logical relation

▪ logic

      those relations between the elements of discourse or thought that constitute its rationality, in the sense either of (1) reasonableness or (2) intelligibility. A statement may be perfectly intelligible without being based upon any good evidence or reason, though of course no statement can be reasonable without its being intelligible. Logical relations are contrasted by most philosophers with causal relations within reality, thought, or discourse.

      Statements or propositions are logically related in the sense of reasonableness if the truth or falsity of one requires truth or falsity in the other. Thus, “John has a high IQ and is immensely popular” is logically related to “John has a high IQ,” because if the latter is false the former must be false, whereas if the former is true the latter must be true. Similarly, “All living things require oxygen” and “No living things require oxygen” are logically related in that if one is true the other must be false. The more important logical relations are implication (as in the first example above) and equivalence; and, as displayed in the square of opposition (see opposition, square of), contrariety (as in the second example), contradiction, subcontrariety, and subimplication.

      A type of relation between the elements of thought and discourse that has almost always been regarded by philosophers as much more significant for their concerns than those that condition reasonableness is the kind that must be maintained if the discourse is to be intelligible or understandable, i.e., if it is to be about, and be recognized as being about, some definite object or event or state of affairs. These logical relations often are thought of as holding between concepts, as opposed to whole propositions. Clear cases may be drawn from certain rules of grammar. Thus, no string of mere prepositions and adverbs—as “to quickly brightly away through . . . ”—yields an intelligible assertion. A similar but not identical unintelligibility is present in “Prudence is light blue in odour.” Many relations, however, have to do, not with grammar, but with the context—often the extra-linguistic context—in which an expression or thought occurs. Thus, if a person looks out the window and says, “It is raining, but I do not believe it”; or if after telling you he has no auto he wishes to sell you his car; or if he asks you to close a door that both of you know is already closed, in each of these examples it is not clear what he is saying or doing.

      A still more general (and vague) conception of logical relation is that it is any relation in which a logician may have a peculiar professional interest. Relations of names to their objects, of functions to their arguments (as of an equation to its x's, y's, a's, and b's), or of metalanguages (discourse on languages) to their object languages, are examples here. But on questions relating to the nature and range of logic as a theoretical discipline, because of widespread disagreement on these issues among competent professionals, little of accepted substance can be said about logical relations in this third sense. Nonetheless, the adjective logical lies at the centre of interest, disagreement, and confusion in 20th-century British and American philosophy.

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