Warfare in the 21st Century

▪ 2003

Introduction

by Peter Saracino

      The war that began in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, demonstrated both the capabilities and the limitations of modern military technology. It should have come as no surprise that the U.S.-led 17-member coalition toppled the Taliban regime in only a few weeks. In conventional terms, the Taliban were a pushover; they possessed no air force, had very limited air defenses, and were an unpopular and weak regime. It must be remembered, however, that in 1979 the Soviet Union controlled Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, within a week of beginning its invasion and then spent the next decade trying to defeat the mujahideen guerrillas. The coalition faced a similar challenge in 2002 against widely dispersed and tenacious al-Qaeda forces operating in rugged and inhospitable terrain. Consequently, the coalition has yet to eliminate al-Qaeda's terrorist infrastructure or determine the fate of its leader, Osama bin Laden.

New Weapons.

      Shortly after the war began, an American bomb designed to destroy underground tunnels and bunkers was rushed into service. The BLU-118/B thermobaric bomb was dropped on a suspected enemy cave in the eastern part of the country in March 2002. Although the device detonated as intended, a problem with its laser guidance caused it to land far enough away from the cave entrance to negate its effect. Thermobaric weapons work in two stages; first they release a fine cloud of high-explosive fuel, and then the fuel is detonated, creating a large fireball and a devastating shockwave. These weapons are most effective in confined spaces, because there the immense overpressures they create are contained and magnified. Ironically, the Soviets employed thermobaric bombs in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Research on thermobaric bombs continues in the U.S., Great Britain, and other countries as a means of destroying deep underground bunkers and hidden supplies of biological or chemical weapons without having to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

      Another 21st-century device, the laser-guided bomb, now used by many countries, has two main disadvantages: the laser beam marking the target has to be aimed by someone on the ground or in an aircraft, and smoke and bad weather can degrade the laser beam such that it can no longer guide the falling bomb. In Afghanistan such problems have been overcome through the use of the new Global Positioning System (GPS) Aided Munition. A computer mounted in the bomb is programmed with the coordinates of the intended target and uses GPS guidance to strike with a reported accuracy of 12–18 m (40–60 ft). Since the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, special forces troops have been using handheld GPS receivers, laser designators, and satellite radios to help artillery and aircraft attack targets with minimal delay. This capability has assumed a greater importance in Afghanistan, where reducing the “sensor to shooter” loop to just a few minutes has helped pin down and destroy small groups of guerrillas on the move.

      The Afghan war will also be remembered as the first in which armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were used to attack targets. UAVs have been in service for more than 40 years as drones for target practice and to gather intelligence with onboard sensors, but the CIA used a specially adapted Predator UAV to fire a Hellfire antitank missile at a group of three men believed to be al-Qaeda leaders. All were killed, but it later turned out that they were local villagers. Although expensive (the price of a Global Hawk UAV is over $15 million, and a Predator costs over $3.3 million), they have the advantage of being able to overfly enemy territory without risking the lives of pilots and can remain on patrol longer than most manned aircraft. UAVs are, however, vulnerable to ground fire, bad weather, ice buildup on their wings, and operator error. At least five Predators and one Global Hawk have crashed or been shot down during the war.

Logistic Challenges.

      What sets the U.S. military apart from all others is its ability to dispatch thousands of troops and their weapons, vehicles, and supplies to any point on Earth and to sustain them there. No other country could wage war in a landlocked country by supplying its forces almost entirely by air. By the end of September 2001, nearly the entire active-duty fleet of C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft—a total of about 140—was dedicated to the war effort. The 30-year-old C-5 can carry 122,000 kg (270,000 lb) of cargo, but it requires a runway at least 1,495 m (4,900 ft) long for landing. Conversely, the C-17 can land on runways as short as 915 m (3,000 ft), which makes it much better suited to the primitive or war-damaged airfields in Afghanistan. At the height of the war in early 2002, coalition troops each month consumed 7.9 million litres (2.1 million gal) of fuel, 13.6 million litres (3.6 million gal) of water, and the equivalent of 72 18-wheel transport trucks of food. Meeting such a demand for supplies does not come cheap, however. For example, the price of delivering fuel to remote war zones can exceed $1,500 per litre.

The Role of Special Forces.

      The elimination of remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban members from their isolated mountain caves and village hideouts has remained problematic for the coalition and is a major reason why up to 2,000 special forces troops have been committed to the campaign. Although much of their work has been kept secret, several coalition members have admitted that they have deployed such forces, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S. What sets special operations forces apart from regular troops is that they tend to be organized in groups of fewer than a dozen soldiers and are trained in specialties such as mountain, desert, and jungle warfare, counterterrorism, combat search-and-rescue operations, and covert reconnaissance. Special forces troops are also highly mobile and take advantage of specialized equipment that permits them to travel at night and in most weather conditions. For example, the MH-53J Pave Low III heavy-lift helicopter (based on the 1960s-era CH-53 Sea Stallion) has sophisticated radar and a forward-looking infrared sensor to enable its crew to avoid obstacles and fly just above the ground at night. The Pave Low is equipped with armour plating and machine guns and can transport up to 38 troops.

Command and Information.

      For the most part, the war in Afghanistan has been managed from U.S. Central Command headquarters in Florida, more than 11,260 km (7,000 mi) and 10 time zones away. Commanders have for the first time been able to watch battles live via TV cameras mounted in UAVs. Although a technical achievement, this has led to complaints that the attention of headquarters staff is diverted and that troops in the field are being micromanaged. The large volume of data moving between commanders and troops in the field has been a mixed blessing for coalition forces. On one hand it has allowed commanders to deploy forces quickly and effectively to where they are needed most, but on the other hand information overload has created the requirement for new positions, such as that of “knowledge management officer” to filter out minor details and ensure that commanders get only the information they need in order to make decisions.

Peter Saracino is a freelance defense journalist and a contributor to PEJ News based in Victoria, B.C.

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