/terr"kee/, n., pl. turkeys, (esp. collectively) turkey.
1. a large, gallinaceous bird of the family Meleagrididae, esp. Meleagris gallopavo, of America, that typically has green, reddish-brown, and yellowish-brown plumage of a metallic luster and that is domesticated in most parts of the world. See illus. in next column.
2. the flesh of this bird, used as food.
4. Slang.
a. a person or thing of little appeal; dud; loser.
b. a naive, stupid, or inept person.
c. a poor and unsuccessful theatrical production; flop.
5. Bowling. three strikes in succession.
6. talk turkey, Informal. to talk frankly; mean business.
[1545-55; short for Turkey cock and Turkey hen cock and hen of Turkey, first applied to guinea fowl, later confused with the American bird]

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Introduction Turkey -
Background: Turkey was created in 1923 from the Turkish remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Soon thereafter the country instituted secular laws to replace traditional religious fiats. In 1945 Turkey joined the UN and in 1952 it became a member of NATO. Turkey occupied the northern portion of Cyprus in 1974 to prevent a Greek takeover of the island; relations between the two countries remain strained but have begun to improve over the past three years. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Marxist-Leninist, separatist group, initiated an insurgency in Southeast Turkey, often using terrorist tactics to try to attain its goal of an independent Kurdistan. The group - whose leader, Abdullah OCALAN, was captured in Kenya in February 1999 and sentenced to death by a Turkish court - has observed a unilateral cease-fire since September 1999, although there have been occasional clashes between Turkish military units and some of the 4,000-5,000 armed PKK militants, most of whom currently are encamped in northern Iraq. The PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in April 2002. Geography Turkey
Location: southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia (that portion of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically part of Europe), bordering the Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria
Geographic coordinates: 39 00 N, 35 00 E
Map references: Middle East
Area: total: 780,580 sq km water: 9,820 sq km land: 770,760 sq km
Area - comparative: slightly larger than Texas
Land boundaries: total: 2,648 km border countries: Armenia 268 km, Azerbaijan 9 km, Bulgaria 240 km, Georgia 252 km, Greece 206 km, Iran 499 km, Iraq 352 km, Syria 822 km
Coastline: 7,200 km
Maritime claims: exclusive economic zone: in Black Sea only: to the maritime boundary agreed upon with the former USSR territorial sea: 6 NM in the Aegean Sea; 12 NM in Black Sea and in Mediterranean Sea
Climate: temperate; hot, dry summers with mild, wet winters; harsher in interior
Terrain: mostly mountains; narrow coastal plain; high central plateau (Anatolia)
Elevation extremes: lowest point: Mediterranean Sea 0 m highest point: Mount Ararat 5,166 m
Natural resources: antimony, coal, chromium, mercury, copper, borate, sulfur, iron ore, arable land, hydropower
Land use: arable land: 34.53% permanent crops: 3.36% other: 62.11% (1998 est.)
Irrigated land: 42,000 sq km (1998 est.)
Natural hazards: very severe earthquakes, especially in northern Turkey, along an arc extending from the Sea of Marmara to Lake Van Environment - current issues: water pollution from dumping of chemicals and detergents; air pollution, particularly in urban areas; deforestation; concern for oil spills from increasing Bosporus ship traffic Environment - international party to: Air Pollution, Antarctic
agreements: Treaty, Biodiversity, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: Antarctic- Environmental Protocol, Environmental Modification
Geography - note: strategic location controlling the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, Dardanelles) that link Black and Aegean Seas; Mount Ararat, the legendary landing place of Noah's Ark, is in the far eastern portion of the country People Turkey -
Population: 67,308,928 (July 2002 est.)
Age structure: 0-14 years: 27.8% (male 9,520,030; female 9,178,423) 15-64 years: 65.9% (male 22,552,253; female 21,827,002) 65 years and over: 6.3% (male 1,946,523; female 2,284,697) (2002 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.2% (2002 est.)
Birth rate: 17.95 births/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Death rate: 5.95 deaths/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2002 est.)
Sex ratio: at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.03 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.85 male(s)/ female total population: 1.02 male(s)/ female (2002 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 45.77 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.) Life expectancy at birth: total population: 71.52 years female: 74.01 years (2002 est.) male: 69.15 years
Total fertility rate: 2.07 children born/woman (2002 est.) HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate: 0.01% (1999 est.) HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/ NA
HIV/AIDS - deaths: NA
Nationality: noun: Turk(s) adjective: Turkish
Ethnic groups: Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20%
Religions: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)
Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic, Armenian, Greek
Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 85% male: 94% female: 77% (2000) Government Turkey -
Country name: conventional long form: Republic of Turkey conventional short form: Turkey local long form: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti local short form: Turkiye
Government type: republican parliamentary democracy
Capital: Ankara Administrative divisions: 81 provinces (iller, singular - il); Adana, Adiyaman, Afyon, Agri, Aksaray, Amasya, Ankara, Antalya, Ardahan, Artvin, Aydin, Balikesir, Bartin, Batman, Bayburt, Bilecik, Bingol, Bitlis, Bolu, Burdur, Bursa, Canakkale, Cankiri, Corum, Denizli, Diyarbakir, Duzce, Edirne, Elazig, Erzincan, Erzurum, Eskisehir, Gaziantep, Giresun, Gumushane, Hakkari, Hatay, Icel, Igdir, Isparta, Istanbul, Izmir, Kahramanmaras, Karabuk, Karaman, Kars, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Kilis, Kirikkale, Kirklareli, Kirsehir, Kocaeli, Konya, Kutahya, Malatya, Manisa, Mardin, Mugla, Mus, Nevsehir, Nigde, Ordu, Osmaniye, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sanliurfa, Siirt, Sinop, Sirnak, Sivas, Tekirdag, Tokat, Trabzon, Tunceli, Usak, Van, Yalova, Yozgat, Zonguldak
Independence: 29 October 1923 (successor state to the Ottoman Empire)
National holiday: Independence Day, 29 October (1923)
Constitution: 7 November 1982
Legal system: derived from various European continental legal systems; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
Executive branch: chief of state: President Ahmet Necdet SEZER (since 16 May 2000) elections: president elected by the National Assembly for a seven-year term; election last held 5 May 2000 (next to be held NA May 2007); prime minister and deputy prime ministers appointed by the president note: a National Security Council serves as an advisory body to the president and the cabinet cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president on the nomination of the prime minister head of government: Prime Minister Bulent ECEVIT (since 11 January 1999) election results: Ahmed Necdet SEZER elected president on the third ballot; percent of National Assembly vote - 60% note: president must have a two- thirds majority of the National Assembly on the first two ballots and a simple majority on the third ballot
Legislative branch: unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey or Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (550 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections: last held 18 April 1999 (next to be held NA 2004) election results: percent of vote by party - NA%; seats by party - DSP 136, MHP 130, FP 110, DYP 86, ANAP 88; note - as of 11 January 2002 seating was DSP 129, MHP 127, DYP 84, ANAP 79, AK 53, Saadet 48, independents 20, vacancies 10
Judicial branch: Constitutional Court (judges are appointed by the president); Court of Appeals (judges are elected by the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors) Political parties and leaders: Democratic Left Party or DSP [Bulent ECEVIT]; Justice and Development Party or AK [Recep Tayip ERDOGAN]; Motherland Party or ANAP [Mesut YILMAZ]; Nationalist Action Party or MHP [Devlet BAHCELI]; Saadet Party [Recai KUTAN]; note - KUTAN was head of the Virtue Party or FP which was banned by Turkey's Constitutional Court in June 2001; Socialist Democratic Party or TDP [Sema PISKINSUT]; True Path Party or DYP [Tansu CILLER] Political pressure groups and Confederation of Revolutionary
leaders: Workers Unions or DISK [Ridvan BUDAK]; Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association or MUSIAD [Erol YARAR]; Moral Rights Workers Union or Hak-Is [Salim USLU]; Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association or TUSIAD [Muharrem KAYHAN]; Turkish Confederation of Employers' Unions or TISK [Refik BAYDUR]; Turkish Confederation of Labor or Turk-Is [Bayram MERAL]; Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges or TOBB [Fuat MIRAS] International organization AsDB, Australia Group, BIS, BSEC,
participation: CCC, CE, CERN (observer), EAPC, EBRD, ECE, ECO, ESCAP, EU (applicant), FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ISO, ITU, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNMIK, UNOMIG, UNRWA, UNTAET, UPU, WEU (associate), WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO, ZC Diplomatic representation in the US: chief of mission: Ambassador Dr. Osman Faruk LOGOGLU FAX: [1] (202) 612-6744 consulate(s) general: Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York chancery: 2525 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008 telephone: [1] (202) 612-6700 Diplomatic representation from the chief of mission: Ambassador Robert
US: W. PEARSON embassy: Ataturk Bulvari 110, Ankara mailing address: PSC 93, Box 5000, APO AE 09823 telephone: [90] (312) 468-6110 FAX: [90] (312) 467-0019 consulate(s) general: Istanbul consulate(s): Adana
Flag description: red with a vertical white crescent (the closed portion is toward the hoist side) and white five-pointed star centered just outside the crescent opening Economy Turkey
Economy - overview: Turkey's dynamic economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along with a traditional agriculture sector that in 2001 still accounted for 40% of employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic industry, banking, transport, and communication. The most important industry - and largest exporter - is textiles and clothing, which is almost entirely in private hands. In recent years the economic situation has been marked by erratic economic growth and serious imbalances. Real GNP growth has exceeded 6% in most years, but this strong expansion was interrupted by sharp declines in output in 1994, 1999, and 2001. Meanwhile the public sector fiscal deficit has regularly exceeded 10% of GDP - due in large part to the huge burden of interest payments, which in 2001 accounted for more than 50% of central government spending - while inflation has remained in the high double digit range. Perhaps because of these problems, foreign direct investment in Turkey remains low - less than $1 billion annually. In late 2000 and early 2001 a growing trade deficit and serious weaknesses in the banking sector plunged the economy into crisis - forcing Ankara to float the lira and pushing the country into recession. Prospects for 2002 are much better, because of strong financial support from the IMF, tighter fiscal policy, a major bank restructuring program, and the enactment of numerous other economic reforms.
GDP: purchasing power parity - $443 billion (2001 est.)
GDP - real growth rate: -6.5% (2001 est.)
GDP - per capita: purchasing power parity - $6,700 (2001 est.) GDP - composition by sector: agriculture: 14.5% industry: 28.4% services: 57.1% (2000) Population below poverty line: NA% Household income or consumption by lowest 10%: 2.3%
percentage share: highest 10%: 32.3% (1994) Distribution of family income - Gini 41.5 (1994)
index: Inflation rate (consumer prices): 69% (2001)
Labor force: 23.8 million (2001 3rd quarter) note: about 1.2 million Turks work abroad (1999) Labor force - by occupation: agriculture 39.7%, services 37.9%, industry 22.4% (2001 3rd quarter)
Unemployment rate: 10.6% (plus underemployment of 6.1%) (2001 4th quarter)
Budget: revenues: $42.4 billion expenditures: $69.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (2001)
Industries: textiles, food processing, autos, mining (coal, chromite, copper, boron), steel, petroleum, construction, lumber, paper Industrial production growth rate: -8.9% (2001) Electricity - production: 119.18 billion kWh (2000) Electricity - production by source: fossil fuel: 74.09% hydro: 25.65% other: 0.26% (2000) nuclear: 0% Electricity - consumption: 114.192 billion kWh (2000)
Electricity - exports: 437 million kWh (2000)
Electricity - imports: 3.791 billion kWh (2000)
Agriculture - products: tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, pulse, citrus; livestock
Exports: $33.8 billion (f.o.b., 2001)
Exports - commodities: apparel 24.8%, foodstuffs 12.8%, textiles 12.7%, metal manufactures 8.8%, transport equipment 8.5% (2000)
Exports - partners: Germany 17.4%, US 10.2%, Italy 7.5%, UK 7.0%, France 6.1% (2001 est.)
Imports: $39.7 billion (c.i.f., 2001 est.)
Imports - commodities: machinery 25.4%, chemicals 13.4%, semi-finished goods 13.7%, fuels 14.0%, transport equipment 12.4% (2000)
Imports - partners: Germany 13.3%, Italy 8.6%, Russia 8.4%, US 8.1%, France 5.7%, UK 4.5% (2001 est.)
Debt - external: $118.8 billion (September 2001) Economic aid - recipient: ODA, $195 million (1993)
Currency: Turkish lira (TRL)
Currency code: TRL
Exchange rates: Turkish liras per US dollar - 1,223,140 (January 2002), 1,223,140 (2001), 625,219 (2000), 418,783 (1999), 260,724 (1998), 151,865 (1997)
Fiscal year: calendar year Communications Turkey - Telephones - main lines in use: 19.5 million (1999) Telephones - mobile cellular: 17.1 million (2001)
Telephone system: general assessment: undergoing rapid modernization and expansion, especially with cellular telephones domestic: additional digital exchanges are permitting a rapid increase in subscribers; the construction of a network of technologically advanced intercity trunk lines, using both fiber-optic cable and digital microwave radio relay is facilitating communication between urban centers; remote areas are reached by a domestic satellite system; the number of subscribers to mobile cellular telephone service is growing rapidly international: international service is provided by three submarine fiber-optic cables in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, linking Turkey with Italy, Greece, Israel, Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia; also by 12 Intelsat earth stations, and by 328 mobile satellite terminals in the Inmarsat and Eutelsat systems (2002) Radio broadcast stations: AM 16, FM 107, shortwave 6 (2001)
Radios: 11.3 million (1997) Television broadcast stations: 635 (plus 2,934 repeaters) (1995)
Televisions: 20.9 million (1997)
Internet country code: .tr Internet Service Providers (ISPs): 50 (2001)
Internet users: 4 million (2001) Transportation Turkey -
Railways: total: 8,607 km standard gauge: 8,607 km 1.435- m gauge (2,131 km electrified) (2001)
Highways: total: 382,059 km paved: 106,976 km (including 1,726 km of expressways) unpaved: 275,083 km (1999 est.)
Waterways: 1,200 km (approximately)
Pipelines: crude oil 1,738 km; petroleum products 2,321 km; natural gas 708 km
Ports and harbors: Gemlik, Hopa, Iskenderun, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli (Izmit), Icel (Mersin), Samsun, Trabzon
Merchant marine: total: 553 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 5,674,099 GRT/9,108,819 DWT ships by type: bulk 138, cargo 239, chemical tanker 45, combination bulk 5, combination ore/oil 2, container 27, liquefied gas 6, passenger/cargo 1, petroleum tanker 45, refrigerated cargo 3, roll on/roll off 27, short- sea passenger 10, specialized tanker 5 note: includes some foreign-owned ships registered here as a flag of convenience: Belize 1, Cyprus 1, Denmark 2, Greece 1, Italy 1, Thailand 1, United Kingdom 11 (2002 est.)
Airports: 120 (2001) Airports - with paved runways: total: 86 over 3,047 m: 16 2,438 to 3,047 m: 30 914 to 1,523 m: 15 under 914 m: 6 (2001) 1,524 to 2,437 m: 19 Airports - with unpaved runways: total: 34 over 3,047 m: 1 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 under 914 m: 24 (2001) 914 to 1,523 m: 8
Heliports: 6 (2001) Military Turkey -
Military branches: Land Forces, Navy (includes Naval Air and Naval Infantry), Air Force, Coast Guard, Gendarmerie Military manpower - military age: 20 years of age (2002 est.) Military manpower - availability: males age 15-49: 19,219,177 (2002 est.) Military manpower - fit for military males age 15-49: 11,623,675 (2002
service: est.) Military manpower - reaching males: 674,805 (2002 est.)
military age annually: Military expenditures - dollar $8.1 billion (2002 est.)
figure: Military expenditures - percent of 4.5% (2002 est.)
GDP: Transnational Issues Turkey - Disputes - international: complex maritime, air, and territorial disputes with Greece in Aegean Sea; Cyprus question with Greece; dispute with downstream riparian states (Syria and Iraq) over water development plans for the Tigris and Euphrates rivers; traditional demands regarding former Armenian lands in Turkey have subsided; Turkey is quick to rebuff any perceived Syrian claim to Hatay province; border with Armenia remains closed over Nagorno-Karabakh dispute
Illicit drugs: key transit route for Southwest Asian heroin to Western Europe and - to a far lesser extent the US - via air, land, and sea routes; major Turkish, Iranian, and other international trafficking organizations operate out of Istanbul; laboratories to convert imported morphine base into heroin are in remote regions of Turkey as well as near Istanbul; government maintains strict controls over areas of legal opium poppy cultivation and output of poppy straw concentrate

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officially Republic of Turkey

Country, western Asia and southeastern Europe.

Area: 300,948 sq mi (779,452 sq km), nearly all of which lies in Asia. Population (2002 est.): 67,140,000. Capital: Ankara. Ethnic groups include the Turks and Kurds. Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic. Religions: Islam (mostly Sunnite); Christianity and Judaism to a small extent. Currency: Turkish lira. Turkey is a mountainous country with an extensive plateau covering central Anatolia. The highest peak is Mount Ararat (16,853 ft [5,137 m]). The Taurus Mountains lie in the south. The rivers include the Tigris, Euphrates, Kızıl, and Menderes. Turkey is a major producer and exporter of chromite and also mines iron ore, coal, lignite, bauxite, and copper. It is the Middle East's leading steel producer. Chief agricultural products include wheat, barley, olives, and tobacco. Tourism also is important. Turkey is a republic with one legislative house; its chief of state is the president, and the head of government is the prime minister. Turkey's early history corresponds to that of Anatolia, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Byzantine rule emerged when Constantine the Great made Constantinople (modern Istanbul) his capital. The Ottoman Empire, begun in the 12th century, dominated for more than 600 years; it ended in 1918 after the Young Turk revolt precipitated its demise. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a republic was proclaimed in 1923. Turkey remained neutral throughout most of World War II (1939–45), siding with the Allied Powers in 1945. Since the war it has alternated between civil and military governments and has had several conflicts with Greece over Cyprus. Since the 1990s it has experienced political and civic turmoil between Islamists and secularists and ongoing ethnic tension with Kurdish separatists.

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▪ 2009

783,562 sq km (302,535 sq mi)
(2008 est.): 71,002,000
Chief of state:
President Abdullah Gul
Head of government:
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

      In the first quarter of 2008, Turkey's ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was threatened with closure, less than a year after it had won a second term in office with an increased majority in the parliament. On March 31 the Constitutional Court agreed to hear a petition by Turkey's chief prosecutor, who alleged that the AKP had become a “focus of activity against the secular order” and asked that the party be closed down and that 71 of its leading members be banned from politics for five years. Although the court accepted the charge on July 30, it failed to muster the majority needed for a ban; as a result, the AKP was given a lesser penalty—a 50% cut in state funding. Erdogan remained in office but with limited freedom of action. (See Special Report.

      The nationalist wing of the secularist opposition had in the meantime come under attack with an investigation into an alleged plot to overthrow the government. The investigation was prompted by the discovery in Istanbul in June 2007 of a store of army-issue grenades in the home of a retired officer. This triggered several waves of arrests of nationalists during 2008, with a number of high-ranking military officers among those detained. Civilian detainees included Dogu Perincek, the leader of the small nationalist Workers' Party (IP), and the managers of a nationalist TV channel. On July 25 the Istanbul criminal court agreed to initiate proceedings, and charges were brought against 86 defendants, 46 of whom were remanded. The first hearing took place on October 20.

      The high command stayed out of the legal battle. On August 28 the chief of the general staff (who functions as commander in chief), Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, retired and was replaced by the commander of the land forces, Gen. Ilker Basbug. The military continued to fight the Kurdish nationalist separatists of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), who persistently attacked security personnel and engaged in other terrorist activities. The Turkish air force repeatedly bombed PKK bases in northern Iraq, and the army launched an incursion into the area in February and claimed to have killed some 250 militants, with the loss of 24 soldiers. Attacks by the PKK continued, with 15 soldiers killed at a border post on October 3. A bomb exploded in a suburb of Istanbul on July 27, killing 17 civilians. The Constitutional Court, meanwhile, continued to examine the charge that the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which was represented in the parliament and controlled local government in some of the most important towns in southeastern Turkey, was the political front organization of the PKK and should be closed down.

      Domestic preoccupations did not prevent the Erdogan government from pursuing an active foreign policy. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Georgia in August, Turkey proposed the conclusion of a stability and cooperation pact for the Caucasus. Many high-level visits were undertaken to promote this initiative, the most notable being that paid by Pres. Abdullah Gul to Yerevan, Arm., on September 6, when Turkey had no diplomatic relations with that country. The frontier between Turkey and Armenia remained closed pending the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

      Turkey continued its efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria, with Syrian Pres. Bashar al-Assad holding talks in Turkey on August 5. Later that month Iranian Pres. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid a working visit to Istanbul, where he met President Gul. Turkey welcomed the resumption of talks between the presidents of the internationally recognized (Greek) Cyprus and of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which Turkey alone recognized.

      Economic growth fell from 6.7% year-on-year in the first quarter to 1.9% in the second quarter of 2008. The rise in oil prices was largely responsible for the foreign trade deficit's widening to $63 billion by the end of October. With net tourism revenue amounting to some $15 billion by the end of September, and with continued foreign direct investment, the country withstood the first shock of the world financial crisis; by year's end, however, the index of the Istanbul Stock Exchange had been halved, from 55,538 at the end of 2007 to 26,864. Meanwhile, consumer prices had risen by 11% year-on-year by the end of November.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2008

783,562 sq km (302,535 sq mi)
(2007 est.): 73,884,000
Chief of state:
Presidents Ahmet Necdet Sezer and, from August 28, Abdullah Gul
Head of government:
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

 In 2007 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the centre-right Justice and Development Party (AKP), won a second mandate and succeeded in having his candidate elected to the presidency. Erdogan's decision to back the candidacy of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul (Gul, Abdullah ) was vehemently criticized at a series of mass meetings. Beginning in April, doubts were expressed about the AKP's professed attachment to the secular republic when Gul's wife, Hayrunnisa, insisted on wearing the Muslim head scarf, which was banned in all official functions in Turkey. On April 27, on the eve of a second mass rally in Istanbul, 357 of the 550 members of the parliament voted in favour of Gul. The opposition, represented by the secularist Republican People's Party (CHP), boycotted the session. A few hours later the general staff posted on its Web site a statement that the armed forces would not remain indifferent if the secular regime was endangered, while the CHP petitioned the Constitutional Court to annul the election. On May 1 the court allowed the petition on the novel grounds that the vote to elect the president required a quorum of two-thirds of the members of the parliament. Erdogan responded by securing parliamentary approval of a constitutional amendment that provided for the election of the president by popular vote and by calling general elections on July 22, some three months early. An opposition petition to disallow the constitutional amendment was rejected by the Constitutional Court on July 5, and on October 21 voters approved a referendum that endorsed several constitutional changes, including the holding of presidential elections by popular vote.

      In the elections on July 22, the AKP increased its vote to 47% (12% more than in the 2002 elections) and won 341 seats (22 fewer than in 2002). The CHP came in second (with 21% and 112 seats), and the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) took third place (with 14% and 70 seats). Members of the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP), which could not hope to cross the 10% threshold, stood as independents. Twenty of the 26 independents who were elected subsequently rejoined the DTP and thereby gained the right to form a parliamentary group. This meant that for the first time, Kurdish nationalists were represented by their own party in the parliament. In the predominantly Kurdish-speaking southeastern region, however, the AKP won 53% of the vote, and DTP independents took 24%.

      Strengthened by its success in the polls, the AKP put forward Gul for a second time as its candidate for the presidency, and he was elected president on August 28. Military commanders broke with precedent by absenting themselves from the swearing-in ceremony.

      Throughout the year, militants of the radical nationalist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which had its chief operational base in northern Iraq, mounted hit-and-run raids on Turkish security forces, while other PKK terrorists set off bombs in metropolitan areas. PKK attacks during the year cost the lives of some 150 people, including civilians and members of the security forces. A convention on the prevention of terrorism signed with Iraq on September 27 had little effect. The U.S. and Turkish retired generals who had been appointed to coordinate measures against the PKK gave up their efforts. Erdogan thereupon asked the parliament to authorize the deployment of Turkish forces outside the country's boundaries. The attempts by the U.S. administration to dissuade Turkey from an incursion into northern Iraq were hampered by a vote in October by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives to recognize the massacres that attended the deportation of Armenians in the Ottoman empire in 1915 as an act of genocide. Turkish-Armenian relations had been dealt a blow earlier when Hrant Dink (Dink, Hrant ), the editor of Agos, a bilingual Turkish-Armenian-language weekly in Istanbul, was shot dead by a Turkish adolescent in the service of a group of nationalist fanatics, some of whom had links with the security forces. U.S.-Turkish relations improved, however, after Erdogan visited Pres. George W. Bush in Washington on November 5. Following an agreement to share intelligence on the PKK, the U.S. opened Iraqi airspace prior to a series of Turkish raids on PKK camps in December. Meanwhile, EU membership negotiations made no progress.

      Economic growth slowed, but at 4% (in the first nine months of the year) it was still well above the EU average. Despite record exports, the foreign- trade deficit rose to $51 billion by the end of October owing to the steep rise in imports, while the deficit in external payments stood at approximately $30 billion.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2007

783,562 sq km (302,535 sq mi)
(2006 est.): 72,932,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

 The Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan survived its fourth year in office in 2006 and prepared for an unprecedented fifth year. The negotiation of Turkey's accession to the EU advanced at a snail's pace. A preliminary EU scanning showed that Turkish laws were largely compatible with EU norms. Progress was held up, however, by Turkey's refusal to open its harbours and air space to (Greek) Cyprus shipping and aircraft until such time as Turkish Cypriots were allowed to establish direct communications with the outside world, without having to go through Turkey. The EU Commission welcomed the approval by the Turkish parliament in October of the ninth package of liberal reforms but did not find them sufficient. It was particularly critical of article 301 of the penal code, which punishes insults to the Turkish state and Turkish identity. Nationalist lawyers invoked this article to institute criminal proceedings against well-known writers, including the novelists Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak. Cases against these and other writers were thrown out at a preliminary stage, however, to the government's relief. The award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Pamuk (see Nobel Prizes ) in October dovetailed with a vote in the French lower house of Parliament that would criminalize the denial that genocide had been perpetrated against Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Even as many European politicians made known their opposition to Turkey's EU accession, support in Turkey for EU membership fell to below 50%.

      On April 20 the judiciary expelled from its ranks a prosecutor who had implicated Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, the commander of land forces, in his indictment of servicemen accused of bombing a pro- PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) bookshop near the Iraqi frontier. The military closed ranks around Buyukanit, and Prime Minister Erdogan distanced himself from the campaign against the general, a staunch secularist and nationalist. The overlap between some nationalists and Islamists became apparent on May 17, however, when Aslan Alpaslan, a young nationalist lawyer, stormed into the offices of the Council of State and gunned down a judge to protest a decision denying promotion to a headmistress who wore an Islamic head scarf on her way to school. At the end of August, Buyukanit was promoted to the top post of chief of the General Staff.

      In August the Freedom Falcons of Kurdistan (TAK), an offshoot of the PKK, exploded bombs in tourist resorts on Turkey's Mediterranean coast, killing three people and injuring dozens. In the southeastern provinces more than 180 members of the security forces and 70 civilians were killed by PKK snipers and mines in 18 months to the end of June. In mid-July, after another 15 soldiers and policemen were killed in the space of a few days, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul summoned the U.S. and Iraqi ambassadors and warned that Turkey would act in self-defense if measures were not taken to end the PKK presence in northern Iraq. The following month the U.S. appointed retired general Joseph Ralston to be its coordinator in joint measures against the PKK. Turkey's concerns were voiced once again when Erdogan was received by U.S. Pres. George W. Bush in Washington on October 2. Anger at perceived U.S. attempts to stop Turkey from action in Iraqi Kurdistan at a time when the U.S. strongly supported the Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon showed itself in strong public opposition to Turkish participation in the enlarged UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Erdogan was backed solidly by his party when the parliament agreed on September 5 to send Turkish troops to assist in providing humanitarian relief to Lebanon.

      The Turkish economy continued to perform strongly. Gross national product rose by 5.5%; exports increased by 16%; and imports rose by 19% in the first 11 months. During the same period, the number of foreign tourists decreased by 7% to 19 million, but an increase in foreign direct investment helped to cover the deficit in the balance of payments. A new airport terminal opened in Ankara on October 13.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2006

783,562 sq km (302,535 sq mi)
(2005 est.): 72,083,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

      The government headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which had been in power since the November 2002 elections, achieved its immediate foreign-policy objective when negotiations for Turkey's accession to the European Union opened formally in Luxembourg on Oct. 3, 2005. Earlier, Turkey had extended to the 10 new EU members, including Cyprus, the customs union that it had signed with the original membership in 1995. The Turkish government declared simultaneously, however, that it did not recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of the republic of Cyprus. The EU issued a counterdeclaration, stating that it expected Turkey to meet its obligations to all members. The decision to open accession negotiations was difficult for the EU Council of Ministers; public-opinion surveys showed that in most EU countries the majority of voters did not want Turkey as a full member. As a result, the document setting out the framework within which the negotiations were to be carried out was replete with conditions and reservations, and Turkey was warned not to expect membership for at least 10 years. Nevertheless, full membership remained the goal of the negotiations, and the Austrian government withdrew at the last moment its demand that a “privileged partnership” be specified as an alternative. This helped Prime Minister Erdogan answer opposition claims that he had made concessions to the EU, notably on Cyprus and on the rights of Turkey's Kurdish citizens, to no good effect.

      Turkey's hope that Cypriot Turks would be rewarded for backing the UN plan to reunify the island was not realized. The fact that Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat—who favoured the UN plan—increased his representation in the Turkish assembly in parliamentary elections on February 20 and then on April 17 was elected president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ([TRNC], recognized only by Turkey) suggested that Erdogan was in step with Turkish Cypriot opinion.

      The tone of the Turkish opposition became more nationalistic following the reelection on January 29 of Deniz Baykal to the leadership of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and the revival of the Motherland Party (ANAP), which mustered 22 seats in the parliament, after its leadership was passed on April 3 to 42-year-old Erkan Mumcu, a minister in the former AKP government.

 Turkey's efforts to secure EU membership continued to be supported by the United States, which Erdogan visited three times during the year; he met Pres. George W. Bush on June 8. Relations were hampered, however, by the failure of the U.S. to take action against the presence in northern Iraq of armed militants of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, now renamed KONGRA-GEL), which was banned in the U.S. and in the EU as a terrorist organization. Terrorists calling themselves Freedom Falcons of Kurdistan (TAK), believed to be an offshoot of the PKK, tried to disrupt Turkey's tourist industry with bomb attacks in Istanbul and in coastal resorts. In the face of mounting popular anger, Erdogan broke with tradition by declaring on August 10 that Turkey faced a Kurdish problem that he intended to solve by democratic means. The PKK responded by offering a truce until the end of September. Terrorist attacks and sweeps by Turkish security forces continued, however, and tension rose in November when an explosion in the remote mountainous province of Hakkari was blamed on a death squad of paramilitary policemen.

      The growth of the economy slowed from 9.9% in 2004 to 3.4% in the second quarter of 2005, but these figures were still high by EU standards. Exports increased by 18%, and imports rose by 21% in the first nine months of the year. The consequent increase of the trade deficit to $32 billion was the main cause for disquiet. Inflation continued to drop, and consumer prices increased by only 6% in the first 10 months. Despite the threat of terrorism, the number of foreign visitors increased by 21%, to a record 19 million in the first 10 months of the year. Though the IMF was satisfied with the progress of the Turkish economy as a whole, popular discontent focused on unemployment, which remained high, about 9% in August, at a time when only 45% of the population of working age was employed.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2005

774,815 sq km (299,158 sq mi)
(2004 est.): 71,617,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

      The prospect of securing a firm date from the European Union for the opening of negotiations on Turkey's accession dominated domestic politics and foreign policy in 2004. Although a settlement of the Cyprus problem was not formally a precondition, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), sought to satisfy the EU request that Turkey encourage the Turkish Cypriot leadership to agree to a referendum on the settlement proposals put forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. When Erdogan visited (January 26–31) the U.S., Secretary of State Colin Powell promised to persuade Annan to restart negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. Though the two sides failed to agree on a common settlement plan, on April 7 both Turkey and Greece announced that they would support a referendum on the island on April 24 on the text finalized by Annan. The plan was endorsed by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by Greek Cypriots. The Turkish government secured promises from both Brussels and Washington that the Turkish Cypriots would be rewarded for their positive attitude, even though their area in northern Cyprus remained outside the EU, when the republic of Cyprus became a full member on May 1. Erdogan then concentrated on domestic reforms to satisfy the political criteria for Turkey's accession negotiations. His task was eased when on June 9 the court of appeal in Ankara ordered the release, pending a retrial, of four Kurdish nationalist members of the parliament, including writer Leyla Zana, winner of the 1995 Council of Europe's Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought; she had spent 10 years in jail on charges of collusion with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization and until October 14 had been unable to accept her prize. On June 7 Turkish public-service television started broadcasting in minority languages, including two Kurdish dialects. The parliament approved another major reform on September 26, when it amended the Turkish penal code in line with EU standards. At its meeting on December 16–17, the European Council decided to begin EU membership talks for Turkey in 2005.

      Erdogan's ability to make major changes in domestic and foreign policy was enhanced by the results of local polls on March 28. In provincial councils the AKP increased its share of the poll to 42% (from 34%); the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) trailed with 18%. In mayoral elections the AKP retained control of Istanbul and Ankara and made gains at the expense of the Kurdish Nationalist Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) in the Kurdish-speaking southeastern provinces. This did not prevent a recrudescence of terrorism, however; at a meeting in northern Iraq, the leadership of the PKK—renamed the People's Congress of Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL)—announced that it would resume armed attacks on June 1. The terrorist threat topped the agenda of the NATO summit meeting held in Istanbul on June 28–29. When U.S. Pres. George W. Bush stopped over in Ankara on his way to Istanbul, the Turkish government pressed him once again to take action against KONGRA-GEL terrorists based in northern Iraq. NATO leaders declared that terrorist activities in and from Iraq threatened the security of its neighbours. Although Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masʾud al-Barzani (both of whom visited Ankara) said that they would not allow any attacks on Turkey from territory under their control, KONGRA-GEL terrorists continued to infiltrate into Turkey from northern Iraq; more than 20 Turkish soldiers and policemen had been killed by early September. The major threat to Turkey, however, came from Iraq, where Islamist terrorists murdered more than 60 Turks—mainly truck drivers—in an effort to force Turkish companies to abandon the reconstruction program.

      The Turkish economy performed strongly; the GNP grew by nearly 10% in the first three quarters of 2004 year-on-year; by the end of November, consumer price inflation had dropped to 10% year-on-year (against 19% for the same period in 2002–03); exports and imports increased, respectively, by 31% and 40% in the first 10 months; and the number of visitors from abroad rose by 28% in the first nine months. The stabilization of the economy was symbolized by the “new lira,” a unit of currency that was to be launched in January 2005.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2004

774,815 sq km (299,158 sq mi)
(2003 est.): 70,597,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Ministers Abdullah Gul and, from March 14, Recep Tayyip Erdogan

      Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a trying first year in office in 2003. On February 6 Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, acting as a proxy for party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been prevented from standing for the parliament in the elections in November 2002 (see Biographies (Erdogan, Recep Tayyip )), secured parliamentary approval of a resolution allowing the U.S. to upgrade air bases and harbours in Turkey for use against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The party was divided, however, and the country overwhelmingly antagonistic when Gul presented a second resolution asking the Grand National Assembly for permission to allow foreign troops to transit through Turkish territory and Turkish troops to be sent abroad. The vote on March 1 failed by three votes. When Erdogan won a by-election on March 9, Gul resigned. Erdogan formed a new government on March 14 in which Gul became deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

      A decision by the Grand National Assembly on March 20 to open Turkish airspace to coalition aircraft helped soothe U.S.-Turkish relations and allowed Erdogan to concentrate on internal reforms in an effort to meet the criteria for Turkey's membership in the European Union. The process of bringing Turkish law into line with EU standards, which had been initiated by the previous coalition government, was pushed forward energetically. On August 7 the parliament approved the seventh “harmonization package,” which reduced the powers of the National Security Council. This body, which brought together the government and the top military commanders, was assigned a purely consultative function. Erdogan declared that the legislative changes demanded by the EU had been completed, which left a year for implementation, and that a special ministerial committee would make sure that the European Council, which had promised a decision in December 2004, would have no grounds for delaying further the beginning of accession negotiations.

      In the meantime, the Turkish government continued to proclaim its determination to promote a settlement in Cyprus. This process was set back when, at a meeting at The Hague on March 10–11, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan failed to persuade Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to submit to a referendum the plan prepared under UN auspices for the reunification of the island prior to its accession to the EU, planned for May 2004.

      After lengthy negotiations with the U.S., the Turkish government decided to meet the American request for Turkish troops to help keep the peace in Iraq. A resolution allowing the government to send troops abroad for one year was approved by the parliament on October 7 by 358 votes to 183. Given that at the time the AKP held 367 seats (including that of the nonvoting speaker), the result showed that Erdogan had regained full control of his party. The parliamentary vote was followed by more talks with the U.S. to determine the details and conditions of Turkish deployment. The talks were suspended after the Iraqi Governing Council expressed its opposition, and on November 7 it was announced that Turkey had withdrawn its offer to send peacekeepers. Throughout, Turkey had insisted on U.S. action to eliminate from northern Iraq the estimated 5,000 fighters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, renamed KADEK/Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan). The Kurds announced on September 1 that they had ended the unilateral cease-fire that, they claimed, they had observed for four years in their struggle with Turkish security forces. The PKK declaration followed the approval by the Turkish parliament on July 29 of a law granting a limited amnesty to those who had been incarcerated for terrorism. Only a handful of PKK militants in Iraq returned home as a result. On November 11 KADEK announced that it was dissolving itself and that a new group would be formed to pursue Kurdish rights through negotiations.

      Also in November, two terrorist incidents perpetrated by an al-Qaeda cell in Istanbul caused great carnage. On November 15, truck bombs destroyed the largest synagogue in Istanbul and another synagogue as well, killing at least 20 people. Five days later two more truck bombs blew up the British consulate and a British-owned bank, killing some 30 people. In late December, Istanbul's governor declared that the terrorist cell had been broken up.

      The economy continued to improve after the 2001 financial crisis. Growth continued at a slower rate than in 2002, but, at 7.4% in the first quarter and 3.7% in the second, it was still high. November's terrorist attacks, however, threatened to scuttle the recovery. Inflation was nearly halved (from 37% to 21% year-on-year, as of September 1), as was the yield on government bonds (from 59% to 31% in September). Employment was stagnant, however, and the unemployment rate, at 10%—near the EU average—remained the biggest cause of discontent in the country.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2003

779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)
(2002 est.): 69,359,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and, from November 19, Abdullah Gul

      The collapse of the three-party coalition headed by 77-year-old Bulent Ecevit, leader of the centre-left Democratic Left Party (DSP), precipitated early elections that transformed the Turkish political scene in 2002. The first serious rift occurred on February 6 when a set of democratization measures designed to bring Turkish legislation in line with European Union (EU) standards was opposed by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the second strongest party in the coalition, and was passed only with the help of the opposition in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Confidence was further eroded when Ecevit refused to name an acting prime minister during a protracted illness that began in May. The decision taken on July 1 by Ecevit and his two coalition partners, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the MHP, and Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), to continue in office until the end of the parliamentary term in April 2004 failed to calm the still-unsteady markets. A few days later, fearing that he would be supplanted in the coalition by Tansu Ciller's more liberal centre-right True Path Party (DYP), Bahceli demanded early elections in November. Mesut Yilmaz agreed, and the fate of the coalition was sealed when between July 8 and 11 seven ministers resigned from the DSP; more than half of the party's parliamentary group followed over the next few months. On July 31, the parliament voted overwhelmingly to bring elections forward to November 3, against Ecevit's wishes. On August 3 a wide-ranging set of amendments to the constitution and penal laws that would abolish the death penalty and allow instruction and broadcasting in minority languages was endorsed by the parliament, once again over the opposition of the MHP. As a result, the death sentence on the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan was commuted to life imprisonment on October 3.

      On August 10 Ecevit's economic supremo, Kemal Dervis, resigned, and soon after that he joined the opposition centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP), led by Deniz Baykal. Attempts to lower the threshold of 10% of the countrywide poll, which parties had to pass in order to qualify for representation in the parliament, failed. As public opinion surveys predicted a massive win by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the more moderate of the two successors to the banned Virtue Party (FP) of Islamic inspiration, the judiciary moved against the AKP leader, former Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In September the High Electoral Board ruled that a previous conviction disqualified him from standing for the parliament and, therefore, from becoming prime minister. On October 23 the chief prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to ban the AKP for maintaining Erdogan in the leadership, but no ruling on the question occurred before the election.

      On November 3 the AKP won 363 seats in the 550-member Turkish Grand National Assembly on 34.3% of the total vote and was thus able to form a single-party government after more than a decade of fissiparous coalitions. Only one other party, the CHP, crossed the 10% barrier, winning 178 seats on 19.4% of the poll. With only 6.2% of the poll, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), the legal vehicle for Kurdish nationalism, failed to enter the parliament. The new government formed by Abdullah Gul, deputy leader of the AKP, was confirmed by the parliament on November 28. On December 27 the parliament voted through a constitutional amendment that would clear the way for Erdogan to run for prime minister.

      At its meeting in Copenhagen on December 12, the EU Council of Ministers noted the democratization measures approved by the outgoing parliament and decided that a firm date should be set to begin negotiations on Turkey's entry after further progress on remaining shortcomings had been reviewed.

      At the end of October, Gen. Tommy Franks, chief of U.S. Central Command, and the NATO supreme allied commander Europe, Gen. Joseph Ralston, visited Ankara. The new Turkish chief of general staff, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, went to Washington in November. After his party's election victory, Erdogan echoed Ecevit and other party leaders in asking for UN authorization of any military action against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. On June 20 Turkey took over from Britain the command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

      Economic growth resumed and inflation fell, but the consequences of the 2001 economic crisis were still felt in low investment and high unemployment. The Blue Stream pipeline, the deepest underwater pipeline in the world, which would transport Russian natural gas under the Black Sea to Turkey, was completed on October 20.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2002

779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)
(2001 est.): 66,229,000
Chief of state:
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit

      The financial crisis that struck Turkey in November 2000 worsened in 2001. Financial markets tumbled in February after Pres. Ahmet Necdet Sezer accused Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of obstructing corruption inquiries involving government ministers. The Turkish lira, which had been pegged to targeted inflation under the program arranged with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the end of 1999, was allowed to float on February 22. By the end of the year, it had depreciated by 114% year-on-year. A number of banks failed and had to be taken over by the state. The gross national product dropped by 8% in the first nine months of the year; industrial production decreased by 14% by the end of November; imports were down by 25% (though exports rose 13%) by the end of October; and consumer prices surged 68% year-on-year by the end of December. Demonstrations by shopkeepers, tradesmen, and public employees over price rises and the sharp contraction in employment took place without incident. Calls by business associations for the government's resignation or for a change of economic policy also had little impact, and the draft budget for 2002 submitted to the parliament in October maintained a restrictionist stance by calling for a primary surplus of 6.5%.

      On March 2 Kemal Dervis, vice president of the World Bank in charge of the Middle East and North Africa, was appointed minister of state in charge of the economy. He secured additional funding from the IMF for a revised program. Although some $19 billion was secured from international financial institutions, the government's ability to service its domestic debt, swollen by bank takeovers, continued to depend on foreign help. In mid-November, however, the IMF signaled that it would approve a rescue loan to bridge a $10 billion financing gap. As a result, market confidence increased at year's end.

      The campaign against corruption and accusations of foot-dragging in implementing the IMF program led to the resignation of several ministers. Nonetheless, the ruling coalition—made up of Ecevit's Democratic Left Party, Devlet Bahceli's Nationalist Action Party, and Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party—retained a solid majority of seats (338) in the 550-member single-chamber Turkish Grand National Assembly. In June the Islamist Virtue Party (FP) was banned by the constitutional court, and 2 of its 101 MPs were disqualified for engaging in activities against the secular character of the state. The remaining Islamist deputies divided between two parties: the Felicity Party, headed by former FP leader Recai Kutan, and the Justice and Development Party, established in August by former Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The courts had yet to decide whether Erdogan's former conviction for antisecularist pronouncements barred him from political office, however.

      Grounds for banning political parties were narrowed and wider freedoms recognized (including the freedom to use any language, and, therefore, the right to broadcast in Kurdish) under a package of constitutional amendments approved by the parliament in October. After a month of debate, the parliament ratified sweeping changes to a civil code dating to 1926. Women, who previously had not been given a voice concerning family life, including decisions about home or children, were granted equal roles in family matters. In addition, in the event of a divorce, women would be entitled under certain conditions to an equal division of marital property and assets, not just the properties that were in both names. The new code would be effective Jan. 1, 2002.

      After the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., Turkey—the only Muslim nation belonging to NATO—agreed immediately that Article 5 of the NATO alliance should be invoked; Turkey opened its air space to U.S. and other allied military aircraft and allowed the use of the U.S. air base at Incirlik (near Adana in southern Turkey) for antiterrorist operations. On October 9 the parliament authorized the dispatching of Turkish troops abroad and the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish soil at the government's discretion. Only the two Islamist parties voted against the measure. Turkish diplomacy, which had long sought to persuade Western governments to deny facilities to Kurdish, Marxist, and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists seeking to subvert the regime in Turkey, went into action in support of the coalition. President Sezer traveled to Pakistan to strengthen the hand of Pres. Pervez Musharraf, and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem sought to gain support for the initiative at the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Doha, Qatar, and from the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, which he toured in October.

      In early November Turkey and Greece signed a landmark agreement that provided for the return by Greece of illegal Turkish immigrants. The deal significantly improved relations between the two countries and lessened fears by Greece that it would face an increased influx of refugees in the wake of the U.S. bombings in Afghanistan.

      Sabiha Gokcen, Turkey's first woman military pilot and the adopted daughter of the republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, died on March 22. A few months earlier, an airport named for her had opened on the Asian shore of Istanbul.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2001

779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)
(2000 est.): 65,667,000
Chief of state:
Presidents Suleyman Demirel and, from May 16, Ahmet Necdet Sezer
Head of government:
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit

      The euphoria that greeted the decision in December 1999 by the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) to grant Turkey the status of a candidate for full membership gradually dissipated during 2000, but the three-party coalition headed by Bulent Ecevit, leader of the centre-left Democratic Left Party, pushed ahead with its program of political and economic reforms. A threat to the government's cohesion was removed when Ecevit's coalition partner, the Nationalist Action Party, agreed on January 12 to await the decision of the European Court of Human Rights before asking the Turkish Grand National Assembly to ratify the death sentence passed on the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan. In July the government was strengthened when Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the third coalition party, the Motherland Party, entered the cabinet as a deputy prime minister after the Assembly had cleared him of accusations of administrative impropriety. Yilmaz was put in charge of the process of meeting the “Copenhagen criteria,” the political and economic reforms required by the EU before the beginning of formal membership negotiations. The EU had earlier criticized the arrest of the mayors of the three main cities of the Kurdish-inhabited region, but the matter was resolved when the mayors were released on February 28 after a week in prison. Controversy then arose over the sentence of one year's imprisonment passed on March 10 on Necmettin Erbakan, the former leader of the banned (Islamic) Welfare Party. The sentence was confirmed on appeal, but a stay was granted until January 2001 as the government began the process of amending the law under which Erbakan was sentenced for an allegedly inflammatory public statement.

      Prime Minister Ecevit failed in his attempt to give Pres. Suleyman Demirel a second term of office when a constitutional amendment to that effect was rejected by the Assembly on April 5. Ecevit then put forward Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the president of the Constitutional Court, who was supported by the leaders of all the political parties represented in the Assembly. Sezer was elected president of the republic on a third ballot on May 5 and took office on May 16. He subsequently fell out with Ecevit during the Assembly's summer recess when he vetoed two decrees, one facilitating the dismissal of public employees deemed to have been subversive and the second privatizing some government-owned banks.

      The demand for a rapid purge of subversive civil servants, voiced by military commanders in the National Security Council, was intensified early in the year as a result of the discovery that some public employees had links with the Islamic terrorist organization Hezbollah, most of whose members were ethnic Kurds. Its leader, Huseyin Velioglu, was shot dead on January 17 when a safe house of the organization was raided in Istanbul. Nationwide searches revealed at least 60 bodies of people murdered by Hezbollah and buried in safe houses. As the controversy raged, President Sezer decided not to attend the Tehran summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization on June 10. Sezer made his first foreign trip as president on June 23 to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey) and thereby stressed Turkey's support for the Turkish Cypriots. In October Sezer visited the Turkic republics of Central Asia, an area where Turkish diplomacy was active throughout the year.

      The government's main efforts during the year centred on the reduction of inflation. The rise in the world price of oil and the decline in the value of the euro made it impossible to reduce consumer price inflation to 25% by the end of the year, as had been agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There was progress, however; consumer prices rose by 39%, as against 69% in 1999. In November a crisis of confidence hit the banking system and led to large-scale flight of capital. The situation was brought under control when the IMF granted credits in excess of $10 billion. The budget for 2001 continued the austerity policies initiated a year earlier. Nevertheless, two major projects were completed. In January the Ataturk airport in Istanbul acquired new large terminal buildings, and in September the nation's first modern subway line was opened, also in Istanbul.

Andrew Mango

▪ 2000

779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)
(1999 est.): 64,431,000
Chief of state:
President Suleyman Demirel
Head of government:
Prime Ministers Mesut Yilmaz and, caretaker from January 11 and official from May 28, Bulent Ecevit

      On Aug. 17, 1999, an earthquake struck Turkey in a heavily populated area stretching from a western suburb of Istanbul to the city of Adapazari northeast of the Sea of Marmara. The industrial city of Izmit and the naval base of Golcuk were devastated. The death toll was over 15,000, and more than 40,000 people were injured. Some 244,000 residences and workplaces were destroyed or seriously damaged, and an estimated 600,000 people were rendered homeless. A second strong earthquake hit part of the same area on November 12, killing at least 750 more people.

      The disaster called forth a prompt international relief effort, which affected Turkish perceptions of the outside world. While aid from the U.S. and Israel strengthened existing friendly relations, aid from European Union member countries helped repair the damage caused by the earlier refusal of the EU to name Turkey as an official candidate for full membership, and aid from Greece (which Turkey reciprocated when Athens was struck by an earthquake on September 7) softened the animosity between the two countries. Relations with the EU improved further in October when the European Commission recommended that Turkey be named an official candidate; Turkey was included on the list of candidates for admission on December 10.

      Internally, the new government, headed by veteran politician Bulent Ecevit (see Biographies (Ecevit, Bulent )), leader of the Democratic Left Party (DLP), which took office on May 28, was criticized for inadequacies in responding to the disaster. The government was a coalition of the DLP with the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), which between them had won an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections on April 18. The Kurdish nationalist People's Democracy Party (HADEP) received 5% of the total vote and thus failed to pass the 10% barrier needed to win representation in the Grand National Assembly. HADEP candidates were elected mayors in 37 towns in the southeast of the country, however.

      The electoral performance of the DLP and the MHP, both of them parties with strong nationalist credentials, benefited from the capture in Kenya of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which had been engaged in an armed campaign against the Turkish state since 1954. Ocalan was returned to Turkey by a commando unit on February 16, was tried by a state security court at the prison island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara, and was sentenced to death on June 29. In August Ocalan called on his followers to end their insurrection and leave Turkey by September 1. The Court of Appeal began reviewing Ocalan's case on October 21, and on November 25 the court upheld the conviction and the sentence. The case was then referred to the Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France. At year's end the government felt it could loosen its strict rule in the Kurdish areas, but, although the Kurdish insurrection was divided and much reduced, it was not clear that it had been terminated. The capture of Ocalan was followed by disturbances in Turkey and abroad, and this reduced considerably the number of foreign tourists traveling to Turkey.

      The coalition government formed by Ecevit in May secured passage through the Assembly of a number of measures to restructure the economy in line with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. The constitution was amended to facilitate privatization and to allow international arbitration in disputes between the state and foreign contractors. Rules governing state pensions and banking supervision were tightened. The difficult economic position in which the government found itself was discussed when Ecevit met U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton in Washington at the end of September. Clinton paid an official visit to Turkey in November and signed an agreement providing for construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Transcaucasia to Turkey before attending a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

      It was estimated that the economy would contract by 6% during the year, while the public deficit would reach 15% of gross national product, and that inflation would stand at 64% at the end of the year. The budget submitted to the Assembly in October sought to lower inflation to 25% while raising the growth of the economy to 5.5% by the end of the year 2000.

Andrew Mango

▪ 1999

      Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)

      Population (1998 est.): 64,567,000

      Capital: Ankara

      Chief of state: President Suleyman Demirel

      Head of government: Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz

      The celebration of the 75th anniversary of the republic on October 29 and the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the death of its founder, Kemal Atatürk, on November 10 helped counteract the depressing effect of continued political instability and social division in Turkey in 1998. The campaign against the influence of Islam in politics intensified. On January 16 the Constitutional Court decreed that the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) should be dissolved, its assets confiscated, and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and six of his followers banned from politics for five years. When the decision took effect on February 22, a successor, the Virtue Party (FP), was formed, and almost all the deputies of RP transferred to it. On May 14 the FP elected as leader Recai Kutan, a former minister in the Erbakan administration. On September 23 the Appeals Court confirmed a 10-month prison sentence, with consequent loss of political rights, for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Islamist mayor of Istanbul. A decision of the Constitutional Court depriving university rectors of any latitude in applying the ban on the wearing of head scarves by women students led to Islamist demonstrations when the academic year opened in the autumn. A Turkish Airlines domestic flight was diverted by a hijacker on September 14 in protest against the ban.

      The minority secular coalition government formed by Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the centre-right Motherland Party, resigned on November 25 when Parliament censured it over irregularities in the privatization of state assets. Following this, two attempts were made to form a government, but both proved unsuccessful. In an unusual move, President Demirel first asked Bulent Ecevit, a former prime minister and leader of the Democratic Left Party, which had minority status with only 61 members in the 550-member Parliament. Ecevit approached Yilmaz, but was ultimately defeated by the opposition of the conservative True Path Party led by Tansu Ciller, also a former prime minister, as well as other leftist parties.

      For the second attempt Demirel chose Yalim Erez, the former minister of industry and commerce under Prime Minister Yilmaz. He was equally frustrated, however, also derailed by the opposition of Ciller, determined not to yield an iota to her rivals. Yilmaz remained as caretaker as the year ended. According to law, on January 10 Demirel could appoint a prime minister who would then form a government based on the various parties representation in the legislature. Parliament had decided earlier to advance the date of legislative elections and hold them simultaneously with local government elections on April 18, 1999.

      Throughout the year the government was shaken by successive revelations about links between prominent politicians and criminal gangs. A supporter of the prime minister, Minister of State Eyup Asik, resigned from the legislature on September 24 when a recording of conversations he had held with a Turkish fugitive, subsequently imprisoned in France, was made public.

      On July 22 Prime Minister Yilmaz obtained the approval of the legislature for a wide-ranging tax-reform law. It was a key measure in the government's program that aimed to reduce inflation to 50% by the end of 1998 and 20% a year later. An agreement was reached to have the program monitored by the staff of the International Monetary Fund. In September, however, as the world financial crisis began to threaten Turkey, the government was forced to reduce the tax burden, first on banks and then on shareholders. This did not stop the Istanbul Stock Exchange from losing more than half its capitalization between July and October. Nevertheless, inflation dropped substantially. During the first nine months of the year, wholesale prices rose by 40% (against 61% the previous year) and consumer prices by 49% (64% in the corresponding period of 1997).

      There was no letup in the guerrilla campaign waged by the radical Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). On October 1 Pres. Suleyman Demirel told the legislature that Turkey reserved the right to retaliate if Syria continued to afford facilities to the PKK. Following mediation by Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak, who visited Ankara on October 6, Syria agreed to desist from any action threatening public order in Turkey. A protocol to this effect was signed by Turkish and Syrian officials on October 20. Abdullah Ocalan, who had led the PKK armed campaign from Syria since 1984, moved to Moscow and later to Rome. When Italy refused to extradite him, Turkey retaliated with a boycott of Italian goods. Cooperation with Israel increased, and joint U.S.-Turkish-Israeli naval exercises were held to test procedures for rescues at sea.

      Turkey's determination to stand by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (which Turkey was alone in recognizing) was reaffirmed by Yilmaz in July and Demirel in August. The lack of progress in solving the conflict with Greece in Cyprus contributed to Turkey's continued failure to be accepted into the European Union; economic relations, however, continued to develop within the framework of the EU-Turkey customs union begun in 1996.


▪ 1998

      Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi)

      Population (1997 est.): 63,528,000

      Capital: Ankara

      Chief of state: President Suleyman Demirel

      Head of government: Prime Ministers Necmettin Erbakan and, from June 30, Mesut Yilmaz

      The year 1997 in Turkey was dominated by the struggle between Islamists and secularists. Tension between the coalition government formed in June 1996 by Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), and the secularist opposition, supported by the armed forces, came to a head at the beginning of the year. On February 1 the secularists were outraged by speeches at a meeting organized by the RP mayor of the Ankara suburb of Sincan to commemorate Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's call for the "liberation" of Jerusalem. The Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Bagheri, who spoke at the meeting and denounced the U.S. and Israel, was forced to leave the country; the Turkish ambassador in Tehran was expelled in retaliation; and the mayor of Sincan was arrested.

      On February 4 the armed forces showed their hand by sending a column of armoured vehicles through the streets of Sincan. On February 28, at a meeting of the National Security Council, the commanders of the armed forces declared that religious reaction had become a greater danger than Kurdish separatism and demanded that the government legislate eight-year compulsory secular education. This demand would entail the closing of religious "middle schools" (for 12-16-year olds) and the limitation of enrollment in religious high schools to the staffing needs of mosques. Erbakan agreed in principle, but he delayed action, and the secularist opposition put pressure on the RP's junior partner, Tansu Ciller's True Path Party (DYP), to quit the coalition.

      Pressure on the coalition increased on May 21 when the chief prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to order the dissolution of the RP for activities against the secular character of the republic. On the same day, labour and employers organizations issued a joint declaration demanding the government's resignation.

      As defections from the DYP threatened to deprive the coalition of its slender majority, Erbakan agreed to cede the premiership to Ciller and call early elections. A small right-wing group, the Great Unity Party, promised to support Ciller, who was therefore confident of securing the nomination. Pres. Suleyman Demirel decided, however, to entrust the formation of the new government to Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the centre-right Motherland Party, the second largest party in the national legislature. On June 30 Yilmaz succeeded in forming a minority coalition with the centre-left Democratic Left Party of Bulent Ecevit and with DYP dissidents inside and outside the Democratic Turkey Party. The new secularist government secured legislative endorsement on July 12, by 281 votes to 256, thanks to the support of a second centre-left party, the Republican People's Party, led by Deniz Baykal.

      On August 16 the legislature passed the education law demanded by the military. In November the budget bill introduced a three-year stabilization program designed to cure chronic inflation. At the end of the year, the government sought the backing of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for the program, which aimed at halving annual economic growth to 3% and reducing inflation to 50% by the end of 1998.

      Erbakan's efforts to give an Islamic slant to Turkish foreign policy culminated in the formation of "D8," the grouping of Islamic less-developed countries, at a summit meeting in Istanbul on June 14-15, just as his government was about to fall. Little was heard of this new organization after the change of government.

      The new prime minister, Yilmaz, and his foreign minister, Ismail Cem, turned their attention to relations with the West. Their efforts to have Turkey included in the list of countries considered for eventual full membership in the European Union suffered a setback on December 13, when the EU heads of government meeting in Luxembourg decided to invite Turkey to a standing European conference, but refused to commit themselves further. They also stressed that Turkey had to resolve its problems with Greece, assist a Cyprus settlement, and improve its human rights record before it could be considered for membership. Yilmaz turned down the invitation. His principled position earned him popular support at home but perplexed the foreign ministries of the EU nations, which felt the Luxembourg decision was eminently fair. Turkey also went its own way at the December Islamic summit meeting in Iran; President Demirel departed early, apparently to snub protests from Islamic nations over the growing importance of his country's ties with Israel.

      Attempts at dialogue with Greece culminated in a meeting between Yilmaz and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Simitis in Crete in November, but they succeeded only in preventing clashes and did not advance a solution. There was no letup either in the insurgency led by the radical Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey. Turkish troops crossed repeatedly into the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases. They secured the cooperation of Masˋud al-Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party and supported it against its rival, Jalal at-Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.


▪ 1997

      A republic of Asia Minor and southeastern Europe, Turkey has coastlines on the Aegean, Black, and Mediterranean seas. Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi), including 23,764 sq km in Europe. Pop. (1996 est.): 62,650,000. Cap.: Ankara. Monetary unit: Turkish lira, with (Oct. 11, 1996) a free rate of 93,990 liras to U.S. $1 (148,063 liras = £1 sterling). President in 1996, Suleyman Demirel; prime ministers, Tansu Ciller until March 7, Mesut Yilmaz until June 28, and, from June 28, Necmettin Erbakan.

      The inconclusive results of elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly held on Dec. 24, 1995, hindered the government's effectiveness in 1996. The coalition between Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's centre-right True Path Party (DYP) and Deniz Baykal's centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP) remained in power in a caretaker capacity until March 6, when Pres. Suleyman Demirel approved a new coalition between the DYP and its centre-right rival, Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party. On March 12 the new government was endorsed by 257 votes to 207 in the 550-member parliament.

      The coalition protocol provided for a rotating premiership, filled first by Yilmaz and then by Ciller after Jan. 1, 1997. But the understanding broke down when Yilmaz failed to block a move by the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) to set up a parliamentary inquiry into corruption charges against Ciller. On May 14 the Constitutional Court ruled that the parliamentary endorsement of the new government by a simple majority of members present had been invalid. Ciller then instructed her party to vote against the government in the vote of confidence that it sought, and as a result, Yilmaz was forced to resign. Alliances were then reversed. Ciller agreed to become junior partner in a coalition headed by Necmettin Erbakan (see BIOGRAPHIES (Erbakan, Necmettin )), leader of the Islamic RP, against whom she had campaigned the previous year. The RP-DYP coalition took office on June 28 and was endorsed on July 8 by 278 votes to 265. The accession to power of an avowed Islamist as prime minister was a milestone in the history of Turkey's secular republic, although the sensitive portfolios of foreign affairs, defense, and the interior were left in the hands of the nominally secular DYP. That party's Interior Minister Mehmet Agar was forced to resign after a car accident in November revealed suspicious ties between legislators, top police officials, right-wing activists, and gangsters and suggested longtime government support for death squads.

      The troubled domestic scene was reflected in the conduct of foreign policy. Ciller was caretaker prime minister at the end of January when both Greece and Turkey sent naval units to the eastern Aegean in a dispute over the ownership of uninhabited islets, known as Imia in Greek and Kardak in Turkish. A clash was avoided when both sides withdrew their forces in response to U.S. diplomacy. On March 24 Yilmaz, then prime minister, called on Greece to agree to negotiations on all outstanding issues, which would include recourse to third-party adjudication or arbitration. The call was rejected by Greece.

      Also during Yilmaz's premiership, Turkey signed an agreement with Israel providing for cooperation in the training of military air crews and negotiated a wider defense industry cooperation agreement.

      Continuity in foreign policy was preserved when Erbakan came to power; the permission given to the U.S., Great Britain, and France to use bases in Turkey to fly over northern Iraq was extended until the end of the year, and the two agreements with Israel were confirmed. Doubts were raised, however, when Erbakan went to Iran and on August 12 signed an agreement for the purchase of Iranian natural gas and the possible construction of a pipeline to carry it. But by the end of the year, no move had been made to implement this deal, which was valued at $23 billion.

      The cohesion of the coalition was then strained when Erbakan decided to go to Libya in October. The controversy increased when Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi told Erbakan that he favoured an independent Kurdistan. Nevertheless, Ciller instructed her party to vote for the government when the opposition sought to censure Erbakan over the Libyan trip, and the motion was rejected 275-265 on October 16.

      Security operations against the armed bands of the Kurdish Workers' Party continued. A suicide bomb attack and the killing of 14 soldiers in an ambush on Republic Day, October 29, showed that the problem was far from being solved. As the death toll in the 12-year-old insurgency rose above 20,000, allegations of violations of human rights in Turkey were cited by the European Parliament as one reason for suspending economic aid to Turkey. The parliament was also critical of Turkish policy in Cyprus. Both Erbakan and Ciller visited northern Cyprus to demonstrate their support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which Turkey was alone in recognizing. (ANDREW MANGO)

▪ 1996

      A republic of Asia Minor and southeastern Europe, Turkey has coastlines on the Aegean, Black, and Mediterranean seas. Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi), including 23,764 sq km in Europe. Pop. (1995 est.): 62,526,000. Cap.: Ankara. Monetary unit: Turkish lira, with (Oct. 6, 1995) a free rate of 50,093 liras to U.S. $1 (79,189 liras = £1 sterling). President in 1995, Suleyman Demirel; prime minister, Tansu Ciller.

      Prime Minister Tansu Ciller survived a succession of political crises in 1995, but in December parliamentary elections (due originally in October 1996) left the pro-Islamic Welfare Party as the single largest bloc, with 158 of the 550 seats. The leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, had based the election campaign on opposition to secularism in Turkish political life. He had decried "the yoke of the West" and promised to create Islamic counterparts to NATO and the European Union. Ciller remained at the head of a caretaker government as her centre-right True Path Party (DYP) negotiated with its archrival centre-right Motherland Party to prevent the Islamists from taking power.

      The ruling coalition of Ciller's DYP and the centre-left social democratic parties had been threatened repeatedly by the attempts of the social democrats to assert themselves and regain some of the popular support lost by their acquiescence in unpopular government decisions. On February 18 the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and the smaller Republican People's Party (CHP) voted to merge, adopting the latter's name. Hikmet Cetin, a former foreign minister, was elected to the leadership of the united party, replacing Murat Karayalcin, while the former SHP leader, Erdal Inonu, became foreign minister when the CHP team of ministers was reshuffled on March 27. At a party convention on September 10, Cetin lost the leadership to Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP before the merger. Ten days later Baykal withdrew his support from the coalition. Ciller formed a minority administration, relying on, among others, Alpaslan Turkes, leader of the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action Party, and Bulent Ecevit, leader of the left-wing nationalist Democratic Left Party. Ecevit withdrew his support when Ciller failed to resolve a strike of public-sector workers, and the minority government, which took office on October 5, was defeated in a vote of confidence on October 15. The following day the prime minister patched up her differences with Baykal and agreed to revive the DYP-CHP coalition. The new government took office on October 30, after parliament had scheduled elections on December 24 and passed an electoral law accommodating changes in the constitution, which lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, gave the vote to Turks living abroad, and increased the size of the parliament from 450 to 550 members.

      The constitutional amendments, which also increased trade-union rights and widened political participation, sought to meet the demands for democratic reforms voiced by European Union foreign ministers on March 6 when they agreed to implement a customs union with Turkey on Jan. 1, 1996. The decision was approved by the European Parliament at its meeting on December 13.

      On October 26 four of the imprisoned deputies of the dissolved Democracy Party, which championed the views of radical Kurdish nationalists, were freed on appeal, but the court confirmed the sentences of 15 years' imprisonment passed on four others convicted of involvement in the armed campaign waged by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). The death toll since the start of the insurgency in 1984 exceeded 20,000 by the end of 1995. On March 20 Turkish forces launched a major incursion into Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and destroyed PKK camps before withdrawing two months later. They returned in smaller numbers in the autumn in an effort to end the fighting between rival militias and establish some security in the area.

      The decision by the Azerbaijani oil consortium to export early production through both Russia and Georgia was hailed as a victory by Turkey, which intended to link the Georgian route to the existing pipeline from Iraq to the Gulf of Iskenderun. U.S.-Turkish cooperation, which made this decision possible, was further reinforced when, at U.S. prompting, NATO launched air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, a course long advocated by Turkey. Pres. Suleyman Demirel, who visited the Turkish contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March, reached agreements with Bosnia and Croatia when he attended a UN meeting in October. Both Demirel and Ciller cultivated relations with the Turkic Central Asian countries. Visits to all these republics, as well as to Tajikistan and Mongolia, led up to the Turkic summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in August.

      Before leaving the scene, the minority government settled the public-sector strike, at the cost of $1.3 billion in wage increases. Civil service salaries and pensions also were raised. Living standards had dropped sharply as a result of the austerity program introduced in April 1994, which had led to a record drop of 6% in the gross national product (GNP) in 1994. After stagnating in the first quarter of 1995, however, the GNP jumped by 12% in the second quarter. The foreign trade deficit doubled to over $6 billion in the first seven months of the year, while consumer prices rose by 52% by the end of September. The government imposed a levy on foreign supplier credits while negotiating new performance targets with the International Monetary Fund, which had backed the austerity program.


▪ 1995

      A republic of Asia Minor and southeastern Europe, Turkey has coastlines on the Aegean, Black, and Mediterranean seas. Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi), including 23,764 sq km in Europe. Pop. (1994 est.): 61,183,000. Cap.: Ankara. Monetary unit: Turkish lira, with (Oct. 7, 1994) a free rate of 34,441 liras to U.S. $1 (54,779 liras = £1 sterling). President in 1994, Suleyman Demirel; prime minister, Tansu Ciller.

      The coalition government of the centre-right True Path Party (DYP) and the centre-left Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) had to contend with successive crises in 1994. A collapse in the value of the Turkish lira at the end of January forced Prime Minister Tansu Ciller to abandon her expansionary economic policy and introduce an austerity program on April 5. Bolstered by a standby agreement concluded with the International Monetary Fund in July, the government succeeded in cutting the public-sector deficit, moving into surplus in external payments and servicing its foreign debt. This was achieved, however, at the cost of a domestic recession, which reduced the gross national product by a record 11% in the second quarter of the year.

      In local government elections on March 27, the DYP's share of the vote dropped to 22% and that of the SHP to 13%, while the Islamic-based Welfare Party (RP) advanced to 18% and won control of the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan areas. The Motherland Party, representing the mainstream centre-right opposition, received 21% of the total vote.

      Terrorists of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) continued their attacks in southeastern Turkey and, to a lesser extent, in tourist resorts and cities outside the main Kurdish areas. The national security forces responded with an all-out offensive, which involved the forcible evacuation of hundreds of mountain villages as well as repeated attacks on PKK bases in northern Iraq. The conduct of the security forces, the decision made by the Grand National Assembly in March to revoke the parliamentary immunity of eight radical Kurdish deputies, the subsequent arrest of the deputies, who were sentenced to up to 15 years in prison on December 8, and the closing of the Democracy Party in June by order of the Constitutional Court strained relations with the West. The U.S. Congress decided that the disbursement of part of U.S. aid to Turkey should be made subject to improvements in human rights in Turkey and to progress in the dispute with Greece over Cyprus.

      Within the government the two coalition partners found it difficult to work together. On August 5, when the Social Democratic leader, Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin, changed his party's ministers in the government, the Foreign Ministry was given to Mumtaz Soysal, until then a leading critic of the coalition's policies. A privatization law, earlier opposed by Soysal, was passed on November 24. Four days later Soysal resigned from the government.

      Domestic preoccupations did not prevent Turkey from pursuing an active foreign policy. After visits to Ankara by leaders of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, a Turkic summit was held in Istanbul on October 18. Later that month Pres. Suleyman Demirel visited Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, and took part in the inauguration of the construction of a pipeline to carry natural gas from Turkmenistan through Iran to Turkey.

      Turkey's attempts at common action with the Turkic republics were ill-received in Russia, which had earlier expressed reservations about an agreement with a Western-led consortium to pipe oil from Azerbaijan through Turkey to the Mediterranean. Friction was also caused by the imposition of new rules on July 1 on commercial ships navigating the Turkish straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles). Although the case for better protection for the Istanbul metropolitan area had been demonstrated by the collision of two oil tankers at the northern entrance to the Bosporus in March, Russia argued that the new rules violated the 1936 Montreux Convention.

      The first-ever visits by a president of Israel to Turkey, in January, and by the Turkish prime minister to Israel, in November, signaled closer Turkish involvement in the Middle Eastern peace process. At the same time, relations with Syria, already strained by the facilities afforded by the latter to the PKK terrorists, were further soured by the opening in November of the first tunnel to carry water from the newly built Ataturk dam on the Euphrates River to irrigate the Harran plain in Turkey, north of the Syrian frontier.

      Turkey's role in the UN and NATO was highlighted by the dispatch of a Turkish peacekeeping contingent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in June, following a visit by Ciller to Sarajevo on February 2. This displeased Greece, with which Turkey's relations were strained by the continuing impasse over Cyprus, the murder of a Turkish diplomat in Athens on July 4, and the continuing dispute over territorial waters in the Aegean. (ANDREW MANGO)

▪ 1994

      A republic of Asia Minor and southeastern Europe, Turkey has coastlines on the Aegean, Black, and Mediterranean seas. Area: 779,452 sq km (300,948 sq mi), including 23,764 sq km in Europe. Pop. (1993 est.): 59,869,000. Cap.: Ankara. Monetary unit: Turkish lira, with (Oct. 4, 1993) a free rate of 12,073 liras to U.S. $1 (18,291 liras = £1 sterling). Presidents in 1993, Turgut Ozal to April 17, Husamettin Cindoruk (acting) from April 17 to May 16, and, from May 16, Suleyman Demirel; prime ministers, Suleyman Demirel to May 16, Erdal Inonu (acting) from May 16, and, from June 25, Tansu Ciller.

      Pres. Turgut Ozal, the author of Turkey's rapid economic development in the 1980s, died on April 17, 1993. (See OBITUARIES (Ozal, Turgut ).) He was succeeded by his erstwhile opponent, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. On June 13 Demirel was replaced in the leadership of the centre-right True Path Party by Tansu Ciller (see BIOGRAPHIES (Ciller, Tansu )), an academic economist, and on the following day she was named Turkey's first woman prime minister. She proceeded to reconstitute the coalition, while changing most of the ministers belonging to her own party.

      Changes at the top made little impression on Turkey's pressing problem of terrorism. On January 24 the country's best-known radical newspaper columnist, Ugur Mumcu, was assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists in Ankara. Hundreds of thousands of mourners turned his funeral on January 27 into the biggest-ever demonstration in defense of the secular republic. On July 2 a mob of Sunni fanatics set fire to a hotel in Sivas in which the Turkish writer Aziz Nesin, who had published excerpts of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in his newspaper, was staying. Nesin escaped, but 36 people, most of them Shi'ite intellectuals, perished in the fire.

      It was the terror campaign of the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), however, that claimed most victims. Hopes were raised when the Damascus, Syria-based PKK leader Abdullah ("Apo") Ocalan declared a unilateral truce, which began on March 20; on May 24, however, a PKK band murdered 33 unarmed soldiers and 5 civilians in an ambush in the mountains of the southeast. The security forces then intensified their operations, while the PKK mounted new attacks, many of them directed against their civilian Kurdish opponents. The PKK launched a coordinated series of attacks on Turkish diplomatic offices and businesses in Germany, Switzerland, France, and Denmark on June 24. On October 22 PKK snipers killed the southeast regional gendarmarie commander, Gen. Bahtiyar Aydin, in the township of Lice. The security forces responded massively, leaving the town in ruins. In November a Turkish military court handed down sentences, including 15 death sentences and 14 for life imprisonment, against 145 PKK members and other Kurdish separatists. Most of those sentenced were at large. Later, in December, the government carried out raids and air strikes on Kurdish positions inside Iraq. The worsening security situation led to the replacement of the ministers of defense and the interior.

      The Islamic opponents of the PKK were also active. On September 4 they murdered a radical member of the parliament, Mehmet Sincar of the New Democracy Party (formerly the People's Labour Party).

      Turkish diplomacy had little to show for its efforts in 1993. In spite of the visit paid to Syria by Prime Minister Demirel in January and of constant contacts with Iran, PKK terrorists continued to operate from both countries, as well as from the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq. Turkish pleading for firmer action in defense of Bosnian Muslims was ineffective. The Turkish government did not intervene when Armenians enlarged their conquests in Azerbaijan or when the pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan, Abulfez Elchibey, was ousted in June.

      A visit to the Turkic republics by President Ozal a few days before his death and a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Ciller on September 9 sought to promote trade links with the former Soviet states but had little impact on political developments. Ciller's trip to Germany on September 20 served to improve relations after the murder of Turkish workers by German neo-Nazis. Turkey's pressing need for foreign finance was discussed when Prime Minister Ciller went to Washington, D.C., on October 15. In Brussels work continued on the implementation of a full customs union between Turkey and the European Community in 1995.

      Inflation in Turkey rose to 68% by the end of September. The country's foreign-trade gap nearly doubled from $5 billion to $9.3 billion by the end of August. The Social Democrats prevented any significant progress in privatization, even though Ciller had identified it as one of her main objectives. (ANDREW MANGO)

* * *

Turkey, flag of   country that occupies a unique geographic position, lying partly in Asia and partly in Europe. Throughout its history it has acted as both a barrier and a bridge between the two continents.

      Turkey is among the larger countries of the Middle East in terms of territory and population, and its land area is greater than that of any European state. Nearly all of the country is in Asia, comprising the oblong peninsula of Asia Minor, known also as Anatolia (Anadolu). The remainder—Turkish Thrace (Trakya)—lies in the extreme southeastern part of Europe, a tiny remnant of an empire that once extended over much of the Balkans.

      The country has a north-south extent that ranges from about 300 to 400 miles (480 to 640 km), and it stretches about 1,000 miles from west to east. Turkey is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on the northeast by Georgia and Armenia, on the east by Azerbaijan and Iran, on the southeast by Iraq and Syria, on the southwest and west by the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea, and on the northwest by Greece and Bulgaria. The capital is Ankara.

 Of a total boundary length of some 4,000 miles (6,440 km), about three-fourths is maritime, including coastlines along the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean, as well as the narrows that link the Black and Aegean seas. These narrows—which include the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara (Marmara, Sea of), and the Dardanelles—are known collectively as the Turkish straits; Turkey's control of the straits, the only outlet from the Black Sea, has been a major factor in its relations with other states. Most of the islands along the Aegean coast are Greek; only the islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada remain in Turkish hands. The maritime boundary with Greece has been a source of dispute between the two countries on numerous occasions since World War II.

 A long succession of political entities existed in Asia Minor over the centuries. Turkmen tribes invaded Anatolia in the 11th century CE, founding the Seljuq empire; during the 14th century the Ottoman Empire began a long expansion, reaching its peak during the 17th century. The modern Turkish republic, founded in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, is a nationalist, secular, parliamentary democracy. After a period of one-party rule under its founder, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (Atatürk, Kemal), and his successor, Turkish governments since the 1950s have been produced by multiparty elections based on universal adult suffrage.

Land (Turkey)

  Turkey is a predominantly mountainous country, and true lowland is confined to the coastal fringes. About one-fourth of the surface has an elevation above 4,000 feet (1,200 metres), and less than two-fifths lies below 1,500 feet (460 metres). Mountain crests exceed 7,500 feet (2,300 metres) in many places, particularly in the east, where Turkey's highest mountain, Mount Ararat (Ararat, Mount) (Ağrı), reaches 16,945 feet (5,165 metres) close to the borders with Armenia and Iran. In the southeast the Uludoruk Peak reaches 15,563 feet (4,744 metres); though further west, the Demirkazık Peak (12,320 feet [3,755 metres]) and Mount Aydos (11,414 feet [3,479 metres]) are also significant peaks. Steep slopes are common throughout the country, and flat or gently sloping land makes up barely one-sixth of the total area. These relief features affect other aspects of the physical environment, producing climates often much harsher than might be expected for a country of Turkey's latitude and reducing the availability and productivity of agricultural land. Structurally, the country lies within the geologically young folded-mountain zone of Eurasia, which in Turkey trends predominantly east to west. The geology of Turkey is complex, with sedimentary rocks ranging from Paleozoic (Paleozoic Era) to Quaternary, numerous intrusions, and extensive areas of volcanic material. Four main regions can be identified: the northern folded zone, the southern folded zone, the central massif, and the Arabian platform.

The northern folded zone
      The northern folded zone comprises a series of mountain ridges, increasing in elevation toward the east, that occupy a belt about 90 to 125 miles (145 to 200 km) wide immediately south of the Black Sea. The system as a whole is referred to as the Pontic Mountains (Doğukaradeniz Dağları). In the west the system has been fractured by the faulting that produced the Turkish straits; in Thrace the Ergene lowlands are among the largest in the country, and the main mountain range—the Yıldız (Istranca)—reaches only 3,379 feet (1,030 metres). Lowlands also occur to the south of the Sea of Marmara and along the lower Sakarya River east of the Bosporus. High ridges trending east-west rise abruptly from the Black Sea coast, and the coastal plain is thus narrow, opening out only in the deltas of the Kızıl (Kızıl River) and Yeşil rivers. These rivers break through the mountain barrier in a zone of weakness where summits are below 2,000 feet (600 metres), dividing the Pontic Mountains into western and eastern sections. In the western section, between the Sakarya and Kızıl rivers, there are four main ridges: the Küre, Bolu, Ilgaz, and Köroğlu mountains. East of the Yeşil the system is higher, narrower, and steeper. Less than 50 miles from the coast, peaks rise to more than 10,000 feet (3,000 metres), with a maximum elevation of 12,917 feet (3,937 metres) in the Kaçkar range. Separated by the narrow trough of the Kelkit and Çoruh river valleys stands a second ridge that rises above 8,000 feet (2,400 metres).

The southern folded zone
 The southern folded zone occupies the southern third of the country, from the Aegean to the Gulf of Iskenderun, from which it extends to the northeast and east around the northern side of the Arabian platform. Over most of its length, the Mediterranean coastal plain is narrow, but there are two major lowland embayments. The Antalya Plain extends inland some 20 miles (30 km) from the Gulf of Antalya; the Adana Plain, measuring roughly 90 by 60 miles (145 by 100 km), comprises the combined deltas of the Seyhan and Ceyhan (Ceyhan River) rivers. The mountain system falls into two main parts. West of Antalya a complex series of ridges with a north-south trend reaches 6,500 to 8,200 feet (2,000 to 2,500 metres), but the most prominent feature is the massive Taurus (Taurus Mountains) (Toros) mountain system, running parallel to the Mediterranean coast and extending along the southern border. There crest lines are often above 8,000 feet (2,400 metres), and several peaks exceed 11,000 feet (3,400 metres).

      In the eastern third of the country, the northern and southern fold systems converge to produce an extensive area of predominantly mountainous terrain, with pockets of relatively level land confined to valleys and enclosed basins, as are found around Malatya, Elazığ, and Muş.

The central massif
      The central massif is located in the western half of the country, between the Pontic and Taurus systems. This elevated zone is often referred to as the Anatolian plateau, although its relief is much more varied than this term suggests. At least four subdivisions of the central massif can be identified. Inland from the Aegean as far as a line from Bursa to Denizli, a series of faulted blocks gives a north-south alternation of steep-sided plateaus rising 5,000–6,500 feet (1,500–2,000 metres) and low-lying valley floors. Alluvial plains along the larger rivers, such as the Gediz, Küçükmenderes, and Büyükmenderes, are among the largest in Turkey and are of special agricultural value. East of this section, roughly to a line from Eskişehir to Burdur, is a complex upland zone. The general surface level rises to the east from 1,500 to 3,000 feet (460 to 900 metres); set into the upland are several downfaulted basins, and above it short mountain ranges rise to 6,500 feet.

      The most distinctive part of the central massif is the area bounded on the south by the Taurus Mountains and on the northeast by a line from Ankara through Lake Tuz (Tuz, Lake) to Niğde. There the term plateau is most applicable, with large expanses of flat or gently sloping land at elevations of about 3,000 feet separated by low upswellings in the surface. Measuring some 150 by 200 miles (240 by 320 km), these are by far the most extensive plains in Turkey; however, their agricultural value is reduced by the effects of altitude and location on their climate.

      The remainder of the central massif, a roughly triangular area with its eastern apex near Sivas, forms a mountainous zone that bounds the plains on their eastern side. Much of this section rises above 5,000 feet (1,500 metres), and there are numerous peaks with elevations of about 6,500 feet. A noteworthy feature is the extensive area of geologically recent volcanic activity in Niğde, Nevşehir, and Kayseri provinces, including the volcanic peaks of Erciyes (12,848 feet [3,916 metres]) and Hasan (10,686 feet [3,257 metres]).

The Arabian platform
      Southeastern Turkey between Gaziantep and the Tigris (Dicle) River rests on a stable massif called the Arabian platform. It is characterized by relatively gentle relief, with broad plateau surfaces descending to the south from about 2,500 feet (760 metres) at the mountain foot to 1,000 feet (300 metres) along the Syrian border. In the centre of this zone, the volcanic Mount Karaca reaches 6,294 feet (1,918 metres).

      The geologic structure of Turkey—where recent faulting and folding are widespread and mountain building is still in progress—is particularly conducive to earthquakes (earthquake), of which there have been many of varying intensity in modern times. A number of serious events have been centred in the east, near Erzurum in 1959 and 1966, Bingöl in 1971 and 2003, and Erzincan in 1939 and 1992. In 1999 the country's northwest was struck by a powerful earthquake near İzmit (Kocaeli) that killed more than 17,000 people and evoked strong criticism of state institutions for their delayed response to the disaster.

      Eight main drainage basins may be discerned, of which two cross the country's frontiers and six are entirely within Turkish territory. The smallest, in the far east of the country, is that of the Aras River, which rises south of Erzurum and flows east for some 250 miles (400 km) to the frontier with Azerbaijan, eventually reaching the Caspian Sea. The bulk of eastern Turkey, however, is drained by the Euphrates (Fırat) and Tigris rivers, which flow south for some 780 miles (1,250 km) and 330 (530 km) miles, respectively, before entering Syria and then Iraq, where they converge to enter the Persian Gulf (see Tigris-Euphrates river system).

      There are two basins of inland drainage. In the far east a small area drains to Lake Van (Van, Lake) from which there is no surface outlet. The main inland basin is in west-central Anatolia; its two main centres are the Lake Tuz and Konya basins. Several smaller, separate catchments in this basin contain lakes such as Eğridir and Beyşehir. The remainder of the country drains to the four surrounding seas—Black, Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean—and can thus, in a sense, be considered a single system that eventually drains to the Mediterranean. Most of the rivers flowing to the Black Sea are short torrential streams incised into the Pontic Mountains, but several have developed lengthy inland sections and tributaries running parallel to the east-west ranges of northern Turkey. These rivers include the Yenice (Filyos), Çoruh, Kelkit, Yeşil, and Kızıl. One of the largest basins is that of the Sakarya River, which covers about 500 miles (800 km) from its source, southwest of Ankara, to its mouth, north of Adapazarı (Sakarya).

      Numerous small rivers drain into the Sea of Marmara; the largest is the Mustafakemalpaşa. Most of European Turkey lies in the Ergene-Maritsa basin, which drains into the northern Aegean. The main elements of the Aegean drainage are the parallel rivers flowing west from the Anatolian interior: the Gediz, Küçükmenderes, and Büyükmenderes. Along the section of the Mediterranean coast bounded by the Taurus Mountains, numerous rivers descend rapidly to the sea, including the short Aksu, Köprü, and Manavgat and the longer Göksu. Two much larger rivers—the Seyhan and the Ceyhan (Ceyhan River)—flow into the Gulf of Iskenderun; their broad combined delta forms the greater part of the fertile Adana Plain.

      Turkey has about 50 lakes with areas larger than four square miles and more than 200 smaller ones. By far the largest are Lakes Van (Van, Lake) (1,434 square miles [3,714 square km]) and Tuz (Tuz, Lake) (about 600 square miles [1,550 square km]); the latter is very shallow, expanding and contracting with the seasons. Being centres of inland drainage, both are saline.

      The largest freshwater lakes are those in the lake district on the north side of the Taurus system, which include Lakes Akşehir, Eğridir, and Beyşehir. Another freshwater lake is Lake İznik, northeast of Bursa. The development of hydroelectric power has produced a number of artificial lakes, of which the largest are those connected with the Atatürk and Keban barrages on the Euphrates, the Hirfanlı on the Kızıl, the Sarıyar on the Sakarya, the Demirköprü on the Gediz, and the Seyhan on the Seyhan.

      Turkey's relief features and climatic variations produce major contrasts in soil types between the interior and the periphery. The detailed pattern, however, is complex; zonal soil types are broken by variations in relief and parent material, and thus a variety of azonal soils are present. Seven main soil groups may be distinguished, each containing several soil types.

      Red and gray-brown podzolic soils (podzolic soil), along with brown forest soils, represent the most extensive group, covering about one-third of the country. These occur mainly in mountainous areas as a broad belt around the northern, western, and southern sides of the Anatolian interior and are associated with the more humid climatic zones. The red and gray-brown podzolic soils are moderately leached and somewhat acidic, the red type occurring in the wetter, warmer areas. Brown forest soils are generally developed on calcareous rocks and are less acidic than the red and gray-brown podzolic soils.

      Brown and reddish brown soils are characteristic of the driest parts of the country, mainly in the semiarid zones of central Anatolia and in the southeast; covering about one-fifth of the country, they support extensive dryland grain production. These soils are for the most part calcareous and are more productive when irrigated.

      Noncalcic brown soils with rendzinas and grumusols are found in slightly wetter climates. Noncalcic brown soils are a zonal type, less strongly leached and less acidic than the podzols; they are most extensive in lowland Thrace but also occur in patches along the Aegean. Rendzinas—highly calcareous azonal soils derived from limestones—occur mainly along the Mediterranean; grumusols, found mainly in Thrace, also are calcareous but are deeper and heavier.

      Chestnut soils are found on a smaller scale in the same regions as the brown and reddish brown group but under slightly more humid conditions where the parent materials are calcareous.

      Serozems—highly alkaline semidesert gray soils—are found in the driest areas, notably in the Konya basin and the Aras valley.

      Terra rossas and red prairie soils are the products of limestone weathering under Mediterranean climates; the red prairie soils occur under warmer and damper conditions and are slightly more leached than the terra rossas. Both occur in patches along the Aegean and Mediterranean, notably in the Antalya and Adana lowlands.

      Alluvial soils, which cover only a small portion of the country, are the most valuable type and support the most-intensive agriculture. These soils are found mainly in the valleys of the Marmara and Aegean regions, the deltas along the Black Sea, the basins of central and eastern Anatolia, and the Adana lowland.

      Turkey's varied climate—generally a dry semicontinental Mediterranean variant—is heavily influenced by the presence of the sea to the north, south, and west and by the mountains that cover much of the country. The sea and the mountains produce contrasts between the interior and the coastal fringes. Several areas have the winter rainfall maximum typical of the Mediterranean regime, and summer drought is widespread. However, the elevation of the country ensures that winters are often much colder than is common in Mediterranean climates, and there are significant contrasts between winter and summer temperatures.

      January mean temperatures are below freezing throughout the interior, and in the east there is a sizable area below 23 °F (−5 °C); extremely low temperatures occur at times, with minima from −4 °F (−20 °C) in the west to −40 °F (−40 °C) in the east. The duration of snow cover ranges from two weeks in the warmer areas to four months in some mountainous areas in the east. The coastal fringes are mild, with January means above 41 °F (5 °C). Summers generally are hot: July means exceed 68 °F (20 °C) in all but the highest mountain areas, 77 °F (25 °C) along the Aegean and Mediterranean, and 86 °F (30 °C) in the southeast. Precipitation is strongly affected by relief; annual totals of 12–16 inches (305–406 mm) are characteristic of much of the interior, whereas the higher parts of the Pontic and Taurus ranges receive more than 40 inches (1,000 mm).

Climatic regions
      Contrasts between the interior and the coasts produce six main climatic regions.

      The Black Sea coastlands are the wettest region, with rain throughout the year and a winter maximum. Annual totals exceed 32 inches (813 mm), reaching 96 inches (2,438 mm) in the east. Frosts can occur, but winters are generally mild, with January means of 43–45 °F (6–7 °C); summers are hot, with July means above 68 °F (20 °C) at sea level.

      Thrace and Marmara are influenced by winter depressions passing through the straits, but summers are drier than along the Black Sea. Annual precipitation ranges from 24 to 36 inches (610 to 914 mm), with a pronounced winter maximum. January mean temperatures are close to freezing; summers are hot, with July means above 77 °F (25 °C).

      The Aegean coastlands have a Mediterranean regime. Average temperatures range from 45–47 °F (7–8 °C) in January to 77–86 °F (25–30 °C) in July, and frosts are rare. Annual rainfall varies from 24 to 32 inches (610 to 813 mm), and there is a pronounced summer drought.

      The Mediterranean coastlands display characteristics similar to the Aegean but in a more intense form. July means exceed 83 °F (28 °C) at sea level. Annual rainfall declines from 40 inches (1,000 mm) in the west to barely 24 inches in the Adana Plain, and the summer months are virtually rainless at sea level.

      The southeast is dry and hot during the summer. Winters are cold, with January means near freezing; July means are generally above 86 °F (30 °C). Annual rainfall ranges from 12 to 24 inches (305 to 610 mm).

      The Anatolian interior has a semicontinental climate with a large temperature range; Ankara's January mean is 28 °F (−2 °C), and its July mean is 74 °F (23 °C). Precipitation is influenced by relief: Konya, with barely 12 inches, is among the driest places in the country, but in the mountainous east the annual totals generally exceed 24 inches.

Plant and animal life
      Patterns of natural vegetation are closely related to those of relief, climate, and soils. There are two main types: steppe grasslands, which occur mainly in central Anatolia and the southeast but are also found in lowland Thrace and in the valleys and basins of eastern Anatolia; and forest and woodland, which cover the remainder of the country. Over much of Turkey, however, these natural vegetation types have been greatly modified by human action, both directly (through lumbering and clearance for agriculture) and indirectly (through the activities of grazing animals).

      The richest type of woodland is the Pontic, or Colchian, forest, confined to the eastern part of the Black Sea coastlands, where rainfall is heavy, there is no summer drought, and winters are mild. Hornbeam, sweet chestnut, oriental spruce, and alder are the commonest species, and there is a rich shrub layer of rhododendron, laurel, holly, myrtle, hazel, and walnut. The remainder of the Black Sea zone is occupied by humid deciduous forest, second only to the Colchian type in richness and variety. The main tree species in the Black Sea zone are oriental spruce, beech, hornbeam, alder, oak, fir, and yew, with oak and pine in the drier parts. Coniferous species become dominant above 3,300 feet (1,000 metres), giving way to alpine grassland above 6,500 feet (2,000 metres).

      Drier conditions in the western and eastern parts of the interior—on either side of the central steppe-grassland zone—produce the drier mixed- and deciduous-forest belt, where the dominant species are oak, juniper, pine, and fir, with patches of open grassland. Mediterranean mountain forest is characteristic of the central and western Taurus range; pine, fir, and oak are the main species, but cedar, beech, juniper, and maple also occur. Along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts is a belt of Mediterranean lowland vegetation of the maquis type. Myrtle, wild olive, laurel, and carob are the commonest species, but there are occasional stands of oak, pine, and cypress.

      Turkey is fairly rich in wild animals and game birds. Wolves, foxes, boars, wildcats, beavers, martens, jackals, hyenas, bears, deer, gazelles, and mountain goats are still found in secluded and wooded regions. Domesticated animals include water buffalo, Angora goats (on the central massif), and camels (in the southwest), as well as horses, donkeys, sheep, and cattle. Major game birds are partridge, wild geese, quail, and bustards.

Settlement patterns
  More than three-fifths of the population lives in towns and cities. Prior to the mid-20th century, however, the population was predominantly rural, and its distribution was strongly influenced by the agricultural potential of the land. Thus, there are pronounced regional variations in population density, the main contrast being between the interior and the periphery. The regional coastlands of the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Aegean Sea are the most densely settled regions; accounting for less than two-fifths of the country's land area, the regions together represent more than half its population. The Mediterranean coastal region is more thinly settled, though there are pockets of high population density in the Antalya and Adana basins. The remainder of the country is relatively lightly populated: the Anatolian interior and southeast, occupying more than half the country's territory, contain less than two-fifths of Turkey's population. At the beginning of the 21st century, however, the southeast was the country's fastest-growing region.

      Historically, much of Anatolia—especially the east—was populated by nomads and transhumants, who migrated seasonally between upland and plain. Some of their descendants, herders of sheep and goats, move from plain to mountain, living in tents, while others possess houses in two or even three villages at different altitudes.

      Over much of the country, the bulk of the population lives in villages, which are estimated to number at least 50,000. The average village population tends to vary, and many villages comprise two or three separate rural settlements some distance apart.

      The typical Turkish village house is a rectangular flat-roofed building, the colour of the local unbaked brick or stone from which it is made, one or two stories high. The poorest contain a single room to house family, livestock, and possessions; the better village houses encompass joint households of perhaps 20 people living in large compounds, off which lead many living rooms, stores, stables, and barns. The vast majority of homes fall between these extremes, and there is great local variation. Commonly, the head of the household and his wife live and sleep in the main room of the house, which contains the bedding (stacked away in the daytime), the cooking stove (in some areas a beehive-shaped oven built into the floor), shelves with cooking pots and implements, a gaily painted chest containing the woman's trousseau and personal possessions, and a chest for flour and grain. People sit on rugs or mats spread on the floor. Many homes also have at least one room fitted as a guest room, normally for the use of men only. The guest room has built-in divans running along the walls and very often a stone or wooden floor. The most marked contrast occurs in the forests of the northern mountain ranges, where the village homes are made of timber and have red roofs. Brick, cement, and cinder block are now also becoming common wherever people can afford them.

 Cities in Turkey are for the most part of moderate size, though many have grown rapidly since the 1970s. The largest is Istanbul; though no longer the capital city, it remains the chief port and commercial centre, attracting migrants from the entire country. With its suburbs along the Bosporus, Istanbul forms a sprawling agglomeration with nearly nine million inhabitants. The second largest city, Ankara, is of much more recent origin. Prior to the establishment of the republic, it was one of many small provincial towns in the interior, but its choice as the capital city has resulted in a long period of rapid growth. The third largest city, İzmir, is the port and commercial centre for the prosperous Aegean coastal zone.

  Apart from these three main centres, an important cluster of cities is located in the Adana Plain, where Adana, Mersin (İçel), and a number of smaller centres are situated. Elsewhere the chief cities are widely separated regional and provincial capitals, of which the largest are Bursa, in the Marmara lowlands; Samsun, on the Black Sea; Antalya, on the Mediterranean; Konya, Kayseri, Eskişehir, Malatya, Erzurum, and Sivas, in the interior; and Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa, in the southeast.

      Traditional Anatolian town houses, still the most common residence in many smaller cities, were built in stone or wood, usually of two stories, with wooden floors and, sometimes, beautifully carved ceilings. The upper story often protrudes, cantilever fashion, into the street. With whitewashed walls and red-tiled roofs, these small towns sometimes present a more modern appearance than most villages, though just as often the distinction between large villages and small towns is barely visible. In the larger cities, while traditional building types are still visible in the older areas, large recently developed sections are dominated by simpler styles in brick and concrete. Downtown areas have an increasingly European appearance.

People (Turkey)

Language and religion
 According to the Turkish constitution, the word “Turk,” as a political term, includes all citizens of the Republic of Turkey, without distinction of or reference to race or religion; ethnic minorities have no official status. Linguistic data show that a majority of the population claim Turkish (Turkish language) as their mother tongue; most of the remainder speak Kurdish (Kurdish language) and a small minority Arabic (Arabic language) as their first language. Though estimates of the Kurdish population in Turkey have generally been widely varied, at the beginning of the 21st century, Kurds (Kurd) were estimated to account for almost one-fifth of the country's population. Ethnic Kurds are present in significant numbers throughout eastern Anatolia and form a majority in a number of provinces, including Ağrı, Bitlis, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Hakkari (Hakkâri), Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Van. Arabic (Arabic language) speakers are mainly in Hatay, Adana, Mardin, Siirt, and Şanlıurfa. There are a further six ethnic groups with sizable numbers: Greeks, Armenians, and Jews are found almost entirely in Istanbul, and Circassians (Circassian), Georgians, and Laz are generally located in the far east.

 More than nine-tenths of the population is Muslim (Islāmic world). Nevertheless, Turkey is a secular country. In a 1928 constitutional amendment, Islam was removed as the official state religion, and since that time the state has found itself periodically at odds with religion. Turkey's strong secularism has resulted in what have been perceived by some as strictures on the freedom of religion; for example, the head scarf has long been prohibited in a number of public venues, and a constitutional amendment passed in February 2008 that permitted women to wear it on university campuses sparked considerable controversy. In addition, the armed forces have maintained a vigilant watch over Turkey's political secularism, which they affirm to be a keystone among Turkey's founding principles. The military has not left the maintenance of a secular political process to chance, however, and has intervened in politics on a number of occasions.

      In addition to the Muslim majority, there also exist small populations of Jews and Christians; Christian adherents are divided between Greek Orthodox (Greek Orthodox Church), Armenian Orthodox, Roman Catholic (Roman Catholicism), Protestant (Christianity), and other denominations.

Demographic trends
      In 1927 the total population of the Turkish republic was about 13 million; since then it has increased more than fivefold. Growth was particularly rapid after World War II, reaching nearly 3 percent annually in the early 1960s, but the rate of growth has since declined. A fall in the birth rate was the main factor for the decline, offset somewhat by a decline in the death rate. In the early 21st century, the age profile of the population remained youthful.

      A notable development of the postwar period was large-scale internal migration, from rural to urban areas both within each province and over longer distances. Areas attracting the most migrants were those with major urban agglomerations: the zone around the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean coast, the Adana Plain, and Ankara. Net migration losses occurred over much of the interior, particularly the eastern part.

      Another element of population movement was the movement of Turkish workers abroad (migrant labour). In the early 1980s some two million Turks lived in various western European countries, three-fourths of them in what was then West Germany, and there were numerous short-term Turkish workers in Arab countries, mainly Libya and Saudi Arabia. The demand for Turkish labour abroad subsequently declined, and the outflow became much smaller. In the early 21st century there were roughly one million Turkish citizens working abroad; of those, a majority of them were living in western Europe.

      Since its inception in 1923, Turkey has operated a mixed economy, in which both state and private enterprise have contributed to economic development. The economy has been transformed from predominantly agricultural to one in which industry and services are the most productive and rapidly expanding sectors. Until about 1950 the state played the leading role in industrialization, providing most of the capital for structural improvement in railways, ports, and shipping facilities and for the establishment of such basic industries as mining, metallurgy, and chemicals; it also invested in manufacturing, notably in the food-processing, textile, and building-material sectors. Emerging industries were protected by tariff barriers, and foreign investment was discouraged; the economy remained self-contained and somewhat isolated, with foreign trade playing only a minor role.

      Major political developments of the early postwar period—such as the institution of a multiparty democracy and Turkey's adherence to the Western alliance—had a profound effect on the economy, which became more open to foreign influences. Foreign aid, chiefly from the United States, arrived in large quantities and was used in part to finance agricultural expansion and to import agricultural and industrial machinery and transportation equipment. Growth accelerated, with the private sector playing an increasing role. State intervention—mainly in the form of government loans to private firms—remained strong, and economic development was guided by a series of five-year plans. By the late 1970s, however, the economy was plagued by high inflation, large-scale unemployment, and a chronic foreign trade deficit.

      Consequently, during the 1980s there were further shifts in economic policy, including the encouragement of foreign investment, the establishment of joint enterprises, a reduction in the relative importance of the state sector, and a vigorous export drive. By the 1990s, inflation remained a serious problem, and Turkey's per capita gross domestic product remained well below those of most Middle Eastern and European countries. Facing inflation that had reached almost 100 percent by 1997, an 18-month economic monitoring program was initiated with the International Monetary Fund, which succeeded in significantly decreasing the rate of inflation in the following two years. At the beginning of the 21st century, agriculture remained a large employer, with about one-third of the labour force, while about one-fifth of Turkish workers were in the industrial sector.

 Turkey has a great variety of natural resources, though few occur on a large scale. Apart from Iran, Turkey is the only Middle Eastern country with significant coal deposits, mainly in the Zonguldak field. Output of lignite is substantial. There is small-scale production of oil from fields in the southeast of the country, as well as in the northwestern Thrace region; this provides for only a fraction of the country's needs, and Turkey is thus dependent on imported petroleum products. Both lignite and oil are used in electricity generation, and hydroelectric resources are under intensive development. Among the largest hydroelectric plants are those on the Sakarya, Kemer, Kızıl, and Seyhan rivers and on the Keban and Atatürk barrages on the Euphrates. A national electricity grid covers the whole country, including nearly all villages. The most important metallic ores are iron, mainly from Divriği in Sivas province, and chromite, much of which is exported. There are significant deposits of manganese, zinc, lead, copper, and bauxite.

      About one-third of Turkey's land area is utilized for agriculture, much of it extensively. About half of the agricultural land is used for field crops and about one-third for grazing. These proportions have remained fairly stable since the 1960s, following a period of rapid change in the 1950s, when the advent of tractors supported significant expansion of arable land, mainly at the expense of grazing land. A smaller proportion of the cultivated land consists of vineyards, orchards, olive groves, and vegetable gardens. The most important field crops are cereals; these occupy one half of the cultivated area. A majority of the cereal land is sown in wheat, with smaller areas of barley, rye, oats, corn (maize), and rice. Other important crops are cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, and potatoes. Roughly one-sixth of the cropland is irrigated. Livestock farming is a major activity; Turkey has vast numbers of cattle, sheep, goats, and water buffalo. Landholdings are generally small, with family farms averaging only 15 acres (6 hectares). Agricultural products provide substantial export earnings; cotton, tobacco, fruits, vegetables, nuts, livestock, and livestock products are the main items.

      Regional variations in agriculture reflect those in the physical environment, especially between the interior, where cereals and livestock are predominant, and the coastal fringes, where most of the higher-value crops are grown. The relative warmth and dampness of the Black Sea coastlands make this region one of the most intensively cultivated despite its limited lowlands. Corn is the chief cereal and supports large numbers of cattle. High-value crops include hazelnuts, tobacco, tea, walnuts, almonds, pistachios, and citrus and other fruits; sugar beets, sunflowers, potatoes, and vegetables also are important. The Aegean coastlands constitute the most productive, commercialized, and export-oriented region, with a relatively low proportion of cereals. Cotton is the main industrial crop, and the Aegean coastlands are Turkey's chief area of olive production. There are extensive vineyards, and the region is famous for its raisins, sultanas, and figs. The western part of the Mediterranean coastlands is dominated by wheat and barley, but cotton, flax, sesame, potatoes, fruits (including grapes and citrus—and even bananas, around Alanya), and rice also are grown. The Adana Plain is an important cotton-producing region. The elevated lands of the Anatolian interior are dominated by livestock and cereals, mainly wheat and barley. In the more favoured areas, especially where irrigation is possible, some cotton, fruits, tobacco, hemp, and sugar beets also are found, as are vineyards. The lowlands of Thrace and Marmara grow wheat, barley, corn, tobacco, sunflowers, vegetables, fruits, and olives. Vineyards also are present there and in the southeast, which is focused mainly on dry-farmed wheat and barley but also produces rice, fruits, and vegetables.

      Turkey supports a wide range of manufacturing activities. Manufacturing plants are widely distributed, with clusters of factories in all sizable towns, although a high proportion of total output comes from four highly industrialized zones: Istanbul and the area around the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean coast around İzmir, the Adana basin, and the region around Ankara. The leading manufactures are chemicals; food, beverages, and tobacco; and textiles, clothing, and footwear.

      Turkey, the Middle East's leading steel producer, supplies most of its own domestic needs. The main plants are at Karabük, Ereğli, and İskenderun. Small-scale nonferrous metallurgy occurs at several sites, including Göktaş, Ergani, and Antalya. Engineering industries expanded rapidly during the 1970s and '80s and now are widely dispersed, with major concentrations around Istanbul, İzmir, and Ankara. The chemical industries are located close to the oil refineries at Mersin (İçel), İzmit, and İzmir and at a variety of other sites.

      The major manufacturing employer is the textile industry. The biggest plants are in the cotton-growing districts of the Adana Plain and Büyükmenderes valley, but textile production also occurs in most regional centres. The processing of agricultural products also is widely dispersed; leading branches are tobacco manufacture, mainly in the Black Sea and Aegean regions, and sugar production, in the beet-growing districts of the interior.

      Foreign trade has played an increasing role in the Turkish economy since World War II. Until the 1960s most exports were derived from agriculture, and most of the remainder consisted of minerals and raw materials; imports were mainly limited to machinery, transportation equipment, and manufactured goods. The development of the manufacturing sector provided a new source of exports, and basic and miscellaneous manufactures together now contribute more than half the total. The leading exports are textile fibres, yarns, fabrics, and clothing, iron and steel, fruits and vegetables, livestock products, tobacco, and machinery. Imports include machinery, chemicals, petroleum products, transportation equipment, and consumer goods. About half of all trade is with Europe, where Germany is the main trading partner. Significant trade also takes place within the Middle East, particularly with Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, which are the main suppliers of oil and the main recipients of Turkish manufactures; Algeria and Israel are also trade partners in the region.

      Since the establishment of the republic, and particularly since World War II, economic development has involved large-scale state investment in transportation. Until the 1950s this investment was concentrated on the railway network, but in subsequent decades Turkey focused on its system of roads and highways.

      Prior to World War I the only long-distance rail route extended from Istanbul to Adana and into Iraq, developed as part of a German plan for a Berlin-Baghdad railway (see Baghdad Railway) to provide an overland link between Europe and the Persian Gulf. Other early rail lines were confined to a few short stretches in the west, linking areas of commercial agriculture to ports on the Aegean and Sea of Marmara. In the interwar years the state railway company built several lines to link the main regional centres, notably a line connecting Ankara, Kayseri, Sivas, and Erzurum with the Soviet frontier (with branches to the Black Sea at Samsun and Zonguldak) and a line connecting Konya, Kayseri, Sivas, and Malatya with Diyarbakır and the Raman oil field. The major development of the postwar period was the construction of a line from Elazığ to the Iranian frontier, which involved a train ferry across Lake Van and was part of an ambitious plan to provide a rail connection between Europe and Pakistan. Despite these developments, the rail network remained rudimentary. Railways carried a proportion of freight traffic—mainly agricultural produce and minerals—and relatively few passengers, but both of these uses steadily declined throughout the 1990s. By the early years of the 21st century, only a negligible number of passengers chose rail as their means of transport; the proportion of freight transport taking place by rail was also slight. In response, the Marmaray Project was undertaken to improve approximately 45 miles (75 km) of Turkey's railway network. The massive transport project was anticipated to upgrade rail service around Istanbul and included an ambitious rail tunnel running beneath the Bosporus to connect the European and Asian halves of the city. The project was stalled in 2006, however, with the discovery of a 4th-century port along the construction zone.

      Roads are by far the most important carriers of both freight and passengers. In addition to domestic traffic, there is a large and growing international freight movement across Turkey between Europe and the Middle East. This has been made possible by massive state investment in the construction of a modern road network linking all the main towns. Buses are widely used. City thoroughfares in Turkey are generally congested.

      Coastal shipping routes are important freight carriers, particularly along the Black Sea coast; the main international ports are Istanbul, İzmir, Mersin (İçel), İskenderun, and İzmit.

      The state airline and several international carriers provide air links through Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, and there is an internal network linking these cities with more than a dozen provincial centres. Airports on the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts at Dalaman and Antalya have been improved and cater to the growing tourist charter traffic.

Administration and social conditions

      Following a period of authoritarian, one-party rule under the first president of the republic, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, Kemal) (Atatürk; 1923–38), and his successor, İsmet İnönü (İnönü, İsmet) (1938–50), multiparty democracy was instituted in 1950. Parliamentary democracy has for the most part remained in force since that date, although it has been interrupted by brief periods of military government at times when civilian rule was perceived as ineffective. After each military interlude (1960–61, 1971–73, 1980–83), power was returned to civilian hands under a revised constitution.

      Under the current constitution, approved by national referendum in 1982 and amended several times since, the main legislative body is a 550-member parliament, the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi), elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. Members are chosen by a modified system of proportional representation based on political parties. There are a number of restrictions: extremist parties of both left and right are banned, and no party that obtains less than 10 percent of the national vote may be represented in parliament. Though religion had been largely discouraged from appearing in the political sphere, the role of Islamist parties in Turkish politics expanded in the 1990s and 2000s.

      Executive power is divided between the prime minister and the president. The prime minister, elected by the parliament, selects other ministers (subject to parliamentary approval) and is responsible, along with the cabinet—the Council of Ministers—for carrying out government policy. Cabinet actions may be referred to a constitutional court for a ruling on their legality. The president, also elected by the parliament, holds a symbolic role as head of state but also has considerable powers, notably calling or dissolving parliament, approving the appointment of the prime minister, returning legislation to parliament for reconsideration, referring laws to the constitutional court, and submitting proposed constitutional changes to a popular referendum.

      Before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish civil law was linked to religion and was administered by Sharīʿah courts. With the reforms of 1926, a number of new legal codes were established based in part on the Swiss Civil and Italian penal codes. Following these changes, the independence of the judiciary—including the constitutional court and the courts responsible for criminal, civil, and administrative matters—has been ensured by the constitution. A number of superior courts, including a court of appeals, also exist to examine these rulings.

      Turkey's provinces are administered by governors, who are appointed by the Council of Ministers, subject to the approval of the president. Provinces are divided into districts and subdistricts. Villages are governed by a headman and a council of elders, both elected by the village residents.

      Between 1950 and 1980 the number, names, and composition of Turkish political parties changed frequently. Generally, there was one main leftist and one main rightist party—receiving roughly equal shares of the popular vote—and several smaller parties. As a result, the country often was ruled by unstable coalitions. The 1982 constitution, with its 10 percent electoral threshold for parliamentary representation, was designed to reduce the need for coalition governments but has largely failed to do so.

 A recurrent theme in Turkish politics is the conflict between progressive and conservative elements, the former intent on fully implementing Atatürk (Atatürk, Kemal)'s vision of a wholly secular, Westernized state and the latter seeking to preserve the values of traditional Islamic-Turkish culture. The legacy of Atatürk remains central to Turkish political life; throughout the first 50 years of the republic, all major political parties professed adherence to the doctrines of Atatürkism, which defined Turkey as nationalist, republican, statist, populist, and revolutionary and emphasized Westernization, the separation of religion from politics, and a leading role for the state in economic affairs. In the 1980s and '90s there were significant changes: state intervention in economic matters was reduced, a program of privatization of state-run farms was introduced, and private enterprise—both indigenous and foreign—was encouraged. Most striking, while the maintenance of a secular state remained enshrined in the constitution, this issue became even more prominent as a focus of political dispute; support for pro-Islamic political parties increased greatly, resulting in the expansion of the role of Islamist parties in Turkish politics in the 1990s and 2000s.

      Throughout the first several decades of the postwar period, Turkey's international relationships were influenced by its Westernization policies and by the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. A founding member of the United Nations, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and has been a close ally of the United States. Turkey was also a member—along with the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, and Pakistan—of the now-defunct Central Treaty Organization, which was created as part of the “ring of containment” separating the Soviet Union from the Arab Middle East. Turkey is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and of the Council of Europe (Europe, Council of). It has long sought full membership in the European Union (EU) and its predecessor organizations. A customs accord between Turkey and the EU was signed in 1995. Turkey's relations with the Arab world at times have been cool; Turkey was long the only Middle Eastern state that maintained cordial relations with Israel.

      Turkey's international relationships have reflected its geographic position at the junction of Europe and the Middle East; it belongs wholly to neither but has interests in both. Since the 1970s, while retaining its predominantly Western orientation, Turkey has moved closer to the Arab states of the Middle East, both politically and economically. Many Turks, particularly those who support Islamic political parties, have felt a certain disenchantment with the Western alliance, resulting from perceived Western support of Greece in the disputes over Cyprus and control of the Aegean, European criticism of Turkey's record on human rights (especially with regard to the Kurds), the treatment of Turkish workers in western Europe, and delays in Turkey's admission to the European Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, Turkey in the 1990s sought closer relationships with the countries around the Black Sea and with the Turkic-speaking former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Education, health, and welfare
      As part of its modernization policy, Turkey has sought—with limited resources—to improve the social conditions of its population in a variety of ways.

      The state education system involves five main sectors. Primary education, which is free and compulsory, begins at age six and lasts five years. A considerable proportion of the primary schools are village schools, where training in agricultural activities and handicrafts is emphasized. Nearly all eligible children are enrolled. Secondary education—with more than half of eligible students enrolled—continues for another six years and includes middle school and high school programs of three years each. There are a large number of technical and vocational schools, which may be entered after completion of the middle school level. Of the more than 1,200 institutions of higher education, more than 60 have university status. The largest are the universities at Istanbul, Ankara, and Ege (Aegean, at İzmir) and the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Istanbul Technical University, and Hacettepe University in Ankara.

Health and welfare
      Health care is provided by both state and private health services. Not all workers are covered by the social security system, which provides health insurance. Turkey has a sufficient number of doctors and other health workers, but facilities are concentrated in urban areas. To counter this, the government operates a network of “health houses,” each staffed with a midwife, in the villages; “health units,” directed by a physician, serving groups of villages; and group hospitals, located in district and provincial centres.

      Pensions and other social security programs are coordinated by various organizations within the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance. Very few agricultural workers participate in these programs.

Cultural life
 Culturally, as in so many other respects, Turkey sits between East and West, drawing elements from both to produce its own unique blend. The territory that now constitutes the republic has been subject to a striking range of cultural influences; these have left a rich archaeological legacy, still visible in the landscape, from the civilizations of Classical Europe and the Islamic Middle East. Several locations of cultural significance have been designated UNESCO World Heritage sites (World Heritage site), including historic areas around Istanbul, the Great Mosque and Hospital of Divriği, the old Hittite capital of Hattusha, the remains at Nemrut Dağ and Xanthos-Letoon, the city of Safranbolu, and the archaeological site of Troy. In addition to these, UNESCO recognized two mixed-interest properties (sites of both cultural and natural significance) in Turkey: the area of Göreme National Park and the Rock Sites of Cappadocia, which is known for the traces of Byzantine art extant amid its dramatic rocky landscape, and Hierapolis-Pamukkale, which is known for its terraced basins of unique mineral formations and petrified waterfalls, where ruins of the thermal baths and temples constructed there in the 2nd century BCE are still present.

 With the division of the Roman Empire into western and eastern sections, Asia Minor became part of the Byzantine realm (see Byzantine Empire), centred at Constantinople (Istanbul). The rise of Islam (Islām) in the east led to a division of the peninsula between the Byzantine Christian world and the Islamic Middle East, and it was not until the arrival of the Turks that Asia Minor finally became part of the Islamic world. The Ottoman Empire was multinational and multicultural; the new Turkey established by Atatürk (Atatürk, Kemal), however, was more homogeneous in language and religion than its predecessor states. Under Atatürk and his followers, Turkey became increasingly secular and Western-oriented, a trend manifested in the reform of the Turkish language, the replacement of the traditional Arabic script by a modified Roman alphabet, and the separation of Islam (Islāmic world) from the state. Nevertheless, Islam has exerted a profound influence on the relations between the sexes and on family life. The strength of this influence varies between the more- and less-developed regions of the country, between urban and rural populations, and between the social classes.

Daily life
      In the rural areas each season has different tasks and activities. Except in the south and west, winter is a period of frost, snow, and social activities. Animals are often kept indoors and fed mainly chopped straw. With the spring thaw, plowing and sowing are soon under way. After a month or so of less-urgent work, the hay harvest is followed immediately by the main grain harvest, a period of intense activity lasting some six to eight weeks; everyone works, some people 16 to 20 hours a day. Most village areas contain weavers, masons, carpenters, and smiths such as tinsmiths. Some villagers go to town for craft services, and a number of craftsmen travel around the villages—particularly specialists, such as sieve makers or sawyers.

      It is impossible to summarize in a few words the material culture of the towns and cities, which not long ago were the central part of a great empire and have since been profoundly influenced by European fashions and technology. Most towns, large and small, nevertheless still contain markets where simple lockup shops stand side by side in rows. Usually these are arranged by craft or wares—coppersmiths, jewelers, cobblers, tailors, motor mechanics, and so on. Retailers also are grouped by commodity. The larger towns have become increasingly Westernized, with modern factories, offices, and shops. Large-scale commuting from sprawling suburban areas is typical of the major cities, where it produces traffic congestion, air pollution, and strains on public transportation.

 Turkish men have increasingly adopted the styles and sombre colours of European male dress. Fezzes and turbans were abolished by law in 1925, and most peasants now wear cloth caps. The famous Turkish baggy trousers, exceedingly full in the seat, are still quite common in rural areas and among the poorer town dwellers, but the traditional cummerbund and colourful shift or waistcoat are rare. Village women still largely preserve traditional attire. They wear some locally customary combination of baggy trousers, skirts, and aprons. In many areas it is still possible to identify a woman's town or village and her marital status by her dress; village women in Turkey have never worn a veil, but they have traditionally covered their heads and mouths with a large scarf. This practice has been revived among the more devout urban women, though the scarf is often combined with Western dress.

Religious practice
      For the observant, Islam entails many duties. Men and women are to maintain a state of ritual purity, pray five times a day, fast during the month of Ramadan (Ramaḍān) every year, and strive, if possible, to visit Mecca at least once in their lifetime. Islam provides basic ideas about the nature of morality, charity, transgression, reward and punishment, and relations between men and women, as well as about cleanliness and impurity.

Social roles and kinship
Male and female roles
      In rural areas the main responsibilities of the men are the heavy agricultural work, looking after the livestock, and making all contacts outside the home, both official and economic, including shopping. Women—widows, for example—might do men's work, but men never undertake women's tasks. One consequence of this is that men are more dependent on women than women are on men, and a bereaved widower who has no other adult women in his household may remarry within a few days or weeks. Women are concerned with the care of children and their houses and with the preparation and cooking of food. They are also responsible for milking, caring for the chickens, making cakes of winter fuel from dung and straw, weeding vegetable plots near the village, and reaping barley and other short-stemmed crops. Overall, women are responsible for a high proportion of the agricultural work in addition to their domestic duties.

      In urban areas the role of women is related to social class. The emancipation of women was among the Westernizing objectives of Atatürkism, and for the urban educated middle and upper classes much has been achieved. Women were given the right to vote in 1930, women were first elected to parliament in 1935, and a woman first held the prime ministership in the 1990s. Women are found in medicine, science, and the arts, and increasing numbers of women work in industry and the service sector. The position of working-class urban women—particularly from the families of recent migrants—and of women in rural areas, however, remains highly traditional.

      The structure of social relationships is in innumerable ways profoundly affected by the sharp social segregation of men and women. This segregation is related to attitudes toward sex and sexuality, which are often seen as ritually impure and somewhat shameful; for example, sex is a banned topic between close kin, and a young couple is forbidden to show any interest in each other if anyone else, even a member of the household, is present.

marriage and family life
      The traditional rural household consisted of a man, his wife, his adult sons and their wives, and his young children and grandchildren. On the death of the household head, this large household broke up into as many first-generation households as there were sons, each beginning the process again. The former high death rate among adult men, the lack of living sons, and, very rarely, quarrels between generations made these large households a minority of all households at any one time. Thus, although most villagers probably lived some part of their lives in such a household, most village households at any given time contained only parents and children, with perhaps other random relatives. The average size of a household was probably between five and six persons.

      In most rural areas household heads were grouped in patrilineal lineages or clans—that is, a group of men descended only through males from a common ancestor, usually a great-grandfather but perhaps an even earlier ancestor. Such lineages were concerned primarily with mutual support and defense within the village, and the members often had adjacent houses and lands. This traditional organization persists in many areas.

      Traditional village weddings involve elaborate ceremonies and last several days. Large transfers of wealth often are involved. Regional variations are considerable, but commonly a man may still make a marriage payment to the father of his son's bride and also pay for the wedding, the total cost amounting to as much as or more than one year's total income for an average household, without counting the need to provide a new room or house. These traditions have largely broken down among the urban educated classes, where traditional and Western courtship styles have demonstrated the ability to intermingle. In some cases, families arrange for an introduction between potential spouses; if they are compatible, the two may choose to continue with a period of courtship. This pattern, more common among urban educated youth, results in a longer period, on average, between meeting and marriage, as well as a later marriage age. Dating is growing more common among university populations.

      Kinship carries strong obligations of mutual support and interest. People look to their kin for day-to-day sociability, for hospitality in other villages, for help in trouble, for cooperation in weddings and funerals, and for aid in urban migration, in finding jobs, and in getting official favours. Kinship and marriage ties have had important political and economic implications, both at higher levels of power in the towns and in links between towns and villages.

      Change in Turkish society—which, as in many other developing countries, includes growth in population, communication, production, urbanization, and administration and education—has been rapid, complex, and extremely uneven.

      A vast increase in jobs available in towns and cities has attracted migrant labour in the form of men who work in urban centres, many of whom work in cities still keep their families in the village tilling the land. It has also meant that many village households have uprooted themselves and moved to towns and cities, greatly increasing the urban population.

      At the same time, through political and administrative pressure and greater efficiency, secularization and modernization have increasingly pervaded the rural areas and small towns. State schools have increased in numbers in the countryside, introducing more-national and cosmopolitan ideas. Bureaucracy has introduced registration of births, deaths, and marriages and more-complex systems of credit and law. Land disputes are now often settled by official and legal means rather than by local social pressures. Legal divorce has tended to replace socially recognized separation.

      The state is constitutionally secular, but it still controls the religious establishment. Until 1950 no religious teaching was permitted, but modern religious schools and theology faculties were later established, and religious lessons were allowed in state schools. Many courses and groups outside the state system have been set up to teach children religion, and the number of new mosques is large. Thus, the deep attachment of the majority to Islam (Islāmic world) has been demonstrated. With the exception of a secularist elite, many Turkish people remain committed to a Muslim identity and to an Islamic worldview.

      Changes in kinship, family, and marriage have resulted from economic and demographic changes. Young men can now more easily establish economic independence. Universal formal education and the possibilities of upward social mobility or migration for work have given young people a view of the world that is different from that of their ancestors, but significant changes in customary behaviour are slow in developing.

Arts and media
 During the 20th century, Western forms of art, music, and literature assumed a place in Turkish national culture alongside traditional indigenous cultural expressions. While many writers, artists, and musicians have abandoned traditional Islamic modes in favour of Western ones, Turkish culture has adopted a strongly nationalistic slant evidenced by the use of the vernacular in literature, the depiction of village scenes in the visual arts, and the popularity of folk ballads and other traditional forms in music. Western-style theatres, orchestras, and opera companies are thriving, while the popular arts also flourish. There are many popular dances and games specific to particular regions. Folk instruments include drums, trumpets, flutes, tambourines, viols, and cymbals. Popular drama includes shadow plays, performed by puppets reflected on a linen screen, and the orta oyunu, a type of improvised comedy. Popular traditional literature takes the form of narrative (hikâye) and poetry (siir), recited by minstrels known as âşıks. Turkish contemporary literature was the focus of wide international regard when Orhan Pamuk (Pamuk, Orhan), an acclaimed Turkish novelist, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006.

      Formal cultural institutions are led by the Ministry of Culture, established in 1971. Organizations devoted to the sciences and arts include music conservatories in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir, the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul, the National Folklore Institute in Ankara, the Turkish Folklore Society in Istanbul, and many scientific and professional societies. There are archaeological museums in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir and the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Art in Istanbul. The National Library is located in Ankara.

      The country's leading newspapers include Milliyet, Sabah, Zaman, and Hürriyet, all based in Istanbul; Cumhuriyet is also an influential publication. The state-run Turkish Radio-Television Corporation (TRT) operates four radio networks and five domestic television channels, as well as a major international satellite television channel. There also are private radio stations and television channels. Freedom of the press is occasionally restricted, particularly for leftist or pro-Kurdish publications.

Sports and recreation
      Football (soccer) is a favourite sport in Turkey; introduced to the region in the late 19th century, the game was repressed by Ottoman officials, who believed that it was connected to rebellious activities. In 1923 a national federation was formed, and it became affiliated with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association later that year; in 1954 the country appeared in its first World Cup. Wrestling is another favoured sport. Numerous athletes still compete in oiled wrestling—a sport practiced in the region for some six centuries—in annual competitions.

      Turkey made its first Olympic appearance at the 1908 games in London, where it was represented by gymnast Aleko Mulas. However, most of the country's medals have been for wrestling, although it has also had success in boxing and track and field. One of Turkey's most famous Olympians is Naim Süleymanoğlu (Suleymanoglu, Naim) (known as Pocket Hercules), a Bulgarian-born featherweight weightlifter who defected to Turkey while a teenager. Süleymanoğlu set numerous world records in the late 1980s and '90s and won a number of Olympic gold medals.

John C. Dewdney Ed.

      This entry discusses the history of modern Turkey from its formation in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in World War I (1914–18) until the 21st century. For discussion of earlier history of the area, see Anatolia; Ottoman Empire.

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, Kemal) and the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–23
 Although the legal Ottoman government in Istanbul under the 36th and last Ottoman sultan, Mehmed VI (Vahideddin; ruled 1918–22), had decided that resistance to Allied demands was impossible, pockets of resistance remained in Anatolia—the rump of the Ottoman state that later was to form the bulk of modern Turkey—after the Armistice of Mudros (Mudros, Armistice of), the agreement that ended Ottoman involvement in World War I. These included bands of irregulars and deserters, a number of intact Ottoman units, and various societies for the “defense of rights.” Resistance was stimulated by the Greek occupation of İzmir (May 15, 1919). At this time Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, Kemal)—one of the empire's most successful officers during the war—was sent on an official mission to eastern Anatolia, landing at Samsun on May 19. He immediately began to organize resistance, despite official Ottoman opposition. Through the Association for the Defense of the Rights (Defense of Rights, Associations for the) of Eastern Anatolia (founded March 3, 1919), congress was summoned at Erzurum (July–August), followed by a second congress at Sivas (September) with delegates representing the whole country. The new Association for the Defense of the Rights (Defense of Rights, Associations for the) of Anatolia and Rumelia was established, and an executive committee with Mustafa Kemal as chairman was created to conduct resistance.

      The official government yielded to Kemalist pressure. The unpopular grand vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, resigned and was replaced by the more sympathetic Ali Riza Pasha. Negotiations with the Kemalists were followed by the election of a new parliament, which met in Istanbul in January 1920. A large majority in parliament was opposed to the official government policy and passed the National Pact, formulated at Erzurum and Sivas, which embodied the political aims of independence roughly within the October 1918 armistice lines. The Allies countered by extending the occupied area of Istanbul (March 16, 1920) and by arresting and deporting many deputies. Damad Ferid became grand vizier again on April 5 and, with religious support, set out to crush the Kemalists.

The Fundamental Law and abolition of the sultanate
      The Kemalists were now faced with local uprisings, official Ottoman forces, and Greek hostility. The first necessity was to establish a legitimate basis of action. A parliament, the Grand National Assembly, met at Ankara on April 23 and asserted that the sultan's government was under infidel control and that it was the duty of Muslims to resist foreign encroachment. In the Fundamental Law of Jan. 20, 1921, the assembly declared that sovereignty belonged to the nation and that the assembly was the “true and only representative of the nation.” The name of the state was declared to be Turkey (Türkiye), and executive power was entrusted to an executive council, headed by Mustafa Kemal, who could now concentrate on the war.

      Local uprisings and the Ottoman forces were defeated, principally by irregular forces, who at the end of 1920 were brought under Mustafa Kemal's control. In 1920–21 the Greeks made major advances, almost to Ankara, but were defeated at the Battle of the Sakarya River (Aug. 24, 1921) and began a long retreat that ended in the Turkish occupation of İzmir (Sept. 9, 1922).

      The Kemalists had already begun to gain European recognition. On March 16, 1921, the Soviet-Turkish Treaty gave Turkey a favourable settlement of its eastern frontier by restoring the cities of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. Domestic problems induced Italy to begin withdrawal from the territory it occupied, and, by the Treaty of Ankara (Ankara, Treaty of) (Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, Oct. 20, 1921), France agreed to evacuate the southern region of Cilicia. Finally, by the Armistice of Mudanya, the Allies agreed to Turkish reoccupation of Istanbul and eastern Thrace.

      A comprehensive settlement was eventually achieved via the Treaty of Lausanne (Lausanne, Treaty of) (1923). The Turkish frontier in Thrace was established on the Maritsa River, and Greece (Greece, history of) returned the islands of Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos). A compulsory exchange of populations was arranged, as a result of which an estimated 1,300,000 Greeks left Turkey and 400,000 Turks were repatriated. The question of the city of Mosul was left to the League of Nations (Nations, League of), which in 1925 recommended that it become part of the new state of Iraq. The Treaty of Lausanne also provided for the apportionment of the Ottoman public debt, for the gradual abolition of the capitulations (capitulation) (Turkey regained tariff autonomy in 1929), and for an international regime for the straits (Straits Question) that controlled access to the Black Sea (see Straits Question). Turkey did not recover complete control of the straits until the 1936 Montreux Convention.

      The result of the war and the peace settlement was a state in which the great majority spoke Turkish. Though there has been a tendency to see this as the almost inevitable consequence of the rise of Turkish and Arab nationalism, it seems in fact to have been the accident of war that broke off the Arab provinces. Whatever the views of Mustafa Kemal himself, it is clear that the majority of his followers thought of themselves primarily as Muslims; in the elaborate religious ceremony that preceded the opening of the Grand National Assembly, there was no mention of Turks or Turkey but only of the need to save “religion's last country.” The creation of a sense of Turkish nationhood was the product of a long effort in which Mustafa Kemal played the dominant role.

      Construction of a new political system began with the abolition of the sultanate and the declaration of a republic. Loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty was strong even among Kemalists, but Mehmed VI's identification with the Allies weakened his support. An Allied invitation to the sultan to nominate representatives to Lausanne aided Mustafa Kemal; a split Turkish delegation would have been self-defeating. With a brilliant mixture of threats and persuasion, Mustafa Kemal was able, therefore, to induce the assembly to abolish the sultanate (Nov. 1, 1922). Mehmed VI left Turkey, and his cousin Abdülmecid II was installed as the first and last Ottoman caliph who was not also sultan.

Declaration of the Turkish republic
      On Oct. 29, 1923, the assembly declared Turkey to be a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal as its first president. The caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924, and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled from Turkey. A full republican constitution was adopted on April 20, 1924; it retained Islam as the state religion, but in April 1928 this clause was removed, and Turkey became a purely secular republic.

Turkey under Mustafa Kemal
      The assembly was the instrument of Mustafa Kemal's will. The first assembly had contained large factions hostile to his policies, including religious conservatives, merchants, and former members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP; a Young Turks organization). In opposition to his 197 acknowledged supporters, who were known as the First Group, there were 118 opponents, members of the Second Group. The first assembly was dissolved on April 16, 1923, and Mustafa Kemal took care to keep his opponents out of the second assembly; only three of the Second Group were returned. Mustafa Kemal's own party, which became the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; CHP), dominated all assemblies until 1950; in this period the assemblies included a heavy preponderance of urban professional men and of officials with a university education. With an outlook different from that of the illiterate Turkish peasants, they carried out a revolution from the top.

      There was little opposition to Mustafa Kemal: the small Progressive Republican Party (November 1924–June 1925) had only 29 members and was suppressed because he feared that its leading members, who included some of his most notable associates in the war of independence, might have too much influence in the army; and the similarly short-lived Liberal Republican Party (August–December 1930) was an abortive attempt by Mustafa Kemal to organize a moderate opposition to his own party. Otherwise, he ruled quite autocratically. A plot against his life in 1926 gave him the chance to deal with his rivals, who were tried by a special court. Many of them were sentenced to death, imprisonment, or exile. Opposition outside the assembly—including the dangerous Kurdish revolts of 1925, 1930, and 1937—was suppressed vigorously.

Kemalist policies
      The bases of Mustafa Kemal's policies were enshrined in the CHP program of 1931, which was written into the Turkish constitution in 1937. Mustafa Kemal's six fundamental principles were republicanism (i.e., the creation of the republic), nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolution. Revolution was implicit in the radical reorganization of the political, social, and economic systems. Populism was the effort to mobilize popular support from the top through such characteristic devices as the People's Houses (1931–51), which spread the new concept of a national culture in provincial towns, and the village institutes, which performed the same educational and proselytizing role in the countryside. The creation of a sense of nationalism was encouraged by changes in school curricula, the rewriting of history to glorify the Turkish past, the “purification” of the language by a reduction of the number of words of foreign origin (sometime later, this effort appeared to be redundant in light of a declaration that all languages were descended from Turkish (Turkish language)), and the renunciation of Pan-Islamic, Pan-Turkish (Pan-Turkism), and Pan-Ottoman goals in foreign policy.

      Statism was the movement toward state-controlled economic development; the shortage of skilled labour and entrepreneurs (caused largely by the reduction of the Greek and Armenian communities, which in 1914 had controlled four-fifths of Ottoman finance, industry, and commerce), the lack of capital, and the intense nationalist desire for industrial self-sufficiency that would banish foreign influence all stimulated a movement in the 1930s toward state ownership or control. This was achieved through investment banks, monopolies, state industrial enterprises, and planning. A five-year plan was instituted in 1934. Although the immediate results were disappointing, the policy of state-inspired economic growth was important for future economic advance.

       secularism included the reform of law, involving the abolition of religious courts and schools (1924) and the adoption of a purely secular system of family law. The substitution of the Latin alphabet for the Arabic in writing Turkish was a significant step toward secularism and made learning easier; other measures included the adoption (1925) of the Gregorian calendar, which had been jointly used with the Muslim (Hijrī) calendar since 1917, the replacement of Friday by Sunday as the weekly holiday (1935), the adoption of surnames (1934), and, most striking of all, the abolition of the wearing of the fez (1925), a hat that reformers saw as a sign of cultural backwardness. The wearing of clerical garb outside places of worship was forbidden in 1934.

      These changes, coupled with the abolition of the caliphate and the elimination of the dervish (Sufi) orders (see Sufism (Ṣūfism)) after a Kurdish revolt in 1925, dealt a tremendous blow to Islam's position in social life, completing the process begun in the Tanzimat reforms under the Ottomans. With secularism there came a steady improvement in the status of women, who were given the right to vote and to sit in parliament.

      Vital as these changes were, in many cases they were primarily matters of appearance and style. Structural changes in society took longer. At the first census, in 1927, the population was put at 13.6 million, of which about one-fourth was urban. In 1940 the population was 17.8 million, but the urban proportion was almost unchanged. In 1938 the per capita income and literacy rate were both below comparable figures for developed countries.

      Foreign policy was subordinated to internal change. The loss of Mosul was accepted (June 5, 1926). Hatay (Antalya) province along the Syrian border, however, was recovered. It was given internal autonomy by France in 1937, occupied by Turkish troops in 1938, and incorporated into Turkey in 1939. Turkey followed a neutralist policy, supported the League of Nations (which it joined in 1932), and sought alliances with other minor powers, leading to the Balkan Entente (1934) and the Saʿdābād Pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan (1937).

Turkey after Kemal “Atatürk”
World War II and the postwar era, 1938–50
 The autocratic, dominating, and inspiring personality of Kemal Atatürk (“Father of Turks,” as Mustafa Kemal came to be known) had directed and shaped the Turkish republic. At his death in 1938 his closest associate, İsmet İnönü (İnönü, İsmet), was elected president. With the approach of World War II (1939–45), foreign affairs assumed greater importance. An alliance with the Allied powers Britain and France (Oct. 19, 1939) was not implemented because of Germany's early victories. After Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941), there was popular support for an alliance with Germany, which seemed to offer prospects of realizing old Pan-Turkish aims. Although a nonaggression pact was signed with Germany (June 18, 1941), Turkey clung to neutrality until the defeat of the Axis Powers became inevitable; it entered the war on the Allied side on Feb. 23, 1945, mere weeks before the war's end. The great expansion of Soviet power in the postwar years exposed Turkey in June 1945 to Soviet demands for control over the straits (Straits Question) connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and for the cession of territory in eastern Anatolia. It was also suggested that a large area of northeastern Anatolia be ceded to Soviet Georgia. This caused Turkey to seek and receive U.S. assistance; U.S. military aid began in 1947 (providing the basis for a large and continuing flow of military aid), and economic assistance began in 1948.

      The war also brought changes in domestic policy. The army had been kept small throughout the Atatürk period, and defense expenditure had been reduced to about one-fourth of the budget. The army was rapidly expanded in 1939, and defense expenditures rose to more than half the budget for the duration of the war. Substantial deficits were incurred, imposing a severe economic strain, which was aggravated by shortages of raw materials. By 1945, agricultural output had fallen to 70 percent of the 1939 figure and per capita income to 75 percent. Inflation was high: official statistics show a rise of 354 percent between 1938 and 1945, but this figure probably understates the fall in the value of money, which in 1943 was less than one-fifth of its 1938 purchasing power. One means chosen by the government to raise money was a capital levy, introduced in 1942, arranged to fall with punitive force upon the non-Muslim communities and upon the Dönme (a Jewish sect that had adopted Islam). The war did provide some stimulus to industry, however, and enabled Turkey to build up substantial foreign credits, which were used to finance postwar economic development.

      The most notable change in the postwar years was the liberalization of political life. The investment in education was beginning to show some return, and the literacy rate had risen to nearly one-third of the adult population by 1945. A growing class of professional and commercial men demanded more freedom. The Allied victory had made democracy more fashionable; accordingly, the government made concessions allowing new political parties, universal suffrage, and direct election.

      From a split within the CHP, the Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1946 and immediately gathered support. Despite government interference, the DP won 61 seats in the 1946 general election. Some elements in the CHP, led by Prime Minister Recep Peker (served 1946–47), wished to suppress the DP, but they were prevented from doing so by İnönü. In his declaration of July 12, 1947, İnönü stated that the logic of a multiparty system implied the possibility of a change of government. Prophetically, he renounced the title of “National Unchangeable Leader,” which had been conferred upon him in 1938. Peker resigned and was succeeded by the more liberal Prime Ministers Hasan Saka (1947–49) and Şemseddin Günaltay (1949–50).

      Other restrictions on political freedom, including press censorship, were relaxed. The first mass-circulation independent newspapers were established during the period. The formation of trade unions was permitted in 1947, though unions were not given the right to strike until 1963. A far-reaching land-redistribution measure was passed in 1945, although little was done to implement it before 1950. Other political parties were established, including the conservative National Party (1948); socialist and communist activities, however, were severely repressed.

      In the more open atmosphere, the DP was able to organize in the villages. The CHP, despite its local village institutes, had always been the government party and had little real grassroots organization. The Democrats were much more responsive to local interests. The DP won a massive victory in the 1950 elections, claiming 54 percent of the vote and 396 out of 487 seats. The CHP won 68 seats, the National Party 1. The DP victory has been attributed variously to American influence, social change, a desire for economic liberalization, better organization, religious hostility to the CHP, and a bad harvest in 1949. Perhaps the ultimate reason, however, is simply that in 27 years the CHP had made too many enemies.

Turkey under the Democrats, 1950–60
      In the DP government Celâl Bayar (Bayar, Celâl) became president and Adnan Menderes (Menderes, Adnan) prime minister, a post which for the first time came to surpass that of the president in importance.

The economy
      The Democrats were committed to a program of economic growth, to be achieved through a reduction of state interference. At first they had much success, assisted by good harvests in 1950 and 1953 and by an economic boom caused by the Korean War (1950–53). But problems appeared after 1953. In 1954 another poor harvest obliged Turkey to import wheat again. A shortage of foreign exchange limited the purchase of essential materials and parts, which handicapped industry. After a sudden favourable surge in the early 1950s, the international balance of trade moved steadily against Turkey. Inflation, which averaged 15 percent or more annually, became a serious problem. The government attempted unsuccessfully to control prices through legislation, but its continually rising public expenditure worsened inflation. Despite the problems, the DP achieved considerable political success throughout the 1950s.

Political repressions
      The political fortunes of the Democrat government closely reflected the economic changes. In the 1954 elections—the Democrat peak—the DP took a majority of the vote and most of the seats; the CHP took about one-third of the vote and many of the remaining seats. Subsequent economic difficulties led to mounting criticism within and outside the DP, to which the government responded with increasing repression. In 1953 much of the property of the CHP was confiscated, forcing the closure of the People's Houses. The CHP newspaper presses in Ankara were seized. In 1954 the National Party was dissolved because of its opposition to Kemalist principles, though it was immediately re-formed as the Republican Nation's Party and in 1958 united with the Peasants' Party to form the Republican Peasants' Nation Party. Laws passed in 1954 provided for heavy fines on journalists thought to have damaged the prestige of the state or the law; several prominent journalists were prosecuted under this law, which was made more severe in 1956, while other laws substantially abridged the independence of civil servants (including university teachers) and judges. In 1955 critics within the DP were expelled; these critics subsequently formed the Freedom Party, which in 1958 merged with the CHP. In 1956, limitations were placed upon public meetings.

      The DP's declining popularity was reflected in the elections of October 1957. The three opposition parties attempted to form an electoral coalition, but a law passed that September had declared such coalitions illegal. The combined opposition vote was more than half the total, but the DP controlled a majority of the seats, and many believed that the law banning coalitions had deprived the opposition of victory. Opposition attacks upon the DP became stronger, and it was accused of unconstitutional action. At the same time, the Democrats, fearing a revolution, redoubled control. In December 1959 an alleged plot (the so-called Nine Officers' Plot) was unearthed; some of the accused were so clearly innocent that punishment ultimately fell upon the accuser, but it appears that there indeed had been a conspiracy of some sort.

      The CHP strenuously accused the DP of reversing the principles of secularism and favouring conservative religious organizations. Indeed, the DP had relaxed some of the secularist policies of pure Kemalism, following in the steps of the CHP in the years 1945–49. Religious instruction in schools had been extended and the organization of religious schools permitted. Arabic had been reinstated for the call to prayer, and radio readings of the Qurʾān had been allowed. These were modest concessions in themselves, however, and the Democrats had clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to tolerate religious influence in politics by suppressing the renewed activities of dervish orders in 1950–52.

      The years 1958–60 saw a further worsening of the economy as the government reluctantly introduced restrictive measures. Returns on new investment fell and inflation continued. Serious problems of housing and unemployment were emerging in the large towns, whose population had been growing annually at the rate of about 10 percent, so that by 1960 the urban portion of the population had risen to nearly one-third. CHP attacks became more bitter and the government's response stronger. In April 1960 the government ordered the army to prevent İnönü from campaigning in Kayseri and formed a committee to investigate the affairs of the CHP. It was widely believed that the government's next action would be to close the CHP. Student demonstrations followed, and martial law was declared on April 28. The army had been brought directly into the political arena.

The military coup of 1960
      Relatively neglected from 1923 to 1939, the army underwent a rapid expansion during World War II and, after the war, was extensively modernized with the aid of U.S. advisers. Many officers feared that the DP threatened the principles of the secular progressive Kemalist state. Some younger officers saw the army as the direct instrument of unity and reform. On May 3, 1960, the commander of the land forces, General Cemal Gürsel, demanded political reforms and resigned when his demands were refused. On May 27 the army acted; an almost bloodless coup was carried out by officers and cadets from the Istanbul and Ankara war colleges. The leaders established a 38-member National Unity Committee with Gürsel as chairman. The Democrat leaders were imprisoned.

The National Unity Committee
      From the outset a clear division existed between the officers who carried out the coup. One group, consisting predominantly of younger officers, believed that, to restore national unity and carry out major social and economic reforms, it would be necessary to retain power for an extended period; this group included both those who supported a nationalistic and Islamist policy and those who favoured accelerated secularization. Another group, which included most of the senior officers, wanted to withdraw the army from politics as soon as possible. In November 1960 the dispute was decided in favour of the second group, and 14 members of the first group were expelled from the committee and sent into diplomatic exile.

      The main work of the National Unity Committee was to destroy the DP and to prepare a new constitution. Substantial purges took place: 5,000 officers, including 235 of the 260 generals, were dismissed or retired, 147 university teachers left their jobs, and 55 wealthy landowners were banished from eastern Anatolia, their lands confiscated. The DP was abolished (September 1960), and many Democrats were brought to trial on a small island (Yassıada) in the Bosporus on charges of corruption, unconstitutional rule, and high treason. Of 601 tried, 464 were found guilty. Three former ministers, including Menderes, were executed; 12 others, including Bayar, had their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

The constitution of 1961
      Work on the new constitution began immediately after the coup, when a committee of five law professors was appointed to prepare a draft. This document was submitted to the National Unity Committee on October 18. That committee appointed a second committee to redraft the constitution; the new draft was presented to the Constituent Assembly, which met in January 1961. The constitution was completed in May and was approved by 61 percent of the voters at a referendum in July.

      The new constitution established a two-chamber parliament, consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly. A separate electoral law provided for proportional representation. The president was elected by the Senate and National Assembly together. The constitution also provided for the Constitutional Court and the State Planning Organization. The first elections were held in October 1961. The army then withdrew from direct political involvement, although the members of the National Unity Committee retained some influence as life members of the Senate.

The ascendancy of the right, 1961–71
      No party won a majority in October 1961. The CHP won 38 percent of the votes and 173 of the 450 assembly seats. The newly formed Justice Party (JP), led by the retired general Ragıp Gümüşpala (Gümüşpala, Ragıp), received 35 percent and 158 seats. The remaining seats were divided between two smaller parties—the Republican Peasants' Nation Party, which took 54 seats, and the liberal New Turkey Party, which gained 65. The results demonstrated the enduring popularity of the old DP. Its votes had been divided among the three smaller parties, the majority going to the JP, which also emerged as the largest party in the Senate. The CHP had failed to hold all of its 1957 vote and had suffered by identification with the army coup.

      The new Grand National Assembly elected General Gürsel as president. The CHP leader İnönü formed a coalition government with the JP, but the coalition survived only until June 1962, when it broke up over the question of an amnesty for the imprisoned Democrats. After some delay and splits within the parties, which led to the formation of the Nation Party by dissidents who withdrew from the Republican Peasants' Nation Party, the CHP formed a coalition with the two smaller parties. This accelerated the tendency for former Democrat voters to turn to the JP.

      In the local elections of 1963, the JP made extensive gains at the expense of the two smaller parties. This led to the breakup of the coalition, and, because the JP was unable to form a government, İnönü formed a minority government from his own party alone but with voting support from the New Turkey Party. The CHP government resigned after a defeat on the budget in February 1965 and was replaced by a coalition of all the other parties, under the leadership of an independent, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü; this coalition acted as caretaker until the elections of Oct. 10, 1965.

      In December 1964 a new electoral law introduced the principle of the “national remainder,” by which a certain number of seats were distributed to parties according to their proportion of the vote. The law was intended to operate in favour of the smaller parties and against the JP, but in the election of 1965 the JP won a surprising majority with 53 percent of the votes and 240 seats. The CHP received 29 percent and 134 seats and the smaller parties 76 seats. The new JP leader, Süleyman Demirel (Demirel, Süleyman), a former engineer, was able to form a government.

      Political moderation triumphed in the years 1961–65. The army stood aloof while power came gradually to a party that drew its main support from the same groups and areas as the Democrats and that espoused a similar philosophy. Attempts to restore army rule failed. Intervention proposed by senior officers in October 1961 was rejected by others. Two projected coups were foiled in February 1962 and May 1963. Members of a secret society within the army—the Young Kemalists—were arrested in April 1963. Criticism of the 1960 revolution was made illegal in 1962; army leaders contented themselves with occasional warnings against too rapid a rehabilitation of the Democrats. This peaceful political evolution can be ascribed partly to İnönü, who used his personal influence and prestige to restrain the army even while power ebbed from his own party. The price was the postponement of several reforms. The only significant progressive initiative of the early 1960s was the labour law of 1963, which legalized strikes and promoted an expansion of trade unions; by the 1990s about half of Turkey's nonagricultural workers were members of a trade union.

      The JP's program embraced political and economic liberalization. The DP prisoners were released (1962–64), and their political rights were restored in 1969. The JP eschewed central economic planning and sought foreign investment in industry to provide growth. The policy had much success: over the period 1963–77 the gross domestic product grew strongly, and industry replaced agriculture as the major contributor to national income. But the JP failed to address new political problems caused by the rise of extremist parties of the right and left and by political violence.

      Industrial development, urbanization, and the growth of trade unions provided a base for the development of a radical left that included a new trade union federation, the Confederation of Reformist Workers' Unions (Devrimci Işçi Sendıkalari Konfederasyonu [DİSK]; founded 1967); a revolutionary youth movement, Dev Genç (1969); a socialist political party, the Workers' Party of Turkey (WPT; 1961); and an armed guerrilla movement, the Turkish People's Liberation Army (1970). These and similar groups espoused anticapitalist and anti-Western doctrines, and their followers, particularly in the universities, often supported them by violent action. The violence of the left was opposed by that of right-wing groups, of which the most prominent was the National Action Party (NAP), created in 1963 from the former Republican Peasants' Nation Party and led by an ex-officer, Alparslan Türkeş. The NAP's agenda combined Islam and Turkish nationalism and stressed education. As part of its organization, the NAP developed a paramilitary section, known as the Gray Wolves, that clashed with the leftists.

      The JP's failure to deal with increasing violence during the late 1960s was caused in part by its own internal divisions. A coalition of diverse groups, including prosperous farmers from western Anatolia and big and small businessmen, the JP fell victim to personal rivalries. Its victory in the 1969 election, with slightly less than half the vote, was narrower than its 1965 victory; moreover, it lost votes not to the CHP—which was supported by only about one-fourth of the electorate—but to smaller parties. However, a change in the electoral system had made it more difficult for these smaller parties to win seats, and the JP thus increased its parliamentary representation. In the new parliament the right wing of the JP, led by Sadettin Bilgiç, disappointed at its exclusion from the government, defeated Demirel in February 1970; the Demirel government continued but was much weakened by these events.

Political developments, 1970s to the '90s
Military intervention and coalition governments
      Senior army officers, concerned by the uncontrolled spread of political violence and a revolt in Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey—a part of the region commonly referred to as Kurdistan—and fearing that political divisions would spread to the army itself, delivered a warning to the government in March 1970 and a year later forced Demirel's resignation. During the next two years, Turkey was ruled by supraparty coalitions of conservative politicians and technocrats who governed with the support of the army and who were primarily concerned with restoring law and order. martial law was established in several provinces and was not completely lifted until September 1973; there were armed clashes with guerrillas and many arrests and trials; extremist political parties, including the WPT and the Islamic-based National Order Party (NOP), were shut down; and the constitution was amended to limit personal freedoms. Unlike in 1960–61, however, there was no sweeping political reorganization; the constitution, parliament, and major political parties remained. In 1973 the army withdrew to the barracks when its candidate for the presidency was defeated, leaving government once more to the politicians.

      From 1973 until 1980 the army and the politicians were faced with the consequences of their failure to address the political problems that had led to the 1971 military intervention. During these years Turkey was ruled mainly by weak coalition governments dependent on the support of minor parties, including the extremists; these extremists refused to agree to measures that would curb their own violence, and they introduced their supporters into state institutions. The annual death toll from political violence rose from 34 in 1975 to about 1,500 before the military intervention in September 1980.

 In the 1973 election the CHP emerged as the strongest party, with about one-third of the vote, narrowly defeating its principal rival, the JP. The CHP had changed its character since the early 1960s; its conservative wing, opposed to the leftist program adopted at the 1965 election, had departed. The party leader, İnönü, supported the radicals but in 1972 was discarded in favour of the radical leader, Bülent Ecevit (Ecevit, Bülent). The CHP thus became a social democratic party, drawing its support primarily from workers and intellectuals in the major cities. The remainder of the vote was distributed among small parties, mainly of the right.

      Lacking a majority, the CHP formed a coalition with the National Salvation Party (NSP), founded in 1972 as a successor to the banned NOP and led by Necmettin Erbakan (Erbakan, Necmettin). The electoral success of the NSP—which polled more than one-tenth of the vote—was striking. Although the constitution banned religious parties, the NSP was in all but name an Islamic party; in 1980 it called for the restoration of Islamic law ( Sharīʿah). The coalition's principal domestic achievement was a land reform measure that reduced ceilings on landholdings to about 250 acres (100 hectares) of irrigated and 500 acres (200 hectares) of dry land. Implementation of the land reform was slow, however, and the law was eventually annulled by the constitutional court in 1977. In September 1974 Ecevit resigned, hoping to bring about an election in which he could profit from the popular Turkish invasion of Cyprus (see Foreign affairs since 1950 (Turkey)), but his gamble failed; nonpartisan and coalition governments of the right followed, and there was no election until 1977.

      In the 1977 elections the CHP again emerged as the largest party, with about two-fifths of the vote, edging out the JP. The smaller parties, which had done so well in 1973, lost votes but still held the balance of power in the assembly. The NSP took about one-tenth of the vote and the NAP a smaller proportion. Demirel's ineffective coalition government continued and was succeeded in 1978 by an even more ineffective coalition under Ecevit. Inflation, unemployment, the trade deficit, and political violence all grew rapidly. The economy was seriously weakened by a rise in world oil prices and a fall in remittances from Turkish workers abroad. Ecevit resigned in 1979, and Demirel formed a minority JP government that announced a major new economic recovery program.

The 1980s
      On Sept. 12, 1980, the senior command of the army, led by General Kenan Evren, carried out a bloodless coup. This coup, the third army intervention in 20 years, was generally supported by the public. The leading politicians were arrested, and parliament, political parties, and trade unions were dissolved. A five-member National Security Council took control, suspending the constitution and implementing a provisional constitution that gave almost unlimited power to military commanders. Martial law, which had been established in a number of provinces in 1979, was extended throughout Turkey, and a major security operation was launched to eradicate terrorism. There followed armed clashes, thousands of arrests, imprisonment, torture, and executions, but political violence by opponents of the government was greatly reduced.

      As it had been in 1971, the army's intervention was prompted by disgust at the failure of the politicians to control violence, fear of the Islamic upsurge (which drew strength from the Iranian Revolution [1978–79] that had resulted in the declaration of an Islamic Republic), concern at the spread of guerrilla warfare in Kurdistan, and renewed worries that the army might become infected by the politicization that had paralyzed the police force. In 1980, however, the army was determined not only to restore order but also to undertake a thorough reform of the political system.

The 1982 constitution
      A new constitution, modeled on the French constitution of 1958, was approved by referendum in 1982. It provided for a strong president (elected for a seven-year term) who appointed the prime minister and senior judges and could dismiss parliament and declare a state of emergency. A unicameral parliament replaced the bicameral experiment of 1961, and—in an effort to reduce the influence of smaller parties—no party polling less than 10 percent of the votes cast was to receive seats in parliament. There were also close controls over political parties, the press, and trade unions.

      The first elections under the new constitution were held in 1983 and were a disappointment to the army, which had intended that two parties—the centre-right National Democratic Party (NDP) and the centre-left Populist Party (PP)—should dominate the new parliament. Instead, a third party, the Motherland Party (MP), emerged as the clear winner, gaining more than half the seats. The MP—a heterogeneous coalition of liberal, nationalist, social democratic, and Islamic groups—owed its success to the unwillingness of Turks to accept the army's prescription for government and to the reputation of its leader, Turgut Özal (Özal, Turgut). Özal was considered an authority on economic issues; he had been the author of the JP's economic reform package of 1980 and had been responsible for the successful stabilization program carried out after the army intervention. By the early 1980s, then, only the army upheld the principles of Atatürk.

      Under Özal's leadership the MP ruled Turkey until 1991. From 1983 to 1987 its economic policies—based on removing state controls, encouraging foreign trade, and relying on free-market principles—had considerable success, helped by the fall in world oil prices and by opportunities created by the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). The inflation rate fell, and economic growth was strong. After 1987, however, the economic situation deteriorated as a result of the world recession of the late 1980s and early '90s and the government's failure to stem the rising budget deficit, largely the consequence of the continued burden of inefficient, heavily subsidized state industries. Inflation and unemployment rose, and a large foreign-trade deficit developed.

The Kurdish (Kurd) conflict
      The public security situation also worsened, notably in the Kurdish provinces of the southeast. Following major social changes associated with the commercialization of agriculture since the 1950s, there were outbreaks of violence in Kurdistan during the 1970s, generally linked with the activities of the revolutionary left. After 1980, however, the disturbances took on a specifically Kurdish character. Several groups emerged, espousing demands ranging from freedom of cultural expression to outright independence; some turned to violence to advance their cause. The most important of these groups was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; PKK), led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK, a leftist group founded in 1978, initiated violent attacks in the late 1970s before launching its armed campaign against the state in 1984 from bases in Iraq. The PKK sought an independent Kurdish state or, possibly, full Kurdish autonomy. With between 5,000 and 10,000 armed fighters, the PKK directed attacks against government property, government officials, Turks living in the Kurdish regions, Kurds accused of collaborating with the government, foreigners, and Turkish diplomatic missions abroad. The PKK received support from Syria and from Kurds living abroad and also acquired money through criminal activities. From 1991 the existence of so-called safe havens in Iraqi Kurdistan—established following the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and protected by U.S. and British forces—provided new bases for PKK operations. Turkish governments sought to deal with the Kurdish problem by granting cultural concessions in 1991 and limited autonomy in 1993. The establishment of Kurdish political parties, however, remained forbidden. The main government effort remained the military suppression of the uprising; martial law was imposed in Kurdish areas, and increasing numbers of troops and security forces were committed to the task. By 1993 the total number of security forces involved in the struggle in southeastern Turkey was about 200,000, and the conflict had become the largest civil war in the Middle East. It is estimated that between 1982 and 1995 some 15,000 people were killed, the great majority of them Kurdish civilians. Dozens of villages were destroyed and many inhabitants driven from their homes. Turkish forces also attacked PKK bases in Iraq, first from the air and then with ground forces; in an operation in late 1992, about 20,000 Turkish troops entered the safe havens in Iraq, and in 1995 some 35,000 troops were employed in a similar campaign.

      In the 1987 election the MP was returned to power. Its share of the vote fell to slightly more than one-third, but it expanded its representation in parliament. Prior to the election, the political rights of the old politicians had been restored, and they figured prominently in the campaign. Demirel reemerged as the leader of the True Path Party (TPP; founded 1983), which won about one-fifth of the vote. Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü (İnönü, İsmet), led the Social Democratic and Populist Party (SDPP; founded 1985), which gained one-fourth of the vote. Erbakan's new Welfare Party (WP; an Islamic party) and Türkeş's right-wing National Endeavour Party (NEP) also took part, although they failed to obtain at least 10 percent of the vote and thus were not represented in parliament.

      After 1987 the popularity of the MP fell rapidly. Fractures developed—especially between liberals and Islamists—and Özal was heavily criticized for nepotism and corruption. In October 1989 Özal was elected president, succeeding Evren, while within the MP the internal struggle continued and was eventually decided in favour of the liberals, whose young leader, Mesut Yılmaz, became prime minister.

The 1990s
      Despite considerable fluctuations from year to year, Turkey maintained the economic advance that had begun in 1950. Increasingly, Turkey was becoming an urbanized, industrialized country and a major exporter of manufactured goods, especially to Europe. Yet the pace of economic change was an underlying cause of much of the social and political unrest that beset Turkey during the 1990s.

      The MP was defeated in the elections of 1991 but secured about one-fourth of the vote. The remainder of the centre-right vote went to the TPP, which emerged as the largest party in the new assembly. Mainly because of personality differences between Özal and Demirel, the obvious coalition government of the MP and the TPP was not possible; instead, the TPP formed a coalition government with the third largest party, the SDPP. The declining centre-left vote was divided between the SDPP and the Democratic Left Party (DLP) of Ecevit. The program of the new government, with Demirel as prime minister, represented a compromise between the economic liberalism of the TPP and the political liberalism of the SDPP, but the lack of fundamental agreement made it difficult to tackle the economic and political problems that troubled Turkey. In addition to the continuing Kurdish war, there was a recrudescence of the political violence by the radical left and right. After Özal's death in 1993, Demirel was elected president. Tansu Çiller (Ciller, Tansu), a liberal economist, became Turkey's first woman prime minister. Çiller emphasized more-rapid economic privatization and closer links with the European Union (EU). The coalition government collapsed in September 1995 when the SDPP withdrew from the government after protracted internal divisions. Çiller failed to form a new coalition and called an election for December 1995.

 The most striking feature of the 1995 election was the extent of support for the WP, which emerged as the largest single party, with about one-fifth of the vote. The political success of the WP reflected the increasing role of Islam (Islāmic world) in Turkish life during the 1980s and '90s, as evidenced by changes in dress and appearance, segregation of the sexes, the growth of Islamic schools and banks, and support for Sufi orders. Support for the WP came not only from the smaller towns but also from major cities, where the WP drew support from the secular left parties. The WP stood for a greater role for Islam in public life, state-directed economic expansion, and a turning away from Europe and the West toward the Islamic countries of the Middle East. Despite its electoral success, the WP was unable to find a coalition partner to form a government, and in March 1996 a coalition government of the MP and TPP was formed, although it was dependent on voting support from the centre left. Yılmaz and Çiller agreed to share the prime ministership; Yılmaz took the first turn, in 1996.

Malcolm Edward Yapp
      In June 1996 Erbakan's Islamist WP formed a short-lived coalition government, which was opposed by secularists and the armed forces. By mid-1997 Erbakan was succeeded by Yılmaz and the MP. However, two years later the MP lost power to the DLP, still led by Ecevit. The DLP government benefited from the capture of PKK leader Öcalan, who was sentenced to death.

      Late in 1997, a pair of powerful earthquakes shook eastern Turkey, killing thousands.

Challenges of the 21st century
 In 2002 the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP), a party with Islamist roots, swept the parliamentary elections. It came to power under the ostensible leadership of Abdullah Gül, since party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip) was ineligible to serve in parliament or as prime minister because of a 1998 conviction; a constitutional amendment in late 2002 removed this ineligibility. Erdoğan won a seat in parliament in early 2003 and quickly replaced Gül as prime minister. That same year, Turkey refused to grant transit through its territory to the U.S. military during the Iraq War, though it did extend rights to air transport.

      In January 2007, Armenian journalist and community leader Hrant Dink was murdered outside his office in Istanbul in what many viewed as a political attack, as Dink had received a number of death threats for his position on the early 20th-century treatment of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman Empire—a highly sensitive topic and a source of tension between both Turkish and Armenian communities.

      Tensions also simmered later that year when tens of thousands of secularist protesters, wary of Erdoğan's Islamist roots, demonstrated in Ankara in an attempt to discourage him from seeking the presidency; Erdoğan acquiesced. The AKP then nominated Gül as its candidate, even though he shared a similar political history with Erdoğan: both began their careers in a pro-Islamic party, since banned, and both were married to women who opted to wear the head scarf, a visible marker of religion in a resolutely secular republic and a major source of contention in modern Turkish society. Gül's marriage to a woman who wore the head scarf was received as but one signal of his Islamist leanings, an unnerving proposition for many voters.

      Though many suggested that the Islamist roots of the AKP might represent a challenge to Turkey's secular democracy, others felt that the periodic intrusion of the military into Turkish politics posed a greater threat. The military, which had maneuvered Turkish political proceedings in the past, issued a memorandum on the Internet criticizing the rising role of Islamists in the government and indicating military readiness to act if an unapproved candidate, such as Gül, won the presidency; this approach was dubbed an “e-coup” by pundits.

      Gül went on to receive the majority of the votes in parliament's election for the presidency, but the CHP opposition boycotted the vote and caused Gül to fall short of the necessary quorum by a narrow margin. Consequently, the election results were later overturned in court, and a stalemate ensued. Erdoğan worked to resolve the standoff by calling for early parliamentary elections, in which the AKP secured a decisive victory. In spite of the previous political standoff, the AKP then once more nominated Gül as its candidate, and in the parliamentary elections that followed he won the presidency by a wide margin.

      The PKK, quiescent since the capture of Öcalan, resumed guerrilla activities in 2004 under a new name, Kongra-Gel, chosen in 2003. Although the organization reverted to its former designation (PKK) in 2005, some elements continued to make use of the new name. The group was thought to be the source of a number of subsequent attacks, and in October 2007 the Turkish parliament approved military action for one year against PKK targets across the border in Iraq; a series of strikes began in December, and a ground incursion was initiated in February. Although the United States indicated its support for the limited maneuvers against the PKK by sharing intelligence with Turkey, it encouraged the development of a long-term resolution to the conflict.

      In February 2008 the parliament voted to amend Turkey's constitution by eliminating a ban barring the head scarf from being worn on university campuses. The amendment aggravated a long-standing fault line within Turkish society; while portions of the population supported the liberty to wear the head scarf, others feared that the change endangered Turkey's secular ideals and could lead to increasing pressure upon those women who choose not to wear the garment. Galvanized by the amendment, opponents of the AKP renewed charges that the party's Islamist agenda threatened Turkish secular order. In March 2008 the constitutional court voted unanimously to hear a case that called for the disbanding of the AKP and a five-year ban of Erdoğan and dozens of other party members from Turkish politics, and in early June it annulled the amendment. The AKP successfully retained its position, however, when in July 2008 the court ruled narrowly against the party's closure.

Foreign affairs since 1950
      Until the 1960s, Turkish foreign policy was wholly based on close relations with the West, particularly the friendship of the United States. Turkey sent troops to fight in the Korean War and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; 1952) and the Central Treaty Organization (1955). This Western-oriented policy derived from Turkey's fear of its enormous northern neighbour, the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), from its dependence on U.S. military and economic aid, and from its desire to be accepted as a secular, democratic, Western state. After 1960, however, this policy came into question as a consequence of East-West détente, the rise of economic and political cooperation in western Europe, and the growing economic importance of Middle Eastern countries.

      Doubts also began to creep into Turkish political thought about the reliability of the United States as an ally, especially in consequence of events in Cyprus. The independence of Cyprus had been arranged through the Zürich and London agreements of 1959. Turkey sought to protect the interests of the Turkish community on Cyprus, and, when these were threatened by disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1963 and again in 1967, Turkey contemplated intervention. In July 1974 the Greek (Greece, history of) government supported the leaders of a coup that overthrew the Cypriot president, Makarios III, and proclaimed the union of Cyprus with Greece. Failing to persuade either Britain or the United States to take effective action, Turkey acted unilaterally and occupied the northern part of the island, refusing to withdraw until a new arrangement satisfactory to the Turkish Cypriots was agreed to and guaranteed. These events, which were followed by disputes over the extent of territorial waters, underwater resources in the Aegean Sea, sovereignty over uninhabited islands, and airspace, led to bad relations with Greece and a cooling of relations with the United States, which Turks believed had favoured Greece. In 1987 and 1996 Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war over the Aegean.

      As a result, Turkey—while remaining faithful to the Western alliance—broadened its options. From 1964 it developed better relations with the Soviet Union, leading to a friendship agreement in 1978; following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, Turkey was quick to establish relations with the newly independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian states (many of which had Turkic-speaking majorities). Turkey recognized the government of mainland China in 1971, improved relations with the Balkan states (although relations with Bulgaria were disturbed by an exodus of 300,000 Turkish refugees from that country in 1989), and cultivated closer connections with the Arab and Islamic worlds. In the former Yugoslavia, popular Turkish sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims led Turkey to advocate international action on their behalf, and Turkish forces took part in the United Nations (UN) and NATO operations there. Turkey cooperated with Iraq in suppressing Kurdish (Kurd) disorder, although it supported the UN against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, allowing use of U.S. air bases in Turkey. In return, the United States extended the defense agreement that was due to expire in 1990 and increased military and economic aid. International sanctions against Iraq cost Turkey hundreds of millions of dollars a year in oil pipeline revenues. Turkey's relations with Syria were adversely affected by Syria's support for Kurdish rebels and by Syrian concern over the construction of the Atatürk Dam in southeastern Turkey, which threatened to divert the Euphrates River, whose flow is shared by Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.

      Turkey applied to join the European Community (now embedded in the EU) in 1959, and an association agreement was signed in 1963. In 1987 Özal applied for full membership. The increasing economic links between Turkey and the EU (European Union)—more than half of Turkey's trade was with the EU in the 1990s—gave the application a stronger economic justification. However, doubts persisted in the EU, where Turkish policy on human rights and on Cyprus was criticized, and in Turkey, where the Islamists opposed membership. Nevertheless, in 1996 a customs union between Turkey and the EU was inaugurated. In the final years of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st, Turkey continued to flirt with membership in the EU. To strengthen its bid, the Turkish government began pursuing a number of key changes. In the early 21st century the emphasis on freedom of speech and Kurdish-language rights was accompanied by a reformed penal code and a decrease in the role of the military in politics. In 2004 the death penalty (capital punishment) was banned, a move largely lauded by the EU community.

      That same year the EU called upon Turkey to intervene in the ongoing Turkish-Greek Cyprus standoff by encouraging the Turkish north to support a UN-sponsored unification plan that was to precede Cyprus's admittance to the EU. Although Turkey was successful in its efforts and the Turkish north voted strongly in favour of the plan, the Greek south overwhelmingly rejected it. In May 2004 Cyprus entered the EU as a divided territory: EU rights and privileges were extended only to the southern region, because it alone was under the administration of the internationally recognized Cypriot government. Late in the following year, formal negotiations over Turkey's EU membership were officially opened. Though it has since recognized Cyprus as a member of the EU, Turkey's failure to extend full diplomatic recognition subsequently posed a recurrent stumbling block in its EU bid; talks were stalled in late 2006 by Turkey's continued failure to open its air- and seaports to Cypriot passage.

      In addition, Turkey's bid was slowed by a number of challenges from standing EU members, with opposition from France and Austria traditionally being among the most vocal; French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Sarkozy, Nicolas) expressed the opinion that Turkey did not belong in the EU. In addition, Sarkozy sought to establish new limitations on future expansion of the EU community. Austria, France, and Slovakia, among others, suggested that Turkey be extended a “privileged partnership” in the place of full membership.

Malcolm Edward Yapp Ed.

Additional Reading

General works
A general introduction that contains a useful bibliography is Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Turkey: A Country Study, 5th ed. (1996). A helpful shorter work is Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally (1987). Older, still useful works include Lord Kinross (patrick Balfour, Baron Kinross), Turkey (1960); Cedric Salter, Introducing Turkey (1961); and Andrew Mango, Turkey (1968).

The land
Works in European languages dealing specifically with Turkey are somewhat restricted. The only text devoted solely to the geography of Turkey is John C. Dewdney, Turkey (1971); but much additional geographic information is available from broader studies, including George Babcock Cressey, Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia (1960); William C. Brice, South-west Asia (1966); Stephen H. Longrigg, The Middle East: A Social Geography, 2nd ed., rev. by James Jankowski (1970); W.B. Fisher, The Middle East, 7th ed., completely rev. (1978); Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography (1985); and Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study, 2nd ed. (1988). Numerous aspects of Turkey's physical and human geography are mapped and analyzed in Gerald H. Blake, John C. Dewdney, and Jonathan Mitchell (eds.), The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa (1987). The standard national atlas is Ali Tanoğlu, S. Erinç, and Erol Tümertekin, Türkiye Atlasi (1961).

The people
The country's population is discussed in John C. Dewdney, “Turkey: Recent Population Trends,” in John I. Clarke and W.B. Fisher (eds.), Populations of the Middle East and North Africa (1972), pp. 40–67. Village life is described in Mahmut Makal, A Village in Anatolia, trans. from Turkish (1954); Joe E. Pierce, Life in a Turkish Village (1964, reissued 1983); and Paul Stirling, Turkish Village (1965). Migration is treated in Nermin Abadan-Unat et al., Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960–1975 (1976); and in Ruşen Keleş, “The Effects of External Migration on Regional Development in Turkey,” in Ray Hudson and Jim Lewis (eds.), Uneven Development in Southern Europe (1985), pp. 54–75.

The economy
Economic development is the main focus of Oddvar Aresvik, The Agricultural Development of Turkey (1975); Edwin J. Cohn, Turkish Economic, Social, and Political Change (1970); Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth (1968), and Economic Planning in Turkey (1968); Caglar Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923–1929 (1981); Malcolm D. Rivkin, Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent (1965); and Bertil Wålstedt, State Manufacturing Enterprise in a Mixed Economy: The Turkish Case (1980). John C. Dewdney, “Agricultural Development in Turkey,” in John I. Clarke and Howard Bowen-Jones (eds.), Change and Development in the Middle East (1981), pp. 213–223, surveys agriculture's role in the economy.Much attention has been paid to the modernization of Turkey and the changes that followed the establishment of the republic, most notably in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (1968, reprinted 1979); but also in David Barchard, Turkey and the West (1985); Peter Benedict, Erol Tümertekin, and Fatma Mansur (eds.), Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives (1974); William M. Hale (ed.), Aspects of Modern Turkey (1976); William M. Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (1981); Jacob Landau (ed.), Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (1984); and Huseyin Ramazanoglu (ed.), Turkey in the World Capitalist System (1985).

Administration and social conditions
Political aspects are dealt with in detail by C.H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 2nd, enlarged ed. (1990); Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey (1985); Kemal H. Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey (1973); Lord Kinross (Patrick Balfour, Baron Kinross), Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (1964, reissued 1993); and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (1964). Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (1981), studies the role of religion in Turkey's development.John C. Dewdney

The best general history covering this period is Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (1968, reprinted 1979); it is updated by Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (1993); and by Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (1993). Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (1964), covers similar ground but concentrates on the development of ideas. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (1964), has valuable essays on general themes. Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey (1981), covers the period beginning in 1923.R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (1963, reissued 1973); and Carter V. Findlay, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922 (1980), discuss the Tanzimat. Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (1963), is a careful study of the 1876 crisis and the establishment of the first Ottoman parliament. Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (1962), is a study of the Young Ottomans; and studies of the Young Turks include Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (1957, reissued 1970); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (1995); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914 (1969); and Erik J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926 (1984). David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908 (1977), considers ideological aspects. The Ottoman public debt is considered in Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (1929, reissued 1966). Charles Issawi (ed.), The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914 (1980); and Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration (1983), are good economic histories.Several chronologies are useful for Turkish history since 1918; they appear in Gotthard Jäschke, Die Welt des Islams, Die Türkei in den Jahren 1935–1941 (1943), Die Türkei in den Jahren 1942–1951 (1955), and Die Türkei in den Jahren 1952–1961 (1965). Economic developments during this period are outlined in Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry, and George Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (1949, reissued 1968); Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth (1968); Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey (1975); and William M. Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (1981).Ahmed Emin (Ahmet Emin Yalman), Turkey in the World War (1930), is still the only account of the subject; although relations with Germany can be followed in Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (1968, reprinted 1989); and with Austria in Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent (1970). Several books consider aspects of Allied war aims in the Middle East. Although outdated in parts, Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923 (1931, reissued 1966), is comprehensive; but the best modern account is David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 (1989). E.D. Smith, Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, 1919–1923 (1959), is also worth consulting. Lord Kinross (Patrick Balfour, Baron Kinross), Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation (1964, reissued 1981; also published as Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey, 1965, reissued 1978), is a good biography. Political developments in Turkey and particularly the rise of the Democratic Party are detailed in Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics (1959). Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (1963), is a good general account, strongest on economic aspects. Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (1965), is an illuminating and detailed analysis of the membership of the Grand National Assembly.Various periods are examined in the following works: Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960–1961 (1963, reprinted 1980), on the 1960 military coup; C.H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey (1969), and Democracy and Development in Turkey (1979), on the period 1961–65; and, for the postwar period generally, Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975 (1977). Later political movements are analyzed in Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (1974); Ergun Özbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey (1976); Lucille W. Pevsner, Turkey's Political Crisis (1984); and Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy, and the Military (1988). Political parties are addressed by Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey (1991). Nationalist ideology is discussed in Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey (1981); and the role of Islām in politics is explored by Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdaği, Political Parties in Turkey (1984). Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey (1991), a collection of essays, is also of interest. Andreas M. Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey (1966), may serve as a history of educational developments. A fine study of Turkish foreign relations is Kemal H. Karpat et al., Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974 (1975). The Kurdish problem is considered by Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State (1978, reissued 1992); and Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey (1990). Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (1994), covers political, economic, social, and diplomatic developments since the 1960s.Malcolm Edward Yapp

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