variety of names. (The word cannon became dominant only gradually, and the modern use of the term to describe a gun large enough to fire an explosive shell did not emerge until the 20th century.) The earliest efficient wrought-iron cannon were called bombards or lombards, a term that continued in use well into the 16th century. The term basilisk, the name of a mythical dragonlike beast of withering gaze and flaming breath, was applied to early “long” cannon capable of firing cast-iron projectiles, but, early cannon terminology being anything but consistent, any particularly large and powerful cannon might be called a basilisk.

      Founders had early adopted the practice of classifying cannon by the weight of the ball, so that, for example, a 12-pounder fired a 12-pound cannonball. By the 16th century, gunners had adopted the custom of describing the length of a cannon's bore in calibres (calibre), that is, in multiples of the bore diameter. These became basic tools of classification and remained so into the modern era with certain categories of ordnance such as large naval guns. Also by the 16th century, European usage had divided ordnance into three categories according to bore length and the type of projectile fired. The first category was the culverins (culverin), “long” guns with bores on the order of 30 calibres or more. The second was the cannons (cannon), or cannon-of-battery, named for their primary function of battering down fortress walls; these typically had barrels of 20 to 25 calibres. The third category of ordnance was the pedreros, stone-throwing guns with barrels of as little as eight to 10 calibres that were used in siege and naval warfare.

      Mortars (mortar) were a separate type of ordnance. With very wide bores of even fewer calibres than those of the pedreros, they were used in siege warfare for lobbing balls at a very high trajectory (over 45°). Mortars owed their name to the powder chamber of reduced diameter that was recessed into the breech; this made them similar in appearance to the mortars used to pulverize grain and chemicals by hand. Unlike the longer cannon, mortars were cast with trunnions at the breech and were elevated by placing wedges beneath the muzzle.

Special-purpose shot
      Both culverins and cannon-of-battery generally fired cast-iron balls. When fired against masonry walls, heavy iron balls tended to pulverize stone and brick. Large stone cannonballs, on the other hand, were valued for the shock of their impact, which could bring down large pieces of wall. Undercutting the bottom of a wall with iron cannonballs, then using the heavy impact of large stone shot to bring it down, was a standard tactic of siege warfare. (Ottoman gunners were particularly noted for this approach.)

      In the 15th century exploding shot was developed by filling hollow cast-iron balls with gunpowder and fitting a fuze that had to be lit just before firing. These ancestors of the modern exploding shell were extremely dangerous to handle, as they were known to explode prematurely or, with equally catastrophic results, jam in the gun barrel. For this reason they were used only in the short-bored mortars.

      For incendiary purposes, iron balls were heated red-hot in a fire before loading. (In that case, moist clay was sometimes packed atop the wadding that separated the ball from the powder charge.) Other projectiles developed for special purposes included the carcass, canister, grapeshot, chain shot, and bar shot. The carcass was a thin-walled shell containing incendiary materials. Rounds of canister and grapeshot consisted of numerous small missiles, usually iron or lead balls, held together in various ways for simultaneous loading into the gun but designed to separate upon leaving the muzzle. Because they dispersed widely upon leaving the gun, the projectiles were especially effective at short range against massed troops. Bar shot and chain shot consisted of two heavy projectiles joined by a bar or a chain. Whirling in their trajectories, they were especially effective at sea in cutting the spars and rigging of sailing vessels.

      During most of the black-powder era, with smoothbore cannon firing spherical projectiles, artillery fire was never precisely accurate at long ranges. (Aiming and firing were particularly difficult in naval gunnery, since the gunner had to predict the roll of the ship in order to hit the target.) Gunners aimed by sighting along the top of the barrel, or “by the line of metals,” then stepped away before firing to avoid the recoil. The basic relationship between range and elevation being understood, some accuracy was introduced through the use of the gunner's quadrant, in which the angle of elevation of a gun barrel was measured by inserting one leg of the quadrant into the barrel and reading the angle marked on the scale by a vertically hanging plumb line. Nevertheless, the inherent inaccuracy of smoothbore artillery meant that most shooting was done at short ranges of 1,000 yards or less; at these ranges, estimating elevation by rule of thumb was sufficient. For attacking fortress walls, early modern gunners preferred a range of 60 to 80 yards; a range of 100 to 150 yards was acceptable, but 300 yards or more was considered excessive.

The first small arms (small arm)
      Small arms did not exist as a distinct class of gunpowder weapon until the middle of the 15th century. Until then, hand cannon differed from their larger relatives only in size. They looked much the same, consisting of a barrel fastened to a simple wooden stock that was braced beneath the gunner's arm. A second person was required to fire the weapon. About the middle of the 15th century, a series of connected developments established small arms as an important and distinct category of weaponry. The first of these was the development of slow match—or match, as it was commonly called. This was cord or twine soaked in a solution of potassium nitrate and dried. When lit, match smoldered at the end in a slow, controlled manner. Slow match found immediate acceptance among artillerists and remained a standard part of the gunner's kit for the next four centuries.

      Small arms appeared during the period 1460–80 with the development of mechanisms that applied match to hand-portable weapons. German (Germany) gunsmiths apparently led the way. The first step was a simple S-shaped “trigger,” called a serpentine, fastened to the side of a hand cannon's stock. The serpentine was pivoted in the middle and had a set of adjustable jaws, or dogs, on the upper end that held the smoldering end of a length of match. Pulling up on the bottom of the serpentine brought the tip of the match down into contact with powder in the flashpan, a small, saucer-shaped depression surrounding the touchhole atop the barrel. This arrangement made it possible for one gunner to aim and fire, and it was quickly improved on. The first and most basic change was the migration of the touchhole to the right side of the barrel, where it was served by a flashpan equipped with a hinged or pivoting cover that protected the priming powder from wind, rain, and rough handling. The serpentine was replaced by a mechanism, enclosed within the gunstock, that consisted of a trigger, an arm holding the match with its adjustable jaws at the end, a sear connecting trigger and arm, and a mechanical linkage opening the flashpan cover as the match descended. These constituted the matchlock, and they made possible modern small arms.

      One final refinement was a spring that drove the arm holding the match downward into the pan when released by the sear. This mechanism, called the snap matchlock, was the forerunner of the flintlock. The fabrication of these devices fell to locksmiths, the only sizable body of craftsmen accustomed to constructing metal mechanisms with the necessary ruggedness and precision. They gave to the firing mechanism the enduring name lock.

      The development of mechanical locks was accompanied by the evolution of gunstocks with proper grips and an enlarged butt to transmit the recoil to the user's body. The result was the matchlock harquebus, the dominant military small arm of the 15th century and the direct ancestor of the modern musket. The harquebus was at first butted to the breastbone, but, as the power of firearms increased, the advantages of absorbing the recoil on the shoulder came to be appreciated. The matchlock harquebus changed very little in its essentials until it was replaced by the flintlock musket in the final years of the 17th century.

      The principal difficulty with the matchlock mechanism was the need to keep a length of match constantly smoldering. German gunsmiths addressed themselves to this problem early in the 16th century. The result was the wheel lock mechanism, consisting of a serrated wheel rotated by a spring and a spring-loaded set of jaws that held a piece of iron pyrites against the wheel. Pulling the trigger caused the wheel to rotate, directing a shower of sparks into the flashpan. The wheel lock firearm could be carried in a holster and kept ready to fire indefinitely, but, being delicate and expensive, it did not spread beyond cavalry elites and had a limited impact on warfare as a whole.

      Flintlock firing mechanisms were known by the middle of the 16th century, about a hundred years before they made their appearance in quantity in infantry muskets. A flintlock was similar to a wheel lock except that ignition came from a blow of flint against steel, with the sparks directed into the priming powder in the pan. This lock was an adaptation of the tinderbox used for starting fires.

      In the several different types of flintlocks that were produced, the flint was always held in a small vise, called a cock, which described an arc around its pivot to strike the steel (generally called the frizzen) a glancing blow. A spring inside the lock was connected through a tumbler to the cock. The sear, a small piece of metal attached to the trigger, either engaged the tumbler inside the lock or protruded through the lock plate to make direct contact with the cock.

      Flintlocks were not as surefire as either the matchlock or the wheel lock, but they were cheaper than the latter, contained fewer delicate parts, and were not as difficult to repair in primitive surroundings. In common with the wheel locks they had the priceless advantage of being ready to fire immediately. A flintlock small arm was slightly faster to load than a matchlock, if the flint itself did not require adjustment.

      Before gunpowder artillery, a well-maintained stone castle, secured against escalade by high curtain walls and flanking towers, provided almost unbreachable security against attack. Artillery at first did little to change this. Large wrought-iron cannon capable of throwing wall-smashing balls of cut stone appeared toward the end of the 14th century, but they were neither efficient nor mobile. Indeed, the size and unwieldiness of early firearms and cannon suited them more for fortress arsenals than for the field, and adjustments to gunpowder by fortification engineers quickly tilted the balance of siege operations toward the defense. Gunports were cut low in walls for covering ditches with raking fire, reinforced platforms and towers were built to withstand the recoil shock of defensive cannon, and the special firing embrasures for crossbows were modified into gunports for hand cannon, with sophisticated vents to carry away the smoke. The name of the first truly effective small arm, the hackenbüsche, or hackbutt, is indicative: the weapon took its name, literally “hook gun,” from a projection welded beneath the forward barrel that was hooked over the edge of a parapet in order to absorb the piece's recoil.

From medieval to modern
      The inviolability of the medieval curtain wall came to an end in the 15th century, with the development of effective cast-bronze siege cannon. Many of the basic technical developments that led to the perfection of heavy bronze ordnance were pioneered by German founders. Frederick I, elector of Brandenburg from 1417 to 1425, used cannon systematically to defeat the castles of his rivals one by one in perhaps the earliest politically decisive application of gunpowder technology. The French and Ottomans were the first to bring siege artillery to bear in a decisive manner outside their own immediate regions. Charles VII of France (reigned 1422–61) used siege artillery to reduce English forts in the last stages of the Hundred Years' War. When his grandson Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494, the impact of technically superior French artillery was immediate and dramatic; the French breached in eight hours the key frontier fortress of Monte San Giovanni, which had previously withstood a siege of seven years.

      The impact of Ottoman (Ottoman Empire) siege artillery was equally dramatic. Sultan Mehmed II breached the walls of Constantinople in 1453 by means of large bombards, bringing the Byzantine Empire to an end and laying the foundations of Ottoman power. The Turks retained their superiority in siegecraft for another generation, leveling the major Venetian fortifications in southern Greece in 1499–1500 and marching unhindered through the Balkans before being repulsed before Vienna in 1529.

      The shock of the sudden vulnerability of medieval curtain walls to French, Ottoman, and, to a lesser extent, German siege cannon quickly gave way to attempts by military engineers to redress the balance. At first, these consisted of the obvious and expensive expedients of counter-battery fire. By the 1470s, towers were being cut down to the height of the adjacent wall, and firing platforms of packed earth were built behind walls and in the lower stories of towers. Italian (Italy) fortress architects experimented with specially designed artillery towers with low-set gunports sited to sweep the fortress ditch with fire; some were even sited to cover adjacent sections of wall with flanking fire. However, most of these fortresses still had high, vertical walls and were therefore vulnerable to battery.

      A definitive break with the medieval past was marked by two Italian sieges. The first of these was the defense of Pisa in 1500 against a combined Florentine and French army. Finding their wall crumbling to French cannon fire, the Pisans in desperation constructed an earthen rampart behind the threatened sector. To their surprise and relief, they discovered not only that the sloping earthen rampart could be defended against escalade but that it was far more resistant to cannon shot than the vertical stone wall that it supplanted. The second siege was that of Padua in 1509. Entrusted with the defense of this Venetian city, a monk-engineer named Fra Giocondo (Giocondo, Fra Giovanni) cut down the city's medieval wall. He then surrounded the city with a broad ditch that could be swept by flanking fire from gunports set low in projections extending into the ditch. Finding that their cannon fire made little impression on these low ramparts, the French and allied besiegers made several bloody and fruitless assaults and then withdrew.

The sunken profile
 While Pisa demonstrated the strength of earthen ramparts, Padua showed the power of a sunken profile supported by flanking fire in the ditch. With these two cities pointing the way, basic changes were undertaken in fortress design. Fortress walls, still essential for protection against escalade, were dropped into the ground behind a ditch and protected from battery by gradually sloping earthen ramparts beyond. A further refinement was the sloping of the glacis, or forward face of the ramparts, in such a manner that it could be swept by cannon and harquebus fire from the parapet behind the ditch. As a practical matter the scarp, or main fortress wall, now protected from artillery fire by the glacis, was faced with brick or stone for ease of maintenance; the facing wall on the forward side of the ditch, called the counterscarp, was similarly faced. Next, a level, sunken space behind the glacis, the covered way, was provided so that defenders could assemble for a sortie under cover and out of sight of the attackers. This, and the provision of firing embrasures for cannon in the parapet wall, completed the basics of the new fortress profile (see Figure 2—>).

      Refinements of the basic sunken design included a palisade of sharpened wooden stakes either in the ditch or immediately behind the glacis and a sunken, level path behind the parapet for ammunition carts, artillery reinforcements, and relief troops. As attacking and defending batteries became larger, fortress designers placed greater emphasis on outworks intended to push the besieging batteries farther back and out of range.

      The profile of the outworks was designed according to the same basic principles applied to the fortress. Well established by 1520, these principles remained essentially unchanged until rifled artillery transformed positional warfare in the mid-19th century.

The bastioned trace
      The sunken profile was only half the story of early modern fortress design; the other half was the trace, the outline of the fortress as viewed from above. The new science of trace design was based, in its early stages, on the bastion, a projection from the main fortress wall from which defending fire could sweep the face of adjacent bastions and the wall between. Actually, bastions had been introduced before engineers were fully aware of the power of artillery, so that some early 16th-century Italian fortifications combined sophisticated bastioned traces with outmoded high walls, a shallow ditch, and little or no protective glacis. After early experimentation with rounded contours, which were believed to be stronger, designers came to appreciate the advantages of bastions with polygonal shapes, which eliminated the dead space at the foot of circular towers and provided uninterrupted fields of view and fire. Another benefit of the polygonal bastion's long, straight sections of wall was that larger defensive batteries could be mounted along the parapets.

      The relatively simple traces of the early Italian bastioned fortresses proved vulnerable to the ever larger armies and ever more powerful siege trains of the 16th century. In response, outworks were developed, such as ravelins (detached outworks in front of the bastions) and demilunes (semidetached outworks in the ditch between bastions), to shield the main fortess walls from direct battery. The increasing scale of warfare and the greater resources available to the besieger accelerated this development, and systems of outworks grew more and more elaborate and sprawling as a means of slowing the attacker's progress and making it more costly.

      By the late 17th century, fortress profiles and traces were closely integrated with one another and with the ground on which they stood. The sophistication of their designs is frequently linked with the name of the French military engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban.

Duration of early modern fortification
      With various refinements, the early modern fortress, based on a combination of the sunken profile and bastioned trace, remained the basic form of permanent fortification until the American Civil War, which saw the first extensive use of heavy rifled cannon made of high-quality cast iron. These guns not only had several times the effective range and accuracy of their predecessors, but they were also capable of firing explosive shells. They did to the early modern fortress what cast-bronze cannon had done to the medieval curtain wall. In 1862 the reduction by rifled Union artillery of Fort Pulaski, a supposedly impregnable Confederate fortification defending Savannah, Ga., marked the beginning of a new chapter in the design of permanent fortifications.

John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

Additional Reading
Arther Ferrill, The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (1985), offers a scholarly survey of evidence for prehistoric war. For a glimpse of the vestiges of prehistoric tradition in modern times, see the article “Ancient World of a War-Torn Tribe: Willigiman-Wallalua People,” Life, 53(13):73–91 (Sept. 28, 1962), which contains dramatic photographs of New Guinea tribesmen skirmishing with javelins. James D. Muhly, “How Iron Technology Changed the Ancient World and Gave the Philistines a Military Edge,” The Biblical Archaeology Review, 8(6):40–54 (November/December 1982), analyzes early metalworking techniques and their role in the beginnings of military technology. Yigael Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Study, 2 vol. (1963; originally published in Hebrew, 1963), applies an operational perspective to the development of military technology and tactics in ancient and early classical time, but some of the author's conclusions need to be modified in light of subsequent archaeological discoveries. P.A.L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages (1973), offers a revisionist analysis of the use of horses in war. J.G. Landels, Engineering in the Ancient World (1978), presents a comparative study of human and animal muscle, wind, and falling water as sources of power and has separate chapters on land and sea transport and catapult design. A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (1967), is a brief but scholarly work on the subject. F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (1957, reprinted 1967); and E.W. Marsden, Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development (1969), remain standard treatments. Werner Soedel and Vernard Foley, “Ancient Catapults,” Scientific American, 240(3):150–160 (March 1979), is an illustrated technical analysis. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century A.D. to the Third (1976), devotes considerable attention to technical aspects of Rome's military power. J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (1958, reissued 1981), remains a standard historical treatment of the organization and use of the army; it can be supplemented by the brilliant examination in Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (1978). Brief historical surveys of equipment and dress, based on artistic interpretations of archaeological evidence, are presented in the works from the “Men-at-Arms” series: Terence Wise, Ancient Armies of the Middle East (1981), and Armies of the Carthaginian Wars, 265–146 BC (1982); Nick Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks: Armies of Classical Greece, 5th and 4th Centuries BC (1986), and The Army of Alexander the Great (1984); and Michael Simkins, The Roman Army From Caesar to Trajan, rev. ed. (1984).Michel Bur, “The Social Influence of the Motte-and-Bailey Castle,” Scientific American, 248(5):132–140 (May 1983), describes the early beginnings of the European feudal system of war; and John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730–1200 (1971), summarizes the subject. Bernard S. Bachrach, "Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” in the symposium L'Uomo di fronte al mondo animale nell'alto Medioevo, vol. 1, pp. 707–751 (1985), analyzes textual, graphic, and archaeological evidence on the development of the technology of mounted shock action in western Europe; the same author's Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751 (1972) examines the social context within which the new technology developed. A.V.B. Norman, The Medieval Soldier (1971); and A.V.B. Norman and Don Pottinger, English Weapons & Warfare, 449–1660 (1979, reissued 1985), address weaponry in detail. Charles Ffoulkes, Armour & Weapons (1909, reprinted 1973), remains a classic treatment of the development of personal armour in Europe.V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (eds.), War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East (1975), contains a number of essays dealing with various aspects of warfare and military technology during the age of cavalry. David C. Nicolle, Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era, 1050–1350, 2 vol. (1988), is a comprehensive reference work. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (eds.), Chinese Ways in Warfare (1974), is a collection of scholarly essays. S.R. Turnbull, The Mongols (1980); and David C. Nicolle, The Armies of Islam, 7th–11th Centuries (1982), are two works from the “Men-at-Arms” series. Ralph Payne-Gallwey, A Summary of the History, Construction, and Effects in Warfare of the Projectile-Throwing Engines of the Ancients with a Treatise on the Structure, Power, and Management of Turkish and Other Oriental Bows of Mediaeval and Later Times (1907, reprinted 1973), though old, contains valuable reports of practical experiments in the reconstruction of mechanical artillery and informed speculation on the capabilities of the composite bow. W.F. Paterson, "The Archers of Islam,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 9(1–2):69–87 (November 1966), offers technical and tactical analysis of medieval archery. Paul E. Klopsteg, Turkish Archery and the Composite Bow: A Review of an Old Chapter in the Chronicles of Archery, and a Modern Interpretation, 3rd enlarged ed. (1987), contains the most complete technical description of composite bow construction, based on an 1847 Ottoman text written during the final revival of Turkish archery. Ralph Payne-Gallwey, The Crossbow, Mediaeval and Modern, Military and Sporting: Its Construction, History & Management, with a Treatise on the Balista and Catapult of the Ancients, and an Appendix on the Catapult, Balista & the Turkish Bow, 2nd ed. (1958, reprinted 1981), remains the basic text on the crossbow; Robert Hardy, Longbow: A Social and Military History (1976, reissued 1986), is a definitive treatment by a famous archer, with appendixes on design and ballistics by technical experts. The above-mentioned “Men-at-Arms” series includes Douglas Miller, The Landsknechts (1976) and The Swiss at War, 1300–1500 (1979); David C. Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 1300–1774 (1983); and S.R. Turnbull, Samurai Armies, 1550–1615 (1979). Though not primarily concerned with warfare or military technology, Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (1972, reprinted 1980); and Peter Duus, Feudalism in Japan, 2nd ed. (1976), provide the institutional and cultural context for military developments.David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society, 2nd ed. (1978), studies a military elite that failed to adapt to gunpowder. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2nd rev. ed., 2 vol. (1924, reissued 1959), and A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (1937, reprinted 1979), provide encyclopaedic coverage and analytical treatment. F.L. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529 (1921, reprinted 1973), is a useful supplement. Jacob de Gheyn, The Exercise of Armes: A Seventeenth Century Military Manual, new ed., edited by David J. Blackmore (1986; originally published in Dutch, 1607), is one of the earliest published detailed books of musket drill. Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars (1979), provides comprehensive coverage of the subject. Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness History of Land Warfare (1973; also published as The History of Land Warfare, 1974), is a useful reference source. Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (1987), is a comprehensive treatment of European methods of war. Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (1972), examines human and tactical aspects of the war of the Netherlands, and his The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (1988), uses current scholarship in an analysis of the impact of gunpowder on warfare and politics on a global scale.Christopher Duffy, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660–1860 (1975), and Siege Warfare, vol. 1: The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660, and vol. 2: The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1680–1789 (1979–85), treat the development of methods of siege craft and fortification and survey positional warfare. Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, trans. and ed. by George A. Rothrock (1968; originally published in French, 1740), is the famous text with informative notes, appendixes, and introduction; and Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, Firearms & Fortification: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Siena (1986), studies the technology and tactics of early modern positional warfare in detail. Peter Young and Wilfrid Emberton, Sieges of the Great Civil War, 1642–1646 (1978), offers siege narratives of the English Civil War; and Horst De la Croix, Military Considerations in City Planning: Fortifications (1972), surveys urban fortifications from the earliest times to the mid-19th century.For the transition to modern warfare, see William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D.1000 (1982), a broad overview of the political and economic effect of developments in military technology; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (1983), which summarizes developments from the age of Frederick the Great onward; and Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (1989).John F. Guilmartin, Jr.

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