Smith, Vernon L.

▪ American economist

born January 1, 1927, Wichita, Kansas, U.S.

      American economist, corecipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2002 for his use of laboratory experiments in economic analysis, which laid the foundation for the field of experimental economics. He shared the award with Israeli-born psychologist Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, Daniel).

      Smith studied electrical engineering at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech; B.S., 1949), then switched to economics at the University of Kansas (M.A., 1951) and Harvard (Ph.D., 1955). Smith taught and did research at Purdue University (1955–67), Brown University (1967–68), the University of Massachusetts (1968–75), Caltech (1973–75), and the University of Arizona (1975–2001), where he was Regents' Professor of Economics from 1988. In 2001 he was named professor of economics and law at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. Much of Smith's commercial work was related to the deregulation of energy in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. He served on the editorial boards of several publications and wrote extensively on subjects ranging from capital theory and finance to natural resource economics and experimental economics.

      Smith's early work was inspired by the classroom experiments of his teacher at Harvard, E.H. Chamberlain, who tested the neoclassical theory of perfect competition. Smith improved on the process of testing the fundamental economic theory that under perfect competition the market price of any product or service establishes an equilibrium between supply and demand at the level where the value assigned by a marginal buyer is equal to that of a marginal seller. The results of Smith's experiments, published in 1962, involved the random designation of the roles of buyers and sellers with different and uninformed valuations of a commodity, expressed as a lowest acceptable selling price and highest acceptable buying price. He was able to determine the theoretical equilibrium, or acceptable market price. Unexpectedly, the prices obtained in the laboratory were close to the theoretical values. Many of his experiments focused on the outcome of public auctions; he showed that the way in which the bidding was organized affected the selling price. Smith also devised “wind-tunnel tests,” where trials of new alternative market designs, such as those for a deregulated industry, could be tested.

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