Spotlight: The Spat over the Spratlys

▪ 1996

 Scattered over 388,000 sq km (150,000 sq mi) of the South China Sea midway between Vietnam and the Philippines, the 500-600 largely uninhabited islets, reefs, and shoals of the Spratly Islands (see Map—>) seem a curious prize in Southeast Asia's most contentious territorial dispute. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan lay claim to the entire archipelago, and Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines to islands close to their shores.

      At the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum on security in Brunei in July, ASEAN, bolstered by seventh member Vietnam, pressed China to abide by a 1992 ASEAN declaration to settle the Spratly dispute through negotiations. Over Chinese opposition to U.S. involvement, Washington said that it wanted freedom of navigation maintained. Some 200 vessels ply the South China Sea at any one time, conveying nearly half of Asia's commerce, including 70% of Japan's oil.

      While asserting its sovereignty over the Spratlys, Beijing agreed in Brunei to resolve claims according to international law, softening its past insistence on historical title. In talks lasting until August, China and the Philippines adopted measures to avoid military conflict. Beijing allowed the Filipinos to destroy its stone markers and small structures on islets around Mischief Reef (but not the main facilities, which China contended were for fishermen). The Philippines detained 62 Chinese fishing in a nearby area but later released all except four captains. Analysts believed Beijing was conciliatory in order to preserve relations with ASEAN and to forestall any regional alliance to "contain" China.

      While the Mischief Reef problem was smoothed over, a general Spratlys resolution remained remote. At a workshop on the issue at which Indonesia served as host in October, the sixth since 1990, participants from the six claimants endorsed a call to set aside sovereignty questions and undertake joint development. Besides abundant fish, the area may contain oil, tin, manganese, and other minerals, judging by what is found in surrounding waters. The workshop in Borneo agreed on low-level programs, and Indonesia hoped joint projects would create an atmosphere for tackling weightier matters, but some participants opposed discussing such measures in the next meeting.

      Seeds of the dispute were planted 50 years ago. In 1945 the Allies took the Spratlys from Japanese control. The Nationalist Chinese occupied Spratly Island but withdrew in 1950. After Tokyo formally relinquished the islands in its 1951 peace treaty with the Allies, other countries began staking claims. In 1956 South Vietnam occupied Spratly Island and the Paracels group farther north. That same year, by Manila's account, Filipino mariner Tomas Cloma claimed a group of 53 islands, reefs, and shoals, which he named Freedomland. In 1962 Taiwan drove Filipino settlers from Itu Aba, the largest Spratly island at 43 ha (106 ac). In 1968 the Philippines occupied three islets. In the 1970s, when China took the Paracels, unified Vietnam took more islands. In 1995 Vietnam held 25 islands, China 12, the Philippines 8, Malaysia 4, and Taiwan 1.

      In 1988 Vietnam lost three vessels and 77 seamen in a half-hour battle with China. Hanoi said Chinese troops also took over a reef it had held and six unoccupied islands. That same year Malaysian gunboats detained 49 Filipino fishermen near Commodore Reef, also claimed by Manila. In 1992 China passed legislation formally claiming—by force, if necessary—the Spratlys, the Paracels, the East China Sea's Senkaku islands (claimed by Japan), and most of the South China Sea. Beijing then gave Crestone, a U.S. oil firm, a concession in waters within Vietnam's claimed exclusive economic zone. In 1994 Vietnam drove Crestone away, which prompted a temporary Chinese blockade of a Russo-Vietnamese oil rig. The Philippines also awarded oil concessions, while Malaysia developed one island into a diving resort. In recent years the addition of new warplanes and vessels to their forces has augmented the ability of most claimants to intervene in the area.

      While accepting international law, China still preferred bilateral, not multilateral, talks with rival claimants. Legal experts, though, believe that all six claims are weak. Spratly references in Chinese and Vietnamese historical records are intermittent, which suggests no lasting claim, occupation, or settlement. No nation has administered the area anywhere near the 50 years normally conferring title. Under the UN Law of the Sea, none of the claimants seemed qualified to claim 200-nautical-mile economic zones around the Spratlys, and zones based on the continental shelves of Malaysia and Vietnam probably carry greater legal weight. So despite tough talk and some military buildup, claimants are unlikely to wage war over the Spratlys and torpedo lucrative relations among themselves—unless national pride overcomes pragmatism.

      Ricardo Saludo is a senior editor at Asiaweek magazine and is based in Hong Kong.

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