/ak'see ol"euh jee/, n.the branch of philosophy dealing with values, as those of ethics, aesthetics, or religion.[1905-10; < F axiologie < Gk axí(a) worth, value + -ologie; see -O-, -LOGY]
* * *or value theoryPhilosophical theory of value.Axiology is the study of value, or goodness, in its widest sense. The distinction is commonly made between intrinsic and extrinsic valuei.e., between that which is valuable for its own sake and that which is valuable only as a means to something else, which itself may be extrinsically or intrinsically valuable. Many different answers have been given to the question "What is intrinsically valuable?" For hedonists, it is pleasure; for pragmatists, it is satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; for Kantians, it is a good will. Pluralists such as G.E. Moore and William David Ross assert that there are any number of intrinsically valuable things. According to subjective theories of value, things are valuable only insofar as they are desired; objective theories hold that there are at least some things that are valuable independently of people's interest in or desire for them. Cognitive theories of value assert that ascriptions of value function logically as statements of fact, whereas noncognitive theories assert that they are merely expressions of feeling (see emotivism) or prescriptions or commendations (see prescriptivism). According to naturalists, expressions such as "intrinsically good" can be analyzed as referring to natural, or non-ethical, properties, such as being pleasant. Moore famously denied this, holding that "good" refers to a simple (unanalyzable) non-natural property. See also fact-value distinction; naturalistic fallacy.
* * *(from Greek axios, “worthy”; logos, “science”), also called Theory Of Value, the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms. Its significance lies (1) in the considerable expansion that it has given to the meaning of the term value and (2) in the unification that it has provided for the study of a variety of questions—economic, moral, aesthetic, and even logical—that had often been considered in relative isolation.The term “value” originally meant the worth of something, chiefly in the economic sense of exchange value, as in the work of the 18th-century political economist Adam Smith. A broad extension of the meaning of value to wider areas of philosophical interest occurred during the 19th century under the influence of a variety of thinkers and schools: the Neo-Kantians Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Albrecht Ritschl; Friedrich Nietzsche, author of a theory of the transvaluation of all values; Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels; and Eduard von Hartmann (Hartmann, Eduard von), philosopher of the unconscious, whose Grundriss der Axiologie (1909; “Outline of Axiology”) first used the term in a title. Hugo Münsterberg (Münsterberg, Hugo), often regarded as the founder of applied psychology, and Wilbur Marshall Urban, whose Valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909) was the first treatise on this topic in English, introduced the movement to the United States. Ralph Barton Perry's (Perry, Ralph Barton) book General Theory of Value (1926) has been called the magnum opus of the new approach. A value, he theorized, is “any object of any interest.” Later, he explored eight “realms” of value: morality, religion, art, science, economics, politics, law, and custom.A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and intrinsic value—between what is good as a means and what is good as an end. John Dewey (Dewey, John), in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and Theory of Valuation (1939), presented a pragmatic interpretation and tried to break down this distinction between means and ends, though the latter effort was more likely a way of emphasizing the point that many actual things in human life—such as health, knowledge, and virtue—are good in both senses. Other philosophers, such as C.I. Lewis, Georg Henrik von Wright, and W.K. Frankena, have multiplied the distinctions—differentiating, for example, between instrumental value (being good for some purpose) and technical value (being good at doing something) or between contributory value (being good as part of a whole) and final value (being good as a whole).Many different answers are given to the question “What is intrinsically good?” Hedonists say it is pleasure; Pragmatists, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; Kantians, a good will; Humanists, harmonious self-realization; Christians, the love of God. Pluralists, such as G.E. Moore (Moore, G E), W.D. Ross, Max Scheler, and Ralph Barton Perry, argue that there are any number of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined.Because “fact” symbolizes objectivity and “value” suggests subjectivity, the relationship of value to fact is of fundamental importance in developing any theory of the objectivity of value and of value judgments. Whereas such descriptive sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion all attempt to give a factual description of what is actually valued, as well as causal explanations of similarities and differences between the valuations, it remains the philosopher's task to ask about their objective validity. The philosopher asks whether something is of value because it is desired, as subjectivists such as Perry hold, or whether it is desired because it has value, as objectivists such as Moore and Nicolai Hartmann claim. In both approaches, value judgments are assumed to have a cognitive status, and the approaches differ only on whether a value exists as a property of something independently of human interest in it or desire for it. Noncognitivists, on the other hand, deny the cognitive status of value judgments, holding that their main function is either emotive, as the positivist A.J. Ayer (Ayer, Sir A.J.) maintains, or prescriptive, as the analyst R.M. Hare holds. Existentialists (Existentialism), such as Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasizing freedom, decision, and choice of one's values, also appear to reject any logical or ontological connection between value and fact.
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