Omaha Beach

▪ World War II

Introduction

 second beach from the west among the five landing areas of the Normandy Invasion of World War II. It was assaulted on June 6, 1944 (D-Day of the invasion), by units of the U.S. 29th and 1st infantry divisions, many of whose soldiers were drowned during the approach from ships offshore or were killed by defending fire from German troops placed on heights surrounding the beach.

 Formally part of the Omaha invasion area was Pointe du Hoc, a promontory situated to the west of the landing beach. On D-Day it was the object of a daring seaborne assault by U.S. Army rangers, who scaled its cliffs with the aim of silencing artillery pieces placed on its heights.

The landing beach

  The largest of the D-Day assault areas, Omaha Beach stretched over 10 km (6 miles) between the fishing port of Port-en-Bessin on the east and the mouth of the Vire River on the west. The western third of the beach was backed by a seawall 3 metres (10 feet) high, and the whole beach was overlooked by cliffs 30 metres high. There were five exits from the sand and shingle beach; the best was a paved road in a ravine leading to the resort village of Vierville-sur-Mer, two were only dirt paths, and two were dirt roads leading to the villages of Colleville-sur-Mer and Saint-Laurent-sur-Mer.

  The Germans under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (Rommel, Erwin) had built formidable defenses to protect this enclosed battlefield. The waters and beach were heavily mined (mine), and there were 13 strongpoints called Widerstandsnester (“resistance nests”). Numerous other fighting positions dotted the area, supported by an extensive trench (trench warfare) system. The defending forces consisted of three battalions of the veteran 352nd Infantry Division. Their weapons were fixed to cover the beach with grazing enfilade fire as well as plunging fire from the cliffs. Omaha was a killing zone.

  Omaha Beach was part of the invasion area assigned to the U.S. First Army, under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley (Bradley, Omar Nelson). The assault sectors at Omaha were code-named (from west to east) Charlie, Dog (consisting of Green, White, and Red sections), Easy (Green and Red sections), and Fox (Green and Red sections). The beach was to be assaulted at 0630 hours by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, with the 116th Regiment of the 29th Division attached for D-Day only. Omaha was wide enough to land two regiments side by side with armour in front, and so the 116th Regiment was to land at Dog (Green, White, and Red) and Easy Green, while the 16th Regiment, 1st Division, was to land at Easy Red and Fox Green.

  The objectives of the 1st Division were ambitious. First it was to capture the villages of Vierville, Saint-Laurent, and Colleville; then it was to push through and cut the Bayeux-Isigny road; and then it was to attack south toward Trévières and west toward the Pointe du Hoc. Elements of the 16th Regiment were to link up at Port-en-Bessin with British units from Gold Beach to the east.

   From the beginning everything went wrong at Omaha. Special “DD” tanks (amphibious Sherman tanks (Sherman tank) fitted with flotation screens) that were supposed to support the 116th Regiment sank in the choppy waters of the Channel. Only 2 of the 29 launched made it to the beach. With the exception of Company A, no unit of the 116th landed where it was planned. Strong winds and tidal currents carried the landing craft from right to left. The 16th Regiment on the east half of the beach did not fare much better, landing in a state of confusion with units badly intermingled.

  Throughout the landing, German gunners poured deadly fire into the ranks of the invading Americans. Bodies lay on the beach or floated in the water. Men sought refuge behind beach obstacles, pondering the deadly sprint across the beach to the seawall, which offered some safety at the base of the cliff. Destroyed craft and vehicles littered the water's edge and beach, and at 0830 hours all landing ceased at Omaha. The troops on the beach were left on their own and realized that the exits were not the way off. Slowly, and in small groups, they scaled the cliffs. Meanwhile, navy destroyers (destroyer) steamed in and, scraping their bottoms in the shallow water, blasted the German fortifications at point-blank range. By 1200 hours German fire had noticeably decreased as the defensive positions were taken from the rear. Then one by one the exits were opened.

  By nightfall the 1st and 29th divisions held positions around Vierville, Saint-Laurent, and Colleville—nowhere near the planned objectives, but they had a toehold. The Americans suffered 2,400 casualties at Omaha on June 6, but by the end of the day they had landed 34,000 troops. The German 352nd Division lost 20 percent of its strength, with 1,200 casualties, but it had no reserves coming to continue the fight.

Pointe du Hoc

  An ominous piece of land jutting into the English Channel, Pointe du Hoc provided an elevated vantage point from which huge German guns with a range of 25 km (15 miles) could deliver fire upon both Omaha Beach (7 km, or 4 miles, to the east) and Utah Beach (11 km, or 7 miles, to the west). Allied intelligence and photoreconnaissance had identified five 155-mm guns emplaced in reinforced-concrete casemates on the Pointe, and Allied commanders had determined that the neutralization of these guns was the key to the fate of the Omaha and Utah landings. The area of the Pointe was defended by elements of the German 352nd Infantry Division.

  The task of neutralizing the guns, and of cutting the road running behind the Pointe from Saint-Pierre-du-Mont to Grandcamp, fell to the 2nd and 5th ranger battalions, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder. The scheme was to land Companies D, E, and F of the 2nd Battalion in a cliff-scaling attack on the Pointe while Company C landed to the east to destroy gun positions on the western end of Omaha Beach. While these assaults were taking place, Companies A and B, along with all of the 5th Battalion, were to mark time off the beach and wait for a signal that the cliff scaling had succeeded. If the signal came, they were to follow in and also scale the heights. If the signal did not come, they were to land at Omaha Beach and attack the Pointe from the rear.

  Companies D, E, and F landed at the Pointe at 0710 hours, 40 minutes later than their planned landing time. They were the victims of heavy seas and winds, one of their landing craft having sunk on the way in. Once landed, however, the rangers engaged the Germans on top of the cliffs in a heavy firefight, and within minutes the first man was up. In small groups the rangers fought their way to the casemates, only to find them empty of the big guns. They moved forward and cut the road behind the Pointe, and then a two-man patrol went down a narrow road leading south and discovered the guns some 500 metres (550 yards) from the casemates. The guns were zeroed in on Utah Beach, and a German force, totaling some 100 men, was assembled a short distance away. Using thermite grenades, the two rangers melted and destroyed the guns' elevating and traversing mechanisms, rendering the pieces immovable. They then returned to their positions.

  The other rangers offshore, not seeing the signal from the Pointe, landed at Omaha Beach but were not able to accomplish their mission of attacking Pointe du Hoc since they became involved in the desperate fighting on Omaha itself. They were, however, a key to the eventual success at Omaha.

 Although early reports characterized the attack on the Pointe as a wasted effort because the German guns were not there, the attack was in fact highly successful. By 0900 hours the rangers on the Pointe had cut the road behind the Pointe and had put the guns out of action. They were thus the first American unit to accomplish its mission on D-Day—at a cost of half of their fighting force. By the end of the day they were holding onto a small pocket on the heights of the Pointe, and the Germans were counterattacking. The rangers held out for two days until help arrived.

Ronald J. Drez

* * *