Europe, history of

Europe, history of


      history of European peoples and cultures from prehistoric times to the present. Europe is a more ambiguous term than most geographic expressions. Its etymology is doubtful, as is the physical extent of the area it designates. Its western frontiers seem clearly defined by its coastline, yet the position of the British Isles remains equivocal. To outsiders, they seem clearly part of Europe. To many British and some Irish people, however, “Europe” means essentially continental Europe. To the south, Europe ends on the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Yet, to the Roman Empire, this was mare nostrum (“our sea”), an inland sea rather than a frontier. Even now, some question whether Malta or Cyprus is a European island. The greatest uncertainty lies to the east, where natural frontiers are notoriously elusive. If the Ural Mountains mark the eastern boundary of Europe, where does it lie to the south of them? Can Astrakhan, for instance, be regarded as European? Can even the Crimea or the Ukraine? The questions have more than merely geographic significance.

      These questions have acquired new importance as Europe has come to be more than a geographic expression. After World War II, much was heard of “the European idea.” Essentially, this meant the idea of European unity, at first confined to western Europe but by the beginning of the 1990s seeming able at length to embrace central and eastern Europe as well.

      Unity in Europe is an ancient ideal. In a sense it was implicitly prefigured by the Roman Empire. In the Middle Ages, it was imperfectly embodied first by Charlemagne's empire and then by the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic church. Later, a number of political theorists proposed plans for European union, and both Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler tried to unite Europe by conquest.

      It was not until after World War II, however, that European statesmen began to seek ways of uniting Europe peacefully on a basis of equality instead of domination by one or more great powers. Their motive was fourfold: to prevent further wars in Europe, in particular by reconciling France and Germany and helping to deter aggression by others; to eschew the protectionism and “beggar-my-neighbour” policies that had been practiced between the wars; to match the political and economic influence of the world's new superpowers, but on a civilian basis; and to begin to civilize international relations by introducing common rules and institutions that would identify and promote the shared interests of Europe rather than the national interests of its constituent states.

      Underlying this policy is the conviction that Europeans have more in common than divides them, especially in the modern world. By comparison with other continents, western Europe is small and immensely varied, divided by rivers and mountains and cut into by inlets and creeks. It is also densely populated—a mosaic of different peoples with a multiplicity of languages. Very broadly and inadequately, its peoples can be sorted into Nordic, Alpine or Celtic, and Mediterranean types, and the bulk of their languages classified as either Romance or Germanic. In this sense, what Europeans chiefly share is their diversity; and it may be this that has made them so energetic and combative. Although uniquely favoured by fertile soils and temperate climates, they have long proved themselves warlike. Successive waves of invasion, mainly from the east, were followed by centuries of rivalry and conflict, both within Europe and overseas. Many of Europe's fields have been battlefields, and many of Europe's cities, it has been said, were built on bones.

      Yet Europeans have also been in the forefront of intellectual, social, and economic endeavour. As navigators, explorers, and colonists, for a long time they dominated much of the rest of the world and left on it the impress of their values, their technology, their politics, and even their dress. They also exported both nationalism and weaponry.

      Then, in the 20th century, Europe came close to destroying itself. World War I cost more than 8 million European lives, World War II more than 18 million in battle, bombing, and systematic Nazi genocide—to say nothing of the 30 million who perished elsewhere.

      As well as the dead, the wars left lasting wounds, psychological and physical alike. But, whereas World War I exacerbated nationalism and ideological extremism in Europe, World War II had almost the opposite effect. The burned child fears fire; and Europe had been badly burned. Within five years of the war's end, the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, prompted by Jean Monnet, proposed to Germany the first practical move toward European unity, and the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer agreed. Others involved in that first step included the statesmen Alcide De Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak. All except Monnet were men from Europe's linguistic and political frontiers—Schuman from Lorraine, Adenauer from the Rhineland, De Gasperi from northern Italy, Spaak from bilingual Belgium. Europe's diversity thus helped foster its impulse to unite.

Richard J. Mayne
      This article treats the history of European society and culture. For a discussion of the physical and human geography of the continent, see Europe. For the histories of individual countries, see specific articles by name. Articles treating specific topics in European history include Byzantine Empire; Steppe, the; World War I; and World War II. For the lives of prominent European figures, see specific biographies by name—e.g., Charlemagne, Erasmus (Erasmus, Desiderius), and Bismarck (Bismarck, Otto von). Related topics are discussed in such articles as those on religion (e.g., Celtic religion; Greek religion; Germanic religion (Germanic religion and mythology); Christianity; and Judaism), literature (e.g., English literature, Scandinavian literature, and Russian literature), and the fine arts (e.g., painting, history of; and music, history of).

      The appearance of anatomically modern humans in Europe about 35,000 BC was accompanied by major changes in culture and technology. There was a further period of significant change after the last major Pleistocene (Pleistocene Epoch) glaciation, which included the widespread adoption of farming and the establishment of permanent settlements from the 7th millennium BC. These laid the foundation for all future developments of European civilization.

      Knowledge of these early periods of the European past is entirely dependent on archaeology. The evidence, which has almost all been collected since the middle of the 19th century, varies greatly from region to region and is limited by what was deposited and by whether what was deposited has survived. The archaeological evidence has also been disturbed by a range of human and natural processes, from glacial activity to farming and modern development. Modern techniques have greatly increased the amount of information available, but many parts of the story of the past may be difficult or impossible to recover, and the evidence that has been revealed needs to be assessed in the light of all these factors.

       dating depends on scientific methods. Cores through deep ocean-floor sediments and the Arctic ice cap have provided a continuous record of climatic conditions for the last one million years, but individual sites cannot easily be matched to it. Radiocarbon dating is effective to 35,000 years ago, and prior to that other scientific methods can be used with varying degrees of precision. Tree rings give precise dates for wood as early as the 5th millennium BC. Detailed typological studies, especially of pottery and stone tools, can be used to establish the relative sequence of material. The dates cited in this section are based on various scientific methods. For the earliest period, to about 35,000 BC, they are derived from absolute determinations by potassium-argon and thorium-uranium dating, together with correlations to the deep-sea and ice-core sequences; for the later period, they are derived primarily from radiocarbon determinations, calibrated where appropriate to give actual calendar years.

Paleolithic settlement
Earliest developments
      The period of human activity to the end of the last major Pleistocene glaciation, about 8300 BC, is termed the Paleolithic Period (Old Stone Age); that part of it from 35,000 to 8300 BC is termed the Upper Paleolithic.

      The climatic record shows a cyclic pattern of warmer and colder periods; in the last 750,000 years, there have been eight major cycles, with many shorter episodes. In the colder periods, the Arctic and Alpine ice sheets expanded, and sea levels fell. Some parts of southern Europe may have been little affected by these changes, but the advance and retreat of the ice sheets and accompanying glacial environments had a significant impact on northern Europe; at their maximum advance, they covered most of Scandinavia, the North European Plain, and Russia. Human occupation fluctuated in response to these changing conditions, but continuous settlement north of the Alps required a solution to the problems of living in extremely cold conditions.

      By 1,000,000 years ago hominids (Hominidae) were widely distributed in Africa and Asia, and some finds in Europe may be that early. The earliest securely dated material is from Isernia la Pineta in southern Italy, where stone tools and animal bones were dated to about 730,000 BC. Thereafter the evidence becomes more plentiful, and by 375,000 BC most areas except Scandinavia, the Alps, and northern Eurasia had been colonized.

      Fossil remains of the hominids themselves are rare, and most of the evidence consists of stone tools (tool). The simplest were chopping tools made from pebbles with a few flakes struck off to create an edge. These were replaced by more complex traditions of toolmaking, which produced a range of hand axes and flake tools; these industries are referred to as Acheulian (Acheulean industry), after the French site of Saint-Acheul. Some of the tools were for woodworking, but only rarely do any tools of organic material, such as wooden spears, survive as evidence of other Paleolithic technologies.

      The subsistence economy depended on hunting and gathering (hunting and gathering culture). Population densities were necessarily low, and group territories were large. The main evidence is animal bones, which suggest a varied reliance on species such as rhinoceros, red deer, ibex, and horse, but it is difficult to reconstruct how such food was actually acquired. Open confrontation with large animals, such as the rhinoceros, is unlikely, and they were probably killed in vulnerable locations such as lake-edge watering spots; at La Cotte de Sainte Brelade in the Channel Islands, rhinoceroses and mammoths were driven over a cliff edge. Scavenging meat from already dead animals also may have been important. Food resources such as migratory herds and plants were available only seasonally, so an annual strategy for survival was necessary. It is not clear, however, how it was possible to store food acquired at times of plenty; carcasses of dead animals frozen in the snow would have provided a store of food.

      From the beginning of the last major Pleistocene glaciation about 120,000 BC, the hominid fossils belong to the Neanderthals (Neanderthal), who have been found throughout Europe and western Asia, including the glacial environments of central Europe. They were biologically and culturally adapted to survival in the harsh environments of the north, though they are also found in more moderate climates in southern Europe and Asia. Finds of stone tools from the Russian plains suggest the first certain evidence of colonization there by 80,000 BC. Despite their heavy skeletons and developed brow ridges, Neanderthals were probably little different from modern humans. Some of the skeletal remains appear to be from deliberate burials, the first evidence for such careful behaviour among humans.

Upper Paleolithic developments
      From about 35,000 BC, anatomically modern humans—Homo sapiens sapiens, the ancestor of modern populations—were found throughout Europe, and the following period was marked by a series of important technological and cultural changes, in marked contrast to the comparative stability of the preceding hundreds of thousands of years. These changes cannot be simply explained as the result of the sudden appearance of modern, intelligent humans. The preceding Neanderthals differed little in brain size, and some Neanderthal remains are associated with tool assemblages of the new technology as well as with behavioral practices such as burial. The problem of the relationship of the Neanderthals to the sudden appearance of modern humans is difficult; possible explanations include total replacement of Neanderthals by modern populations, interbreeding with an immigrant modern population, or Neanderthals as ancestors of modern humans.

      The technological changes of the Upper Paleolithic Period include the disappearance of heavy tools such as hand axes and choppers and the introduction of a much wider range of tools for special purposes, many of them made from long, thin blades. Tools made of antler, bone, and ivory were also widely used, apparently for the first time. After 18,000 BC there were further innovations. Flint was pretreated by heating to alter its structure and make flaking easier, and new tool types included harpoons, needles for sewing fur garments, and small blades for hafting in spears and arrows. The new technologies and more complex and specialized tool types suggest a major change in the pattern of energy expenditure. Much more effort was devoted to the careful use of resources, and tools were prepared in advance and retained, rather than made and discarded expediently.

      Sites of this period are found throughout Europe, though at the height of the last major Pleistocene glaciation (about 35,000 to 13,000 BC) much of the North European Plain was abandoned as populations moved south. There is a greatly increased number of sites, many of which show evidence of more permanent structures such as hearths, pavements, and shelters built of skins on a frame of bone or wood. Some of this increase may be due to the greater likelihood of finding sites of this more recent period, but it may also indicate a growing population density and a greater investment of energy in construction.

      Subsistence still depended on hunting and gathering, but the role of plant foods is difficult to estimate. As population increased, group territories may have become smaller, and the increasingly harsh environments of the last glaciation necessitated appropriate strategies for survival. Some sites show a concentration on particular large animal species (horse and reindeer in the north and ibex and red deer in the south), but there is also evidence for the increasing use of other food resources, such as rabbits, fish, and shellfish. In comparison with large animals, these produced small amounts of food, but they were an important addition because of their greater reliability. Settlement patterns reflect these social and economic strategies, which allowed most of the population to stay at one location for long periods while others left to procure distant resources.

      Some of the most important evidence is for change in social organization and human behaviour. There is increasing evidence for deliberate and careful burial, sometimes with elaborate treatment of the dead. At Sungir in Russia and at Grotta Paglicci in Italy, for instance, the dead were buried with tools and ornaments, indicating a respect for their identity or status. Personal ornaments, especially bracelets, beads, and pendants, are common finds. They were made from a wide variety of materials, including animal teeth, ivory, and shells; some appear to have been sewn onto garments. Such ornamentation not only shows an elaboration of clothing and an interest in display but may also have been used as a means of signaling individual or group identity.

      The earliest art objects in Europe also date from this period. There are small figurines of animals and humans made from finely carved bone or ivory. Among the most striking are the so-called Venus figurines, stylized representations of females with large breasts and buttocks, which show a marked degree of similarity from France to Russia. There are also thousands of small stone plaques engraved with representations of humans and animals.

      Art is also found in caves, particularly in France and Spain, in caves such as Lascaux and Altamira, though there is one cave at Kapova in the Urals with decoration in a similar style. In some cases, reliefs of humans or animals are carved on rock walls, but the most spectacular artworks are the paintings, dominated by large animals such as mammoth, horse, or bison; human figures are rare, but there are many other signs and symbols. The precise meaning of this art is impossible to recover, but it appears to have played a significant part in group ceremonial activity; much of it is in almost inaccessible depths of caves and may have been important for rituals of hunting or initiation.

      The similarity in style over great distances—seen most clearly in the case of the Venus figurines—is evidence for the existence of extensive social networks throughout Europe. Material items also were transmitted over long distances, especially particular types of flint, fossil shell, and marine mollusks. Such networks were most extensive at the height of the last glaciation and were an important social solution to the problem of surviving in extreme climates; they provided alliances to supply food and other material resources as well as information about a far-flung environment. Human developments during this so-called Ice Age thus included not only technological, economic, and social solutions to the problems of adaptation and survival but also an increased awareness of individual and group identity and a new field of symbolic and artistic activity.

Mesolithic (Mesolithic Period) adaptations
      The extreme conditions of the last Pleistocene (Pleistocene Epoch) glaciation began to improve about 13,000 BC as temperatures slowly rose. The Scandinavian Ice Sheet itself started to retreat northward about 8300 BC, and the period between then and the origins of agriculture (at various times in the 7th to 4th millennia, depending on location) was one of great environmental and cultural change. It is termed the Mesolithic Period (Middle Stone Age) to emphasize its transitional importance, but the alternative term Epipaleolithic, used mostly in eastern Europe, stresses the continuity with processes begun earlier.

      As the ice sheets retreated, vast areas of new land in northern Europe were opened up for human occupation. Resettlement began in some short warmer episodes at the end of the last glaciation. In the longer term, the melting of the Arctic glaciers produced a rise in sea levels, though this was to some extent offset by a rise in land levels as the weight of the overlying ice was removed. The combined effect of these processes was to flood large areas of land in the Mediterranean and especially in the North Sea basin. Britain was isolated from the continent during the 7th millennium, and the modern coastline was broadly established by the 4th.

      The changes in physical landforms were accompanied by similarly major changes in the environment. The rising temperature and humidity led to the increased growth of plant life, including birch and pine as well as smaller trees and bushes that produced nuts and fruit. Continued climatic amelioration meant further environmental change, and the initial open forest progressively gave way to climax forest dominated by oak and elm, which crowded out many of the smaller species. There were similar changes among animals. The large animals of the Ice Age such as bison and mammoth disappeared, either because of climatic change or from overhunting, and reindeer herds moved northward in search of colder conditions. The European forests were dominated by smaller animals, such as wild cattle, pigs, and deer, with ibex in the south.

      The evidence for human exploitation of these changing environments varies considerably, depending on the precise range of regionally available resources. As the reindeer moved north, so did some human groups. Others adapted to the new animal and plant resources available. Wild cattle, deer, and pigs were widely hunted, as well as many types of bird. Fish were also caught, including river species such as salmon and carp and many sea species. On the western coasts, shellfish also were exploited. The role of plant foods is difficult to estimate, but there is evidence for the use of many species, including hazelnuts and various berries.

      These new patterns of economy needed new technologies. Stone tools increasingly took the form of small blades for tipping or hafting in arrows and spears. Where conditions allow their survival, it is possible to see many new tools and equipment made of organic materials, though some, such as the bow and arrow, may have been made in earlier periods. Hooks, nets, and traps for fishing; birch bark containers; and textiles made from plant fibres are all known. Canoes and paddles also have been found.

      Though subsistence was dependent on hunting and gathering seasonally available resources, those resources could be managed in elementary ways. Hunting strategies concentrated on taking adult males, preserving the young and female animals needed to maintain the herds. Dogs were a source of meat and fur, but they may also have been used in hunting. It may have been possible to control the movement of herds by making clearances in the forest, thus attracting animals to the new growth; the evidence for fire and repeated small-scale clearances supports this theory. Plants may have been husbanded. In these ways, human control was exercised over the environment and its resources.

      Human occupation expanded throughout Europe, and many areas show a pattern of settlement with base camps occupied by all members of the group for some part of the year and small sites used for the exploitation of some particular resource. Wide social networks continued to exist, as shown by the long-distance exchange of some raw materials such as special types of rock. Mobility may have been important for ensuring an adequate annual subsistence, but some environments, such as the coastal regions of the Baltic and the west, may have allowed the possibility of more permanent settlement. Reliance on fish and shellfish there might be thought a last resort; alternatively, it could have been a purposive choice of resources that would allow permanent residence. Denmark and western France have traditions of deliberate human burial that support this theory.

      Thus the environmental changes were met with a variety of social, economic, and technological responses, but human society did not adapt passively. Opportunities existed to manage the environment more actively and to make choices for social rather than purely survival purposes.

The Neolithic (Neolithic Period) Period
The adoption of farming
      From about 7000 BC in Greece, farming economies were progressively adopted in Europe, though areas farther west, such as Britain, were not affected for two millennia and Scandinavia not until even later. The period from the beginning of agriculture (agriculture, origins of) to the widespread use of bronze about 2300 BC is called the Neolithic (New Stone Age).

      Agriculture had developed at an earlier date in the Middle East (Middle East, ancient), and the relationship of Europe to that area and the mechanism of the introduction of agriculture have been variously explained. At one extreme is a model of immigrant colonization from the Middle East, with the agricultural frontier pushing farther westward as population grew and new settlements were founded. A variation of this model denies the uniformity of such a “wave of advance” and stresses the possibility of a more irregular pioneering movement. At the other extreme is a model of agricultural adoption by indigenous Mesolithic groups, with a minimum of reliance on any introduced people or resources.

      In favour of the intrusive model is the nature of the crops that formed the basis of early agriculture; the main cereals were emmer wheat, einkorn wheat, and barley, together with other plants such as peas and flax. These had all been domesticated in the Middle East, where their wild progenitors were found. The material culture of the earliest farmers in Greece and southeastern Europe also shows great similarity to that of the Middle East. On the other hand, the animals important to early agriculture are not so clearly introduced; wild sheep and goats may have been available in southern Europe, and cattle were probably domesticated in southeastern Europe at least as early as in the Middle East. There also were definite European contributions; the dog was domesticated in Europe in the Mesolithic Period, and evidence suggests that the horse was first domesticated on the Western Steppe.

      The process of agricultural adoption, furthermore, was neither fast nor uniform. It took at least 4,000 years for farming to reach its northern limit in Scandinavia, and there it was the success of fishing and sealing that allowed agriculture as a desirable addition to the economy. In many areas of western Europe, it is likely that domesticated animals were used before the adoption of agricultural plants. It is also possible to argue for a considerable Mesolithic contribution, especially in the north and west. Not only did some areas continue to rely on hunting and gathering in addition to farming but there was also continuity of settlement location and resource use, especially of stone for tools. Despite the disappearance of the small blades previously used for spears and arrows and the appearance of heavy tools for forest clearance, there was some continuity of tool technology.

      The adoption of farming is unlikely to have been a simple or uniform process throughout Europe. In some regions, especially Greece, the Balkans, southern Italy, central Europe, and Ukraine, actual colonization by new populations may have been important; elsewhere, especially in the west and north, a gradual process of adaptation by indigenous communities is more likely, though everywhere the pattern would have been mixed.

      The consequences of the adoption of farming were important for all later developments. Permanent settlement, population growth, and exploitation of smaller territories all brought about new relationships between people and the environment. Mobility had previously necessitated small populations at low densities and had allowed only material items that could be carried, with little investment in structures; these restraints were removed, and the opportunity was created for many new crafts and technologies.

      The earliest evidence for agriculture comes from sites in Greece (ancient Greek civilization), such as Knossos and Argissa, soon after 7000 BC. During the 7th millennium, farming was widespread in southeastern Europe (Balkans). The material culture of this region bears a strong similarity to that of the Middle East. Pottery making was introduced, and a variety of highly decorated vessels was produced. Permanent settlements of small mud-brick houses were established; continuous rebuilding of such villages on the same spot produced large settlement mounds, or tells. Clay figurines, mostly female, are common finds in many houses, and there may also have been special shrines or temples. The precise beliefs cannot be ascertained, but they suggest the importance of ritual and religion in these societies. By the 5th and 4th millennia, some of these sites, such as Sesklo and Dhimini in Greece, were defended. From the early 5th millennium, there is evidence for the development of copper and gold metallurgy, independently of Middle Eastern traditions, and copper mines have been found in the Balkan Peninsula. Metal products included personal ornaments as well as some functional items; the cemetery at Varna, Bulg., contained many gold objects, with large collections in some graves. Control of ritual, technology, and agriculture, as well as the need for defense, all suggest the growing differentiation within Neolithic society.

      In the central and western Mediterranean, the clearest evidence is from southern Italy, where a mixed farming economy was established in the 7th millennium. Many large villages, often surrounded by enclosure ditches, have been recognized. Elsewhere in the region, domesticated crops and animals were adopted more slowly into the indigenous economies. New technologies also were adopted; pottery decorated with characteristic impressed patterns was made, and by the 4th millennium copper was being worked in Spain. The major islands of the Mediterranean were colonized. The general picture is one of small-scale regional development. One such regional pattern was on Malta, where a series of massive stone temples was constructed from the early 4th millennium.

      In a band across central and western Europe, the earliest farmers from 5400 BC onward are represented by a homogeneous pattern of settlements and material culture, named the LBK culture (from Linienbandkeramik or Linearbandkeramik), after the typical pottery decorated with linear bands of ornament. The same styles of pottery and other material are found throughout the region, and their settlements show a regular preference for the easily worked and well-drained loess soils. The houses were 20 to 23 feet (6 to 7 metres) wide and up to 150 feet long and possibly included stalling for animals; in some areas they were grouped in large villages, but elsewhere there was a dispersed pattern of small clusters of houses. Some cemeteries are known; they show a concentration of objects deposited with older males. About 4700 BC the cultural homogeneity ended, and regional patterns of settlement and culture appeared as the population grew and new areas were exploited for farming. Some of the best information comes from villages on the edges of lakes in France and Switzerland, where organic material has been preserved in damp conditions.

      Farming also spread northeastward into the steppe north of the Black Sea. Before 6000 BC domesticated animals and pottery were found there, but in societies that still relied heavily on hunting and fishing. By about 4500 BC a new pattern of villages, such as at Cucuteni and Tripolye, was established with a mixed farming economy. Some of these villages contained many hundreds of houses in a planned layout, and they were increasingly surrounded by massive fortifications. Farther east across the steppe as far as the southern Urals, pottery, domesticated animals, and cereals were progressively added to an indigenous hunting-and-gathering economy, and the horse was domesticated. Nomadic pastoral economies developed by the 2nd millennium.

      Farming extended from central to northern Europe only after a long interval. For a millennium, agriculturalists and hunter-gatherers were in contact and pottery was adopted or exchanged, but domesticated animals and crops were only introduced into northern Germany, Poland, and southern Scandinavia about 4200 BC, apparently after a decline in the availability of marine food resources. Farming was rapidly adopted as the mainstay of subsistence and expanded to its maximum climatic viability in Scandinavia. By the middle of the 4th millennium, large communal tombs were being built, frequently of megalithic (large-stone) construction.

      In western Europe, there was a similar delay in the spread of farming. In western France, domesticated animals were added to hunting and gathering in a predominantly stock-based economy, and pottery was also adopted. In Britain and Ireland, forest clearance as early as 4700 BC may represent the beginnings of agriculture, but there is little evidence for settlements or monuments before 4000 BC, and hunting-and-gathering (hunting and gathering culture) economies survived in places. The construction of large communal tombs and defended enclosures from 4000 BC may mark the growth of agricultural populations and the beginning of competition for resources. Some of the enclosures were attacked and burned, clear evidence of violent warfare. The tombs, of earth and timber or of megalithic construction, contained communal burials and served as markers for claims to farming territories as well as foci for the worship of ancestors. Some, such as the tombs of Brittany and Ireland, contained elaborately decorated stones.

The late Neolithic Period

Agricultural intensification
      From the late 4th millennium a number of developments in the agricultural economy became prominent. They did not, however, begin all at once nor were they found everywhere. Some of them may have been in use for some time, and there also are distinct regional variations. Cumulatively, however, they add up to a new phase of agricultural organization.

      One of the most important developments was the management of animal (animal breeding) herds for purposes other than the provision of meat. In the case of cattle, there is some evidence for milk production earlier, but dairying appears to have taken on a much more significant role from this time. Oxen were raised to provide traction. Sheep were managed not for meat but primarily as a source of manure and wool. Textiles in the early Neolithic Period were predominantly made of flax, but from the early 3rd millennium wool was widely used, and spinning and weaving became important crafts and new ways of exploiting agricultural resources. New crops also were introduced. The most important were the vine and the olive, found in Greece from the early 3rd millennium. These tree crops represented an important addition to the range of agricultural produce and formed the basis for later developments in the Aegean.

 There were also new technologies, especially the use of animal traction for the plow and for wheeled (wheel) vehicles. The earliest evidence for plowing consists of marks preserved in the soil under burial mounds and dated to the end of the 4th millennium. A clay model of a wheeled cart of the same date is known from a grave at Szigetszentmárton, Hung., and actual wheels from northern Europe by 2500 BC. In southeastern Spain, the most arid area of Europe, irrigation (irrigation and drainage) systems were probably introduced. These all represent important new technologies applied to agriculture and an intensification of energy expenditure in that field.

      The innovations outlined above marked the development of early agriculture toward a system more specifically adapted to the European environment and capable of producing a much wider range of outputs, especially of nonfood products. Some, such as wine and cloth, had a particular social significance, and others, especially the wheeled vehicle, led to further developments. The new agricultural regime also showed a better adaptation to the wide variety of regional environments in Europe and permitted expansion into new ecological zones. Whereas the earliest farmers mostly preferred the prime arable soils, such as the loess of central Europe, it was now possible, especially with the use of sheep, to exploit many less fertile soils.

      The period from the late 4th millennium also saw many important social changes. They varied from region to region but laid the foundations for the society of the Bronze Age, which followed.

      In southeastern Europe about 3200 BC, there was a major break in material culture and settlement patterns. The old styles of decorated pottery were replaced with new plainer forms, and the evidence for ritual, such as the figurines, ends. Many of the long-occupied tell sites were abandoned; the new settlement pattern shows many smaller sites and some larger ones which may have played a central role. In Greece there were similar changes, with population expansion especially in the south and the emergence of some sites as centres of authority; this period marked the beginning of the Aegean (Aegean civilizations) Bronze Age.

      Elsewhere in the Mediterranean the changes are most marked in parts of Iberia. At Los Millares in southeastern Spain and in southern Portugal at sites such as Vila Nova de São Pedro, strongly fortified settlements accompanied by cemeteries containing rich collections of prestige goods suggest the appearance of a more hierarchically organized society. Similar trends toward the emergence of sites of central authority took place in southern France, but there is little sign of such developments in Italy.

      In central and northern Europe, changes of a different nature began about 2800 BC. The most obvious feature is two phases of new burial rites, comprising individual rather than communal burials with a particular emphasis on the deposition of prestige grave goods with adult males. The first phase, characterized by Corded Ware pottery and stone battle-axes, is found particularly in central and northern Europe. The second phase, dated to 2500–2200 BC, is marked by Bell Beaker pottery and the frequent occurrence of copper daggers in the graves; it is found from Hungary to Britain and as far south as Italy, Spain, and North Africa. At the same time, there was an increase in the exchange of prestige goods such as amber, copper, and tools (tool) from particular rock sources.

      Both of these burial rites have been attributed to invading population groups. On the other hand, they may also be seen as a new expression of an ideology of social status, emphasizing control of resources rather than ancestral descent. Such an explanation fits better with a picture of slow internal development within European society. The new ideology did not prevail everywhere, however, and in Britain, for instance, the 3rd millennium saw the construction of massive ceremonial monuments such as Avebury and Stonehenge, before the introduction of individual burial rites at the end of the millennium.

The Indo-Europeans
      When there is evidence for the languages spoken in Europe at the end of the prehistoric period, it is clear that with few exceptions, such as Basque or Etruscan, they belonged to the Indo-European (Indo-European languages) language group, which also extended to India and Central Asia. This raises the question of when these languages, or their ancestral prototype, were first spoken in Europe. One theory links these languages with a particular population of Indo-Europeans and explains the expansion of the languages as the result of invasion or immigration; their origin is sought in the east, perhaps in the area north of the Black and Caspian seas. The invasion is associated with the new patterns of settlement, economy, material culture, burial, and social organization seen about 3000 BC. These innovations, however, may be better attributed to internal developments. An alternative explanation for the origin of Indo-European languages associates it with the immigration of the first farmers from Anatolia at the beginning of the Neolithic Period, but the spread of farming does not seem to have been a uniform process or to have been achieved everywhere by population migration. There is, however, no single archaeological pattern that might correspond to a migration on an appropriate geographic scale throughout Europe, and all these explanations raise fundamental questions about the development, spread, and adoption of languages, the relationship of language to ethnic groups, and the correspondence of archaeologically recognizable patterns of material culture to either language or ethnicity.

Timothy C. Champion

The Metal Ages
      The period of the 3rd, the 2nd, and the 1st millennia BC was a time of drastic change in Europe. This has traditionally been defined as the Metal Ages, which may be further divided into stages, of approximate dates as shown: the Bronze Age (2300–700 BC) and the Iron Age (700–1 BC), which followed a less distinctly defined Copper Age (c. 3200–2300 BC). At this time, societies in Europe began consciously to produce metals (metal). Simultaneous with these technological innovations were changes in settlement organization, ritual life, and the interaction between the different societies in Europe. These developments and their remarkable reflections in the material culture make the period appear as a series of dramatic changes.

      Local developments were long thought to have been caused by influences from the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and by migrations. Thus it was suggested that the segmented faience beads from the rich early Bronze Age graves in Wessex were Mycenaean products or that development of bronze working in central Europe was due to the Aegean civilization's need for new bronze supplies. New methods of absolute dating, including radiocarbon dating, revolutionized the understanding of this phase in prehistoric Europe. They showed that many supposedly interdependent developments had in fact developed independently and been separated by centuries. The Metal Ages of Europe thus must be understood as indigenous local inventions and as an independent cultural evolution. There were influences from, and contact with, the Middle East, and there were some migrations of people, especially from the Russian steppes; but the Metal Ages in Europe were in general far more locally independent phenomena than had been recognized. They grew out of conditions created in the Neolithic Period and the Copper Age, followed their own trajectory in Europe, and resulted in a range of new expressions in material culture and in new social concerns.

The chronology of the Metal Ages
      Changes in metal objects, in styles, and in burial (death rite) rituals have been used to subdivide the period. The most basic division uses the same criteria as Christian Jürgensen Thomsen's Three Age system, in which the material used for producing tools and weapons distinguishes an age. This has resulted in a distinction between the Copper, Bronze, and Iron ages, each of which has been further divided. In temperate Europe all these subdivisions consist of relative chronologies, and in such systems synchronizations and comparisons among regions are vital. For the Bronze Age, synchronization is possible, since this was a period of long-distance contacts and trade (international trade) between different regions. The period had in many ways a remarkable coherence, and it has been likened to the Common Market. On this basis a general chronological framework has been developed that, using the changes in burial rites and metal assemblages, divides the Bronze Age into either Early, Middle, and Late phases or into the Unetician, Tumulus, and Urnfield cultures. Synchronizations of the more detailed local subdivisions, which were based on typology of metal objects and cross-associations, have employed schemes of Paul Reinecke and Oscar Montelius (Montelius, Oscar). Oscar Montelius' chronology was developed on the basis of Scandinavian bronze objects and resulted in a division of the Bronze Age into Montelius I–VI, while Paul Reinecke used south German material to divide it into shorter time sequences known as Bronze Age A–D and Hallstatt (Ha) A–D, with Hallstatt C marking the transition to the Iron Age in central Europe.

      The Iron Age chronology is detailed and regional. Although the Iron Age was a Pan-European phenomenon, its regional variability, together with its fragmented and tribalized cultural landscape, makes its chronology complex. In addition to typology and cross-association, the Iron Age chronology is also built upon historical events and Mediterranean imports of known date; the development of artistic styles (decorative art) also plays a major role in its subdivision. It is again central Europe that provided the most commonly used general chronology. The Hallstatt Period, named after an artifact-rich cemetery next to late Bronze and Iron Age salt mines in the Austrian Salzkammergut, is divided into Early (Ha A–B) and Late (Ha C–D) phases, with the former marking the end of the Urnfield culture in Europe and the latter being the first phase of the Iron Age in areas such as central and southern Europe but the transition to the Iron Age in other regions. The second phase of the Iron Age, when it extended throughout Europe, is named after La Tène, a site at Lake Neuchâtel in Switzerland. The exact function of this site is not known, but it contained thousands of swords, spears, shields, fibulae, and tools. These were distinctive in shape and beautifully ornamented in a style different from that of the objects from the Hallstatt period. This, the La Tène style, was found from the 5th to the 1st century BC throughout most of Europe, and its development and change over time are the basis of the chronological division into La Tène A–D. Other evidence, such as southern imports, has increasingly become incorporated into the La Tène chronology, and the time from the end of the Hallstatt Period until the spread of the Roman Empire is divided into a number of short phases, each with distinct material expressions. The stylistic basis of this chronology stresses the common heritage, the Celtic art style, which developed over large areas of Europe during this time.

      The transitions between the three phases of the Metal Ages are primarily defined by a change in the metal used, but they also reflect economic changes and transformations of social organization. It is within these larger concerns that the character of this part of European prehistory can be found.

General characteristics
The Copper Age
      Also known as the Chalcolithic or Eneolithic Period, the Copper Age was a time of diffuse and sporadic use of copper (copper work) for a limited number of small tools and personal ornaments. If the age is defined simply as the time when copper first began to be used, then localized Copper Age cultures existed in southeastern Europe from the 5th millennium BC. On the other hand, if it is defined as the time when copper was an established element in the material culture, then it must be dated from about 3200 BC in the Carpathian Basin and southeastern Europe, slightly later in the Aegean, and later still in Iberia.

      In these early copper-using societies, copper had no importance in subsistence production, and the tools (tool) made could hardly compete with those of flint and stone. The new material had prestige, however, and was used to adorn the deceased. It was at this early stage of metal use that one of its important roles was established: to mark and articulate social (social status) prestige and status. The Copper Age as a distinct stage developed only in a few regions; these included groups in areas as far apart as Bulgaria, Bohemia, the Aegean, and southeastern Spain.

      One of these remarkable centres of early copper use was in southeastern Spain. Situated in the Almerian lowland, in an area confined by the coast and the mountains, it was a densely settled region with large nucleated and often fortified hilltop settlements of surprising architectural sophistication and with a rich and inventive material culture known as the Millaran Culture, after the site of Los Millares. Like contemporary sites in the region, Los Millares was located so as to overlook a river from a promontory in the foothills of higher mountains. The sides and plateau of the hill were fortified (fortification) with massive stone walls, regularly placed semicircular bastions, and outlying towers. These created a well-defined and protected space of approximately 12 acres (5 hectares), with several occupation phases and of some complexity. The settlement was townlike, with rows of stone houses, alleys, and a central communal place within the walls. An artificial watercourse may have led to the settlement. There was specialization of production between households. Outside the settlement was a cemetery containing more than 100 megalithic tombs (tomb) with corbeled chambers used as collective burial places.

The Bronze Age
      Simultaneous with such Copper Age cultures were a number of late Neolithic (Neolithic Period) cultures in other regions. The Early Bronze Age had, therefore, various roots. In some areas it developed from the Copper Age, while in others it grew out of late Neolithic cultures. In western and part of central Europe, the Bell Beaker Culture (Beaker folk) continued into the Early Bronze Age. It had introduced the use of copper for prestigious personal objects, individual burial rites, and possibly also new ideological structures to the Neolithic societies over vast areas of Europe. These new elements were the basis of the transformation that took place during the Early Bronze Age and became prominent within the emerging societies.

      In the rest of central and in northern Europe, the Corded Ware Culture was an important component of the late Neolithic, and some local Early Bronze Age characteristics can be traced to these roots. For example, this is seen in terms of burial rituals. Burials of the Corded Ware Culture were usually single graves in pits, with or without a barrow. The deceased was placed in a contracted position, men on their left side, women on their right, both facing south. This differentiation of body position according to sex was maintained in the earliest Bronze Age in many areas, but at times the orientation was reversed, such as at Branč, in Slovakia, where 81 percent of females were on their left side and 61 percent of males on their right. As the period progressed, grave forms began to diversify, and, though inhumation in pits remained the commonest form, it was elaborated in different ways. The position of the body became stretched rather than contracted, and sex and age were not expressed by body position but were reflected through elements such as grave goods or location within the cemetery.

      The characteristics of, and the dates for, the Early Bronze Age vary regionally in central Europe. Some areas, such as the Saarland, even appear either to have had continuous Neolithic occupation until as late as 1400 BC or to have been uninhabited during the Early Bronze Age. Most of these areas were enclaves, however, and it was only in Scandinavia, where the Bronze Age began about 1800 BC, that the transition to the Bronze Age was substantially delayed for a whole region.

      Such local delay of the earliest Bronze Age cannot simply be seen in terms of retarded cultural development; rather, it reflects that different cultural trajectories were followed by various societies. Scandinavia illustrates this well, since the period preceding the Bronze Age was a time not of devolution but of new flint technologies and new material forms, with a wealth of beautifully manufactured flint daggers and a conspicuous display of local craft. This constituted a distinct local Late Neolithic phase, interspersed between the Corded Ware Culture and the Bronze Age proper. The flint daggers (dagger) show clear influences from bronze daggers, and examples of flint swords reflect the emulation of new ideas. This indicates the degree of contact with bronze-using societies. When bronze was introduced and incorporated into the local culture, its role in terms of the cultural manners of manufacture and behaviour was rapidly established, and it quickly reflected a distinct local tradition: the Nordic Bronze Age. At this point, the absence of local raw material did not prevent the society from integrating bronze as a basic material in its culture nor did the dependency on trade partners for bronze mean that the local material culture developed without its own distinct character. The Nordic Bronze Age illustrates the ability of local cultures to maintain their independent character in spite of dependency on other, larger systems. This characteristic can be observed in different forms throughout the Metal Ages, and, in an essential manner, this qualifies the impression of an overall common cultural heritage developing during these millennia.

      Although the dates and the cultural roots of the Early Bronze Age vary, it is similarly defined by the use of copper alloys for tools throughout Europe. During the Bronze Age, the techniques of metalworking (metalwork) increased in sophistication. A range of new working methods, such as valve molds (mold), cire perdue, and sheet-metal working, were developed. The development of molds made it possible both to mass-produce (mass production) objects and to produce more elaborate items, including hollow objects. One of the most spectacular objects produced in this fashion was the lur, a musical instrument of great precision and beauty. The later Bronze Age and Iron Age method of sheet working facilitated the production of large objects, such as caldrons and shields, and a similar working method was used for the boss motif of bands of raised circles, which became a favoured element on many Urnfield Period objects such as horse harnesses and situlae (bucket-shaped vessels).

      The manner of decorating the objects expressed regional as well as chronological styles. Among these, the most noticeable stylistic developments were the widespread use of the combined sun-bird-ship motif of the Urnfield Culture and the later break in stylistic tradition indicated by La Tène, or so-called Celtic, art. Most important, however, may be the invention of new types of objects. While objects made of ceramics, gold, stone, and organic materials during this period differed from those of previous periods, they did not represent drastic changes in the employment of a particular medium, but this was not true of bronze. Bronze is an artificial material made by alloying copper with different metals, in particular tin, through which a new material with its own distinct properties is produced. The production of bronze was an invention in its true sense, and the potentials of this material were increasingly revealed and exploited during the Bronze Age. The effect of this was a range of new objects, of which some were new shapes for old concepts but others introduced new functions and concepts into the societies.

      Among the latter, one of the most important new elements was the invention of the sword. With the sword there was for the first time in European history an object entirely dedicated to fighting and not doubling as a tool. Fighting is evident from earlier periods as well, but during the Bronze Age it was formalized. Toward the Late Bronze Age the warrior emerged, sheathed in an assemblage of defensive items: the armour. To have been a warrior (war) during the Iron Age must have been an established role, and the importance of warfare led to monumental defensive structures and further evolution of swords and shields. The latter development shows changes in the fighting technique, and in the Early Iron Age the stabbing sword of the Bronze Age was replaced by a heavy slashing sword, indicating fighting from horseback. The actual importance of warfare is difficult to establish, and a distinction between the symbolic representation of aggression (aggressive behaviour) and real aggression must be kept in mind. The presence of swords and armour does, however, represent a concrete expression of aggression and of the concept of warfare.

      The increased importance of fortified (fortification) settlements and villages further shows that aggression was a major component of life. Professional soldiers, as they were known at the time of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, are unlikely to have existed at this time, but group warfare existed from the Iron Age onward, and other related professions developed. For example, the location of fortified sites in strategic places, such as near mountain passes and river crossings, suggests that these sites were not primarily defensive but were based on the ability to control certain resources, including access and passage. This is illustrated by the rich Early Bronze Age fortified site at Spišský Štvrtok, Slovakia, strategically located to control the trade routes running through a mountain pass across the Carpathians along the Hornád River, and by the Late Bronze Age Lusatian hilltop site in the Moravian Pforte passes. The development of aggression and its formalization played a role in providing middlemen and entrepreneurs with opportunities and helped to establish them in the position of power they gained in the Iron (iron processing) Age.

The Iron Age
      During most of the Middle and Late Bronze Age, iron was present, albeit scarce. It was used for personal ornaments and small knives, for repairs on bronzes, and for bimetallic items. The Iron Age thus did not start with the first appearance of iron but rather at the stage when its distinct functional properties were being exploited and it began to supplant bronze in the production of tools (tool) and weapons. This occurred at different times in various parts of Europe, and the transition to the Iron Age is embedded in local cultural developments. The reasons why iron was adopted differed among regions, but generally a similar pattern was followed. After an introductory period, iron quickly supplanted bronze for the making of tools and weapons. It was at this stage that metal, in spite of the earlier presence of bronze tools, replaced stone, flint, and wood in agricultural (agriculture, origins of) production. New and more effective tools were developed during the last centuries BC, and subsistence production must have increased drastically. Along with these domestic changes, there were changes in the traditional routes of contact and trade. These routes had been established during the Bronze Age, and through them copper, tin, and other commodities had traveled throughout Europe. With the appearance of the rich Late Hallstatt communities of south-central Europe, the orientation of contact changed. The northern links were increasingly ignored, and trade became concentrated on, and dependent upon, commodities from the south. South and west-central Europe were now included in the periphery of the expanding Mediterranean civilization; and the previous network of contact was broken. In the rest of Europe, regional diversity increased, a tribalized (tribe) landscape emerged, and new types of social organization developed. During the Iron Age, the roots of historic Europe were planted. Proto-urban settlements, hierarchical social orders, new ideological structures, and writing were parts of this picture. It was also a time during which the difference between the Mediterranean world and temperate Europe became even more pronounced and new degrees and forms of dependency developed in the sociopolitical systems.

Social and economic developments
Control over resources
      The Metal Ages were periods of discovery, invention, and exploitation of various metals and metallurgical procedures. New elements were introduced into the societies, which played a role in their further development. In the later 5th and earlier 4th millennia BC, copper from easily worked surface deposits was used for relatively simple items in southeastern Europe and the Carpathian Basin. The Transylvanian copper ores were particularly important. For example, copper was extracted (mining) from the quarry at Varna, Bulg., about 4400 BC in an area near a rich Copper Age cemetery. After this initial exploitation, metal objects again became rare until they reappeared in the late 4th millennium BC. The reasons for this change are unknown but may in part relate to the depletion of surface ore deposits. At this early state, the technique of copper manufacture consisted of smelting in an open one-faced mold and hammering. Later, when copper of different compositions from deeper deposits was used, the properties of copper in combination with other metals were explored. The copper sulfide ores from these deep mines were more difficult to procure, since they relied on more sophisticated mining techniques and needed initial roasting before smelting. At the same time, they were more widely available than surface deposits, and there were sources in both central and western Europe—ores in Germany, Austria, and the Czech and Slovak Republics were exploited from the early 3rd millennium BC. This long initial phase of sporadic use of copper was finally replaced by a period of copper alloys (alloy), which began about 2500 BC in southeastern Europe, slightly later in the Aegean, and later still in Iberia. Bronze industries were widespread in Europe by 2300 BC, but copper-tin alloys were first used toward the end of the 3rd millennium, with renewal of the centres of metallurgical production in Austria, Germany, and neighbouring areas. The raw material needed was available only in a few regions, and tin, particularly restricted in its distribution, was found only in eastern Portugal, Sardinia, Tuscany, Cornwall, the Isles of Scilly, and the Bohemian Ore Mountains. The latter site, on the border between the Czech Republic and eastern Germany, was one of the rare instances of close proximity between copper and tin. This region, together with the copper areas of the Harz Mountains, the Alps, and central Slovakia, became one of the most important regions of the Early Bronze Age. With the progression of the Bronze Age, local metallurgical traditions developed throughout Europe, including areas lacking both tin and copper sources; but the chief metalworking centres continued to influence the material culture of larger areas. This was an important factor behind the trade and exchange network that came into existence.

      The discovery of iron was most likely a by-product of bronze working, and much of the earliest iron use is not culturally distinct from the use of bronze. At its early stage, iron may have been monopolized and produced by those individuals or groups who controlled bronze. Iron (iron processing), however, is different from bronze in many respects. It is found widely in Europe either as iron ore or as bog iron. To be usable, iron (ironwork) does not need alloying with other metals, and the demands are mainly the fuel and labour needed to smelt or roast the ore. This process involves high temperatures and skilled control of pyrotechnology. To produce a usable iron, the bloom must be hammered while red-hot to reduce the impurities and to change its internal structures. Only then can the shaping of the final object begin. Thus, the production of an iron object consists of several distinct stages, each different from those involved in bronze production.

      Iron appeared in Romania about 1700 BC and in Greece shortly after. During the Middle and Late Bronze Age, it occurred infrequently except in Iberia, Britain, and some other parts of western Europe. The earliest iron was used for small knives, pins, and other personal objects and for repairs on bronze items. Only in Romania was iron used for heavy tools during the Bronze Age; toward the end of the Bronze Age, tools and some weapons made of iron appeared generally in Europe. With Ha C, iron swords were being made, and, in the following La Tène Period, iron had clearly become a material important in its own right, being used for a range of new functional items, including plowshares, carpentry tools, and nails. At this point it is likely that the previous monopolies on metal production and trade were severely challenged, and iron became a common material, produced and procured anywhere in Europe.

      The intensity of metal use varied regionally, and the centres of innovation and wealth moved over time. During the Metal Ages the communities of Europe can be studied through their reaction to, and adoption of, their inventions. It is a phase in prehistory that raises cultural questions about the nature of innovation and of its consequences for society. Metal brought several important new items to the communities, but, more importantly, it changed the nature of society itself. The production of bronze was an important step in human history, indicating a point at which the limits imposed by natural materials were broken by human invention. The behavioral impact of this cannot be measured, but it was likely substantial. It may have altered attitudes to nature and created the activities that resulted in deep mining of metals and salt and caused experimentation with new materials, such as glass.

      Metal also had social (social status) impact, and one of its important roles came from its involvement in the articulation of prestige and status and thus its ability to assign power. Scarcity usually implies preciousness, and control over scarce or precious resources often leads to power. The production of both bronze and iron objects involved scarcity of either resources or knowledge or both. Control of metal production was a relevant factor in prehistory, as shown by the location of important Copper Age and Early Bronze Age communities in close proximity to copper or tin ores or by the breakdown of trade alliances that occurred in the Early Iron Age. The wealth and outstanding material culture of the Copper and Early Bronze Age communities were probably related to the trade in, and prestigious value of, copper and bronze. It is also a characteristic of these communities that this wealth was not consolidated by other activities, and some of the centres were short-lived and declined quickly. The lack of ability to invest and rechannel wealth in absolute terms is one of the most basic differences between these communities and those of both the Mediterranean civilizations and the Iron Age. Only some of the Copper Age centres developed into flourishing communities in the earliest Bronze Age. Those that did remain became the Early Bronze Age centres of wealth, contact, and trade (international trade), with dense populations. These centres were widely spaced and were internally extremely different, ranging from places such as El Argar in Iberia to Wessex in southern England. Of these, the Argaric Culture in southeastern Iberia comprised nucleated village settlements similar to those from Los Millares but with even greater sophistication and with a changed funerary rite. The deceased, richly adorned with diadems, arm rings, and pins and accompanied by metal tools, were individually entombed in large funerary urns placed under the house floors. At the other extreme was the group of rich Early Bronze Age graves in Wessex. The objects found in them are comparable in wealth to the Argaric ones, and, although the exotic items were unique to each area, they shared a range of tools and some ornaments. There was essential divergence in other respects, however, and at Wessex there was no association with elaborate domestic structures. The rich graves served as the ritual centre for a dispersed community living in relatively simple constructions of wattle and daub and without demarcations of the limits of their settlements. These Early Bronze Age centres developed in different environmental zones, ranging from semiarid to lush temperate, and they are at different distances from copper ore. They all have possible links with areas containing tin ores, however, and they developed in regions that were local centres in the previous period. These two criteria may have been necessary conditions for this development; but such conditions in themselves did not result in rich centres in the Early Bronze Age, nor could they guarantee continuous survival of the centres. As in the case of the earlier Copper Age centres, these were without an additional stable foundation, and they disappeared at different rates and under varying local circumstances. Such situations were plentiful during the Metal Ages. They show not only that the scarce and prestigious resources could be controlled and could give access to power and wealth but also that a multitude of factors influenced whether that power was secured and how it was maintained.

Changing centres of wealth
      Societies are dynamic structures that interact with each other. In this interaction, asymmetrical relationships frequently develop between areas or groups, with one partner assuming a central, and the other a peripheral, role. Such relations are not stable, however, and over time their internal asymmetry will change. These changes can be illustrated by two examples from the Metal Ages in western central Europe.

      The first is from the Early Bronze Age, where a remarkable shift in cultural initiative took place. The earliest Bronze Age centre, Unetician A, consisted of a complex of flat inhumation graves with modest grave goods in copper and bronze that was found in Slovakia. During Unetician B this complex continued, spreading into Bohemia and much of Germany and Poland. In this process, the original centre was complemented by a number of extremely rich graves on its periphery, such as at Leubingen, Helmsdorf, and Straubing in central Germany and Łęki Małe in southern Poland. These graves were inhumations under large barrows, with elaborate chambers and rich grave goods. Leubingen, for example, was a 28-foot- (8.5-metre-) high barrow with an elaborately constructed 66-foot-wide central stone cairn delineated by a ring ditch. The cairn covered and protected a thatched tentlike wooden structure made of large oak planks with gypsum mortar in the cracks. The skeleton of an old man lay extended on the oak floor, and at a right angle across his hips lay another body, which appeared to be that of an adolescent or child. In the space around the deceased were a number of objects, including, a pot in a setting of stones, bronze halberds and tools, and a group of gold ornaments. These graves show that a new and radically different funerary ceremony had taken place in this area, although the material culture still remained related to that of the previous centre. Thus, this group of barrows constituted a complementary Unetician area on the periphery of the original complex, and it was from this area that much of the impetus for the development of the Tumulus Period came.

      The second illustration of change in the relationship between areas is from the earliest Iron Age in southern Germany, as exemplified by the hill fort at Heuneburg and its satellite barrows and secondary sites. These sites show how the central position of southern Germany and Switzerland during the Urnfield Period was transformed in the course of the Late Hallstatt Period into a peripheral role on the edge of the Mediterranean world. Heuneburg had several occupation phases, ranging from the middle of the 2nd millennium BC to the late 1st millennium AD, but the climax of its occupation was in the 6th and early 5th centuries BC, the so-called IV phase. The site, on a promontory overlooking the valley of the upper Danube, consisted of seven acres enclosed within a defensive earthwork. During its IV phase, this defense included bastions and mud-brick walls, both of which were Mediterranean inventions. The site was densely populated, and it shows a range of activities taking place at the interior in workshops for bronze, iron, antler, and coral. Among the imports were Black-Figure shards from Greece (ancient Greek civilization), an Etruscan clay mold, and wine amphorae from a Greek colony in southern France. Some of the local pottery, which was among the earliest wheel-thrown pottery in central Europe, shows imitation of Greek ornamentation from southern France, while other examples copy Etruscan bronze vessels.

      On the plateau behind Heuneburg are several large barrows with multiple burials, which are among the largest and richest in Europe. There were a number of farmsteads between these and the hill fort itself. This association between an important hill fort and rich graves for male and female leaders was present at other places during the 6th and early 5th centuries BC, particularly in eastern France, Switzerland, and southwestern Germany. Examples include the Hohenasperg oppidum and the rich burials at Kleinaspergle, in southern Germany, and the Mont Lassois oppidum in eastern France and the Vix grave. The latter contained a five-foot-high bronze wine krater of Greco-Etruscan workmanship, a gold diadem, and an exquisite bronze statuette, together with wine-drinking equipment, Greek pottery, a vehicle, and other ornaments. The complexity of the structural buildup in the landscape surrounding these hill forts is amazing. Many of the sites had several phases of occupation but, as with Heuneburg, the Late Hallstatt Period is a distinct phase, and the brief time it took for these centres to come into existence demonstrates the potential for power available at the time. Heuneburg was one of the wealthiest of all these sites, and it is important for many reasons. It provides evidence of emulation of another culture, and it clearly demonstrates the changes in its position vis-à-vis a number of cultural systems. This is shown most clearly in the construction techniques used in phase IV, which copied both plans and building techniques from Greece. The mud bricks were totally unsuited to this part of Europe, but they show the importance of the Mediterranean culture during this period, as does the adoption of wine-drinking ceremonies. Through these evidences of emulation, Heuneburg stands as a key site for appreciating the changes in the Early Iron Age in the relationship between the classical world and the rest of Europe.

      The exceptional concentration of Late Hallstatt chieftain burials on the upper Danube and upper Rhine lasted only to the beginning of the 5th century BC, when decentralization set in, but it had played a role in a period when relations within Europe were transformed. During the Bronze Age, Europe was roughly divided into two worlds: the eastern Mediterranean and temperate Europe, each with a common cultural heritage. With the Iron Age, the fragmentation and diversification of temperate Europe began, while the eastern Mediterranean expanded through a burst of colonial activities that resulted in cultural dominance over an extended but internally diverse area.

Prestige and status
      The Neolithic was a period of remarkable communal enterprises. Against this background, the emphasis that the Bell Beaker (Beaker folk) and Corded Ware cultures placed on the individual constituted a radical change. The British archaeologist Colin Renfrew characterized the change as one from “group orientation” to “individualized chiefdom,” and this change was essential for the emerging Early Bronze Age communities. In the Late Neolithic, collective burials disappear from European prehistory in favour of individual graves. The form of the grave and the character of the funerary ceremonies changed substantially during the Bronze and Iron ages. The common and widespread use of cremation introduced by the Urnfield culture is an important indication of the potential for radical changes within this realm. Throughout the period, the individual remained the focus of the funerary ceremony, and the evidence suggests that prestige and status (social status) often were communicated through the wealth and types of objects found in graves. It is debated whether the differences between individuals that this suggests were classlike and absolute, were expressions of sex, age, and lineage differentiation, or were assigned through deeds rather than ascribed at birth. The changes through time suggest increased social differentiation, but there also are periods, such as the Urnfield Culture, in which social differentiations are less obviously expressed in graves. The grave can, therefore, be used mainly to establish relative differentiation within one community rather than pronouncing absolute historical trends. One such study comes from the cemetery at Branč, where 308 inhumation graves spanning 200 to 400 years of the early Unetician Culture were analyzed. Within the graves there was clear evidence of internal differentiation, with some individuals having more elaborate grave goods than others. This suggests that in this type of community there would be leading families, marked by their grave goods, and that wealth and status would tend to be inherited through the male line (since male children had richer grave goods than female children). Females obtained rich costumes during adolescence and young adulthood, possibly at the time of their marriage. The status expressed at this period was to a large extent relational, placing each member of the community according to lineage, sex, and age. This differentiation was not directly based on access to power, possessions, or absolute wealth, and, in most areas of temperate Europe, social differentiation until the 1st millennium BC was likely moderate. The exception to this was short-lived local expressions of individual wealth or, more likely, prestige, such as the Wessex graves and the Leubingen-Helmsdorf group, since they suggest single leaders occupying sociopolitical roles, which were symbolized through emblems of power.

      Throughout the Bronze Age, sex and age were the main components organizing the structures of daily life. Outside the Mediterranean area, there were few differences between the size and plan of most of the structures within individual sites, although the sites within a region often were internally ranked in terms of size and complexity, which suggests that they had different functions. Such “tiered” settlement systems came into being in the Early Bronze Age in areas such as southeastern Europe, and they were quite prominent during the Late Bronze Age in the Lusatian Culture of Poland and northeastern Germany as well as in the Urnfield Culture of central Europe. This settlement organization probably continued into the Early Iron Age in some regions, such as England, where the hill forts became central places for an agricultural, and possibly also political, upland.

      A clear social and political hierarchy was, however, lacking from the Bronze Age settlement pattern. This was particularly true of northern, western, and central Europe, which saw a variety of settlement organizations during the period. There were extended farmsteads in northern and western Europe with a development of enclosed compounds and elaborate field systems in Britain. In central Europe the extended farmsteads were in time supplemented by both unenclosed villages and defended hilltop sites, as was also the case in the area of the Late Bronze Age Lusatian complex in Poland and neighbouring areas. The fortified settlements were usually large planned enterprises, rather than organic village sprawl, and they were often erected over a few years; an example is the Lusatian defended settlement at Biskupin, Pol., where a settlement of 102–106 houses estimated to shelter some 1,000 to 1,200 people was built in just one year. The fortified sites and enclosed villages of the European Bronze Age show centralized decision-making and capacities for planning and constructing grand enterprises. Their concern was the whole community rather than the individual household, and communal features such as paths, gates, and wells were well maintained and planned. The superbly preserved Late Bronze Age sites from the Swiss lakes show these communities vividly. The settlement at Cortallois-Est, on Lake Neuchâtel in Switzerland, illustrates the main features of such sites: straight rows of equal-sized houses aligning paths and alleyways, with the whole complex contained within a perimeter fence. Each house had a fireplace with a decorated house-alter, or firedog. The rubbish accumulated in front of the entrance, and various activities took place within the house. The sites were densely inhabited, and minor internal differences of objects and structure existed between the houses; but they were not divided into different classes in terms of their wealth, size, or accessibility, although different crafts and trades may have made up quarters within the village. These Late Bronze Age villages did not contain any structures that could be interpreted as administrative centres or as religious offices.

      A different form of organization is found throughout the Early Bronze Age in southeastern Europe and in southeastern Spain. Both areas had nucleated defended settlements during this period, and there appears to have been some differentiation of the houses in terms of function and size. A tendency toward centralization is demonstrated by the Early Bronze Age site at Spišsky Štvrtok. This was a fortified site of economic, administrative, and strategic importance. An oval area, enclosed by a ditch and rampart, was differentiated into an acropolis and a settlement area, with the houses of the acropolis built using a different technique. The amount of gold and bronze objects hidden in chests under the floors of the houses in the settlement area further suggests that there were economic and social distinctions among the inhabitants.

      The important exception to this picture is the eastern Mediterranean, which underwent a rapid and dramatic social development during this period, permanently severing its cultural affinity with temperate Europe. At a time of modest stratification in the rest of Europe, the first European civilization—as defined by administration, bookkeeping, writing, urbanism, and the separation of different kinds of power—arose in the Aegean. Its background was the Neolithic cultures of the 3rd millennium BC, which were closely aligned with those of temperate and southeastern Europe. The Neolithic roots alone cannot explain the development in the Aegean, and there is no convincing evidence for external influences behind these changes in Greece nor is there basis for arguing for a migration. Local factors must have caused development to follow a different route in this area.

      One of many possible factors was the marked population increase in the south Aegean during the Early Bronze Age. This led to the development of some extensive settlements, although the overall settlement pattern continued to be dispersed, with a majority of small hamlets and farmsteads. This could have caused a degree of settlement hierarchy at this stage, with some sites acting as regional centres. Central places provide opportunity for craft specialization and redistribution of commodities and thus lead to social hierarchy and a type of society known as the complex chiefdom. Another important factor was the change in agricultural (agriculture, origins of) production that followed the adoption of vine and olive cultivation during the 3rd millennium BC and the possible increase in the exploitation of sheep. These were commodity-oriented activities, which furthered exchange and redistribution. These products were more suitable for a redistributive economy than for a household economy. Olives (olive), in particular, demand capital investment, since it takes several years before the crop produces. Within this setting, the palace economy, a complex bureaucratic organization based on a redistributive economy, developed. The first state had appeared in Europe.

      This process can be followed from 1800 BC onward in Mycenae, in mainland Greece, and on Crete. The character of the society was distinct at each of these centres, but the palace economy distinguished them from the villages and farmsteads of temperate Europe. For reasons not clearly known but possibly related to subsistence crises and over-exploitation of dwindling metal supplies, these centres collapsed suddenly about 1200 BC, and thereafter Greece entered its Dark Ages. After a few centuries of restructuring, about 800 BC this was followed by a remarkable Greek expansion into the western Mediterranean, during which colonies were founded in southern Italy, Mediterranean France (Massalia), and along the southeastern coast of Spain. The Etruscan state, which developed in Italy from about 700 BC, competed for domination of the western Mediterranean, and during the Early Iron Age Etruscan as well as Greek influences reached beyond their Mediterranean neighbours.

      During the Iron Age, stratification became common and marked throughout Europe. Differences in wealth and status in terms of both individuals and households were reflected in graves as well as settlements. Settlements reveal internal division of houses according to size and function, and the population of any village was divided by wealth in addition to sex, age, kinship, and personal characteristics. Socially differentiated settlements existed from Scandinavia to Italy and from Ireland to the Russian borders, although they were differently laid out and organized. This period saw the building of permanent fences and enclosures around fields and farms; the development of villages and, within these, increasing differentiation of the sizes of individual buildings; and increased stratification between settlements, with proto-urban centres coming into being. The rate of change varied in different parts of Europe, but toward the end of the 1st millennium BC all areas had undergone these changes. The end of this trend in northern Europe is vividly illustrated by the Hodde village in Denmark, where the community can be followed during the centuries near the end of the 1st millennium, revealing how a few farms within the enclosed village gradually grew bigger at the cost of the others. An unstratified village was replaced by a society divided into rich and poor in only a few centuries. In other parts of temperate Europe, social division was equally clearly present, and proto-urban characteristics such as commerce, administrative centres, and religious offices came into existence on some of these sites. In this process, the defended hilltop settlement of the Early Iron Age was increasingly replaced by more complex sites.

      The proto-urban tendencies are particularly strongly suggested by the oppida of western, central, and eastern Europe. These were often densely populated enclosed sites, which housed full-time specialists, such as glassmakers, leather workers, and smiths. Manching, one of the largest oppida in Europe, contained many of these characteristics. The site, located at the junction of the Danube and the Paar rivers, was occupied from about 200 BC and developed rapidly from a small undefended village to a large walled settlement. The defense was an elaborate construction consisting of four-mile-long walls built of timber and stones and including four gateways. Some areas within the defense were never occupied but others (a total of about 500 acres) were densely settled. The organization of the settlement was preplanned, with streets up to 30 feet wide and regular rows of rectangular buildings in front of zones containing pits and working areas; other areas were enclosed for granaries or the stalling of horses. The site was divided into work areas for particular crafts, such as wood, leather, and iron working. Coins were minted and used on the site, and there is evidence of much trade.

      A market economy, rather than a redistributive economy, is the hallmark of these sites, and they were important supplements to the regionally dispersed smaller villages and farmsteads. Commodities became direct wealth, and the exchange of different values was monitored through coins (coin). A drastically altered society was the result, but the Roman (ancient Rome) expansion at the end of the 2nd century BC caused major changes and brought local development to an end. The Romans established their own towns and a new system of government, and the oppida were not given the opportunity of developing on their own into towns, for which they had laid the ground.

      The beginning of the Iron Age was in many areas marked by change in burial rites. The extensive use of cremation during the Urnfield Period was replaced by inhumation graves with magnificent displays of wealth. During the Late Hallstatt Period these changes were most dramatically reflected by the group of so-called princely graves in west-central Europe. These were immensely rich burials in large barrows (barrow), in which the construction of grave chamber and barrow became monumental enterprises, reminiscent of the late Unetician barrows at Leubingen and Straubing. In each case the grave was a display of power and status, giving emphasis and prestige to an individual or a lineage at a time of overt disruption of the social order. One of these rich Hallstatt graves was Hohmichele, located within the complex around Heuneburg on the Danube. This barrow was one of the satellite graves surrounding the large hill fort. It covered a central grave and 12 secondary burials. The barrow was constructed in several stages, resulting in a large imposing monument on the level land behind the hill fort. The central grave was robbed in antiquity, but it had been an inhumation grave within a wood-lined chamber, which acted as the display area for the wealth of the deceased. The walls seem to have been draped in textiles with thin gold bands, and the deceased, dressed in finery including silk, was placed on a bed next to a four-wheeled wagon. These graves, while commemorating members of the society in a traditional way, also show new elements that had become part of the life of the nobility north of the Alps. The drinking set suggests the adoption and importance of the Greek drinking ceremonies, using the Greek jugs and Schnabelkannen (“beaked pots”) for pouring and serving wine, the kraters for mixing, and the amphorae for storage and transport. The implied wine-drinking ceremony, which was likely restricted to certain sectors of the society, and furniture directly imported from the south show the emulation of southern city life by the central European chiefs.

      The rich princely graves were constructed in southwestern Germany during Ha C–D. Thereafter inhumation graves became more widespread in central Europe and neighbouring areas, and they were the main burial form until the 2nd century BC, when formal burial rites disappeared in many regions and cremation was reintroduced in others. The graves of the early La Tène Period remained very rich, but barrows and elaborate grave chambers ceased after their resurrection by the Hallstatt princes and princesses. Regional variations in rites and assemblages became prolific. In France, La Tène cemeteries contained rich flat graves that had two-wheeled wagons rather than the earlier four-wheeled ones. These graves held large amounts of beautifully manufactured Celtic objects such as swords and torques, as well as Roman and Greek imports, and there were clear distinctions drawn between the sexes. In central and eastern Europe a new regional complex had developed northwest of the Black Sea, in which there were both inhumation and cremation graves clustered in large cemeteries. This complex is often attributed to Scythian invaders, and the rich assemblages and warrior graves show their influence. In the area of the lower reaches of the Dnepr, Dnestr, and Don rivers, rich Scythian graves have been excavated in the form of shaft and pit graves; in these, the deceased was accompanied by a number of other humans and by horse burials. In northern Europe and Scandinavia, cremation in large urnfields continued during most of the Iron Age. In this area the social differentiation present in the settlements and the wealth displayed by a few large hoards were not expressed in the graves, and, while large numbers of the population were given formal burials, their social statuses were not explicitly expressed in this ritual. Roman and Greek imports and wine-drinking ceremonies also reached northern Europe, but it was not until the end of the Iron Age, when formal inhumation burials reappeared, that they were being used in ways similar to those in more southerly regions.

      In Britain the sequence is even more complicated and shows both a strong indigenous tradition and clear local influences from western Europe. The greatest complication is the disappearance of formal burials (death rite) in this area in the Late Bronze Age; they did not reappear before the last century BC and then only in a few regions, such as Yorkshire. The Late Iron Age inhumation graves in Yorkshire are almost identical to wagon graves in northern France, and there must have been very specific and personal contacts between the two areas to account for this.

      Social differentiation existed throughout the Metal Ages but changed with time and in degree. This was not, however, a smooth process that can easily be followed through the centuries. There were odd kinks in the progression from the minimal ranking of the earliest Bronze Age to the proto-urban state of the Late Iron Age. There were also spatial variabilities and a number of different factors involved in the progression toward greater social complexity. Throughout the Metal Ages in Europe, new social institutions came into being and the relationships between people changed.

The relationship between nature and culture
      During the Middle Bronze Age, the landscapes of most parts of Europe were filled in. Nature became cultivated, and this had costs. It seriously affected social organization as the population spread over larger areas and adapted to local conditions. It also affected the environment, which during the later part of the Bronze Age began to change. This was in part due to climatic changes, but it was furthered by human activity. There was overexploitation of marginal lands; people had moved onto the dunes in areas such as Poland and The Netherlands and into the uplands of Britain, France, and Scandinavia. But, even on less marginal land, centuries of agricultural (agriculture, origins of) exploitation began to exact a price. Many areas in southeastern Europe were extensively overpopulated in comparison with their agricultural capacities in the Copper and Early Bronze ages. In Hungary, for example, the area around the large Early Bronze Age tell at Tószeg was so densely occupied that the villages were within sight of each other. Overpopulation and overexploitation caused peat formation to begin, heathland to expand, blanket bog to grow over established fields and grazing grounds, and fields to turn into meadows. How the people reacted to this is not known in detail, nor is it easy to establish the rate of change, but it is possible to detect a number of changes during the end of the Bronze Age and the Early Iron Age that were associated with the strained economic and ecological conditions. These changes in the environment were not, as previously believed, an environmental catastrophe, but humans had influenced their surroundings to such an extent that they had to change their way of life in order to live with the consequences.

Rituals (ritual), religion, and art
      Throughout this period there were vivid and striking manifestations of religious beliefs, ritual behaviour, and artistic activities. One of the most remarkable phenomena was hoarding. Objects, usually in large numbers, were deliberately hidden in the ground or deposited in water in the form of a hoard. Hoards were known in a modest form during the Neolithic Period, and in some areas, such as Scandinavia and France, there continued to be a few large hoards in the Iron Age; but it was in the Bronze Age that hoarding became a common phenomenon of great social and economic importance. The contents of the hoards varied; they ranged from two to several hundred items or consisted of only one deliberately deposited object, such as the single swords found in the River Thames. They might contain several objects of the same type or of many different types. They were commonly placed in association with wet areas—such as rivers, bogs, and meadows—or located under or near large stones, including in old megalithic tombs. They were seldom parts of settlements, but they have been found in wells, such as at Berlin-Lichterfelde, in Germany. They also may have come to function as a foundation deposit for a later settlement, as was the case at Danebury, in southern England, where an Iron Age hill fort was placed at the location of a Late Bronze Age hoard. Hoards were relatively infrequent during the earliest part of the Bronze Age, when they were found mainly in southeastern Europe, Bavaria, and Austria and contained flat axes and neck rings. Hoarding reached its peak during the later part of the Early Bronze Age and the Middle Bronze Age, when the activity spread throughout Europe and became an established phenomenon in most of its communities. In the Middle and Late Bronze Age, large numbers of hoards were deposited, and a substantial number of bronze objects were in this way consumed and withdrawn from circulation. Late Bronze Age hoards from Romania, among the largest ever, contained up to four tons of bronze objects. At the same time, large collections of unused tools, newly taken from their molds, were deposited together in France.

      Hoarding is one of the more unusual elements of Bronze Age Europe, and it is difficult to explain. The activity consumed large parts of the wealth of these societies without apparent benefits. Traditional explanations have divided them into different types with varying function. The lack of settlement association means that they were not originally foundation deposits, such as are known from the Roman period. They must, therefore, be explained either in terms of metalworking procedures or as having a ritual or religious meaning. Hoards that could have been retrieved from their hiding place have been interpreted, depending on their contents, as hidden treasure, merchants' stock, or items intended for recycling by the smiths. Hoards that could not possibly have been retrieved must have had ritual or religious significance, or, alternatively, they were acts of conspicuous consumption of wealth in a potlatch ceremony. This would enhance the position of the owner and, incidentally, would also ensure the flow of imports and the value of bronze. But a functional interpretation of hoards as a kind of stock cannot account for why these hoards were so often not retrieved. Thousands of hoards were made during the Bronze Age, and enormous riches were disposed of through these activities. In spite of their internal differences and variations in terms of location, composition, and amounts, it is likely that ritual behaviour and cultural meaning were always major components of this practice. There is, however, only little indication of what that meaning was. The association with water, which became more pronounced through time, could suggest water-related rituals and has been interpreted as relating to fertility rites and agricultural production. Because the location and composition of hoards vary locally as well as through time, however, they may embody more than one meaning.

      Only a few areas saw instances of hoarding in the Iron Age, and their forms were distinctly different from those of the Bronze Age. The most obvious example is the votive deposit at Hjortspring, Den., where a large wooden boat equipped for war with wooden shields, spears, and swords was destroyed and deposited in a small bog. The events behind these hoards were known to classical writers such as Tacitus and Orosius, who gave accounts of war offerings by Germanic and Cimbrian tribes, respectively. They describe how the weaponry (weapon) confiscated in war was destroyed and deposited in victory ceremonies. The Iron Age hoards of northern Europe had clear associations with war, the types and numbers of objects deposited together are incomparable with the Bronze Age hoards, and the ritual destruction of the entire assemblage was a new element.

      The new hoarding ritual contained elements of conspicuous consumption, but its form and focus were different from previous activities. It developed shortly before the end of the 1st millennium, and it continued as a tradition among the Germanic tribes in northern Europe for several centuries. Another area with complex ritual ceremonies during the Iron Age is France. There are not many of these ritual places, but those that existed were large complex sanctuaries with continuous use over several centuries. One of these sites is Gournay-sur-Aronde, in northern France, a sanctuary used from 300 to 50 BC. The site consisted of a square enclosed by a ditch and palisade with a number of large pits for exposing and displaying offerings at its centre and a number of wood-lined ditches along the edges. In the ditches were found the remains of hundreds of iron weapons, all deliberately and systematically destroyed, as well as fibulae and tools. There were also the remains of 208 animals and 12 humans. These remains indicate some of the ceremonial behaviour that had taken place on the site. All cattle had the muzzle cut off during offering, and their skulls were displayed on top of pits and ditches. The humans had been beheaded, and the bones were at some points moved from the central pits to the ditches and rearranged there according to different prescriptions. The archaeology shows that both the Bronze and Iron ages were periods of specific and unique ritual behaviour but also that their beliefs and norms were not uniform throughout each period. As the socioeconomic structures of these societies changed, their ideological structures underwent transformation.

      Societies reveal themselves through their art (arts, the). These expressions are, however, difficult to interpret, and much of this evidence from the past has disappeared. It is at the same time an essential source, giving insight into the artistry and sophistication of the people of these periods. The development of styles can be followed through the decoration (decorative art) of metal objects and ceramics, while a more distinct pictorial art is found in the rock art from many parts of Europe, in the wall paintings from Minoan Crete, and in the odd figures and scenarios engraved on a range of materials. Stylistic developments show the existence of workshops and schools, and the degree of influence they exercised reached into far corners of the Bronze and Iron Age communities. In the stylistic development during the Metal Ages, two phenomena are of particular interest. The first is the development of the Sun- bird- ship motif of the Urnfield culture. The origin of this motif, which featured bird-headed ships embellished with solar disks, is not known, but over a short period about 1400 BC it became common both as incised decoration and as plastic art throughout a vast area of eastern and central Europe. The similarity in execution and composition is remarkable and suggests a shared understanding of its meaning and the intensity of contact between distant areas.

      The second point of interest is the change in style between the Hallstatt and La Tène periods. Throughout the Bronze Age and the Late Hallstatt Period, there were two distinct types of decoration in temperate Europe: the dominant geometric design of various compositions, including curvilinear styles, and the less common naturalistic style portraying humans and animals and used, for example, in rock art. At the end of the Hallstatt Period, at the beginning of the second phase of the Iron Age, a new decorative style, the La Tène style developed, and it rapidly replaced the geometric decoration. This style, as abstract as the Bronze Age one, was nonetheless substantially different. It incorporated flowing curved lines of floral designs with zoomorphic motifs filling the surfaces of the objects and increasingly used settings of semiprecious stones and coral. During the Iron Age this style flourished and branched out into different schools of great beauty. The style reached its mature form in the 4th century BC with the Waldalgesheim style, and, after this point, its most interesting branch was found in Britain, which saw a very individual development and where La Tène art continued to flourish after this style had passed its zenith on the Continent. The La Tène style was used on a variety of artifacts, such as gold and silver jewelry, swords and scabbards, shields inlaid with enamel, bronze mirrors, and beautifully executed containers in wood and ceramics.

      The origin and spread of the different art styles have been the subject of much debate. Early Bronze Age geometric and linear motifs, in particular the use of double-axe and spirals motifs, looked to be the result of Mycenaean influences. The art of the Urnfield Culture was thought to be the result of an invasion of people from the east, bringing cremation and a new art style into Europe. La Tène art was associated with the Celtic (Celt) people, and their spread throughout large parts of Europe was assumed to have brought this art to different areas. The genesis of the various artistic developments cannot easily be established; but they were not as unified a phenomenon as has been assumed, and local variations are prolific. Different art styles influenced each other and were spread widely through copies, exchange, and communication; but this was interspersed with periods of greater local diversity and less desire for contact and emulation.

The people of the Metal Ages
      The Iron Age is often seen as the time of the appearance in history of the European peoples, the “barbarians” as they were seen by Rome. These people included a number of different tribes and groups, the configuration of which changed over time; all had more or less obvious roots in the Bronze Age. Ethnicity is not easy to establish, however, and the fact that, for example, the Romans ascribed an area to a particular people does not necessarily mean that those inhabiting that area constituted an ethnic and linguistic group. Continuous changes in the composition of tribal (tribe) formation occurred in the Iron Age as groups bound together through alliances created by gift giving, trade, and aggression. From Greek, and later Roman, writers and from Assyrian texts, historical information about some of these people has been preserved. The main groups presented by these texts are the Celts in western Europe, the Germanic (Germanic peoples) people of northern Europe, the Slavs (Slav) from eastern Europe, and Cimmerians (Cimmerian), Scythians (Scythian), and, later, Sarmatians (Sarmatian) coming into southeastern Europe from the Russian Steppe. The texts describe what to their authors appeared as barbarous customs in cultures they did not understand, but they also provide historic insights into the movements of different peoples and tribes during this unrestful period.

      It was also during the Iron Age that individually named people appeared for the first time in European sources, and the names of kings, heroes, gods, and goddesses have become known through legendary writers such as Homer. In the main, however, the Metal Ages were before literature began to immortalize individuals, and in general little is known about individual people or even groups from these periods. It remains up to the archaeologist to explain how the people lived and who they were, since they are known only through their art, their actions, and their own physical remains. Their art shows the people through figures and drawings, but always in a stylistic or symbolic way rather than as portraits. This is even the case in the wall paintings from Mycenaean Crete, which show detailed full-figure drawings of women and men in different costumes and involved in various, presumably partly ceremonial, activities. The figurative representations, whether drawings or statues, do not give accurate insight into the appearance, health, and mentality of these people, but evidence of this is provided by their physical remains and the things they made and used.

      Their appearance can to some extent be reconstructed on the basis of skeletal materials from graves. Owing to changes in burial rites, these are better preserved from some periods than others, but in general there is good evidence. The people were close to the same height as people living today and were of a similar build. In some areas, as demonstrated by the Early Bronze Age cemetery at Ripa Lui Bodai, in Romania, people of different racial characteristics were buried in a similar manner within one cemetery, suggesting that the population was racially mixed. It is quite likely that such mixture was common in many areas, suggesting that the cultures correspond to social structures rather than ethnic or racial ones.

      The mortality rate was high, and the average life expectancy was about 30–40 years, with high infant mortality and few very old members of society. At the Unetician cemetery at Tornice, Pol., the average age at death for men was 31 and for women 20, while that from the Early Bronze Age cemetery at Lerna, Greece, was 31–37 for men and 29–31 for women. Women would have given birth at an early age, and their lower life expectancy was likely due to death in connection with pregnancy or childbirth. The difference in life expectancy may be indirect evidence of girl-child infanticide. Generational time would have been short, and the nature of society was therefore drastically different. As an example, the estimate of the living population at Branč suggests that it consisted of 30 to 40 people, half of them children. This would have influenced social life, kinship systems, and subsistence activities. The bodies often show signs of heavy physical labour (labour, division of), and the wear on the bones suggests that many activities took place in a squatting position.

      Generally, social divisions of labour and resources did not in the Bronze Age reach such degrees that this affected the bodies, but this changed with time. Analysis of the human bones from the Early Iron Age cemetery at Mount Magdalenska, Slovenia, shows such divisions. The males of some clans or leading families had more access to animal products than any of the other members of the community, and the women generally had a more restricted and homogeneous diet. With the advent of the Iron Age, the society had become so differentiated that some people lived a life protected from hard labour and physical toils while others worked extensively and had a poor diet.

      Throughout the Metal Ages, humans were victims of various diseases, such as rheumatism and arthritis, which complicated life and crippled the body. Tuberculosis also has been observed, as have periodontal disease, caries, and bone tumours. Some of these diseases caused joint changes or vertebral deformities—such as were seen on a Copper Age skeleton found in Hungary—which resulted in restricted working and even walking capacities for the individual concerned. Badly crippled and handicapped people often survived, and they must have been taken care of and fed by other members of their community.

      There is also evidence to suggest that people took great care with their appearance. The hairstyles (hairdressing) were often sophisticated, with braids, hairnets, and ornaments being used by women or with the hair cut straight at the shoulder in a bob as for the girl in the grave at Egtved, Den. Manicure equipment was common in Late Bronze and Early Iron Age graves (tomb), and the mirror was a favoured object among both the Celtic people and Scythian warriors. These objects and evidence from well-preserved graves show people as well-groomed individuals who shaved regularly, braided or cut their hair, and had well-cared-for, manicured hands.

      In addition to how the people looked, there is also evidence of the clothing (dress) and ornaments they used. There are a few scattered wool textiles from the Neolithic, but the first well-documented evidence of wool textiles dates from the Bronze Age. At times the textiles themselves have been found, but more commonly it is the equipment used in textile production that shows their presence. Spindle whorls, loom weights, and combs became increasingly common components of settlement debris, showing weaving as a household task performed at any settlement. With the Iron Age, new weaving techniques developed, and embroideries, dyes, and more complicated designs were introduced, as were textiles of materials such as linen and silk. At this point, it also became common to have specialist weavers, and in some oppida the weavers lived in certain designated quarters within the settlement. The increase in textile production meant that the raising of sheep intensified in many regions during the Bronze Age. In the Aegean, this happened early in the Bronze Age, and Linear B tablets that give accounts of trade in textiles certify the economic importance of this commodity for this area. In other parts of Europe, it took a little longer, but, toward the end of the Bronze Age, changes in the fleece of sheep in England demonstrate how substantially the use of sheep had grown.

      Remains of Bronze Age costumes are limited, but they show various relatively simple wool garments adorned with bronze ornaments and attachments. In many areas, hats (hat) of different kinds—possibly with a clear distinction in style between those worn by men and women—were used. Bronze statues show similarly prominent headpieces, and they often gave great attention to depicting hairstyles. In the course of the Early Bronze Age, pins (pin) became common elements of costumes, and with the Tumulus Culture they became prominent pieces, at times exceeding 12 to 16 inches (30 to 40 centimetres) in length, with elaborate heads that often reflect regional patterns. At this time, the pins lost much of their original functional role and became primarily display items. Their regional diversity suggests how people used elements of their dress to express their group identity. During the Late Bronze Age, the pin remained in use and of importance. Thousands were found in the Swiss lake sites, but these are small elegant pieces that at times were composed into complex breast pieces by connecting chains and pendants. Iron Age textiles are found much more frequently, and clothing at that time became an elaborate and colourful medium of regional and social variability. Metal attachments (jewelry) became less common; but the fibula (a brooch resembling a safety pin) replaced the pin, and it became an object of fashion widely adopted and undergoing much regional development and elaboration.

      These were the people who lived with and created the Metal Ages of prehistoric Europe. The conditions of their lives had undergone considerable changes during the centuries of the Copper (Copper Age), Bronze (Bronze Age), and Iron ages (Iron Age); but these were gradual changes initiated and managed largely internally and at a rate dictated from within. Roman expansion into temperate Europe during the last centuries BC changed this, and new social and ideological structures were imposed from above upon local communities. Long-established links of contact and previous cultural affinities were broken, and a new Europe came into being.

Marie-Louise Stig Sørensen

Greeks, Romans, and barbarians
 The main treatment of classical Greek and Roman history is given in the article Aegean civilizations; ancient Greek civilization; Hellenistic Age; ancient Italic people; and ancient Rome. Only a brief cultural overview is offered here, outlining the influence of Greeks and Romans on European history.

      Of the Indo-European tribes of European origin, the Greeks were foremost as regards both the period at which they developed an advanced culture and their importance in further evolution. The Greeks emerged in the course of the 2nd millennium BC through the superimposition of a branch of the Indo-Europeans on the population of the Mediterranean region during the great migrations of nations that started in the region of the lower Danube. From 1800 BC onward the first early Greeks reached their later areas of settlement between the Ionian and the Aegean seas. The fusion of these earliest Greek-speaking people with their predecessors produced the civilization known as Mycenaean. They penetrated to the sea into the Aegean region and via Crete (approximately 1400 BC) reached Rhodes and even Cyprus and the shores of Anatolia. From 1200 BC onward the Dorians followed from Epirus. They occupied principally parts of the Peloponnese (Sparta and Argolis) and also Crete. Their migration was followed by the Dark Ages—two centuries of chaotic movements of tribes in Greece—at the end of which (c. 900 BC) the distribution of the Greek mainland among the various tribes was on the whole completed.

      From about 800 BC there was a further Greek expansion through the founding of colonies (colonialism, Western) overseas. The coasts and islands of Anatolia were occupied from south to north by the Dorians, Ionians, and Aeolians, respectively. In addition, individual colonies were strung out around the shores of the Black Sea in the north and across the eastern Mediterranean to Naukratis on the Nile delta and in Cyrenaica and also in the western Mediterranean in Sicily, lower Italy, and Massalia (Marseille). Thus, the Hellenes, as they called themselves thereafter, came into contact on all sides with the old, advanced cultures of the Middle East and transmitted many features of these cultures to western Europe. This, along with the Greeks' own achievements, laid the foundations of European civilization.

      The position and nature of the country exercised a decisive influence in the evolution of Greek civilization. The proximity of the sea tempted the Greeks to range far and wide exploring it, but the fact of their living on islands or on peninsulas or in valleys separated by mountains on the mainland confined the formation of states to small areas not easily accessible from other parts. This fateful individualism in political development was also a reflection of the Hellenic temperament. Though it prevented Greece from becoming a single unified nation that could rival the strength of the Middle Eastern monarchies, it led to the evolution of the city-state (polis). This was not merely a complex social and economic structure and a centre for crafts and for trade with distant regions; above all it was a tightly knit, self-governing political and religious community whose citizens were prepared to make any sacrifice to maintain their freedom. Colonies, too, started from individual cities and took the form of independent city-states. Fusions of power occurred in the shape of leagues of cities, such as the Peloponnesian League, the Delian League, and the Boeotian League. The efficacy of these leagues depended chiefly upon the hegemony of a leading city (Sparta, Athens, or Thebes), but the desire for self-determination of the others could never be permanently suppressed, and the leagues broke up again and again.

      The Hellenes, however, always felt themselves to be one people. They were conscious of a common character and a common language, and they practiced only one religion. Furthermore, the great athletic contests and artistic competitions had a continually renewed unifying effect. The Hellenes possessed a keen intellect, capable of abstraction, and at the same time a supple imagination. They developed, in the form of the belief in the unity of body and soul, a serene, sensuous conception of the world. Their gods were connected only loosely by a theogony that took shape gradually; in the Greek religion there was neither revelation nor dogma to oppose the spirit of inquiry.

      The Hellenes benefited greatly from the knowledge and achievement of other countries as regards astronomy, chronology, and mathematics, but it was through their own native abilities that they made their greatest achievements, in becoming the founders of European philosophy and science. Their achievement in representative art and in architecture was no less fundamental. Their striving for an ideal, naturalistic rendering found its fulfillment in the representation of the human body in sculpture in the round. Another considerable achievement was the development of the pillared temple to a greater degree of harmony. In poetry the genius of the Hellenes created both form and content, which have remained a constant source of inspiration in European literature.

      The strong political sense of the Greeks produced a variety of systems of government from which their theory of political science abstracted types of constitution that are still in use. On the whole, political development in Greece followed a pattern: first the rule of kings, found as early as the period of Mycenaean civilization; then a feudal period, the oligarchy of noble landowners; and, finally, varying degrees of democracy. Frequently there were periods when individuals seized power in the cities and ruled as tyrants. The tendency for ever-wider sections of the community to participate in the life of the state brought into being the free democratic citizens, but the institution of slavery, upon which Greek society and the Greek economy rested, was untouched by this.

      In spite of continual internal disputes, the Greeks succeeded in warding off the threat of Asian despotism. The advance of the Persians into Europe failed (490 and 480–79 BC) because of the resistance of the Greeks and in particular of the Athenians. The 5th century BC saw the highest development of Greek civilization. The Classical period of Athens and its great accomplishments left a lasting impression, but the political cleavages, particularly the struggle between Athens and Sparta, increasingly reduced the political strength of the Greeks. Not until they were conquered by the Macedonians (Macedonia) did the Greeks attain a new importance as the cultural leaven of the Hellenistic empires of Alexander the Great and his successors. A new system of colonization spread as far as the Indus city-communities fashioned after the Greek prototype, and Greek education and language came to be of consequence in the world at large.

      Greece again asserted its independence through the formation of the Achaean League, which was finally defeated by the Romans in 146 BC. The spirit of Greek civilization subsequently exercised a great influence upon Rome. Greek culture became one of the principal components of Roman imperial culture and together with it spread throughout Europe. When Christian teaching appeared in the Middle East, the Greek world of ideas exercised a decisive influence upon its spiritual evolution. From the time of the partition of the Roman Empire, leadership in the Eastern Empire fell to the Greeks. Their language became the language of the state, and its usage spread to the Balkans. The Byzantine Empire, of which Greece was the core, protected Europe against potential invaders from Anatolia until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. (The main treatment of the Byzantine Empire from about 330 to about 1453 is given in the article Byzantine Empire. (Byzantine Empire))

Romans (ancient Rome)
      The original Mediterranean population of Italy was completely altered by repeated superimpositions of peoples of Indo-European stock. The first Indo-European migrants, who belonged to the Italic tribes, moved across the eastern Alpine passes into the plain of the Po River about 1800 BC. Later they crossed the Apennines and eventually occupied the region of Latium, which included Rome. Before 1000 BC there followed related tribes, which later divided into various groups and gradually moved to central and southern Italy. In Tuscany they were repulsed by the Etruscans (Etruscan), who may have come originally from Anatolia. The next to arrive were Illyrians from the Balkans, who occupied Venetia and Apulia. At the beginning of the historical period, Greek colonists arrived in Italy, and after 400 BC the Celts (Celt), who settled in the plain of the Po.

      The city of Rome, increasing gradually in power and influence, created through political rule and the spread of the Latin language something like a nation out of this abundance of nationalities. In this the Romans were favoured by their kinship with the other Italic (ancient Italic people) tribes. The Roman and Italic elements in Italy, moreover, were reinforced in the beginning through the founding of colonies by Rome and by other towns in Latium. The Italic element in Roman towns decreased: a process—less racial than cultural—called the Romanization of the provinces. In the 3rd century BC, central and southern Italy were dotted with Roman colonies, and the system was to be extended to ever more distant regions up to imperial times. As its dominion spread throughout Italy and covered the entire Mediterranean basin, Rome received an influx of people of the most varied origins, including eventually vast numbers from Asia and Africa.

      The building of an enormous empire was Rome's greatest achievement. Held together by the military power of one city, in the 2nd century AD the Roman Empire extended throughout northern Africa and western Asia; in Europe it covered all the Mediterranean countries, Spain, Gaul, and southern Britain. This vast region, united under a single authority and a single political and social organization, enjoyed a long period of peaceful development. In Asia, on a narrow front, it bordered the Parthian empire, but elsewhere beyond its perimeter there were only barbarians. Rome brought to the conquered parts of Europe the civilization the Greeks had begun, to which it added its own important contributions in the form of state organization, military institutions, and law. Within the framework of the empire and under the protection of its chain of fortifications (fortification), extending uninterrupted the entire length of its frontiers (marked in Europe by the Rhine and the Danube), there began the assimilation of varying types of culture to the Hellenistic-Roman pattern. The army principally, but also Roman administration, the social order, and economic factors, encouraged Romanization. Except around the eastern Mediterranean, where Greek remained dominant, Latin became everywhere the language of commerce and eventually almost the universal language.

      The empire formed an interconnected area of free trade (international trade), which was afforded a thriving existence by the pax romana (“Roman peace”). Products of rural districts found a market throughout the whole empire, and the advanced technical skills of the central region of the Mediterranean spread outward into the provinces. The most decisive step toward Romanization was the extension of the city system into these provinces. Rural and tribal (tribe) institutions were replaced by the civitas form of government, according to which the elected city authority shared in the administration of the surrounding country region; and, as the old idea of the Greek city-state gained ground, a measure of local autonomy appeared. The Romanized upper classes of the provinces began supplying men to fill the higher offices of the state. Ever-larger numbers of people acquired the status of Roman citizens, until in AD 212 the emperor Caracalla bestowed it on all freeborn subjects. The institution of slavery, however, remained.

      The enjoyment of equal rights by all Roman citizens did not last. The coercive measures by which alone the state could maintain itself divided the population anew into hereditary classes according to their work; and the barbarians, mainly Germanic, who were admitted into the empire in greater numbers, remained in their own tribal associations either as subjects or as allies. The state created a perfected administrative apparatus, which exercised a strongly unifying effect throughout the empire, but local self-government became less and less effective under pressure from the central authority.

      The decline of the late empire was accompanied by a stagnation of spiritual forces, a paralysis of creative power, and a retrograde development in the economy. Much of the empire's work of civilization was lost in internal and external wars. Equally, barbarization began with the rise of unchecked pagan ways of life and the settlement of Germanic tribes long before the latter shattered the Western Empire and took possession of its parts. Though many features of Roman civilization disappeared, others survived in the customs of peoples in various parts of the empire. Moreover, something of the superstructure of the empire was taken over by the Germanic states, and much valuable literature was preserved in manuscript for later times.

      It was under the Roman Empire that the Christian (Christianity) religion penetrated into Europe. By winning recognition as the religion of the state, it added a new basic factor of equality and unification to the imperial civilization and at the same time reintroduced Middle Eastern and Hellenistic elements into the West. Organized within the framework of the empire, the church became a complementary body upholding the state. Moreover, during the period of the decline of secular culture, Christianity and the church were the sole forces to arouse fresh creative strength by assimilating the civilization of the ancient world and transmitting it to the Middle Ages. At the same time, the church in the West showed reserve toward the speculative dogma of the Middle Eastern and Hellenic worlds and directed its attention more toward questions of morality and order. When the Western Empire collapsed and the use of Greek had died there, the division between East and West became still sharper. The name Romaioi remained attached to the Greeks of the Eastern Empire, while in the West the word Roman developed a new meaning in connection with the church and the bishop of Rome. Christianity and a church of a Roman character, the most enduring legacy of the ancient world, became one of the most important features in western European civilization.

Barbarian migrations and invasions
The Germans and Huns
      The wanderings of the Germanic peoples, which lasted until the early Middle Ages and destroyed the Western Roman Empire, were, together with the migrations (human migration) of the Slavs (Slav), formative elements of the distribution of peoples in modern Europe. The Germanic peoples originated about 1800 BC from the superimposition, on a population of megalithic culture on the eastern North Sea coast, of Battle-Ax people from the Corded Ware Culture of middle Germany. During the Bronze Age the Germanic peoples spread over southern Scandinavia and penetrated more deeply into Germany between the Weser and Vistula rivers. Contact with the Mediterranean through the amber trade encouraged the development from a purely peasant culture, but during the Iron Age the Germanic peoples were at first cut off from the Mediterranean by the Celts (Celt) and Illyrians. Their culture declined, and an increasing population, together with worsening climatic conditions, drove them to seek new lands farther south. Thus the central European Celts and Illyrians found themselves under a growing pressure. Even before 200 BC the first Germanic tribes had reached the lower Danube, where their path was barred by the Macedonian kingdom. Driven by rising floodwaters, at the end of the 2nd century BC, migratory hordes of Cimbri, Teutoni, and Ambrones from Jutland broke through the Celtic-Illyrian zone and reached the edge of the Roman sphere of influence, appearing first in Carinthia (113 BC), then in southern France, and finally in upper Italy. With the violent attacks of the Cimbri, the Germans stepped onto the stage of history.

      These migrations were in no way nomadic; they were the gradual expansions of a land-hungry peasantry. Tribes did not always migrate en masse. Usually, because of the loose political structure, groups remained in the original homelands or settled down at points along the migration route. In the course of time, many tribes were depleted and scattered. On the other hand, different tribal groups would sometimes unite before migrating or would take up other wanderers en route. The migrations required skilled leadership, and this promoted the social and political elevation of a noble and kingly class.

      In 102 BC the Teutoni were totally defeated by the Romans, who in the following year destroyed the army of the Cimbri. The Swabian tribes, however, moved steadily through central and southern Germany, and the Celts were compelled to retreat to Gaul. When the Germans under Ariovistus crossed the upper Rhine, Julius Caesar arrested their advance and initiated the Roman countermovement with his victory in the Sundgau (58 BC). Under the emperor Augustus, Roman rule was carried as far as the Rhine and the Danube. On the far side of these rivers, the Germans were pushed back only in the small area contained within the Germano-Raetian limes (fortified frontier) from about AD 70.

      The pressure of population was soon evident once more among the German peoples. Tribes that had left Scandinavia earlier (Rugii, Goths, Gepidae, Vandals, Burgundians, and others) pressed on from the lower Vistula and Oder rivers (AD 150 onward). The unrest spread to other tribes, and the resulting wars between the Romans and the Marcomanni (166–180) threatened Italy itself. The successful campaigns of Marcus Aurelius resulted in the acquisition by Rome of the provinces of Marcomannia and Sarmatia, but after his death these had to be abandoned and the movement of the Germanic peoples continued. Soon the Alemanni, pushing up the Main River, reached the upper German limes.

      To the east the Goths (Goth) had reached the Black Sea about AD 200. Year after year Goths and others, either crossing the lower Danube or traveling by sea, penetrated into the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia as far as Cyprus on plundering expeditions. Only with the Roman victory at Naissus (Niš) (269) was their advance finally checked. Enriched with booty and constituted imperial mercenaries in return for the payment of a yearly tribute, they became a settled population. The Romans, however, surrendered Dacia beyond the Danube.

      In 258 the Alemanni and the Franks (Frank) broke through the lines and settled on the right bank of the Rhine, continuously infiltrating thereafter toward Gaul and Italy. Everywhere within the empire, towns were fortified, even Rome itself. Franks and Saxons (Saxon) ravaged the coasts of northern Gaul and Britain, and for the next three centuries incursions by Germanic peoples were the scourge of the Western Empire. Nevertheless, it was only with German help that the empire was able to survive as long as it did. The Roman army received an ever-growing number of recruits from the German tribes, which also provided settlers for the land. The Germans soon proved themselves capable of holding the highest ranks in the army. Tribute money to the tribes, pay to individual soldiers, and booty all brought wealth to the Germans, which in turn gave warrior lords the means with which to maintain large followings of retainers.

      In the West, however, among the Alemanni and Franks, the beginnings of political union into larger groups did not go beyond loose associations. Only in the East did the Gothic kingdom gather many tribes under a single leadership. Above all, the development of the eastern Germans was stimulated by their undisturbed contact with the frontiers of the ancient world. Their economy, however, was still unable to support the needs of a steadily growing population, and pressure from overpopulation resulted in further incursions into the Roman Empire. The imperial reforms of Diocletian and Constantine the Great brought a period of improvement. The usurpation of the imperial title by a Frankish general in 356 let loose a storm along the length of the Rhine and subsequently on the Danube, but the frontiers were restored by the forces of the emperors Julian and Valentinian I, who repelled attacks by both the Franks and the Alemanni.

      At that time, a new force appeared. In 375 the Huns (Hun) from Central Asia first attacked the Ostrogoths (Ostrogoth)—an event that provoked serious disturbances among the eastern Germans. The Huns remained in the background, gradually subjugating many Germanic and other tribes. The terrified Goths and related tribes burst through the Danube frontier into the Roman Empire, and the Balkans became once again a battlefield for German armies. After the crushing defeat of the Romans at Adrianople (Adrianople, Battle of) (378), the empire was no longer in a position to drive all its enemies from its territories. Tribes that could no longer be expelled were settled within the empire as “allies” ( foederati). They received subsidies and in return supplied troops. The Germanization of the empire progressed, that of the army being nearly completed. None of the tribes, however, that had broken into the Balkans settled there. After the division of the empire in 395, the emperors at Constantinople did all in their power to drive the Germanic tribes away from the vicinity of the capital toward the Western Empire.

      From the beginning of the 5th century, the Western Empire was the scene of numerous further migrations. The Visigoths (Visigoth) broke out of the Balkans into Italy and in 410 temporarily occupied Rome. In 406–407, Germanic and other tribes (Vandals (Vandal), Alani, Suebi, and Burgundians) from Silesia and even farther east crossed the Rhine in their flight from the Huns and penetrated as far as Spain. The Vandals subsequently crossed to Africa and set up at Carthage the first independent German state on Roman soil. In the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains (451), the Roman commander Aëtius, with German support, defeated Attila, who had united his Huns with some other Germans in a vigorous westward push. The Balkans suffered a third period of terrible raids from the eastern Germans; and Jutes, Angles, and Saxons from the Jutland Peninsula crossed over to Britain. The Franks and the Alemanni finally established themselves on the far side of the Rhine, the Burgundians extended along the Rhône valley, and the Visigoths took possession of nearly all of Spain. In 476 the Germanic soldiery proclaimed Odoacer, a barbarian general, as king of Italy, and, when Odoacer deposed the emperor Romulus Augustulus at Ravenna, the empire in the West was at an end. In the East, imperial rule remained a reality, and Constantinople, also called “New Rome,” survived many sieges until its fall in 1453. In comparison, “Old Rome” declined into an episcopal centre, losing many of its imperial characteristics.

Hermann Aubin Ed.

The reconfiguration of the empire
      By the end of the 5th century, however, most of the non-Roman peoples settled in the West were adopting Roman customs and Christian belief. Intermarriage with established Roman families, the assumption of imperial titles, and, finally, conversion assisted a process of acculturation among their leaders, for instance, in the case of Clovis, the Frank. Theodoric the Ostrogoth established an impressive “sub-Roman” kingdom based on Ravenna, where public buildings and churches served by an Arian clergy competed with imperial monuments. Increased Roman influence can also be seen in the law codes (law code) promulgated by the Visigoths Euric (late 5th century) and Alaric II (the Breviary of 506) and the Burgundians, Bavarians, Ostrogoths, and Franks (Lex Salica, 507–511). Christianity often provided the medium for incorporation into old imperial structures. While the Goths (Goth) were still in the Danube basin, they had embraced Arian Christianity (Arianism) (which denied that the Son was of the same substance as the Father), and their first bishop, Ulfilas, translated the Bible into Gothic. Given its heretical nature, this religious literature in a written vernacular could not survive, and, with conversion to orthodox (“catholic”) Christianity, the barbarian languages gradually gave way to Latin.

      Nonetheless, the Germanic tribes brought into Europe their own tribal institutions, ethnic patterns, and oral and artistic traditions, including a highly developed epic poetry. Their influence was strongest in central Europe, where the Romans had had the least impact; less marked in the northern and eastern parts, where Romano-British and Gallo-Roman cultures were established; and weakest in the highly Romanized southern regions. Linguistically, Old High German developed in the first zone and Anglo-Saxon in Britain, while farther south medieval Romance languages developed from their common Latin inheritance.

      In the southern zone, imperial traditions were reinforced by the reconquest, albeit brief, of North Africa, Italy, and parts of Spain by forces from Constantinople under Justinian's general Belisarius. Despite the restoration of Roman administration between 533 and 554 (celebrated in the mosaics of Ravenna and the Pragmatic Sanction of 554), imperial forces could not prevent the Lombards (Lombard) from moving inexorably into northern Italy, which they occupied in 568. The reconquered parts of the Western Empire were thus reduced to a narrow strip of territory from the head of the Adriatic to Ravenna, the exarchate, Rome—now governed effectively by its bishop—plus small duchies. In addition, Sicily, Bruttium, and Calabria remained subject to Constantinople and were Greek-speaking for many centuries.

      In contrast to previous invaders, from the 6th century onward, newly arrived barbarian forces clung to their pagan culture and resisted assimilation. The Saxons established themselves east of the Rhine in the north. The Avars (Avar) and their Slav allies, who moved steadily westward from the Vistula and Dnepr river basins, disrupted weak imperial defenses at the Danube and pressed south and west into the Balkans and central Europe. By 567 the Avars established control over the Hungarian plain, where they remained until their defeat by Charlemagne in 796. After successfully besieging Sirmium and Singidunum in the 580s, the eastern Slavs infiltrated the Balkans, while others moved north and west to settle eventually along the Elbe beside the Saxons. The failure of the combined Avaro-Slav siege of Constantinople in 626 ended this pagan expansion. Although Slavs occupied the Balkan Peninsula for two centuries or more, disrupting east-west communication along the ancient Via Egnatia, they were eventually evangelized and absorbed into the Eastern Empire.

Judith Eleanor Herrin

The Middle Ages (Middle Ages)
 The period of European history extending from about 500 to 1400–1500 CE is traditionally known as the Middle Ages. The term was first used by 15th-century scholars to designate the period between their own time and the fall of the Western Roman Empire (Roman Republic and Empire). The period is often considered to have its own internal divisions: either early and late or early, central or high, and late.

      Although once regarded as a time of uninterrupted ignorance, superstition, and social oppression, the Middle Ages are now understood as a dynamic period during which the idea of Europe as a distinct cultural unit emerged. During late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, political, social, economic, and cultural structures were profoundly reorganized, as Roman imperial traditions gave way to those of the Germanic peoples who established kingdoms in the former Western Empire. New forms of political leadership were introduced, the population of Europe was gradually Christianized, and monasticism was established as the ideal form of religious life. These developments reached their mature form in the 9th century during the reign of Charlemagne and other rulers of the Carolingian dynasty, who oversaw a broad cultural revival known as the Carolingian renaissance.

      In the central, or high, Middle Ages, even more dramatic growth occurred. The period was marked by economic and territorial expansion, demographic and urban growth, the emergence of national identity, and the restructuring of secular and ecclesiastical institutions. It was the era of the Crusades, Gothic art and architecture, the papal monarchy (papacy), the birth of the university, the recovery of ancient Greek thought, and the soaring intellectual achievements of St. Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas, Thomas, Saint) (c. 1224–74).

      It has been traditionally held that by the 14th century the dynamic force of medieval civilization had been spent and that the late Middle Ages were characterized by decline and decay. Europe did indeed suffer disasters of war, famine, and pestilence in the 14th century, but many of the underlying social, intellectual, and political structures remained intact. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Europe experienced an intellectual and economic revival, conventionally called the Renaissance, that laid the foundation for the subsequent expansion of European culture throughout the world.

      Many historians have questioned the conventional dating of the beginning and end of the Middle Ages, which were never precise in any case and cannot be located in any year or even century. Some scholars have advocated extending the period defined as late antiquity (c. 250–c. 750 CE) into the 10th century or later, and some have proposed a Middle Ages lasting from about 1000 to 1800. Still others argue for the inclusion of the old periods Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation into a single period beginning in late antiquity and ending in the second half of the 16th century.

Edward Peters Michael Frassetto

The idea of the Middle Ages
The term and concept before the 18th century
      From the 4th to the 15th century, writers of history (historiography) thought within a linear framework of time derived from the Christian (Christianity) understanding of Scripture—the sequence of Creation, Incarnation, Christ (Jesus Christ)'s Second Coming, and the Last Judgment. In Book XXII of City of God, the great Church Father Augustine (Augustine, Saint) of Hippo (354–430) posited six ages of world history, which paralleled the six days of Creation and the six ages of the individual human life span. For Augustine, the six ages of history—from Adam and Eve to the Flood, from the Flood to Abraham, from Abraham to King David, from David to the Babylonian Exile, from the Exile to Jesus Christ, and from Christ to the Second Coming—would be followed by a seventh age, the reign of Christ on earth. World history was conceived as “salvation history”—the course of events from Creation to the Last Judgment—and its purposes were religious and moral. Thus, all the references by Augustine and other early authors to a “middle time” must be understood within the framework of the sixth age of salvation history. Early Christian interpretations of the biblical Book of Daniel (Daniel, The Book of) (Daniel 2:31–45, 7), especially those of the Church Father Jerome (Jerome, Saint) (c. 347–419/420) and the historian Paulus Orosius (Orosius, Paulus) (flourished 414–417), added the idea of four successive world empires—Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome. Late writers in this tradition added the idea of the translation imperii (“translation of empire”): from Alexander the Great to the Romans, from the Romans to the Franks (Frank) under Charlemagne in 800, and from Charlemagne to the East Frankish emperors and Otto I. A number of early European thinkers built upon the idea of the translation of empire to define European civilization in terms of scholarship and chivalry (the knightly code of conduct). All these ideas were readily compatible with the Augustinian sequence of the six ages of the world.

      The single exception to this trend was the work of the late 12th-century Calabrian abbot and scriptural exegete Joachim Of Fiore (c. 1130– c. 1201). According to Joachim, there were three ages in human history: that of the Father (before Christ), that of the Son (from Christ to an unknown future date, which some of Joachim's followers located in the late 13th century), and that of the Holy Spirit (during which all Christendom would turn into a vast church with a universal priesthood of believers). But Joachim's view was also firmly expressed in terms of salvation history. Many chroniclers and writers of histories, of course, wrote about shorter periods of time and focused their efforts on local affairs, but the great Augustinian metanarrative underlay their work too. From several confessional perspectives, this view still survives.

 In the 14th century, however, the literary moralist Petrarch (1304–74), fascinated with ancient Roman history and contemptuous of the time that followed it, including his own century, divided the past into ancient and new—antiquity and recent times—and located the transition between them in the 4th century, when the Roman emperors converted to Christianity. According to Petrarch, what followed was an age of tenebrae (“shadows”), a “sordid middle time” with only the hope of a better age to follow. Although Petrarch's disapproval of the Christianized Roman and post-Roman world may seem irreligious, he was in fact a devout Christian; his judgment was based on aesthetic, moral, and philological criteria, not Christian ones. Petrarch's limitless admiration for Rome heralded a novel conception of the European past and established criteria for historical periodization other than those of salvation history or the history of the church, empire, cities, rulers, or noble dynasties. His followers in later centuries focused primarily on the transformation of the arts and letters, seeing a renewal of earlier Roman dignity and achievement beginning with the painter Giotto (Giotto di Bondone) (1266/67 or 1276–1337) and with Petrarch himself and continuing into the 15th and 16th centuries.

      In the early 16th century, religious critics and reformers, including both the Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus (Erasmus, Desiderius) and the Protestant reformer Martin Luther (Luther, Martin), added another dimension to the new conception and terminology: the idea of an evangelical, apostolic Christian church that had become corrupt when it was absorbed by the Roman Empire and now needed to be reformed, or restored to its earlier apostolic authenticity. The idea of reform had long been built into the Christian (Christianity) worldview. This conception of the period between the 4th and 16th centuries was laid out in the great Protestant (Protestantism) history by Matthias Flacius Illyricus (Flacius Illyricus, Matthias), Centuriae Magdeburgensis (1559–74; “The Magdeburg Centuries”), which also introduced the practice of dividing the past into ostensibly neutral centuries. The Roman Catholic (Roman Catholicism) version of church history was reflected in the Annales Ecclesiastici (“Ecclesiastical Annals”) of Caesar Baronius (Baronius, Caesar) (1538–1607), completed by Oderico Rinaldi in 1677. Thus, the historical dimension of both the Protestant and the Catholic reformations of the 16th and 17th centuries added a sharply polemical religious interpretation of the Christian past to Petrarch's original conception, as church history was put to the service of confessional debate.

      Petrarch's cultural successors, the literary humanists, also used variants of the expression Middle Ages. Among them was media tempestas (“middle time”), first used by Giovanni Andrea, bishop of Aleria, in 1469; others were media antiquitas (“middle antiquity”), media aetas (“middle era”), and media tempora (“middle times”), all first used between 1514 and 1530. The political theorist and historian Melchior Goldast appears to have coined the variation medium aevum (“a middle age”) in 1604; shortly after, in a Latin work of 1610, the English jurist and legal historian John Selden (Selden, John) repeated medium aevum, Anglicizing the term in 1614 to middle times and in 1618 to middle ages. In 1641 the French historian Pierre de Marca apparently coined the French vernacular term le moyen âge, which gained authority in the respected lexicographical work Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis (1678; “A Glossary for Writers of Middle and Low Latin”), by Charles du Fresne, seigneur du Cange (Cange, Charles du Fresne, Seigneur du), who emphasized the inferior and “middle” quality of Latin linguistic usage after the 4th century. Other 17th-century historians, including Gisbertus Voetius (Voetius, Gisbertus) and Georg Horn, used terms such as media aetas in their histories of the church before the Reformation of the 16th century.

      The term and idea circulated even more widely in other historical works. Du Cange's great dictionary also used the Latin term medium aevum, as did the popular historical textbook The Nucleus of Middle History Between Ancient and Modern (1688), by the German historian Christoph Keller—although Keller observed that in naming the period he was simply following the terminology of earlier and contemporary scholars. By the late 17th century the most commonly used term for the period in Latin was medium aevum, and various equivalents of Middle Ages or Middle Age were used in European vernacular languages.

Enlightenment scorn and Romantic admiration
 During the 17th and 18th centuries a number of thinkers argued that western Europe after the 15th century had surpassed even antiquity in its discoveries and technology and had thereby created a distinctively modern world. Their views, which were sharpened by Enlightenment critics of earlier European political and religious structures, did nothing to change the image of the Middle Ages. Voltaire, in his An Essay on Universal History, the Manners and Spirit of Nations from the Reign of Charlemaign to the Age of Lewis XIV (1756), savaged the Latin Christian and the reformed churches for their clerical obscurantism and earlier rulers for their ruthless and arbitrary use of force. Edward Gibbon (Gibbon, Edward), the English historian whose great work The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–88) begins with events in late antiquity and ends with the fall of Constantinople (Istanbul) (the capital of the Byzantine Empire) to the Ottoman (Ottoman Empire) Turks in 1453, categorically attributed the beginning of that very long “decline and fall” to “the triumph of barbarism and religion,” thus contemptuously characterizing the entire period from the 5th to the 15th century.

      But, as Gibbon's own work showed, not only had the term and the often pejorative idea of the Middle Ages been shaped in the 16th and 17th centuries, but so had the critical and technical standards of modern historical scholarship. Some Enlightenment thinkers even became interested in earlier periods of European history. Their attraction to the Middle Ages paralleled the respect for and interest in the period shared by many ideologically conservative rulers, nobles, magistrates, and churchmen. But the historians also began to apply critical techniques to their investigation of the Middle Ages. The new scholarship on the period was animated in the late 18th and early 19th centuries by historians imbued with ethnic-national sentiment and with a conception of historically “ethnic” communities—especially in Germany and England—that lacked a recognized past (or had only a peripheral past) in traditional histories of the Greco-Roman world.

      During the Romantic (Romanticism) era, an affectionate and sentimentalized portrait of the Middle Ages emerged that was usually no more accurate than the polemical characterizations of Enlightenment writers. Such views contributed to the myth that 19th-century nation-states were composed of ethnic groups that had remained unchanged and had occupied the same territory for long periods (or had once occupied territory that was now inhabited by other nation-states). These arguments became powerful and dangerous political forces in the 19th and 20th centuries, although research in the late 20th century dismissed them as political fantasies.

 Not all 19th-century historians were appreciative of the Middle Ages. Although the French historian Jules Michelet (Michelet, Jules) at first praised the Middle Ages as the time of the birth of France, his increasing political liberalism led him to shift his admiration to the 16th century, virtually coining the term Renaissance in the process of appropriating it for France. In 1860 the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (Burckhardt, Jacob) published his The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, a work as widely read and influential as that of Michelet. Despite Romantic nostalgia and increasingly disciplined scholarship, the work of Michelet and Burckhardt served to fix the opposition between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in the modern mind, generally to the disadvantage of the former. These views were sharpened by 19th-century anticlericalism, especially anti-Roman Catholicism, although they were countered by equally learned Catholic apologists.

The Middle Ages in modern historiography
      With the extraordinary growth of the academic discipline of history in the 19th century, the history of the Middle Ages was absorbed into academic curricula of history in Europe and the United States and established in university survey courses and research seminars. Journals of scholarly historical research began publication in Germany (1859), France (1876), England (1886), and the United States (1895), regularly including studies of one aspect or another of the Middle Ages. Historical documents were edited and substantial scholarly literature was produced that brought the history of the Middle Ages into synchronization with other fields of history. The study of the Middle Ages developed chiefly as a part of the national histories of the individual European countries, but it was studied in the United States as a pan-European phenomenon, with a focus after World War I chiefly on English and French history. The growing influence and prestige of the new academic and professional field of medieval history were reflected in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica (“Historical Monuments of the Germans”), a research and publication institute founded in 1819 and still in operation in Munich, and in the eight-volume collaborative Cambridge Medieval History (1911–36). (The latter's replacement, The New Cambridge Medieval History, began to appear in 1998.)

      Most scholars of the 19th and early 20th centuries accepted the view that history is largely a story of progress, in which occasional periods of decline—such as the Middle Ages—are succeeded by periods of renewal. The most articulate attack on this view was by the American medievalist Charles Homer Haskins (Haskins, Charles Homer) in The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (1927), which applied Michelet's and Burckhardt's term Renaissance to the 12th century rather than to the 15th or 16th.

      Although the teaching responsibilities of academic historians of the Middle Ages still generally reflect either the original tripartite division of European history or the more recent and more common quadripartite division (ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern), most scholars specialize in only very small parts of a very long period. With the emergence of late antiquity as a distinct field of research and teaching since the mid-20th century, the early part of the conventional Middle Ages has been rethought and rewritten. The distinctive post-Classical period of late antiquity is now considered the medium through which ancient Greco-Roman traditions were passed on to later Europeans. The older image of a Classical antiquity despised by world-rejecting Christians and wiped out by savage barbarians is no longer credible.

 Historians in the late 20th and early 21st centuries also debated the existence of a rapid and extensive change in European society at about the turn of the 2nd millennium. Some scholars, following the pioneering lead of the French historian Georges Duby (Duby, Georges), argued for a rapid mutation, chiefly with regard to the development of new kinds of lay and ecclesiastical power over agricultural labour and the simultaneous restructuring of aristocratic lineages in the 11th century. Others maintained that a gradual transformation of society and culture occurred over a longer period of time, beginning earlier than the 11th century. These debates influenced the concept of a long Middle Ages mentioned above.

      With the emergence of the concept of early modern history, roughly from 1400 to 1800, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the scientific revolution were subsumed into a period extending from the late 14th century to the 18th century. The creation of specialized scholarly conferences, historical journals, monograph series, and thematic collections of scholarly essays has reflected these changes in the configuration of the period.

      Scholars also rethought the nature of change in different parts of Europe. They recognized the problem of the obvious differences between those European lands in late antiquity that had once been part of the Roman Empire and those that had not and therefore got their Romanism and antiquity secondhand. They also revised their understanding of the relations between the older Mediterranean world (large areas of which entered the Byzantine (Byzantine Empire) and Arab-Islamic cultural orbits) and northern Europe. In addition, scholars examined how Roman culture exported itself to peripheries on the north and east through a form of colonization that culminated in the absorption of originally peripheral colonies into an expanded core culture.

      Middle Ages remains both a commonplace colloquial term and the name of a subject of academic study. But the history of the term and the current debate about its temporal and spatial application and appropriateness is a reminder that historical periods are cultural and social constructs based on later perceptions of the past, that human life often changes quite rapidly within labeled periods, however designated, and that the dialogue between continuity and change is the historian's primary intellectual activity.

      Regardless of the loaded aesthetic, philological, moral, confessional, and philosophical origins of the term Middle Ages, the period it defines is important because it witnessed the emergence of a distinctive European civilization centred in a region that was on the periphery of ancient Mediterranean civilization. Although European civilization appropriated elements of both Greco-Roman antiquity and Judeo-Christian religion and ethics, it emerged just as the ancient Mediterranean ecumenical world was divided into the civilizations of East Rome, or Byzantium, and Islam (Islām) in the 7th and 8th centuries. Three sibling civilizations, two of them Christian, developed at about the same time. The influence of wider Eurasian and North African history on that of Europe has attracted the attention of increasing numbers of historians since the late 20th century. But such change does not occur in a single year and not even in a single century. To assign any but an approximate date to the beginning of the end of the Middle Ages, as was once the fashion, is pointless. Far more important is the assessment of the nature of change in different areas of life in different periods and different places between the 3rd and the 16th centuries.

      The 8th-century English monk and computist Bede (Bede the Venerable, Saint) (673–735), adapting an invention of the 6th-century theologian Dionysius Exiguus, introduced the method of counting years from the birth of Jesus, anno Domini (“in the year of our Lord”), which formed the basis of the modern notion of the Common Era. The new method superseded older traditions, which included dating by four-year Olympiads, by the number of years since the founding of Rome in 753 BCE, by the years of Roman consuls, by the regnal years of emperors, and by the 15-year tax assessment cycle of indictions (indiction). Bede's innovation was taken up by Frankish chroniclers and rulers from the late 8th century and became standard practice in Europe.

      The year itself was divided according to a universal Christian calendar that gradually displaced the old Roman calendar, although it retained the Roman names for the months. The liturgical year alternated seasons of penitence and joy, beginning with Advent, the fifth Sunday before Christmas, and culminating in penitential Lent and joyful Easter and its aftermath until Advent returned. Although the unit of the week and the Sabbath were taken over from Jewish usage—displacing the older Roman divisions of the month into Kalendae, Nonae, and Ides and the nine-day market cycle—Christians began to mark time by the seven-day week and moved its holiest day to Sunday during the 4th century.

Late antiquity: the reconfiguration of the Roman world
 The Roman Empire of late antiquity was no longer the original empire of its founder, Augustus, nor was it even the 2nd-century entity of the emperor Marcus Aurelius. In the 3rd century the emperor, who was first called princeps (“first citizen”) and then dominus (“lord”), became divus (“divine”). The powerful religious connotations of the imperial office were adopted even by usurpers of the imperial throne, backed by their armies, who then ruled autocratically at the head of a vast bureaucratic and military organization. Internal and external crises during the 3rd and 4th centuries resulted in the division of the empire into an eastern and a western part after 285, with the east possessing a great and flourishing capital built by the emperor Constantine—Constantinople (now Istanbul)—and far more economic, political, and military resources than the western half. The administration of the entire empire was restructured to finance immense military expenditures, giving the western European provinces and frontier areas greater importance but fewer resources. Most of the population of the empire, including soldiers, were frozen hereditarily in their occupations. The Western Empire, whose capital moved north from Rome in the 4th century to a number of provincial cities—Trier, Arles, Milan, and ultimately Ravenna—became less urbanized, more ruralized, and gradually dominated by an aristocracy of landowners and military officials, most of whom lived on large villas and in newly fortified cities. The provincial economy had become increasingly rural and localized and was dominated by the needs of the vast military bases near the frontiers.

      The great and small estates were worked by slaves, freedmen, and coloni (colonus) (“farmers”), who had once been independent but had voluntarily or involuntarily subordinated themselves to the great landowners as their only protection against imperial tax collectors or military conscription. The landowners dispensed local justice and assembled private armies, which were powerful enough to negotiate on their subordinates' behalf with imperial officials. Mediterranean trade diminished, and the production of more and more goods was undertaken locally, as was the organization of social, devotional, and political life.

      Non-Roman peoples from beyond the frontiers—barbari (“barbarians”) or externae gentes (“foreign peoples”), as the Romans called them—had long been allowed to enter the empire individually or in families as provincial farmers and soldiers. But after 375 a number of composite Germanic peoples, many of them only recently assembled and ruled by their own new political and military elites, entered the empire as intact groups, originally by treaty with Rome and later independently. They established themselves as rulers of a number of western provinces, particularly parts of Italy, Iberia, Gaul, and Britain, often in the name of the Roman emperor and with the cooperation of many Roman provincials.

      Roman ethnography classified external peoples as distinct and ethnically homogeneous groups with unchanging identities; they were part of the order of nature. Adopting this view, philologists, anthropologists, and historians in the 19th century maintained that the Germanic “tribes” that first appeared in the 3rd century were the ethnic ancestors of the “tribes” of the 5th century and that the ethnic composition of these groups remained unchanged in the interval. Late 20th-century research in ethnogenesis thoroughly demonstrated the unreliability of Roman ethnography, although modern concepts of ethnicity continue to exploit it for political purposes.

The organization of late imperial Christianity
      Many Roman provincials were Christian higher clergy. Between the legalization of Christianity by Constantine (Constantine I) about 313 and the adoption of Christianity as the legal religion of Rome by the emperor Theodosius I in 380, Christian communities received immense donations of land, labour, and other gifts from emperors and wealthy converts. The Christian clergy, originally a body of community elders and managerial functionaries, gradually acquired sacramental authority and became aligned with the grades of the imperial civil service. Each civitas (community or city), an urban unit and its surrounding district, had its bishop (from the Latin episcopus, “overseer”). Because there had been more Roman civitates in the Italian and provincial European areas, there were more and usually smaller dioceses in these regions than in the distant north and east.

      During the 5th and 6th centuries, bishops gradually assumed greater responsibility for supplying the cities and administering their affairs, replacing the local governments that for centuries had underpinned and constituted the local administration of the empire. Two bishops, Ambrose (Ambrose, Saint) of Milan (339–397) and Gregory I (Gregory I, Saint) of Rome (pope 590–604), wrote influential guidebooks on episcopal and other clerical duties and responsibilities toward congregations. These works set standards for all later bishops and are still observed in many churches.

 Besides the bishops and their subordinates the priests, who tended to the spiritual and material needs of Christians living in the world—the “secular clergy”—there also existed communities of monks (monk) and religious women who had fled the world. These communities were independent, although nominally under the control of the local bishop, and they followed diverse rules of life—hence their designation as “regular clergy” (from regula, “rule”). The most influential monastic rule in Latin Christianity after the 8th century was that of Benedict of Nursia (Benedict of Nursia, Saint) (c. 480–c. 547). Benedict's rule provided for a monastic day of work, prayer, and contemplation, offering psychological balance in the monk's life. It also elevated the dignity of manual labour in the service of God, long scorned by the elites of antiquity. Benedict's monastery at Monte Cassino, south of Rome, became one of the greatest centres of Benedictine monasticism.

      The origins of monasticism lay in the ascetic practices of Egyptian and Syrian monks, which were transplanted to western Europe through texts such as the 4th-century Latin translation of the Life of Saint Antony (by Patriarch Athanasius (Athanasius, Saint) of Alexandria) and through widely traveled observers such as the theologian and monk John Cassian (Cassian, Saint John) (360–435). These Mediterranean-wide influences were among the last examples of the communications network of the older, ecumenical Mediterranean world. Monasticism developed and sustained a powerful ascetic dimension in both Greek and Latin Christianity that increased in importance as monasticism itself came to define the ideal of clerical life in the West.

      In the case of Martin (Martin of Tours, Saint) (316–397), a former Roman soldier turned wandering holy man, monastic asceticism was combined with the office episcopal, as Martin eventually became bishop of Tours in Gaul. He emphasized the conversion of rural pagans, as well as ministering to the urban and rural elites. In the Iberian Peninsula the work of the monk and bishop Martin of Braga (c. 515–580) was also devoted to the religious instruction of rustics. His work provided an influential model for the later conversion of northern and eastern Europe.

      While Greek Christians called their church and religion Orthodox (Eastern Orthodoxy), Latin Christians adopted the term Catholic (from catholicus, “universal”). The term catholic Christianity was originally used to authenticate a normative, orthodox Christian cult (Roman Catholicism) (system of religious belief and ritual) on the grounds of its universality and to characterize different beliefs and practices as heterodox on the grounds that they were merely local and did not reflect duration, unanimity, or universality. These three characteristics of Latin orthodoxy were defined by the 5th-century monastic writer Vincent of Lérins (Vincent of Lérins, Saint) (died c. 450) and adopted generally throughout the Latin church.

      Devotional movements that differed from the norms of orthodoxy were defined as heterodoxy, or heresy. The earliest of these were several forms of Judaizing Christianity and Gnosticism, a dualist belief in asceticism and spiritual enlightenment. Once Christianity was established throughout the empire, other local movements were also condemned. Donatism (Donatist), the belief among many North African Christians that Christian leaders who had bowed to pagan imperial persecution before 313 had lost their priestly status and needed to be reordained, was the first major heterodox practice to be considered—and condemned—at an imperial church council (411). Other movements were Arianism, which challenged the divinity of Jesus, and Pelagianism, which denied original sin and emphasized purely human abilities to achieve salvation. Other beliefs, usually those that contradicted increasingly normative doctrines of Trinitarianism (Trinity) (the belief that the Godhead includes three coequal, coeternal, and consubstantial persons) or Christology (the interpretation of the nature of Christ), were also condemned as heresy.

      Normative Christianity, which was expressed in imperial legislation, church councils, and the works of influential Christian writers, gradually became the faith of Europe's new regional rulers. Within that broad, universal ideology, however, many of the new kings and peoples based their claims to legitimacy and a common identity on their own versions of Latin Christianity, as expressed in local law, ritual, saints' cults, sacred spaces and shrines, and saints' relics. The cults of saints and their relics served to territorialize devotion, and control over them was a distinctive sign of legitimate power. Although the older empire and the new, nonimperial lands in Europe into which a new culture expanded came to call themselves Christianitas (“Christendom”), they were in practice divided into many self-contained entities that have been called “micro-Christendoms,” each based on the devotional identity of king, clerics, and people.

Kings and peoples
      The kings (monarchy) of new peoples ruled as much in Roman style as they could, issuing laws written in Latin for their own peoples and their Roman subjects and striking coins that imitated imperial coinage. They also sponsored the composition of “ethnic” and genealogical histories that attributed to themselves and their peoples, however recently assembled, an identity and antiquity rivaling that of Rome. Although the Romans, who called their own society a populus (“civil people”), used the term rex (“king”) only for rulers of peoples at lower levels of sociocultural development, the political order of kings and peoples became a commonplace in Europe in late antiquity and would remain so until the 19th century. Some of these kingdoms, especially that of the Visigoths in southern Gaul and later in Iberia, also modeled themselves on the ancient Hebrew kingdoms as described in Scripture. They borrowed and adapted some ancient Jewish rituals, such as liturgically anointing the ruler with oil and reminding him in sermons, prayers, and meetings of church councils that he was God's servant, with spiritual and political responsibilities that legitimized his power.

      As the cultures associated with the new kings and peoples spread throughout western Europe from the 5th to the 8th centuries, they influenced political and religious change in areas that the empire had never ruled—initially Ireland, then northern Britain, the lower Rhineland, and trans-Rhenish Europe (the lands east of the Rhine River). The bishop and the monk were two of the most remarkable and longest enduring religious and social inventions of late antiquity; the barbarian kingdoms were a third. Although many of the latter did not survive, their experiments in Christian kingship, as represented in texts, ritual, pictures, and objects, began a long tradition in European political life and thought.

The great commission
      The process of expansion was also driven by a missionary (mission) mandate. Reflecting a new, literal, and personal understanding of Jesus' command in the Gospels to baptize and to proclaim the word of God (Matthew 28:19; Mark 16:15), the work of conversion to Christianity was extended to all peoples, not just to those of the empire. Conversion was carried out at first by individual Christians acting on their own, not as agents of an organized church. Greek Christians from Constantinople also undertook missionary work, sometimes individually but also as an increasingly prominent aspect of Byzantine imperial diplomacy in the Balkans and north of the Danube valley and the Black Sea. In the eastern parts of the Byzantine Empire, communities of Nestorian Christians, who stressed the independence of the human and divine persons of Christ, moved beyond the imperial frontiers, first into Persia and then farther east. By the 10th century a long string of such settlements ran along the Silk Road from the Mediterranean to China.

      Individual conversion stories were modeled on that of St. Paul the Apostle (Paul, the Apostle, Saint) (Acts of the Apostles 9–10), which itself was echoed in the Confessions of St. Augustine. Individual conversion experiences touched people in all walks of life: Martin of Tours, the soldier turned ascetic and bishop; the Gallo-Roman aristocrats Sulpicius Severus—who wrote the influential life of Martin—and Caesarius of Arles (Caesarius of Arles, Saint); and the free Romano-Briton St. Patrick (Patrick, Saint), who had been a slave in pagan Ireland and returned to convert his former captors.

      But the most widely accepted model of conversion of both religious belief and practice was collective—that of a ruler and his followers together as a new Christian people. In this way, the king and church integrated rulership with clerical teaching and the development of the liturgy and with the definition of sacred space, control of sanctity, and the rituals surrounding key moments in human life, from baptism to death and burial. The most notable of the collective conversions were that of the Visigoths (Visigoth) from Arian to Catholic Christianity in 589, that of the Frankish leader Clovis (Clovis I) by his Catholic Burgundian wife Clotilda (Clotilda, Saint) and the Gallo-Roman bishop Remigius of Reims (Remigius of Reims, Saint) about the turn of the 6th century, and that of Aethelberht (Aethelberht I) of Kent by St. Augustine of Canterbury (Augustine of Canterbury, Saint).

      As Romans and non-Romans locally assimilated into new peoples during the 6th and 7th centuries, non-Romans, as had Romans before them, became Christian monks, higher clergy, and sometimes saints. In the late 5th century the conversion of Ireland, the first Christianized territory that had never been part of the Roman Empire, brought the particularly Irish ascetic practice of self-exile to bear on missionary work. In the 6th century the Irish monk Columba (Columba, Saint) (c. 521–597) exiled himself to the island of Iona, from which he began to convert the peoples of southwestern Scotland. Other Irish monk-exiles moved through the Rhine valley, Austria, Bavaria, Switzerland, and northern Italy. Columban (Columban, Saint) (c. 543–615), the most influential of these missionaries, greatly reformed the devotional life of the Frankish nobility and founded monasteries at Sankt Gallen, Luxeuil, and Bobbio. Irish and Scottish devotional practices also influenced England, where Celtic forms (Celtic Church) of Christianity clashed with Continental, especially Roman, forms—a conflict resolved at the Synod of Whitby (Whitby, Synod of) in 664, when Roman norms were adopted first for the kingdom of Northumbria and later for other English kingdoms. Irish influence remained strong in the English church, however, especially in matters of learning, church reform, missionary exile, and clerical organization.

      From the late 7th century, English pilgrims visited Rome, creating a strong devotional link between Rome and Britain, which was reasserted wherever English missionary activity took place. Benedict Biscop (Benedict Biscop, Saint), an English noble, traveled to Rome several times, returning with Roman books and pictures. He founded the twin monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow (the saintly scholar Bede (Bede the Venerable, Saint) was a monk of Wearmouth-Jarrow) and escorted the learned Theodore of Tarsus (Theodore of Canterbury, Saint) back to England when Theodore was appointed archbishop of Canterbury (Canterbury, archbishop of). Theodore's pastoral and educational activities greatly enhanced English clerical culture, producing both a network of schools and a missionary consciousness that sent English monks, like their Irish predecessors, to the Continent. The most influential of these figures was Boniface (Boniface, Saint) (c. 675–754), the first archbishop of Mainz, who spent much of his adult life in missionary and reform work in and around the edges of the kingdom of the Franks. The letters of Boniface demonstrate his respect for Rome and provide important information about his missionary activities. His great monastery of Fulda played an important role in both reform and conversion.

The bishops of Rome (papacy)
 Throughout their history, the bishops of Rome enjoyed great respect and veneration because of the antiquity of their see, its historical orthodoxy, the relics of its martyrs (including Saints Peter (Peter the Apostle, Saint) and Paul (Paul, the Apostle, Saint) the Apostles), and the imperial and Christian history of the city of Rome. The material conditions of the 6th and 7th centuries, however, greatly limited any papal exercise of universal authority or influence, and the popes developed relatively little theory about papal authority of any kind over all Christians. Like other bishops, however, the bishops of Rome benefited from the idea of traditio (Latin: “tradition”), which stated that the authority of the Apostles had been passed down to the Christian higher clergy. They also gradually assumed more and more responsibility for the administration of the city itself. Because Rome was Rome and because the properties of the Roman church extended throughout Italy, the papal administration of the city and the invocation of its Christian, rather than imperial, past slowly turned it into the Rome of St. Peter, who accordingly assumed an increasingly important role in medieval spirituality. This Christianized Rome was a place that the diversified societies of western Europe could revere and visit because of its devotional centrality in the Latin Christian world.

      Between the 5th and the 11th century, many argued that, just as there had been a hierarchy of cities in the old empire, there was a hierarchy of bishops, and the bishop of Rome stood at its head. Although the idea of papal supremacy in Latin Christendom found a number of papal and nonpapal exponents during this period, it did not become dominant until the late 11th century. Even before then, however, the affection and respect for Rome built up in England and in the kingdom of the Franks did much to increase the attractiveness of the papacy.

The Mediterranean world divided
      During the 7th and 8th centuries, new invasions of the eastern part of the empire and the emergence of Islam (Islām), first in the Arabian Peninsula and then to the west in Egypt and Numidia and to the east in Persia, divided the old Mediterranean ecumenical world into three distinct culture zones: East Rome, or Byzantium (Byzantine Empire); Islam; and Latin Europe. Byzantium and western Europe remained long on the defensive against Islamic pressures, which extended to the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711, Sicily in 902, and Anatolia in the 11th century. Each of these three cultures developed its own character based on different uses of and attitudes toward the Roman-Mediterranean ecumenical past. They maintained diplomatic and commercial contact with each other, though sometimes on a much-reduced scale, and continued to influence each other culturally even as they became more distinct. In spite of their increasing distinctiveness, they were never entirely separated, since both trade and the transmission of ideas passed through their porous edges. In addition, large numbers of Jews and Christians continued to live as privileged religious aliens in most of the Muslim world.

The Frankish ascendancy
      In the late 5th and early 6th centuries, Clovis (Clovis I) (c. 466–511), the warrior-leader of one of the groups of peoples collectively known as the Franks (Frank), established a strong independent monarchy in what are now the northern part of France and the southwestern part of Belgium. He expanded into southern Gaul, driving the Visigoths (Visigoth) across the Pyrenees, and established a strong Frankish presence east of the Rhine. His power was recognized by the eastern emperor Anastasius (Anastasius I), who made him a Roman consul (a high-ranking magistrate). In the generations following the death of Clovis, the Frankish kingdom was often divided into the two kingdoms of Neustria and Austrasia, though it was occasionally reunited under Clovis's successors, the Merovingian dynasty. It was later reunited under the lordship and (after 751) monarchy of the eastern Frankish Arnulfing-Pippinid family (later known as the Carolingian dynasty), which included Pippin II and his successors Charles Martel, Pippin III, and Charlemagne (reigned 768–814). This dynasty brought much of western Europe under Frankish control and established diplomatic relations with Britain, Iberia, Rome, Constantinople, Christians in the Holy Land, and even Hārūn al-Rashīd (Hārūn ar-Rashīd), the great caliph in Baghdad.

 Charlemagne and his successors also patronized a vast project that they and their clerical advisers called correctio—restoring the fragmented western European world to an earlier idealized condition. During the Carolingian Renaissance, as it is called by modern scholars, Frankish rulers supported monastic studies and manuscript production, attempted to standardize monastic practice and rules of life, insisted on high moral and educational standards for clergy, adopted and disseminated standard versions of canon law and the liturgy, and maintained a regular network of communications throughout their dominions.

      Charlemagne drew heavily on most of the kingdoms of Christian Europe, even those he conquered, for many of his advisers. Ireland sent Dicuil the geographer. The kingdoms of Anglo-Saxon England, drawn close to Rome and the Franks during the 8th century, produced the widely circulated works of Bede (Bede the Venerable, Saint) and the ecclesiastical reformer Boniface. Also from England was the scholar Alcuin, a product of the great school at York, who served as Charlemagne's chief adviser on ecclesiastical and other matters until becoming abbot of the monastery of St. Martin of Tours. Charlemagne's relations with the kingdoms in England remained cordial, and his political and intellectual reforms in turn shaped the development of a unified English monarchy and culture under Alfred (reigned 871–899) and his successors in the 9th and 10th centuries.

      Although the Visigothic (Visigoth) kingdom fell to Arab and Berber armies in 711, the small Christian principalities in the north of the Iberian Peninsula held out. They too produced remarkable scholars, some of whom were eventually judged to hold heretical beliefs. The Christological theology of Adoptionism, which held that Christ in his humanity is the adopted son of God, greatly troubled the Carolingian court and generated a substantial literature on both sides before the belief was declared heterodox. But Iberia also produced scholars for Charlemagne's service, particularly Theodulf of Orleans (Theodulf Of Orléans), one of the emperor's most influential advisers.

      The kingdom of the Lombards (Lombard), established in northern and central Italy in the later 6th century, was originally Arian but converted to Catholic Christianity in the 7th century. Nevertheless, Lombard opposition to Byzantine forces in northern Italy and Lombard pressure on the bishops of Rome led a number of 8th-century popes to call on the assistance of the Carolingians. Pippin invaded Italy twice in the 750s, and in 774 Charlemagne conquered the Lombard kingdom and assumed its crown. Among the Lombards who migrated for a time to Charlemagne's court were the grammarian Peter of Pisa and the historian Paul The Deacon.

      From 778 to 803 Charlemagne not only stabilized his rule in Frankland and Italy but also conquered and converted the Saxons and established frontier commands, or marches, at the most vulnerable edges of his territories. He built a residence for himself and his court at Aachen, which was called “a second Rome.” He remained on excellent terms with the bishops of Rome, Adrian I (reigned 772–795) and Leo III (Leo III, Saint) (reigned 795–816). Scholars began to call Charlemagne “the father of Europe” and “the lighthouse of Europe.” Although the lands under his rule were often referred to as “the kingdom of Europe,” contemporaries recognized them as forming an empire, much of which extended well beyond the imperial frontiers of Rome. Because of its use in reference to the empire, the old geographical term Europe came to be invested with a political and cultural meaning that it did not have in Greco-Roman antiquity.

 In 800 Charlemagne extracted Leo III from severe political difficulties in Rome (Leo had been violently attacked by relatives of the former pope and accused of various crimes). On Christmas Day of that year Leo crowned Charlemagne emperor of the Romans, a title that Charlemagne's successors also adopted. Although the title gave Charlemagne no resources that he did not already possess, it did not please all his subjects, and it greatly displeased the Byzantines. But it survived the Frankish monarchy and remained the most respected title of a lay ruler in Europe until the Holy Roman Empire, as it was known from the mid-12th century, was abolished by Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon I) in 1806, a little more than 1,000 years after Charlemagne was crowned. Historians still debate whether the coronation of 800 indicated a backward-looking last manifestation of the older world of late antiquity or a new organization of the elements of what later became Europe.

      Charlemagne's kingdoms, but not the imperial title, were divided after the death of his son Louis I (the Pious) in 840 into the regions of West Francia, the Middle Kingdom, and East Francia. The last of these regions gradually assumed control over the Middle Kingdom north of the Alps. In addition, an independent kingdom of Italy survived into the late 10th century. The imperial title went to one of the rulers of these kingdoms, usually the one who could best protect Rome, until it briefly ceased to be used in the early 10th century.

Carolingian decline and its consequences
      After the Carolingian dynasty died out in the male line in East Francia in 911, Conrad I, the first of a series of territorial dukes, was elected king. He was followed by a series of vigorous and ambitious rulers from the Saxon (Saxon Dynasty) (919–1024) and Salian (Salian Dynasty) (1024–1125) dynasties. Otto I (reigned 936–967), the most successful of the Saxon rulers, claimed the crown of the old Lombard kingdom in Italy in 951, defeated an invading Hungarian army at the Battle of Lechfeld in 955, and was crowned emperor in Rome in 962. In contrast to the kings of East Francia, the rulers of West Francia, whose last Carolingian ruler was succeeded in 987 by the long-lasting dynasty of Hugh Capet (the Capetian (Capetian dynasty) dynasty), had difficulty ruling even their domains in the middle Seine valley, and they were overshadowed by the power of the territorial lords who had established themselves in principalities in the rest of the kingdom.

      The end of Carolingian expansion in the early 9th century and the inability of several kings to field sufficiently large armies and reward their followers were two consequences of the division of Charlemagne's empire. In addition, the empire now shared borders with hostile peoples in the Slavic east and in the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and Iberia. The end of expansion meant that the basis of the economy shifted from mixed forest-agricultural labour and income drawn from plunder and tribute to more-intensive cultivation of lands within the kingdoms. Accordingly, kings were forced to draw on local resources to reward their followers. The consequences of these military and economic changes included a general weakening of royal authority, the transformation of the Carolingian aristocracy into active lords of the land, and a loss of social status for the labourers who worked the land.

 In the 9th and early 10th centuries a series of invasions from Scandinavia, the lower Danube valley, and North Africa greatly weakened the Carolingian world. The divisions within the Frankish empire impaired its ability to resist the Viking and Hungarian invasions but did not destroy it. Kings and warlords ultimately either turned back the invaders, as Otto I did in 955, or absorbed them into their territories, as the kings of West Francia did with the Vikings in Normandy. In England the invasions destroyed all of the older kingdoms except Wessex, whose rulers, starting with Alfred, expanded their power until they created a single kingdom of England.

      Although two kinds of invaders—the Scandinavians and the Hungarians—became acculturated and Christianized during the next several centuries, creating the Christian kingdoms of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Hungary, the Islamic world remained apart, extending from Iberia and Morocco eastward to the western edges of China and Southeast Asia. In the case of western Europe, the attacks of the 9th and 10th centuries were the last outside invasions until the Allied landings during World War II; indeed, for a period of nearly 1,000 years western Europe was the only part of the world that was not invaded. Western Europe developed internally without outside interference, expanded geographically, increased demographically, improved materially, and engaged in cultural, commercial, and technological exchanges with parallel civilizations.

Growth and innovation
 Although historians disagree about the extent of the social and material damage caused by the 9th- and 10th-century invasions, they agree that demographic growth began during the 10th century and perhaps earlier. They have also identified signs of the reorganization of lordship and agricultural labour, a process in which members of an order of experienced and determined warriors concentrated control of land in their own hands and coerced a largely free peasantry into subjection. Thus did the idea of the three orders of society—those who fight, those who pray, and those who labour—come into use to describe the results of the ascendancy of the landholding aristocracy and its clerical partners. In cooperation with bishops and ecclesiastical establishments, particularly great monastic foundations such as Cluny (established 910), the nobility of the late 11th and 12th centuries reorganized the agrarian landscape and rural society of western Europe and made it the base of urbanization, which was also well under way in the 11th century.

Demographic and agricultural growth
      It has been estimated that between 1000 and 1340 the population of Europe increased from about 38.5 million people to about 73.5 million, with the greatest proportional increase occurring in northern Europe, which trebled its population. The rate of growth was not so rapid as to create a crisis of overpopulation; it was linked to increased agricultural production, which yielded a sufficient amount of food per capita, permitted the expansion of cultivated land, and enabled some of the population to become nonagricultural workers, thereby creating a new division of labour and greater economic and cultural diversity.

      The late Roman countryside and its patterns of life—a social pattern of landlords, free peasants, half-free workers, and slaves and an economic pattern of cultivated fields and orchards and the use of thick forests and their products—survived well into the Carolingian period. In the late 9th century, however, political circumstances led landholders to intensify the cultivation of their lands. They did this by reducing the status of formerly free peasants to dependent servitude and by slowly elevating the status of slaves to the same dependency, creating a rural society of serfs (serfdom). The old Latin word for slave (slavery), servus, now came to designate a category of rural workers who were not chattel property but who were firmly bound to their lord's land. The new word for slave, sclavus, was derived from the source of many slaves, the Slavic lands of the east.

      During the 11th and 12th centuries the chief social distinction in western European society was that between the free and the unfree. For two centuries the status of serfdom was imposed on people whose ancestors had been free and who themselves would become free only when the rise of a money economy in the late 12th century made free, rent-paying peasants more economically attractive to lords than bound serfs. The aristocracy was able to accomplish this because of weakening royal power and generosity and because of its assumption of the bannum (“ban”), the old public and largely royal power to command and punish (now called “banal jurisdiction”). It announced its new claims by calling them “customs” and adjudicated them in local courts.

      The aristocracy supervised the clearing of forest for the expansion of cereal cultivation but restricted the remaining forest to itself for hunting. It also forced its dependents to use its mills and local markets, to provide various labour services, and to settle more densely in the villages, which were slowly coordinated with an expanded system of parishes (local churches with lay patrons, to which peasants had to pay the tithe, or one-tenth of their produce). Serfdom was gradually eliminated in western Europe during the 13th and 14th centuries as a result of economic changes that made agricultural labour less financially advantageous to lords. During the same period, however, serfdom increased in eastern Europe, where it lasted until the 19th century.

      The new stratification of society into the categories of free and unfree was accompanied by the transformation of the late Carolingian aristocratic family from a widespread association of both paternal and maternal relatives to a narrower lineage, in which paternal ancestry and paternal control of the disposition of inheritance dominated. family memory restricted itself to a founding paternal ancestor (patriarchy), ignoring the line of maternal ancestors, and the new lineages identified themselves with a principal piece of property, from which they often took a family name. They also patronized religious establishments, which memorialized the families in prayers, enhanced their local prestige, and often provided them burial in their precincts.

 The new lords of the land identified themselves primarily as warriors. Because new technologies of warfare, including heavy cavalry, were expensive, fighting men required substantial material resources as well as considerable leisure to train. The economic and political transformation of the countryside filled these two needs. The old armies of free men of different levels of wealth were replaced by new armies of specialist knights. The term knight (Latin miles) came into more frequent use to designate anyone who could satisfy the new military requirements, which included the wealthiest and most powerful lords as well as fighting men from far lower levels of society. The new order gradually developed its own ethos, reflected in the ideal of chivalry, the knight's code of conduct. The distinction between free and unfree was reinforced by the distinction between those who fought, even at the lowest level, and those who could not. Those who functioned at the lowest level of military service worked hard to distinguish themselves from those who laboured in the fields.

 The increases in population and agricultural productivity were accompanied by a technological revolution that introduced new sources of power and a cultural “machine-mindedness,” both of which were incorporated into a wide spectrum of economic enterprises. The chief new sources of power were the horse, the water mill, and the windmill. Europeans began to breed both the specialized warhorse, adding stirrups to provide the mounted warrior a better seat and greater striking force, and the draft horse, now shod with iron horseshoes that protected the hooves from the damp clay soils of northern Europe. The draft horse was faster and more efficient than the ox, the traditional beast of burden. The invention of the new horse collar in the 10th century, a device that pulled from the horse's shoulders rather than from its neck and windpipe, immeasurably increased the animal's pulling power.

      The extensive network of rivers in western Europe spurred the development of the water mill (waterwheel), not only for grinding grain into flour but also by the 12th century for converting simple rotary motion into reciprocal motion. Where water was not readily available, Europeans constructed windmills (windmill), which had been imported from the Middle East, thereby spreading the mill to even more remote locations.

      In heavily forested and mountainous parts of western Europe, foresters, charcoal burners, and miners formed separate communities, providing timber, fuel, and metallic ores in abundance. The demands of domestic and public building and shipbuilding threatened to deforest much of Europe as early as the 13th century. Increasingly refined metallurgical technology produced not only well-tempered swords, daggers, and armour for warriors but also elaborate domestic ware. Glazed pottery and glass also appeared even in humble homes, which were increasingly built of stone rather than wood and thatch.

 The most striking and familiar examples of the technological revolution are the great Gothic (Gothic art) cathedrals and other churches, which were constructed from the 12th century onward. Universally admired for their soaring height and stained-glass windows, they required mathematically precise designs; considerable understanding of the properties of subsoils, stone, and timber; near-professional architectural skills; complex financial planning; and a skilled labour force. They are generally regarded as the most-accomplished engineering feats of the Middle Ages.

Urban growth
      The experience of building great churches was replicated in the development of the material fabric of the new and expanded cities (city). The cities of the Carolingian world were few and small. Their functions were limited to serving the needs of the kings, bishops, or monasteries that inhabited them. Some, especially those that were close to the Mediterranean, were reconfigured Roman cities. In the north a Roman nucleus sometimes became the core of a new city, but just as often cities (urbanization) emerged because of the needs of their lords. The northern cities were established as local market centres and then developed into centres of diversified artisanal production with growing merchant populations. In the 10th and 11th centuries new cities were founded and existing cities increased in area and population. They were usually enclosed within a wall once their inhabitants thought that the city had reached the limits of its expansion; as populations grew and suburbs began to surround the walls, many cities built new and larger walls to enclose the new space. The succession of concentric rings of town walls offers a history of urban growth in many cities. Inhabitants also took pride in their city's appearance, as evidenced by the elaborate decorations on city gates, fountains, town halls (in northern Italy from the 10th century), and other public spaces. Cities were cultural as well as economic and political centres, and their decoration was as important to their inhabitants as their water systems, defenses, and marketplaces.

      The cities attracted people from the countryside, where the increasing productivity of the farms was freeing many peasants from working on the land. Various mercantile and craft guilds were formed beginning in the 10th century to protect their members' common interests. The merchants' guilds and other associations also contributed to the emergence of the sworn commune, or the self-regulating city government, originally chartered by a bishop, count, or king. The city distinguished itself from the countryside, even as it extended its influence there. During the 12th century this distinction was recognized culturally, when the Latin word urbanitas (“urbanity”) came to be applied to the idea of acceptable manners and informed Christian belief, while rusticitas (“rusticity”) came to mean inelegance and backwardness. Despite this awareness, cities had to protect their food supplies and their trade and communication routes, and thus in both southern and northern Europe the city and its contado (region surrounding the city) became closely linked.

      In some areas of northern Europe, particular kinds of manufacturing became prominent, especially dyeing, weaving, and finishing woolen cloth. Wool production was the economic enterprise in which the cities of the southern Low Countries took pride of place, and other cities developed elaborate manufacturing of metalwork and armaments. Still others became market centres of essential products that could not be produced locally, such as wine. This specialized production led to the proliferation of long-range trade and the creation of communications networks along the rivers of western Europe, where many cities were located. Although some lords, including the kings of England, were reluctant to recognize the towns' autonomy, most eventually agreed that the rapidly increasing value of the towns as centres of manufacturing and trade was worth the risk of their practical independence.

      Originally a product of the agrarian dynamic that shaped society after the year 1000, the growing towns of western Europe became increasingly important, and their citizens acquired great wealth, usually in cooperation rather than conflict with their rulers. The towns helped transform the agrarian world out of which they were originally created into a precapitalist manufacturing and market economy that influenced both urban and rural development.

Reform and renewal
      A number of the movements for ecclesiastical reform that emerged in the 11th century attempted to sharpen the distinction between clerical and lay status. Most of these movements drew upon the older Christian (Christianity) ideas of spiritual renewal and reform, which were thought necessary because of the degenerative effects of the passage of time on fallen human nature. They also drew upon standards of monastic conduct (monasticism), especially those regarding celibacy and devotional rigour, that had been articulated during the Carolingian period and were now extended to all clergy, regular (monks) and secular (priests). Virginity, long seen by Christian thinkers as an equivalent to martyrdom, was now required of all clergy. It has been argued that the requirement of celibacy was established to protect ecclesiastical property, which had greatly increased, from being alienated by the clergy or from becoming the basis of dynastic power. The doctrine of clerical celibacy and freedom from sexual pollution, the idea that the clergy should not be dependent on the laity, and the insistence on the libertas (“liberty”) of the church—the freedom to accomplish its divinely ordained mission without interference from any secular authority—became the basis of the reform movements that took shape during this period. Most of them originated in reforming monasteries in transalpine Europe, which cooperative lay patrons and supporters protected from predatory violence.

      By the middle of the 11th century, the reform movements reached Rome itself, when the emperor Henry III intervened in a schism that involved three claimants to the papal throne. At the Synod of Sutri in 1046 he appointed a transalpine candidate of his own—Suidger, archbishop of Bamberg, who became Pope Clement II (1046–47)—and removed the papal office from the influence of the local Roman nobility, which had largely controlled it since the 10th century. A series of popes, including Leo IX (Leo IX, Saint) (1049–54) and Urban II (1088–99), promoted what is known as Gregorian Reform, named for its most zealous proponent, Pope Gregory VII (Gregory VII, Saint) (1073–85). They urged reform throughout Europe by means of their official correspondence and their sponsorship of regional church councils. They also restructured the hierarchy, placing the papal office at the head of reform efforts and articulating a systematic claim to papal authority over clergy and, in very many matters, over laity as well.

 The emotional intensity of ecclesiastical reform led to outbursts of religious enthusiasm from both supporters and opponents. Many laypeople also enthusiastically supported reform; indeed, their support was a key factor in its ultimate success. The increase in lay piety on the side of reform was indicated by the events of 1095, when Urban II called on lay warriors to cease preying on the weak and on each other and to undertake the liberation of the Holy Land from its Muslim conquerors and occupiers. The enormous military expedition that captured Jerusalem in 1099 and established for a century the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem (Jerusalem, kingdom of), an expedition only much later called the First Crusade (Crusades), is as dramatic a sign as possible of the vitality and devotion of clerical and lay reformers.

      The First Crusade had other, unintended effects. The success of Genoa, Pisa, and other Italian maritime cities in supplying the Christian outposts in the Holy Land increased their already considerable wealth and political power, which were soon comparable to that of Venice. Proposals for later Crusades often led to searching analyses, not only of specific military, financial, and logistical requirements but also of the social reforms that such ventures would require in the kingdoms of Europe. Finally, by bringing Latin Christians other than pilgrims deeper into western Eurasia than they had ever been before, the Crusade movement led Europeans in the 12th century to a greater interest in distant parts of the world.

      The reform movement had a pronounced effect on church and society. It produced an independent clerical order (clergy), hierarchically organized under the popes (papacy). The clergy claimed both a teaching authority (magisterium) and a disciplinary authority, based on theology and canon law, that defined orthodoxy and heterodoxy and regulated much of lay and all of clerical life. The clergy also expressed its authority through a series of energetic church councils, from the first Lateran Council in 1123 to the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, and greatly enhanced both the ritual and legal authority of the popes.

      The reform movement also erupted in a violent conflict, known as the Investiture Controversy, between Gregory VII (Gregory VII, Saint) and the emperor Henry IV (reigned 1056–1105/06). In this struggle the pope claimed extraordinary authority to correct the emperor; he twice declared the emperor (Holy Roman Empire) deposed before Henry forced him to flee Rome to Salerno, where he died in exile. Despite Gregory's apparent defeat, the conflicts undermined imperial claims to authority and shattered the Carolingian-Ottonian image of the emperor as the lay equal of the bishop of Rome, responsible for acting in worldly matters to protect the church. The emperor, like any other layman, was now subordinate to the moral discipline of churchmen.

      Some later emperors, notably the members of the Hohenstaufen dynasty—including Frederick I Barbarossa (1152–90), his son Henry VI (1190–97), and his grandson Frederick II (1220–50)—reasserted modified claims for imperial authority and intervened in Italy with some success. But Barbarossa's political ambitions were thwarted by the northern Italian cities of the Lombard League and the forces of Pope Alexander III at the Battle of Legnano in 1176. Both Henry VI and Frederick II, who had united the imperial and Lombard crowns and added to them that of the rich and powerful Norman kingdom of Sicily, were checked by similar resistance. Frederick himself was deposed by Pope Innocent IV in 1245. Succession disputes following Frederick's death and that of his immediate successors led to the Great Interregnum of 1250–73, when no candidate received enough electoral votes to become emperor. The interregnum ended only with the election of the Habsburg (Habsburg, House of) ruler Rudolf I (1273–91), which resulted in the increasing provincialization of the imperial office in favour of Habsburg dynastic and territorial interests. In 1356 the Luxembourg emperor Charles IV (1316–78) issued the Golden Bull (Golden Bull of Emperor Charles IV), which established the number of imperial electors at seven (three ecclesiastical and four lay princes) and articulated their powers.

      Although the emperor possessed the most prestigious of all lay titles, the actual authority of his office was very limited. Both the Habsburgs and their rivals used the office to promote their dynastic self-interests until the Habsburg line ascended the throne permanently with the reign of Frederick III (1442–93), the last emperor to be crowned in Rome. The imperial office and title were abolished when Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.

The consequences of reform
      The conflicts between emperors and popes constituted one conspicuous result of the reform movement. The transformation and new institutionalization of learning, the reconstitution of the church, the intensification of ecclesiastical discipline, and the growth of territorial monarchies were four others. Each of these developments was supported by the agricultural, technological, and commercial expansion of the 10th and 11th centuries.

The transformation of thought and learning
      The polemics of the papal-imperial debate revealed the importance of establishing a set of canonical texts on the basis of which both sides could argue. A number of academic disciplines, particularly the study of dialectic, had developed considerably between the 9th and 12th centuries. By the 12th century it had become the most widely studied intellectual discipline, in part because it was an effective tool for constructing and refuting arguments. The Gregorian reformers had also based their arguments on canon law, and a number of Gregorian and post-Gregorian collections, particularly that of Ivo of Chartres (Ivo of Chartres, Saint) (c. 1040–1116), pointed the way toward the creation of a commonly accessible canon law. That goal was achieved in about 1140–50 in two successive recensions (perhaps by two different authors) of a lawbook called Concordia discordantium canonum (Gratian's Decretum) (“Concordance of Discordant Canons”), or Decretum, attributed to Master Gratian. The Decretum became the standard introductory text of ecclesiastical law. Simultaneously, the full text of the 6th-century body of Roman law, later called the Corpus Iuris Civilis (Justinian, Code of) (“Body of Civil Law”), began to circulate in northern Italy and was taught in the schools of Bologna. The learned character of the revived Roman law contributed powerfully to the development of legal science throughout Europe in the following centuries.

 Early in the 12th century, Hugh of Saint-Victor (1096–1141), schoolmaster of a house of canons just outside Paris, wrote a description of all the subjects of learning, the Didascalicon. Hugh's contemporary, Peter Abelard (Abelard, Peter) (1079–1142), taught dialectic at Paris to crowds of students, many of whom became high officials in ecclesiastical and secular institutions. The teaching methods of scholars such as Gratian, Hugh, Abelard, and others became the foundation of Scholasticism, the method used by the new schools in the teaching of arts, law, medicine, and theology. In theology itself, comparable canonical work was done by Peter Lombard (c. 1100–60) in his Sententiarum libri iv (“Four Books of Sentences”), which became, next to the Bible, the fundamental teaching text of theology.

      But not all Christians admired the new Scholastic theology. The Scholastic teaching of Scripture replaced the early contemplative monastic style of exegesis with dialectical investigative techniques and speculative theology. Many monks and some outraged laity thought that Scripture was being mishandled, stripped of its dignity and mystery in the service of feeble human logic and cold rationality. They did not, however, stop the tide, as Scholastic theology created a complex, effective, and highly persuasive means of discussing both the complexities of divinity and the moral obligations of Christians on earth.

      As groups of teachers organized themselves into guilds (guild) in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, they and their students received imperial, papal, and royal privileges. About 1200 these associations, modeling themselves on ecclesiastical corporations, developed into the first universities (university). During the remainder of the 13th century, clerical teaching authority within the universities was articulated. The first guilds were formed for the teaching of law at several schools in Bologna and for the teaching of arts and theology at Paris and later at Oxford, Cambridge, and other towns. With the foundation of the University of Prague in 1348, the model crossed the Rhine River for the first time. By the 15th century it had become a standard fixture of European learning.

      University teachers insisted on the right to define teaching authority (education). Proclaiming the earliest version of academic freedom, they rejected outside interference and asserted that their professional competence alone entitled them to determine the content of disciplines and the standards for admitting, examining, graduating, and certifying students. They also transformed both the written script and the nature of the material book. Since teaching required a readable script and books whose texts were as close to identical as possible, the distinctive “Gothic” or “ black letter” script was developed, which standardized abbreviations and the writing style used in texts.

      The presence of universities of teachers and students in western European society was significant in itself. The universities reflected favourably on the cities in which they were located and on the rulers who protected them. The rulers also benefited from the opportunity to recruit increasingly educated public servants and bureaucrats from these institutions. The church benefited too, since the universities produced theologians, canon lawyers, and other officials that the church—even the papal office—now seemed to require.

 The universities (university) aided in the recovery and dissemination of Aristotelianism, particularly in the physical sciences and metaphysics. Only the new universities, moreover, could have housed and spread the intellectual work of Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas, Thomas, Saint) (1224/25–1274) and Bonaventure (Bonaventure, Saint) (1217–74), the greatest theologians of the 13th century, and of Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis; c. 1200–71) and Sinibaldo Fieschi (later Pope Innocent IV, reigned 1243–54), the greatest canon lawyers of the century.

The structure of ecclesiastical and devotional life

Ecclesiastical organization
      With the removal of the most offensive instances of lay influence in ecclesiastical affairs, the organization of the universal church and local churches acquired a symmetry and consistency hardly possible before 1100. An 11th-century anonymous text that was accepted by canon law identified two orders of Christians, the clergy and the laity. It considered the clergy largely in a monastic context, indicating that the new attention to the secular clergy had transferred to them the virtues and discipline of monks. Although many monks (monk) were not ordained priests, their disciplined, contemplative life was held up for centuries as the ideal clerical model.

      The work of the laity was the business of the world. The clergy, however, considered itself far more important than the laity. Members of the clergy themselves were ranked in terms of sacramental orders, minor and major. When a boy or young man entered the clergy, he received the tonsure, symbolizing his new status. He might then move in stages through the minor orders: acolyte, exorcist, lector, and doorkeeper. At the highest of minor orders the candidate could still leave the clergy. Many clerics in minor orders served in the administration of secular and ecclesiastical institutions. They also sometimes caused trouble in secular society, since even they received benefit of clergy (clergy, benefit of), or exemption from trial in secular courts. Ordination to the major orders—subdeacon (elevated to a major order by Pope Innocent III in 1215), deacon, and priest—entailed vows of chastity and conferred sacramental powers on the recipient.

      At the head of the Latin Christian church was the pope (papacy), whose powers were now articulated in canon law, most of which was made by the popes themselves and by their legal advisers. Not only did popes claim powers over even secular rulers in many instances, but a number of rulers, including King John of England (John) (reigned 1199–1216), submitted their kingdoms to the popes and received them back to govern for their new spiritual and temporal masters. The popes also issued charters of foundation for universities, convened church councils, called Crusades and commissioned preachers to deliver Crusade sermons, and appointed papal judges delegate or subdelegate to investigate specific problems. In all these areas, as in the articulation of canon law, papal authority directly affected the lives of all Christians, as well as the lives of Jews and Muslims in their relations with Christians.

      The popes were assisted by the College of cardinals, which was transformed during the papal-imperial conflict from a group of Roman liturgical assistants into a body of advisers individually appointed by the popes. Among its duties articulated in conciliar and papal decrees of 1059 and 1179—rules still in effect in the Roman Catholic Church today—was to elect the pope. A cardinal could be a cardinal bishop (if the church he was given was outside the city of Rome, whose only bishop, of course, was the pope himself), a cardinal priest, or a cardinal deacon. Cardinals also had different roles. The cardinal bishop of Ostia, for example, always crowned a new pope. For some time the senior cardinal deacon gave the pope his papal name, a practice that began in the 10th century, perhaps in imitation of monastic tradition.

      The papacy developed other means to implement its authority. After the Concordat of Worms (Worms, Concordat of) (1122), which settled some aspects of the Investiture Controversy, popes held regular assemblies of higher clergy in church councils, the first of which was the first Lateran Council in 1123. Conciliar legislation was the means by which reform principles were most efficiently formulated and disseminated to the highest clerical levels. Although councils in the 12th, 13th, and 14th centuries were closely controlled by the popes, later councils sometimes opposed papal authority with claims to conciliar authority, a position generally known as conciliarism. Papal legates, judges, and emissaries, widely used by Gregory VII and later popes, were dispatched with full papal authority to deal with issues in distant parts of Europe.

      Papal collectors, who received funds owed to the popes for Crusading or other purposes, were also essential components of papal government. The papal chamberlain of Celestine III (1191–98), Cencio Savelli (later Pope Honorius III; 1216–27), produced the Liber Censuum (“The Book of the Census”) in 1192, the first comprehensive account of the sources of papal funding. In this respect, as in the formal communications of the papal chancery, the pope created an influential model, imitated by all other European principalities and kingdoms. Although only four papal registers (collections of important papal letters and decisions) from before 1198 survive more or less intact, all registers since then have been preserved.

      The day-to-day work of the popes was carried out by the Roman Curia; the name Curia Romana was first used by Urban II at the end of the 11th century. The Curia consisted of the chancery; the Apostolic Camera, or financial centre; the consistory, or legal office, including the Roman Rota (chief papal court); and the Penitentiary, or spiritual and confessional office. The popes were also the secular rulers of Rome and the Papal States, and accordingly their servants included the rulers and officials of these territories.

      The popes ran afoul of local movements for greater independence, including the revolution led by Arnold of Brescia, the priest and religious dissident, in 1143. Revolts continued throughout the 13th century and increased in frequency during the Avignon papacy (1305–78), when the popes resided in Avignon, and during the Great Schism (Western Schism) (1378–1417), when there were two and then three claimants for the papal office. (The crisis was resolved in 1415–18 at the Council of Constance (Constance, Council of), which elected a new pope and restored papal authority over the city of Rome and the Papal States.) When a pope could safely reside in Rome, he worked at the church of St. John Lateran, his cathedral as bishop of the city of Rome, and not at the Vatican, which was chiefly a pilgrimage shrine. Only after Martin V (1417–31), the pope elected at the Council of Constance, found that the papal quarters at the Lateran had fallen into ruins was the papal residence and administration moved to the Vatican.

      Lower levels of the clerical hierarchy replicated the papal administration on a smaller scale. The immense dioceses of northern Europe, ruled by prince-archbishops (as in Cologne) or by prince-bishops (as in Durham), were very different from the tiny rural dioceses of southern Italy. Within the secular clergy the highest rank below the pope was that of primate, who was usually the regional head of a group of archbishops. The archbishops (archbishop), or metropolitans, ruled archdioceses, or provinces, holding provincial synods of clergy under their jurisdiction, ruling administrative courts, and supervising the suffragan bishops (bishops assigned to assist in the administration of the archdiocese). The archbishop was expected to make regular visits to the ecclesiastical institutions in his province and to hear appeals from the verdicts of courts at lower levels.

 The archdiocese was divided into dioceses (diocese), each ruled by a bishop, who supervised his own administration and episcopal court. In ecclesiastical tradition, bishops were considered the successors of the Apostles, and a strong sense of episcopal collegiality between pope and bishops survived well into the age of increased papal authority. Episcopal courts included a chancery for the use of the bishop's seal, a judicial court under the direction of the official or the archdeacon, financial officers, and archpriests (priests assigned to special functions). The bishop's church, the cathedral, was staffed by a chapter (a body of clergy) and headed by a dean, who was specifically charged with administering the cathedral and its property. The chapter was not usually the bishop's administrative staff and thus sometimes found itself in conflict with the bishop. Struggles between bishop and chapter were frequent and notorious in canon law courts, since they could be appealed, like disputed episcopal elections, all the way to the papal court.

      Episcopal powers were extensive: only the bishop could consecrate churches, ordain clergy, license preachers, or appoint teachers in episcopal schools. The bishop's pastoral responsibilities extended to all Christians in his diocese. Moreover, since canon law touched the lives of all Christians, episcopal legal officials held great power. They visited diocesan institutions and presided over trials of those accused of violating canon law, which concerned many areas that in modern legal systems are subsumed under civil and criminal law, family courts, and morals offenses.

      The diocese was divided into deaconries for the archdeacons (archdeacon), which might convoke lesser synods. Deaconries too had their own chancellors, notaries, and judicial officers, as well as archpriests who assisted the deacons. Since the archdeacon or official was usually the point of contact between the laity and ecclesiastical discipline, they were often the butt of satire and complaint. One topic said to have been proposed for debate at a 13th-century university was: Can an archdeacon be saved?

      At the lowest level of the clerical hierarchy was the parish, with its priest, suffragan priests, vicars, and chaplains, who together supervised the spiritual life of the majority of European laity. The parish owned its church and the land that provided the priest's income (the glebe); additional income was derived from tithes collected from all parishioners and often from an endowment. The priest was presented to the bishop for ordination by a layman, cleric, or clerical corporation with proprietary rights over the parish. In many cases, the actual care of souls in a parish was in the hands of a vicar, who was deputed by a patron to perform the priest's duties when the priest was away studying or occupied in other business. The parish priest also administered the ecclesiastical calendar for his parishioners. Parishioners themselves might belong to spiritual associations, called confraternities, but all were expected to be baptized, to make confession once a year (after the fourth Lateran Council prescribed this in 1215), to take Holy Communion, to marry, and to be buried in the parish churchyard. The parish was the level at which most people learned their Christianity and the level at which most of them lived it.

Devotional life
      The popes also supervised the regular clergy, which included the religious orders of monks, canons regular (secular clergy who lived collegiately according to a rule), and mendicants. Each of these orders had a superior, who was advised by a chapter general that comprised representatives of the religious houses of the order. Orders, like dioceses, were organized according to regions, each having a regional superior and holding regional chapters. Individual religious houses were headed by an abbot or abbess (the mendicant orders had a slightly different organization) and administered by a chancellor and chamberlain. Provosts and deans usually supervised the property of each house.

      In the 12th century, new devotional movements (movements devoted to Jesus or the saints) led to outbursts of religious dissent (with new forms of ecclesiastical discipline devised to control them) and equally passionate expressions of orthodox devotion. Although monasticism was by then an old institution, one of the great themes of the century was the search for the apostolic life as monks, canons, and laypeople might live it. The canons regular were one result of this movement, as were new monastic orders, particularly the Cistercian Order. But the most dynamic movement was that of the mendicant orders, the Dominicans (Dominican) and the Franciscans (Franciscan), founded in the early 13th century.

 The Order of Friars Minor, founded by the layman Francis of Assisi (Francis of Assisi, Saint) (1181/82–1226) to minister to the spiritual needs of the cities, spread widely and rapidly, as did the Order of Preachers, founded by the canon of Osma, Dominic (Dominic, Saint) of Guzmán (c. 1170–1221). These and other devotional movements of laypeople were supported by Pope Innocent III and his successors. The mendicant orders greatly influenced popular piety, because they specialized in preaching in new churches that were built to hold large crowds. Indeed, during this time the sermon came into its own as the most effective mass medium in Europe. The mendicants also increased devotion to the Virgin Mary and to the infant or crucified and suffering Jesus (Jesus Christ), rather than to the figure of Jesus as regal and remote.

      Other forms of devotional life took shape during the 12th, 13th, and 14th centuries. The Cistercian Order, for example, instituted the status of lay brother, who was usually an adult layman who retired from the world to undertake the management of monastic resources. Still other members of the laity retired to the sequestered life of hermits and recluses, usually under the supervision of a chaplain.

      During the 13th and 14th centuries, devotional movements arose that were neither monastic nor clerical in any other sense. The most notable of these was the Beguines, an order of devout women (and occasionally, but more rarely, men, who lived in all-male communities and were called Beghards) who lived together in devotional communities within towns, especially in the Low Countries and the Rhineland, followed no rule, and took no vow. They worked in the towns but lived collectively and might leave for marriage or another form of life at any time. Some of the most important devotional literature of the period was written by and for Beguines.

      The vast movements of reform, ecclesiastical organization, and pastoral care of the 12th and 13th centuries reached their greatest intensity in the pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216). Lothar of Segni, as he was originally known, was the son of a landholding noble family outside Rome; he was educated in the schools of Paris and attached to the Roman Curia in 1187. Innocent issued the strongest and most tightly argued claims for papal authority, and he launched Crusades and instituted the office of papal judge-delegate to combat clerical crimes and heterodox belief. He also supported the new mendicant orders, paid particular attention to the needs of popular devotion, reformed and disciplined the Curia, and assembled the fourth Lateran Council in November 1215. Innocent came as close to realizing the ideals of reform and renewal in ecclesiological practice as any pope before or since.

      The organization of normative religion, the formal rules and norms of practice in the faith, was intended to give regularity and order to lived religion. Daily religious life was characterized by the acceptance of tradition and authority and by belief in the saints as patrons of local communities and belief in the parish priest as a conveyor of grace by virtue of his sacramental powers (conferred by ordination) and his legal powers (conferred by the bishop). During the 12th century, institutional structures for official acts of canonization were established, but the enthusiasm for the saints (saint) remained an important part of both popular devotion and the official cult of the saints (the system of religious belief and ritual surrounding the saints). The cult of the saints was celebrated by clergy and laity in the observance of feast days and processions, the veneration of saints' relics, pilgrimages to saints' shrines, and the rituals of death and burial near the graves of saints. The liturgical dimension of pastoral care regulated the major events of the day, week, season, and Christian year, according to whose rhythms everyone lived. Priests blessed harvests, animals, and ships and liturgically interceded in the face of natural or man-made disasters.

      Religious devotion strengthened the presence of normative religion in marriage and the family, the sacred character of the local community and the territorial monarchy, and the moral rules by which lay affairs were conducted. The fourth Lateran Council largely institutionalized the work of the 12th-century moral theologians at Paris, who had begun to apply the principles of doctrine and canon law to the lives of their contemporaries.

From persuasion to coercion: The emergence of a new ecclesiastical discipline
      The ecclesiastical reform movements that sharply distinguished clergy from laity also developed a means of sustaining that distinction through intensified ecclesiastical discipline. Clergy were not only freed from most forms of subordination to laypersons but also were granted legal privileges, being triable only in church courts and subject only to penalties deemed suitable by church authorities (benefit of clergy). Laity who injured clerical personnel or property were punished more harshly. But the distinction between clergy and laity also enhanced lay status. Lay authorities could legally perform judicial actions that were forbidden to clergy, like the shedding of blood or other forms of physical punishment. Clerical thinkers greatly legitimated lay activities that earlier monastic Christianity had once scorned, attributing a positive value to commerce, the law, just warfare (just war), marriage, and other roles once considered signs of fallen and weak human nature.

      The intensity of the reform movements led to a new and elaborated idea of sin and to categories of sin so grave that they required the harshest punishments, sometimes in cooperation with lay courts. The idea of crime itself, drawing on both older Roman law and earlier ecclesiastical discipline, gradually came to assume a distinctive place in secular law, as more and more conflicts that had once been settled privately came within the purview of lay legal officials. Clerical crime became a major focus of disciplinary concern. The term heresy, loosely used until the 11th century, slowly became better defined and was initially applied to clerical misconduct such as simony (the acceptance of ecclesiastical office from laymen) and nicolaitism (clerical marriage). The increasingly precise exposition of Christian doctrine by 12th-century theologians seemed to many people a displacement of the Christianity that they had always understood and practiced. Legal collections began to treat various forms of doctrinal and devotional dissent as heresy, thus formulating a category that would criminalize a wide variety of beliefs and conduct.

      Promoters of the new ecclesiastical doctrine and discipline believed that the increasingly numerous devotional collectives and their charismatic leaders would eventually threaten the order of both clerical and lay society. In the early 13th century the English theologian Robert Grosseteste (Grosseteste, Robert) formulated a definition that accurately reflected the changed understanding of religious dissent: “Heresy is an opinion chosen by human faculties, contrary to sacred scripture, openly taught, and pertinaciously defended.” Criminal heresy involved belief that contradicted orthodox doctrine and was arrived at by purely human capacities. It was also belief that was publicly, and therefore seditiously, proclaimed, even after legitimate instruction by authorized teachers, thereby making the “heretic” contumacious in the eyes of the law.

      Like the problem of criminal clergy, the problem of heresy raised procedural questions in law. Legal procedure in criminal cases might be initiated by an accusation by a responsible individual or by a denunciation by a group of specially appointed synodal witnesses. In 1199 Innocent III added a third procedure, that of inquisition, or inquiry by an appropriate authority, which was first used to investigate clerical crimes. Later popes appointed judges delegate as individual inquisitors, although there was not an institutionalized office of inquisition until the royal-papal establishment of the Spanish Inquisition in 1478.

      The sacred texts of revealed religions may be eternal and unchanging, but they are understood and applied by human beings living in time. Christians believed not only that the Jews had misunderstood Scripture, thus justifying the Christian reinterpretation of Jewish Scripture, but that all of Jewish Scripture had to be understood as containing only partial truth. The whole truth was comprehensible only when Jewish Scripture was interpreted correctly, in what Christians called a “spiritual” rather than merely a “carnal” manner.

      Although early Christian texts and later papal commands had prohibited the persecution and forced conversion of Jews, these doctrines were less carefully observed starting in the 11th century. Heralded by a series of pogroms in both Europe and the Middle East carried out in the course of the First Crusade, a deeper and more widespread anti-Judaism came to characterize much of European history after 1100. There also emerged in this period what some historians have termed “chimeric” anti-Judaism, the conception of the Jew not only as ignorant of spiritual truth and stubbornly resistant to Christian preaching but as actively hostile to Christianity and guilty of ugly crimes against it, such as the ritual murder of Christian children and the desecration of the consecrated host of the mass. This form of anti-Judaism resulted in massacres of Jews, usually at moments of high social tension within Christian communities. One of the best documented of these massacres took place at York, Eng., in 1190.

      Before the 11th century the Jews (Jew) faced little persecution, lived among Christians, and even pursued the same occupations as Christians. The Jews' restricted status after that time encouraged many of them to turn to moneylending, which only served to increase Christian hostility (Christians were forbidden to lend money to other Christians). Because the Jews often undertook on behalf of rulers work that Christians would not do or were not encouraged to do, such as serving as physicians and financial officers, Jews were hated both for their religion and for their social roles.

      Jewish identity was also visually marked. Jews were depicted in particular ways in art, and the fourth Lateran Council in 1215 insisted that Jews wear identifying marks on their clothing. Even when not savagely persecuted, Jews were considered the property of the territorial monarchs of Europe and could be routinely exploited economically and even expelled, as they were from England in 1290, France in 1306, and Spain in 1492.

      Yet Christians also believed that it was necessary for the Jews to continue to exist unconverted, because the Apocalypse, or Revelation to John, the last book of the Christian Bible, stated that the Jews would be converted at the end of time. Therefore, a “saving remnant” of Jews needed to exist so that scriptural prophecy would be fulfilled.

      Muslims (Islāmic world), on the other hand, possessed neither the historical status of Jews nor their place in salvation history (the course of events from Creation to the Last Judgment). To many Christian thinkers, Muslims were former Christian heretics who worshipped Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam (Islām), and were guilty of occupying the Holy Land and threatening Christendom with military force. The First Crusade had been launched to liberate the Holy Land from Islamic rule, and later Crusades were undertaken to defend the original conquest.

      The Crusading movement failed for many reasons but mainly because the material requirements for sustaining a military and political outpost so far from the heartland of western Europe were not met. But as a component of European culture, the Crusade ideal remained prominent, even in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the powerful Ottoman Empire indeed threatened to sweep over Mediterranean and southeastern Europe. Not until the Treaty of Carlowitz (Carlowitz, Treaty of) in 1699 was a stable frontier between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire established.

      Contempt for Islam and fear of Muslim military power did not, however, prevent a lively and expansive commercial and technological transfer between the two civilizations or between them and the Byzantine Empire. Commercial and intellectual exchanges between Islamic lands and western Europe were considerable. Muslim maritime, agricultural, and technological innovations, as well as much East Asian technology via the Muslim world, made their way to western Europe in one of the largest technology transfers in world history. What Europeans did not invent they readily borrowed and adapted for their own use. Of the three great civilizations of western Eurasia and North Africa, that of Christian Europe began as the least developed in virtually all aspects of material and intellectual culture, well behind the Islamic states and Byzantium. By the end of the 13th century it had begun to pull even, and by the end of the 15th century it had surpassed both. The late 15th-century voyages of discovery were not something new but a more ambitious continuation of the European interest in distant parts of the world.

From territorial principalities to territorial monarchies
      As a result of the Investiture Controversy of the late 11th and early 12th centuries, the office of emperor lost much of its religious character and retained only a nominal universal preeminence over other rulers, though several 12th- and 13th-century emperors reasserted their authority on the basis of their interpretation of Roman law and energetically applied their lordship and pursued their dynastic interests in Germany and northern Italy. But the struggle over investiture and the reform movement also legitimized all secular authorities, partly on the grounds of their obligation to enforce discipline. The most successful rulers of the 12th and 13th centuries were, first, individual lords who created compact and more intensely governed principalities and, second and most important and enduring, kings who successfully asserted their authority over the princes, often with princely cooperation. The monarchies of England, France, León-Castile, Aragon, Scandinavia, Portugal, and elsewhere all acquired their fundamental shape and character in the 12th century.

The office and person of the king
      By the 12th century, most European political thinkers agreed that monarchy was the ideal form of governance, since it imitated on earth the model set by God for the universe. It was also the form of government of the ancient Hebrews, the Roman Empire, and the peoples who succeeded Rome after the 4th century. For several centuries, some areas had no monarch, but these were regarded as anomalies. Iceland (until its absorption by Norway in 1262) was governed by an association of free men and heads of households meeting in an annual assembly. Many city-republics in northern Italy—especially Florence, Milan, Genoa, Pisa, and Venice—were in effect independent from the 10th to the 16th century, though they were nominally under the rule of the emperor. Elsewhere in Europe, the prosperous and volatile cities of the Low Countries frequently asserted considerable independence from the counts of Flanders and the dukes of Brabant. In the 15th century the forest cantons of Switzerland won effective independence from their episcopal and lay masters. For the rest of Europe, however, monarchy was both a theoretical norm and a factual reality.

      Whereas kings were originally rulers of peoples, from the 11th century they gradually became rulers of peoples in geographic territories, and kingdoms came to designate both ruled peoples and the lands they inhabited. Gradually, inventories of royal resources, royal legislation, and the idea of borders and territorial maps became components of territorial monarchies.

      Kings acquired their thrones by inheritance, by election or acclamation (as in the empire), or by conquest. The first two means were considered the most legitimate, unless conquest was carried out at the request or command of a legitimate authority, usually the pope. The king's position was confirmed by a coronation ceremony, which acknowledged what royal blood claimed: a dynastic right to the throne, borne by a family rather than a designated individual. inheritance of the throne might involve the successor's being designated coruler while the previous king still lived (as in France), designation by the will of the predecessor, or simply agreement and acclamation by the most important and powerful royal subjects. When dynasties died out in the male line, the search for a ruler became more complicated; when they died out in the male line and a woman succeeded, there were usually intense debates about the legitimacy of female succession. Liturgical anointing with consecrated oil was accompanied by the ceremonial presentation to the king of objects with symbolic meaning (the crown, the sword of justice, and the helmet, robe, and scepter), by the chanting of prayers dedicated to rulership, and usually by an oath, in which the king swore to protect the church, the weak, and the peace of his kingdom, to administer justice, and to defend the kingdom against its (and his) enemies.

      From the very beginning of European history, kings had responsibilities as well as rights and powers. Kings who were thought to have violated their oaths might be considered tyrants or incompetents, and a number of kings were deposed by local factions or papal command, especially in the 13th and 14th centuries. Depositions also required ceremonies that reversed the coronation liturgy.

Instruments of royal governance
      Kings ruled through their courts, which were gradually transformed from private households into elaborate bureaucracies. Royal religious needs were served by royal chapels—whose personnel often became bishops in the kingdom—and by clerical chancellors, who were responsible for issuing and sealing royal documents. Royal chanceries, financial offices, and law courts became specialized institutions during the 12th century. They recruited people of skill as well as of respectable birth, and they established programs to ensure uniformity and norms of professional competence, goals that were increasingly aided by the education offered by the new universities.

      In some circumstances, kings were expected to seek and follow the advice of the most important men in their kingdoms, and these gatherings were formalized after the 12th century. Kings also sometimes convened larger assemblies of lower-ranking subjects in order to issue their commands or urge approval of financial demands. As kings grew stronger and their bureaucracies more articulated, their costs, particularly for war, also increased. Greater financial needs often determined a king's use of representative institutions in order to gain widespread acceptance of new direct or indirect taxation.

      These assemblies developed differently in different kingdoms. In England the first Parliaments (Parliament) were held in the late 13th century, though they were not powerful institutions until the 16th century. In France the Parlement developed into a royal law court, while the intermittent meetings of the Estates-General (a representative assembly of the three orders of society) served as an instrument of consultation and communication for the kings. Across Europe these representative assemblies were composed differently, functioned differently, and possessed different degrees of influence on the ruler and the rest of the kingdom. Their later role as essential and powerful components of government began only in the 16th and 17th centuries.

      The territorial monarchies represented something entirely new in world history. Although they often borrowed from the political literature of antiquity–—from the Greek philosopher Aristotle, the Roman statesman Cicero (Cicero, Marcus Tullius), and Roman epic poetry—they applied it to a very different world, one whose ideas were shaped by courtiers, professors, and canon lawyers as well as by political philosophers. Incorporating both clergy and laity under vigorous royal dynasties, the kingdoms of Europe grew out of the political experience of the papacy, the north Italian city-republics, and their own internal development. By the 15th century the territorial monarchies had laid the groundwork for the modern state. When, to further their own interests, they began to incorporate successively lower levels of society, they also laid the groundwork for the nation. The combination of these, the nation-state, became the characteristic form of the early modern European and Atlantic polity.

The three orders
      In the 11th and 12th centuries thinkers argued that human society consisted of three orders: those who fight, those who pray, and those who labour. The structure of the second order, the clergy, was in place by 1200 and remained intact until the religious reformations of the 16th century. The very general category of those who labour (specifically, those who were not knightly warriors or nobles) diversified rapidly after the 11th century into the lively and energetic worlds of peasants, skilled artisans, merchants, financiers, lay professionals, and entrepreneurs, which together drove the European economy to its greatest achievements. The first order, those who fight, was the rank of the politically powerful, ambitious, and dangerous. Kings took pains to ensure that it did not resist their authority.

      The term noble (aristocracy) was originally used to refer to members of kinship groups whose names and heroic past were known, respected, and recognized by others (though it was not usually used by members of such groups themselves). Noble groups married into each other, recognizing the importance of both the female and the male lines. Charlemagne used this international nobility to rule his empire, and its descendants became the nobility of the 11th and 12th centuries, though by then the understanding of noble status had changed. During the 11th century, however, some branches of these broad groups began to identify themselves increasingly with the paternal line and based their identity on their possession of a particular territory handed down from generation to generation, forming patriarchal lineages whose consciousness of themselves differed from that of their predecessors. Titles such as count or duke were originally those of royal service and might increase the prestige and wealth of a family but were not originally essential to noble status. Nor were even kings thought to be able to ennoble someone who was not noble by birth. As the status of the free peasant population was diminished, freedom and unfreedom, as noted above, gradually became the most significant social division (see above Demographic and agricultural growth (Europe, history of)).

      The new warrior order encompassed both great nobles and lesser fighting men who depended upon the great nobles for support. This assistance usually took the form of land or income drawn from the lord's resources, which could also bring the hope of social advancement, even marriage into a lordly family. The acute need on the part of these lower-ranking warriors was to distinguish themselves from peasants—hence the relegation of all who were not warriors to the vague category of those who labour.

 Some nobles asserted their nobility by seizing territory, controlling it and its inhabitants from a castle, surviving as local powers over several generations, marrying well, achieving recognition from their neighbours, and dispensing ecclesiastical patronage to nearby monasteries. The greatest and wealthiest of the nobles controlled vast areas of land, which they received by inheritance or through a grant from the king. Some of them developed closely governed territorial principalities which, in France, were eventually absorbed and redistributed by the crown to members of the royal family or their favourites. Despite the extreme diversity between knights, lesser nobility, and greater nobility, their common warrior-culture, expressed in the literature and ideology of chivalry, served as an effective social bond, excluding all those who did not share it.

      As the territorial monarchies gradually increased in both prestige and power, the higher nobility adjusted by accepting more royal offices, titles, and patronage, developing an elaborate vocabulary of noble status, and restricting access to its ranks even though kings could now ennoble whomever they chose. The culture of chivalry served the ambitions of the lower-ranking nobility, but it also reflected the spectrum of different levels of nobility, all subordinated to the ruler. The culture and power of the European aristocracy lasted until the end of the 18th century.

Crisis, recovery, and resilience: Did the Middle Ages end?
 Both ancient and modern historians have often conceived the existence of civilizations and historical periods in terms of the biological stages of human life: birth, development, maturity, and decay. Once the Middle Ages was identified as a distinct historical period, historians in the 15th and 16th centuries began to describe it as enduring in a sequence of stages from youthful vigour to maturity (in the 12th and 13th centuries) and then sinking into old age (in the 14th and 15th centuries). Much of the evidence used to support this view was based on the series of apparently great disasters that struck Europe in the 14th century: the Mongol invasions, the great famine of 1315, the Black Death of 1348 and subsequent years, the financial collapse of the great Italian banking houses in the early 14th century, and the vastly increased costs and devastating effects of larger-scale warfare. For a long time historians considered these disasters dramatic signs of the end of an age, especially because they already believed that the Renaissance had emerged following the collapse of medieval civilization.

      Reconsideration of the Europe of the 14th and 15th centuries, however, does not reveal decline or decay but rather a remarkable resilience that enabled it to recover from disaster and reconstitute itself by means of most of the same institutions it had possessed in 1300. Only from a highly selective and partial historical perspective was there ever, as the great Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (Huizinga, Johan) once termed it, a “waning,” “autumn,” or “end” of the Middle Ages.

      The process of rural and urban expansion and development indeed paused in the 14th century as famine, epidemic disease, intensified and prolonged warfare, and financial collapse brought growth to a halt and reduced the population for a time to about half of the 70 million people who had inhabited Europe in 1300. But the resources that had created the Europe of the 12th and 13th centuries survived these crises: first the European countryside and then the cities were rapidly repopulated. It is the resiliency of Europe, not its weakness, that explains the patterns of recovery in the late 14th and 15th centuries. That recovery continued through the 16th and 17th centuries.

      The missionary (mission) mandate reached out across Mongol-dominated Asia as far east as China, where a Christian bishop took up his seat in 1307. The Mongol opening of Eurasia also relocated Europe in the minds of its inhabitants. No longer were its edges simply its borders with the Islamic world. Improved techniques in both navigation and marine engineering led Europeans from the 13th century to cross and map first their local seas, then the west African coasts, then the Atlantic and Pacific. From the late 15th century Europe began to export itself once more, as it once had to the north and east from the 10th to the 15th century, this time over vast oceans and to continents that had been unknown to the Greeks and Romans.

      Neither the crises of the 14th century nor the voyages and discoveries of the 15th suggest the end of a historical period or an exhausted medieval Europe. The resilience and capacity for innovation of 14th- and 15th-century Europe, the hopeful, determined, and often passionate search for salvation on the part of ordinary people leading ordinary lives, even the inability of governments to weigh down their subjects without fierce displays of resistance—all indicate the strength of a European society and culture that men and women had shaped from the 8th century.

Edward Peters

The Renaissance (Renaissance)
      Few historians are comfortable with the triumphalist and western Europe-centred image of the Renaissance as the irresistible march of modernity and progress. A sharp break with medieval values and institutions, a new awareness of the individual, an awakened interest in the material world and nature, and a recovery of the cultural heritage of ancient Greece and Rome—these were once understood to be the major achievements of the Renaissance. Today, every particular of this formula is under suspicion if not altogether repudiated. Nevertheless, the term Renaissance remains a widely recognized label for the multifaceted period between the heyday of medieval universalism, as embodied in the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire, and the convulsions and sweeping transformations of the 17th century.

      In this period some important innovations of the Middle Ages came into their own, including the revival of urban life, commercial enterprise based on private capital, banking, the formation of states, systematic investigation of the physical world, classical scholarship, and vernacular literatures. In religious life the Renaissance was a time of the broadening and institutionalizing of earlier initiatives in lay piety and lay-sponsored clerical reforms, rather than of the abandonment of traditional beliefs. In government, city-states and regional and national principalities supplanted the fading hegemony of the empire and the Papacy and obliterated many of the local feudal jurisdictions that had covered Europe, although within states power continued to be monopolized by elites drawing their strength from both landed and mercantile wealth. If there was a Renaissance “rediscovery of the world and of man,” as the 19th-century historians Jules Michelet (Michelet, Jules) (in the seventh volume of his History of France) and Jacob Burckhardt (Burckhardt, Jacob) (in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy [1860]) asserted, it can be found mainly in literature and art, influenced by the latest and most successful of a long series of medieval classical revivals. For all but exceptional individuals and a few marginal groups, the standards of behaviour continued to arise from traditional social and moral codes. Identity derived from class, family, occupation, and community, although each of these social forms was itself undergoing significant modification. Thus, for example, while there is no substance to Burckhardt's notion that in Italy women enjoyed perfect equality with men, the economic and structural features of Renaissance patrician families may have enhanced the scope of activity and influence of women of that class. Finally, the older view of the Renaissance centred too exclusively on Italy, and within Italy on a few cities—Florence, Venice, and Rome. By discarding false dichotomies—Renaissance versus Middle Ages, classical versus Gothic, modern versus feudal—one is able to grasp more fully the interrelatedness of Italy with the rest of Europe and to investigate the extent to which the great centres of Renaissance learning and art were nourished and influenced by less exalted towns and by changes in the pattern of rural life.

      Additional treatment of Renaissance thought and intellectual activity can be found in humanism and classical scholarship. (classical scholarship)

The Italian Renaissance
Urban (city) growth
      Although town revival was a general feature of 10th- and 11th-century Europe (associated with an upsurge in population (urbanization) that is not completely understood), in Italy the urban imprint of Roman times had never been erased. By the 11th century, the towers of new towns, and, more commonly, of old towns newly revived, began to dot the spiny Italian landscape—eye-catching creations of a burgeoning population literally brimming with new energy due to improved diets. As in Roman times, the medieval Italian town lived in close relation to its surrounding rural area, or contado; Italian city folk seldom relinquished their ties to the land from which they and their families had sprung. Rare was the successful tradesman or banker who did not invest some of his profits in the family farm or a rural noble who did not spend part of the year in his house inside city walls. In Italian towns, knights, merchants, rentiers, and skilled craftsmen lived and worked side by side, fought in the same militia, and married into each other's families. Social hierarchy there was, but it was a tangled system with no simple division between noble and commoner, between landed and commercial wealth. That landed magnates took part in civic affairs helps explain the early militancy of the townsfolk in resisting the local bishop, who was usually the principal claimant to lordship in the community. Political action against a common enemy tended to infuse townspeople with a sense of community and civic loyalty. By the end of the 11th century, civic patriotism began to express itself in literature; city chronicles combined fact and legend to stress a city's Roman origins and, in some cases, its inheritance of Rome's special mission to rule. Such motifs reflect the cities' achievement of autonomy from their respective episcopal or secular feudal overlords and, probably, the growth of rivalries between neighbouring communities.

      Rivalry between towns was part of the expansion into the neighbouring countryside, with the smaller and weaker towns submitting to the domination of the larger and stronger. As the activity of the towns became more complex, sporadic collective action was replaced by permanent civic institutions. Typically, the first of these was an executive magistracy, named the consulate (to stress the continuity with republican Rome). In the late 11th and early 12th centuries, this process—consisting of the establishment of juridical autonomy, the emergence of a permanent officialdom, and the spread of power beyond the walls of the city to the contado and neighbouring towns—was well under way in about a dozen Italian centres and evident in dozens more; the loose urban community was becoming a corporate entity, or commune; the city was becoming a city-state.

      The typical 13th-century city-state was a republic administering a territory of dependent towns; whether it was a democracy is a question of definition. The idea of popular sovereignty existed in political thought and was reflected in the practice of calling a parlamento, or mass meeting, of the populace in times of emergency; but in none of the republics were the people as a whole admitted to regular participation in government. On the other hand, the 13th century saw the establishment, after considerable struggle, of assemblies in which some portion of the male citizenry, restricted by property and other qualifications, took part in debate, legislation, and the selection of officials. Most offices were filled by men serving on a rotating, short-term basis. If the almost universal obligation of service in the civic militia is also considered, it becomes clear that participation in the public life of the commune was shared by a considerable part of the male population, although the degree of participation varied from one commune to another and tended to decline. Most of the city republics were small enough (in 1300 Florence, one of the largest, had perhaps 100,000 people; Padua, nearer the average, had about 15,000) so that public business was conducted by and for citizens who knew each other, and civic issues were a matter of widespread and intense personal concern.

      The darker side of this intense community life was conflict. It became a cliché of contemporary observers that when townsmen were not fighting their neighbours they were fighting each other. Machiavelli (Machiavelli, Niccolò) explained this as the result of the natural enmity between nobles and “the people—the former desiring to command, the latter unwilling to obey.” This contains an essential truth: a basic problem was the unequal distribution of power and privilege, but the class division was further complicated by factional rivalry within the ruling groups and by ideological differences—Guelfism (Guelf and Ghibelline), or loyalty to the pope, versus Ghibellinism, or vassalage to the German emperors. The continuing leadership of the old knightly class, with its violent feudal ways and the persistence of a winner-take-all conception of politics, guaranteed bloody and devastating conflict. Losers could expect to be condemned to exile, with their houses burned and their property confiscated. Winners had to be forever vigilant against the unending conspiracies of exiles yearning to return to their homes and families.

      During the 14th century a number of cities, despairing of finding a solution to the problem of civic strife, were turning from republicanism to signoria, the rule of one man. The signore, or lord, was usually a member of a local feudal (feudalism) family that was also a power in the commune; thus, lordship did not appear to be an abnormal development, particularly if the signore chose, as most did, to rule through existing republican institutions. Sometimes a signoria was established as the result of one noble faction's victory over another, while in a few cases a feudal noble who had been hired by the republic as its condottiere, or military captain, became its master. Whatever the process, hereditary lordship had become the common condition and free republicanism the exception by the late 14th century. Contrary to what Burckhardt believed, Italy in the 14th century had not shaken off feudalism. In the south, feudalism was entrenched in the loosely centralized Kingdom of Naples, successor state to the Hohenstaufen and Norman kingdoms. In central and northern Italy, feudal lordship and knightly values merged with medieval communal institutions to produce the typical state of the Renaissance. Where the nobles were excluded by law from political participation in the commune, as in the Tuscan cities of Florence, Siena, Pisa, and Lucca, parliamentary republicanism had a longer life; but even these bastions of liberty had intervals of disguised or open lordship. The great maritime republic of Venice reversed the usual process by increasing the powers of its councils at the expense of the doge (from Latin dux, “leader”). However, Venice never had a feudal nobility, only a merchant aristocracy that called itself noble and jealously guarded its hereditary sovereignty against incursions from below.

Wars of expansion
      There were new as well as traditional elements in the Renaissance city-state. Changes in the political and economic situation affected the evolution of government, while the growth of the humanist movement influenced developing conceptions of citizenship, patriotism, and civic history. The decline in the ability of both the empire and the Papacy to dominate Italian affairs as they had done in the past left each state free to pursue its own goals within the limits of its resources. These goals were, invariably, the security and power of each state vis-à-vis its neighbours. Diplomacy became a skilled game of experts; rivalries were deadly, and warfare was endemic. Because the costs of war were all-consuming, particularly as mercenary troops replaced citizen militias, the states had to find new sources of revenue and develop methods of securing public credit. Governments borrowed from moneylenders (stimulating the development of banking), imposed customs duties, and levied fines; but, as their costs continued to exceed revenues, they came up with new solutions such as the forced loan, funded debt, and taxes on property and income. New officials with special skills were required to take property censuses (the catasto), calculate assessments, and manage budgets, as well as to provision troops, take minutes of council meetings, administer justice, write to other governments, and send instructions to envoys and other agents. All this required public space—council, judicial, and secretarial rooms, storage space for bulging archives, and both closed and open-air ceremonial settings where officials interacted with the citizenry and received foreign visitors. As secular needs joined and blended with religious ones, towns took their place alongside the church and the monasteries as patrons of builders, painters, and sculptors (often the same persons). In the late 13th century, great programs of public building and decoration were begun that were intended to symbolize and portray images of civic power and beneficence and to communicate the values of “the common good.” Thus the expansion of the functions of the city-state was accompanied by the development of a public ideology and a civic rhetoric intended to make people conscious of their blessings and responsibilities as citizens.

      The city-state tended to subsume many of the protective and associative functions and loyalties connected with clan, family, guild, and party. Whether it fostered individualism by replacing traditional forms of association—as Burckhardt, Alfred von Martin, and other historians have claimed—is problematic. The Renaissance “discovery of the individual” is a nebulous concept, lending itself to many different meanings. It could be argued, for example, that the development of communal law, with its strong Roman influence, enhanced individual property rights or that participatory government promoted a consciousness of individual value. It could also be argued, however, that the city-state was a more effective controller of the loyalty and property of its members than were feudal jurisdictions and voluntary associations. In some respects the great merchants and bankers of the Renaissance, operating in international markets, had more freedom than local tradespeople, who were subject to guild restrictions, communal price and quality controls, and usury laws; but the economic ideal of Renaissance states was mercantilism, not free private enterprise.

      Amid the confusion of medieval Italian politics, a new pattern of relations emerged by the 14th century. No longer revolving in the papal or in the imperial orbit, the stronger states were free to assert their hegemony over the weaker, and a system of regional power centres evolved. From time to time the more ambitious states, especially those that had brought domestic conflict under control, made a bid for a wider hegemony in the peninsula, such as Milan attempted under the lordship of the Visconti family. In the 1380s and '90s Gian Galeazzo Visconti (Visconti, Gian Galeazzo) pushed Milanese power eastward as far as Padua, at the very doorstep of Venice, and southward to the Tuscan cities of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena and even to Perugia in papal territory. Some believed that Gian Galeazzo meant to be king of Italy; whether or not this is true, he would probably have overrun Florence, the last outpost of resistance in central Italy, had he not died suddenly in 1402, leaving a divided inheritance and much confusion. In the 1420s, under Filippo Maria, Milan began to expand again; but by then Venice, with territorial ambitions of its own, had joined with Florence to block Milan's advance, while the other Italian states took sides or remained neutral according to their own interests. The mid-15th century saw the Italian peninsula embroiled in a turmoil of intrigues, plots, revolts, wars, and shifting alliances, of which the most sensational was the reversal that brought the two old enemies, Florence and Milan, together against Venetian expansion. This “diplomatic revolution,” supported by Cosimo de' Medici (Medici, Cosimo de'), the unofficial head of the Florentine republic, is the most significant illustration of the emergence of balance-of-power (power, balance of) diplomacy in Renaissance Italy.

      The notion that ancient wisdom and eloquence lay slumbering in the Dark Ages until awakened in the Renaissance was the creation of the Renaissance itself. The idea of the revival of classical (classical literature) antiquity is one of those great myths, comparable to the idea of the universal civilizing mission of imperial Rome or to the idea of progress in a modern industrial society, by which an era defines itself in history. Like all such myths, it is a blend of fact and invention. Classical thought and style permeated medieval culture in ways past counting. Most of the authors known to the Renaissance were known to the Middle Ages as well, while the classical texts “discovered” by the humanists were often not originals but medieval copies preserved in monastic or cathedral libraries. Moreover, the Middle Ages had produced at least two earlier revivals of classical antiquity. The so-called Carolingian Renaissance of the late 8th and 9th centuries saved many ancient works from destruction or oblivion, passing them down to posterity in its beautiful minuscule script (which influenced the humanist scripts of the Renaissance). A 12th-century Renaissance saw the revival of Roman law, Latin poetry, and Greek science, including almost the whole corpus of Aristotelian writings known today.

Growth of literacy
      Nevertheless, the classical revival of the Italian Renaissance was so different from these earlier movements in spirit and substance that the humanists might justifiably claim that it was original and unique. During most of the Middle Ages, classical studies and virtually all intellectual activities were carried on by churchmen, usually members of the monastic orders. In the Italian cities, this monopoly was partially breached by the growth of a literate laity with some taste and need for literary culture. New professions reflected the growth of both literary and specialized lay education—the dictatores, or teachers of practical rhetoric, lawyers, and the ever-present notary (a combination of solicitor and public recorder). These, and not Burckhardt's wandering scholar-clerics, were the true predecessors of the humanists.

      In Padua a kind of early humanism emerged, flourished, and declined between the late 13th and early 14th centuries. Paduan classicism was a product of the vigorous republican life of the commune, and its decline coincided with the loss of the city's liberty. A group of Paduan jurists, lawyers, and notaries—all trained as dictatores—developed a taste for classical literature that probably stemmed from their professional interest in Roman law and their affinity for the history of the Roman Republic. The most famous of these Paduan classicists was Albertino Mussato (Mussato, Albertino), a poet, historian, and playwright, as well as lawyer and politician, whose play Ecerinis, modeled on Seneca, has been called the first Renaissance tragedy. By reviving several types of ancient literary forms and by promoting the use of classical models for poetry and rhetoric, the Paduan humanists helped make the 14th-century Italians more conscious of their classical heritage; in other respects, however, they remained close to their medieval antecedents, showing little comprehension of the vast cultural and historical gulf that separated them from the ancients.

Language and eloquence
      It was Francesco Petrarca, or Petrarch, who first understood fully that antiquity was a civilization apart and, understanding it, outlined a program of classically oriented studies that would lay bare its spirit. The focus of Petrarch's insight was language: if classical antiquity was to be understood in its own terms, it would be through the speech with which the ancients had communicated their thoughts. This meant that the languages of antiquity had to be studied as the ancients had used them and not as vehicles for carrying modern thoughts. Thus, grammar, which included the reading and careful imitation of ancient authors from a linguistic point of view, was the basis of Petrarch's entire program.

      From the mastery of language, one moved on to the attainment of eloquence. For Petrarch, as for Cicero, eloquence was not merely the possession of an elegant style, nor yet the power of persuasion, but the union of elegance and power together with virtue. One who studied language and rhetoric in the tradition of the great orators of antiquity did so for a moral purpose—to persuade men and women to the good life—for, said Petrarch in a dictum that could stand as the slogan of Renaissance humanism, “it is better to will the good than to know the truth.”

      To will the good, one must first know it, and so there could be no true eloquence without wisdom. According to Leonardo Bruni (Bruni, Leonardo), a leading humanist of the next generation, Petrarch “opened the way for us to show in what manner we might acquire learning.” Petrarch's union of rhetoric and philosophy, modeled on the classical ideal of eloquence, provided the humanists with an intellectual dignity and a moral ethos lacking to the medieval dictatores and classicists. It also pointed the way toward a program of studies—the studia humanitatis—by which the ideal might be achieved. As elaborated by Bruni, Pier Paolo Vergerio, and others, the notion of the humanities was based on classical models—the tradition of a liberal arts curriculum conceived by the Greeks and elaborated by Cicero and Quintilian. Medieval scholars had been fascinated by the notion that there were seven liberal arts, no more and no less, although they did not always agree as to which they were. The humanists had their own favourites, which invariably included grammar, rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy, and history, with a nod or two toward music and mathematics. They also had their own ideas about methods of teaching and study (education). They insisted upon the mastery of Classical Latin (Latin language) and, where possible, Greek, which began to be studied again in the West in 1397, when the Greek scholar Manuel Chrysoloras (Chrysoloras, Manuel) was invited to lecture in Florence. They also insisted upon the study of classical authors at first hand, banishing the medieval textbooks and compendiums from their schools. This greatly increased the demand for classical texts, which was first met by copying manuscript books in the newly developed humanistic scripts and then, after the mid-15th century, by the method of printing with movable type, first developed in Germany and rapidly adopted in Italy and elsewhere. Thus, while it is true that most of the ancient authors were already known in the Middle Ages, there was an all-important difference between circulating a book in many copies to a reading public and jealously guarding a single exemplar as a prized possession in some remote monastery library.

      The term humanist (Italian umanista, Latin humanista) first occurs in 15th-century documents to refer to a teacher of the humanities. Humanists taught in a variety of ways. Some founded their own schools—as Vittorino da Feltre did in Mantua in 1423 and Guarino Veronese in Ferrara in 1429—where students could study the new curriculum at both elementary and advanced levels. Some humanists taught in universities (university), which, while remaining strongholds of specialization in law, medicine, and theology, had begun to make a place for the new disciplines by the late 14th century. Still others were employed in private households, as was the poet and scholar Politian (Angelo Poliziano), who was tutor to the Medici children as well as a university professor.

      Formal education was only one of several ways in which the humanists shaped the minds of their age. Many were themselves fine literary (Italian literature) artists who exemplified the eloquence they were trying to foster in their students. Renaissance Latin poetry, for example, nowadays dismissed—usually unread—as imitative and formalistic, contains much graceful and lyrical expression by such humanists as Politian, Giovanni Pontano, and Jacopo Sannazzaro. In drama, Politian, Pontano, and Pietro Bembo were important innovators, and the humanists were in their element in the composition of elegant letters, dialogues, and discourses. By the late 15th century, humanists were beginning to apply their ideas about language and literature to composition in Italian as well as in Latin, demonstrating that the “vulgar” tongue could be as supple and as elegant in poetry and prose as was Classical Latin.

      Not every humanist was a poet, but most were classical scholars. Classical scholarship consisted of a set of related, specialized techniques by which the cultural heritage of antiquity was made available for convenient use. Essentially, in addition to searching out and authenticating ancient authors and works, this meant editing—comparing variant manuscripts of a work, correcting faulty or doubtful passages, and commenting in notes or in separate treatises on the style, meaning, and context of an author's thought. Obviously, this demanded not only superb mastery of the languages involved and a command of classical literature but also a knowledge of the culture that formed the ancient author's mind and influenced his writing. Consequently, the humanists created a vast scholarly literature devoted to these matters and instructive in the critical techniques of classical philology, the study of ancient texts.

Arts and letters
      Classicism and the literary impulse went hand in hand. From Lovato Lovati and Albertino Mussato to Politian and Pontano, humanists wrote Latin poetry and drama with considerable grace and power (Politian wrote in Greek as well), while others composed epistles, essays, dialogues, treatises, and histories on classical models. In fact, it is fair to say that the development of elegant prose was the major literary achievement of humanism and that the epistle was its typical form. Petrarch's practice of collecting, reordering, and even rewriting his letters—of treating them as works of art—was widely imitated.

      For lengthier discussions, the humanist was likely to compose a formal treatise or a dialogue—a classical form that provided the opportunity to combine literary imagination with the discussion of weighty matters. The most famous example of this type is The Courtier, published by Baldassare Castiglione (Castiglione, Baldassare) in 1528; a graceful discussion of love, courtly manners, and the ideal education for a perfect gentleman, it had enormous influence throughout Europe. Castiglione had a humanist education, but he wrote The Courtier in Italian, the language Bembo chose for his dialogue on love, Gli Asolani (1505), and Ludovico Ariosto chose for his delightful epic, Orlando furioso, completed in 1516. The vernacular was coming of age as a literary medium.

      According to some, a life-and-death struggle between Latin and Italian began in the 14th century, while the mortal enemies of Italian were the humanists, who impeded the natural growth of the vernacular after its brilliant beginning with Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. In this view, the choice of Italian by such great 16th-century writers as Castiglione, Ariosto, and Machiavelli represents the final “triumph” of the vernacular and the restoration of contact between Renaissance culture and its native roots. The reality is somewhat less dramatic and more complicated. Most Italian writers regarded Latin as being as much a part of their culture as the vernacular, and most of them wrote in both languages. It should also be remembered that Italy (Italian language) was a land of powerful regional dialect traditions; until the late 13th century, Latin was the only language common to all Italians. By the end of that century, however, Tuscan was emerging as the primary vernacular, and Dante's choice of it for his The Divine Comedy ensured its preeminence. Of lyric poets writing in Tuscan (hereafter called Italian), the greatest was Petrarch. His canzoni, or songs, and sonnets in praise of Laura are revealing studies of the effect of love upon the lover; his Italia mia is a plea for peace that evokes the beauties of his native land; his religious songs reveal his deep spiritual feeling.

      Petrarch's friend and admirer Giovanni Boccaccio (Boccaccio, Giovanni) is best known for his Decameron; but he pioneered in adapting classical (classical literature) forms to Italian usage, including the hunting poem, romance, idyll, and pastoral, whereas some of his themes, most notably the story of Troilus and Cressida, were borrowed by other poets, including Geoffrey Chaucer and Torquato Tasso.

      The scarcity of first-rate Italian poetry throughout most of the 15th century has caused a number of historians to regret the passing of il buon secolo, the great age of the language, which supposedly came to an end with the ascendancy of humanist classicism. For every humanist who disdained the vernacular, however, there was a Leonardo Bruni to maintain its excellence or a Poggio Bracciolini to prove it in his own Italian writings. Indeed, there was an absence of first-rate Latin poets until the late 15th century, which suggests a general lack of poetic creativity in this period and not of Italian poetry alone. It may be that both Italian and Latin poets needed time to absorb and assimilate the various new tendencies of the preceding period. Tuscan was as much a new language for many as was Classical Latin, and there was a variety of literary forms to be mastered.

      With Lorenzo de' Medici (Medici, Lorenzo de') the period of tutelage came to an end. The Magnificent Lorenzo, virtual ruler of Florence in the late 15th century, was one of the fine poets of his time. His sonnets show Petrarch's influence, but transformed with his own genius. His poetry epitomizes the Renaissance ideal of l'uomo universale, the many-sided man. Love of nature, love of women, love of life are the principal themes. The woodland settings and hunting scenes of Lorenzo's poems suggest how he found relief from a busy public life; his love songs to his mistresses and his bawdy carnival ballads show the other face of a devoted father and affectionate husband. The celebration of youth in his most famous poem was etched with the sad realization of the brevity of life. His own ended at the age of 43.

Oh, how fair is youth, and yet how fleeting! Let yourself be joyous if you feel it: Of tomorrow there is no certainty—

      Florence was only one centre of the flowering of the vernacular. Ferrara saw literature and art flourish under the patronage of the ruling Este (Este, House of) family and before the end of the 15th century counted at least one major poet, Matteo Boiardo (Boiardo, Matteo Maria, Conte Di Scandiano), author of the Orlando innamorato, an epic of Roland. A blending of the Arthurian and Carolingian epic traditions, Boiardo's Orlando inspired Ludovico Ariosto (Ariosto, Ludovico) to take up the same themes. The result was the finest of all Italian epics, Orlando furioso. The ability of the medieval epic and folk traditions to inspire the poets of such sophisticated centres as Florence and Ferrara suggests that, humanist disdain for the Dark Ages notwithstanding, Renaissance Italians did not allow classicism to cut them off from their medieval roots.

Renaissance thought
      While the humanists were not primarily philosophers and belonged to no single school of formal thought, they had a great deal of influence upon philosophy. They searched out and copied the works of ancient authors, developed critical tools for establishing accurate texts from variant manuscripts, made translations from Latin and Greek, and wrote commentaries that reflected their broad learning and their new standards and points of view. Aristotle's (Aristotle) authority remained preeminent, especially in logic and physics, but humanists were instrumental in the revival of other Greek scientists and other ancient philosophies, including stoicism, skepticism, and various forms of Platonism, as, for example, the eclectic Neoplatonist and Gnostic doctrines of the Alexandrian schools known as Hermetic philosophy. All of these were to have far-reaching effects on the subsequent development of European thought. While humanists had a variety of intellectual and scholarly aims, it is fair to say that, like the ancient Romans, they preferred moral philosophy (ethics) to metaphysics. Their faith in the moral benefits of poetry and rhetoric inspired generations of scholars and educators. Their emphasis upon eloquence, worldly achievement, and fame brought them readers and patrons among merchants and princes and employment in government chancelleries and embassies.

      Humanists were secularists (secularism) in the sense that language, literature, politics, and history, rather than “sacred subjects,” were their central interests. They defended themselves against charges from conservatives that their preference for classical authors was ruining Christian (Christianity) morals and faith, arguing that a solid grounding in the classics was the best preparation for the Christian life. This was already a perennial debate, almost as old as Christianity itself, with neither side able to prove its case. There seems to have been little atheism or dechristianization among the humanists or their pupils, although there were efforts to redefine the relationship between religious and secular culture. Petrarch struggled with the problem in his book Secretum meum (1342–43, revised 1353–58), in which he imagines himself chastized by St. Augustine for his pursuit of worldly fame. Even the most celebrated of Renaissance themes, the “dignity of man,” best known in the Oration (1486) of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, was derived in part from the Church Fathers. Created in the image and likeness of God, people were free to shape their destiny, but human destiny was defined within a Christian, Neoplatonic context of contemplative thought.

You will have the power to sink to the lower forms of life, which are brutish. You will have the power, through your own judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.

      Perhaps because Italian politics were so intense and innovative, the tension between traditional Christian teachings and actual behaviour was more frankly acknowledged in political thought than in most other fields. The leading spokesman of the new approach to politics was Niccolò Machiavelli (Machiavelli, Niccolò). Best known as the author of The Prince (1513), a short treatise on how to acquire power, create a state, and keep it, Machiavelli dared to argue that success in politics had its own rules. This so shocked his readers that they coined his name into synonyms for the Devil (“Old Nick”) and for crafty, unscrupulous tactics (Machiavellian). No other name, except perhaps that of the Borgias, so readily evokes the image of the wicked Renaissance, and, indeed, Cesare Borgia was one of Machiavelli's chief models for The Prince.

      Machiavelli began with the not unchristian axiom that people are immoderate in their ambitions and desires and likely to oppress each other whenever free to do so. To get them to limit their selfishness and act for the common good should be the lofty, almost holy, purpose of governments (government). How to establish and maintain governments that do this was the central problem of politics, made acute for Machiavelli by the twin disasters of his time, the decline of free government in the city-states and the overrunning of Italy by French, German, and Spanish armies. In The Prince he advocated his emergency solution: Italy needed a new leader, who would unify the people, drive out “the barbarians,” and reestablish civic virtue. But in the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy (1517), a more detached and extended discussion, he analyzed the foundations and practice of republican government, still trying to explain how stubborn and defective human material was transformed into political community.

      Machiavelli was influenced by humanist culture in many ways, including his reverence for classical antiquity, his concern with politics, and his effort to evaluate the impact of fortune as against free choice in human life. The “new path” in politics that he announced in The Prince was an effort to provide a guide for political action based on the lessons of history and his own experience as a foreign secretary in Florence. In his passionate republicanism he showed himself to be the heir of the great humanists of a century earlier who had expounded the ideals of free citizenship and explored the uses of classicism for the public life.

      At the beginning of the 15th century, when the Visconti rulers of Milan were threatening to overrun Florence, the humanist chancellor Coluccio Salutati (Salutati, Coluccio) had rallied the Florentines by reminding them that their city was “the daughter of Rome” and the legatee of Roman justice and liberty. Salutati's pupil, Leonardo Bruni (Bruni, Leonardo), who also served as chancellor, took up this line in his panegyrics of Florence and in his Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII (“Twelve Books of Histories of the Florentine People”). Even before the rise of Rome, according to Bruni, the Etruscans had founded free cities in Tuscany, so the roots of Florentine liberty went very deep. There equality was recognized in justice and opportunity for all citizens, and the claims of individual excellence were rewarded in public offices and public honours. This close relation between freedom and achievement, argued Bruni, explained Florence's superiority in culture as well as in politics. Florence was the home of Italy's greatest poets, the pioneer in both vernacular and Latin literature, and the seat of the Greek revival and of eloquence. In short, Florence was the centre of the studia humanitatis.

      As political rhetoric, Bruni's version of Florentine superiority was magnificent and no doubt effective. It inspired the Florentines to hold out against Milanese aggression and to reshape their identity as the seat of “the rebirth of letters” and the champions of freedom; but, as a theory of political culture, this “civic humanism,” as Hans Baron has called it, represented the ideal rather than the reality of 15th-century communal history. Even in Florence, where after 1434 the Medici family held a grip on the city's republican government, opportunities for the active life began to fade. The emphasis in thought began to shift from civic humanism to Neoplatonist idealism and to the kind of utopian mysticism represented by Pico's Oration on the Dignity of Man. At the end of the century, Florentines briefly put themselves into the hands of the millennialist Dominican preacher Fra Girolamo Savonarola (Savonarola, Girolamo), who envisioned the city as the “New Jerusalem” rather than as a reincarnation of ancient Rome. Still, even Savonarola borrowed from the civic tradition of the humanists for his political reforms (and for his idea of Florentine superiority) and in so doing created a bridge between the republican past and the crisis years of the early 16th century. Machiavelli got his first job in the Florentine chancellery in 1498, the year of Savonarola's fall from power. Dismissing the friar as one of history's “unarmed prophets” who are bound to fail, Machiavelli was convinced that the precepts of Christianity had helped make the Italian states sluggish and weak. He regarded religion as an indispensable component of human life, but statecraft as a discipline based on its own rules and no more to be subordinated to Christianity than were jurisprudence or medicine. The simplest example of the difference between Christian and political morality is provided by warfare, where the use of deception, so detestable in every other kind of action, is necessary, praiseworthy, even glorious. In the Discourses, Machiavelli commented upon a Roman defeat:

This is worth noting by every citizen who is called upon to give counsel to his country, for when the very safety of the country is at stake there should be no question of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of honour or disgrace, but putting every other consideration aside, that course should be followed which will save her life and liberty.

      Machiavelli's own country was Florence; when he wrote that he loved his country more than he loved his soul, he was consciously forsaking Christian ethics for the morality of civic virtue. His friend and countryman Francesco Guicciardini (Guicciardini, Francesco) shared his political morality and his concern for politics but lacked his faith that a knowledge of ancient political wisdom would redeem the liberty of Italy. Guicciardini was an upper-class Florentine who chose a career in public administration and devoted his leisure to writing history and reflecting on politics. He was steeped in the humanist traditions of Florence and was a dedicated republican, notwithstanding the fact—or perhaps because of it—that he spent his entire career in the service of the Medici and rose to high positions under them. But Guicciardini, more skeptical and aristocratic than Machiavelli, was also half a generation younger, and he was schooled in an age that was already witnessing the decline of Italian autonomy.

      In 1527 Florence revolted against the Medici a second time and established a republic. As a confidant of the Medici, Guicciardini was passed over for public office and retired to his estate. One of the fruits of this enforced leisure was the so-called Cose fiorentine (Florentine Affairs), an unfinished manuscript on Florentine history. While it generally follows the classic form of humanist civic history, the fragment contains some significant departures from this tradition. No longer is the history of the city treated in isolation; Guicciardini was becoming aware that the political fortunes of Florence were interwoven with those of Italy as a whole and that the French invasion of Italy in 1494 was a turning point in Italian history. He returned to public life with the restoration of the Medici in 1530 and was involved in the events leading to the tightening of the imperial grip upon Italy, the humbling of the Papacy, and the final transformation of the republic of Florence into a hereditary Medici dukedom. Frustrated in his efforts to influence the rulers of Florence, he again retired to his villa to write; but, instead of taking up the unfinished manuscript on Florentine history, he chose a subject commensurate with his changed perspective on Italian affairs. The result was his History of Italy. Though still in the humanist form and style, it was in substance a fulfillment of the new tendencies already evident in the earlier work—criticism of sources, great attention to detail, avoidance of moral generalizations, shrewd analysis of character and motive.

      The History of Italy has rightly been called a tragedy by the American historian Felix Gilbert, for it demonstrates how, out of stupidity and weakness, people make mistakes that gradually narrow the range of their freedom to choose alternative courses and thus to influence events until, finally, they are trapped in the web of fortune. This view of history was already far from the world of Machiavelli, not to mention that of the civic humanists. Where Machiavelli believed that virtù—bold and intelligent initiative—could shape, if not totally control, fortuna—the play of external forces—Guicciardini was skeptical about men's ability to learn from the past and pessimistic about the individual's power to shape the course of events. All that was left, he believed, was to understand. Guicciardini wrote his histories of Florence and of Italy to show what people were like and to explain how they had reached their present circumstances. Human dignity, then, consisted not in the exercise of will to shape destiny but in the use of reason to contemplate and perhaps to tolerate fate. In taking a new, hard look at the human condition, Guicciardini represents the decline of humanist optimism.

The northern Renaissance
Political, economic, and social background
      In 1494 King Charles VIII of France led an army southward over the Alps, seeking the Neapolitan (Naples, Kingdom of) crown and glory. Many believed that this barely literate gnome of a man, hunched over his horse, was the Second Charlemagne, whose coming had been long predicted by French and Italian prophets. Apparently, Charles himself believed this; it is recorded that, when he was chastised by Savonarola (Savonarola, Girolamo) for delaying his divine mission of reform and crusade in Florence, the king burst into tears and soon went on his way. He found the Kingdom of Naples easy to take and impossible to hold; frightened by local uprisings, by a new Italian coalition, and by the massing of Spanish troops in Sicily, he left Naples in the spring of 1495, bound not for the Holy Land, as the prophecies had predicted, but for home, never to return to Italy. In 1498 Savonarola was tortured, hanged, and burned as a false prophet for predicting that Charles would complete his mission. Conceived amid dreams of chivalric glory and crusade, the Italian expedition of Charles VIII was the venture of a medieval king—romantic, poorly planned, and totally irrelevant to the real needs of his subjects.

      The French invasion of Italy marked the beginning of a new phase of European politics, during which the Valois (Valois Dynasty) kings of France and the Habsburgs (Habsburg, House of) of Germany fought each other, with the Italian states as their reluctant pawns. For the next 60 years the dream of Italian conquest was pursued by every French king, none of them having learned anything from Charles VIII's misadventure except that the road southward was open and paved with easy victories. For even longer Italy would be the keystone of the arch that the Habsburgs tried to erect across Europe from the Danube to the Strait of Gibraltar in order to link the Spanish and German inheritance of the emperor Charles V. In destroying the autonomy of Italian politics, the invasions also ended the Italian state system, which was absorbed into the larger European system that now took shape. Its members adopted the balance-of-power (power, balance of) diplomacy first evolved by the Italians as well as the Italian practice of using resident ambassadors who combined diplomacy with the gathering of intelligence by fair means or foul. In the art of war, also, the Italians were innovators in the use of mercenary troops, cannonry, bastioned fortresses, and field fortification. French artillery (military technology) was already the best in Europe by 1494, whereas the Spaniards developed the tercio, an infantry unit that combined the most effective field fortifications and weaponry of the Italians and Swiss.

      Thus, old and new ways were fused in the bloody crucible of the Italian Wars. Rulers who lived by medieval codes of chivalry adopted Renaissance techniques of diplomacy and warfare to satisfy their lust for glory and dynastic power. Even the lure of Italy was an old obsession; but the size and vigour of the 16th-century expeditions were new. Rulers were now able to command vast quantities of men and resources because they were becoming masters of their own domains. The nature and degree of this mastery varied according to local circumstances; but throughout Europe the New Monarchs, as they are called, were reasserting kingship as the dominant form of political leadership after a long period of floundering and uncertainty.

      By the end of the 15th century, the Valois kings of France had expelled the English from all their soil except the port of Calais, concluding the Hundred Years' War (1453), had incorporated the fertile lands of the duchy of Burgundy to the east and of Brittany to the north, and had extended the French kingdom from the Atlantic and the English Channel to the Pyrenees and the Rhine. To rule this vast territory, they created a professional machinery of state, converting wartime taxing privileges into permanent prerogative, freeing their royal council from supervision by the Estates-General, appointing a host of officials who crisscrossed the kingdom in the service of the crown, and establishing their right to appoint and tax the French clergy. They did not achieve anything like complete centralization; but in 1576 Jean Bodin (Bodin, Jean) was able to write, in his Six Books of the Commonweal, that the king of France had absolute sovereignty because he alone in the kingdom had the power to give law unto all of his subjects in general and to every one of them in particular.

      Bodin might also have made his case by citing the example of another impressive autocrat of his time, Philip II of Spain. Though descended from warrior kings, Philip spent his days at his writing desk poring over dispatches from his governors in the Low Countries, Sicily, Naples, Milan, Peru, Mexico, and the Philippines and drafting his orders to them in letters signed “I the King.” The founding of this mighty empire went back more than a century to 1469, when Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella (Isabella I) of Castile brought two great Hispanic kingdoms together under a single dynasty. Castile, an arid land of sheepherders, great landowning churchmen, and crusading knights, and Aragon, with its Catalan miners and its strong ties to Mediterranean Europe, made uneasy partners; but a series of rapid and energetic actions forced the process of national consolidation and catapulted the new nation into a position of world prominence for which it was poorly prepared. Within the last decade of the 15th century, the Spaniards took the kingdom of Navarre in the north; stormed the last Muslim stronghold in Spain, the kingdom of Granada; and launched a campaign of religious unification by pressing tens of thousands of Muslims and Jews to choose between baptism and expulsion, at the same time establishing a new Inquisition under royal control. They also sent Columbus on voyages of discovery to the Western Hemisphere, thereby opening a new frontier just as the domestic frontier of reconquest was closing. Finally, the crown linked its destinies with the Habsburgs by a double marriage, thus projecting Spain into the heart of European politics. In the following decades, Castilian hidalgos (hidalgo) (lower nobles), whose fathers had crusaded against the Moors in Spain, streamed across the Atlantic to make their fortunes out of the land and sweat of the American Indians, while others marched in the armies and sailed in the ships of their king, Charles I, who, as Charles V, was elected Holy Roman emperor in 1519 at the age of 19. In this youth, the vast dual inheritance of the Spanish and Habsburg empires came together. The grandson of Ferdinand and Isabella on his mother's side and of the emperor Maximilian I on his father's, Charles was duke of Burgundy, head of five Austrian dukedoms (which he ceded to his brother), king of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, and claimant to the duchy of Milan as well as king of Aragon and Castile and German king and emperor. To administer this enormous legacy, he presided over an ever-increasing bureaucracy of viceroys, governors, judges, military captains, and an army of clerks. The New World lands were governed by a separate Council of the Indies (Indies, Council of the) after 1524, which, like Charles' other royal councils, combined judicial, legislative, military, and fiscal functions.

      The yield in American (Americas) treasure was enormous, especially after the opening of the silver mines of Mexico and what is now Bolivia halfway through the 16th century. The crown skimmed off a lion's share—usually a fifth—which it paid out immediately to its creditors because everything Charles could raise by taxing or borrowing was sucked up by his wars against the French in Italy and Burgundy, the Protestant princes in Germany, the Turks on the Austrian border, and the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean. By 1555 both Charles and his credit were exhausted, and he began to relinquish his titles—Spain and the Netherlands to his son Philip, Germany and the imperial title to his brother Ferdinand I. American silver did little for Spain except to pay the wages of soldiers and sailors; the goods and services that kept the Spanish armies in the field and the ships afloat were largely supplied by foreigners, who reaped the profits. Yet, for the rest of the century, Spain continued to dazzle the world, and few could see the chinks in the armour; this was an age of kings, in which bold deeds, not balance sheets, made history.

      The growth of centralized monarchy claiming absolute sovereignty over its subjects may be observed in other places, from the England of Henry VIII on the extreme west of Europe to the Muscovite tsardom of Ivan III the Great on its eastern edge, for the New Monarchy was one aspect of a more general phenomenon—a great recovery that surged through Europe in the 15th century. No single cause can be adduced to explain it. Some historians believe it was simply the upturn in the natural cycle of growth: the great medieval population boom had overextended Europe's productive capacities; the depression of the 14th and early 15th centuries had corrected this condition through famines and epidemics, leading to depopulation; now the cycle of growth was beginning again.

      Once more, growing numbers of people, burgeoning cities, and ambitious governments were demanding food, goods, and services—a demand that was met by both old and new methods of production. In agriculture (agriculture, origins of), the shift toward commercial crops such as wool and grains, the investment of capital, and the emancipation of servile labour completed the transformation of the manorial system already in decline. (In eastern Europe, however, the formerly free peasantry (peasant) was now forced into serfdom by an alliance between the monarchy and the landed gentry, as huge agrarian estates were formed to raise grain for an expanding Western market.) Manufacturing boomed, especially of those goods used in the outfitting of armies and fleets—cloth, armour, weapons, and ships. New mining and metalworking technology made possible the profitable exploitation of the rich iron, copper, gold, and silver deposits of central Germany, Hungary, and Austria, affording the opportunity for large-scale investment of capital.

      One index of Europe's recovery is the spectacular growth of certain cities (city). Antwerp, for example, more than doubled its population in the second half of the 15th century and doubled it again by 1560. Under Habsburg patronage, Antwerp became the chief European entrepôt for English cloth, the hub of an international banking network, and the principal Western market for German copper and silver, Portuguese spices, and Italian alum. By 1500 the Antwerp Bourse was the central money market for much of Europe. Other cities profited from their special circumstances, too: Lisbon as the home port for the Portuguese maritime empire; Sevilla (Seville), the Spaniards' gateway to the New World; London, the capital of the Tudors and gathering point for England's cloth-making and banking activity; Lyon, favoured by the French kings as a market centre and capital of the silk industry; and Augsburg, the principal north-south trade route in Germany and the home city of the Fugger merchant-bankers. (For further discussion, see below The emergence of modern Europe: Economy and society (Europe, history of).)

      Cities were also markets for culture. The resumption of urban growth in the second half of the 15th century coincided with the diffusion of Renaissance ideas and educational values. Humanism offered linguistic and rhetorical skills that were becoming indispensable for nobles and commoners seeking careers in diplomacy and government administration, while the Renaissance ideal of the perfect gentleman was a cultural style that had great appeal in this age of growing courtly refinement. At first many who wanted a humanist education went to Italy, and many foreign names appear on the rosters of the Italian universities. By the end of the century, however, such northern cities as London, Paris, Antwerp, and Augsburg were becoming centres of humanist activity rivaling Italy's. The development of printing, by making books cheaper and more plentiful, also quickened the diffusion of humanism.

      A textbook convention, heavily armoured against truth by constant reiteration, states that northern humanism—i.e., humanism outside Italy—was essentially Christian in spirit and purpose, in contrast to the essentially secular nature of Italian humanism. In fact, however, the program of Christian humanism had been laid out by Italian humanists of the stamp of Lorenzo Valla (Valla, Lorenzo), one of the founders of classical philology, who showed how the critical methods used to study the classics ought to be applied to problems of biblical exegesis and translation as well as church history. That this program only began to be carried out in the 16th century, particularly in the countries of northern Europe (and Spain), is a matter of chronology rather than of geography. In the 15th century, the necessary skills, particularly the knowledge of Greek, were possessed by a few scholars; a century later, Greek was a regular part of the humanist curriculum, and Hebrew (Hebrew language) was becoming much better known, particularly after Johannes Reuchlin (Reuchlin, Johannes) published his Hebrew grammar in 1506. Here, too, printing was a crucial factor, for it made available a host of lexicographical and grammatical handbooks and allowed the establishment of normative biblical texts and the comparison of different versions of the Bible.

      Christian humanism was more than a program of scholarship, however; it was fundamentally a conception of the Christian life that was grounded in the rhetorical, historical, and ethical orientation of humanism itself. That it came to the fore in the early 16th century was the result of a variety of factors, including the spiritual stresses of rapid social change and the inability of the ecclesiastical establishment to cope with the religious needs of an increasingly literate and self-confident laity. By restoring the gospel to the centre of Christian piety, the humanists believed they were better serving the needs of ordinary people. They attacked scholastic (Scholasticism) theology as an arid intellectualization of simple faith, and they deplored the tendency of religion to become a ritual practiced vicariously through a priest. They also despised the whole late-medieval apparatus of relic mongering, hagiology, indulgences, and image worship, and they ridiculed it in their writings, sometimes with devastating effect. According to the Christian humanists, the fundamental law of Christianity was the law of love as revealed by Jesus Christ in the Gospel. Love, peace, and simplicity should be the aims of the good Christian, and the life of Christ his perfect model. The chief spokesman for this point of view was Desiderius Erasmus (Erasmus, Desiderius), the most influential humanist of his day. Erasmus and his colleagues were uninterested in dogmatic differences and were early champions of religious toleration. In this they were not in tune with the changing times, for the outbreak of the Reformation polarized European society along confessional lines, with the paradoxical result that the Christian humanists, who had done so much to lay the groundwork for religious reform, ended by being suspect on both sides—by the Roman Catholics as subversives who (as it was said of Erasmus) had “laid the egg that Luther hatched” and by the Protestants as hypocrites who had abandoned the cause of reformation out of cowardice or ambition. Toleration belonged to the future, after the killing in the name of Christ sickened and passions had cooled.

      The quickening of the religious impulse that gave rise to Christian humanism was also manifested in a variety of forms of religious devotion among the laity, including mysticism. In the 14th century a wave of mystical ardour seemed to course down the valley of the Rhine, enveloping men and women in the rapture of intense, direct experience of the divine Spirit. It centred in the houses of the Dominican order, where friars and nuns practiced the mystical way of their great teacher, Meister Eckhart (Eckhart, Meister). This wave of Rhenish mysticism radiated beyond convent walls to the marketplaces and hearths of the laity. Eckhart had the gift of making his abstruse doctrines understandable to a wider public than was usual for mystics; moreover, he was fortunate in having some disciples of a genius almost equal to his own—the great preacher of practical piety, Johann Tauler (Tauler, Johann), and Heinrich Suso (Suso, Heinrich), whose devotional books, such as The Little Book of Truth and The Little Book of Eternal Wisdom, reached eager lay readers hungry for spiritual consolation and religious excitement. Some found it by joining the Dominicans; others, remaining in the everyday world, joined with like-spirited brothers and sisters in groups known collectively as the Friends of God, where they practiced methodical contemplation, or, as it was widely known, mental prayer. Probably few reached, or even hoped to reach, the ecstasy of mystical union, which was limited to those with the appropriate psychological or spiritual gifts. Out of these circles came the anonymous German Theology, from which, Luther (Luther, Martin) was to say, he had learned more about man and God than from any book except the Bible and the writings of St. Augustine.

      In the Netherlands (Netherlands, The) the mystical impulse awakened chiefly under the stimulus of another great teacher, Gerhard Groote (Groote, Geert). Not a monk nor even a priest, Groote gave the mystical movement a different direction by teaching that true spiritual communion must be combined with moral action, for this was the whole lesson of the Gospel. At his death a group of followers formed the Brethren of the Common Life (Common Life, Brethren of the). These were laymen and laywomen, married and single, earning their livings in the world but united by a simple rule that required them to pool their earnings and devote themselves to spiritual works, teaching, and charity. Houses of Brothers and Sisters of the Common Life spread through the cities and towns of the Netherlands and Germany, and a monastic counterpart was founded in the order of Canons Regular of St. Augustine, known as the Windesheim Congregation, which in the second half of the 15th century numbered some 82 priories. The Brethren were particularly successful as schoolmasters, combining some of the new linguistic methods of the humanists with a strong emphasis upon Bible study. Among the generations of children who absorbed the new piety (devotio moderna) in their schools were Erasmus and, briefly, Luther. In the ambience of the devotio moderna appeared one of the most influential books of piety ever written, The Imitation of Christ (Imitation of Christ), attributed to Thomas à Kempis, a monk of the Windesheim Congregation.

      One man whose life was changed by The Imitation was the 16th-century Spaniard Ignatius of Loyola (Loyola, Saint Ignatius of). After reading it, Loyola founded the Society of Jesus and wrote his own book of methodical prayer, Spiritual Exercises. Thus, Spanish piety was in some ways connected with that of the Netherlands; but the extraordinary outburst of mystical and contemplative activity in 16th-century Spain was mainly an expression of the intense religious exaltation of the Spanish people themselves as they confronted the tasks of reform, Counter-Reformation, and world leadership. Spanish mysticism belies the usual picture of the mystic as a withdrawn contemplative, with his or her head in the clouds. Not only Loyola but also St. Teresa of Avila (Teresa of Ávila, Saint) and her disciple, St. John of the Cross (John of the Cross, Saint), were tough, activist Reformers who regarded their mystical experiences as means of fortifying themselves for their practical tasks. They were also prolific writers who could communicate their experiences and analyze them for the benefit of others. This is especially true of St. John of the Cross, whose mystical poetry is one of the glories of Spanish literature.

The growth of vernacular literature
      In literature, medieval forms continued to dominate the artistic imagination throughout the 15th century. Besides the vast devotional literature of the period—the ars moriendi, or books on the art of dying well, the saints' lives, and manuals of methodical prayer and spiritual consolation—the most popular reading of noble and burgher alike was a 13th-century love allegory, the Roman de le rose (Roman de la rose). Despite a promising start in the late Middle Ages, literary creativity suffered from the domination of Latin (Latin language) as the language of “serious” expression, with the result that, if the vernacular attracted writers, they tended to overload it with Latinisms and artificially applied rhetorical forms. This was the case with the so-called grande rhetoriqueurs of Burgundy and France. One exception is 14th-century England (English literature), where a national literature made a brilliant showing in the works of William Langland, John Gower, and, above all, Geoffrey Chaucer. The troubled 15th century, however, produced only feeble imitations. Another exception is the vigorous tradition of chronicle writing in French, distinguished by such eminently readable works as the chronicle of Jean Froissart and the memoirs of Philippe de Commynes. In France, too, about the middle of the 15th century there lived the vagabond François Villon, a great poet about whom next to nothing is known. In Germany The Ship of Fools, by Sebastian Brant, was a lone masterpiece.

      The 16th century saw a true renaissance of national literatures. In Protestant countries, the Reformation had an enormous impact upon the quantity and quality of literary output. If Luther's rebellion destroyed the chances of unifying the nation politically—because religious division exacerbated political division and made Lutherans intolerant of the Catholic Habsburgs—his translation of the Bible into German (German language) created a national language. Biblical translations, vernacular liturgies, hymns, and sacred drama had analogous effects elsewhere. For Roman Catholics, especially in Spain, the Reformation was a time of deep religious emotion expressed in art and literature. On all sides of the religious controversy, chroniclers and historians writing in the vernacular were recording their versions for posterity.

      While the Reformation was providing a subject matter, the Italian Renaissance was providing literary methods and models. The Petrarchan sonnet inspired French, English, and Spanish poets, while the Renaissance neoclassical drama finally began to end the reign of the medieval mystery play. Ultimately, of course, the works of real genius were the result of a crossing of native traditions and new forms. The Frenchman François Rabelais (Rabelais, François) assimilated all the themes of his day—and mocked them all—in his story of the giants Gargantua and Pantagruel. The Spaniard Miguel de Cervantes (Cervantes, Miguel de), in Don Quixote, drew a composite portrait of his countrymen, which caught their exact mixture of idealism and realism. In England, Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare used Renaissance drama to probe the deeper levels of their countrymen's character and experiences.

Renaissance science (science, history of) and technology
      According to medieval scientists, matter was composed of four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—whose combinations and permutations made up the world of visible objects. The cosmos was a series of concentric spheres in motion, the farther ones carrying the stars around in their daily courses. At the centre was the globe of Earth, heavy and static. Motion was either perfectly circular, as in the heavens, or irregular and naturally downward, as on Earth. The Earth had three landmasses—Europe, Asia, and Africa—and was unknown and uninhabitable in its southern zones. Human beings, the object of all creation, were composed of four humours—black and yellow bile, blood, and phlegm—and the body's health was determined by the relative proportions of each. The cosmos was alive with a universal consciousness with which people could interact in various ways, and the heavenly bodies were generally believed to influence human character and events, although theologians worried about free will.

      These views were an amalgam of classical and Christian thought and, from what can be inferred from written sources, shaped the way educated people experienced and interpreted phenomena. What people who did not read or write books understood about nature is more difficult to tell, except that belief in magic, good and evil spirits, witchcraft, and forecasting the future was universal. The church might prefer that Christians seek their well-being through faith, the sacraments, and the intercession of Mary and the saints, but distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable belief in hidden powers were difficult to make or to maintain. Most clergy shared the common beliefs in occult forces and lent their authority to them. The collaboration of formal doctrine and popular belief had some of its most terrible consequences during the Renaissance, such as pogroms against Jews and witch-hunts, in which the church provided the doctrines of Satanic conspiracy and the inquisitorial agents and popular prejudice supplied the victims, predominantly women and marginal people.

      Among the formally educated, if not among the general population, traditional science was transformed by the new heliocentric, mechanistic, and mathematical conceptions of Copernicus, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. Historians of science are increasingly reluctant to describe these changes as a revolution, since this implies too sudden and complete an overthrow of the earlier model. Aristotle's authority gave way very slowly, and only the first of the great scientists mentioned above did his work in the period under consideration. Still, the Renaissance made some important contributions toward the process of paradigm shift, as the 20th-century historian of science Thomas Kuhn called major innovations in science. Humanist scholarship provided both originals and translations of ancient Greek scientific works—which enormously increased the fund of knowledge in physics, astronomy, medicine, botany, and other disciplines—and presented as well alternative theories to those of Ptolemy and Aristotle. Thus, the revival of ancient science brought heliocentric astronomy to the fore again after almost two millennia. Renaissance philosophers, most notably Jacopo Zabarella, analyzed and formulated the rules of the deductive and inductive methods by which scientists worked, while certain ancient philosophies enriched the ways in which scientists conceived of phenomena. Pythagoreanism, for example, conveyed a vision of a harmonious geometric universe that helped form the mind of Copernicus.

      In mathematics the Renaissance made its greatest contribution to the rise of modern science. Humanists included arithmetic and geometry (mathematics) in the liberal arts curriculum; artists furthered the geometrization of space in their work on perspective; Leonardo da Vinci perceived, however faintly, that the world was ruled by “number.” The interest in algebra in the Renaissance universities, according to the 20th-century historian of science George Sarton, “was creating a kind of fever.” It produced some mathematical theorists of the first rank, including Niccolò Tartaglia and Girolamo Cardano. If they had done nothing else, Renaissance scholars would have made a great contribution to mathematics by translating and publishing, in 1544, some previously unknown works of Archimedes, perhaps the most important of the ancients in this field.

      If the Renaissance role in the rise of modern science was more that of midwife than of parent, in the realm of technology (technology, history of) the proper image is the Renaissance magus, manipulator of the hidden forces of nature. Working with medieval perceptions of natural processes, engineers and technicians of the 15th and 16th centuries achieved remarkable results and pushed the traditional cosmology to the limit of its explanatory powers. This may have had more to do with changing social needs than with changes in scientific theory. Warfare (military technology) was one catalyst of practical change that stimulated new theoretical questions. With the spread of the use of artillery, for example, questions about the motion of bodies in space became more insistent, and mathematical calculation more critical. The manufacture of guns also stimulated metallurgy and fortification; town planning and reforms in the standards of measurement were related to problems of geometry. The Renaissance preoccupation with alchemy, the parent of chemistry, was certainly stimulated by the shortage of precious metals, made more acute by the expansion of government and expenditures on war.

      The most important technological advance of all, because it underlay progress in so many other fields, strictly speaking, had little to do with nature. This was the development of printing, with movable metal type, about the mid-15th century in Germany. Johannes Gutenberg (Gutenberg, Johannes) is usually called its inventor, but in fact many people and many steps were involved. Block printing on wood came to the West from China between 1250 and 1350, papermaking came from China by way of the Arabs to 12th-century Spain, whereas the Flemish technique of oil painting was the origin of the new printers' ink. Three men of Mainz—Gutenberg and his contemporaries Johann Fust (Fust, Johann) and Peter Schöffer (Schöffer, Peter)—seem to have taken the final steps, casting metal type and locking it into a wooden press. The invention spread like the wind, reaching Italy by 1467, Hungary and Poland in the 1470s, and Scandinavia by 1483. By 1500 the presses of Europe had produced some six million books. Without the printing press it is impossible to conceive that the Reformation would have ever been more than a monkish quarrel or that the rise of a new science, which was a cooperative effort of an international community, would have occurred at all. In short, the development of printing amounted to a communications revolution of the order of the invention of writing; and, like that prehistoric discovery, it transformed the conditions of life. The communications revolution immeasurably enhanced human opportunities for enlightenment and pleasure on one hand and created previously undreamed-of possibilities for manipulation and control on the other. The consideration of such contradictory effects may guard us against a ready acceptance of triumphalist conceptions of the Renaissance or of historical change in general.

Donald Weinstein

The emergence of modern Europe, 1500–1648

Economy and society
      The 16th century was a period of vigorous economic expansion. This expansion in turn played a major role in the many other transformations—social, political, and cultural—of the early modern age.

      By 1500 the population in most areas of Europe was increasing after two centuries of decline or stagnation. The bonds of commerce (business organization) within Europe tightened, and the “wheels of commerce” (in the phrase of the 20th-century French historian Fernand Braudel) spun ever faster. The great geographic discoveries then in process were integrating Europe into a world economic system. New commodities, many of them imported from recently discovered lands, enriched material life. Not only trade but also the production of goods increased as a result of new ways of organizing production. Merchants, entrepreneurs, and bankers (bank) accumulated and manipulated capital (capitalism) in unprecedented volume. Most historians locate in the 16th century the beginning, or at least the maturing, of Western capitalism. Capital assumed a major role not only in economic organization but also in political life and international relations. Culturally, new values—many of them associated with the Renaissance and Reformation—diffused through Europe and changed the ways in which people acted and the perspectives by which they viewed themselves and the world.

      This world of early capitalism, however, can hardly be regarded as stable or uniformly prosperous. Financial crashes were common; the Spanish crown, the heaviest borrower in Europe, suffered repeated bankruptcies (in 1557, 1575–77, 1596, 1607, 1627, and 1647). The poor and destitute in society became, if not more numerous, at least more visible. Even as capitalism advanced in the West, the once-free peasants of central and eastern Europe slipped into serfdom. The apparent prosperity of the 16th century gave way in the middle and late periods of the 17th century to a “general crisis” in many European regions. Politically, the new centralized states insisted on new levels of cultural conformity on the part of their subjects. Several states expelled Jews, and almost all of them refused to tolerate religious dissenters. Culturally, in spite of the revival of ancient learning and the reform of the churches, a hysterical fear of witches grasped large segments of the population, including the learned. Understandably, historians have had difficulty defining the exact place of this complex century in the course of European development.

The economic background
      The century's economic expansion owed much to powerful changes that were already under way by 1500. At that time, Europe comprised only between one-third and one-half the population it had possessed about 1300. The infamous Black Death of 1347–50 principally accounts for the huge losses, but plagues were recurrent, famines frequent, wars incessant, and social tensions high as the Middle Ages ended. The late medieval disasters radically transformed the structures of European society—the ways by which it produced food and goods, distributed income, organized its society and state, and looked at the world.

      The huge human losses altered the old balances among the classical “factors of production”— labour, land, and capital (capital and interest). The fall in population forced up wages in the towns and depressed rents in the countryside, as the fewer workers remaining could command a higher “scarcity value.” In contrast, the costs of land and capital fell; both grew relatively more abundant and cheaper as human numbers shrank. Expensive labour and cheap land and capital encouraged “factor substitution,” the replacement of the costly factor (labour) by the cheaper ones (land and capital). This substitution of land and capital for labour can be seen, for example, in the widespread conversions of arable land to pastures; a few shepherds, supplied with capital (sheep) and extensive pastures, could generate a higher return than plowland, intensively farmed by many well-paid labourers.

      Capital could also support the technology (technology, history of) required to develop new tools, enabling labourers to work more productively. The late Middle Ages was accordingly a period of significant technological advances linked with high capital investment in labour-saving devices. The development of printing by movable metal type substituted an expensive machine, the press, for many human copyists. Gunpowder and firearms gave smaller armies greater fighting power. Changes in shipbuilding and in the development of navigational aids allowed bigger ships to sail with smaller crews over longer distances. By 1500 Europe achieved what it had never possessed before: a technological edge over all other civilizations. Europe was thus equipped for worldwide expansion.

      Social changes also were pervasive. With a falling population, the cost of basic foodstuffs (notably wheat) declined. With cheaper food, people in both countryside and city could use their higher earnings to diversify and improve their diets—to consume more meat, dairy products, and beverages. They also could afford more manufactured products from the towns, to the benefit of the urban economies. The 14th century is rightly regarded as the golden age of working people.

      Economic historians have traditionally envisioned the falling costs of the basic foodstuffs (cereals) and the continuing firm price of manufactures as two blades of a pair of open scissors. These price scissors diverted income from countryside to town. The late medieval price movements thus favoured urban artisans over peasants and merchants over landlords. Towns achieved a new weight in society; the number of towns counting more than 10,000 inhabitants increased from 125 in about 1300 to 154 in 1500, even as the total population was dropping. These changes undermined the leadership of the landholding nobility and enhanced the power and influence of the great merchants and bankers of the cities. The 16th would be a “bourgeois century.”

      Culturally, the disasters of the late Middle Ages had the effect of altering attitudes and in particular of undermining the medieval faith that speculative reason could master the secrets of the universe. In an age of ferocious and unpredictable epidemics, the accidental and the unexpected, chance or fate, rather than immutable laws, seemed to dominate the course of human affairs. In an uncertain world, the surest, safest philosophical stance was Empiricism. In formal philosophy, this new priority given to the concrete and the observable over and against the abstract and the speculative was known as nominalism. In social life, there was evident a novel emphasis on close observation, on the need to study each changing situation to arrive at a basis for action.

      The 16th century thus owed much to trends originating in the late Middle Ages. It would, however, be wrong to view its history simply as a playing out of earlier movements. New developments proper to the century also shaped its achievements. Those developments affected population; money and prices; agriculture, trade, manufacturing, and banking; social and political institutions; and cultural attitudes. Historians differ widely in the manner in which they structure and relate these various developments; they argue over what should be regarded as causes and what as effects. But they are reasonably agreed concerning the general nature of these trends.

      For the continent as a whole, the population growth under way by 1500 continued over the “long” 16th century until the second or third decade of the 17th century. A recent estimate by the American historian Jan De Vries set Europe's population (excluding Russia and the Ottoman Empire) at 61.6 million in 1500, 70.2 million in 1550, and 78.0 million in 1600; it then lapsed back to 74.6 million in 1650. The distribution of population across the continent was also shifting. Northwestern Europe (especially the Low Countries and the British Isles) witnessed the most vigorous expansion; England's population more than doubled between 1500, when it stood at an estimated 2.6 million, and 1650, when it probably attained 5.6 million. Northwestern Europe also largely escaped the demographic downturn of the mid-17th century, which was especially pronounced in Germany, Italy, and Spain. In Germany, the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) may have cost the country, according to different estimates, between 25 and 40 percent of its population.

      Cities (city) also grew, though slowly at first. The proportion of Europeans living in cities with 10,000 or more residents increased from 5.6 percent of the total population in 1500 to only 6.3 percent in 1550. The towns of England continued to suffer a kind of depression, now often called “urban decay,” in the first half of the century. The process of urbanization then accelerated, placing 7.6 percent of the population in cities by 1600, and even continued during the 17th-century crisis. The proportion of population in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants reached 8.3 percent in 1650.

      More remarkable than the slow growth in the number of urban residents was the formation of cities of a size never achieved in the medieval period. These large cities were of two principal types. Capitals and administrative centres—such as Naples, Rome, Madrid, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow—give testimony to the new powers of the state and its ability to mobilize society's resources in support of courts and bureaucracies. Naples, one of Europe's largest cities in 1550, was also one of its poorest. The demographic historian J.C. Russell theorized that Naples' swollen size was indicative of the community's “loss of control” over its numbers. Already in the 16th century, Naples was a prototype of the big, slum-ridden, semiparasitic cities to be found in many poorer regions of the world in the late 20th century.

      Commercial ports, which might also have been capitals, formed a second set of large cities: examples include Venice, Livorno, Sevilla (Seville), Lisbon, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Bremen, and Hamburg. About 1550, Antwerp was the chief port of the north. In 1510, the Portuguese moved their trading station from Brugge to Antwerp, making it the chief northern market for the spices they were importing from India. The Antwerp bourse, or exchange, simultaneously became the leading money market of the north. At its heyday in mid-century, the city counted 90,000 inhabitants. The revolt of the Low Countries against Spanish rule (from 1568) ruined Antwerp's prosperity. Amsterdam, which replaced it as the greatest northern port, grew from 30,000 in 1550 to 65,000 in 1600 and 175,000 in 1650. The mid-17th century—a period of recession in many European regions—was Holland's golden age. Late in the century, Amsterdam faced the growing challenge of another northern port, which was also the capital of a powerful national state—London. With 400,000 residents by 1650 and growing rapidly, London then ranked below only Paris (440,000) as Europe's largest city. Urban concentrations of such magnitude were unprecedented; in the Middle Ages, the largest size attained was roughly 220,000, reached by a single city, Paris, about 1328.

      Another novelty of the 16th century was the appearance of urban systems, or hierarchies of cities linked together by their political or commercial functions. Most European cities had been founded in medieval or even in ancient times, but they long remained intensely competitive, duplicated each other's functions, and never coalesced during the Middle Ages into tight urban systems. The more intensive, more far-flung commerce of the early modern age required a clearer distribution of functions and cooperation as much as competition. The centralization of governments in the 16th century also demanded clearly defined lines of authority and firm divisions of functions between national and regional capitals.

Trade and the “Atlantic revolution”
      The new importance of northwestern Europe in terms of overall population and concentration of large cities reflects in part the “Atlantic revolution,” the redirection of trade routes brought about by the great geographic discoveries. The Atlantic revolution, however, did not so much replace the old lines of medieval commerce as build upon them. In the Middle Ages, Italian ports— Venice and Genoa in particular—dominated trade with the Middle East and supplied Europe with Eastern wares and spices. In the north, German cities, organized into a loose federation known as the Hanseatic League, similarly dominated Baltic trade. When the Portuguese in 1498 opened direct maritime links with India, Venice faced the competition of the Atlantic ports, first Lisbon and Antwerp. Nonetheless, Venice effectively responded to the new competition and attained in the 16th century its apogee of commercial importance; in most of its surviving monuments, this beautiful city still reflects its 16th-century prosperity. Genoa was not well placed to take advantage of the Atlantic discoveries, but Genoese bankers played a central role in the finances of Spain's overseas empire and in its military ventures in Europe. Italians did not quickly relinquish the prominence as merchants and bankers that had distinguished them in the Middle Ages.

      In the north, the Hanseatic towns faced intensified competition from the Dutch, who from about 1580 introduced a new ship design (the fluitschip, a sturdy, cheaply built cargo vessel) and new techniques of shipbuilding, including wind-powered saws. Freight charges dropped and the size of the Dutch merchant marine soared; by the mid-17th century, it probably exceeded in number of vessels all the other mercantile fleets of Europe combined. The English competed for a share in the Baltic trade, though they long remained well behind the Dutch.

      In absolute terms, Baltic trade was booming. In 1497 the ships passing through the Sound separating Denmark from Sweden numbered 795; 100 years later the number registered by the toll collectors reached 6,673. The percentage represented by Hanseatic ships rose over the same century from roughly 20 to 23–25 percent; the Germans were not yet routed from these eastern waters.

      In terms of maritime trade, the Atlantic revolution may well have stimulated rather than injured the older exchanges. At the same time, new competition from the western ports left both Hanseatics and Italians vulnerable to the economic downturn of the 17th century. For both the Hanseatic and Italian cities, the 17th—and not the 16th—century was the age of decline. At Lübeck in 1628, at the last meeting of the Hanseatic towns, only 11 cities were represented, and later attempts to call a general meeting ended in failure.

Prices and inflation
      In historical accounts, the glamour of the overseas discoveries tends to overshadow the intensification of exchanges within the continent. Intensified exchanges led to the formation of large integrated markets for at least some commodities. Differences in the price of wheat (cereal) in the various European regions leveled out as the century progressed, and prices everywhere tended to fluctuate in the same direction. The similar price movements over large areas mark the emergence of a single integrated market in cereals. Certain regions came to specialize in wheat production and to sell their harvests to distant consumers. In particular, the lands of the Vistula basin, southern Poland, and Ruthenia (western Ukraine) became regular suppliers of grain to Flanders, Holland, western Germany, and, in years of poor harvests, even England and Spain. In times of famine, Italian states also imported cereals from the far-off Baltic breadbasket. From about 1520, Hungary emerged as a principal supplier of livestock to Austria, southern Germany, and northern Italy.

      Changes in price levels in the 16th century profoundly affected every economic sector, but in ways that are disputed. The period witnessed a general inflation, known traditionally as the “price revolution.” It was rooted in part in frequent monetary (money) debasements; the French kings, for example, debased or altered their chief coinage (coin), the livre tournois, in 1519, 1532, 1549, 1561, 1571–75 (four mutations), and 1577. Probably more significant (though even this is questioned) was the infusion of new stocks of precious metal, especially silver, into the money supply. The medieval economy had suffered from a chronic shortage of precious metals. From the late 15th century, however, silver output, especially from German mines, increased and remained high through the 1530s. New techniques of sinking and draining shafts, extracting ore, and refining silver made mining a booming industry. From 1550 “American (Americas) treasure,” chiefly from the great silver mine at Potosí in Peru (now in Bolivia), arrived in huge volumes in Spain, and from Spain it flowed to the many European regions where Spain had significant military or political engagements. Experts estimate (albeit on shaky grounds) that the stock of monetized silver increased by three or three and a half times during the 16th century.

      At the same time, the growing numbers of people who had to be fed, clothed, and housed assured that coins would circulate rapidly. In monetary theory, the level of prices varies directly with the volume of money and the velocity of its circulation. New sources of silver and new numbers of people thus launched (or at least reinforced) pervasive inflation. According to one calculation, prices rose during the century in nominal terms by a factor of six and in real terms by a factor of three. The rate is low by modern standards, but it struck a society accustomed to stability. As early as 1568 the French political theorist Jean Bodin perceptively attributed the inflation to the growing volume of circulating coin, but many others, especially those victimized by inflation, chose to blame it on the greed of monopolists. Inflation contributed no small part to the period's social tensions.

      Inflation always redistributes wealth; it penalizes creditors and those who live on fixed rents or revenues; it rewards debtors and entrepreneurs who can take immediate advantage of rising prices. Moreover, prices tend to rise faster than wages. For the employer, costs (chiefly wages) lag behind receipts (set by prices), and this forms what is classically known as “profit inflation.” This profit inflation has attracted the interest of economists as well as historians; especially notable among the former is the great British economic theorist John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, John Maynard). In a treatise on money published in 1930, he attributed to the 16th-century price revolution and profit inflation a crucial role in the primitive accumulation of capital and in the birth of capitalism itself. His analysis has attracted much criticism. Wages lagged not so much behind the prices of manufactured goods as of agricultural commodities, and inflation may not have increased profits at all. Then, too, inflation in Spain (particularly pronounced in the 1520s), or later in France, did not lead to a burst of enterprise. There is no mechanical connection between price structures and behaviour.

      On the other hand, the price revolution certainly stimulated the economy. It clearly penalized the inactive. Those who wished to do no more than maintain their traditional standard of living had, nonetheless, to assume an active economic stance. The increased supply of money seems further to have lowered interest rates—another advantage for the entrepreneur. The price revolution by itself did not assure capital accumulation and the birth of capitalism, but it did bring about increased outlays of entrepreneurial energy.

Landlords and peasants
      The growing population in the 16th century and the larger concentrations of urban dwellers required abundant supplies of food. In the course of the century, wheat prices steadily rose; the blades of late medieval price scissors once more converged. Money again flowed into the countryside to pay for food, especially wheat. But the social repercussions of the rising price of wheat varied in the different European regions.

      In eastern Germany (with the exception of electoral Saxony), Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Lithuania, and even eventually Russia, the crucial change was the formation of a new type of great property, called traditionally in the German literature the Gutsherrschaft (ownership of an estate). The estate was divided into two principal parts: the landlord's (landlord and tenant) demesne, from which he took all the harvest; and the farms of the peasants (peasant), who supplied the labour needed to work the demesne. The peasants (and their children after them) were legally serfs (serfdom), bound to the soil. These bipartite, serf-run estates superficially resemble the classical manors of the early Middle Ages but differ from them in that the new estates were producing primarily for commercial markets. The binding of the peasants of eastern Europe to the soil and the imposition of heavy labour services constitute, in another traditional term, the “second serfdom.”

      In the contemporary west (and in the east before the 16th century), the characteristic form of great property was the Grundherrschaft (“ownership of land”). This was an aggregation of rent-paying properties. The lord might also be a cultivator, but he worked his land through hired labourers.

      What explains the formation of the Gutsherrschaft in early modern eastern Europe? Historians distinguish two phases in its appearance. The nobility and gentry, even without planning to do so, accumulated large tracts of abandoned land during the late medieval population collapse. However, depopulation also meant that landlords could not easily find the labour to work their extensive holdings. Population, as previously mentioned, was growing again by 1500, and prices (especially the price of cereals) steadily advanced. Inflation threatened the standard of living of the landlords; to counter its effects, they needed to raise their incomes. They accordingly sought to win larger harvests from their lands, but the lingering shortage of labourers was a major obstacle. As competition for their labour remained high, peasants were prone to move from one estate to another, in search of better terms. Moreover, the landlords had little capital to hire salaried hands and, in the largely rural east, there were few sources of capital. They had, however, one recourse. They dominated the weak governments of the region, and even a comparatively strong ruler, like the Russian tsar, wished to accommodate the demands of the gentry. In 1497 the Polish gentry won the right to export their grain without paying duty. Further legislation bound the peasants to the soil and obligated them to work the lord's demesne. The second serfdom gradually spread over eastern Europe; it was established in Poland as early as 1520; in Russia it was legally imposed in the Ulozhenie (Law Code) of 1649. At least in Poland, the western market for cereals was a principal factor in reviving serfdom, in bringing back a seemingly primitive form of labour organization.

      No second serfdom developed in western Europe, even though the stimulus of high wheat prices was equally powerful. Harassed landlords, pressed to raise their revenues, had more options than their eastern counterparts. They might look to a profession or even a trade or, more commonly, seek at court an appointment paying a salary or a pension. The western princes did not want local magnates to dominate their communities, as this would erode their own authority. They consequently defended the peasants against the encroachments of the gentry. Finally, landlords in the west could readily find capital (capital and interest). They could use the money either to hire workers or to improve their leased properties, in expectation of gaining higher rents. The availability of capital in the west and its scarcity in the east were probably the chief reasons why the agrarian institutions of eastern and western Europe diverged so dramatically in the 16th century.

      In the west, in areas of plow agriculture, the small property remained the most common productive unit. However, the terms under which it was held and worked differed widely from one European region to another. In the Middle Ages, peasants were typically subject to a great variety of charges laid upon both their persons and the land. They had to pay special marriage and inheritance taxes; they were further required to provide tithes to the parish churches. These charges were often small—sometimes only recognitive—and were fixed by custom. They are often regarded as “feudal” (feudal land tenure) as distinct from “capitalist” (capitalism) rents, in that they were customary and not negotiated; the lord, moreover, provided nothing—no help or capital improvements—in return for the payments.

      The 16th century witnessed a conversion—widespread though never complete—from systems of feudal to capitalist rents. The late medieval population collapse increased the mobility of the peasant population; a peasant who settled for one year and one day in a “free village” or town received perpetual immunity from personal charges. Personal dues thus eroded rapidly; dues weighing upon the land persisted longer but could not be raised. It was therefore in the landlord's interest to convert feudal tenures into leaseholds, and this required capital.

      In England upon the former manors, farmers (the original meaning of the term was leaseholder or rent payer), who held land under long-term leases, gradually replaced copyholders, or tenants subject only to feudal dues. These farmers constituted the free English yeomanry (yeoman), and their appearance marks the demise of the last vestiges of medieval serfdom. In the Low Countries, urban investors bought up the valuable lands near towns and converted them into leaseholds, which were leased for high rents over long terms. The heavy infusions of urban capital into Low Country agriculture helped make it technically the most advanced in Europe, a model for improving landlords elsewhere. In central and southern France and in central Italy, urban investment in the land was closely linked to a special type of sharecropping lease, called the métayage in France and the mezzadria in Italy. The landlord (typically a wealthy townsman) purchased plots, consolidated them into a farm, built a house upon it, and rented it. Often, he also provided the implements needed to work the land, livestock, and fertilizer. The tenant gave as rent half of the harvest. The spread of this type of sharecropping in the vicinity of towns had begun in the late Middle Ages and was carried vigorously forward in the 16th century. Nonetheless, the older forms of feudal tenure, and even some personal charges, also persisted, especially in Europe's remote and poorer regions. The early modern countryside presents an infinitely complex mixture of old and new ways of holding and working the land.

      Two further changes in the countryside are worth noting. In adopting Protestantism, the North German states, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and England confiscated and sold, in whole or in part, ecclesiastical properties. Sweden, for example, did so in 1526–27, England in 1534–36. It is difficult to assess the exact economic repercussions of these secularizations (secularism), but the placing of numerous properties upon the land market almost surely encouraged the infusion of capital into (and the spread of capitalist forms of agrarian organization in) the countryside.

      Second, the high price of wheat did not everywhere make cereal cultivation the most remunerative use of the land. The price of wool continued to be buoyant, and this, linked with the availability of cheap wheat from the east, sustained the conversion of plowland into pastures that also had begun in the late Middle Ages. In England this movement is called “enclosure.” (enclosure) In the typical medieval village, peasants held the cultivated soil in unfenced strips, and they also enjoyed the right of grazing a set number of animals upon the village commons. Enclosure meant both the consolidating of the strips into fenced fields and the division of the commons among the individual villagers. As poorer villagers often received plots too small to work, they often had little choice but to sell their share to their richer neighbours and leave the village. In 16th-century England, enclosure almost always meant the conversion of plowland and commons into fenced meadows or pastures. To many outspoken observers, clergy and humanists in particular, enclosures were destroying villages, uprooting the rural population, and multiplying beggars on the road and paupers in the towns. sheep were devouring the people—“Where there have been many householders and inhabitants,” the English bishop Hugh Latimer lamented, “there is now but a shepherd and his dog.” In light of recent research, these 16th-century enclosures were far less extensive than such strictures imply. Nonetheless, enclosures are an example of the power of capital to transform the rhythms of everyday life; at the least, they were an omen of things to come.

      In Spain, sheep and people also entered into destructive competition. Since the 13th century, sheepherding had fallen under the control of a guild known as the Mesta; the guild was in turn dominated by a few grandees. The Mesta practiced transhumance (alternation of winter and spring pastures); the flocks themselves moved seasonally along great trailways called cañadas. The government, which collected a tax on exported wool, was anxious to raise output and favoured the Mesta with many privileges. Cultivators along the cañadas were forbidden to fence their fields, lest the barriers impede the migrating sheep. Moreover, the government imposed ceiling prices on wheat in 1539. Damage from the flocks and the low price of wheat eventually crippled cereal cultivation, provoked widespread desertion of the countryside and overall population decline, and was a significant factor in Spain's 17th-century decline. High cereal prices primarily benefited not the peasants but the landlords. The landlords in turn spent their increased revenues on the amenities and luxuries supplied by towns. In spite of high food costs, town economies fared well.

      Historians favour the term “protoindustrialization” to describe the form of industrial organization that emerged in the 16th century. The word was initially applied to cottage industries in the countryside. In spite of the opposition of urban guilds, rural residents (peasant) were performing many industrial tasks. Agricultural labour did not occupy the peasants during the entire year, and they devoted their free hours to such activities as spinning wool or weaving and washing cloth. Peasants usually worked for lower remuneration than urban artisans. Protoindustrialization gave rural residents supplementary income, which conferred a certain immunity from harvest failures; it enabled them to marry younger and rear larger families; it prepared them, socially and psychologically, for eventual industrialization. The efforts of urban guilds to limit rural work enjoyed only limited success; in England, for example, the restrictions seem rarely to have been enforced. Cottage industries certainly existed in the Middle Ages, but the economic expansion of the 16th century diffused them over much larger areas of the European countryside, perhaps most visibly in England and western Germany.

      More recently, historians have stressed the role of towns in this early form of industrial organization. Towns remained the centres from which the raw materials were distributed in the countryside. Moreover, urban entrepreneurs coordinated the efforts of the rural workers and marketed their finished products. Certain processes—usually the most highly skilled and the most remunerative—remained centred in cities. Not only the extension of industry into rural areas but also the greater integration of city and countryside in regional economies was the principal achievement of 16th-century industry.

      This manner of organizing manufactures is known as the “putting-out system,” (domestic system) an awkward translation of the German Verlagssystem. The key to its operation was the entrepreneur, who purchased the raw materials, distributed them among the working families, passed the semifinished products from one artisan to another, and marketed the finished products. He was typically a great merchant resident in the town. As trade routes grew longer, the small artisan was placed at ever-greater distances from sources of supply and from markets. Typically, the small artisan would not have the knowledge of distant markets or of the preferences of distant purchasers and rarely had the money to purchase needed raw materials. The size of the trading networks and the volume of merchandise moving within them made the services of the entrepreneur indispensable and subordinated the workers to his authority.

      The production of fabric remained everywhere the chief European industry, but two developments, both of them continuations of medieval changes, are noteworthy. In southern Europe the making of silk cloth, stimulated by the luxurious tastes of the age, gained unprecedented prominence. Lucca, Bologna, and Venice in Italy and Sevilla and Granada in Spain gained flourishing industries. Even more spectacular in its rise as a centre of silk manufacture was the city and region of Lyon in central France. Lyon was also a principal fair town, where goods of northern and southern Europe were exchanged. It was ideally placed to obtain silk cocoons or thread from the south and to market the finished cloth to northern purchasers. The silk industry is also notable in that most of the workers it employed were women.

      Northern industry continued to concentrate on woolens (wool) but partially turned its efforts to producing a new type of cloth, worsteds (worsted knitting yarn). Unlike woolens, worsteds were woven from yarn spun from long-haired wool; moreover, the cloth is not fulled (that is, washed, mixed with fuller's earth, and pounded in order to mat the weave). Worsteds were lighter and cheaper to make than woolens and did not require the services of a mill, which might have to be located near running water. Under the name of “new draperies,” worsteds had come to dominate the Flemish wool industry in the late Middle Ages. In the 16th century, several factors—the growth of population and of markets, the revolt of the Low Countries against Spain, and religious persecutions, which led many skilled Protestant workers to seek refuge among their coreligionists—stimulated the worsted industry in England. England had developed a vigorous woolens industry in the late Middle Ages, and the spread of worsted manufacture made it a European leader in fabric production.

      Another major innovation in 16th-century industrial history was the growing use of coal as fuel. England, with rich coal mines located close to the sea, could take particular advantage of this cheap mineral fuel. The port of Newcastle in Northumbria emerged in the 16th century as a principal supplier of coal to London consumers. As yet, coal could not be used for the direct smelting of iron, but it found wide application in glassmaking, brick baking, brewing, and the heating of homes. The use of coal eased the demand on England's rapidly diminishing forests and contributed to the growth of a coal technology that would make a crucial contribution to the later Industrial Revolution.

      In industry, the 16th century was not so much an age of dramatic technological departures; rather, it witnessed the steady improvement of older technological traditions—in shipbuilding, mining and metallurgy, glassmaking, silk production, clock and instrument making, firearms, and others. Europe slowly widened its technological edge over non-European civilizations. Most economic historians further believe that protoindustrialization, and the commerce that supplied and sustained it, best explains the early accumulations of capital and the birth of a capitalist economy.

Growth of banking and finance (business finance)
      Perhaps the most spectacular changes in the 16th-century economy were in the fields of international banking and finance. To be sure, medieval bankers such as the Florentine Bardi and Peruzzi in the 14th century and the Medici in the 15th had operated on an international scale, but the full development of an international money market with supporting institutions awaited the 16th century. Its earliest architects were South German banking houses, from Augsburg and Nürnberg in particular, who were well situated to serve as financial intermediaries between such southern capitals as Rome (or commercial centres such as Venice) and the northern financial centre at Antwerp. Through letters of exchange drawn on the various bourses that were growing throughout Europe, these bankers were able to mobilize capital in fabulous amounts. In 1519 Jakob II Fugger the Rich of Augsburg amassed nearly two million florins for the Habsburg king of Spain, Charles I, who used the money to bribe the imperial electors (he was successfully elected Holy Roman emperor as Charles V). Money was shaping the politics of Europe.

      The subsequent bankruptcies of the Spanish crown injured the German bankers; from 1580 or even earlier, the Genoese became the chief financiers of the Spanish government and empire. Through the central fair at Lyon and through letters of exchange and a complex variant known as the asiento, the Genoese transferred great sums from Spain to the Low Countries to pay the soldiers of the Spanish armies. In the mid-16th century, dissatisfied with Lyon, the Genoese set up a fictional fair, known as Bisenzone (Besançon), as a centre of their fiscal operations. Changing sites several times, “Bisenzone” from 1579 settled at Piacenza in Italy.

Political and cultural influences on the economy
      The centralized state of the early modern age exerted a decisive influence on the development of financial institutions and in other economic sectors as well. To maintain its power both within its borders and within the international system, the state supported a large royal or princely (prince) court, a bureaucracy, and an army. It was the major purchaser of weapons and war matériel. Its authority affected class balances. Over the century's course, the prince expanded his authority to make appointments and grant pensions. His control of resources softened the divisions among classes and facilitated social mobility. Several great merchants and bankers, the Fuggers among them, eventually were ennobled (aristocracy). Yet, in spending huge sums on war, the early modern state may also have injured the economy. The floating debt of the French crown came close to 10 million ecus (the ecu was worth slightly less than a gold florin), that of the Spanish, 20 million. These sums probably equaled the worth of the circulating coin in the two kingdoms. Only in England did the public debt remain at relatively modest proportions, about 200,000 gold ducats. Governments, with the exception of the English, were absorbing a huge part of the national wealth. The Spanish bankruptcies were also sure proof that Spain had insufficient resources to realize its ambitious imperial goals.

      The effort to control the economy in the interest of enhancing state power is the essence of the political philosophy known as mercantilism. Many of the policies of 16th-century states affecting trade, manufactures, or money can be regarded as mercantilistic, but as yet they did not represent a coherent economic theory. The true age of mercantilism postdates 1650.

      Cultural changes also worked to legitimate, even to inspire, the early modern spirit of enterprise. In a famous thesis, the German sociologist Max Weber (Weber, Max) and, later, the English historian Richard Henry Tawney (Tawney, Richard Henry) posited a direct link between the Protestant ethic, specifically in its Calvinist form, and the capitalist (capitalism) motivation. Medieval ethics had supposedly condemned the profit motive, and teachings about usury and the just price had shackled the growth of capitalist practices. Calvinism made the successful merchant God's elect. Today, this thesis appears too simple. Many movements contributed to a reassessment of the mercantile or business life, and the rival religious confessions influenced one another. Calvinism did not really view commercial success as a sign of God's favour until the 17th century, but 16th-century Roman Catholic scholastics (as the humanists before them) had come to regard the operations of the marketplace as natural; it was good for the merchant to participate in them. Martin Luther (Luther, Martin), in emphasizing that every Christian had received a calling (Berufung) from God, gave new dignity to all secular employments. Roman Catholics developed their own theory of the “vocation” to both secular and religious callings in what was a close imitation of the Lutheran Berufung.

Aspects of early modern society
      To examine the psychology of merchants is to stay within a narrow social elite. Historians, in what is sometimes called “the new social history,” have paid close attention to the common people of Europe and to hitherto neglected social groups—women, the nonconformists, and minorities.

      Two fundamental changes affected the status of early modern women. Women under protoindustrialization were valued domestic workers, but they also had little economic independence; the male head of the household, the father or husband, gained the chief fruits of their labour. A second change, perhaps related to the first, was the advancing age of first marriage for women. Medieval girls were very young at first marriage, barely past puberty; these young girls were given to mature grooms who were in their middle or late 20s. By the late 16th century, parish marriage registers show that brides were nearly the same age as their grooms and both were mature persons, usually in their middle 20s. This is, in effect, what demographers call the modern, western European marriage pattern. Comparatively late ages at first marriage also indicate that significant numbers of both men and women would not marry at all. Though the origins of this pattern remain obscure, it may be that families, recognizing the economic value of daughters, were anxious to retain their services as long as possible. European marriages were overwhelmingly patrilocal—that is, the bride almost always joined her husband's household. Thus, the contribution that daughters made to the household economy exerted an upward pressure on their ages of marriage. Whatever the explanation for the new marriage pattern, the near equality of ages between the marriage partners at least opened the possibility that the two would become true friends as well as spouses; this was harder to achieve when brides were young girls and their husbands mature and experienced.

      In investigating what might be called the cultural underground of the early modern age, historians now take full advantage of a distinctive type of source. The established religions of Europe, both Roman Catholic and Protestant (Protestantism), zealously sought to assure uniformity of belief in the regions they dominated. The courts inspired by them actively pursued not only the heterodox but also witches, the insane, and anyone who maintained an unusual style of life. The special papal court known as the inquisition operated in many (though not all) Catholic states. Its judges carefully interrogated witnesses and kept good records. These records permit rare views into the depths of early modern society. They show how widespread was the belief in magic and the practice of witchcraft and how far popular culture diverged from the officially sanctioned ideologies. The variety and strange nature of popular beliefs have convinced some historians that Christianity had never really won the minds of rural people during the Middle Ages. Only the aggressive and reformed churches of the 16th century succeeded in converting the peasants to formal Christianity. This thesis may be doubted, but it cannot be doubted that the European countryside sheltered deep wells of popular culture which the documentation of the age leaves largely in darkness.

      Witchcraft presents special problems. Witches were hunted in the 16th century with a relentlessness never seen before. Were they becoming more numerous, their services more in demand? It may be that the two reformations, Protestant and Catholic, purged Europe of the magical aura that the medieval church had hung over it. It may be that the abiding thirst for enchantment could be slaked only in the cultural underground, only through popular magic. But it may also be that the new determination and efficiency of the reformed religions and the early modern states simply exposed persons long a fixture in village life: the woman healer, who knew the ancient, time-honoured cures; the old wife, who through charms or potions could induce conception or sterility, love or hate. It is hard even to reconstruct the character of early modern witchcraft. Terrorized witnesses tended to respond in ways they thought would please their interrogators; thus they reinforced stereotypes rather than revealing what they truly believed or did. Court records of this kind are not flawless sources, but they remain a rich vein of cultural history. Ironically, the court officials saved for history the thoughts and values they had hoped to extirpate.

      The 16th century also witnessed a continuing deterioration in the status of western Jews (Jew). They had been expelled from England in 1290 and from France in 1306 (the first of several expulsions and readmissions). Riots and killings accompanying the Black Death (the Jews were accused of poisoning the wells) had pushed the centres of German Jewry (the Ashkenazim) to the east, into Poland, Lithuania, and, eventually, the Russian Empire. In 1492 the Jews of Spain (the Sephardim), who had formed the largest and most culturally accomplished western community, were given the choice of conversion or expulsion. Many chose to leave for Portugal (whence they would also be subsequently expelled), the Low Countries, Italy, or the Ottoman Empire. Those who remained and ostensibly converted were called “New Christians,” or Marranos (Marrano), and many of these later chose to emigrate to more hospitable lands. Many Marranos continued to live as Jews while professing Christianity; accusations against them were commonly heard by the Inquisition in both Spain and Italy. Their position was especially distressing. Often, both Jews and Christians rejected them, the former for their ostensible conversion, the latter for secretly practicing Judaism.

      The communities of exiles had different experiences. Jews in Holland made a major contribution to the country's great prosperity. The Italian states, papal Rome included, accepted the exiles, hoping to profit from their commercial and financial expertise. Yet the Jews were also subject to increasingly severe restrictions. The Jewish community at Venice, which absorbed large numbers of Iberian Jews and Marranos, formed the first ghetto (the word itself is Venetian, first used in 1516). The practice of confining Jews into walled quarters, locked at night, became the common social practice of early modern states, at least in the central and eastern parts of the continent. The Sephardim, who continued to speak a form of Spanish known as Ladino, established large and prosperous colonies in Ottoman cities—Salonika, Istanbul, and Cairo among them. On balance, however, the early modern period in Europe was socially and culturally a dark age for Jewry.

      Is there a single factor that can explain the social history of Europe's 16th century? Many have been proposed: population growth, overseas discoveries, the emergence of a world economic system, American treasure, profit inflation, capital accumulation, protoindustrialization, the Renaissance or Reformation. Perhaps the most decisive change was progress toward more integrated systems of social organization and action and toward wider and tighter social networks. The western monarchies overcame much of the political localism of the medieval world and set a model that even divided Italy and Germany would eventually emulate. Economic integration advanced even more rapidly; markets in foodstuffs, spices, luxuries, and money extended throughout the continent: The skilled banker could marshal funds from all the continent's money markets; silks from Lucca were sold in Poland. Cities formed into hierarchies, still on a regional basis but surpassing in their effectiveness the loose associations of medieval urban places. To be sure, competition among the centralized states often led to destructive wars and terrible waste of resources; and the quest for unity brought shameful persecution upon those who could not or would not conform to the dominant culture.

David Herlihy

Politics and diplomacy
The state of European politics
      In the 15th century, changes in the structure of European polity, accompanied by a new intellectual temper, suggested to such observers as the philosopher and clerical statesman Nicholas of Cusa that the “Middle Age” had attained its conclusion and a new era had begun. The Papacy, the symbol of the spiritual unity of Christendom, lost much of its prestige in the Great Western Schism and the conciliar movement and became infected with the lay ideals prevailing in the Italian peninsula. In the 16th century, the Protestant Reformation reacted against the worldliness and corruption of the Holy See, and the Roman Catholic church responded in its turn by a revival of piety known as the Counter-Reformation. While the forces that were to erupt in the Protestant movement were gathering strength, the narrow horizons of the Old World were widened by the expansion of Europe to America and the East. (This section treats the political, diplomatic, and military history of Europe from the Reformation to the Peace of Westphalia. For a discussion of the religious history of this period, see Christianity, Protestantism, and Roman Catholicism. The expansion of European culture to new lands is covered in colonialism (European exploration).)

      In western Europe, nation-states emerged under the aegis of strong monarchical governments, breaking down local immunities and destroying the unity of the European respublica Christiana. Centralized bureaucracy came to replace medieval government. Underlying economic changes affected social stability. Secular values prevailed in politics, and the concept of a balance of power came to dominate international relations. Diplomacy and warfare were conducted by new methods. Permanent embassies were accredited between sovereigns, and on the battlefield standing armies of professional and mercenary soldiers took the place of the feudal array that had reflected the social structure of the past. At the same time, scientific discoveries cast doubt on the traditional cosmology. The systems of Aristotle and Ptolemy, which had long been sanctified by clerical approval, were undermined by Copernicus, Mercator, Galileo, and Kepler.

Discovery of the New World (European exploration)
      In the Iberian Peninsula the impetus of the counteroffensive against the Moors carried the Portuguese to probe the West African coastline and the Spanish to attempt the expulsion of Islām from the western Mediterranean. In the last years of the 15th century, Portuguese navigators established the sea route to India and within a decade had secured control of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean and its approaches. Mercantile interests, crusading and missionary zeal, and scientific curiosity were intermingled as the motives for this epic achievement. Similar hopes inspired Spanish exploitation of the discovery by Christopher Columbus of the Caribbean outposts of the American (Americas) continent in 1492. The Treaties of Tordesillas (Tordesillas, Treaty of) and Saragossa in 1494 and 1529 defined the limits of westward Spanish exploration and the eastern ventures of Portugal. The two states acting as the vanguard of the expansion of Europe had thus divided the newly discovered sea lanes of the world between them.

      By the time of the Treaty of Saragossa, when Portugal secured the exclusion of Spain from the East Indies, Spain had begun the conquest of Central and South America. In 1519, the year in which Ferdinand Magellan embarked on the westward circumnavigation of the globe, Hernán Cortés launched his expedition against Mexico. The seizure of Peru by Francisco Pizarro and the enforcement of Portuguese claims to Brazil completed the major steps in the Iberian occupation of the continent. By the middle of the century, the age of the conquistadores was replaced by an era of colonization, based both on the procurement of precious metal by Indian labour and on pastoral and plantation economies using imported African slaves. The influx of bullion into Europe became significant in the late 1520s, and from about 1550 it began to produce a profound effect upon the economy of the Old World.

Nation-states and dynastic rivalries
      The organization of expansion overseas reflected in economic terms the political nationalism of the European states. This political development took place through processes of internal unification and the abolition of local privileges by the centralizing force of dynastic monarchies. In Spain the union of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia under John II of Aragon was extended to association with Castile through the marriage of his son Ferdinand with the Castilian heiress Isabella. The alliance grew toward union after the accession of the two sovereigns to their thrones in 1479 and 1474, respectively, and with joint action against the Moors of Granada, the French in Italy, and the independent kingdom of Navarre. Yet, at the same time, provincial institutions long survived the dynastic union, and the representative assembly (Cortes) of Aragon continued to cling to its privileges when its Castilian counterpart had ceased to play any effective part. Castilian interest in the New World and Aragonese ties in Italy, moreover, resulted in the ambivalent nature of Spanish 16th-century policy, with its uneasy alternation between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The monarchy increased the central power by the absorption of military orders and the adaptation of the Hermandad, or police organization, and the Inquisition for political purposes. During the reign of Charles I (the emperor Charles V) centralization was quickened by the importation of Burgundian conciliar methods of government, and in the reign of his son Philip II Spain was in practice an autocracy.

      Other European monarchies imitated the system devised by Roman-law jurists and administrators in the Burgundian dominions along the eastern borders of France. In England and France the Hundred Years' War (conventionally 1337–1453) had reduced the strength of the aristocracies, the principal opponents of monarchical authority. The pursuit of strong, efficient government by the Tudors in England, following the example of their Yorkist predecessors, found a parallel in France under Louis XI and Francis I. In both countries revision of the administrative and judicial system proceeded through conciliar institutions, although in neither case did it result in the unification of different systems of law. A rising class of professional administrators came to fulfill the role of the king's executive. The creation of a central treasury under Francis I brought an order into French finances already achieved in England through Henry VII's adaptation of the machinery of the royal household. Henry VIII's minister, Thomas Cromwell (Cromwell, Thomas, Earl of Essex, Baron Cromwell of Okeham), introduced an aspect of modernity into English fiscal administration by the creation of courts of revenue on bureaucratic lines. In both countries, the monarchy extended its influence over the government of the church. The unrestricted ability to make law was established by the English crown in partnership with Parliament. In France the representative Estates-General lost its authority, and sovereignty reposed in the king in council. Supreme courts (parlements) possessing the right to register royal edicts imposed a slight and ineffective limitation on the absolutism of the Valois kings. The most able exponent of the reform of the judicial machinery of the French monarch was Charles IX's chancellor, Michel de L'Hôpital, but his reforms in the 1560s were frustrated by the anarchy of the religious wars. In France the middle class aspired to ennoblement in the royal administration and mortgaged their future to the monarchy by investment in office and the royal finances. In England, on the other hand, a greater flexibility in social relations was preserved, and the middle class engaged in bolder commercial and industrial ventures.

      Territorial unity under the French crown was attained through the recovery of feudal appanages (alienated to cadet branches of the royal dynasty) and, as in Spain, through marriage alliances. Brittany was regained in this way, although the first of the three Valois marriages with Breton heiresses also set in train the dynastic rivalry of Valois and Habsburg. When Charles VIII of France married Anne of Brittany, he stole the bride of the Austrian archduke and future emperor Maximilian I and also broke his own engagement to Margaret of Austria, Maximilian's daughter by Mary of Burgundy. Margaret's brother Philip, however, married Joan, heiress of Castile and Aragon, so that their son eventually inherited not only Habsburg Germany and the Burgundian Netherlands but also Spain, Spanish Italy, and America. The dominions of Charles V thus encircled France and incorporated the wealth of Spain overseas. Even after the division of this vast inheritance between his son, Philip II of Spain, and his brother, the emperor Ferdinand I, the conflict between the Habsburgs and the French crown dominated the diplomacy of Europe for more than a century.

      The principal dynastic conflict of the age was less unequal than it seemed, for the greater resources of Charles V were offset by their cumbrous disunity and by local independence. In the Low Countries he was able to complete the Seventeen Provinces by new acquisitions, but, although the coordinating machinery of the Burgundian dukes remained in formal existence, Charles's regents were obliged to respect local privileges and to act through constitutional forms. In Germany, where his grandfather Maximilian I had unsuccessfully tried to reform the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V could do little to overcome the independence of the lay and ecclesiastical princes, the imperial knights, and the free cities. The revolts of the knights (1522) and the peasantry (1525), together with the political disaggregation imposed by the Reformation, rendered the empire a source of weakness. Even in Spain, where the rebellion of the comuneros took place in 1520–21, his authority was sometimes flouted. His allies, England and the papacy, at times supported France to procure their own profit. France, for its part, possessed the advantages of internal lines of communication and a relatively compact territory, while its alliance with the Ottoman Empire maintained pressure on the Habsburg defenses in southeast Europe and the Mediterranean. Francis I, however, like his predecessors Charles VIII and Louis XII, made the strategic error of wasting his strength in Italy, where the major campaigns were fought in the first half of the century. Only under Henry II was it appreciated that the most suitable area for French expansion lay toward the Rhine.

Turkey and eastern Europe
      A contemporary who rivaled the power and prestige of Francis I and Charles V was the ruler of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan Süleyman I the Magnificent (1520–66). With their infantry corps d'élite (the Janissaries), their artillery, and their cavalry, or sipahis, the Ottomans were the foremost military power in Europe, and it was fortunate for their Christian adversaries that Eastern preoccupations prevented them from taking full advantage of Western disunity. A counterpoise was provided by the rise of the powerful military order of the Ṣafavids (Ṣafavid Dynasty) in Persia—hostile to the orthodox Ottomans through their acceptance of the heretical Islāmic cult of the Shīʿites. Ottoman strength was further dissipated by the need to enforce the allegiance of Turkmen begs in Anatolia and of the chieftains of the Caucasus and Kurdistan and to maintain the conquest of the sultanate of Syria and Egypt by Süleyman's predecessor, Selim I. Süleyman himself overran Iraq and even challenged Portuguese dominion of the Indian Ocean from his bases in Suez and Basra. The Crimean Tatars acknowledged his suzerainty, as did the corsair powers of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. His armies conquered Hungary in 1526 and threatened Vienna in 1529. With the expansion of his authority along the North African coast and the Adriatic littoral, it seemed for a time as if the Mediterranean, like the Black Sea and the Aegean, might become an Ottoman lake.

      Though it observed the forms of an Islāmic legal code, Turkish rule was an unlimited despotism, suffering from none of the financial and constitutional weaknesses of Western states. With its disciplined standing army and its tributary populations, the Ottoman Empire feared no internal threat except during the periods of disputed succession, which continued to occur despite a law empowering the reigning sultan to put to death collateral heirs. It was not unusual for the sultan to content himself with the overlordship of frontier provinces. Moldavia and Walachia were for a time held in this fashion, and in Transylvania the vaivode John Zápolya gladly accepted Süleyman as his master in return for support against Ferdinand of Austria.

      Despite the expeditions of Charles V against Algiers and Tunis, and the inspired resistance of Venice and Genoa in the war of 1537–40, the Ottomans retained the initiative in the Mediterranean until several years after the death of Süleyman. The Knights of St. John were driven from Rhodes and Tripoli and barely succeeded in retaining Malta. Even after Spain, the papacy, Venice, and Genoa had crushed the Turkish armament in 1571 in the Battle of Lepanto (Lepanto, Battle of), the Ottomans took Cyprus and recovered Tunis from the garrison installed by the allied commander, Don John of Austria. North Africa remained an outpost of Islām and its corsairs continued to harry Christian shipping, but the Ottoman Empire did not again threaten Europe by land and sea until late in the 17th century.

      Poland, Lithuania, Bohemia, and Hungary were all loosely associated at the close of the 15th century under rulers of the Jagiellon dynasty. In 1569, three years before the death of the last Jagiellon king of Lithuania-Poland, these two countries merged their separate institutions by the Union of Lublin (Lublin, Union of). Thereafter the Polish nobility and the Roman Catholic faith dominated the Orthodox lands of Lithuania and held the frontiers against Muscovy, the Cossacks, and the Tatars. Bohemia and the vestiges of independent Hungary were regained by the Habsburgs as a result of dynastic marriages, which the emperor Maximilian I planned as successfully in the east as he did in the west. When Louis II of Hungary died fighting the Ottomans at Mohács in 1526, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria obtained both crowns and endeavoured to affirm the hereditary authority of his dynasty against aristocratic insistence on the principle of election. In 1619, Habsburg claims in Bohemia became the ostensible cause of the Thirty Years' War, when the Diet of Prague momentarily succeeded in deposing Ferdinand II.

      In the 16th century, eastern Europe displayed the opposite tendency to the advance of princely absolutism in the West. West of the Carpathians and in the lands drained by the Vistula and the Dnestr, the landowning class achieved a political independence that weakened the power of monarchy. The towns entered a period of decline, and the propertied class, though divided by rivalry between the magnates and the lesser gentry, everywhere reduced their peasantry (peasant) to servitude. In Poland and Bohemia the peasants were reduced to serfdom in 1493 and 1497, respectively, and in free Hungary the last peasant rights were suppressed after the rising of 1514. The gentry, or szlachta, controlled Polish policy in the Sejm (parliament), and, when the first Vasa king, Sigismund III, tried to reassert the authority of the crown after his election in 1587, the opportunity had passed. Yet, despite the anarchic quality of Polish politics, the aristocracy maintained and even extended the boundaries of the state. In 1525 they compelled the submission of the secularized Teutonic Order in East Prussia, resisted the pressure of Muscovy, and pressed to the southeast, where communications with the Black Sea had been closed by the Ottomans and their tributaries.

      Farther to the east the grand principality of Moscow (Moscow, Grand Principality of) emerged as a new and powerful despotism. Muscovy, and not Poland, became the heir to Kiev during the reign of Ivan III the Great in the second half of the 15th century. By his marriage with the Byzantine princess Sofia (Zoë) Palaeologus, Ivan also laid claim to the traditions of Constantinople. His capture of Novgorod and repudiation of Tatar overlordship began a movement of Muscovite expansion, which was continued by the seizure of Smolensk by his son Vasily (Basil) III and by the campaigns of his grandson Ivan IV the Terrible (1533–84). The latter destroyed the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan and reached the Baltic by his conquest of Livonia from Poland and the Knights of the Sword. He was the first to use the title of tsar, and his arbitrary exercise of power was more ruthless and less predictable than that of the Ottoman sultan. After his death Muscovy was engulfed in the Time of Troubles (Troubles, Time of), when Polish, Swedish, and Cossack armies devastated the land. The accession of the Romanov dynasty in 1613 heralded a period of gradual recovery. Except for occasional embassies, the importation of a few Western artisans, and the reception of Tudor trading missions, Muscovy remained isolated from the West. Despite its relationship with Greek civilization, it knew nothing of the Renaissance. Though it experienced a schism within its own Orthodox faith, it was equally untouched by Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the consequences of which convulsed western Europe in the late 16th century.

Reformation and Counter-Reformation
      In a sense, the Reformation was a protest (Protestantism) against the secular values of the Renaissance. No Italian despots better represented the profligacy, the materialism, and the intellectual hedonism that accompanied these values than did the three Renaissance popes, Alexander VI, Julius II, and Leo X. Among those precursors of the reformers who were conscious of the betrayal of Christian ideals were figures so diverse as the Ferraran monk Savonarola, the Spanish statesman Cardinal Jiménez, and the humanist scholar Erasmus.

      The corruption of the religious orders and the cynical abuse of the fiscal machinery of the church provoked a movement that at first demanded reform from within and ultimately chose the path of separation. When the Augustinian monk Martin Luther (Luther, Martin) protested against the sale of indulgences in 1517, he found himself obliged to extend his doctrinal arguments until his stand led him to deny the authority of the pope (papacy). In the past, as in the controversies between pope and emperor, such challenges had resulted in mere temporary disunity. In the age of nation-states, the political implications of the dispute resulted in the irreparable fragmentation of clerical authority.

      Luther had chosen to attack a lucrative source of papal revenue, and his intractable spirit obliged Leo X to excommunicate him. The problem became of as much concern to the emperor as it was to the pope, for Luther's eloquent writings evoked a wave of enthusiasm throughout Germany. The reformer was by instinct a social conservative and supported existing secular authority against the upthrust of the lower orders. Although the Diet of Worms accepted the excommunication in 1521, Luther found protection among the princes. In 1529 the rulers of electoral Saxony, Brandenburg, Hessen, Lüneberg, and Anhalt signed the “protest” against an attempt to enforce obedience. By this time, Charles V had resolved to suppress Protestantism and to abandon conciliation. In 1527 his mutinous troops had sacked Rome and secured the person of Pope Clement VII, who had deserted the imperial cause in favour of Francis I after the latter's defeat at the Battle of Pavia. The sack of Rome proved a turning point both for the emperor and the humanist (humanism) movement that he had patronized. The humanist scholars were dispersed, and the initiative for reform then lay in the hands of the more violent and uncompromising party. Charles V himself experienced a revulsion of conscience that placed him at the head of the Roman Catholic reaction. The empire he ruled in name was now divided into hostile camps. The Catholic princes of Germany had discussed measures for joint action at Regensburg in 1524; in 1530 the Protestants formed a defensive league at Schmalkalden. Reconciliation was attempted in 1541 and 1548, but the German rift could no longer be healed.

       Lutheranism laid its emphasis doctrinally on justification by faith and politically on the God-given powers of the secular ruler. Other Protestants reached different conclusions and diverged widely from one another in their interpretation of the sacraments. In Geneva, Calvinism enforced a stern moral code and preached the mystery of grace with predestinarian conviction. It proclaimed the separation of church and state, but in practice its organization tended to produce a type of theocracy. Huldrych Zwingli and Heinrich Bullinger in Zürich taught a theology not unlike Calvin's but preferred to see government in terms of the godly magistrate. On the left wing of these movements were the Anabaptists, whose pacifism and mystic detachment were paradoxically associated with violent upheavals.

      Lutheranism established itself in northern Germany and Scandinavia and for a time exercised a wide influence both in eastern Europe and in the west. Where it was not officially adopted by the ruling prince, however, the more militant Calvinist faith tended to take its place. Calvinism spread northward from the upper Rhine and established itself firmly in Scotland and in southern and western France. Friction between Rome and nationalist tendencies within the Catholic church facilitated the spread of Protestantism. In France the Gallican church was traditionally nationalist and antipapal in outlook, while in England the Reformation in its early stages took the form of the preservation of Catholic doctrine and the denial of papal jurisdiction. After periods of Calvinist and then of Roman Catholic reaction, the Church of England achieved a measure of stability with the Elizabethan religious settlement.

      In the years between the papal confirmation of the Jesuit order in 1540 and the formal dissolution of the Council of Trent (Trent, Council of) in 1563, the Roman Catholic church responded to the Protestant challenge by purging itself of the abuses and ambiguities that had opened the way to revolt. Thus prepared, the Counter-Reformation embarked upon recovery of the schismatic branches of Western Christianity. Foremost in this crusade were the Jesuits (Jesuit), established as a well-educated and disciplined arm of the papacy by Ignatius Loyola (Loyola, Saint Ignatius of). Their work was made easier by the Council of Trent, which did not, like earlier councils, result in the diminution of papal authority. The council condemned such abuses as pluralism, affirmed the traditional practice in questions of clerical marriage and the use of the Bible, and clarified doctrine on issues such as the nature of the Eucharist, divine grace, and justification by faith. The church thus made it clear that it was not prepared to compromise; and, with the aid of the Inquisition and the material resources of the Habsburgs, it set out to reestablish its universal authority. It was of vital importance to this task that the popes of the Counter-Reformation were men of sincere conviction and initiative who skillfully employed diplomacy, persuasion, and force against heresy. In Italy, Spain, Bavaria, Austria, Bohemia, Poland, and the southern Netherlands (the future Belgium), Protestant influence was destroyed.

John Hearsey McMillan Salmon

diplomacy in the age of the Reformation
      This was a golden era for diplomats and international lawyers. To the network of alliances that became established throughout Europe during the Renaissance, the Reformation added confessional pacts. Unfortunately, however, the two systems were not always compatible. The traditional amity between Castile and England, for example, was fatally undermined when the Tudor dynasty embraced Protestantism after 1532; and the “auld alliance” between Scotland and France was likewise wrecked by the progress of the Reformation in Scotland after 1560. Moreover, in many countries, the confessional divisions of Christendom after Luther created powerful religious minorities who were prepared to look abroad for guarantees of protection and solidarity: for example, the English Catholics to Spain and the French, German, and Dutch Calvinists to England.

      These developments created a situation of chronic political instability. On the one hand, the leaders of countries which themselves avoided religious fragmentation (such as Spain) were often unsure whether to frame their foreign policy according to confessional or political advantage. On the other hand, the foreign policy of religiously divided states, such as France, England, and the Dutch Republic, oscillated often and markedly because there was no consensus among the political elite concerning the correct principles upon which foreign policy should be based.

      The complexity of the diplomatic scene called for unusual skills among the rulers of post-Reformation Europe. Seldom has the importance of personality in shaping events been so great. The quixotic temperaments and mercurial designs of even minor potentates exerted a disproportionate influence on the course of events. Nevertheless, behind the complicated interplay of individuals and events, two constants may be detected. First, statesmen (church and state) and churchmen alike consistently identified politics and religion as two sides of the same coin. Supporters of the Bohemian rebellion of 1618, for example, frequently stated that “religion and liberty stand or fall together”: that is, a failure to defend and maintain religious liberty would necessarily lead to the loss of political freedom. The position of Emperor Ferdinand II (1619–37) was exactly the same. “God's blessing cannot be received,” he informed his subjects, “by a land in which prince and vassals do not both fervently uphold the one true Catholic faith.”

      These two views, precisely because they were identical, were totally incompatible. That their inevitable collision should have so often produced prolonged wars, however, was due to the second “constant”: the desire of political leaders everywhere, even on the periphery of Europe, to secure a balance of power (power, balance of) on the continent favourable to their interests. It is scarcely surprising that, when any struggle became deadlocked, the local rulers should look about for foreign support; it is more noteworthy that their neighbours were normally ready and eager to provide it. Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558–1603) offered substantial support after 1585 to the Dutch rebels against Philip II and after 1589 to the Protestant Henry IV of France against his more powerful Catholic subjects; Philip II of Spain (1556–98), for his part, sent troops and treasure to the French Catholics, while his son Philip III (1598–1621) did the same for the German Catholics.

      This willingness to assist arose because every court in Europe believed in a sort of domino theory, which argued that, if one side won a local war, the rest of Europe would inevitably be affected. The Spanish version of the theory was expressed in a letter from Archduchess Isabella, regent of the Spanish Netherlands, to her master Philip IV in 1623: “It would not be in the interests of Your Majesty to allow the Emperor or the Catholic cause to go down, because of the harm it would do to the possessions of Your Majesty in the Netherlands and Italy.” Thus the religious tensions released by the Reformation eventually pitted two incompatible ideologies against each other; this in turn initiated civil wars that lasted 30 years (in the case of France and Germany) and even 80 years (in the Netherlands), largely because all the courts of Europe saw that the outcome of each confrontation would affect the balance of power for a decade, a generation, perhaps forever.

N. Geoffrey Parker

The Wars of Religion
      Germany, France, and the Netherlands each achieved a settlement of the religious (Reformation) problem by means of war, and in each case the solution contained original aspects. In Germany the territorial formula of cuius regio, eius religio applied—that is, in each petty state the population had to conform to the religion of the ruler. In France, the Edict of Nantes (Nantes, Edict of) in 1598 embraced the provisions of previous treaties and accorded the Protestant Huguenots toleration within the state, together with the political and military means of defending the privileges that they had exacted. The southern Netherlands (Spanish Netherlands) remained Catholic and Spanish, but the Dutch (Dutch Republic) provinces formed an independent Protestant federation in which republican and dynastic influences were nicely balanced. Nowhere was toleration accepted as a positive moral principle, and seldom was it granted except through political necessity.

      There were occasions when the Wars of Religion assumed the guise of a supranational conflict between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Spanish, Savoyard, and papal troops supported the Catholic cause in France against Huguenots aided by Protestant princes in England and Germany. In the Low Countries, English, French, and German armies intervened; and at sea Dutch, Huguenot, and English corsairs fought the Battle of the Atlantic against the Spanish champion of the Counter-Reformation. In 1588 the destruction of the Spanish Armada against England was intimately connected with the progress of the struggles in France and the Netherlands.

      Behind this ideological grouping of the powers, national, dynastic, and mercenary interests generally prevailed. The Lutheran duke Maurice of Saxony assisted Charles V in the first Schmalkaldic War in 1547 in order to win the Saxon electoral dignity from his Protestant cousin, John Frederick; while the Catholic king Henry II of France supported the Lutheran cause in the second Schmalkaldic War in 1552 to secure French bases in Lorraine. John Casimir of the Palatinate, the Calvinist champion of Protestantism in France and the Low Countries, maintained an understanding with the neighbouring princes of Lorraine, who led the ultra-Catholic Holy League in France. In the French conflicts, Lutheran German princes served against the Huguenots, and mercenary armies on either side often fought against the defenders of their own religion. On the one hand, deep divisions separated Calvinist from Lutheran; and, on the other hand, political considerations persuaded the moderate Catholic faction, the Politiques, to oppose the Holy League. The national and religious aspects of the foreign policy of Philip II of Spain were not always in accord. Mutual distrust existed between him and his French allies, the family of Guise, because of their ambitions for their niece Mary Stuart. His desire to perpetuate French weakness through civil war led him at one point to negotiate with the Huguenot leader, Henry of Navarre (Henry IV) (afterward Henry IV of France). His policy of religious uniformity in the Netherlands alienated the most wealthy and prosperous part of his dominions. Finally, his ambition to make England and France the satellites of Spain weakened his ability to suppress Protestantism in both countries.

      In 1562, seven years after the Peace of Augsburg had established a truce in Germany on the basis of territorialism, France became the centre of religious wars which endured, with brief intermissions, for 36 years. The political interests of the aristocracy and the vacillating policy of balance pursued by Henry II's widow, Catherine de Médicis, prolonged these conflicts. After a period of warfare and massacre, in which the atrocities of St. Bartholomew's Day (1572) were symptomatic of the fanaticism of the age, Huguenot resistance to the crown was replaced by Catholic opposition to the monarchy's policy of conciliation to Protestants at home and anti-Spanish alliances abroad. The revolt of the Holy League against the prospect of a Protestant king in the person of Henry of Navarre released new forces among the Catholic lower classes, which the aristocratic leadership was unable to control. Eventually Henry won his way to the throne after the extinction of the Valois line, overcame separatist tendencies in the provinces, and secured peace by accepting Catholicism. The policy of the Bourbon dynasty resumed the tradition of Francis I, and under the later guidance of Cardinal Richelieu the potential authority of the monarchy was realized.

      In the Netherlands the wise Burgundian policies of Charles V were largely abandoned by Philip II and his lieutenants. Taxation, the Inquisition, and the suppression of privileges for a time provoked the combined resistance of Catholic and Protestant. The house of Orange, represented by William I the Silent and Louis of Nassau, acted as the focus of the revolt; and, in the undogmatic and flexible personality of William, the rebels found leadership in many ways similar to that of Henry of Navarre. The sack of the city of Antwerp by mutinous Spanish soldiery in 1576 (three years after the dismissal of Philip II's autocratic and capable governor, the Duke de Alba) completed the commercial decline of Spain's greatest economic asset. In 1579 Alessandro Farnese, Duke di Parma, succeeded in recovering the allegiance of the Catholic provinces, while the Protestant north declared its independence. French and English intervention failed to secure the defeat of Spain, but the dispersal of the Armada and the diversion of Parma's resources to aid the Holy League in France enabled the United Provinces of the Netherlands to survive. A 12-year truce was negotiated in 1609, and when the campaign began again it merged into the general conflict of the Thirty Years' War, which, like the other wars of religion of this period, was fought mainly for confessional security and political gain.

John Hearsey McMillan Salmon

The Thirty Years' War (Thirty Years' War)

The crisis in Germany
      The war originated with dual crises at the continent's centre: one in the Rhineland and the other in Bohemia, both part of the Holy Roman Empire.

“The dear old Holy Roman Empire, How does it stay together?”

 asked the tavern drinkers in Goethe's Faust—and the answer is no easier to find today than in the late 18th, or early 17th, century. The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was a land of many polities. In the empire there were some 1,000 separate, semiautonomous political units, many of them very small—such as the Imperial Knights, direct vassals of the emperor and particularly numerous in the southwest, who might each own only part of one village—and others comparable in size with smaller independent states elsewhere, such as Scotland or the Dutch Republic. At the top came the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs (Habsburg, House of), covering the elective kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, as well as Austria, the Tyrol (Tirol), and Alsace, with about 8,000,000 inhabitants; next came electoral Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bavaria, with more than 1,000,000 subjects each; and then the Palatinate, Hesse (Hessen), Trier, and Württemberg, with about 500,000 each.

      These were large polities, indeed, but they were weakened by three factors. First, they did not accept primogeniture: Hesse had been divided into four portions at the death of Landgrave Philip the Magnanimous, Luther's patron, in 1567; the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs were partitioned in 1564 and again in 1576. Second, many of the states were geographically fragmented: thus the Palatinate was divided into an Upper County, adjoining the borders of both Bohemia and Bavaria, and a Lower County, on the middle Rhine. These factors had, in the course of time, created in Germany a balance of power (power, balance of) between the states. The territorial strength of the Habsburgs may have brought them a monopoly of the imperial title from 1438 onward, but they could do no more: the other princes, when threatened, were able to form alliances whose military strength was equal to that of the emperor himself. However, the third weakness—the religious upheaval of the 16th century—changed all that: princes who had formerly stood together were now divided by religion. Swabia, for example, more or less equal in area to modern Switzerland, included 68 secular and 40 spiritual princes and also 32 imperial free cities. By 1618 more than half of these rulers and almost exactly half of the population were Catholic; the rest were Protestant (Protestantism). Neither bloc was prepared to let the other mobilize an army. Similar paralysis was to be found in most other regions: the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had separated Germany into hostile but evenly balanced confessional camps.

      The Religious Peace of Augsburg (Augsburg, Peace of) in 1555 had put an end to 30 years of sporadic confessional warfare in Germany between Catholics and Lutherans by creating a layered structure of legal securities for the people of the empire. At the top was the right (known as cuius regio, eius religio) of every secular ruler, from the seven electors down to the imperial knights, to dictate whether their subjects' religion was to be Lutheran or Catholic (the only officially permitted creeds). The only exceptions to this rule were the imperial free cities, where both Lutherans (Lutheranism) and Catholics were to enjoy freedom of worship, and the Catholic ecclesiastical states, where bishops and abbots who wished to become Lutherans were obliged to resign first. The latter provision, known as the reservatum ecclesiasticum, gave rise to a war in 1583–88 when the archbishop of Cologne declared himself a Protestant but refused to resign: in the end a coalition of Catholic princes, led by the duke of Bavaria, forced him out.

      This “War of Cologne” was a turning point in the religious history of Germany. Until then, the Catholics had been on the defensive, losing ground steadily to the Protestants. Even the decrees of the Council of Trent, which animated Catholics elsewhere, failed to strengthen the position of the Roman church in Germany. After the successful struggle to retain Cologne, however, Catholic princes began to enforce the cuius regio principle with rigour. In Bavaria, as well as in Würzburg, Bamberg, and other ecclesiastical states, Protestants were given the choice of either conversion or exile. Most of those affected were adherents of the Lutheran church, already weakened by defections to Calvinism, a new creed that had scarcely a German adherent at the time of the Religious Peace of Augsburg. The rulers of the Palatinate (1560), Nassau (1578), Hesse-Kassel (1603), and Brandenburg (1613) all abandoned Lutheranism for the new confession, as did many lesser rulers and several towns. Small wonder that the Lutherans came to detest the Calvinists even more than they loathed the Catholics.

      These religious divisions created a complex confessional pattern in Germany. By the first decade of the 17th century, the Catholics were firmly entrenched south of the Danube and the Lutherans northeast of the Elbe; but the areas in between were a patchwork quilt of Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic, and in some places one could find all three. One such was Donauwörth, an independent city just across the Danube from Bavaria, obliged (by the Peace of Augsburg) to tolerate both Catholics and Protestants. But for years the Catholic minority had not been permitted full rights of public worship. When in 1606 the priests tried to hold a procession through the streets, they were beaten and their relics and banners were desecrated. Shortly afterward, an Italian Capuchin, Fray Lorenzo da Brindisi (Lawrence of Brindisi, Saint), later canonized, arrived in the city and was himself mobbed by a Lutheran crowd chanting “Capuchin, Capuchin, scum, scum.” He heard from the local clergy of their plight and promised to find redress. Within a year, Fray Lorenzo had secured promises of aid from Duke Maximilian of Bavaria and Emperor Rudolf II. When the Lutheran magistrates of Donauwörth flatly refused to permit their Catholic subjects freedom of worship, the Bavarians marched into the city and restored Catholic worship by force (December 1607). Maximilian's men also banned Protestant worship and set up an occupation government that eventually transferred the city to direct Bavarian rule.

      These dramatic events thoroughly alarmed Protestants elsewhere in Germany. Was this, they wondered, the first step in a new Catholic offensive against heresy? Elector Frederick IV of the Palatinate took the lead. On May 14, 1608, he formed the Evangelical, or Protestant (Protestant Union), Union, an association to last for 10 years, for self-defense. At first, membership remained restricted to Germany, although the elector's leading adviser, Christian of Anhalt, wished to extend it, but before long a new crisis rocked the empire and turned the German union into a Protestant International.

      The new crisis began with the death of John William, the childless duke of Cleves-Jülich, in March 1609. His duchies, occupying a strategic position in the Lower Rhineland, had both Protestant and Catholic subjects, but both of the main claimants to the inheritance were Protestants; under the cuius regio principle, their succession would lead to the expulsion of the Catholics. The emperor therefore refused to recognize the Protestant princes' claim. Since both were members of the Union, they solicited, and received, promises of military aid from their colleagues; they also received, via Christian of Anhalt, similar promises from the kings of France and England. This sudden accretion in Protestant strength caused the German Catholics to take countermeasures: a Catholic League was formed between Duke Maximilian (Maximilian I) of Bavaria and his neighbours on July 10, 1609, soon to be joined by the ecclesiastical rulers of the Rhineland and receiving support from Spain and the Papacy. Again, reinforcement for one side provoked countermeasures. The Union leaders signed a defensive treaty with England in 1612 (cemented by the marriage of the Union's director, the young Frederick V of the Palatine, to the king of England's daughter) and with the Dutch Republic in 1613.

      At first sight, this resembles the pyramid of alliances, patiently constructed by the statesmen of Europe 300 years later, which plunged the continent into World War I. But whereas the motive of diplomats before 1914 was fear of political domination, before 1618 it was fear of religious extirpation. The Union members were convinced of the existence of a Catholic conspiracy aimed at rooting out all traces of Protestantism from the empire. This view was shared by the Union's foreign supporters. At the time of the Cleves-Jülich succession crisis, Sir Ralph Winwood, an English diplomat at the heart of affairs, wrote to his masters that, although “the issue of this whole business, if slightly considered, may seem trivial and ordinary,” in reality its outcome would “uphold or cast down the greatness of the house of Austria and the church of Rome in these quarters.” Such fears were probably unjustified at this time. In 1609 the unity of purpose between pope and emperor was in fact far from perfect, and the last thing Maximilian of Bavaria wished to see was Habsburg participation in the League: rather than suffer it, in 1614 he formed a separate association of his own and in 1616 he resigned from the League altogether. This reduction in the Catholic threat was enough to produce reciprocal moves among the Protestants. Although there was renewed fighting in 1614 over Cleves-Jülich, the members of the Protestant Union had abandoned their militant stance by 1618, when the treaty of alliance came up for renewal. They declared that they would no longer become involved in the territorial wrangles of individual members, and they resolved to prolong their association for only three years more.

      Although, to some extent, war came to Germany after 1618 because of the existence of these militant confessional alliances, the continuity must not be exaggerated. Both Union and League were the products of fear; but the grounds for fear seemed to be receding. The English ambassador in Turin, Isaac Wake, was sanguine: “The gates of Janus have been shut,” he exulted in late 1617, promising “calm and Halcyonian days not only unto the inhabitants of this province of Italye, but to the greatest part of Christendome.” That Wake was so soon proved wrong was due largely to events in the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs over the winter of 1617–18.

The crisis in the Habsburg (Habsburg, House of) lands
      While the Cleves-Jülich crisis held the attention of western Europe in 1609, the eyes of observers farther east were on Prague, the capital of Bohemia. That elective kingdom (which also included Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia), together with Hungary, had come to the Habsburg family in 1526. At first they were ruled jointly with Austria by Ferdinand I (brother of Emperor Charles V), but after his death in 1564 the inheritance was divided into three portions: Alsace and Tyrol (known as “Further Austria”) went to one of his younger sons; Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola (known as “Inner Austria”) went to a second; only the remainder was left for his successor as emperor, Maximilian II.

      By 1609 fragmentation had advanced even further: Maximilian's eldest son, Rudolf II (emperor, 1576–1611), ruled only Bohemia; all the rest of his father's territories had been acquired, the previous year, by a younger son, Matthias. The new ruler had come to power not through strength or talent, however, but by the exploitation of the religious divisions of his subjects. During the 1570s the Protestants of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary had used their strength of numbers and control of local representative assemblies to force the Habsburgs to grant freedom of worship to their Protestant subjects. This was clearly against the cuius regio principle, and everyone knew it. In 1599 the ruler of Inner Austria, Archduke Ferdinand (Ferdinand II), began a campaign of forcible re-Catholicization among his subjects, which proved entirely successful. But, when Rudolf II launched the same policy in Hungary shortly afterward, there was a revolt, and the rebels offered the Hungarian crown to Matthias in return for guarantees of toleration. The Bohemians decided to exploit Rudolf's temporary embarrassment by pressing him to grant similarly far-reaching concessions to the non-Catholic majority of that kingdom. The “Letter of Majesty” (Majestätsbrief) signed by Rudolf on July 9, 1609, granted full toleration to Protestants and created a standing committee of the Estates, known as “the Defensors,” to ensure that the settlement would be respected.

      Rudolf II—a recluse who hid in a world of fantasy and alchemy in his Hradčany palace above Prague, a manic depressive who tried to take his own life on at least one occasion—proved to be incapable of keeping to the same policy for long. In 1611 he tried to revoke the Letter of Majesty and to depose the Defensors by sending a small Habsburg army into Prague, but a force of superior strength was mobilized against the invaders and the Estates resolved to depose Rudolf and offer their crown to Matthias. The emperor, broken in mind and body, died in January 1612. All his territories were then ruled by his brother, who also succeeded him as Holy Roman emperor later in the year. The alliance with the Protestant Estates that brought about Matthias's elevation, however, did not long continue once he was in power. The new ruler sought to undo the concessions he had made, and he looked for support to his closest Habsburg relatives: his brother Albert (Albert VII), ruler of the Spanish Netherlands; his cousin Ferdinand, ruler of Inner Austria; and his nephew Philip III, king of Spain. All three, however, turned him down.

      Albert had in 1609 succeeded in bringing the war between Spain and the Dutch Republic to a temporary close with the Twelve Years' Truce. The last thing he wanted was to involve his ravaged country in supplying men and money to Vienna, perhaps provoking countermeasures from Protestants nearer home. Archduke Ferdinand, although willing to aid Matthias to uphold his authority (not least because he regarded himself as heir presumptive to the childless Matthias), was prevented from doing so by the outbreak of war between his Croatian subjects and the neighbouring republic of Venice (the Uskok War, 1615–18). Philip of Spain was also involved in war: in 1613–15 and 1616–17, Spanish forces in Lombardy fought the troops of the duke of Savoy over the succession to the childless duke of Mantua. Spain could therefore aid neither Matthias nor Ferdinand.

      In 1617, however, papal diplomats secured a temporary settlement of the Mantuan question, and Spanish troops hastened to the aid of Ferdinand. Before long, Venice made overtures for peace, and the archduke was able to leave his capital at Graz in order to join Matthias. The emperor, old and infirm, was anxious to establish Ferdinand as his heir, and, in the autumn of 1617, the Estates of both Bohemia and Hungary were persuaded to recognize the archduke unconditionally as king-designate. On the strength of this, Ferdinand proceeded over the winter of 1617–18 to halt the concessions being made to Protestants. He created a council of regency for Bohemia that was overwhelmingly Catholic, and it soon began to censor works printed in Prague and to prevent non-Catholics from holding government office. More inflammatory still, the regents ordered Protestant worship to stop in towns on church lands (which they claimed were not included in the Letter of Majesty).

      The Defensors (Prague, Defenestration of) created by the Letter of Majesty expressed strong objection to these measures and summoned the Estates of the realm to meet in May 1618. When the regents declared the meeting illegal, the Estates invaded the council chamber and threw two Catholic regents, together with their secretary, from the window. Next, a provisional government (known as the Directors) was created and a small army was raised.

      Apart from the famous “defenestration,” the events in Prague in May 1618 were, superficially, little different from those in 1609 and 1611. Yet no 30-year struggle arose from those earlier crises. The crucial difference lay in the involvement of foreign powers: in 1609 and 1611 the Habsburgs, represented by Rudolf and Matthias, had given in to their subjects' demands; in 1618, led by Ferdinand, they did not. At first his defiant stance achieved nothing, for the army of the rebels expelled loyal troops from almost every part of the kingdom while their diplomats secured declarations of support from Silesia, Lusatia, and Upper Austria almost at once and from Moravia and Lower Austria shortly afterward. In May 1619 the rebel army even laid siege to Ferdinand in Vienna. Within weeks, however, they were forced to withdraw because a major Spanish army, partly financed by the pope, invaded Bohemia.

      The appearance of Spanish troops and papal gold in eastern Europe immediately reawakened the fears of the Protestant rulers of the empire. To the government of Philip III, led by the former ambassador in Vienna, Don Balthasar de Zúñiga, the choice had seemed clear: “Your Majesty should consider,” wrote one minister, “which will be of the greater service to you: the loss of these provinces [to the house of Habsburg], or the dispatch of an army of 15 to 20 thousand men to settle the matter.” Seen in these terms, Spain could scarcely avoid military intervention in favour of Ferdinand; but to Protestant observers the logic of Spanish intervention seemed aggressive rather than defensive. Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador to the Dutch Republic, observed that the new emperor “flatters himself with prophesies of extirpating the Reformed religion and restoring the Roman church to the ancient greatness” and accurately predicted that, if the Protestant cause were to be “neglected and by consequence suppressed, the Protestant princes adjoining [Bohemia] are like to bear the burden of a victorious army.”

      This same argument carried weight with the director of the Protestant Union, Frederick V of the Palatinate, parts of whose territories adjoined Bohemia. So, when in the summer of 1619 the Bohemians deposed Ferdinand and offered the crown to Frederick, he was favourably disposed. Some of the elector's advisers favoured rejecting this offer, since “acceptance would surely begin a general religious war”; but others pointed out that such a war was inevitable anyway when the Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the Dutch Republic expired in April 1621 and argued that allowing the Bohemian cause to fail would merely ensure that the conflict in the Netherlands would be resolved in Spain's favour later, making a concerted Habsburg attack on the Protestants of the empire both ineluctable and irresistible.

      Frederick accepted the Bohemian crown and in so doing rekindled the worst fears of the German Catholics. The Catholic League was re-created, and in December 1619 its leaders authorized the levy of an army of 25,000 men to be used as Maximilian of Bavaria thought fit. At the same time, Philip III and Archduke Albert each promised to send a new army into Germany to assist Ferdinand (who had succeeded the late Matthias as Holy Roman emperor). The crisis was now apparent, and, as the Palatine diplomat Count John Albert Solms warned his master,

If it is true that the Bohemians are about to depose Ferdinand and elect another king, let everyone prepare at once for a war lasting twenty, thirty or forty years. The Spaniards and the House of Austria will deploy all their worldly goods to recover Bohemia.

      The underlying cause for the outbreak of a war that would last 30 years was thus the pathological fear of a Catholic conspiracy among the Protestants and the equally entrenched suspicion of a Protestant conspiracy among the Catholics. As a Bohemian noblewoman, Polyxena Lobkovic, perceptively observed from the vantage point of Prague: “Things are now swiftly coming to the pass where either the papists will settle their score with the Protestants, or the Protestants with the papists.”

The triumph of the Catholics, 1619–29
      Frederick V entered Prague and was crowned king by the rebel Estates in October 1619, but already the Catholic net was closing around him. The axis linking Vienna with Munich, Brussels, and Madrid enjoyed widespread support: subsidies came from Rome and Genoa, while Tuscany and Poland sent troops. Equally serious, states favourable to Frederick's cause were persuaded to remain neutral: Spanish diplomacy kept England out of the war, while French efforts persuaded the Protestant Union to remain aloof from the Bohemian adventure of their leader. The Dutch Republic also did nothing, so that in the summer of 1620 a Spanish army was able to cross from the Netherlands and occupy the Rhine Palatinate. Meanwhile, the armies of the emperor and League, reinforced with Spanish and Italian contingents, invaded the rebel heartland. On November 8, in the first significant battle of the war, at the White Mountain (White Mountain, Battle of) outside Prague, Frederick's forces were routed. The unfortunate prince fled northward, abandoning his subjects to the mercy of the victorious Ferdinand.

      This was total victory, and it might have remained the last word but for events in the Low Countries. Once the Twelve Years' Truce expired in April 1621, the Dutch, fearing a concerted attack by both Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, decided to provide an asylum for the defeated Frederick and to supply diplomatic and, eventually, military assistance to his cause. In 1622 and again in 1623, armies were raised for Frederick with Dutch money, but they were defeated. Worse, the shattered armies retreated toward the Netherlands, drawing the Catholic forces behind them. It began to seem that a joint Habsburg invasion of the republic was inevitable after all.

      The emperor's political position, however, weakened considerably in the course of 1623. Although his armies won impressive victories in the field, they were only able to do so thanks to massive financial and military support from the Catholic League, controlled by Maximilian (Maximilian I) of Bavaria. Ferdinand II, thanks to the Spanish and papal subsidies, maintained some 15,000 men himself, but the League provided him with perhaps 50,000. Thus Maximilian's armies had, in effect, won Ferdinand's victories and, now that all common enemies had been defeated, Maximilian requested his reward: the lands and electoral title of the outlawed Frederick of the Palatinate. Don Balthasar de Zúñiga (Baltazar de Zúñiga), chief minister of Ferdinand's other major ally, Spain, warned that the consequences of acceding to this demand could be serious, but in October 1622 he died, and no one else in Madrid—least of all his successor as principal minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares—had practical experience of German affairs; so in January 1623 the emperor felt able to proceed with the investiture of Maximilian as elector Palatine.

      Zúñiga, however, had been right: the electoral transfer provoked an enormous outcry, for it was clearly unconstitutional. The Golden Bull (Golden Bull of Emperor Charles IV) of 1356, which was universally regarded in Germany as the fundamental and immutable law of the empire, ordained that the electorate should remain in the Palatine house in perpetuity. The transfer of 1623 thus undermined a cornerstone of the Constitution, which many regarded as their only true safeguard against absolute rule. Inside Germany, a pamphlet war against Maximilian and Ferdinand began; outside, sympathy for Frederick at last created that international body of support for his cause which had previously been so conspicuously lacking. The Dutch and the Palatine exiles found little difficulty in engineering an alliance involving France, England, Savoy, Sweden, and Denmark that was dedicated to the restoration of Frederick to his forfeited lands and titles (the Hague Alliance, Dec. 9, 1624). Its leader was Christian IV of Denmark (1588–1648), one of the richest rulers in Christendom, who saw a chance to extend his influence in northern Germany under cover of defending “the Protestant cause.” He invaded the empire in June 1625.

      The Protestants' diplomatic campaign had not gone unnoticed, however. Maximilian's field commander, Count Tilly (Tilly, Johann Tserclaes, Graf von), warned that his forces alone would be no match for a coalition army and asked that the emperor send reinforcements. Ferdinand obliged: in the spring of 1625 he authorized Albrecht von Wallenstein (Wallenstein, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von, Herzog von Friedland, Herzog von Mecklenburg, Fürst Von Sagen), military governor of Prague, to raise an imperial army of 25,000 men and to move it northward to meet the Danish threat. Wallenstein's approach forced Christian to withdraw; when the Danes invaded again the following year, they were routed at the Battle of Lutter (Aug. 26, 1626). The joint armies of Tilly and Wallenstein pursued the defeated forces: first they occupied the lands of North German rulers who had declared support for the invasion, then they conquered the Danish mainland itself. Christian made peace in 1629, promising never again to intervene in the empire. His allies had long since withdrawn from the struggle.

      The White Mountain delivered the Bohemian rebels into the emperor's grasp; Lutter delivered the rebels' German supporters. After the victories, important new policies were initiated by Ferdinand which aimed at exalting the Catholic religion and his own authority. In the Habsburg provinces there was widespread confiscation of land—perhaps two-thirds of the kingdom of Bohemia changed hands during the 1620s—and a new class of loyal landowners—like Wallenstein—was established. At the same time, the power of the Estates was curtailed and freedom of worship for Protestants was restricted (in some territories) or abolished (in most of the rest). Even a rebellion in Upper Austria in 1626, provoked principally by the persecution of Protestants, failed to change Ferdinand's mind. Indeed, fortified by his success in the Habsburg lands, he decided to implement new policies in the empire. First, disloyal rulers were replaced (the Palatinate went to Maximilian, Mecklenburg to Wallenstein, and so on). Next, serious steps were taken to reclaim church lands that had fallen into Protestant hands. At first this was done on a piecemeal basis, but on March 28, 1629, an Edict of Restitution was issued which declared unilaterally that all church lands secularized since 1552 must be returned at once, that Calvinism was an illegal creed in the empire, and that ecclesiastical princes had the same right as secular ones to insist that their subjects should be of the same religion as their ruler. The last clause, at least, was clearly contrary to the terms of the Peace of Augsburg, which Protestants regarded as a central pillar of the Constitution. There was, however, no opportunity for argument, for the imperial edict was enforced immediately, brutally, by the armies of Wallenstein and Tilly, which now numbered some 200,000 men. The people of the empire seemed threatened with an arbitrary rule against which they had no defense. It was this fear, skillfully exploited once again by Protestant propagandists, which ensured that the war in Germany did not end in 1629 with the defeat of Denmark. Ferdinand may have won numerous military victories, but in doing so he had suffered a serious political defeat. The pens of his enemies proved mightier than the sword.

The crisis of the war, 1629–35
      If Maximilian of Bavaria desired the title of elector as his reward for supporting Ferdinand, Spain (for its part) required imperial support for its war against the Dutch. When repeated requests for a direct invasion by Wallenstein's army remained unanswered (largely due to Bavarian opposition), Spain began to think of creating a Baltic navy, with imperial assistance, which would cleanse the inland sea of Dutch shipping and thus administer a body blow to the republic's economy. But the plan aborted, for the imperial army failed in 1628 to conquer the port of Stralsund, selected as the base for the new fleet. Now, with Denmark defeated, Madrid again pleaded for the loan of an imperial army, and this time the request was granted. In the end, however, the troops did not march to the Netherlands: instead, they went to Italy.

      The death of the last native ruler of the strategic states of Mantua and Montferrat in December 1627 created dangers in Italy that the Spaniards were unable to ignore and temptations that they were unable to resist. Hoping to forestall intervention by others, Spanish forces from Lombardy launched an invasion, but the garrisons of Mantua and Montferrat declared for the late duke's relative, the French-born duke of Nevers. Nevers lacked the resources to withstand the forces of Spain alone, and he appealed to France for support. Louis XIII (1610–43) and Cardinal Richelieu (Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal et duc de) (chief minister 1624–42) were, however, engaged in a desperate war against their Calvinist subjects; only when the rebels had been defeated, early in 1629, was it possible for the king and his chief minister to cross the Mount Cenis Pass and enter Italy. It was to meet this threat that the emperor was asked by Philip IV of Spain (1621–65) to send his troops to Italy rather than to the Netherlands. When Louis XIII launched a second invasion in 1630, some 50,000 imperial troops were brought south to oppose them, reducing the war for Mantua to a stalemate but delivering the Dutch Republic from immediate danger and weakening the emperor's hold on Germany.

       Gustav II Adolf of Sweden (1611–32) had spent most of the 1620s at war with Poland, seeking to acquire territory on the southern shore of the Baltic. By the Truce of Altmark (Sept. 26, 1629), with the aid of French and British mediators, Poland made numerous concessions in return for a six-year truce. Gustav lost no time in redeploying his forces: on July 6, 1630, he led a Swedish expeditionary force ashore near Stralsund with the declared intention of saving the “liberties of the empire” and preserving the security of the Baltic.

      Despite the defeat of the German Protestants and their allies, Sweden's position was far more favourable than that of Denmark five years earlier. Instead of the two armies that had faced Christian IV, Gustav was opposed by only one, for in the summer of 1630 the emperor's Catholic allies in Germany—led by Maximilian of Bavaria—demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein and the drastic reduction of his expensive army. It was an ultimatum that Ferdinand, with the bulk of his forces tied down in the war of Mantua, could not ignore, even though he thereby lost the services of the one man who might conceivably have retained all the imperial gains of the previous decade and united Germany under a strong monarchy.

      The emperor and his German allies, nevertheless, did remain united over the Edict of Restitution: there were to be no concessions in matters of religion and no restoration of forfeited lands. As a result, the German Protestants were driven reluctantly into the arms of Sweden, whose army was increased with the aid of subsidies secured from France and the Dutch. In September 1631 Gustav at last felt strong enough to challenge the emperor's forces in battle: at Breitenfeld (Breitenfeld, Battle of), just outside Leipzig in Saxony, he was totally victorious. The main Catholic field army was destroyed, and the Swedish Protestant host overran most of central Germany and Bohemia in the winter of 1631–32. The next summer they occupied Bavaria. Although Gustav died in battle at Lützen (Lützen, Battle of) on Nov. 16, 1632, his forces were again victorious and his cause was directed with equal skill by his chief adviser, Axel Oxenstierna (Oxenstierna, Axel, Greve). In the east, Sweden managed to engineer a Russian invasion of Poland in the autumn of 1632 that tied down the forces of both powers for almost two years. Meanwhile, in Germany, Oxenstierna crafted a military alliance that transferred much of the cost of the war onto the shoulders of the German Protestant states (the Heilbronn League, April 23, 1633). Swedish ascendancy, however, was destroyed in 1634 when Russia made peace with Poland (at Polyanov, June 4) and Spain sent a large army across the Alps from Lombardy to join the imperial forces at the Battle of Nördlingen (Nördlingen, Battle of) (September 6). This time the Swedes were decisively beaten and were obliged to withdraw their forces in haste from most of southern Germany.

      Yet Sweden, under Oxenstierna's skillful direction, fought on. Certainly its motives included a desire to defend the Protestant cause in Germany and to restore deposed princes to their thrones; but more important by far was the fear that, if the German Protestants were finally defeated, the imperialists would turn the Baltic into a Habsburg lake and might perhaps invade Sweden. The Stockholm government therefore desired a settlement that would atomize the empire into a jumble of independent, weak states incapable of threatening the security of Sweden or its hold on the Baltic. Furthermore, to guarantee this fragmentation, Oxenstierna desired the transfer to his country of sovereignty over certain strategic areas of the empire—particularly the duchy of Pomerania on the Baltic coast and the electorate of Mainz on the Rhine.

      These, however, were not at all the goals of Sweden's German allies. They aimed rather at the restoration of the prewar situation—in which there had been no place for Sweden—and it soon became clear that they were prepared to make a separate settlement with the emperor in order to achieve it. No sooner was Gustav dead than the elector of Saxony, as “foremost Lutheran prince of the Empire,” put out peace-feelers toward Vienna. At first John George (John George I of Saxony) (1611–56) was adamant about the need to abolish the Edict of Restitution and to secure a full amnesty for all as preconditions for a settlement; but the imperial victory at Nördlingen made him less demanding. The insistence on an amnesty for Frederick V was dropped, and it was accepted that the edict would be applied in all areas recovered by Catholic forces before November 1627 (roughly speaking, this affected all lands south of the Elbe, but not the Lutheran heartland of Saxony and Brandenburg). The elector might have been required to make even more concessions but for the fact that, over the winter of 1634–35, French troops began to mass along the borders of Germany. As the papal nuncio in Vienna observed: “If the French intervene in Germany, the emperor will be forced to conclude peace with Saxony on whatever terms he can.” So the Peace of Prague was signed between the emperor and the Saxons on May 30, 1635, and within a year most other German Lutherans also changed their allegiance from Stockholm to Vienna.

The European war in Germany 1635–45
      This partial settlement of the issues behind the war led many in Germany to look forward to a general peace. Certainly the exhaustion of many areas of the empire was a powerful incentive to end the war. The population of Lutheran Württemberg, for example, which was occupied by the imperialists between 1634 and 1638, fell from 450,000 to 100,000; material damage was estimated at 34 million thalers. Mecklenburg and Pomerania, occupied by the Swedes, had suffered in proportion. Even a city like Dresden, the capital of Saxony, which was neither besieged nor occupied, saw its demographic balance change from 121 baptisms for every 100 burials in the 1620s to 39 baptisms for every 100 burials in the 1630s. Amid such catastrophes an overwhelming sense of war-weariness engulfed Germany. The English physician William Harvey (Harvey, William) (discoverer of the circulation of blood), while visiting Germany in 1636, wrote:

The necessity they have here is of making peace on any condition, where there is no more means of making war and scarce of subsistence. . . . This warfare in Germany . . . threatens, in the end, anarchy and confusion.

      Attempts were made to convert the Peace of Prague into a general settlement. At a meeting of the electors held at Regensburg in 1636–37, Ferdinand II agreed to pardon any prince who submitted to him and promised to begin talks with the foreign powers to discover their terms for peace. But the emperor's death immediately after the meeting ended this initiative. Efforts by Pope Urban VIII (1623–44) to convene a general conference at Cologne were similarly unavailing. Then, in 1640, the new emperor, Ferdinand III (1637–57), assembled the Imperial Diet for the first time since 1613 in order to solve at least the outstanding German problems of the amnesty question and the restitution of church lands. He met with little success and could not prevent first Brandenburg (1641) and then Brunswick (1642) from making a separate agreement with Sweden. The problem was that none of these attempts at peace were acceptable to France and Sweden, yet no lasting settlement could be made without them.

      After the Peace of Prague, the nature of the Thirty Years' War was transformed. Instead of being principally a struggle between the emperor and his own subjects, with some foreign aid, it became a war of the emperor against foreign powers whose German supporters were, at most times, few in number and limited in resources. Sweden, as noted above, had distinct and fairly consistent war aims: to secure some bases in the empire, both as guarantees of influence in the postwar era and as some recompense for coming to the rescue of the Protestants, and to create a system of checks and balances in Germany, which would mean that no single power (power, balance of) would ever again become dominant. If those aims could be achieved, Oxenstierna was prepared to quit. As he wrote:

We must let this German business be left to the Germans, who will be the only people to get any good out of it (if there is any), and therefore not spend any more men or money, but rather try by all means to wriggle out of it.

      But how could these objectives be best achieved? The Heilbronn League did not long survive the Battle of Nördlingen and the Peace of Prague, and so it became necessary to find an alternative source of support. The only one available was France. Louis XIII and Richelieu, fresh from their triumph in Italy, had been subsidizing Sweden's war effort for some time. In 1635, in the wake of Nördlingen, they signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Dutch Republic (February 8), with Sweden (April 28), and with Savoy (July 11); they sent an army into the Alps to occupy the Valtelline, a strategic military link between the possessions of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs (March); and they mediated a 20-year truce between Sweden and Poland (September 12). Finally, on May 19, 1635, they declared war on Spain.

      The aims of France were very different from those of Sweden and its German allies. France wished to defeat Spain, its rival for more than a century, and its early campaigns in Germany were intended more to prevent Ferdinand from sending aid to his Spanish cousins than to impose a Bourbon solution on Germany—indeed, France only declared war on Ferdinand in March 1636. Sweden at first therefore avoided a firm commitment to France, leaving the way clear for a separate peace should the military situation improve sufficiently to permit the achievement of its own particular aims. The war, however, did not go in favour of the allies. French and Swedish forces, operating separately, totally failed to reverse the verdict of Nördlingen: despite the Swedish victory at Wittstock (Oct. 4, 1636) and French gains in Alsace and the middle Rhine (1638), the Habsburgs always seemed able to even up the score. Thus in 1641 Oxenstierna abandoned his attempt to maintain independence and threw in his lot with France. By the terms of the Treaty of Hamburg (March 15, 1641), the two sides promised not to make a separate peace. Instead, joint negotiations with the emperor and the German princes for the satisfaction of the allies' claims were to begin in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. And, while the talks proceeded, the war was to continue.

      The Treaty of Hamburg had at last created a coalition capable of destroying the power both of Ferdinand III and of Maximilian of Bavaria. On the whole, France attacked Bavaria, and Sweden fought the emperor; but there was considerable interchange of forces and a carefully coordinated strategy. On Nov. 2, 1642, the Habsburgs' army was routed in Saxony at the Second Battle of Breitenfeld, and the emperor was saved from further defeat only by the outbreak of war between Denmark and Sweden (May 1643–August 1645). Yet, even before Denmark's final surrender, the Swedes were back in Bohemia, and at Jankov (March 6, 1645) they totally destroyed another imperial army. The emperor and his family fled to Graz, while the Swedes advanced to the Danube and threatened Vienna. Reinforcements were also sent to assist the French campaign against Bavaria, and on August 3 Maximilian's forces were decisively defeated at Allerheim.

      Jankov and Allerheim were two of the truly decisive battles of the war, because they destroyed all possibility of the Catholics obtaining a favourable peace settlement. In September 1645 the elector of Saxony made a separate peace with Sweden and so—like Brandenburg and Brunswick before him—in effect withdrew from the war. Meanwhile, at the peace conference in session in Westphalia, the imperial delegation began to make major concessions: Oxenstierna noted with satisfaction that, since Jankov, “the enemy begins to talk more politely and pleasantly.” He was confident that peace was just around the corner. He was wrong.

Making peace, 1645–48
      One hundred and ninety-four European rulers, great and small, were represented at the Congress of Westphalia (Westphalia, Peace of), and talks went on constantly from the spring of 1643 until the autumn of l648. The outstanding issues of the war were solved in two phases: the first, which lasted from November 1645 until June 1647, saw the chief imperial negotiator, Maximilian, Count Trauttmannsdorf, settle most issues; the second, which continued from then until the treaty of peace was signed in October 1648, saw France try to sabotage the agreements already made.

      The purely German problems were resolved first, partly because they were already near solution and partly because the foreign diplomats realized that it was best (in the words of Count d'Avaux, the French envoy)

to place first on the table the items concerning public peace and the liberties of the Empire, . . . because if the German rulers do not yet truly wish for peace, it would be . . . damaging to us if the talks broke down over our own particular demands.

      So in 1645 and 1646, with the aid of French and Swedish mediation, the territorial rulers were granted a large degree of sovereignty (Landeshoheit), a general amnesty was issued to all German princes, an eighth electorate was created for the son of Frederick V (so that both he and Maximilian possessed the coveted dignity), the Edict of Restitution was finally abandoned, and Calvinism within the empire was granted official toleration. The last two points were the most bitterly argued and led to the division of the German rulers at the Congress into two blocs: the Corpus Catholicorum and the Corpus Evangelicorum. Neither was monolithic or wholly united, but eventually the Catholics split into those who were prepared to make religious concessions in order to have peace and those who were not. A coalition of Protestants and pragmatic Catholics then succeeded in securing the acceptance of a formula that recognized as Protestant all church lands in secular hands by Jan. 1, 1624 (that is, before the gains made by Wallenstein and Tilly), and granted freedom of worship to religious minorities where these had existed by the same date. The Augsburg settlement of 1555 was thus entirely overthrown, and it was agreed that any change to the new formula must be achieved only through the “amicable composition” of the Catholic and Protestant blocs, not by a simple majority.

      The amicable composition principle was finally accepted by all parties early in l648, thus solving the last German problem. That this did not lead to immediate peace was due to the difficulty of satisfying the foreign powers involved. Apart from France and Sweden, representatives from the Dutch Republic, Spain, and many other non-German participants in the war were present, each of them eager to secure the best settlement they could. The war in the Netherlands was the first to be ended: on Jan. 30, 1648, Philip IV of Spain signed a peace that recognized the Dutch Republic as independent and agreed to liberalize trade between the Netherlands and the Iberian world. The French government, led since Richelieu's death (Dec. 4, 1642) by Jules Cardinal Mazarin (Mazarin, Jules, Cardinal) (Giulio Mazzarino), was bitterly opposed to this settlement, since it left Spain free to deploy all its forces in the Low Countries against France; as a consequence, France devoted all its efforts to perpetuating the war in Germany. Although Mazarin had already signed a preliminary agreement with the emperor in September 1646, which conveyed parts of Alsace and Lorraine to France, in 1647–48 he started a new campaign in Germany in order to secure more. On May 17, l648, another Bavarian army was destroyed at Zusmarshausen, near Nördlingen, and Maximilian's lands were occupied by the French.

      Mazarin's desire to keep on fighting was thwarted by two developments. On the one hand, the pressure of the war on French taxpayers created tensions that in June l648 erupted into the revolt known as the Fronde (Fronde, the). On the other hand, Sweden made a separate peace with the emperor. The Stockholm government, still directed by Oxenstierna, was offered half of Pomerania, most of Mecklenburg, and the secularized bishoprics of Bremen and Verden; it was to receive a seat in the Imperial Diet; and the territories of the empire promised to pay five million thalers to the Swedish army for its wage arrears. With so many tangible gains, and with Germany so prostrated that there was no risk of any further imperial attack, it was clearly time to wriggle out of the war, even without France; peace was thus signed on August 6.

      Without Sweden, Mazarin realized that France needed to make peace at the earliest opportunity. He informed his representatives at the Congress:

It is almost a miracle that . . . we can keep our affairs going, and even make them prosper; but prudence dictates that we should not place all our trust in this miracle continuing for long.

      Mazarin therefore settled with the emperor on easy terms: France gained only the transfer of a bundle of rights and territories in Alsace and Lorraine and little else. Mazarin could, nevertheless, derive satisfaction from the fact that, when the ink dried on the final treaty of Oct. 24, l648, the emperor was firmly excluded from the empire and was under oath to provide no further aid to Spain. Mazarin settled down to suppress the Fronde revolt and to win the war against Philip IV.

Problems not solved by the war
      Some historians have sought to diminish the achievements of the Thirty Years' War, and the peace that ended it, because not all of Europe's outstanding problems were settled. The British historian C.V. Wedgwood, for example, in a classic study of the war first published in 1938, stated baldly:

The war solved no problem. Its effects, both immediate and indirect, were either negative or disastrous. . . . It is the outstanding example in European history of meaningless conflict.

      It is true that the struggle between France and Spain continued with unabated bitterness until 1659 and that, within a decade of the Westphalian settlement, Sweden was at war with Poland (1655–60), Russia (1656–58), and Denmark (1657–58). It is also true that, in the east, a war broke out in 1654 between Poland and Russia that was to last until 1667, while tension between the Habsburgs and the Turks increased until war came in 1663. Even within the empire, there were disputes over the partition of Cleves-Jülich, still a battle zone after almost a half-century, which caused minor hostilities in 1651. Lorraine remained a theatre of war until the duke signed a final peace with France in 1661. But to expect a single conflict in early modern times to have solved all of Europe's problems is anachronistic: the continent was not the single political system that it later became. It is wrong to judge the Congress of Westphalia by the standard of the Congress of Vienna (1815). Examined more closely, the peace conference that ended the Thirty Years' War settled a remarkable number of crucial issues.

Problems solved by the war
      The principal Swedish diplomat at Westphalia, Johann Adler Salvius, complained to his government in 1646 that

people are beginning to see the power of Sweden as dangerous to the balance of power (power, balance of). Their first rule of politics here is that the security of all depends upon the equilibrium of the individuals. When one ruler begins to become powerful . . . the others place themselves, through unions or alliances, into the opposite balance in order to maintain the equipoise.

      It was the beginning of a new order in Europe, and Sweden, for all her military power, was forced to respect it. The system depended on channeling the aggression of German princes from thoughts of conquering their neighbours to dreams of weakening them; and it proved so successful that, for more than a century, the settlement of l648 was widely regarded as the principal guarantee of order and peace in central Europe. In 1761 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques) wrote in praise of the “balance of power” in Europe which, he believed, was anchored in the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire

which takes from conquerors the means and the will to conquer. . . . Despite its imperfections, this Imperial constitution will certainly, while it lasts, maintain the balance in Europe. No prince need fear lest another dethrone him. The peace of Westphalia may well remain the foundation of our political system for ever.

      As late as 1866, the French statesman Adolphe Thiers claimed that

Germany should continue to be composed of independent states connected only by a slender federative thread. That was the principle proclaimed by all Europe at the Congress of Westphalia.

      It was indeed: the balance of power with its fulcrum in Germany, created by the Thirty Years' War and prolonged by the Peace of Westphalia, was a major achievement. It may not have lasted, as Rousseau rashly prophesied, forever, but it certainly endured for more than a century.

      It was, for example, almost a century before German rulers went to war with each other again—a strong contrast with the hundred years before 1618, which had been full of armed neutrality and actual conflict. The reason for the contrast was simple: the Thirty Years' War had settled both of the crises which had so disturbed the peace in the decades before it began.

      In the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs (Habsburg, House of), there were now no powerful estates and no Protestant worship (except in Hungary), and, despite all the efforts of the Swedish diplomats at Westphalia, there was no restoration of the lands confiscated from rebels and others. The Habsburg Monarchy, born of disparate units but now entirely under the authority of the king-emperor, had become a powerful state in its own right. Purged of political and religious dissidents and cut off from its western neighbours and from Spain, the compact private territories of the Holy Roman emperor were still large enough to guarantee him a place among the foremost rulers of Europe. In the empire, by contrast, the new stability rested upon division rather than unity. Although the territorial rulers had acquired, at Westphalia, supreme power in their localities and collective power in the Diet to regulate common taxation, defense, laws, and public affairs without imperial intervention, the “amicable composition” formula prevented in fact any changes being made to the status quo. The originality of this compromise (enshrined in Article V, paragraph 52, of the Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense) has not always been appreciated. An age that normally revered the majority principle sanctioned an alternative method—parity between two unequal groups (known as itio in partes)—for reaching decisions.

      Looked at more pragmatically, what the itio in partes formula achieved was to remove religion as a likely precipitant of political conflict. Although religion remained a matter of high political importance (for instance, in cementing an alliance against Louis XIV after 1685 or in unseating James II of England in 1688), it no longer determined international relations as it once had done.

      When one of the diplomats at the Congress of Westphalia observed that “reason of state is a wonderful animal, for it chases away all other reasons,” he in fact paid tribute to the secularization that had taken place in European politics since 1618. But when, precisely, did it happen? Perhaps with the growing preponderance of non-German rulers among the enemies of the emperor. Without question, those German princes who took up arms against Ferdinand II were strongly influenced by confessional considerations, and, as long as these men dominated the anti-Habsburg cause, so too did the issue of religion. Frederick of the Palatine and Christian of Anhalt, however, failed to secure a lasting settlement. Gradually the task of defending the Protestant cause fell into the hands of Lutherans, less militant and less intransigent than the Calvinists; and the Lutherans were prepared to ally, if necessary, with Anglican England, Catholic France, and even Orthodox Russia in order to create a coalition capable of defeating the Habsburgs. Naturally such states had their own reasons for fighting; and, although upholding the Protestant cause may have been among them, it seldom predominated. After 1625, therefore, the role of religious issues in European politics steadily receded. This was, perhaps, the greatest achievement of the war, for it thus eliminated the major destabilizing influence in European politics, which had both undermined the internal cohesion of many states and overturned the diplomatic balance of power created during the Renaissance.

N. Geoffrey Parker

The great age of monarchy, 1648–1789

Order from disorder
      By the 17th century there was already a tradition and awareness of Europe: a reality stronger than that of an area bounded by sea, mountains, grassy plains, steppes, or deserts where Europe clearly ended and Asia began—“that geographical expression” which in the 19th century Otto von Bismarck (Bismarck, Otto von) was to see as counting for little against the interests of nations. In the two centuries before the French Revolution and the triumph of nationalism as a divisive force, Europe exhibited a greater degree of unity than appeared on the mosaic of its political surface. With appreciation of the separate interests that Bismarck would identify as “real” went diplomatic, legal, and religious concerns which involved states in common action and contributed to the notion of a single Europe. King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden saw one aspect when he wrote: “All the wars that are afoot in Europe have become as one.”

      A European identity took shape in the work of Hugo Grotius (Grotius, Hugo), whose De Jure Belli et Pacis (1625; On the Law of War and Peace) was a plea for the spirit of law in international relations. It gained substance in the work of the great congresses (starting with those of Münster and Osnabrück before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) that met not only to determine rights and frontiers, taking into account the verdict of battle and resources of states, but also to settle larger questions of justice and religion. By 1700 statesmen had begun to speak of Europe as an interest to be defended against the ambitions of particular states. Europe represented an audience for those who wrote about the great issues of faith, morals, politics, and, increasingly, science: Descartes did not write only for Frenchmen, nor Leibniz for Germans. The use of Latin as the language of diplomacy and scholarship and the ubiquity, alongside local systems and customs, of Roman law were two manifestations of the unity of Christendom (Christianity).

      As a spiritual inheritance and dynamic idea greater than the sum of the policies of which it was composed, “Christendom” best represents Europe as envisaged by those who thought and wrote about it. The existence of vigorous Jewish (Jew) communities—at times persecuted, as in Poland in 1648, but in places such as Amsterdam secure, prosperous, and creative—only serves to emphasize the essential fact: Europe and Christendom were interchangeable terms. The 16th century had experienced schism, and the development of separate confessions had shredded “the seamless robe,” but it had done so without destroying the idea of catholicism to which the Roman church gave institutional form. The word catholic survived in the creeds of Protestant (Protestantism) churches, such as that of England. Calvin had thought in catholic, not sectarian, terms when he mourned for the Body of Christ, “bleeding, its members severed.” Deeper than quarrels about articles of belief or modes of worship lay the mentality conditioned by centuries of war against pagan and infidel, as by the Reconquista in Spain, which had produced a strong idea of a distinctive European character. The Renaissance, long-evolving and coloured by local conditions, had promoted attitudes still traceable to the common inheritance. The Hellenic spirit of inquiry, the Roman sense of order, and the purposive force of Judaism had contributed to a cultural synthesis and within it an article of faith whose potential was to be realized in the intellectual revolution of the 17th century—namely, that man was an agent in a historical process which he could aspire both to understand and to influence.

      By 1600 the outcome of that process was the complex system of rights and values comprised in feudalism, chivalry, the crusading ideal, scholasticism, and humanism. Even to name them is to indicate the rich diversity of the European idea, whether inspiring adventures of sword and spirit or imposing restraints upon individuals inclined to change. The forces making for change were formidable. The Protestant and Roman Catholic Reformations brought passionate debate of an unsettling kind. Discoveries and settlement overseas extended mental as well as geographic horizons, brought new wealth, and posed questions about the rights of indigenous peoples and Christian duty toward them. Printing gave larger scope to authors of religious or political propaganda. The rise of the state brought reactions from those who believed they lost by it or saw others benefit exceedingly from new sources of patronage.

      Meanwhile, the stakes were raised by price inflation, reflecting the higher demand attributable to a rise in the population of about 25 percent between 1500 and 1600 and the inflow of silver from the New World; the expansion of both reached a peak by 1600. Thereafter, for a century, the population rose only slightly above 100 million and pulled back repeatedly to that figure, which seemed to represent a natural limit. The annual percentage rate of increase in the amount of bullion in circulation in Europe, which had been 3.8 in 1550 and 1 in 1600, was, by 1700, 0.5. The extent to which these facts, with attendant phenomena—notably the leveling out from about 1620, and thereafter the lowering, of demand, prices, and rents before the resumption of growth about 1720—influenced the course of events must remain uncertain. Controversy has centred around the cluster of social, political, and religious conflicts and revolts that coincided with the deepening of the recession toward mid-century. Some historians have seen there not particular crises but a “general crisis.” Most influential in the debate have been the Marxist view that it was a crisis of production and the liberal political view that it was a general reaction to the concentration of power at the centre.

      Any single explanation of the general crisis may be doomed to fail. That is not to say that there was no connection between different features of the period. These arose from an economic malaise that induced an introspective mentality, which tended to pessimism and led to repressive policies but which also was expressed more positively in a yearning and search for order. So appear rationalists following René Descartes in adopting mathematical principles in a culture dominated by tradition; artists and writers accepting rules such as those imposed by the French Academy (founded 1635); statesmen looking for new principles to validate authority; economic theorists (later labeled “mercantilists”) justifying the need to protect and foster native manufactures and fight for an apparently fixed volume of trade; the clergy, Catholic and Protestant alike, seeking uniformity and tending to persecution; witch-hunters rooting out irregularities in the form of supposed dealings with Satan; even gardeners trying to impose order on unruly nature. Whether strands in a single pattern or distinct phenomena that happen to exhibit certain common principles, each has lent itself to a wider perception of the 17th century as classical, baroque, absolutist, or mercantilist.

      There is sufficient evidence from tolls, rents, taxes, riots, and famines to justify arguments for something more dire than a downturn in economic activity. There are, however, other factors to be weighed: prolonged wars fought by larger armies, involving more matériel, and having wider political repercussions; more efficient states, able to draw more wealth from taxpayers; and even, at certain times (such as the years 1647–51), particularly adverse weather, as part of a general deterioration in climatic conditions. There are also continuities that cast doubt on some aspects of the general picture. For example, the drive for conformity can be traced at least to the Council of Trent, whose final sessions were in 1563; but it was visibly losing impetus, despite Louis XIV's intolerant policy leading to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), after the Peace of Westphalia. Puritanism, which has been seen as a significant reflection of a contracting economy, was not a prime feature of the second half of the century, though mercantilism was. Then there are exceptions even to economic generalizations: England and, outstandingly, the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Insights and perspectives gain from the search for general causes. But truth requires an untidy picture of Europe in which discrepancies abound, in which men subscribe to a common civilization while cherishing specific rights; in which countries evolved along distinctive paths; and in which much depended on the idiom of a community, on the ability of ruler or minister, on skills deployed and choices made.

      Complementing the search for order and for valid authority in other fields, and arising out of the assertion of rights and the drive to control, a feature of the 17th century was the clarification of ideas about the physical bounds of the world. In 1600 “Europe” still lacked exact political significance. Where, for example, in the eastern plains before the Ural Mountains or the Black Sea were reached, could any line have meaning? Were Christian peoples—Serbs, Romanians, Greeks, or Bulgarians—living under Turkish rule properly Europeans? The tendency everywhere was to envisage boundaries in terms of estates and lordships. Where the legacy of feudalism was islands of territory either subject to different rulers or simply independent, or where, as in Dalmatia or Podolia (lands vulnerable to Turkish raids), the frontier was represented by disputed, inherently unstable zones, a linear frontier could emerge only out of war and diplomacy. The process can be seen in the wars of France and Sweden. Both countries were seen by their neighbours as aggressive, yet they were concerned as much with a defensible frontier as with the acquisition of new resources. Those objectives inspired the expansionist policies of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV and—with the added incentives of fighting the infidel and recovering a patrimony lost since the defeat at Mohács in 1526—the reconquest of Hungary, which led to the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699). The frontier then drawn was sufficiently definite—despite modifications, as after the loss of Belgrade (1739)—to make possible effective government within its perimeter.

      Another feature of the period was the drawing into the central diplomatic orbit of countries that had been absorbed hitherto in questions of little consequence. Although Henry of Valois had been elected king of Poland before he inherited the French throne (1574) and James VI of Scotland (later James I of England, 1603–25) had married Anne of Denmark, whose country had a footing in Germany through its duchy of Holstein, it was still usual for western statesmen to treat the Baltic states as belonging to a separate northern system. Trading interests and military adventures that forged links, for example, with the United Provinces—as when Sweden intervened in the German war in 1630—complicated already tangled diplomatic questions.

      Travelers who ventured beyond Warsaw, Kraków, and the “black earth” area of Mazovia, thence toward the Pripet Marshes, might not know when they left Polish lands and entered those of the tsar. The line between Orthodox Russia and the rest of Christian Europe had never been so sharp as that which divided Christendom and Islām. Uncertainties engendered by the nature of Russian religion, rule, society, and manners perpetuated former ambivalent attitudes toward Byzantium. Unmapped spaces, where Europe petered out in marshes, steppes, and forests of birch and alder, removed the beleaguered though periodically expanding Muscovite state from the concern of all but neighbouring Sweden and Poland. The establishment of a native dynasty with the accession of Michael Romanov in 1613, the successful outcome of the war against Poland that followed the fateful revolt in 1648 of the Ukraine against Polish overlordship, the acquisition of huge territories including Smolensk and Kiev (Treaty of Andrusovo, 1667), and, above all, the successful drive of Peter I the Great to secure a footing in the Baltic were to transform the picture. By the time of Peter's death in 1725, Russia was a European state: still with some Asian characteristics, still colonizing rather than assimilating southern and eastern lands up to and beyond the Urals, but interlocked with the diplomatic system of the West. A larger Europe, approximating to the modern idea, began to take shape.

The human condition
      For most inhabitants of Europe, the highest aim was to survive in a hazardous world. They were contained in an inelastic frame by their inability to produce more than a certain amount of food or to make goods except by hand or by relatively simple tools and machines. In this natural, or preindustrial, economy, population played the main part in determining production and demand through the amount of labour available for field, mill, and workshop and through the number of consumers. Jean Bodin (writing toward the end of an age of rising population) stated what was to become the truism of the anxious 17th century when he wrote that men were “the only strength and wealth.” The 16th century had seen the last phase in recovery from the Black Death, which had killed about a third of Europe's people. The 1590s brought a sharp check: dearth and disorder were especially severe in France and Spain. There were particular reasons: the effect of civil wars and Spanish invasion in France, the load placed on the Castilian economy by the imperialist policies of Philip II. France made a speedy, if superficial, recovery during the reign of Henry IV, but the truce between Spain and the United Provinces (1609) presented the Dutch with an open market from which they proceeded to drive out the native producers. Meanwhile, virulent outbreaks of plague had contributed to Spain's loss of more than a million people.

      A feature of the late 16th century had been the growth of cities. Those that had flourished most from expansion of trade or government offered sustenance of a kind for refugees from stricken villages. Meanwhile, peasants (peasant) were paying the price for the intensified cultivation necessitated by the 16th century's growth in population. The subdivision of holdings, the cultivation of marginal land, and the inevitable preference for cereal production at the cost of grazing, with consequent loss of the main fertilizer, animal dung, depressed crop yields. The nature of the trap that closed around the poor can be found in the statistics of life expectancy, averaging 25 years but nearer 20 in the larger towns. It took three times as many births to maintain the level of population as it did at the end of the 20th century.

      There also were large fluctuations, such as that caused by the loss of at least 5 of Germany's 20 million during the Thirty Years' War. The “vital revolution” is an apt description of the start of a process that has continued to the present day. Until 1800, when the total European population was about 180 million, growth was modest and uneven: relatively slow in France (from 20 to 27 million), Spain (from 7 to 9 million), and Italy (from 13 to 17 million) and nonexistent in war-torn Poland until 1772, when the first of three partitions anticipated its demise as a political entity. Significantly, the rise in population was the most marked in Britain, where agriculture, manufacturing, and trade benefited from investment and innovation, and in Russia, which was technologically backward but which colonized near-empty lands. Among the causes were improvements in housing, diet, and hygiene.

      Given man's dependence on nature, the deterioration of the climate during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century should be considered as a demographic factor. The absence of sunspots after 1645 was noted by astronomers using the recently invented telescope; the aurora borealis (northern lights) (caused by high-energy particles from the Sun entering the Earth's atmosphere) was so rarely visible that it was thought ominous when it did appear; measurement of tree rings shows them to be relatively thin in this period but containing heavy deposits of radioactive carbon-14, associated with the decline of solar energy; snow lines were observed to be lower; and glaciers advanced into Alpine valleys, reaching their farthest point about 1670. All of these phenomena support plentiful anecdotal evidence for a period of unfavourable climate characterized by cold winters and wet summers. A decrease of about 1 percent in solar radiation meant a growing season shorter by three weeks and the altitude at which crops would ripen lowered by 500 feet. With most of the population living near subsistence level and depending upon cereal crops, the effect was most severe on those who farmed marginal land, especially on northerners for whom the growing season was already short. They were not the only ones who suffered, for freakish conditions were possible then as now. Around Toledo—where until the late 17th century the plains and sierras of New Castile provided a bare living from wheat, vines, and olives—disastrous frosts (frost) resulted in mass emigration. drought also brought deprivation. During 1683 no rain fell in Andalusia until November; the cattle had to be killed, the crops were dry stalks, and thousands starved. In the great winter of 1708–09, rivers froze, even the swift-flowing Rhône, and wolves roamed the French countryside; after late frosts, which killed vines and olive trees, the harvest was a catastrophe: by December the price of bread had quadrupled.

      Less spectacular, but more deadly, were the sequences of cold springs and wet summers. From the great mortalities such as those of 1647–52 and 1691–95 in France the population was slow to recover; women were rendered infertile, marriages were delayed, and births were avoided. They were times of fear for masters and shameful resort to beggary, abortion, and infanticide for the common people. It was also a hard time for the government and its tax-collectors. The disastrous harvest of the previous year was the direct cause of the revolt of the Sicilians in 1648. The connection between the outbreak of the Fronde in the same year and harvest failure is less direct: some revolt would probably have occurred in any case. There is a clear link, however, between the wet Swedish summer of 1649 and the constitutional crisis of the following year.

      The period between the revolt of Bohemia (1618) and the peace of Nystad (1721), which coincides with the check to growth and subsequent recession, also saw prolonged warfare. Developments within states and leagues between them made possible the mustering of larger armies than ever before. How important then was war as an influence on economic and social conditions? The discrepancy between the high aspirations of sovereigns and the brutal practice of largely mercenary soldiers gave the Thirty Years' War a nightmarish character. It is, however, hard to be precise about the consequences of this general melee. As hostilities ended, rulers exaggerated losses to strengthen claims for compensation; refugees returned, families emerged from woods and cellars and reappeared on tax rolls; ruined villages were rebuilt and wastelands were tilled; a smaller population was healthier and readily procreative. The devastation was patchy. Northwestern Germany, for example, was little affected; some cities, such as Hamburg, actually flourished, while others, such as Leipzig and Nürnberg, quickly responded to commercial demand. The preindustrial economy proved to be as resilient as it was vulnerable. Yet the German population did not rise to prewar levels until the end of the 17th century.

      The causes of this demographic disaster lie in the random nature of operations and the way in which armies, disciplined only on the battlefield, lived off the land. Casualties in battle were not the prime factor. In the warfare of the 17th and 18th centuries, mortal sickness in the armies exceeded death in action in the proportion of five to one. Disease spread in the camps and peasant communities deprived by pillage of their livelihood. The cost to the home country of operations abroad could be comparatively small, as it was to Sweden, at least until 1700 and the Great Northern War (Northern War, Second), which developed into a struggle for survival. Special factors—notably naval and commercial strength, the ability to prey on the enemy's commerce and colonies, and immigration from the occupied south—enabled the United Provinces to grow richer from their wars against Spain (1572–1609 and 1621–48). By contrast, those living in the main theatres of war and occupation were vulnerable: the Spanish southern provinces of the Netherlands, Lorraine (open to French troops), Pomerania and Mecklenberg (to Swedish troops), and Württemberg (to Austrian and French) were among those who paid the highest bills of war.

      The ability of states to bring their armies under control meant that operations after 1648 were better regulated and had less effect on civilians. Lands were ravaged deliberately to narrow a front or to deprive the enemy of base and food: such was the fate of the Palatinate, sacked by the French under Marshall René Tessé in 1689. Meanwhile, warfare in the north and east continued to be savage, largely unrestrained by conventions that were gaining hold in the west. The war of the Spanish Succession (Spanish Succession, War of the) (1701–14) ran parallel with the Great Northern War (1700–21) and the war of Austria (allied with Venice and sometimes Poland) against the Turks, which had begun with the relief of Vienna in 1683 and continued intermittently until the peace of Passarowitz in 1718. In brutal campaigning over the plains of Poland and Hungary, the peasants were the chief sufferers. For the Hungarians, long inured to border war, liberation by the Habsburgs meant a stricter landowning regime. In one year, 1706, the Swedes gutted 140 villages on the estates of one of Augustus II's followers. The Russians never subscribed to the stricter rules that were making western warfare look like a deadly game of chess. The later years of Frederick the Great were largely devoted to the restoration of Prussia, despoiled during the Russian occupation of 1760–62.

      Such exceptions apart, it seems that most people were little affected by military operations after 1648. The Flemish peasant plowed the fields in peace within miles of Marlborough's encampments; his uniformed troops received regular pay and looting was punished. That was the norm for armies of the 18th century. This improvement was a factor in the rise of population in that century, but not the main one. At worst, war only exacerbated the conditions of an underdeveloped society.

Health and sickness
      By the dislocation of markets and communications and the destruction of shipping, and by diverting toward destructive ends an excessive proportion of government funds, war tended to sap the wealth of the community and narrow the scope for governments and individuals to plan and invest for greater production. The constructive reforms of the French statesman Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Colbert, Jean-Baptiste) in the 1660s, for example, would have been unthinkable in the 1640s or '50s; they were checked by the renewal of war after 1672 and were largely undone by the further sequence of wars after his death. War determined the evolution of states, but it was not the principal factor affecting the lives of people. Disease was ever present, ready to take advantage of feeble defense systems operating without the benefit of science. The 20th-century French historian Robert Mandrou wrote of “the chronic morbidity” of the entire population. There is plenty of material on diseases, particularly in accounts of symptoms and “cures,” but the language is often vague. Christian of Brunswick was consumed in 1626 “by a gigantic worm”; Charles II of Spain, dying in 1700, was held to be bewitched; men suffered from “the falling sickness” and “distemper.”

      There are no reliable statistics about height and weight. It is difficult even to define what people regarded as normal good health. The average person was smaller than today. Even if courtiers flattered Louis XIV, deemed to be tall at five feet four inches, the evidence of portraits and clothes shows that a Frenchman of six feet was exceptionally tall; the same goes for most southern and central Europeans. Scandinavians, Dutch, and North Germans were generally larger; protein in meat, fish, and cheese was probably as important as their racial stock. Even where there were advances in medicine (medicine, history of), treatment of illness remained primitive. The majority who relied on the simples or charms of the local wise woman may have been no worse off than those for whom more learned advice was available. Court doctors could not prevent the death of the Duke de Bourgogne, his wife, and his eldest son in 1712 from what was probably scarlet fever; the younger son, the future Louis XV, may have been saved by his nurse's removing him from their ministrations.

      The work of William Harvey (Harvey, William), concerning the circulation of the blood; of Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van), observing through his microscope blood circulating in minute capillaries or spermatozoa in water; of Francesco Redi (Redi, Francesco), developing by experiment (in a book of 1668) Harvey's principle that “all living things come from an egg”; or of Hermann Boerhaave (Boerhaave, Hermann), professor of chemistry, medicine, and botany at Leiden, carrying out public dissections of human bodies, reveals the first approaches to modern knowledge and understanding. A striking example of what could be achieved was the efficacy of vaccine against the rampant smallpox after the discoveries of Edward Jenner and others, but vaccination was not much used until the beginning of the 19th century. As in other scientific fields, there was a long pause between pioneering research and regular practice. Trained by book, taking no account of organic life, envisaging illness as a foreign element lodged in the sick person's body, even tending to identify disease with sin, doctors prescribed, dosed, and bled, leaning on pedantic scholarship blended with primitive psychology. Therapy was concerned mainly with moderating symptoms. For this purpose mercury, digitalis, ipecac root, and, especially, opium were used; the latter was addictive but afforded relief from pain. The wisest navigators in this frozen sea were those who knew the limitations of their craft, like William Cullen (Cullen, William), an Edinburgh physician who wrote: “We know nothing of the nature of contagion that can lead us to any measures for removing or correcting it. We know only its effects.”

      To peer in imagination into the hovels of the poor or to walk down streets with open drains between houses decayed into crowded tenements, to visit shanty towns outside the walls, such as London's Bethnal Green or Paris' Faubourg Saint-Marcel, to learn that the latter city's great open sewer was not covered until 1740, is to understand why mortality rates among the poor were so high. In town and country they lived in one or two rooms, often under the same roof as their animals, sleeping on straw, eating with their fingers or with a knife and spoon, washing infrequently, and tolerating lice and fleas. Outside, dung and refuse attracted flies and rodents. Luckier people, particularly in the north, might have had glass in their windows, but light was less important than warmth. In airless rooms, thick with the odours of dampness, defecation, smoke, and unwashed bodies, rheumatic or bronchial ailments might be the least of troubles. Deficient diet in childhood could mean rickety legs. Crude methods of delivery might cause permanent damage to both mothers and children who survived the attentions of the local midwife. The baby who survived (one in four died in the first year of life) was launched on a hazardous journey.

      Some diseases (infectious disease), such as measles, seem to have been more virulent then than now. Typhus, spread by lice and fleas, and typhoid, waterborne, killed many. Tuberculosis was less common than it was to become. Cancer, though hard to recognize from contemporary accounts, was certainly rare: with relatively little smoking and with so many other diseases competing for the vulnerable body, that is not surprising. There were few illnesses, mental or physical, of the kind today caused by stress. Alcoholism (alcohol consumption) was less common, despite the increase in the drinking of spirits that debauched city dwellers: cheap gin became a significant social problem in William Hogarth's London. Abnormalities resulting from inbreeding were frequent in mountain valleys or on remote coasts.

       syphilis had been a growing menace since its introduction in the 16th century, and it was rife among prostitutes and their patrons: it was a common cause of blindness in children. Women, hapless victims of male-dominated morality, were frequently denied the chance of early mercury treatment because of the stigma attached to the disease. scrofula, a gangrenous tubercular condition of the lymph glands, was known as “the king's evil” because it was thought to be curable by the king's touch: Louis XIV practiced the ceremony conscientiously. malaria was endemic in some swampy areas. Though drainage schemes were taken up by enlightened sovereigns, prevention awaited inexpensive quinine. Nor could doctors do more than let smallpox take its course before the general introduction of vaccines. The plague, chiefly an urban disease that was deadliest in summer and dreaded as a sentence of death, could be combated only by measures of quarantine such as those enforced around Marseille in 1720, when it made its last appearance in France. Its last European visitation was at Messina in 1740. Deliverance from plague was not the least reason for Europeans of the Enlightenment to believe that they were entering a happier age.

      Though its extent might vary with current economic trends, poverty was a constant state. It is hard to define since material expectations vary among generations, social groups, and countries. If those with sufficient land or a wage large enough to allow for the replacement of tools and stock are held to be above the poverty line, then at least a quarter of Europe's inhabitants were below it. They were the bas peuple whom the French engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban observed in the 1690s, “three-fourths of them . . . dressed in nothing but half-rotting, tattered linen”; a century later the philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet described those who “possess neither goods nor chattels [and are] destined to fall into misery at the least accident.” That could be illness or injury to a breadwinner, the failure of a crop or death of a cow, fire or flood, or the death or bankruptcy of an employer. Sometimes poverty showed itself in a whole community demoralized through sickness—as by malaria in Italy's Pontine Marshes and goitre in Alpine valleys—or through the sapping of vitality when the young left to find work. Factors could be the unequal struggle with a poor soil or the exactions of a landowner: so the agricultural writer Arthur Young, at Combourg, wondered that the seigneur, “this Monsieur de Chateaubriant, . . . has nerves strung for such a residence amidst such filth and poverty.” Many were victims of an imprisoning socioeconomic regime, such as Castilian latifundia or Polish serfdom. A trade depression, a change of fashion, or an invention that made traditional manufacturing obsolete could bring destitution to busy cities such as Leiden, Lyon, Florence, or Norwich or to specialized communities such as the silk weavers of 18th-century England's Spitalfields.

      Taxes (taxation), on top of rents and dues, might be the decisive factor in the slide from sufficiency to destitution. A member of the Castilian Cortes of 1621 described the results: “Numerous places have become depopulated and disappeared from the map. . . . The vassals who formerly cultivated them now wander the roads with their wives and children.” Some had always been beyond the reach of the collector of taxes and rents, such as the bracchianti (day labourers) described by a Mantuan doctor as “without a scrap of land, without homes, lacking everything except a great brood of children . . . with a humble train of a few sheep and baggage consisting of a tattered bedstead, a mouldy cask, some rustic tools and a few pots and pans.”

      Moneylenders (credit) were pivotal figures in village society. In southern Italy, merchants advanced money on wheat in contratti alla voce (oral agreements). The difference between the arranged price and that at harvest time, when the loan was repaid, represented their profit. Throughout Europe, land changed hands between lender and borrower: foreclosure and forfeit is an aspect of primitive capitalism often overlooked in the focus on trade and manufacturing. Society, even in long-settled areas, revealed a constant flux. As the 20th-century French historian Marc Bloch pointed out, hierarchy was always present in some degree, even in districts where sharecropping meant dependence on the owner's seed and stock. In the typical village of western Europe, there were gradations between the well-to-do farmer, for whom others worked and whose strips would grow if he continued to be thrifty, and the day labourer, who lived on casual labour, hedging, ditching, thatching, repairing terraces, pruning vines, or making roads.

      Urban poverty posed the biggest threat to governments. The situation became alarming after 1750 because the rise in population forced food prices up (inflation), while the employers' advantage in the labour market depressed wages. Between 1730 and 1789, living costs in France rose by 62 percent; in Germany the price of rye for the staple black bread rose by up to 30 percent while wages fell. In Italian cities the poor depended on the authorities' control of markets, prices, and food supplies. The riots of Genoa in 1746 show what was liable to happen if they failed. The causes of riots varied. In England, in 1766, grievances included the Irish, Roman Catholics, the press-gang, and gin taxes. The source was almost invariably poverty measured against a vague conception of a “fair wage,” fanned by rumours about hoarding and the creating of false prices. Paris was not uniquely dangerous. Before 1789, when the fury of the mob acquired political importance, the Gordon Riots (1780) had shown the way in which London could be taken over by a mob. The problem originated in rural poverty. Improvements in agriculture, such as enclosure, did not necessarily provide more work. Where there were no improvements or old abuses continued—such as the short-term leases of southern Italy, which encouraged tenants to over-crop and so exhaust the soil—the city provided the only hope. Naples, with the greatest profusion of beggars in the streets, was the most swollen of cities: at 438,000 in 1797, the population had risen by 25 percent in 30 years.

      The typical relationship of mutual support was between poor hill country and large town; Edinburgh or Glasgow provided support for the Scots Highlanders, Vienna or Marseille for the Alpine poor. In Marseille a settled population of 100,000 supported 30,000 immigrants. Younger sons from the European fringes went for bread to the big armies: Croats to the Austrian, Finns to the Swedish, Scots and Irish everywhere. Women were usually left behind with the old men and children to look after the harvest in areas of seasonal migration. Domestic service drew many girls to towns with a large bourgeois population. Certain other occupations, notably lacemaking, were traditionally reserved for women. Miserably paid, young Frenchwomen risked their eyesight in fine work to earn enough for dowry and marriage. In a society where contraception was little known, except through abstinence, and irregular liaisons were frowned upon, the tendency to marry late was an indication of poverty. Almost half the women of western Europe married after 25; between 10 and 15 percent did not marry at all. The prevalence of abortion and infanticide is painfully significant: it was clearly not confined to unmarried couples. In 18th-century Brussels, more than 2,000 babies were abandoned annually to be looked after by charitable institutions. Repairs to a drain in Rennes in the 1720s revealed the tiny skeletons of 50 babies. Every major city had large numbers of prostitutes (prostitution). There were approximately 20,000 in Paris, and, more surprisingly, in staid, episcopally governed Mainz, it was estimated that a third of the women in the poorer districts were prostitutes. Victims and outcasts, with the beggars and derelicts of crowded tenements, they helped create the amoral ambience in which criminals could expect tolerance and shelter.

      Naturally associated with poverty, crime was also the product of war, even the very maintenance of armies. Desertion led to a man's living an outlaw's life. Despite ferocious penalties (having the nose and one ear cut off) the Prussian army lost 30,000 deserters between 1713 and 1740. The soldier's life might not equip a man for settled work. It was hard, in unsettled times, to distinguish between overtly treasonous acts, as of leaders in revolts, and the persistent banditry that accompanied and outlasted them. Another gray area surrounded the arbitrary actions of officials—for example, billeting troops, sometimes, as in the dragonnades employed by Louis XIV against the Huguenots, for political reasons. Tax collection often involved violence and chicanery. The notorious Mandrin, whose prowess Tobias Smollett recorded, had also been a tax collector. Leader of a gang of some 500, he used his knowledge of the system to construct a regime of extortion. Eventually betrayed and broken on the wheel, he remained a local hero.

      Banditry (crime) was a way of life on the Cossack and Balkan marches, but it was not only there that roads were unsafe. Barred by magistrates from the towns, gangs of beggars terrorized country districts. Children, pursuing victims with sorry tales, were keen trainees in the school of crime, picking pockets, cutting horsetails, soliciting for “sisters,” and abetting smuggling. The enlargement of the role of the state, with tariffs as the main weapon in protectionist strategies, encouraged evasion and smuggling. Just as few country districts were without robbers, few coasts were without smuggling gangs. A Norman seaman could make more by one clandestine Channel crossing than by a year's fishing. Only the approval of the poor could make romantic figures of such criminals as Dick Turpin or Marion de Fouet.

      The savagery of punishments (punishment) was in proportion to the inadequacy of enforcement. To traditional methods—hanging, dismemberment, flogging, and branding—the possession of colonies added a new resort toward the end of the 18th century, that of transportation. By then, notably in the German and Italian lands of the Habsburg brothers Joseph II and Leopold II, who were influenced by arguments of reason and humanity, crime was fought at the source by measures to liberate trade, moderate punishments, and increase provision for the poor.

      A central theme in Christian (Christianity) teaching was the blessed state of the poor. Holy poverty was the friars' ideal; ardent reformers ensured that some returned to it. The ascetic Father Joseph, personal agent of Cardinal Richelieu, and Abraham Sancta Clara, preacher at the court of Leopold I, were representative figures. With the acceptance of poverty went awareness of a Christian's duty to relieve it. Alms for the poor figured largely in wills and were a duty of most religious orders. Corporate charity had a larger place in Counter-Reformation Catholicism (Roman Catholicism) than in the thinking of Protestants (Protestantism), who stressed private virtues and endowments. The secularization of church property that accompanied the Reformation reduced levels of relief. However, meticulous church elders in Holland and parish overseers in England were empowered to raise poor rates. In Brandenburg a law of 1696 authorized parishes to provide work for the deserving poor and punishment for others. In Denmark the government pronounced in 1683 that the pauper had the legal right to relief: he could work in land reclamation or road building. Different was the approach of Vincent de Paul (Vincent De Paul, Saint) (1581–1660), whose instructions to the Sisters of Charity (Charity of Saint Vincent de Paul, Daughters of), founded to help “our lords the poor,” were both compassionate and practical. His idea of the hôpital général, a privately funded institution for the aged, crippled, and orphaned, was taken over in 1662: an edict commended the institution of hôpitaux throughout the land. Care for the poor was tinged with concern for their souls: beggars and prostitutes were carefully segregated.

      With emphasis on the rights of the individual, the French Revolution did not lead to improvement in poor relief but to the reverse. Nor was the record of the Enlightenment impressive in this area. Impatient with tradition and anticlerical, the philosophes (philosophe) tended to be more fluent in criticism of existing systems than practical in proposals for better ones. The new breed of economists, the physiocrats (physiocrat), were opposed to any interference with the laws of nature, especially to any support that did not show a productive return. The threat of social disorder did alarm the upper class, however, and contributed to the revival in Britain of Evangelical (Evangelical church) religion, which stressed elementary education for the poor, reform of prisons, and abolition of the slave trade and slavery. Meanwhile, the Holy Roman emperor Joseph II had harnessed new funds for orphanages, hospitals, medical schools, and special institutions for the blind and the insane. In 1785 the Vienna General Hospital had 2,000 beds. There was provision for deprived children of all sorts. Graduated charges and free medical care for paupers were among features of a policy that represented the utilitarian spirit at its most humane.

The organization of society
Corporate society
      The political history of Europe is inevitably the history of privileged minorities. In states of the eastern and northern fringes, “the political nation”—comprising those individuals who had some notion of loyalties beyond the parish and civil duties, if only at a local level, at the occasional diet, or in the army—hardly extended beyond the ranks of the gentry. Where they were numerous (a tenth of the population in Poland, for example), many would maintain themselves as clients of a magnate; even when theoretically independent, they would be likely to envisage the state in terms of sectional interest. The political life of England and Holland and the growing administration of France, Spain, and some German states opened doors to more sophisticated citizenship. Generally, however, political concerns were beyond the ken of peasants or ordinary townspeople for whom the state existed remotely, in the person of the prince, or directly, in that of the tax collector or billeting officer. It does not follow that it is futile to portray the people as a whole. First, however, it is necessary to identify certain characteristics of their world.

      It was a Christian (Christianity) society which accepted, in and over the animist world where magic held many in thrall, the sovereignty of God and his laws. A priest might use folklore to convey the Christian message and expect allegiance so long as he endorsed paramount loyalties to family and parish. He might lose them if he objected too strongly to vendetta, charivari, and other forms of collective violence or simply to his parishioners' preference for tavern over church. Catholic or Protestant, he might preach against superstition, but he was as likely to denounce the witch as to curb her persecutors. He might see no end to his war against ignorance and sin; and he might falter in assurance of the love of God for suffering humanity. No more than any layperson was he immune to doubt and despair. But the evidence is unambiguous: the framework was hardly shaken. It was Christian doubt or Christian pessimism, all under the judgment of God. The priest in the confessional or the Protestant minister (ministry), Bible in hand, could look to that transcendent idea to support his vision of heaven's joys or hell's torments, of the infinite glory of God and the angels as portrayed by artists in the new Baroque style and of the machinations of the Devil and his minions.

      The churches were the grandest expression of the corporate ideal, which shaped life at all levels and which can be seen in the Christian rites invariably used to enforce rules and cement fellowship. It also informed the guilds, corporations, and colleges that served the needs of craftsmen and tradesmen, inhabitants of cities, and scholars. The idea that society was composed of orders was given perhaps excessively precise form by the lawyer Charles Loyseau in his Traité des Ordres (1610), but it serves to stress the significance of precedence. It was assumed that society was hierarchical and that each order had divine sanction. Wherever man found himself, at prayer or study, under arms or at work, there were collective rights and duties that had evolved as a strategy for survival. With them went the sense of belonging to a family of mutual obligations that had been a civilizing aspect of feudal society.

       feudalism, as a set of political arrangements, was dead by 1600. But aspects of feudal society survived, notably in the countryside. Various forms of personal service were owed by peasants to landowners and, in armies and courts, assumption of office and terms of service reflected the dealings of earlier times when power lay in the ownership of land. At the highest, providing cohesion in the intermediate phase between feudal and bureaucratic regimes, the patron-client relationship contained an idea of service that was nearer to medieval allegiance than to modern contract. Liveries might be out of use, but loyalty was owed to “my lord and master”: a powerful man such as Richelieu could thus describe his service to a greater patron, Louis XIII, and would expect the same from his dependents. Envisaging such a society, the reader must dismiss the idea of natural rights (human rights), which was not current until the last decades of the 18th century. Rights accrued by virtue of belonging, in two ways: first, as the subject of a prince or equivalent authority—for example, magistrates of a free town or the bishop of an ecclesiastical principality; second, as the member of a community or corporation, in which one had rights depending on the rank into which one was born or on one's craft or profession. Whatever the formula by which such rights were expressed, it would be defended with tenacity as the means of ensuring the best possible life.

      Christian, corporate, feudal: each label goes only some way to defining elusive mentalities in preindustrial society. The elements of organization that they represent look artificial unless the domestic basis is taken into account. The family was the lifeblood of all associations, giving purpose and identity to people who were rarely in crowds and knew nothing like the large, impersonal organization of modern times. To stress the family is not to sentimentalize it but to provide a key to understanding a near-vanished society. The intimacies of domestic life could not anesthetize against pain and hunger: life was not softened and death was a familiar visitor. Children (childhood) were especially vulnerable but enjoyed no special status. Valued as an extra pair of hands or deplored as an extra mouth to feed, the child belonged to no privileged realm of play and protection from life's responsibilities. The family might be extended by numerous relations living nearby; in Mediterranean lands it was common for grandparents or brothers and sisters, married or single, to share a house or farm. Especially in more isolated communities, inbreeding added genetic hazards to the struggle for life. Everywhere the hold of the family, and of the father over the family, strengthened by laws of property and inheritance, curtained life's narrow windows from glimpses of a freer world. It affected marriage, since land, business, and dowry were customarily of more weight than the feelings of the bride and groom. But into dowries and ceremonies long saved for would go the display required to sustain the family name. Pride of family was one aspect of the craving for office. Providing status as well as security in a hierarchical society, it was significantly weaker in the countries, notably the United Provinces and England, where trading opportunities were greatest.

Nobles and gentlemen
      Between persistent poverty and the prevailing aristocratic spirit several connections can be made. The strong appeal of noble status and values was a force working generally against the pursuit of wealth and the investment that was to lead, precociously and exceptionally in Britain, to the Industrial Revolution. In France a nobleman could lose rank (dérogeance) by working, which inhibited him from engaging in any but a few specified enterprises. The typical relationship between landed gentleman and peasant producer was still feudal; whether represented by a range of rights and dues or by the more rigorous form of serfdom, it encouraged acceptance of the status quo in agriculture. Every state in Europe, except some Swiss cantons, recognized some form of nobility whose privileges were protected by law. Possession of land was a characteristic mark and aspiration of the elites.

      The use of the two terms nobleman and gentleman indicates the difficulty of definition. The terms were loosely used to mark the essential distinction between members of an upper class and the rest. In France, above knights and esquires without distinctive title, ranged barons, viscounts, counts, and marquises, until the summit was reached with dukes and princes of the blood. In Britain, by contrast, only peers of the realm, whether entitled duke, marquess, earl, or baron, had corporate status: numbering under 200, they enjoyed few special privileges beyond membership of the House of Lords. The gentry, however, with assured social position, knighthoods, armorial bearings, and estates, were the equivalent of Continental nobles. With the nobility, they owned more than three-quarters of the land: in contrast, in France by 1789 the nobility owned barely a third. In northern and eastern Europe, where the social structure was generally simpler than in the west, nobles—dvoriane in Russia, szlachta in Poland and Hungary—were numerous. In these countries, many of those technically noble were in reality of little importance and might even, like the “barefoot szlachta,” have no land.

      Such differences apart, there were rights and privileges that most Continental nobles possessed and values to which most subscribed. The right to wear a sword, to bear a crested coat of arms, to retain a special pew in church, to enjoy such precedence on formal occasions as rank prescribed, and to have if necessary a privileged form of trial would all seem to the noble inherent and natural. As landowner he enjoyed rights over peasants, not least as judge in his own court. In France, parts of Germany, Italy, and Spain, even if he did not own the land, he could as lord still benefit from feudal dues. He could hope for special favours from his sovereign or other patron in the form of a pension or office. There were vital exemptions, as from billeting soldiers and—most valuable—from taxation. The effectiveness of governments can be measured by the extent to which they breached this principle: in France, for example, in the 18th century by the dixième and vingtième taxes, effectively on income; belatedly, in Poland, where nobles paid no tax until the chimney tax of 1775. Generally they could expect favourable treatment: special schools, privileges at university, preferment in the church, commissions in the army. They could assume that a sovereign, while encroaching on their rights, would yet share their values. Richelieu's (Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal et duc de) policy exemplifies such ambivalence. A noble himself, Richelieu sought to promote the interests of his class while directing it toward royal service and clipping the wings of the over-powerful. Frederick II the Great of Prussia was not concerned about faction. Since “most commoners think meanly,” he believed that nobles were best suited to serve in the government and the army. Such admiration for noble virtues did not usually extend to the political role. The decline of Continental estates and diets, with the growth of bureaucracies, largely recruited from commoners, did not mean, however, even in the west, that nobility was in retreat before the rise of the bourgeoisie. Through social preeminence, nobles maintained—and in the 18th century even tightened—their hold on the commanding heights in church and state.

      Within all countries there was a distinction between higher and lower levels within the caste: in some, not only between those who were titled and the rest but, as in Spain and France, between titulos and grandees (grandee), a small group upon which royal blood or the achievement of some ancestor conferred privileges of a self-perpetuating kind. “The grandeeship of the counts of Lemos was made by God and time,” observed the head of the family to the new Bourbon king Philip V. No less pretentious were the Condés or the Montmorencys of France. There was a tendency everywhere to the aggrandizement of estates through arranged marriage, a sovereign's favour, or the opportunities provided by war, as in Bohemia after the suppression of the revolt of 1618 or in England with the rise of the Whig families of Russell and Cavendish. In Britain, the principle of primogeniture ensured succession to the eldest son (promoting social mobility as younger sons made their way in professions or trades). Peter I the Great of Russia legislated for the entail (1714), but without success: it was abandoned by Anna (1731) in favour of the traditional law of inheritance. However, mayorazgo in Castile and fideicommissum in parts of Italy kept vast estates together. Where the colonization of new lands was not restrained by central government, families like the Radziwiłłs and Wiśniowieckis of Poland acquired huge estates. The szlachta of Hungary also cherished privileges as descendants of warriors and liberators. There, Prince Miklós Esterházy, patron of a private orchestra and of Joseph Haydn, excelled all by the end of the 17th century with his annual revenue of 700,000 florins. In Russia, where wealth was measured in serfs, Prince Cherkanski was reckoned in 1690 to have 9,000 peasant households.

      Status increasingly signified economic circumstances. In France, where subtle nuances escaped the outsider, one trend is revealing. The old distinction between “sword” and “gown” lost much importance. Age of title came to mean more for antiquarians and purists than for men of fashion who would not scorn a mésalliance if it “manured the land.” Most daughters of 18th-century tax farmers married the sons of nobles. The class was open to new creations, usually through purchase of an office conferring nobility. When, in a regulation of 1760, the year 1400 was made a test of antiquity, fewer than 1,000 families were eligible. The tendency was toward the formation of a plutocracy. Nobles came to dominate the church and the army, even to penetrate government, from which it had been the policy of the early Bourbons to exclude them. The noble order numbered about 120,000 families by 1789. By then the nobles, particularly those of the country who seldom came to court, had brought their rearguard action to a climax to preserve their privileges—for example, by Ségur's ordinance of 1781, reserving army commissions to nobles of at least four generations. This “feudal reaction” contributed to the problems of government in the years before the Revolution. In Russia, at the height of the conservative reaction that had already secured the abolition (1762) of the service obligation imposed by Peter I, Catherine II the Great was forced to abandon liberal reforms. The Pugachov rising (1773–74) alerted landowners to the dangers of serfdom, but it was reckoned that three-fifths of all landowners owned fewer than 20 serfs. The census of 1687 showed that there were half a million nobles in Spain. But hidalguia might mean little more than a Spaniard's estimation of himself. Without a substantial señorio (estate), the hidalgo was insignificant.

      When “living nobly” meant not working and hidalgos or szlachta attached themselves to a great house for a coat and a loaf, faction became more dangerous and aristocratic interests more resistant to change. It took courage for a sovereign to tackle the entrenched power of nobility in diets, as did the Habsburg queen Maria Theresa (1740–80) in her Austrian and Bohemian lands. Nowhere in Europe did nobles take themselves more seriously, but they were the readier to accept curtailment of their political rights because they enjoyed a healthy economic position. Vienna's cosmopolitan culture and Baroque palaces were evidence of not only the success of the regime in drawing nobles to the capital but also the rise in manorial rents. Nobles played a decorative role in the most ceremonious court in 18th-century Europe. Charles VI (1711–40) had provided 40,000 posts for noble clients. Maria Theresa, concerned about expense, reduced the number of chamberlains to 1,500. It was left to her son Joseph II to attack noble privileges at every point, right up to the abolition of serfdom. There was a correlation between the advance of government and the curtailment of noble privilege. Inevitably it was an uneven process, depending much on the resolution of a ruler. In Sweden it was to the poor gentlemen, a high proportion of its 10,000 nobles, that Charles XI had appealed in his successful promotion of absolutist reforms in the 1680s. After 1718 the same conservative force militated against royal government. The aristocratic reaction of the age of liberty saw the reassertion of the traditional principle that the nobility were the guardians of the country's liberties. So the Swedish upper class arrived at the position of their British counterparts and obtained that power, not divorced from responsibility, which was envied and extolled by the philosophes who regretted its absence from France and sought consolation in the works of Montesquieu (Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de). A central idea of his L'Esprit des lois (1748; The Spirit of Laws) was that noble privilege was the surest guarantee of the laws against despotism. That could not be said of Prussia, although a Junker's (Junker) privilege was wedded to a subject's duty. In exchange for the loss of political rights, Junkers had been confirmed in their social and fiscal privileges: with the full rigour of serfdom (Leibeigenschaft) and rights of jurisdiction over tenants went a secure hold over local government. Under the pressure of war and following his own taste for aristocratic manners, Frederick II taught them to regard the army or civil service as a career. But Frederick disappointed the philosophes who expected him to protect the peasantry. The nobles meanwhile acquired a pride in militarism that was to be potent in the creation of the 19th-century German state. The class became more numerous but remained relatively poor: Junkers often had to sell land to supplement meagre pay. Frederick's working nobility sealed the achievements of his capable predecessors. The price paid indicates the difficulties inherent in any attempt to reconcile the interests of the dominant class to the needs of society.

      Nobility also had a civilizing role. Europe would be immeasurably poorer without the music, literature, and architecture of the age of aristocracy. The virtues of classical taste were to some extent those of aristocracy: splendour restrained by formal rules and love of beauty uninhibited by utilitarian considerations. There was much that was absurd in the pretensions of some patrons; illusions of grandeur are rarely the best basis for the conceiving of great art. The importance of bourgeois patronage should not be overlooked, otherwise no account would be taken of Holland's golden age. Where taste was unaffected by the need for display (as could not be said of Louis XIV's Versailles) or where a wise patron put his trust in the reputedly best architect, art could triumph. Civilizing trends were prominent, as in England, where there was a free intellectual life. New money, as lavished by the Duke of Chandos, builder of the great house of Canons and patron of the composer George Frideric Handel, could be fruitful. Also important was the fusion of aristocratic style with ecclesiastical patronage, as could occur where noblemen enjoyed the best preferment and abbots lived like nobles: the glories of the German Baroque at Melk, Ottobeuren, and Vierzehnheiligen speak as much of aristocracy as of the Christian Gospel.

      In contrast with Sweden, where, in the 18th century, talent was recognized and the scientists Carolus Linnaeus and Emanuel Swedenborg were ennobled, or France, where the plutocracy encountered the Enlightenment without discomfort, the most sterile ground for aristocratic culture was to be found where there was an enforced isolation, as in Spain or Europe's poor marches and remotest western shores. Visitors to Spain were startled by the ignorance of the men and the passivity of the women. Life in Poland, Hungary, and Ireland resolved itself for many of the gentry into a simple round of hunting and carousing. The urban aspect of noble culture needs stress, which is not surprising when its classical inspiration is recalled. Even in England, where educated men favoured country life and did not despise the country town, society would have been poorer without the intense activity of London. All the greater was the importance of the capital cities—Warsaw, St. Petersburg, Budapest, and Dublin—in countries that might not otherwise have generated fine art or architecture.

      The aristocratic spirit transcended frontiers. For the nobleman Europe was the homeland. Italian plasterers and painters, German musicians, and French cabinetmakers traveled for high commissions. There were variations reflecting local traditions: the Baroque style was interpreted distinctively in Austria, Italy, Spain, and France. But high style reveals certain underlying principles and convictions. The same is true of the intellectual life of Europe, reflecting as it did two main sources, French and English. It was especially to France that the two most powerful rulers of eastern Europe, Frederick II and Catherine II, looked for mentors in thought and style. The French language, deliberately purified from the time of Richelieu and the foundation of the Academy, was well adapted to the clear expression of ideas. The salons stimulated the discussion of ideas and engendered a distinctive style. Feminine insights there contributed to a rational culture that was also responsive to the claims of sensibility.

The bourgeoisie
      The European bourgeoisie presents faces so different that common traits can be discerned only at the simplest level: the possession of property with the desire and means to increase it, emancipation from past precepts about investment, a readiness to work for a living, and a sense of being superior to town workers or peasants. With their social values—sobriety, discretion, and economy—went a tendency to imitate the style of their social superiors. In France the expectations of the bourgeoisie were roused by education and relative affluence to the point at which they could be a revolutionary force once the breakdown of royal government and its recourse to a representative assembly had given them the voice they had lacked. Everywhere the Enlightenment was creating a tendency to be critical of established institutions (notably, in Roman Catholic countries, the church), together with a hunger for knowledge as a tool of progress.

      Such dynamic characteristics, conducive to social mobility, should not obscure the essential feature of bourgeois life: conservativism within a corporate frame. In 1600 a town of more than 100,000 would have been thought enormous: only London, Paris, Naples, Seville, Venice, Rome, and Constantinople (Istanbul) came into that class. Half in Asia but enmeshed in the European economic system, Constantinople was unique: it was a megalopolis, a gigantic consumer of the produce of subject lands. London's (London) growth was more significant for the future: it was a seaport and capital, but with a solid base in manufacturing, trade, and finance. Like Naples, it was a magnet for the unemployed and restless. In 1700 there were only 48 towns in Europe with a population of more than 40,000; all were regarded as important places. Even a smaller city might have influence in the country, offering a range of services and amenities; such was Amiens, with 30,000 inhabitants and 36 guilds, including bleachers, dyers, and finishers of the cloth that was woven in nearby villages but sent far afield. Most towns had fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, and a fair number only about 1,000; most towns remained static or declined. Some grew, however: between 1600 and 1750 the proportion of the population living in towns of more than 20,000 doubled from 4 to 8 percent, representing about half the total urban population.

      A universal phenomenon was the growth of capital cities (city), which benefited from the expansion of government, particularly if, as was usual, the court was within the city. Growth could acquire its own momentum, irrespective of the condition of the country: besides clients and servants of all kinds, artisans, shopkeepers, and other providers of services swelled the ranks. Warsaw's (Warsaw) size doubled during Poland's century of distress to stand at 120,000 by 1772. St. Petersburg (Saint Petersburg), in 1700 a swamp, acquired 218,000 inhabitants by 1800. Berlin, the simple electoral capital of some 6,000 inhabitants in 1648, rose with the success of the Hohenzollerns to a population of 150,000 by 1786. By then the population of Vienna—home of the imperial court, a growing professional class, a renowned university and other schools, and hospitals—had reached 220,000. The population of Turin, capital of relatively small Savoy, also doubled in the 18th century. Rome did not suffer too obviously from the retreat of the popes from a leading political role, but the Holy City (140,000 inhabitants in 1700) was top-heavy, with little in the way of manufacturing. All these cities owed their growth to their strategic place in the government rather than to their economic importance.

      Other cities grew around specialized industries or from opportunities for a wider trade than was possible where markets were limited by the range of horse and mule. Growth was likely to be slow where, as in Lyon, Rouen, and Dresden, production continued to be along traditional lines or, in ports such as Danzig, Königsberg, or Hamburg, where trading patterns remained essentially the same. Enterprise, by contrast, brought remarkable growth in Britain, where Manchester and Birmingham both moved up from modest beginnings to the 100,000-population mark during the 18th century. Atlantic ports thrived during the same period with the increase in colonial trade: into this category fall Bordeaux, Nantes, Bristol, Liverpool, and Glasgow. Marseille recovered quickly from the plague of 1720 and grew on the grain import trade; more typical of Mediterranean cities were stagnant Genoa, Venice, and Palermo, where Austrian policy in the 18th century, favouring Milan, was an adverse factor.

      A typical urban experience, where there was no special factor at work, was therefore one of stability. The burgher of 1600 would have felt at home in the town of his descendant five generations later. There might have been calamities along the way: at worst, siege or assault, plague, a particularly serious recession, or a fire, such as destroyed Rennes in 1720. Some building or refacing of houses would have occurred, mainly within the walls. In more fortunate cities, where there was continuing economic stability or strong corporate identity—as in the siege victims La Rochelle (1628) or Magdeburg (1631)—recovery even from the worst of war experiences could be rapid. The professions, notably the church and law, were tough, having large interests in the town and in the property in and around it. Guild discipline, inhibiting in fair years, was a strength in foul ones. Not all towns were so resilient, however. Some Polish towns never recovered from the effects of the Great Northern War; others throughout northern and eastern Europe were victims of the rise of the self-sufficient estate, which supplied needs such as brewing that the town had previously offered. Some Italian and Spanish towns, such as Cremona, Toledo, and Burgos, were affected by the decline of manufacturing and the shift of trade to the Atlantic economies.

      It was possible for a town that had a special importance in the sphere of church or law (Angers, Salzburg, or Trier, for example) to enjoy a quiet prosperity, but there was a special kind of deadness about towns that had no other raison d'être than to be host to numerous clergy. Valladolid contained 53 religious houses “made up principally of consumers” according to a report of 1683. Most numerous were the quiet places that had never grown from their basic function of providing a market. England's archaic electoral system provided graphic evidence of such decay, leaving its residue of “rotten boroughs.”

      Between these extremes lay the mass of towns of middling size, each supervised by a mayor and corporation, dignified by one large church and probably several others serving ward or parish (and, if Catholic, by a religious house of some kind), and including a law court, guildhall, school, and, of course, market. With its bourgeois crust of clerics, lawyers, officials, merchants, and shopkeepers and master craftsmen catering for special needs—fine fabrics, clothing, hats, wigs, gloves, eyeglasses, engravings if not paintings, china, silver, glassware, locks, and clocks—the city was a world apart from the peasant. The contrast was emphasized by the walls, the gates that closed at night, the cobbles or setts of the roads, the different speech and intonation, the well-fed look of some citizens, and above all the fine houses, suggesting as much an ordered way of life as the wealth that supported it. The differences were blurred, however, by the pursuits of the urban landowners; by ubiquitous animals, whether bound for market or belonging to the citizens; by the familiar poverty and filth of the streets and the reek of the tannery and the shambles.

      It is easier to recreate the physical frame than the mentalities of townspeople. Letters, journals, government reports and statistics, wills, and contracts reveal salient features. The preference for safe kinds of investment could be exploited by governments for revenue, as notably by the French: in 1661 Colbert found that, of 46,000 offices of justice and finance, 40,000 were unnecessary. There was an inclination to buy land for status and security. Around cities like Dijon, most of the surrounding land was owned by the bourgeois or the recently ennobled. Custom and ceremony were informed by a keen sense of hierarchy, as in minutely ordered processions. The instinct to regulate was stiffened by the need to restrain servants and journeymen and to ensure that apprentices waited for the reward of their training. Religion maintained its hold more firmly in the smaller towns, while the law was respected as the mainstay of social order and the road to office in courts or administration even where, as in Italy, it was palpably corruptible. There were certain communal dreads, military requisitioning and billeting high among them. There was generally a resolve to ward off beggars, to maintain grain stores, to close the gates to the famished when crops failed, and to enforce quarantine.

      Within towns, popular forms of government were abandoned as power was monopolized by groups of wealthy men. This process can be studied in the Dutch towns in the years after 1648 when regents gained control. Everywhere elites were composed of those who had no business role. Among other labels for this period, when a profession seemed to be more desirable than trade, “a time of lawyers” might be appropriate. Trained to contend, responsive to new ideas, at least dipping into the waters of the Enlightenment, those lawyers (lawyer) who were cheated, by sheer numbers, of the opportunity to rise might become a dissident element, especially in countries where political avenues were blocked and the economy was growing too slowly to sustain them. Sometimes the state moved in to control municipal affairs, as in France where intendants were given wide powers toward the end of Louis XIV's reign. In Spain, towns came into the hands of local magnates.

      A more serious threat to the old urban regime lay in another area where discontents bred radicalism: the guilds (guild). Not until the French Revolution and the radical actions of Joseph II of Austria were guilds anywhere abolished. They had long displayed a tendency to oligarchic control by hereditary masters. They became more restrictive in the face of competition and growing numbers of would-be members and so drove industries, particularly those suited to dispersed production, back to the countryside. For this reason, such cities as Leiden, Rouen, Cologne, and Nürnberg actually lost population in the 18th century. To compensate for falling production, masters tended to put pressure on the relatively unskilled level, where there were always more workers than work. Journeymen's associations sought to improve their situation, sometimes through strikes. The building trade was notorious for its secret societies. The decline of the guilds was only one symptom of the rise in population. Another was the rise in urban poverty, as pressure on resources led to price increases that outstripped wages. In late 18th-century Berlin, which was solidly based on bureaucracy, garrison, and numerous crafts, a third of the population still lacked regular work. The plight of the poor was emphasized by the affluence of increasing numbers of fellow citizens. However class conflict is interpreted, it is clear that its basic elements were by that time present and active.

The peasantry
      In 1700 only 15 percent of Europe's population lived in towns, but that figure concealed wide variations: at the two extremes by 1800 were Britain with 40 percent and Russia with 4 percent. Most Europeans were peasants, dependent on agriculture. The majority of them lived in nucleated settlements and within recognized boundaries, those of parish or manor, but some, in the way characteristic of the hill farmer, lived in single farms or hamlets. The type of settlement reflected its origins: pioneers who had cleared forests or drained swamps, Germans who had pressed eastward into Slav lands, Russians who had replaced conquered Mongols, Spaniards who had expelled the Moors. Each brought distinctive characteristics. Discounting the nomad fringe, there remains a fundamental difference between serfs (serfdom) and those who had more freedom, whether as owners or tenants paying some form of rent but both liable to seigneurial dues. There were about one million serfs in eastern France and some free peasants in Russia, so the pattern is untidy; but broadly it represents the difference between eastern and western Europe.

      The Russian was less attached to a particular site than his western counterparts living in more densely populated countries and had to be held down by a government determined to secure taxes and soldiers. The imposition of serfdom was outlined in the Ulozhenie, the legal code of 1649, which included barschina (forced labour). One consequence was the decline of the mir, the village community, with its fellowship and practical services; another was the tightening of the ties of mutual interest that bound tsar and landowner. Poles, Germans (mainly those of the east and north), Bohemians, and Hungarians were subject to a serfdom less extreme only in that they were treated as part of the estate and could not be sold separately; the Russian serf, who could, was more akin to a slave. Russian state peasants, an increasingly numerous class in the 18th century, were not necessarily secure; they were sent out to farm new lands. Catherine the Great transferred 800,000 serfs to private ownership. The serf could not marry, move, or take up a trade without his lord's leave. He owed labour (robot) in the Habsburg lands for at least three days a week and dues that could amount to 20 percent of his produce. The Thirty Years' War hastened the process of subjection, already fed by the west's demand for grain; peasants returning to ruined homesteads found that their rights had vanished. The process was resisted by some rulers, notably those of Saxony and Brunswick: independent peasants were a source of revenue. Denmark saw an increase in German-style serfdom in the 18th century, but most Swedish peasants were free—their enemies were climate and hunger, rather than the landowner. Uniquely, they had representation in their own Estate in the Riksdag.

      Through much of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal there was some form of rent or sharecropping. feudalism survived in varying degrees of rigour, with an array of dues and services representing seigneurial rights. It was a regime that about half of Europe's inhabitants had known since the Middle Ages. In England all but a few insignificant forms had gone, though feudal spirit lingered in deference to the squire. Enclosures were reducing the yeoman to the condition of a tenant farmer or, for most, a dependent, landless labourer. Although alodial tenures (absolute ownership) ensured freedom from dues in some southern provinces, France provides the best model for understanding the relationship of lord and peasant. The seigneur was generally, but not invariably, noble: a seigneury (manorialism) could be bought by a commoner. It had two parts. The domaine was the house with its grounds: there were usually a church and a mill, but not necessarily fields and woods, for those might have been sold. The censives, lands subject to the seigneur, still owed dues even if no longer owned by him. The cens, paid annually, was significant because it represented the obligations of the peasant: free to buy and sell land, he still endured burdens that varied from the trivial or merely vexatious to those detrimental to good husbandry. They were likely to include banalités, monopoly rights over the mill, wine press, or oven; saisine and lods et ventes, respectively a levy on the assets of a censitaire on death and a purchase tax on property sold; champart, a seigneurial tithe, payable in kind; monopolies of hunting, shooting, river use, and pigeon rearing; the privilege of the first harvest, for example, droit de banvin, by which the seigneur could gather his grapes and sell his wine first; and the corvées, obligatory labour services. Seigneurial rule had benevolent aspects, and justice in the seigneurial court could be even-handed; seigneurs could be protectors of the community against the state's taxes and troops. But the regime was damaging, as much to the practice of farming as to the life of the peasants, who were harassed and schooled in resistance and concealment. To identify an 18th-century feudal reaction—as some historians have called the tendency to apply business principles to the management of dues—is not to obscure the fact that for many seigneurs the system was becoming unprofitable. By 1789 in most provinces there was little hesitation: the National Assembly abolished feudal dues by decree at one sitting because the peasants had already taken the law into their own hands. Some rights were won back, but there could be no wholesale restoration.

      Besides priest or minister, the principal authority in most peasants' lives was that of the lord. The collective will of the community also counted for much, as in arrangements for plowing, sowing, and reaping, and even in some places the allocation of land. The range of the peasant's world was that of a day's travel on foot or, more likely, by donkey, mule, or pony. He would have little sense of a community larger than he could see or visit. His struggle against nature or the demands of his superiors was waged in countless little pockets. When peasants came together in insurgent bands, as in Valencia in 1693, there was likely to be some agitation or leadership from outside the peasant community—in that case from José Navarro, a surgeon. There needed to be some exceptional provocation, like the new tax that roused Brittany in 1675. After the revolt had been suppressed, the parlement of Rennes was exiled to a smaller town for 14 years: clearly government understood the danger of bourgeois complicity. Rumour was always potent, especially when tinged with fantasy, as in Stenka Razin's rising in southern Russia, which evolved between 1667 and 1671 from banditry into a vast protest against serfdom. Generally, cooperation between villages was less common than feuding, the product of centuries of uneasy proximity and conflict over disputed lands.

      The peasant's life was conditioned by mundane factors: soil, water supplies, communications, and above all the site itself in relation to river, sea, frontier, or strategic route. The community could be virtually self-sufficient. Its environment was formed by what could be bred, fed, sown, gathered, and worked within the bounds of the parish. Fields and beasts provided food and clothing; wood came from the fringe of wasteland. Except in districts where stone was available and easy to work, houses were usually made of wood or a cob of clay and straw. Intended to provide shelter from the elements, they can be envisaged as a refinement of the barn, with certain amenities for their human occupants: hearth, table, and benches with mats and rushes strewn on a floor of beaten earth or rough stone. Generally there would be a single story, with a raised space for beds and an attic for grain. For his own warmth and their security the peasant slept close to his animals, under the same roof. Cooking required an iron pot, sometimes the only utensil named in peasant inventories. Meals were eaten off wood or earthenware. Fuel was normally wood, which was becoming scarce in some intensively cultivated parts of northern Europe, particularly Holland, where much of the land was reclaimed from sea or marsh. Peat and dried dung also were used, but rarely coal. Corn was ground at the village mill, a place of potential conflict: only one man had the necessary expertise, and his clients were poorly placed to bargain. Women and girls spun and wove for the itinerant merchants who supplied the wool or simply for the household, for breeches, shirts, tunics, smocks, and gowns. Clothes served elemental needs: they were usually thick for protection against damp and cold and loose-fitting for ease of movement. Shoes were likely to be wooden clogs, as leather was needed for harnesses. Farm implements—plows (except for the share), carts, harrows, and many of the craftsman's tools—were made of wood, seasoned, split or rough-hewn. Few possessed saws; in Russia they were unknown before 1700. Iron was little used and was likely to be of poor quality. Though it might be less true of eastern Europe where, as in Bohemia, villages tended to be smaller, the community would usually have craftsmen—a smith or a carpenter, for example—to satisfy most needs. More intricate skills were provided by traveling tinkers.

      The isolated villager might hear of the outside world from such men. Those living around the main routes would fare better and gather news, at least indirectly, from merchants, students, pilgrims, and government officials or, less reputably, from beggars, gypsies, or deserters (a numerous class in most states). He might buy broadsheets, almanacs, and romances, produced by enterprising printers at centres such as Troyes, to be hawked around wherever there were a few who could read. So were kept alive what became a later generation's fairy tales, along with the magic and astrology that they were not reluctant to believe. Inn and church provided the setting for business, gossip, and rumour. Official reports and requirements were posted and village affairs were conducted in the church. The innkeeper might benefit from the cash of wayfarers but like others who provided a service, he relied chiefly on the produce of his own land. Thus the rural economy consisted of innumerable self-sufficient units incapable of generating adequate demand for the development of large-scale manufactures. Each cluster of communities was isolated within its own market economy, proud, and suspicious of outsiders. Even where circumstances fostered liberty, peasants were pitifully inadequate in finding original solutions to age-old problems but were well-versed in strategies of survival, for they could draw on stores of empirical wisdom. They feared change just as they feared the night for its unknown terrors. Their customs and attitudes were those of people who lived on the brink: more babies might be born but there would be no increase in the food supply.

      In the subsistence economy there was much payment and exchange in kind; money was hoarded for the occasional purchase, to the frustration of tax collectors and the detriment of economic growth. Demand was limited by the slow or nonexistent improvement in methods of farming (agriculture, origins of). There was no lack of variety in the agricultural landscape. Between the temporary cultivation of parts of Russia and Scandinavia, where slash-and-burn was encouraged by the extent of forest land, and the rotation of cereal and fodder crops of Flanders and eastern England, 11 different methods of tillage have been identified. Most common was some version of the three-course rotation that Arthur Young (Young, Arthur) denounced when he traveled in France in 1788. He observed the subdivision and wide dispersal of holdings that provided a further obstacle to the diversification of crops and selective breeding. The loss of land by enclosure pauperized many English labourers. But the development in lowland England of the enclosed, compact economic unit—the central feature of the agrarian revolution—enabled large landowners to prosper and invest and small farmers to survive. They were not trapped, like many Continental peasants, between the need to cultivate more land and the declining yields of their crops, which followed from the loss of pasture and of fertilizing manure. Without capital accumulation and with persisting low demand for goods, economic growth was inhibited. The work force was therefore tied to agriculture in numbers that depressed wage rates, discouraged innovation, and tempted landowners to compensate by some form of exploitation of labour, rights, and dues. Eighteenth-century reformers condemned serfdom and other forms of feudalism, but they were as much the consequence as the cause of the agricultural malaise.

The economic (economic systems) environment
Innovation and development
      Every country had challenges to overcome before its resources could be developed. The possession of a coastline with safe harbours or of a navigable river was an important asset and, as by Brandenburg and Russia, keenly fought for; so were large mineral deposits, forests, and fertile soil. But communications were primitive and transport slow and costly even in favoured lands. Napoleon moved at the same speed as Julius Caesar. By horse, coach, or ship, it was reckoned that 24 hours was necessary to travel 60 miles. In one area, however, innovation had proceeded at such a pace as to justify terms such as “intellectual” or “scientific” revolution; yet there remained a yawning gap between developments in theoretical science (science, history of) and technology. In the age of Newton the frontiers of science were shifting fast, and there was widespread interest in experiment and demonstration, but one effect was to complete the separation of a distinctive intellectual elite: the more advanced the ideas, the more difficult their transmission and application. There was a movement of thought rather than a scientific movement, a culture of inquiry rather than of enterprise. Only in the long term was the one to lead to the other, through the growing belief that material progress was possible. Meanwhile, advances were piecemeal, usually the work of individuals, often having no connection with business. Missing was not only that association of interests that characterizes industrial society but also the educational ground: schools and universities were wedded to traditional courses. Typical inventors of the early industrial age were untutored craftsmen, such as Richard Arkwright, James Watt, or John Wilkinson. Between advances in technology there could be long delays.

      As those names suggest, Britain was the country that experienced the breakthrough to higher levels of production. The description “Industrial Revolution” (Industrial Revolution) is misleading if applied to the economy as a whole, but innovations in techniques and organization led to such growth in iron, woolens, and, above all, cotton textiles in the second half of the 18th century that Britain established a significant lead. It was sustained by massive investment and by the wars following the French Revolution, which shut the Continent off from developments that in Britain were stimulated by war. Factors involved in the unique experience of a country that contained only 1 in 20 of Europe's inhabitants expose certain contrasting features of the European economy. The accumulation of capital had been assisted by agricultural improvement, the acquisition of colonies, the operation of chartered companies (notably the East India Company), trade-oriented policies of governments (notably that of William Pitt during the Seven Years' War), and the development of colonial markets. There existed a relatively advanced financial system, based on the successful Bank of England (founded 1694), and interest rates were consistently lower than those of European rivals. This was particularly important in the financing of road and canal building, where large private investment was needed before profit was realized. Further advantages included plentiful coal and iron ore and swift-flowing streams in the hilly northwest where the moist climate was suited to cotton spinning. The labour force was supplemented by Irish immigrants. A society that cherished political and legal institutions characteristic of the ancien régime also exhibited a free and tolerant spirit, tending to value fortune as much as birth. Comparison with Britain's chief rival in the successive wars of 1740–48, 1756–63, and 1778–83 is strengthened by the consequences of those wars: for France the slide toward bankruptcy, for Britain a larger debt that could still be funded without difficulty.

      Yet the French enjoyed an eightfold growth in colonial trade between 1714 and 1789, considerably larger than that of the British. The Dutch still had the financial strength, colonies, trading connections, and at least some of the entrepreneurial spirit that had characterized them in the 17th century. Enlightened statesmen such as the Marquês de Pombal in Portugal, Charles III of Spain, and Joseph II of Austria backed measures designed to promote agriculture and manufacturing. The question of why other countries lagged behind Britain leads to consideration of material and physical conditions, collective attitudes, and government policies. It should not distort the picture of Europe as a whole or obscure the changes that affected the demand for goods and the ability of manufacturers and traders to respond.

      The mercantilist (mercantilism) theory—which still appealed to a statesman like Frederick the Great, as it had to his great-grandfather—was grounded on the assumption that markets were limited: to increase trade, new markets had to be found. Mobility within society and increased spending by common folk, who were not expected to live luxuriously, were treated as symptoms of disorder. Mercantilists were concerned lest the state be stripped of its treasure and proper distinctions of status be undermined. The moral context is important: mercantilism belongs to the world of the city-state, the guilds, and the church; its ethical teaching is anchored in the medieval situation. By 1600 the doctrine that usury was sinful was already weakened beyond recovery by evasion and example. Needy princes borrowed, but prejudice against banks lingered, reinforced by periodic demonstrations of their fallibility, as in the failure of John Law's Banque Générale in Paris in 1720. Productive activity was not necessarily assumed to be a good thing. Yet it is possible, throughout the period, to identify dynamic features characteristic of capitalism in its developed, industrial phase.

Early capitalism
      Two broad trends can be discerned. The shift from the Mediterranean and its hinterlands to the Atlantic seaboard continued, although there was still vigorous entrepreneurial activity in certain Mediterranean regions; Venice stood still, but Marseille and Barcelona prospered. More striking was the growing gap between the economic systems of the east, where capital remained largely locked up in the large estates, and the west, where conditions were more favourable to enterprise. With more widespread adoption of utilitarian criteria for management went a sterner view of the obligation of workers (work). Respect for the clock, with regular hours and the reduction of holidays for saints' days (already achieved in Protestant countries), was preparing the way psychologically for the discipline of the factory and mill. Handsome streets and squares of merchants' houses witnessed to the prosperity of Atlantic ports such as Bordeaux, Nantes, and Bristol, which benefited from the reorientation of trade. Above all, Amsterdam and London reflected the mutually beneficial activity of trade and services. From shipbuilding, so demanding in skills and raw materials, a network of suppliers reached back to forests, fields, and forges, where timber, iron, canvas, and rope were first worked. Chandlering, insurance, brokerage, and credit-trading facilitated international dealing and amassing of capital. Fairs had long counteracted the isolation of regional economies: Lyon on the Rhône, Hamburg on the Elbe, and Danzig on the Vistula had become centres of exchange, where sales were facilitated by price lists, auctions, and specialization in certain commodities. Retailing acquired a modern look with shops catering to those who could afford coffee from Brazil or tobacco from Virginia; unlike earlier retailing, the goods offered for sale were not the products of work carried out on the premises. The dissemination of news was another strand in the pattern. By 1753 the sale of newspapers exceeded seven million: the emphasis was on news, not opinion, and price lists were carried with the news that affected them. Seamen were assisted by the dredging of harbours and improved docks and by more accurate navigational instruments and charts. In 1600 there were 18 lighthouses on or off the shores of Europe; in 1750 there were 82. The state also improved roads and made them safe for travelers; by 1789 France had 7,500 miles of fine roads, built largely by forced labour. By 1660 nearly every Dutch city was linked by canals (canals and inland waterways). Following their example, Elector Frederick William in Brandenburg and Peter the Great in Russia linked rivers to facilitate trade. In France Colbert's plan for the Languedoc canal (completed 1682) involved private as well as state capital. England's canal builders, notably the Duke of Bridgewater, had to find their own resources: consequently, capital was applied to the best effect to serve mines and factories. The general survival of tolls and the resistance of interested parties to their removal imposed constraints on most governments. The abolition of internal customs was therefore a priority for enlightened reformers such as Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot in France and Joseph II in Austria. Germany's many princes had taken advantage of weak imperial authority to impose the tolls, which produced revenue at the cost of long-distance trade. Numerous external tariffs remained an obstacle to the growth of trade. Radical action, however, could be dangerous. Turgot's attempt to liberate the grain trade in France led to shortages, price rises, and his own downfall. The free trade treaty of 1786 of the French foreign minister, the Count de Vergennes, also had unfortunate consequences: France was flooded by cheap English textiles, peasant weavers were distressed, and the ground was prepared for the popular risings of 1789.

      One important development was the adoption in western Europe of the existing Italian practice of using bills of exchange as negotiable instruments; it was legalized in Holland in 1651 and in England in 1704. Bankers (bank) who bought bills, at a discount to cover risk, thereby released credit that would otherwise have been immobilized. The other aspect of the financial revolution was the growth of banking facilities. In 1660 there had been little advance in a century, since princes and magnates, after raising money too easily, had reneged on debts and damaged the fragile system. Great houses, such as the Fuggers, had been ruined. The high interest rates demanded by survivors contributed to the recession of the 17th century. There were some municipal institutions, such as the Bank of Hamburg and the great Bank of Amsterdam, which played a crucial part in Dutch economic growth by bringing order to the currency and facilitating transfers. They provided the model for the Bank of England (England, Bank of), which was founded in 1694 as a private company and was soon to have a relationship of mutual dependence with the state. The first state bank was that founded in Sweden in 1656; to provide a substitute for Sweden's copper currency, it issued the first bank notes. Overproduced and not properly secured, they soon lost value. Law's (Law, John) ambitious scheme for a royal bank in France foundered in 1720 because it was linked to his Louisiana company and its inflated prospects. After its failure tax farmers resumed their hold over state finance, and as a result interest rates remained higher than those of Britain because there was no secure central agency of investment. Law's opponents were shortsighted: in Britain, where a central bank was successful, a large expansion of private banking also took place.

      Meanwhile silver, everywhere the basic unit of value (money), remained in short supply. One-sided trade with the east meant a continuous drain. Insufficient silver was mined; declining imports from the New World did not affect only Spain. Governments tried to prevent the clipping of coins and so revalued. The deficiency remained, providing evidence for mercantilist policies. Negotiable paper in one form or other went some way to meet the shortage of specie. Stock exchanges, commercial in their original function, dealt increasingly in government stocks. Joint-stock companies became a common device for attracting money and spreading risk. By the mid-18th century the operations of commerce, manufacturing, and public finance were linked in one general system; a military defeat or economic setback affecting credit in one area might undermine confidence throughout the entire investing community.

The old industrial (industrialization) order
      Operations of high finance represented the future of capitalist Europe. The economy as a whole was still closer in most respects to the Middle Ages. Midland and northern England, a belt along the Urals, Catalonia, the Po valley, and Flanders were scenes of exceptionally large-scale operations during the 18th century. The mines, quarries, mills, and factories of entrepreneurs such as Josse van Robais, the Dutch industrialist brought in by Colbert to produce textiles in Abbeville, only emphasized, by contrast, the primitive conditions of most manufacturing enterprise. Technology relied on limited equipment. Peter the Great saw it at its most impressive when he visited Holland in 1697. In villages along the Zaan River were lumber saws powered by 500 windmills and yards equipped with cranes and stacked with timber cut to set lengths to build fluitschips to a standard design.

      The typical unit of production, however, was the domestic enterprise, with apprentices and journeymen living with family and servants. The merchant played a vital part in the provision of capital. When metalworkers made knives or needles for a local market, they could remain their own masters. For a larger market, they had to rely on businessmen for fuel, ore, wages, and transport. In textiles (textile) the capital and marketing skills of the entrepreneur were essential to cottagers. This putting-out system spread as merchants saw the advantages of evading guild control. When the cotton industry was developed around Rouen and Barcelona, it was organized in the same way as woolen textiles. In the old industrial order, output could be increased only in proportion to the number of workers involved. In England the new order was evolving, and ranks of machines in barracklike mills were producing for a mass market. The need to produce economically could transform an industry, as in Brabant, where peasants moved into the weaving side of the linen trade and then established bleaching works that ruined traditionally dominant Haarlem. It also altered the social balance, as in electoral Saxony where, between 1550 and 1750, the proportion of peasants who made most of their living by industry rose from 5 to 30 percent of the population. With such change came the dependence on capital and the market that was to make the worker so vulnerable.

      Inevitably the expansion of domestic manufactures brought problems of control, which were eventually resolved by concentration in factories and by technical advances large enough to justify investment in machinery. Starting with the Lombe brothers' silk mills, their exploitation of secrets acquired from Italy (1733), and John Kaye's flying shuttle, British inventions set textile production on a dizzy path of growth. Abraham Darby's process of coke smelting was perhaps the most important single improvement, since it liberated the iron founder from dependence on charcoal. The shortage of timber, a source of anxiety everywhere except in Russia and Scandinavia, proved to be a stimulus to invention and progress. Technical development on the Continent was less remarkable. The nine volumes of the Theatrum Machinarum (1724), Jakob Leupold's description of engineering, records steady development reflecting the craftsman's empirical outlook. Improvement could be modest indeed. A miller could grind 37 pounds (17 kilograms) of flour each day in the 12th century; by 1700 it might have been 55 pounds. In some areas there were long intervals between theoretical advances and technological application. Galileo, Evangelista Torricelli, Otto von Guericke, and Blaise Pascal worked on the vacuum in the first half of the 17th century, and Denis Papin later experimented with steam engines; however, it was not until 1711 that Thomas Newcomen produced a model that was of any practical use despite the great need for power. mining, already well advanced, was held back by difficulties of drainage. In the Rohrerbuhel copper mines in the Tyrol, the Heiliger Geist shaft, at 2,900 feet (886 metres), remained the deepest in the world until 1872; a third of its labour force was employed in draining. Increases in productivity were generally found in those manufacturing activities where, as in the part-time production of linen in Silesia, the skills required were modest and the raw material could be produced locally.

      Specialized manufacturing, evolving to meet the rising demand generated by the enrichment of the upper classes, showed significant growth. Wherever technical ingenuity was challenged by the needs of the market, results could be impressive. printing was of seminal importance, since the advance of knowledge depended on it. Improvements in type molds and founding contributed to a threefold increase between 1600 and 1700 in the number of pages printed in a day. The Hollander, a pulverizing machine (c. 1670), could produce more pulp for paper than eight stamping mills. The connection between technical innovation and style is illustrated by improvements in glassmaking (glass) that made possible not only the casting of large sheets for mirrors but also, by 1700, the larger panes required for the sash windows that were replacing the leaded panes of casements. Venice lost its dominant position in the manufacture of glass as rulers set up works to save expensive imports. A new product sometimes followed a single discovery, as when the Saxons Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus and Johann Friedrich Böttger successfully imitated Chinese hard paste and created the porcelain of Meissen. A way of life could be affected by one invention. The pendulum clock of the Dutch scientist Christiaan Huygens introduced an age of reliable timekeeping. Clocks were produced in great numbers, and Geneva's production of 5,000 timepieces a year was overtaken by 1680 by the clockmakers of both London and Paris. With groups of workers each responsible for a particular task, such as the making of wheels or the decoration of dials, specialization led to enhanced production, and in these elegant products of traditional craftsmanship the division of labour appeared.

Sovereigns and estates
      Among European states of the High Renaissance, the republic of Venice provided the only important exception to princely rule. Following the court of Burgundy, where chivalric ideals vied with the self-indulgence of feast, joust, and hunt, Charles V, Francis I, and Henry VIII acted out the rites of kingship in sumptuous courts. Enormous Poland, particularly during the reign of Sigismund I (1506–48), and the miniature realms of Germany and Italy experienced the same type of regime and subscribed to the same enduring values that were to determine the principles of absolute monarchy. Appeal to God justified the valuable rights that the kings of France and Spain enjoyed over their churches and added sanction to hereditary right and constitutional authority. Henry VIII moved further when he broke with Rome and took to himself complete sovereignty.

      Rebellion was always a threat. The skill of Elizabeth I (1558–1603) helped prevent England being torn apart by Roman Catholic and Puritan factions. Philip II (1555–98) failed to repress the continuing rebellion of what became a new state formed out of the northern Burgundian provinces. Neither Charles IX (1560–74) nor Henry III (1574–89) could stop the civil wars in which the Huguenots created an unassailable state within France. The failure of Maximilian I (1493–1519) to implement reforms had left the empire in poor shape to withstand the religious and political challenges of the Reformation. Such power as Charles V (1519–56) enjoyed in Germany was never enough to do more than contain schism within the bounds confirmed by the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555. Most of Hungary had been lost after the Turkish victory at Mohács in 1526. Imperial authority waned further under Maximilian II (1564–76) and Rudolf II (1576–1612). The terms of Augsburg were flouted as further church lands were secularized and Calvinism gained adherents, some in restless Bohemia. In these ways the stage was set for the subsequent wars and political developments.

      With the tendency, characteristic of the Renaissance period, for sovereigns to enlarge their authority and assume new rights in justice and finance, went larger revenues, credit, and patronage. Princes fought with as little regard for economic consequences as their medieval precursors had shown. Ominously, the Italian wars had become part of a larger conflict, centring on the dynastic ambitions of the houses of Habsburg and Valois; similarly, the Reformation led to the formation of alliances whose objectives were not religious. The scale and expertise of diplomacy grew with the pretensions of sovereignty. The professional diplomat and permanent embassy, the regular soldier and standing army, served princes still generally free to act in their traditional spheres. But beyond them, in finance and government, what would be the balance of powers? From the answer to this question will come definition of the absolutism that is commonly seen as characteristic of the age.

      The authority of a sovereign was exercised in a society of orders and corporations, each having duties and privileges. St. Paul's image of the Christian body was not difficult for a 17th-century European to understand; the organic society was a commonplace of political debate. The orders, as represented in estates or diets (Diet), were, first, the clergy; (clergy) second, the nobility (aristocracy) (represented with the lords spiritual in the English House of Lords); and, third, commoners. There were variations: upper and lower nobles were sometimes divided; certain towns represented the Third Estate, as in the Castilian Cortes; in Sweden, uniquely, there was an estate of peasants, whose successful effort to maintain their privilege was one component of Queen Christina's crisis of 1650. When, as in the 16th century, such institutions flourished, estates were held to represent not the whole population as individuals but the important elements—the “political nation.” Even then the nobility tended to dominate. Their claim to represent all who dwelled on their estates was sounder in law and popular understanding than may appear to those accustomed to the idea of individual political rights.

      In the empire, the estates were influential because they controlled the purse. Wherever monarchy was weak in relation to local elites, the diet tended to be used to further their interests. The Cortes of Aragon maintained into the 17th century the virtual immunity from taxation that was a significant factor in Spanish weakness. The strength of the representative institution was proportionate to that of the crown, which depended largely on the conditions of accession. The elective principle might be preserved in form, as in the English coronation service, but generally it had withered as the principle of heredity had been established. Where a succession was disputed, as between branches of the house of Vasa in Sweden after 1595, the need to gain the support of the privileged classes usually led to concessions being made to the body that they controlled. In Poland, where monarchy was elective, the Sejm exercised such power that successive kings, bound by conditions imposed at accession, found it hard to muster forces to defend their frontiers. The constitution remained unshakable even during the reign of John Sobieski (John III Sobieski) (1674–96), hero of the relief of Vienna, who failed to secure the succession of his son. Under the Saxon kings Augustus II (1697–1733) and Augustus III (1734–63), foreign interference led to civil wars, but repeated and factious exercise of the veto rendered abortive all attempts to reform. It required the threat—and in 1772, the reality—of partition to give Stanisław II August Poniatowski (1764–95) sufficient support to effect reforms, but this came too late to save Poland.

      At the other extreme were the Russian zemsky sobor, which fulfilled a last service to the tsars in expressing the landowners' demand for stricter laws after the disorders of 1648, and the Estates-General of France, where the size of the country meant that rulers preferred to deal with the smaller assemblies of provinces (pays d'états) lately incorporated into the realm, such as Languedoc and Brittany. They met regularly and had a permanent staff for raising taxes on property. With respect to the other provinces (pays d'élection), the crown had enjoyed the crucial advantage of an annual tax since 1439, when Charles VII successfully asserted the right to levy the personal taille without consent. When Richelieu (Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal et duc de) tried to abolish one of the pays d'état, the Dauphiné, he met with resistance sufficient to deter him and successive ministers from tampering with this form of fiscal privilege. It survived until the Revolution: to ministers it was a deformity, to critics of the régime it provided at least one guarantee against arbitrary rule. The zemsky sobor had always been the creature of the ruler, characteristic of a society that knew nothing of fundamental laws or corporate rights. When it disappeared, the tsarist government was truly the despotism that the French feared but did not, except in particular cases, experience. When, in 1789, the Estates-General met for the first time since 1614, it abolished the privileged estates and corporations in the name of the freedom that they had claimed to protect. The age of natural human rights had dawned.

      The experience of England, where Parliament played a vital part in the Reformation proceedings of Henry VIII's reign and thus gained in authority, shows that power could be shared between princes and representative bodies. On the Continent it was generally a different story. The Estates-General had been discredited because it had come to be seen as the instrument of faction. Religious differences had stimulated debate about the nature of authority, but extreme interpretations of the right of resistance, such as those that provoked the assassinations of William I the Silent, stadtholder of the Netherlands, in 1584 and Henry III of France in 1589, not only exposed the doctrine of tyrannicide but also pointed to the need for a regime strong enough to impose a religious solution. One such was the Edict of Nantes (Nantes, Edict of) of 1598, which conceded to the Huguenots not only freedom of worship but also their own schools, law courts, and fortified towns. From the start the Edict constituted a challenge to monarchy and a test of its ability to govern. Richelieu's capture of La Rochelle, the most powerful Huguenot fortress and epicentre of disturbance, after a 14-month siege (1627–28) was therefore a landmark in the making of absolute monarchy, crucial for France and, because of its increasing power, for Europe as a whole.

Major forms of absolutism

      Certain assumptions influenced the way in which the French state developed. The sovereign held power from God. He ruled in accordance with divine and natural justice and had an obligation to preserve the customary rights and liberties of his subjects. The diversity of laws and taxes meant that royal authority rested on a set of quasi-contractual relationships with the orders and bodies of the realm. Pervading all was a legalistic concern for form, precedence, and the customs that, according to the French jurist Guy Coquille, were the true civil laws. The efforts of successive ministers to create the semblance of a unitary state came less from dogma than from the need to overcome obstacles to government and taxation. Absolutism was never a complete system to match the philosophy and rhetoric that set the king above the law, subject only to God, whom he represented on earth. For 60 years after the Fronde there was no serious challenge to the authority of the crown from either nobles or parlement. The idea of divine right (divine right of kings), eloquently propounded by Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet and embodied in the palace and system of Versailles, may have strengthened the political consensus, but it did little to assist royal agents trying to please both Versailles and their own communities. Absolutism on the ground amounted to a series of running battles for political control. In the front line were the intendants (administrative officials), first used extensively by Richelieu, then, after their abolition during the Fronde, more systematically and with ever-widening responsibilities, by Louis XIV and his successors until 1789.

      Throughout the ancien régime the absolutist ideal was flawed, its evolution stunted through persisting contradictions. The fiscal demands of the crown were incompatible with the constant need to stimulate trade and manufacturing enterprise; and only a resolute minister operating in peacetime, such as Colbert in the 1660s and Philibert Orry in the 1730s, could hope to achieve significant reforms. There was tension between the Roman Catholic ideal of uniformity and pragmatic views of the state's interest. In 1685 Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, a harsh if logical resolution of the question. It was what his Catholic subjects expected of him, but it proved damaging to the economy and to France's reputation. A further contradiction lay between measures to overcome the hostility of the nobles to the aggrandizement of the state and the need not to compromise state authority by conceding too much. Richelieu's actions, including the execution of the Duke of Montmorency for treason (1632), taught the lesson that no subject was beyond the reach of the law. Louis XIV's brilliant court drew the magnates to Versailles, where social eminence, patronage, and pensions compensated for loss of the power for which they had contended during the Fronde. It merely fortified the regime of privilege that defied fundamental reform to the end. There was another side to the politically advantageous sale of office. Capital was diverted that might better have been employed in business, and there was a vested interest in the status quo. For the mass of the nobility the enlargement of the army, quadrupled in the 17th century, provided an honourable career, but it also encouraged militarism and tempted the king and ministers to neglect the interests of the navy, commerce, and the colonies. When France intervened in the War of the Austrian Succession in 1741, the economic consequences undermined the regime. The achievements of the Bourbon government, with able ministers working in small, flexible councils, were impressive, even when undermined by weak kings such as Louis XV (1715–74) and Louis XVI (1774–92). In the 18th century, France acquired a fine network of roads, new harbours were built, and trade expanded; a lively culture was promoted by a prosperous bourgeoisie. It is an irony that the country that nurtured the philosophes was the least affected by the reforms they proposed, but it would have been a remarkable king who could have ruled with the courage and wisdom to enable his servants to overcome obstacles to government that were inherent in the system.

The empire (Holy Roman Empire)
      The character of Austrian absolutism was derived from a dual situation: with the exception of Maria Theresa, who was debarred by the Salic Law of Succession, the head of the house was also Holy Roman emperor. He directly ruled the family lands, comprising different parts of Austria stretching from Alpine valleys to the Danubian plain, which were mainly Roman Catholic and German; Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, which were mainly Slavic in race and language; a fraction of Hungary after the reconquest following the failure of the Turkish Siege of Vienna (1683); and Belgium and Milan (by the Peace of Rastatt in 1714). Each region provided a title and rights pertaining to that state, with an authority limited by the particular rights of its subjects. As an elected emperor, his sovereignty was of a different kind. In effect, the empire was a German confederation, though Bohemia was in and Prussia was outside it; the Mantuan succession affair (1627–31), when the emperor sought to arbitrate, recalls an obsolete Italian dimension. Each German state was self-governing and free to negotiate with foreign powers. Princes, both ecclesiastical and secular, enjoyed the right of representation in the Reichstag. The first of the three curiae in the Reichstag was the college of electors, who elected the emperor; the second comprised princes, counts, barons, and the ecclesiastical princes; and the third, the imperial free cities. The 45 dynastic principalities had 80 percent of the land and population; the 60 dynastic counties and lordships comprised only 3 percent. Some of the 60 imperial free cities were but villages. A thousand imperial knights, often landless, each claimed rights of landlordship amounting to sovereignty and owed allegiance only to the emperor in his capacity as president of the Reichstag. Numbers varied through wastage or amalgamation, but they convey the amorphous character of a confederation in which the emperor could only act effectively in concert with the princes, either individually or organized in administrative circles (Kreis). Bound by weak ties of allegiance and strong sentiment of nationality, this empire represented the world of medieval universalism with some aspects of the early modern state, without belonging wholly to either. Religious schism had created new frontiers and criteria for policy, such as could justify the elector palatine's decision to accept the crown of Bohemia from the rebels who precipitated the Thirty Years' War. The failure of the emperor Ferdinand II to enlarge his authority or enforce conformity led to the settlements of Westphalia in which his son, Ferdinand III, was forced to concede again the cuius regio, eius religio principle. Thereafter he and his successor, Leopold I, devoted their energies to increasing their authority over the family lands. It would be wrong, however, to assume that they, or even the 18th-century emperors, were powerless.

      The political climate in which the empire operated was affected by the way universities (university) dominated intellectual life and by trends within universities, in particular the development of doctrines of natural law and cameralism. German rulers respected the universities because the majority of their students became civil servants. With earnest religious spirit went an emphasis on the duty to work and obey. Even in Catholic states the spirit of the Aufklärung (Enlightenment) was pious and practical. Exponents of natural law, such as the philosopher-scientist Christian Wolff, advocated religious toleration but saw no need for constitutional safeguards: the ideal ruler was absolute. Such commitment to civic virtue explains both the development of the German state and the survival of the empire as a working institution. Territorial fragmentation meant a prince's combining his executive role with that of representative within the Reich: there could be no stimulus to the development of constitutional ideas. The German associated political liberty with the authority of his ruler. He was loyal to his own state, which was the “fatherland”; “abroad” was another state. When judgment was required, the prince would still go to the imperial court, the Reichskammergericht. There were limits to his loyalty. The emperor was expected to lead but could not always do so. So the authorities were ineffective, for example, in the face of Louis XIV's (Louis XIV) seizure of Strasbourg in 1681. Yet Louis found that German opinion was not to be underestimated; it contributed to his defeat in the War of the Grand Alliance.

      Religious animosities persisted into the age of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm) (1646–1716), but his rational approach and quest for religious unity corresponded to the popular yearning for stability. When interests were so delicately balanced, arbitration was preferable to aggression. The mechanism of the Reichskammergericht saved the counties of Isenburg and Solms from annexation by the ruler of Hesse-Darmstadt. More than a court of law, the Reichskammergericht functioned as a federal executive in matters of police, debts, bankruptcies, and tax claims. Small states such as Mainz could manage their affairs so as to turn enlightened ideas to good use, but it was the rulers of the larger states who held the keys to Germany's future, and they took note of the emperor; thus his ambivalent position was crucial. Frederick William I of Prussia accepted the ruling of Emperor Charles VI, confirming his right of succession to Berg. In return, the king guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction (Pragmatic Sanction of Emperor Charles VI), asserting the right of the emperor's daughter to succeed. Charles repudiated Prussia's claim, however, in 1738 when he made a treaty with France. In 1740, when both sovereigns died, Frederick II made Austria pay for this slight to his father. The War of the Austrian Succession (Austrian Succession, War of the) followed his invasion of Silesia; (Silesia) that valuable Bohemian province remained at the heart of the Austro-Prussian conflict. Its final loss taught Maria Theresa and her advisers, notably Friedrich Haugwitz and Wenzel von Kaunitz, that they must imitate what they could not defeat. She created, in place of separate Austrian and Bohemian chancelleries, a more effective central administration based on the Direktorium, which her son Joseph (Joseph II) (coruler from 1765, when he became emperor; sole ruler 1780–90) would develop in ruthless fashion. Maria Theresa respected the Roman Catholic tradition of her house, even while curtailing the powers of the church. Joseph pursued his mother's interests in education and a more productive economy and was concerned with equality of rights and the unity of his domains. Yet he joined in the partition of Poland for the reward of Galicia and showed so little regard for the rules of the empire that he was challenged by Frederick II over the Bavarian succession, which he had sought to manipulate to his advantage. After the ensuing Potato War (1778), the empire's days were numbered, though it required the contemptuous pragmatism of Napoleon to abolish it (1806).

      Frederick II had inherited a style of absolute government that owed much to the peculiar circumstances of Brandenburg-Prussia (Brandenburg) as it emerged from the Thirty Years' War. Lacking natural frontiers and war-ravaged when Frederick William inherited the electorate in 1640, Brandenburg had little more than the prestige of the ancient house of Hohenzollern. The diplomacy of Jules Cardinal Mazarin contributed to the acquisition (1648) of East Pomerania, Magdeburg, and Minden, and war between Sweden and Poland brought sovereignty over East Prussia, formerly held as a fief from Poland. A deal with the Junkers at the Recess of 1653, which secured a regular subsidy in return for a guarantee of their social rights, was the foundation of an increasingly absolute rule. He overcame by force the resistance of the diet of Prussia in 1660: as he became more secure economically, militarily, and bureaucratically, he depended less on his diets. So was established the Prussian model: an aristocracy of service and a bureaucracy harnessed to military needs. The Great Elector's son became King Frederick I of Prussia when he pledged support to the emperor's cause (1701). His son, Frederick William (1713–40), completed the centralization of authority and created an army sustained by careful stewardship of the economy. Personally directing a larger army in wars of aggression and survival, Frederick the Great (1740–86) came close to ruining his state; its survival testifies to the success of his father. Of course Frederick left his own impress on government. He should not be judged by his essays in enlightened philosophy or even by new mechanisms of government, but by the spirit he inspired. He lived out his precept that the sovereign should be the first servant of the state. All was ordered so as to eliminate obstacles to the executive will. Much was achieved: the restoration of Prussia and the establishment of an industrial base, in particular the exploitation of the new Silesian resources. Legal rights and freedom of thought were secure so long as they did not conflict with the interest of the state. A monument to his reign, completed five years after his death in 1786, was the Allgemeine Landrecht, the greatest codification of German law. Perhaps his greatest civil achievement was the stability that made such a striking contrast with the turbulence in Habsburg lands under Joseph II.

Variations on the absolutist theme

      In Sweden the Konungaförsäkran (“King's Assurance”), which was imposed at the accession of the young Gustav II Adolf in 1611 and which formally made him dependent for all important decisions on the Råd (council) and Riksdag (diet), was no hindrance to him and his chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, in executing a bold foreign policy and important domestic reforms. Queen Christina, a minor until 1644, experienced a constitutional crisis (1650) in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, from which Sweden had gained German lands, notably West Pomerania and Bremen. She extricated herself with finesse, then abdicated (1654). Charles X (Charles X Gustav) sought a military solution to the threat of encirclement by invading Poland and, more successfully, Denmark, but he left the kingdom to his four-year-old son (1660) with problems of political authority unresolved. When he came of age, Charles XI won respect for his courage in war and established an absolutism beyond doubt or precedent by persuading the Riksdag to accept an extreme definition of his powers (1680). Then he carried out the drastic recovery of alienated royal lands. With novel powers went military strength based on a corps of farmer-soldiers from the recovered land. Tempting authority awaited Charles XII (1697–1718), but there was also a menacing coalition. Perhaps decline was inevitable, for Sweden's greatness had been a tour de force, but Charles XII's onslaughts on Poland and Russia risked the state as well as the army which he commanded so brilliantly. Even after the Russian victory at Poltava (1709) and Charles's exile in Turkey, Sweden's resistance testified to the soundness of government. When Charles died fighting in Norway, Sweden had lost its place in Germany and a third of its adult population. An aristocratic reaction led to a period of limited monarchy. Decisions were made by committees of the Riksdag, influenced by party struggle, like that of the Hats and Caps at mid-century. Gustav III carried out a coup in 1774 that restored greater power to the sovereign, but there was no break in two great traditions: conscientious sovereign and responsible nobility.

      Denmark also had turned in the absolutist direction. Enforced withdrawal from the Thirty Years' War (in 1629) may not have been a disaster for Denmark, but the loss of the Scanian provinces to Sweden (1658) was—loss of control of the Sound was a standing temptation to go to war again. Events in Denmark exemplify on a small scale what was happening throughout Europe when princes built from war's wreckage, exploiting the yearning for direction and benefiting from the decay of a society that no longer provided good order. The smaller the country, the stronger the ruler's prospect of asserting his will. As if responding to Hobbes's formula for absolute monarchy, the estates declared King Frederick III supreme head on earth, elevated above all human laws (1661). Reforms followed under the statesmen Hannibal Sehested (Sehested, Hannibal) and Peter Schumacker (Griffenfeld, Peder Schumacher, Count af): a new code of law was promulgated; mercantilist measures fostered trade; and Copenhagen flourished. Danes accepted with docility the autocratic rule of the house of Oldenburg, but the peasantry (peasant) suffered from the spread of a German style of landownership. Frederick IV cared much about their souls, and his son Christian VI provided for their schooling, but a decree of 1733 tied peasants to their estates from the age of 14 to 36. Frederick V was fortunate to have capable ministers, notably Andreas Bernstorff, who was mainly responsible for the acquisition of long-disputed Schleswig and Holstein. His son Christian (Christian VIII) VII ruled until 1808; yet his reign is best known for his confinement under Johan Struensee (Struensee, Johann Friedrich, Graf von) and for the latter's liberal reforms. In the two years before his downfall in 1772, more than 1,000 laws were passed, including measures that have left their mark on Danish society to this day. The episode showed the perils as well as benefits of enlightened absolutism when a king or his subject acquired the power to do as he pleased.

      The Iberian Peninsula provides further illustration of the absolutist theme. Historians do not agree about the nature or precise extent of Spain's decline, but there is agreement that it did occur, that it was most pronounced at mid-century, and that its causes may be traced not only to the reign of Philip II (1556–98), the overextended champion of Roman Catholic and Spanish hegemony, but also to the social and political structure of the Spanish states of Castile, Aragon, Portugal, Milan, Naples, the Netherlands, and Franche-Comté. The constitutions of these states reflected the personal nature of the original union of crowns (1479) and of subsequent acquisitions. Castile received the largest share of the prosperity that came with silver bullion from the New World but suffered the worst consequences when Mexico and Peru became self-sufficient. Bullion imports fell sharply; trade with the rest of Europe was severely imbalanced; and the weight of taxation fell largely on Castile. The effort of Philip IV's chief minister, the Count de Olivares, to ensure greater equality of contribution through the union of arms was one factor in the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal (1640). In 1659 Spain had to cede Roussillon, Cerdagne, and Artois to France; and in 1667–68 the Flemish forts could put up no fight against the invading French. Despite a partial recovery in the 1680s under the intelligent direction of the Duke de Medinaceli and Manuel Oropesa, Spain was the object of humiliating partition treaties. In 1700 Charles II had bequeathed the entire inheritance to Philip of Anjou, Louis XIV's grandson. A foundation for recovery was laid early in the reign of Philip V, when outlying provinces lost their privileges and acquired a tax system based on ability to pay and a French-style intendente to enforce it. The pace of reform accelerated with the accession of Charles III in 1759. He was no radical, but he backed ministers who were, such as the Count de Floridablanca and the Count de Campomanes. A national bank, agricultural improvements, and new roads, factories, and hospitals witnessed to the efforts of this benevolent autocrat to overcome the Spanish habit of condemning everything new.

      Neighbouring Portugal acquired independence in 1668 after revolt and war protracted by the stubborn determination of Philip IV to maintain his patrimony. This small country had suffered since 1580 from its Spanish connection. Resentment at the loss of part of Brazil and most of its Far Eastern colonies had been a major cause of the revolt. The Portuguese did not see their interests as lying with Spain's in partnership with Austria and war against France and Holland. The reorientation of foreign policy and alliance with England by the Methuen Treaty (1703) brought respite rather than restoration. When Sebastien Pombal (Pombal, Sebastião de Carvalho, marquês de) became the virtual dictator of Portugal as chief minister of Joseph I, he instituted drastic change. If the rebuilding of Lisbon after the great earthquake of 1755 is his memorial, he is also remembered for his assault on the Jesuits; (Jesuit) Spain, France, and Austria followed his lead in expelling the powerful religious order, whose grip on education seemed to “enlightened” minds to obstruct progress.

      The Marquês de Pombal was inspired by what he had seen in London, and it was in Great Britain (as it became after the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707) that the entrepreneurial spirit was least restricted and most influential in government and society. By the accession of James I in 1603, there had already been a significant divergence from the Continental pattern. The 17th century saw recurring conflict between the crown—more absolute in language than in action—and Parliament. Elected on a narrow, uneven suffrage, it represented privileged interests rather than individuals; it was much concerned with legal precedents and rights. Charles I tried to rule without Parliament from 1629 to 1639, but he alienated powerful interests and, by trying to impose the Anglican prayer book on Scotland, blundered into a civil war that resulted in his overthrow and subsequent execution (1649). Experiments in parliamentary rule culminated in the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell; after his death (1658), Charles II was restored (1660) on financial terms intended to restrict his freedom of maneuver. After a crisis (1678–81) in which the Whigs, led by Lord Shaftesbury, exploited popular prejudice against Roman Catholicism and France to check his absolutist tendency, he recovered the initiative. However, the brief reign of James II (1685–88) justified the fears of those who had sought to exclude him. Policies designed to relieve Roman Catholics antagonized the leaders of the monarchist Anglican church as well as the families who thought that they had the right to manage the state. The Glorious Revolution brought the Dutch stadtholder to the throne as William III (1689–1702). The intense political struggle left a fund of theory and experience on which 18th-century statesmen could draw. There was, however, no written constitution and only a few statutory limitations. Monarchy retained the power to appoint ministers, make foreign policy, and to manage and direct the army. The Bill of Rights (1689) effectively abolished the suspending and dispensing powers, but William III pursued his European policy with an enlarged army, funded by a new land tax and by loans. Conflict grew between the Whigs and Tories, intensified by the controversy over “Marlborough's war” in the reign of Queen Anne (1702–14). The Triennial Act (1694) ensured elections every three years, and the Act of Settlement (1701) sealed the supremacy of the common law by limiting the king's power to dismiss judges. The accession of George I in 1714 did not lead immediately to stability. The union with Scotland (1707) had created strains; and Jacobitism remained a threat after the defeat of James Edward Stuart's rising of 1715—until the defeat of his son Charles Edward at Culloden in 1746, it was a focus for the discontented. But investors in government funds had a growing stake in the survival of the dynasty.

      When George I gave up attending Cabinet meetings, he cleared the way for the Privy Council's displacement by the small cabinet council, and the evolution, in the person of Robert Walpole, first lord of the Treasury from 1721 to 1742, of a “prime minister.” (prime minister) Relations between minister and king amounted to a dialogue between the concepts of ministerial responsibility and royal prerogative. Ministers exercised powers legally vested in the monarch; they also were accountable to Parliament. Yet the king could still appoint and dismiss them. Inevitably tensions resulted. The prime minister's right to select fellow ministers did not go unchallenged, but the reluctance of both George I and George II to master the intricacies of patronage, and the skill of Walpole and Newcastle in political management, ensured that the shift in the balance of power in 1688 was irreversible. A centralized legislature coexisted with a decentralized administration. The theme of centre versus provinces, characteristic of other countries, took on a new form as court patronage became the prime element in political management. Most legislation was concerned not with legal or moral principles but with administrative details. Policy tended to emerge from agreement between king and ministers. The royal veto on legislation was never employed after 1708, no government lost a general election, and nearly every Parliament lasted its full term. Locke's dictum that government has no other end but the preservation of property was an apt text for the British ancien régime, which was dominated by the church and the aristocracy. Even those 200,000 Englishmen who had the vote could be disfranchised by the common practice of an arranged election. In 1747 only three county and 62 borough elections were contested. The tone was set by the Septennial Act (1716), which doubled the life of Parliaments and the value of patronage.

      The English ambassador Sir George Downing in 1664 described the constitution of the United Provinces (Dutch Republic) as “such a shattered and divided thing.” Louis XIV assumed wrongly, in 1672, that the mercantile republic would prove no match for his armies. Experience had taught the English to respect Dutch naval strength as much as they envied its commercial wealth. Foreign attitudes were ambivalent because this small state was not only the newest but also the richest per capita and quite different from any other. The nation of seamen and merchants was also the nation of Rembrandt, Huygens, and Spinoza; culture and the trading empire were inseparable. After 1572 the Dutch proved that they could hold their own in war. Criticism of the structure of government seems therefore to be wide of the mark. In the development of Amsterdam, private enterprise and civic regulation coexisted in creative harmony; so too the state was effective without impinging on the quality of individual lives. The federal republic, so the Dutch believed, guarded religion, lands, and liberties. The price was paid by the Spanish southern provinces, which were drained of vitality by emigration to the north, and by the decay of the trade and manufacturing that had given Antwerp a commanding financial position.

      The constitution of the United Provinces reflected its Burgundian antecedents in civic pride and its concern for form and precedence. Sovereignty lay with the seven provinces separately; in each the States ruled, and in the States the representatives of the towns were dominant. Since action required a unanimous vote, issues were commonly referred back to town corporations. Only in Friesland did peasants have a voice. The States-General dealt with diplomatic and military measures and with taxes. Its members were ambassadors, closely tied by their instructions. Like contemporary Poles and Germans, the Dutch were separatists at heart, but what was lacking in those countries existed in the United Provinces—one province to lead the rest. Holland assumed, and because of its wealth the rest could not deny, that right. War was again the crucial factor.

      One side of the balance was represented by the house of Orange (Orange, House of). Maurice of Nassau (1584–1625) and Frederick Henry (Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau) (1625–47) controlled policy and military campaigns through their virtual monopoly of the office of stadtholder in separate provinces. Monarchs without title, they intermarried with the Protestant dynasties: William III, the grandson of Charles I of England and great-grandson of Henry IV of France, married Mary Stuart and became, with her, joint sovereign of England in 1689. The other side, vigilant for peace, trade, and lower taxes, was represented at its best by Johan de Witt (De Witt, Johan), pensionary of Holland (1653–72). He was murdered during the French invasion of 1672, which brought William III to power. Enlightened oligarchy had little appeal for the poor or tolerance for the Calvinist clergy. Such violence exposed underlying tensions. In 1619 the veteran statesman Johann van (Oldenbarnevelt, Johan van) Oldenbarneveldt was executed, as much because of the political implications of his liberal stance as for his Arminian views. Holland's open society depended on the commercial values of a magistracy versed in finance and state policy. In 1650 the young stadtholder William II attempted a coup against Amsterdam, the outcome of which was uncertain. His sudden death settled the issue in favour of a period of rule without stadtholders. In 1689 William III's elevation led to consolidation of the republican regime. In 1747, William IV enjoyed popular support for a program of civic reform. As stadtholder of all seven provinces he had concentrated powers, but little was achieved. Not until 1815 was the logical conclusion reached with the establishment of William I as king.

      Successive elective kings of Poland failed to overcome the inherent weaknesses of the state, and the belated reforms of Stanisław II served only to provoke the final dismemberments of 1793 and 1795. Russia was a prime beneficiary, having long shown that vast size was not incompatible with strong rule. Such an outcome would not have seemed probable in 1648, when revolt in the Ukraine led to Russian “protection” and the beginning of that process of expansion which was to create an empire. The open character of Russia's boundless lands militated against two processes characteristic of Western society—the growth of cherished rights in distinct, rooted communities and that of central authority, adept in the techniques of government. The validity of the state depended on its ability to make the peasant cultivate the soil. If the nobility were to serve the state, they must be served on the land. Serfdom was a logical development in a society that knew nothing of rights. The feudal concept of fealty, the validity of contract, and the idea of liberty as the creation of law were unknown. German immigrants found no provincial estates, municipal corporations, or craft guilds. Merchants were state functionaries. Absolutism was implicit in the physical conditions and early evolution of Russian society. It could only become a force for building a state comparable to those of the West under a ruler strong enough to challenge traditional ways. This was to be the role of Alexis I (1645–76) and then, more violently, of Peter I (1689–1725).

      When the Romanov Dynasty emerged in 1613 with Tsar Michael, the formula for continued power was similar to that of the Great Elector in Brandenburg: the common interest of ruler and gentry enabled Alexis to dispense with the zemsky sobor. The great code of 1649 affirmed the rights of the state over a society that was to be frozen in its existing shape. The tsars were haunted by the fear that the state would disintegrate. The acquisition of the Ukraine led directly to the revolt of Stenka Razin (1670), which flared up because of the discontent of the serfs. The Russian people had been driven underground; their passivity could not be assumed. There was also a threatening religious dimension in the shape of the Old Believers (Old Believer). Rallying in reaction to the minor reforms of the patriarch Nikon, they came to express a general attachment to old Russia. This was as dangerous to the state when it inspired passive resistance to change as when it provoked revolt, such as that of the streltsy, the privileged household troops, whom Peter purged in 1698. Peter's reforms of Russian government must be set against the military weakness revealed by the Swedish victory at Narva (1700), the grotesque disorder of government as exercised by more than 40 councils, the lack of an educated class of potential bureaucrats, and a primitive economy untouched by Western technology. His domestic policies can then be seen as expedients informed by a patchy vision of Western methods and manners. Catherine II studied his papers and said, “He did not know what laws were necessary for the state.” Yet, without Peter's relentless drive to create a military power based on compulsory service, Catherine might have been in no position to carry out any reforms herself. His Table of Ranks (Ranks, Table of) (1722) graded society in three categories—court, government, and army. The first eight military grades, all commissioned officers, automatically became gentry. Obligatory service was modified by later rulers and abolished by Peter III (1762). By then the army had sufficient attraction: the officer caste was secure.

      Meanwhile, the bureaucracy exemplified the style of a military police. The uniformed official, rule book in hand, was typical of St. Petersburg government until 1917. Peter's new capital, an outrageous defiance of Muscovite tradition, symbolized the chasm that separated the Westernized elite from the illiterate masses. It housed the senate, set up in 1711, and the nine colleges that replaced the 40 councils. There also was the oberprokuror, responsible for the Most Holy Synod, which exercised authority over the church in place of the patriarch. Peter could control the institution; to touch the souls or change the manners of his people was another matter. A Russian was reluctant to lose his beard because God had a beard; a townsman could be executed for leaving his ward; a nobleman could not marry without producing a certificate to show that he could read. With a punitive tax, Peter might persuade Russians to shave and adopt Western breeches and jacket, but he could not trust the free spirit that he admired in England nor expect market, capital, or skills to grow by themselves. So a stream of edicts commanded and explained. State action could be effective—iron foundries, utilizing Russia's greatest natural resource, timber, contributed to the country's favourable trade balance—but nearly all Peter's schools collapsed after his death, and his navy rotted at its moorings.

      After Peter there were six rulers in 37 years. Two of the predecessors of Catherine II (1762–95) had been deposed—one of them, her husband Peter III, with her connivance. Along with the instability exemplified by the palace coup of 1741, when the guards regiments brought Elizabeth to the throne, went an aristocratic reaction against centralist government, particularly loathsome as exercised under Anna (1730–40). Elizabeth's tendency to delegate power to favoured grandees encouraged aristocratic pretension, though it did lead to some enlightened measures. With the accession of the German-born Catherine Russians encountered the Enlightenment as a set of ideas and a program of reforms. Since the latter were mostly shelved, questions arise about the sincerity of the royal author of the Nakaz, instructions for the members of the Legislative Commission (1767–68). If Catherine still hoped that enlightened reforms, even the abolition of serfdom, were possible after the Commission's muddle, the revolt of Yemelyan Pugachov (Pugachov, Yemelyan Ivanovich) (1773–75) brought her back to the fundamental questions of security. His challenge to the autocracy was countered by military might, but not before 3,000,000 peasants had become involved and 3,000 officials and gentry had been murdered. The underlying problem remained. The tired soil of old Russia would not long be able to feed the growing population. Trapped between the low yield of agriculture and their rising debts, the gentry wanted to increase dues. The drive for new lands, culminating in the acquisition of the Crimea (1783), increased the difficulties of control. Empirical and authoritarian, Catherine sought to strengthen government while giving the gentry a share and a voice. The Great Reform of 1775 divided the country into 50 guberni. The dvoriane were allowed some high posts, by election, on the boards set up to manage local schools and hospitals. They were allowed to meet in assembly. It was more than most French nobles could do: indeed, French demands for assemblies were a prelude to revolution. But as in the case of towns, by the Municipal Reform (1785), she gave only the appearance of self-government. Governors were left with almost unbounded powers. Like Frederick the Great, Catherine disappointed the philosophes, but the development of Russia took place within a framework of order. European events in the last years of Catherine's life and Russian history, before and since, testify to the magnitude of her achievement.

      Absolute monarchy had evolved out of conflicts within and challenges outside the state, notably that of war, whose recurring pressures had a self-reinforcing effect. The absolutist ideal was potent, and the rhetoric voiced genuine feeling. The sovereign who envisaged himself as God's Lieutenant or First Servant of the State was responding to those who had found traditional constitutions wanting and whose classical education and religious upbringing had schooled them to look for strong rule within a hierarchical system. For more than 150 years, the upper classes of continental Europe were disposed to accept the ethos of absolutism. They would continue to do so only if the tensions within the system could be resolved and if the state were to prove able to accommodate the expectations of the rising bourgeoisie and the potentially unsettling ideas of the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment (Enlightenment)
      The Enlightenment was both a movement and a state of mind. The term represents a phase in the intellectual history of Europe, but it also serves to define programs of reform in which influential literati, inspired by a common faith in the possibility of a better world, outlined specific targets for criticism and proposals for action. The special significance of the Enlightenment lies in its combination of principle and pragmatism. Consequently, it still engenders controversy about its character and achievements. Two main questions and, relating to each, two schools of thought can be identified. Was the Enlightenment the preserve of an elite, centred on Paris, or a broad current of opinion that the philosophes (philosophe), to some extent, represented and led? Was it primarily a French movement, having therefore a degree of coherence, or an international phenomenon, having as many facets as there were countries affected? Although most modern interpreters incline to the latter view in both cases, there is still a case for the French emphasis, given the genius of a number of the philosophes and their associates. Unlike other terms applied by historians to describe a phenomenon that they see more clearly than could contemporaries, it was used and cherished by those who believed in the power of mind to liberate and improve. Bernard de Fontenelle (Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier, sieur de), popularizer of the scientific discoveries that contributed to the climate of optimism, wrote in 1702 anticipating “a century which will become more enlightened day by day, so that all previous centuries will be lost in darkness by comparison.” Reviewing the experience in 1784, Immanuel Kant saw an emancipation from superstition and ignorance as having been the essential characteristic of the Enlightenment.

      Before Kant's death the spirit of the siècle de lumière (literally, “century of light”) had been spurned by Romantic idealists, its confidence in man's sense of what was right and good mocked by revolutionary terror and dictatorship, and its rationalism decried as being complacent or downright inhumane. Even its achievements were critically endangered by the militant nationalism of the 19th century. Yet much of the tenor of the Enlightenment did survive in the liberalism, toleration, and respect for law that have persisted in European society. There was therefore no abrupt end or reversal of enlightened values.

      Nor had there been such a sudden beginning as is conveyed by the critic Paul Hazard's celebrated aphorism: “One moment the French thought like Bossuet; the next moment like Voltaire.” The perceptions and propaganda of the philosophes have led historians to locate the Age of Reason within the 18th century or, more comprehensively, between the two revolutions—the English of 1688 and the French of 1789—but in conception it should be traced to the humanism of the Renaissance, which encouraged scholarly interest in classical texts and values. It was formed by the complementary methods of the Scientific Revolution, the rational and the empirical. Its adolescence belongs to the two decades before and after 1700 when writers such as Jonathan Swift were employing “the artillery of words” to impress the secular intelligentsia created by the growth in affluence, literacy, and publishing. Ideas and beliefs were tested wherever reason and research could challenge traditional authority.

Sources of Enlightenment thought
      In a cosmopolitan culture it was the preeminence of the French language that enabled Frenchmen of the 17th century to lay the foundations of cultural ascendancy and encouraged the philosophes to act as the tutors of 18th-century Europe. The notion of a realm of philosophy superior to sectarian or national concerns facilitated the transmission of ideas. “I flatter myself,” wrote Denis Diderot (Diderot, Denis) to the Scottish philosopher David Hume, “that I am, like you, citizen of the great city of the world.” “A philosopher,” wrote Edward Gibbon (Gibbon, Edward), “may consider Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation.” This magisterial pronouncement by the author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–88) recalls the common source: the knowledge of classical literature.

      The scholars of the Enlightenment recognized a joint inheritance, Christian as well as classical. In rejecting, or at least reinterpreting, the one and plundering the other, they had the confidence of those who believed they were masters of their destiny. They felt an affinity with the classical world and saluted the achievement of the Greeks, who discovered a regularity in nature and its governing principle, the reasoning mind, as well as that of the Romans, who adopted Hellenic culture while contributing a new order and style: on their law was founded much of church and civil law. Steeped in the ideas and language of the classics but unsettled in beliefs, some Enlightenment thinkers found an alternative to Christian faith in the form of a neo-paganism. The morality was based on reason; the literature, art, and architecture were already supplying rules and standards for educated taste.

      The first chapter of Voltaire's (Voltaire) Siècle de Louis XIV specified the “four happy ages”: the centuries of Pericles and Plato, of Cicero and Caesar, of the Medicean Renaissance, and, appositely, of Louis XIV. The contrast is with “the ages of belief,” which were wretched and backward. Whether denouncing Gothic taste or clerical fanaticism, writers of the Enlightenment constantly resort to images of relapse and revival. Typically, Jean d'Alembert wrote in the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie of a revival of letters, regeneration of ideas, and return to reason and good taste. The philosophes knew enough to be sure that they were entering a new golden age through rediscovery of the old but not enough to have misgivings about a reading of history which, being grounded in a culture that had self-evident value, provided ammunition for the secular crusade.

The role of science (science, history of) and mathematics
      “The new philosophy puts all in doubt,” wrote the poet John Donne. Early 17th-century poetry and drama abounded in expressions of confusion and dismay about the world, God, and man. The gently questioning essays of the 16th-century French philosopher Michel de Montaigne (Montaigne, Michel de), musing on human folly and fanaticism, continued to be popular long after his time, for they were no less relevant to the generation that suffered from the Thirty Years' War. Unsettling scientific views were gaining a hold. As the new astronomy of Copernicus and Galileo, with its heliocentric view, was accepted, the firm association between religious beliefs, moral principles, and the traditional scheme of nature was shaken. In this process, mathematics occupied the central position. It was, in the words of René Descartes (Descartes, René), “the general science which should explain all that can be known about quantity and measure, considered independently of any application to a particular subject.” It enabled its practitioners to bridge gaps between speculation and reasonable certainty: Johannes Kepler thus proceeded from his study of conic sections to the laws of planetary motion. When, however, Fontenelle wrote of Descartes, “Sometimes one man gives the tone to a whole century,” it was not merely of his mathematics that he was thinking. It was the system and philosophy that Descartes derived from the application of mathematical reasoning to the mysteries of the world—all that is meant by Cartesianism—which was so influential. The method expounded in his Discourse on Method (1637) was one of doubt: all was uncertain until established by reasoning from self-evident propositions, on principles analogous to those of geometry. It was serviceable in all areas of study. There was a mechanistic model for all living things.

      A different track had been pursued by Francis Bacon (Bacon, Francis, Viscount Saint Alban (or Albans), Baron of Verulam), the great English lawyer and savant, whose influence eventually proved as great as that of Descartes. He called for a new science, to be based on organized and collaborative experiment with a systematic recording of results. General laws could be established only when research had produced enough data and then by inductive reasoning (induction), which, as described in his Novum Organum (1620), derives from “particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all.” These must be tried and proved by further experiments. Bacon's method could lead to the accumulation of knowledge. It also was self-correcting. Indeed, it was in some ways modern in its practical emphasis. Significantly, whereas the devout humanist Thomas More had placed his Utopia in a remote setting, Bacon put New Atlantis (1627) in the future. “Knowledge is power,” he said, perhaps unoriginally but with the conviction that went with a vision of mankind gaining mastery over nature. Thus were established the two poles of scientific endeavour, the rational and the empirical, between which enlightened man was to map the ground for a better world.

      Bacon's inductive method is flawed through his insufficient emphasis on hypothesis. Descartes was on strong ground when he maintained that philosophy must proceed from what is definable to what is complex and uncertain. He wrote in French rather than the customary Latin so as to exploit its value as a vehicle for clear and logical expression and to reach a wider audience. Cartesian rationalism, as applied to theology, for example by Nicholas Malebranche, who set out to refute the pantheism of Benedict de Spinoza, was a powerful solvent of traditional belief: God was made subservient to reason. While Descartes maintained his hold on French opinion, across the Channel Isaac Newton (Newton, Sir Isaac), a prodigious mathematician and a resourceful and disciplined experimenter, was mounting a crucial challenge. His Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687; Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) ranks with the Discourse on Method in authority and influence as a peak in the 17th-century quest for truth. Newton did not break completely with Descartes and remained faithful to the latter's fundamental idea of the universe as a machine. But Newton's machine operated according to a series of laws, the essence of which was that the principle of gravitation was everywhere present and efficient. The onus was on the Cartesians to show not only that their mechanics gave a truer explanation but also that their methods were sounder. Christiaan Huygens (Huygens, Christiaan) was both a loyal disciple of Descartes and a formidable mathematician and inventor in his own right, who had worked out the first tenable theory of centrifugal force. His dilemma is instructive. He acknowledged that Newton's assumption of forces acting between members of the solar system was justified by the correct conclusions he drew from it, but he would not go on to accept that attraction was affecting every pair of particles, however minute. When Newton identified gravitation as a property inherent in corporeal matter, Huygens thought that absurd and looked for an agent acting constantly according to certain laws. Some believed that Newton was returning to “occult” qualities. Eccentricities apart, his views were not easy to grasp; those who actually read the Principia found it painfully difficult. Cartesianism was more accessible and appealing.

      Gradually, however, Newton's work won understanding. One medium, ironically, was an outstanding textbook of Cartesian physics, Jacques Rohault's Traité de physique (1671), with detailed notes setting out Newton's case. In 1732 Pierre-Louis de Mauperthuis put the Cartesians on the defensive by his defense of Newton's right to employ a principle the cause of which was yet unknown. In 1734, in his Philosophical Letters, Voltaire introduced Newton as the “destroyer of the system of Descartes.” His authority clinched the issue. Newton's physics was justified by its successful application in different fields. The return of Halley's comet was accurately predicted. Charles Coulomb's torsion balance proved that Newton's law of inverse squares was valid for electromagnetic attraction. Cartesianism reduced nature to a set of habits within a world of rules; the new attitude took note of accidents and circumstances. Observation and experiment revealed nature as untidy, unpredictable—a tangle of conflicting forces. In classical theory, reason was presumed to be common to all human beings and its laws immutable. In Enlightenment Europe, however, there was a growing impatience with systems. The most creative of scientists, such as Boyle, Harvey, and Leeuwenhoek, found sufficient momentum for discovery on science's front line. The controversy was creative because both rational and empirical methods were essential to progress. Like the literary battle between the “ancients” and the “moderns” or the theological battle between Jesuits and Jansenists, the scientific debate was a school of advocacy.

      If Newton was supremely important among those who contributed to the climate of the Enlightenment, it is because his new system offered certainties in a world of doubts. The belief spread that Newton had explained forever how the universe worked. This cautious, devout empiricist lent the imprint of genius to the great idea of the Enlightenment: that man, guided by the light of reason, could explain all natural phenomena and could embark on the study of his own place in a world that was no longer mysterious. Yet he might otherwise have been aware more of disintegration than of progress or of theories demolished than of truths established. This was true even within the expanding field of the physical sciences. To gauge the mood of the world of intellect and fashion, of French salons or of such institutions as the Royal Society, it is essential to understand what constituted the crisis in the European mind of the late 17th century.

      At the heart of the crisis was the critical examination of Christian faith, its foundations in the Bible, and the authority embodied in the church. In 1647 Pierre Gassendi had revived the atomistic philosophy of Lucretius, as outlined in On the Nature of Things. He insisted on the Divine Providence behind Epicurus' atoms and voids. Critical examination could not fail to be unsettling because the Christian view was not confined to questions of personal belief and morals, or even history, but comprehended the entire nature of God's world. The impact of scientific research must be weighed in the wider context of an intellectual revolution. Different kinds of learning were not then as sharply distinguished, because of their appropriate disciplines and terminology, as they are in an age of specialization. At that time philomaths could still be polymaths. Newton's contemporary, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm)—whose principal contribution to philosophy was that substance exists only in the form of monads, each of which obeys the laws of its own self-determined development while remaining in complete accord with all the rest—influenced his age by concluding that since God contrived the universal harmony this world must be the best of all possible worlds. He also proposed legal reforms, invented a calculating machine, devised a method of the calculus independent of Newton's, improved the drainage of mines, and laboured for the reunification of the Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches.

The influence of Locke
      The writing of John Locke (Locke, John), familiar to the French long before the eventual victory of his kind of empiricism, further reveals the range of interests that an educated man might pursue and its value in the outcome: discrimination, shrewdness, and originality. The journal of Locke's travels in France (1675–79) is studded with notes on botany, zoology, medicine, weather, instruments of all kinds, and statistics, especially those concerned with prices and taxes. It is a telling introduction to the world of the Enlightenment, in which the possible was always as important as the ideal and physics could be more important than metaphysics. Locke spent the years from 1683 to 1689 in Holland, in refuge from high royalism. There he associated with other literary exiles, who were united in abhorrence of Louis XIV's religious policies, which culminated in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) and the flight of more than 200,000 Huguenots. During this time Locke wrote the Essay on Toleration (1689). The coincidence of the Huguenot dispersion with the English revolution of 1688–89 meant a cross-fertilizing debate in a society that had lost its bearings. The avant-garde accepted Locke's idea that the people had a sovereign power and that the prince was merely a delegate. His Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) offered a theoretical justification for a contractual view of monarchy on the basis of a revocable agreement between ruler and ruled. It was, however, his writings about education, toleration, and morality that were most influential among the philosophes, for whom his political theories could be only of academic interest. Locke was the first to treat philosophy as purely critical inquiry, having its own problems but essentially similar to other sciences. Voltaire admired what Locke called his “historical plain method” because he had not written “a romance of the soul” but offered “a history of it.” The avowed object of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) was “to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent.” For Locke, the mind derives the materials of reason and knowledge from experience. Unlike Descartes' view that man could have innate ideas, in Locke's system knowledge consists of ideas imprinted on the mind through observation of external objects and reflection on the evidence provided by the senses. Moral values, Locke held, are derived from sensations of pleasure or pain, the mind labeling good what experience shows to give pleasure. There are no innate ideas; there is no innate depravity.

      Though he suggested that souls were born without the idea of God, Locke did not reject Christianity. Sensationalism, he held, was a God-given principle that, properly followed, would lead to conduct that was ethically sound. He had, however, opened a way to disciples who proceeded to conclusions that might have been far from the master's mind. One such was the Irish bishop George Berkeley (Berkeley, George) who affirmed, in his Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), that there was no proof that matter existed beyond the idea of it in the mind. Most philosophers after Descartes decided the question of the dualism of mind and matter by adopting a materialist position; whereas they eliminated mind, Berkeley eliminated matter—and he was therefore neglected. Locke was perhaps more scientific and certainly more in tune with the intellectual and practical concerns of the age. Voltaire presented Locke as the advocate of rational faith and of sensationalist psychology; Locke's posthumous success was assured. In the debate over moral values, Locke provided a new argument for toleration. Beliefs, like other human differences, were largely the product of environment. Did it not therefore follow that moral improvement should be the responsibility of society? Finally, since human irrationality was the consequence of false ideas, instilled by faulty schooling, should not education be a prime concern of rulers? To pose those questions is to anticipate the agenda of the Enlightenment.

The proto-Enlightenment
      If Locke was the most influential philosopher in the swirling debates of fin de siècle Holland, the most prolific writer and educator was Pierre Bayle (Bayle, Pierre), whom Voltaire called “the first of the skeptical philosophers.” He might also be called the first of the encyclopaedists, for he was more publicist than philosopher, eclectic in his interests, information, and ideas. The title Nouvelles de la république des lettres (1684–87) conveys the method and ideal of this superior form of journalism. Bayle's Historical Dictionary (1697) exposed the fallacies and deceits of the past by the plausible method of biographical articles. “The grounds of doubting are themselves doubtful; we must therefore doubt whether we ought to doubt.” Lacking a sound criterion of truth or a system by which evidence could be tested but hating dogma and mistrusting authority, Bayle was concerned with the present state of knowledge. He may have been as much concerned with exposing the limitations of human reason as with attacking superstition. Translated and abridged, as, for example, by order of Frederick II of Prussia, the Dictionary became the skeptic's bible. The effect of Bayle's work and that of others less scrupulous, pouring from the presses of the Netherlands and Rhineland and easily penetrating French censorship, could not fail to be broadly subversive.

      Bayle's seminal role in the cultural exchange of his time points to the importance of the Dutch Republic in the 17th century. Because Holland contributed little to science, philosophy, or even art at the time of the philosophes, though enviable enough in the tranquil lives of many of its citizens, its golden 17th century tends to be overlooked in traditional accounts of the Enlightenment. Wealth derived from trade, shipping, and finance and the toleration that attracted Sephardic Jews, Protestants from Flanders and France, and other refugees or simply those who sought a relatively open society combined to create a climate singularly favourable to enterprise and creativity. It was urban, centring on Amsterdam, and it was characterized by a rich artistic life created by painters who worked to please patrons who shared their values. It was pervaded by a scientific spirit. Pieter de Hooch's search for new ways of portraying light, Spinoza's pursuit of a rational system that would comprehend all spiritual truth. Antony van Leeuwenhoek's use of the microscope to reveal the hidden and minute, Hermann Boerhaave's dissection of the human corpse, Jan Blaeuw's accuracy in the making of maps or Huygens' in the new pendulum clock—each represents that passion for discovery that put 17th-century Holland in a central position between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, with some of the creative traits of both periods. Its spirit is epitomized in the university of Leiden, which attracted students from throughout Europe by its excellence in medicine and law and its relative freedom from ecclesiastical authority.

      It was fitting, therefore, that much of the writing that helped form the Enlightenment emanated from the printing presses of the Huguenot emigré Louis Elsevier at Amsterdam and Leiden. Bayle's skepticism belongs to the time when dust was still rising from the collapsing structures of the past, obscuring such patterns of thought as would eventually emerge. There was no lack of material for them. Not only did learning flourish in the cultural common market that served the needs of those who led or followed intellectual fashions; also important, though harder to measure, was the influence of the new relativism, grounded in observable facts about an ever-widening world. It was corrosive alike of Cartesian method, classical regulation, and traditional theology. Of Descartes, Huygens had written that he had substituted for old ideas “causes for which one can comprehend all that there is in nature.”

      Allied to that confidence in the power of reason was a prejudice against knowledge that might distort argument. Blaise Pascal (Pascal, Blaise) had perfectly exemplified that rationalist frame of mind prone to introspection, which in his case—that of mathematical genius and literary sensibility in rare combination—produced some of the finest writing of his day. But the author of the Pensées (1669) was reluctant to travel: “All the ills that affect a man proceed from one cause, namely that he has not learned to sit quietly and contentedly in one room.” Again, the object of the protagonists of the prevailing classicism had been to establish rules: for language (the main role of the Académie), for painting (as in the work of Nicolas Poussin), even for the theatre, where Jean Racine's (Racine, Jean) plays of heightened feeling and pure conflict of ideal or personality gain effect by being constrained within the framework of their Greek archetypes.

History and social thought
      Order, purity, clarity: such were the classical ideals. They had dominated traditional theology as represented by its last great master, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (Bossuet, Jacques-Bénigne). His Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte (“Statecraft Drawn from the Very Words of the Holy Scriptures”) and Discours sur l'histoire universelle offered a worldview and a history based on the Old Testament. Bossuet believed in the unity of knowledge as so many branches of Christian truth. His compelling logic and magisterial writing had a strong influence. When, however, the hypotheses were tested and found wanting, the very comprehensiveness of the system ensured that its collapse was complete. Bossuet had encouraged Richard Simon when he set out to refute Protestantism through historical study of the Bible (biblical criticism) but was shocked when he saw where it led. Inevitably, scholarship revealed inconsistencies and raised questions about the way that the Bible should be treated: if unreliable as history, then how sound was the basis for theology? Simon's works were banned in 1678, but Dutch printers ensured their circulation. No censorship could prevent the development of historical method, which was making a place for itself in the comprehensive search for truth. With Edward Gibbon (himself following the example of the 17th-century giants of church history), Jean Mabillon, and Louis Tillemont historians were to become more skilled and scrupulous in the use of evidence. The philosophes characteristically believed that history was becoming a science because it was subject to philosophical method. It also was subject to the prevailing materialist bias, which is why, scholarly though individual writers like David Hume might be, the Enlightenment was in some respects vulnerable to fresh insights about man—such as those of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, who believed that human beings could be molded for their own good—and further research into the past—which, for Claude-Adrien Helvétius, was simply the worthless veneration of ancient laws and customs.

      In 1703 Baron de Lahontan introduced the idea of the “noble savage,” (noble savage) who led a moral life in the light of natural religion. In relative terms, the uniquely God-given character of European values was questioned; Louis XIV's persecution of the Huguenots and Jansenists offered an unappealing example. Philosophers were provided, through the device of voyages imaginaires, with new insights and standards of reference. As Archbishop Fénelon (Fénelon, François de Salignac de La Mothe-) was to show in Télémaque (1699)—where the population of his imaginary republic of Salente was engaged in farming and the ruler, renouncing war, sought to increase the wealth of the kingdom—a utopian idyll could be a vehicle for criticism of contemporary institutions. A bishop and sentimental aristocrat, heir to the tradition of Christian agrarianism, might seem an unlikely figure to appear in the pantheon of the Enlightenment. But his readers encountered views about the obligations as well as rights of subjects that plainly anticipate its universalism, as in the Dialogue des morts: “Each individual owes incomparably more to the human race, the great fatherland, than to the country in which he is born.”

The language of the Enlightenment
      It is easier to identify intellectual trends than to define enlightened views, even where, as in France, there was a distinct and self-conscious movement, which had by mid-century the characteristics of a party. Clues can be found in the use commonly made of certain closely related cult words such as reason, Nature, and providence. From having a sharp, almost technical sense in the work of Descartes, Pascal, and Spinoza, reason came to mean something like common sense, along with strongly pejorative assumptions about things not reasonable. For Voltaire, the reasonable were those who believed in progress: he lived “in curious times and amid astonishing contrasts: reason on the one hand, the most absurd fanaticism on the other.” Nature in the post-Newtonian world became a system of intelligible forces that grew as the complexity of matter was explored and the diversity of particular species discovered. It led to the pantheism of the Irish writer John Toland, for whom nature replaced God, and to the absolute doubt of Julien La Mettrie, who in L'Homme machine (1747) took the position that nothing about nature or its causes was known. In England, in the writing of Lord Shaftesbury and David Hartley, nature served the cause of sound morals and rational faith. One of the foremost theologians, Joseph Butler (Butler, Joseph), author of the Analogy of Religion (1736), tested revelation against nature and in so doing erased the troublesome distinction in a manner wholly satisfying to those who looked for assurance that God could be active in the world without breaking the laws of its being. Finally, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques), nature—the word that had proved so useful to advocates of an undogmatic faith, of universal principles of law or even, in the hands of the physiocrats, the “natural,” or market, economy—acquired a new resonance. In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), he wrote: “We cannot desire or fear anything, except from the idea of it, or from the simple impulse of nature.” Nature had become the primal condition of innocence in which man was whole—not perfect, but imbued with virtues that reflected the absence of restraints.

      Along with the new view of the universe grew belief in the idea of a benign Providence, which could be trusted because it was visibly active in the world. Writers sought to express their sense of God's benevolent intention as manifest in creation. To the Abbé Pluche domestic animals were not merely docile but naturally loved humanity. Voltaire, equally implausibly, observed of mountain ranges that they were “a chain of high and continuous aqueducts which, by their apertures allow the rivers and arms of the sea the space which they need to irrigate the land.” The idea of Providence could degenerate into the fatuous complacency that Voltaire himself was to deride and against which—in particular, the idea that the universe was just a vast theatre for the divine message—Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Coleridge, Samuel Taylor) was memorably to rebel. faith, wrote the English poet, “could not be intellectually more evident without being morally less effective; without counteracting its own end by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism of a worthless because compulsory assent.” So the Enlightenment can be seen to be carrying the seeds of its own disintegration. The providential idea was based on unscientific assumptions in an age in which scientists, favoured by a truce with men of religion, were free to pursue researches that revealed an untidier, therefore less comforting, world. Newton had argued, from such problems as irregularities in the orbit of planets, that divine intervention was necessary to keep the solar system operating regularly. D'Alembert found, however, that such problems were self-correcting. From being the divine mechanic had God now become the divine spectator?

      No less unsettling were the findings of geologists. Jean-Étienne Guettard (Guettard, Jean-Étienne) concluded that the evidence of fossils found in the volcanic hills of the Puy de Dôme in south-central France conflicted with the time scheme of the Old Testament. Whether, like the Count de Buffon, they attributed to matter a form of life, speculated about life as a constant, shapeless flux, or postulated a history of the world that had evolved over an immensely long time, scientists were dispensing with God as a necessary factor in their calculations. Some theologians sought compromise, while others retreated, looking to a separate world of intuitive understanding for the justification of faith. Joseph Butler pointed to conscience, the voice of God speaking to the human soul. He deplored the enthusiasm that characterized the tireless preaching of John Wesley and his message of the love of God manifested in Christ. “A true and living faith in God,” Butler declared, “is inseparable from a sense of pardon from all past and freedom from all present sins.” It was not the freedom understood by the philosophes, but it touched hearts and altered lives. Meanwhile the path of reason was open for the avowed atheism of Baron (Holbach, Paul-Henri Dietrich, baron d') d'Holbach, who declared in his Système de la nature (1770; “The System of Nature”) that there was no divine purpose: “The whole cannot have an object for outside itself there is nothing towards which it can tend.” Another approach was taken by David Hume (Hume, David), author of Treatise on Human Nature (1739) and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). The notion of miracles was repugnant to reason, but he was content to leave religion as a mystery, to be a skeptic about skepticism, and to deny that man could reach objective knowledge of any kind.

      These may appear to have been intellectual games for the few. It could only be a privileged, relatively leisured minority, even among the educated, who actively participated in debate or could even follow the reasoning. The impact was delayed; it was also uneven. In Dr. Johnson's England the independence bestowed by the Anglican clergyman's freehold and the willingness of the established church to countenance rational theology created a shock absorber in the form of the Broad Church. In Protestant countries criticism tended to be directed toward amending existing structures: there was a pious as well as an impious Enlightenment. Among Roman Catholic countries France's situation was in some ways unique. Even there orthodox doctrines remained entrenched in such institutions as the Sorbonne; some bishops might be worldly but others were conscientious; monasteries decayed but parish life was vital and curés (parish priests) well trained. Nor was theology neglected: in 1770, French publishers brought out 70 books in defense of the faith. Of course the philosophes, endowed with the talents and the means to mount sustained campaigns, ensured that the question of religion remained high on the agenda. There was also a ready sale for writers who sought to apply the rational and experimental methods to what Hume was to call the science of man.

Man and society
      Chief among them was Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu (Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de). His presidency in the parlement of Bordeaux supported the career of a litterateur, scholarly but shrewd in judgment of men and issues. In the Persian Letters (1721), he had used the supposed correspondence of a Persian visitor to Paris to satirize both the church (under that “magician” the pope) and the society upon which it appeared to impose so fraudulently. His masterpiece, The Spirit of Laws, appeared in 22 editions within 18 months of publication in 1748. For this historically minded lawyer, laws (legal profession) were not abstract rules but were necessary relationships derived from nature. Accepting completely Locke's sensationalist psychology, he pursued the line of the Sicilian Giambattista Vico, the innovative author of The New Science (1725), toward the idea that human values are the evolving product of society itself. Among social factors, he listed climate, religion, laws, the principles of government, the example of the past, and social practices and manners and concluded that from these a general spirit is formed. Montesquieu's concern with knowledge as a factor in shaping society is characteristic of the Enlightenment. Nor was he alone in his Anglophile tendency, though it did not prevent him from misinterpreting the English constitution as being based on the separation of powers (powers, separation of). The idea that moral freedom could be realized only in a regime whose laws were enacted by an elected legislature, administered by a separate executive, and enforced by an independent judiciary was to be more influential in the New World than in the Old. His theories reflected a Newtonian view of the static equilibrium of forces and were influenced by his perception of the French government as increasingly arbitrary and centralist; they were conceived as much as a safeguard against despotism as an instrument of progress.

      Montesquieu's political conservatism belonged to a world different from that of the younger generation of philosophes, for whom the main obstacle to progress was privilege; they put their trust in “the enlightened autocrat” and in his mandate for social engineering. They might fear, like Claude Helvétius (Helvétius, Claude-Adrien), that his theories would please the aristocracy. Helvétius—a financier, amateur philosopher, and author of the influential De l'esprit (1759; “On the Mind”)—advocated enlightened self-interest in a way that found an echo in physiocratic economic theory and argued that each individual, in seeking his own good, contributed to the general good. Laws, being man-made, should be changed so as to be more useful. The spirit of the Enlightenment is well conveyed by his suggestion that experimental ethics should be constructed in the same way as experimental physics. By contrast, Montesquieu, whose special concern was the sanctity of human law, saw the problem of right conduct as one of adapting to circumstances. The function of reason was to bring about accord between human and natural law. While the objective nature of his inquiry encouraged those who trusted in the power of reason to solve human problems, it was left to those who saw the Enlightenment in more positive terms to work for change.

      François-Marie Arouet, whose nom de plume Voltaire was to become almost synonymous with the Enlightenment, was a pupil of the Jesuits at their celebrated college of Louis-le-Grand; his political education included 11 months in the Bastille. The contrast between the arbitrary injustice epitomized by the lettre de cachet (cachet, lettre de) that brought about his imprisonment, without trial, for insulting a nobleman and the free society he subsequently enjoyed in England was to inspire a life's commitment to the principles of reason, liberty, justice, and toleration. Voltaire at times played the role of adviser to princes (notably Frederick II) but learned that it was easier to criticize than to change institutions and laws. Like other philosophes living under a regime that denied political opportunity, he was no politician. Nor was he truly a philosopher in the way that Locke, Hume, or even Montesquieu can be so described. His importance was primarily as an advocate at the bar of public opinion. The case for the reform of archaic laws and the war against superstition was presented with passion and authority, as notably in his Philosophical Dictionary. Candide (1759) shows his elegant command of language, whose potential for satire and argument had been demonstrated by Pascal's Provincial Letters of a century before. With astute judgment, he worked on the reader's sensibilities. “The most useful books,” he wrote, “are those to which the readers themselves contribute half; they develop the idea of which the author has presented the seed.” He could lift an episode—the execution of Admiral Byng (1757) for failing to win a battle; of Jean Calas, seemingly, for being a Huguenot (1762); or of the Chevalier de la Barre, after torture, for alleged blasphemy (1766)—to the level at which it exemplified the injustices committed when man would not listen to the voice of reason or could not do so because of archaic laws. In Candide, he presented the debate between the optimistic Dr. Pangloss and Martin, who believes in the reality of evil, in a way that highlights the issues and is as significant now as then.

      Voltaire mounted his campaigns from a comfortable base, his large estate at Ferney. He was vain enough to relish his status as a literary lion and freedom's champion. He could be vindictive and was often impatient with differing views. In his reluctance to follow ideas through or consider their practical implications and in his patrician disregard for the material concerns of ordinary people, he epitomized faults with which the philosophes can be charged, the more because they were so censorious of others. He was generous chiefly in imaginative energy, in the indignation expressed in the celebrated war cry “Écrasez l'infâme” (literally “crush infamy,” signifying for Voltaire the intolerance of the church), and in the time he devoted to the causes of wronged individuals with whose plight he could identify. He had little to put in place of the religion he abused and offered no alternative vision. He did succeed notably in making people think about important questions—indeed, his questions were usually clearer than his answers.

      The Marquis de Condorcet (Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de), a mathematician and one of the more radical of his group, described his fellow philosophes as “a class of men less concerned with discovering truth than with propagating it.” That was the spirit which animated the great Encyclopédie, the most ambitious publishing enterprise of the century. It appeared in 17 volumes between 1751 and 1765, after checks and delays that would have disheartened anyone less committed than its publisher, André-François le Breton, or its chief editor and presiding genius, Denis Diderot (Diderot, Denis). Its publishing history is rich in incident and in what it reveals of the ambience of the Enlightenment. The critical point was reached in 1759, when French defeats made the authorities sensitive to anything that implied criticism of the regime. The publication of Helvétius' De l'esprit, together with doubts about the orthodoxy of another contributor, the Abbé de Prades, and concern about the growth of Freemasonry, convinced government ministers that they faced a plot to subvert authority. If they had been as united as the officials of the church, the Encyclopédie would have been throttled. It was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books (Index Librorum Prohibitorum), and a ban of excommunication was pronounced on any who should read it; but even Rome was equivocal. The knowledge that Pope Benedict XIV was privately sympathetic lessened the impact of the ban; Malesherbes (Malesherbes, Chrétien Guillaume de Lamoignon de), from 1750 to 1763 director of the Librairie, whose sanction was required for publication, eased the passage of volumes he was supposed to censor. Production continued, but without Rousseau, an early contributor, who became increasingly hostile to the encyclopaedists and their utilitarian philosophy.

      Diderot's coeditor, the mathematician Jean le Rond (Alembert, Jean Le Rond d') d'Alembert, had, in his preface, presented history as the record of progress through learning. The title page proclaimed the authors' intention to outline the present state of knowledge about the sciences, arts, and crafts. Among its contributors were craftsmen who provided the details for the technical articles. Pervading all was Diderot's moral theme: through knowledge “our children, better instructed than we, may at the same time become more virtuous and happy.” Such utilitarianism, closely related to Locke's environmentalism, was one aspect of what d'Alembert called “the philosophic spirit.” If it had been only that, it would have been as useful as Ephraim Chambers' Cyclopaedia (1727), which it set out to emulate. Instead, it became the textbook for the thoughtful—predominantly officeholders, professionals, the bourgeoisie, and particularly the young, who might appreciate Diderot's idea of the Encyclopédie as the means by which to change the common way of thinking. In the cause, Diderot sustained imprisonment in the jail at Vincennes (1749) and had to endure the condemnation and burning of one of his books, Philosophic Thoughts (1746). There was nothing narrow about his secular mission. Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature (1753) advanced the idea of nature as a creative process of which man was an integral part. But his greatest achievement was the Encyclopédie. Most of the important thinkers of the time contributed to it. Differences were to be expected, but there was enough unanimity in principles to endow the new gospel of scientific empiricism with the authority that Scripture was losing. It was also to provide a unique source for reformers. Catherine II of Russia wrote to the German critic Friedrich Melchior Grimm for suggestions as to a system of education for young people. Meanwhile, she said she would “flip through the Encyclopédie; I shall certainly find in it everything I should and should not do.”

Rousseau and his followers
      Diderot prefigured the unconventional style that found its archetype in Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques). In his novel of the 1760s, Rameau's Nephew, Diderot's eccentric hero persuades his bourgeois uncle, who professes virtue, to confess to actions so cynical as to be a complete reversal of accepted values. Rousseau was close to this stance when he ridiculed those who derived right action from right thinking. He understood the interests of the people, which the philosophes tended to neglect and which Thomas Paine considered in the Rights of Man (1791). If virtue were dependent on culture and culture the prerogative of a privileged minority, what was the prospect for the rest: “We have physicians, geometricians, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians and painters in plenty; but no longer a citizen among us.” Rousseau is thus of the Enlightenment yet against it, at least as represented by the mechanistic determinism of Condillac or the elitism of Diderot, who boasted that he wrote only for those to whom he could talk—i.e., for philosophers. Rousseau challenged the privileged republic of letters, its premises, and its principles. His Confessions depicted a well-intentioned man forced to become a rogue and outcast by the artificiality of society. His first essay, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750), suggested the contradiction between the exterior world of appearances and the inner world of feeling. With his view of culture now went emphasis on the value of emotions. Seminal use of concepts—such as “citizen” to indicate the rights proper to a member of a free society—strengthened signals that could otherwise confuse as much as inspire.

      Dealing with the basic relations of life, Rousseau introduced the prophetic note that was to sound through democratic rhetoric. The state of nature was a hypothesis rather than an ideal: man must seek to recover wholeness at a higher level of existence. For this to be possible he must have a new kind of education and humanity a new political constitution. Émile (1762) proposed an education to foster natural growth. His Social Contract (1762) was banned, and this lent glamour to proposals for a constitution to enable the individual to develop without offending against the principle of social equality. The crucial question concerned legitimate authority. Rousseau rejected both natural law and force as its basis. He sought a form of association that would allow both security and the natural freedom in which “each man, giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody.” It is realized in the form of the general will, expressed in laws to which all submit. More than the sum of individual wills, it is general in that it represents the public spirit seeking the common good, which Rousseau defined as liberty and equality, the latter because liberty cannot subsist without it. He advocated the total sovereignty of the state, a political formula which depended on the assumption that the state would be guided by the general will. Rousseau's good society was a democratic and egalitarian republic. Geneva, his birthplace, was to prove boundless in inspiration. Rousseau's influence may have been slight in his lifetime, though some were proud to be numbered among admirers. His eloquence touched men of sensibility on both sides of the Atlantic.

      The French writer Morelly in the Code de la nature (1755), attacked property as the parent of crime and proposed that every man should contribute according to ability and receive according to need. Two decades later, another radical abbé, Gabriel de Mably, started with equality as the law of nature and argued that the introduction of property had destroyed the golden age of man. In England, William Godwin (Godwin, William), following Holbach in obeisance to reason, condemned not only property but even the state of marriage: according to Godwin, man freed from the ties of custom and authority could devote himself to the pursuit of universal benevolence. To the young poets William Wordsworth and Percy Bysshe Shelley it was a beguiling vision; those less radical might fear for social consequences, such as the draftsmen of the Declaration of Rights (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) of 1789, who were careful to proclaim the sacred right of property. Thomas Jefferson (Jefferson, Thomas) made the rights of man the foundation of his political philosophy as well as of the U.S. Constitution, but he remained a slave owner. The idea of “de-natured” man was as potent for the unsettling of the ancien régime as loss of the sense of God had been for the generation of Luther and Ignatius. It struck home to the educated young who might identify with Rousseau's self-estrangement and read into the image of “man everywhere in chains” their own perception of the privilege that thwarted talent. Such were Maximilien Robespierre, the young lawyer of Arras; Aleksandr Radischev, who advocated the emancipation of Russian serfs, or the Germans who felt restricted in regimented, often minuscule states. Both the severe rationalism of Kant (Kant, Immanuel) and the idealism of Sturm und Drang found inspiration in Rousseau. Yet Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the sentimental hero portrayed by Goethe (Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von) in his Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) mark the end of the Enlightenment. “It came upon us so gray, so cimmerian, so corpse-like that we could hardly endure its ghost,” wrote Goethe, speaking for the Romantic generation and pronouncing valediction.

      In France the Enlightenment touched government circles only through individuals, such as Anne-Robert Turgot, a physiocrat, finance minister (1774–76), and frustrated reformer. The physiocrats, taking their cue from such writers as François Quesnay, author of Tableau économique (1758), advocated the removal of artificial obstacles to the growth of the natural economic order of a free market for the produce of the land. Even Adam Smith, who wrote the Wealth of Nations (1776) with a capitalist economy in mind, could see his avowed disciple William Pitt move only cautiously in the direction of free trade. Though the visionary William Blake could be adduced to show that there was powerful resistance to the new industrial society, the physician and scientist Erasmus Darwin was—with his fellow luminaries of the Lunar Society, Josiah Wedgwood and Matthew Boulton—at the heart of the entrepreneurial culture: there was no deep divide separating the English philosophes, with their sanctification of private property and individual interests, from the values and programs of government. In dirigiste France, where there was no internal common market and much to inhibit private investment, physiocratic ideas were politically naive: the gap between theory and implementation only illustrates the way in which the Enlightenment undermined confidence in the regime. Operating in a political vacuum, the philosophes could only hope that they would, like Diderot with Catherine the Great, exercise such influence abroad as might fulfill their sense of mission. In both Germany and Italy, however, circumstances favoured emphasis on the practical reforms that appealed as much to the rulers as to their advisers.

The Aufklärung
      In Germany the Aufklärung found its highest expression in a science of government. One explanation lies in the importance of universities (university). There were nearly 50 by 1800 (24 founded since 1600); they were usually the product of a prince's need to have trained civil servants rather than of a patron's zeal for higher learning. Not all were as vigorous as Halle (1694) or Göttingen (1737), but others, such as Vienna in the last quarter of the 18th century, were inspired to emulate them. In general, the universities dominated intellectual and cultural life. Rulers valued them, and their teachers were influential, because they served the state by educating those who would serve. Leading academic figures held posts, enabling them to advise the government: the political economist Joseph von Sonnenfels was an adviser to the Habsburgs on the serf question. Lutheranism was another important factor in the evolution of the attitude to authority that makes the German Enlightenment so markedly different from the French. In the 18th century it was further influenced by Pietism, which was essentially a devotional movement though imbued with a reforming spirit. Nor was the earnest religious spirit confined to the Protestant confessions. In Maria Theresa's Austria, Jansenism, which penetrated Viennese circles from Austrian Flanders, was as important in influencing reforms in church and education as it was in sharpening disputes with the Papacy. But there was nothing comparable, even in the Catholic south and Rhineland, to the revolt of western intellectuals against traditional dogma. Amid all his speculations, Leibniz (Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm), who more than any other influenced German thought, had held to the idea of a personal God not subject to the limitations of a material universe. It was devotion, not indifference, that made him, with Bossuet, seek ground for Christian reunion.

      Leibniz's disciple, Christian Wolff (Wolff, Christian, Freiherr (Baron) von), a leading figure of the Aufklärung, was opposed to the Pietists, who secured his expulsion from Halle in 1723. Yet, though he believed that reason and revelation could be reconciled, he shared with the Pietists fundamental Christian tenets. In Halle there emerged a synthesis of Wolffism and Pietism, a scientific theology that was progressive but orthodox. Pervading all was respect for the ruler, reflecting the acceptance of the cuius regio, eius religio principle; it reduced the scope for internal conflicts, which elsewhere bred doubts about authority. In translating conservative attitudes into political doctrines, the contribution of the lawyers and the nature of the law they taught were crucial. In place of the moral vacuum in which the single reality was the power of the individual ruler, there had come into being a body of law, articulated preeminently by Hugo Grotius (Grotius, Hugo) in On the Law of War and Peace. It was grounded not only in proven principles of private law but also in the Christian spirit, though it was strengthened by Grotius' separation of natural law from its religious aspects. As expounded by Wolff and the historiographer Samuel Pufendorf, natural law endorsed absolutism. They did not wholly neglect civil rights, they advocated religious toleration, and they opposed torture, but, living in a world far removed from that of Locke or Montesquieu, they saw no need to stipulate constitutional safeguards. Wolff declared that “he who exercises the civil power has the right to establish everything that appears to him to serve the public good.” Such a sovereign, comprising legislative, executive, and judicial functions, was also, as defined in Wolff's Rational Thoughts on the Social Life of Mankind (1756), a positive force, benevolent: he was Luther's “godly prince” in 18th-century dress, serving his people's needs. Cameralwissenschaft—the science and practice of administration—would serve the ruler by increasing the revenue and also improve the lot of the people.

      Envisaging progress under the sovereign who created the schools, hospitals, and orphanages and provided officials to run them, Wolff was only one among numerous writers who contributed to the ideal of benevolent bureaucratic absolutism, or Wohlfahrstaat. Though also influenced by the local school of cameralists and 17th-century writers such as Philippe Wilhelm von Hörnigk and Johann Joachim Becher, the emperor Joseph II, having the largest area to rule and the most earnest commitment to its principles, came to exemplify the Aufklärung. By his time, however, there was a growing reaction against the soulless rationality of the natural lawyers. With the exception of the Prussian critic Johann Gottfried Herder, whose ideal Volk-state would have a republican constitution, political thought was unaffected by the emphasis of the literary giants of Romanticism on freedom and spontaneity. His contemporary Kant (Kant, Immanuel), an anticameralist, believed in a degree of popular participation but would not allow even the theoretical right of revolution. In Was ist Aufklärung? Kant drew a vital distinction between the public and private use of one's reason. With Frederick the Great in mind, he advanced the paradox that can be taken as a text for the Enlightenment as well as for German history. The ruler with a well-disciplined and large army could provide more liberty than a republic.

A high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's intellectual freedom, yet also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent.

The Enlightenment throughout Europe
      Foreigners who came to see the monuments of Italy, or perhaps to listen to the music that they might recognize as the inspiration of some of the best of their own, were likely to return convinced that the country was backward. Its intellectual life might remain a closed book. As elsewhere, the Enlightenment consisted of small, isolated groups; measured by impact on governments, they had little obvious effect. Where there was important change, it was usually the work of a ruler, such as Leopold of Tuscany, or a minister, such as Bernardo Tanucci in Naples. The power of the church, symbolized by the listing of Galileo, a century after his condemnation, on the Index of Forbidden Books; the survival, particularly in the south, of an oppressive feudal power; and the restrictive power of the guilds were among the targets for liberals and humanitarians. Universities like Bologna, Padua, and Naples had preserved traditions of scholarship and still provided a stimulating base for such original thinkers as Giambattista Vico and Antonio Genovesi, a devout priest, professor of philosophy, and pioneer in ethical studies and economic theory. The distinctive feature of the Italian Enlightenment, however, as befitted the country that produced such scientists as Luigi Galvani and Alessandro Volta, was its practical tendency—as if speculation were a luxury amid so much disorder and poverty. Its proponents introduced to political philosophy utilitarianism's slogan “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” They also felt the passion of patriots seeking to rouse their countrymen. The greatest representative of the Italian Enlightenment was Cesare Beccaria (Beccaria, Cesare), whose work included Of Crimes and Punishments (1764); in his lifetime it was translated into 22 languages. His pupils and imitators included Catherine II of Russia and Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, Jeremy), the most influential figure in the long-delayed reform of English law. “Newtoncino,” as Beccaria was called by admirers, claimed to apply the geometric spirit to the study of criminal law. There was indeed no mystique about his idea of justice. “That bond which is necessary to keep the interest of individuals united, without which men would return to their original state of barbarity,” may recall the pessimism of Hobbes, but his formula for penalties answered to the enlightened ruler's search for what was both rational and practical: “Punishments which exceed the necessity of preserving this bond are in their nature unjust.” So Beccaria condemned torture and capital punishment, questioned the treatment of sins as crimes, and stressed the value of equality before the law and of prevention having priority over punishment. Much of the best enlightened thought comes together in Beccaria's work, in which the link between philosophy and reform is clearly evident.

      The Enlightenment was a European phenomenon: examples of enlightened thought and writing can be found in every country. There were important reforms in late 18th-century Spain under the benevolent rule of Charles III. There was little originality, however, about the Luces and its disciples. The spirit of acceptance was stronger than that of inquiry; Spain apparently was a casebook example of the philosophes' belief that religion stifled freedom of thought. It was a priest, Benito Feijóo y Montenegro (Feijóo y Montenegro, Benito Jerónimo), who did as much as any man to prepare for the Spanish Enlightenment, preaching the criterion of social utility in a society still obsessed with honour and display. Conservatism was, however, well entrenched, whether expressed in the pedantic procedures of the Inquisition or in the crude mob destroying the Marqués de Squillace's new street lamps in Madrid in 1766. “It is an old habit in Spain,” wrote the Count de Campomanes, “to condemn everything that is new.”

      So the accent in Spain was utilitarian—more Colbertiste than philosophe—as in other countries where local circumstances and needs dictated certain courses of action. Johann Struensee's (Struensee, Johann Friedrich, Graf von) liberal reforms in Denmark (1771–72) represented, besides his own eccentricity, justifiable resentment at an oppressive Pietist regime. The constitutional changes that followed the first partition of Poland in 1772 were dictated as much by the need to survive as by the imaginative idealism of King Stanisław. Despite her interest in abstract ideals, reforms in law and government in Catherine the Great's vast Russian lands represented the overriding imperative, the security of the state. In Portugal, Pombal (Pombal, Sebastião de Carvalho, marquês de), the rebuilder of post-earthquake Lisbon, was motivated chiefly by the need to restore vitality to a country with a pioneering maritime past. Leopold of Tuscany was able to draw on a rich humanist tradition and civic pride. Everywhere the preferences of the ruler had an idiosyncratic effect, as in the Margrave Charles Frederick of Baden's unsuccessful attempt in 1770 to introduce a land tax (the impôt unique advocated by the physiocrats), or in Pombal's campaign to expel the Jesuits (copied supinely by other Catholic rulers).

      Overall it may seem as easy to define the Enlightenment by what it opposed as by what it advocated. Along with some superficiality in thought and cynical expediency in action, this is the basis for conservative criticism: When reason is little more than common sense and utilitarianism so infects attitudes that progress can be measured only by material standards, then Edmund Burke's lament about the age of “sophisters, economists, and calculators” is held to be justified. Some historians have followed Burke in ascribing not only Jacobin authoritarianism but even 20th-century totalitarianism to tendencies within the Enlightenment. Indeed, it may be that the movement that helped to free man from the past and its “self-incurred tutelage” (Kant) failed to prevent the development of new systems and techniques of tyranny. This intellectual odyssey, following Shaftesbury's “mighty light which spreads itself over the world,” should, however, be seen to be related to the growth of the state, the advance of science, and the subsequent development of an industrial society. For their ill effects, the Enlightenment cannot be held to be mainly responsible. Rather it should be viewed as an integral part of a broader historical process. In this light it is easier to appraise the achievements that are its singular glory. To be challenged to think harder, with greater chance of discovering truth; to be able to write, speak, and worship freely; and to experience equality under the law and relatively humane treatment if one offended against it was to be able to live a fuller life.

Geoffrey Russell Richards Treasure

Revolution and the growth of industrial society, 1789–1914
      Developments in 19th-century Europe are bounded by two great events. The French Revolution broke out in 1789, and its effects reverberated throughout much of Europe for many decades. World War I began in 1914. Its inception resulted from many trends in European society, culture, and diplomacy during the late 19th century. In between these boundaries—the one opening a new set of trends, the other bringing long-standing tensions to a head—much of modern Europe was defined.

      Europe during this 125-year span was both united and deeply divided. A number of basic cultural trends, including new literary styles and the spread of science, ran through the entire continent. European states were increasingly locked in diplomatic interaction, culminating in continentwide alliance systems after 1871. At the same time, this was a century of growing nationalism, in which individual states jealously protected their identities and indeed established more rigorous border controls than ever before. Finally, the European continent was to an extent divided between two zones of differential development. Changes such as the Industrial Revolution and political liberalization spread first and fastest in western Europe—Britain, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and, to an extent, Germany and Italy. Eastern and southern Europe, more rural at the outset of the period, changed more slowly and in somewhat different ways.

      Europe witnessed important common patterns and increasing interconnections, but these developments must be assessed in terms of nation-state divisions and, even more, of larger regional differences. Some trends, including the ongoing impact of the French Revolution, ran through virtually the entire 19th century. Other characteristics, however, had a shorter life span.

      Some historians prefer to divide 19th-century history into relatively small chunks. Thus 1789–1815 is defined by the French Revolution and Napoleon; 1815–48 forms a period of reaction and adjustment; 1848–71 is dominated by a new round of revolution and the unifications of the German and Italian nations; and 1871–1914, an age of imperialism, is shaped by new kinds of political debate and the pressures that culminated in war. Overriding these important markers, however, a simpler division can also be useful. Between 1789 and 1849 Europe dealt with the forces of political revolution and the first impact of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1849 and 1914 a fuller industrial society emerged, including new forms of states and of diplomatic and military alignments. The mid-19th century, in either formulation, looms as a particularly important point of transition within the extended 19th century.

Economic effects
      Undergirding the development of modern Europe between the 1780s and 1849 was an unprecedented economic transformation that embraced the first stages of the great Industrial Revolution and a still more general expansion of commercial activity. Articulate Europeans were initially more impressed by the screaming political news generated by the French Revolution and ensuing Napoleonic Wars, but in retrospect the economic upheaval, which related in any event to political and diplomatic trends, has proved more fundamental.

      Major economic change was spurred by western Europe's tremendous population growth during the late 18th century, extending well into the 19th century itself. Between 1750 and 1800, the populations of major countries increased between 50 and 100 percent, chiefly as a result of the use of new food crops (such as the potato) and a temporary decline in epidemic disease. Population growth of this magnitude compelled change. Peasant and artisanal children found their paths to inheritance blocked by sheer numbers and thus had to seek new forms of paying labour. Families of businessmen and landlords also had to innovate to take care of unexpectedly large surviving broods. These pressures occurred in a society already attuned to market transactions, possessed of an active merchant class, and blessed with considerable capital and access to overseas markets as a result of existing dominance in world trade.

      Heightened commercialization showed in a number of areas. Vigorous peasants increased their landholdings, often at the expense of their less fortunate neighbours, who swelled the growing ranks of the near-propertyless. These peasants, in turn, produced food for sale in growing urban markets. Domestic (domestic system) manufacturing soared, as hundreds of thousands of rural producers worked full- or part-time to make thread and cloth, nails and tools under the sponsorship of urban merchants. Craft work in the cities began to shift toward production for distant markets, which encouraged artisan-owners to treat their journeymen less as fellow workers and more as wage labourers. Europe's social structure changed toward a basic division, both rural and urban, between owners and nonowners. Production expanded, leading by the end of the 18th century to a first wave of consumerism as rural wage earners began to purchase new kinds of commercially produced clothing, while urban middle-class families began to indulge in new tastes, such as uplifting books and educational toys for children.

      In this context an outright industrial revolution took shape, led by Britain, which retained leadership in industrialization well past the middle of the 19th century. In 1840, British steam engines were generating 620,000 horsepower out of a European total of 860,000. Nevertheless, though delayed by the chaos of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, many western European nations soon followed suit; thus by 1860 British steam-generated horsepower made up less than half the European total, with France, Germany, and Belgium gaining ground rapidly. Governments and private entrepreneurs worked hard to imitate British technologies after 1820, by which time an intense industrial revolution was taking shape in many parts of western Europe, particularly in coal-rich regions such as Belgium, northern France, and the Ruhr area of Germany. German pig iron production, a mere 40,000 tons in 1825, soared to 150,000 tons a decade later and reached 250,000 tons by the early 1850s. French coal and iron output doubled in the same span—huge changes in national capacities and the material bases of life.

      Technological change soon spilled over from manufacturing into other areas. Increased production heightened demands on the transportation system to move raw materials and finished products. Massive road and canal building programs were one response, but steam engines (steam engine) also were directly applied as a result of inventions in Britain and the United States. Steam shipping plied major waterways soon after 1800 and by the 1840s spread to oceanic transport. railroad systems, first developed to haul coal from mines, were developed for intercity transport during the 1820s; the first commercial line opened between Liverpool and Manchester in 1830. During the 1830s local rail networks fanned out in most western European countries, and national systems were planned in the following decade, to be completed by about 1870. In communication, the invention of the telegraph allowed faster exchange of news and commercial information than ever before.

      New organization of business (business organization) and labour was intimately linked to the new technologies. Workers in the industrialized sectors laboured in factories rather than in scattered shops or homes. Steam and water power required a concentration of labour close to the power source. Concentration of labour also allowed new discipline and specialization, which increased productivity.

      The new machinery was expensive, and businessmen setting up even modest factories had to accumulate substantial capital through partnerships, loans from banks, or joint-stock ventures. While relatively small firms still predominated, and managerial bureaucracies were limited save in a few heavy industrial giants, a tendency toward expansion of the business unit was already noteworthy. Commerce was affected in similar ways, for new forms had to be devised to dispose of growing levels of production. Small shops replaced itinerant peddlers in villages and small towns. In Paris, the department store, introduced in the 1830s, ushered in an age of big business in the trading sector.

       urbanization was a vital result of growing commercialization and new industrial technology. Factory centres such as Manchester grew from villages into cities (city) of hundreds of thousands in a few short decades. The percentage of the total population located in cities expanded steadily, and big cities tended to displace more scattered centres in western Europe's urban map. Rapid city growth produced new hardships, for housing stock and sanitary facilities could not keep pace, though innovation responded, if slowly. Gas lighting improved street conditions in the better neighbourhoods from the 1830s onward, and sanitary reformers pressed for underground sewage systems at about this time. For the better-off, rapid suburban growth allowed some escape from the worst urban miseries.

      Rural life changed less dramatically. A full-scale technological revolution in the countryside (agriculture, origins of) occurred only after the 1850s. Nevertheless, factory-made tools spread widely even before this time, as scythes replaced sickles for harvesting, allowing a substantial improvement in productivity. Larger estates, particularly in commercially minded Britain, began to introduce newer equipment, such as seed drills for planting. Crop rotation, involving the use of nitrogen-fixing plants, displaced the age-old practice of leaving some land fallow, while better seeds and livestock and, from the 1830s, chemical fertilizers improved yields as well. Rising agricultural production and market specialization were central to the growth of cities and factories.

      The speed of western Europe's Industrial Revolution should not be exaggerated. By 1850 in Britain, far and away the leader still, only half the total population lived in cities, and there were as many urban craft producers as there were factory hands. Relatively traditional economic sectors, in other words, did not disappear and even expanded in response to new needs for housing construction or food production. Nevertheless, the new economic sectors grew most rapidly, and even other branches displayed important new features as part of the general process of commercialization.

      Geographic disparities complicate the picture as well. Belgium and, from the 1840s, many of the German states were well launched on an industrial revolution that brought them steadily closer to British levels. France, poorer in coal, concentrated somewhat more on increasing production in craft sectors, converting furniture making, for example, from an artistic endeavour to standardized output in advance of outright factory forms. Scandinavia and The Netherlands joined the industrial parade seriously only after 1850.

      Southern and eastern Europe, while importing a few model factories and setting up some local rail lines, generally operated in a different economic orbit. City growth and technological change were both modest until much later in the 19th century, save in pockets of northern Italy and northern Spain. In eastern areas, western Europe's industrialization had its greatest impact in encouraging growing conversion to market agriculture, as Russia, Poland, and Hungary responded to grain import needs, particularly in the British Isles. As in eastern Prussia, the temptation was to impose new obligations on peasant serfs labouring on large estates, increasing the work requirements in order to meet export possibilities without fundamental technical change and without challenging the hold of the landlord class.

Social upheaval
      In western Europe, economic change produced massive social consequences during the first half of the 19th century. Basic aspects of daily life changed, and work was increasingly redefined. The intensity of change varied, of course—with factory workers affected most keenly, labourers on the land least—but some of the pressures were widespread.

      For wage labourers, the autonomy of work declined; more people worked under the daily direction of others. Early textile and metallurgical factories set shop rules, which urged workers to be on time, to stay at their machines rather than wandering around, and to avoid idle singing or chatter (difficult in any event given the noise of the equipment). These rules were increasingly enforced by foremen, who mediated between owners and ordinary labourers. Work speeded up. Machines set the pace, and workers were supposed to keep up: one French factory owner, who each week decorated the most productive machine (not its operators) with a garland of flowers, suggested where the priorities lay. Work, in other words, was to be fast, coordinated, and intense, without the admixture of distractions common in preindustrial labour. Some of these pressures spilled over to nonfactory settings as well, as craft directors tried to urge a higher productivity on journeymen artisans. Duration of work everywhere remained long, up to 14 hours a day, which was traditional but could be oppressive when work was more intense and walking time had to be added to reach the factories in the first place. Women and children were widely used for the less skilled operations; again, this was no novelty, but it was newly troubling now that work was located outside the home and was often more dangerous, given the hazards of unprotected machinery.

      The nature of work shifted in the propertied classes as well. Middle-class people, not only factory owners but also merchants and professionals, began to trumpet a new work ethic (Protestant ethic). According to this ethic, work was the basic human good. He who worked was meritorious and should prosper, he who suffered did so because he did not work. Idleness and frivolity were officially frowned upon. Middle-class stories, for children and adults alike, were filled with uplifting tales of poor people who, by dint of assiduous work, managed to better themselves. In Britain, Samuel Smiles authored this kind of mobility literature, which was widely popular between the 1830s and 1860s. Between 1780 and 1840, Prussian school reading shifted increasingly toward praise of hard work as a means of social improvement, with corresponding scorn for laziness.

      Shifts in work context had important implications for leisure. Businessmen who internalized the new work ethic felt literally uncomfortable when not on the job. Overall, the European middle class strove to redefine leisure tastes toward personal improvement and family cohesion; recreation that did not conduce to these ends was dubious. Family reading was a common pastime. Daughters were encouraged to learn piano playing, for music could draw the family together and demonstrate the refinement of its women. Through piano teaching, in turn, a new class of professional musicians began to emerge in the large cities. Middle-class people, newly wealthy, were willing to join in sponsorship of certain cultural events outside the home, such as symphony concerts. Book buying and newspaper reading also were supported, with a tendency to favour serious newspapers that focused on political and economic issues and books that had a certain classic status. Middle-class people also attended informative public lectures and night courses that might develop new work skills in such areas as applied science or management.

      Middle-class pressures by no means totally reshaped popular urban leisure habits. Workers (proletariat) had limited time and means for play, but many absented themselves from the factories when they could afford to (often preferring free time over higher earnings, to the despair of their managers). The sheer intensity of work constrained leisure nevertheless. Furthermore, city administrations tried to limit other traditional popular amusements, ranging from gambling to animal contests (bear-baiting, cockfighting) to popular festivals. Leisure of this sort was viewed as unproductive, crude, and—insofar as it massed urban crowds—dangerous to political order. Urban police forces, created during the 1820s in cities like London to provide more professional control over crime and public behaviour, spent much of their time combating popular leisure impulses during the middle decades of the 19th century. Popular habits did not fully accommodate to middle-class standards. Drinking (alcohol consumption), though disapproved of by middle-class critics, was an important recreational outlet, bringing men together in a semblance of community structure. Bars sprouted throughout working-class sections of town. On the whole, however, the early decades of the Industrial Revolution saw a massive decline of popular leisure traditions; even in the countryside, festivals were diluted by importing paid entertainers from the cities. Leisure did not disappear, but it was increasingly reshaped toward respectable family pastimes or spectatorship at inexpensive concerts or circuses, where large numbers of people paid professional entertainers to take their minds away from the everyday routine.

      The growth of cities and industry had a vital impact on family life. The family declined as a production unit as work moved away from home settings. This was true not only for workers but also for middle-class people. Many businessmen setting up a new store or factory in the 1820s initially assumed that their wives would assist them, in the time-honoured fashion in which all family members were expected to pitch in. After the first generation, however, this impulse faded, in part because fashionable homes were located at some distance from commercial sections and needed separate attention. In general, most urban groups tended to respond to the separation of home and work by redefining gender roles, so that married men became the family breadwinners (aided, in the working class, by older children) and women were the domestic specialists.

      In the typical working-class family, women were expected to work from their early teens through marriage a decade or so later. The majority of women workers in the cities went into domestic service in middle-class households, but an important minority laboured in factories; another minority became prostitutes. Some women continued working outside the home after marriage, but most pulled back to tasks, such as laundering, that could be done domestically. Their other activities concentrated on shopping for the family (an arduous task on limited budgets), caring for children, and maintaining contacts with other relatives who might support the family socially and provide aid during economic hardships.

      Few middle-class women worked in paid employment at any point in their lives. Managing a middle-class household was complex, even with a servant present. Standards of child rearing urged increased maternal attention, and women were also supposed to provide a graceful and comfortable tone for family life. Middle-class ideals held the family to be a sacred place and women its chief agents because of their innate morality and domestic devotion. Men owed the family good manners and the provision of economic security, but their daily interactions became increasingly peripheral. Many middle-class families also began, in the early 19th century, to limit their birth rate, mainly through increasing sexual abstinence. Having too many children could complicate the family's economic well-being and prevent the necessary attention and support for the children who were desired. The middle class thus pioneered a new definition of family size that would ultimately become more widespread in European society.

      New family arrangements, both for workers and for middle-class people, suggested new courtship patterns. As wage earners having no access to property, urban workers were increasingly able to form liaisons early in life without waiting for inheritance and without close supervision by a watchful community. Sexual (sexual behaviour, human) activity began earlier in life than had been standard before the 1780s. Marriage did not necessarily follow, for many workers moved from job to job and some unquestionably exploited female partners who were eager for more durable arrangements. Rates of illegitimate births began to rise rapidly throughout western Europe from about 1780 (from 2 to 4 up to 10 percent of total births) among young rural as well as urban workers. Sexual pleasure, or its quest, became more important for young adults. Similar symptoms developed among some middle-class men, who exploited female servants or the growing numbers of brothels that dotted the large cities and that often did exceptional business during school holidays. Respectable young middle-class women held back from these trends. They were, however, increasingly drawn to beliefs in a romantic marriage, which became part of the new family ideal. Marriage age for middle-class women also dropped, creating an age disparity between men and women in the families of this class. Economic criteria for family formation remained important in many social sectors, but young people enjoyed more freedom in courtship, and other factors, sexual or emotional or both, gained increasing legitimacy.

      Changes in family life, rooted in shifts in modes of livelihood and methods of work, had substantial impact on all family members. Older people gained new roles, particularly in working-class families, where they helped out as baby-sitters for grandchildren. Women's economic power in the family decreased. Many groups of men argued vigorously that women should stick to family concerns. By the 1830s and '40s one result was the inception of laws that regulated women's hours of work (while leaving men free from protection or constraints); this was a humanitarian move to protect women's family roles, but it also reduced women's economic opportunities on grounds of their special frailty. The position of children (childhood) also began to be redefined. Middle-class ideals held that children were innocents, to be educated and nurtured. Most working-class families urged a more traditional view of children as contributors to the family economy, but they too could see advantages in sending their children to school where possible and restricting their work in dangerous factories. Again, after the first decades of industrialization, reform laws began to respond. Legislation in Britain, France, and Prussia during the 1830s restricted the employment of young children in the factories and encouraged school attendance.

      Along with its impact on daily patterns of life and family institutions, economic change began to shift Europe's social structure and create new antagonisms among urban social classes (social class). The key division lay between the members of the middle class, who owned businesses or acquired professional education, and those of the working class, who depended on the sale of labour for a wage. Neither group was homogeneous. Many middle-class people criticized the profit-seeking behaviour of the new factory owners. Artisans often shunned factory workers and drew distinctions based on their traditional prestige and (usually) greater literacy. Some skilled workers, earning good wages, emulated middle-class people, seeking education and acquiring domestic trappings such as pianos.

      Nevertheless, the social divide was considerable. It increasingly affected residential patterns, as wealthier classes moved away from the crowded slums of the poor, in contrast to the greater mixture in the quarters of preindustrial cities. Middle-class people deplored the work and sexual habits of many workers, arguing that their bad behaviour was the root cause of poverty. City governments enacted harsh measures against beggars, while new national laws attempted to make charity harder to obtain. The British Poor Law Reform of 1834, in particular, tightened the limits on relief in hopes of forcing able-bodied workers to fend for themselves.

      Class divisions manifested themselves in protest movements (social movement). Middle-class people joined political protests hoping to win new rights against aristocratic monopoly. Workers increasingly organized on their own despite the fact that new laws banned craft organizations and outlawed unions and strikes. Some workers attacked the reliance on machinery in the name of older, more humane traditions of work. Luddite protests of this sort began in Britain during the decade 1810–20. More numerous were groups of craft workers, and some factory hands, who formed incipient trade unions to demand better conditions as well as to provide mutual aid in cases of sickness or other setbacks. National union movements arose in Britain during the 1820s, though they ultimately failed. Huge strikes in the silk industry around Lyon, Fr., in 1831 and 1834 sought a living minimum wage for all workers. The most ambitious worker movements tended to emphasize a desire to turn back the clock to older work systems where there was greater equality and a greater commitment to craft skill, but most failed. Smaller, local unions did achieve some success in preserving the conditions of the traditional systems. Social protest was largely intermittent because many workers were too poor or too disoriented to mount a larger effort, but it clearly signaled important tensions in the new economic order.

The age of revolution
      During the decades of economic and social transformation, western Europe also experienced massive political change. The central event throughout much of the Continent was the French Revolution (1789–99) and its aftermath. This was followed by a concerted effort at political reaction and a renewed series of revolutions from 1820 through 1848.

      Connections between political change and socioeconomic upheaval were real but complex. Economic grievances associated with early industrialization fed into later revolutions, particularly the outbursts in 1848, but the newest social classes were not prime bearers of the revolutionary message. Revolutions also resulted from new political ideas directed against the institutions and social arrangements of the preindustrial order. Their results facilitated further economic change, but this was not necessarily their intent. Political unrest must be seen as a discrete factor shaping a new Europe along with fundamental economic forces.

      Revolution exploded in France in the summer of 1789, after many decades of ideological ferment, political decline, and social unrest. Ideologically, thinkers of the Enlightenment urged that governments should promote the greatest good of all people, not the narrow interests of a particular elite. They were hostile to the political power of the Roman Catholic church as well as to the tax exemptions and landed power of the aristocracy. Their remedies were diverse, ranging from outright democracy to a more efficient monarchy, but they joined in insisting on greater religious and cultural freedom, some kind of parliamentary institution, and greater equality under the law. Enlightenment writings were widely disseminated, reaching many urban groups in France and elsewhere. The monarchy was in bad shape even aside from new attacks. Its finances were severely pressed, particularly after the wars of the mid-18th century and French involvement against Britain during the American Revolution. Efforts to reform the tax structure foundered against the opposition of the aristocracy. Finally, various groups in France were pressed by economic and social change. Aristocrats wanted new political rights against royal power. Middle-class people sought a political voice to match their commercial importance and a government more friendly to their interests. The peasant majority, pressed by population growth, sought access to the lands of the aristocracy and the church, an end to remaining manorial dues and services, and relief from taxation.

      These various discontents came to a head when King Louis XVI called the Estates-General in 1789 to consider new taxes. This body had not met since 1614, and its calling released all the pressures building during recent decades, exacerbated by economic hardships resulting from bad harvests in 1787–88. Reform leaders, joined by some aristocrats and clergy, insisted that the Third Estate, representing elements of the urban middle class, be granted double the membership of the church and aristocratic estates and that the entire body of Estates-General vote as a unit—they insisted, in other words, on a new kind of parliament. The king yielded, and the new National Assembly began to plan a constitution. Riots in the summer of 1789 included a symbolic attack on the Bastille, a royal prison, and a series of risings in the countryside that forced repeal of the remnants of manorialism and a proclamation of equality under the laws. A Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) trumpeted religious freedom and liberty of press and assembly, while reaffirming property rights. Church lands were seized, however, creating a rift between revolutionary and Roman Catholic sentiment. Guilds were outlawed (in 1791), as the revolution promoted middle-class beliefs in individual initiative and freedom for technological change. A 1791 constitution retained the monarchy but created a strong parliament, elected by about half of France's adult males—those with property.

      This liberal phase of the French Revolution was followed, between 1792 and 1794, by a more radical period. Economic conditions deteriorated, prompting new urban riots. Roman Catholic and other groups rose in opposition to the revolution, resulting in forceful suppression and a corresponding growing insistence on loyalty to revolutionary principles. Monarchs in neighbouring countries—notably Britain, Austria, and Prussia—challenged the revolution and threatened invasion, which added foreign war to the unstable mix by 1792. Radical leaders, under the banners of the Jacobin (Jacobin Club) party, took over the government, proclaiming a republic and executing the king and many other leaders of the old regime. Governmental centralization increased; the decimal system was introduced. Mass military conscription was organized for the first time in European history, with the argument that, now that the government belonged to the people, the people must serve it loyally. A new constitution proclaimed universal manhood suffrage, and reforms in education and other areas were widely discussed. The radical phase of the revolution brought increasing military success to revolutionary troops in effectively reorganized armies, which conquered parts of the Low Countries and Germany and carried revolutionary laws in their wake. The revolution was beginning to become a European phenomenon.

      Jacobin rule was replaced by a more moderate consolidation after 1795, during which, however, military expansion continued in several directions, notably in parts of Italy. The needs of war, along with recurrent domestic unrest, prompted a final revolutionary regime change, in 1799, that brought General Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon I) to power.


The Napoleonic era
      Napoleon ruled for 15 years, closing out the quarter-century so dominated by the French Revolution. His own ambitions were to establish a solid dynasty within France and to create a French-dominated empire in Europe. To this end he moved steadily to consolidate his personal power, proclaiming himself emperor and sketching a new aristocracy. He was almost constantly at war, with Britain his most dogged opponent but Prussia and Austria also joining successive coalitions. Until 1812, his campaigns were usually successful. Although he frequently made errors in strategy—especially in the concentration of troops and the deployment of artillery—he was a master tactician, repeatedly snatching victory from initial defeat in the major battles. Napoleonic France directly annexed territories in the Low Countries and western Germany, applying revolutionary legislation in full. Satellite kingdoms were set up in other parts of Germany and Italy, in Spain, and in Poland. Only after 1810 did Napoleon clearly overreach himself. His empire stirred enmity widely, and in conquered Spain an important guerrilla movement harassed his forces. Russia, briefly allied, turned hostile, and an 1812 invasion attempt failed miserably in the cold Russian winter. A new alliance formed among the other great powers in 1813. France fell to the invading forces of this coalition in 1814, and Napoleon was exiled. He returned dramatically, only to be defeated at Waterloo in 1815; his reign had finally ended.

      Napoleon's regime produced three major accomplishments, aside from its many military episodes. First, it confirmed many revolutionary changes within France itself. Napoleon was a dictator, maintaining only a sham parliament and rigorously policing press and assembly. Though some key liberal (liberalism) principles were in fact ignored, equality under the law was for the most part enhanced through Napoleon's sweeping new law codes; hereditary privileges among adult males became a thing of the past. A strongly centralized government recruited bureaucrats according to their abilities. New educational institutions, under state control, provided access to bureaucratic and specialized technical training. Religious freedom survived, despite some conciliations of Roman Catholic opinion. Freedom of internal trade and encouragements to technical innovation allied the state with commercial growth. Sales of church land were confirmed, and rural France emerged as a nation of strongly independent peasant proprietors.

      Napoleon's conquests cemented the spread of French revolutionary legislation to much of western Europe. The powers of the Roman Catholic church, guilds, and manorial aristocracy came under the gun. The old regime was dead in Belgium, western Germany, and northern Italy.

      Finally, wider conquests permanently altered the European map. Napoleon's kingdoms consolidated scattered territories in Germany and Italy, and the welter of divided states was never restored. These developments, but also resentment at Napoleonic rule, sparked growing nationalism in these regions and also in Spain and Poland. Prussia and Russia, less touched by new ideologies, nevertheless introduced important political reforms as a means of strengthening the state to resist the Napoleonic war machine. Prussia expanded its school system and modified serfdom; it also began to recruit larger armies. Britain was less affected, protected by its powerful navy and an expanding industrial economy that ultimately helped wear Napoleon down; but, even in Britain, French revolutionary example spurred a new wave of democratic agitation.

      In 1814–15 the victorious powers convened at the Congress of Vienna (Vienna, Congress of) to try to put Europe back together, though there was no thought of literally restoring the world that had existed before 1789. Regional German and Italian states were confirmed as a buffer to any future French expansion. Prussia gained new territories in western Germany. Russia took over most of Poland (previously divided, in the late 18th century, until Napoleon's brief incursion). Britain acquired some former French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies (including South Africa). The Bourbon dynasty was restored to the French throne in the person of Louis XVIII, but revolutionary laws were not repealed, and a parliament, though based on very narrow suffrage, proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. The Treaty of Vienna disappointed nationalists, who had hoped for a new Germany and Italy, and it certainly daunted democrats and liberals. However, it was not reactionary, nor was it punitive as far as France was concerned. Overall, the treaty strove to reestablish a balance of power in Europe and to emphasize a conservative political order tempered by concessions to new realities. The former was remarkably successful, preserving the peace for more than half a century, the latter effort less so.

The conservative reaction
       conservatism did dominate the European political agenda through the mid-1820s. Major governments, even in Britain, used police agents to ferret out agitators. The prestige of the Roman Catholic church soared in France and elsewhere. Europe's conservative leader was Prince von Metternich (Metternich, Klemens, Fürst von), chief minister of the Habsburg monarchy. Metternich realized the fragility of Habsburg rule, not only wedded to church and monarchy but also, as a polyglot combination of German, Hungarian, and Slavic peoples, vulnerable to any nationalist sentiment. He sedulously avoided significant change in his own lands and encouraged the international status quo as well. He sponsored congresses at several points through the early 1820s to discuss intervention against political unrest. He was particularly eager to promote conservatism in the German states and in Italy, where Austrian administration of northern provinces gave his regime a new stake.

      Nevertheless, in 1820 revolutionary agitation broke out in fringe areas. Risings in several Italian states were put down. A rebellion in Spain was also suppressed, though only after several years, foreshadowing more than a century of recurrent political instability; the revolution also confirmed Spain's loss of most of its American colonies, which had first risen during the Napoleonic occupation. A Greek (Greek Independence, War of) revolution against Ottoman control fared better, for Greek nationalists appealed to European sympathy for a Christian nation struggling against Muslim dominance. With French, British, and Russian backing, Greece finally won its independence in 1829.

      Liberal (liberalism) agitation began to revive in Britain, France, and the Low Countries by the mid-1820s. Liberals wanted stronger parliaments and wider protection of individual rights. They also sought a vote for the propertied classes. They wanted commercial legislation that would favour business growth, which in Britain meant attacking Corn Law tariffs that protected landlord interests and kept food prices (and so wages) artificially high. Belgian liberals also had a nationalist grievance, for the Treaty of Vienna had placed their country under Dutch rule.

      Liberal concerns fueled a new round of revolution (July Revolution) in 1830 (1830, Revolutions of), sparked by a new uprising in Paris. The French monarchy had tightened regulation of the press and of university professors, producing classic liberal issues. Artisans, eager for more political rights, also rose widely against economic hardship and the principles of the new commercial economy. This combination chased the Bourbon king, producing a new and slightly more liberal monarchy, an expanded middle-class voting system, and some transient protections for freedom of the press; the new regime also cut back the influence of the church. Revolution spread to some German and Italian states and also to Belgium, where after several years an independent nation with a liberal monarchy was proclaimed. Britain was spared outright revolution, but massive agitation forced a Reform Bill in 1832 that effectively enfranchised all middle-class males and set the framework for additional liberal legislation, including repeal of the Corn Laws and municipal government reform, during the next decade.

      Europe was now divided between a liberal west and a conservative centre and east. Russia, indeed, seemed largely exempt from the political currents swirling in the rest of the continent, partly because of the absence of significant social and economic change. A revolt by some liberal-minded army officers in 1825 (the Decembrist revolt (Decembrist)) was put down with ease, and a new tsar, Nicholas I, installed a more rigorous system of political police and censorship. Nationalist revolt in Poland, a part of the 1830 movement, was suppressed with great force. Russian diplomatic interests continued to follow largely traditional lines, with recurrent warfare with the Ottoman Empire in an effort to gain territory to the south. Only after 1850 did the Russian regime seriously rethink its adamantly conservative stance.

      This pattern could not prevail elsewhere in Europe. Scandinavian (Scandinavia) governments moved toward increasing liberalism by expanding the power of parliaments, a development that was completed in the late 1840s; the Dutch monarchy did the same. Elsewhere, the next major step resulted once again from a series of revolutions in 1848, which proved to be western Europe's final revolutionary round.

The Revolutions of 1848 (1848, Revolutions of)
      After adopting reforms in the 1830s and the early 1840s, Louis-Philippe of France rejected further change and thereby spurred new liberal agitation. Artisan concerns also had quickened, against their loss of status and shifts in work conditions following from rapid economic change; a major recession in 1846–47 added to popular unrest. Some socialist (socialism) ideas spread among artisan leaders, who urged a regime in which workers could control their own small firms and labour in harmony and equality. A major propaganda campaign for wider suffrage and political reform brought police action in February 1848, which in turn prompted a classic street rising that chased the monarchy (never to return) and briefly established a republican regime based on universal manhood suffrage.

      Revolt quickly spread to Austria, Prussia, Hungary, Bohemia, and various parts of Italy. These risings included most of the ingredients present in France, but also serious peasant grievances against manorial obligations and a strong nationalist current that sought national unification in Italy and Germany and Hungarian independence or Slavic autonomy in the Habsburg lands. New regimes were set up in many areas, while a national assembly convened in Frankfurt to discuss German unity.

      The major rebellions were put down in 1849. Austrian revolutionaries were divided over nationalist issues, with German liberals opposed to minority nationalisms; this helped the Habsburg regime maintain control of its army and move against rebels in Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary (in the last case, aided by Russian troops). Parisian revolutionaries divided between those who sought only political change and artisans who wanted job protection and other gains from the state. In a bloody clash in June 1848, the artisans were put down and the republican regime moved steadily toward the right, ultimately electing a nephew of Napoleon I as president; he, in turn (true to family form), soon established a new empire, claiming the title Napoleon III. The Prussian monarch turned down a chance to head a liberal united Germany and instead used his army to chase the revolutionary governments, aided by divisions between liberals and working-class radicals (including the socialist Karl Marx, who had set up a newspaper in Cologne).

      Despite the defeat of the revolutions, however, important changes resulted from the 1848 rising. Manorialism was permanently abolished throughout Germany and the Habsburg lands, giving peasants new rights. Democracy ruled in France, even under the new empire and despite considerable manipulation; universal manhood suffrage had been permanently installed. Prussia, again in conservative hands, nevertheless established a parliament, based on a limited vote, as a gesture to liberal opinion. The Habsburg monarchy installed a rationalized bureaucratic structure to replace localized landlord rule. A new generation of conservatives came to the fore—Metternich had been exiled by revolution—who were eager to compromise with and utilize new political forces rather than oppose them down the line. Finally, some new political currents had been sketched. Socialism, though wounded by the failure of the revolutions, was on Europe's political agenda, and some feminist agitation had surfaced in France and Germany. The stage was set for rapid political evolution after 1850, in a process that made literal revolution increasingly difficult.

      The years between 1815 and 1850 had not seen major diplomatic activity on the part of most European powers, Russia excepted. Exhaustion after the Napoleonic Wars combined with a desire to use diplomacy as a weapon of internal politics. Britain continued to expand its colonial hold, most notably introducing more direct control over its empire in India. France and Britain, though still wary of each other, joined in resisting Russian gains in the Middle East. France also began to acquire new colonial holdings, notably by invading Algeria in 1829. Seeds were being planted for more rapid colonial expansion after mid-century, but the period remained, on the surface, rather quiet, in marked contrast to the ferment of revolution and reaction during the same decades.

Peter N. Stearns

Romanticism and Realism
The legacy of the French Revolution
      To make the story of 19th-century culture start in the year of the French Revolution is at once convenient and accurate, even though nothing in history “starts” at a precise moment. For although the revolution itself had its beginnings in ideas and conditions preceding that date, it is clear that the events of 1789 brought together and crystallized a multitude of hopes, fears, and desires into something visible, potent, and irreversible. To say that in 1789 reform becomes revolt is to record a positive change, a genuine starting point. One who lived through the change, the Duke de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, was even sharper in his vision when (as the story goes) he answered Louis XVI, who had asked whether the tumult outside was a revolt: “No, sire, it is a revolution.” In cultural history as in political, significance is properly said to reside in events; that is, in the acts of certain men or the appearance of certain works that not only embody the feelings of the hour but also prevent other acts or works from having importance or effect. To list some examples: the year 1790 saw the appearance of Goethe's Faust, a Fragment, of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, of Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell, and of Kant's Critique of Judgment. In these works are found the Romanticist view of human destiny, of the state, of moral energy, and of aesthetics. The remainder of the decade goes on to show that it belongs to a new age; it gave the world Goya's “Caprichos” and the portrait of the Duchess de Alba, Beethoven's Piano Sonata in C Minor (Pathétique), Hölderlin's Hyperion, the beginning of August Wilhelm von Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck's translation of Shakespeare into German, Schelling's Nature Philosophy, Herder's Letters on the Progress of Mankind, Wordsworth and Coleridge's Lyrical Ballads, Schiller's Wallenstein, and Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. These are so many evidences of a new direction in thought and culture.

      To say, then, that the cultural history of the later modern age—1789 to the present—begins with the French Revolution is to discuss that revolution's ideas rather than the details of its onward march during its first 10 years. These ideas are the recognition of individual rights, the sovereignty of the people, and the universal applicability of this pair of propositions. In politics the powerful combination of all three brings about a permanent state of affairs: “the revolution” as defined here has not yet stopped. It continues to move the minds of men, in the West and beyond. The revolution is “dynamic” because it does not simply change rulers or codes of law but also arouses a demand and a hope in every individual and every people. When the daily paper tells of another new nation born by breaking away, violently or not, from some other group, the revolutionary doctrine of the sovereignty of the people may be observed still at work after two centuries.

Cultural nationalism
      The counterpart of this political idea in the 19th century is cultural nationalism. The phrase denotes the belief that each nation in Europe had from its earliest formation developed a culture of its own, with features as unique as its language, even though its language and culture might have near relatives over the frontier. Europe was thus seen as a bouquet of diverse flowers harmoniously bunched, rather than as a uniform upper-class civilization stretching from Paris to St. Petersburg, from London to Rome, and from Berlin to Lisbon—wherever “polite society” could be found, a society acknowledging the same artistic ideals, speaking French, and taking its lead from the French court and culture. In still other words, the revolutionary idea of the people as the source of power ended the idea of a cosmopolitan Europe.

      The “uniform” conception presupposed a class or elite transcending boundaries; the “diverse” implied a number of distinct nations made up of citizens attached to their native soil and having an inborn and exclusive understanding of all that had been produced on it. In each nation it is the people as a whole, not just the educated class, that is deemed the creator and repository of culture; and that culture is not a conscious product fashioned by the court artists of the moment: it is the slow growth of centuries. This view of Europe explains one of the great intellectual forces of the postrevolutionary era—the passion for history. An emotion that may be called cultural populism replaced the devotion to a single horizontal, Europe-wide, and “sophisticated” civilization. These vertical national cultures were “popular” not only in their scope but also in their simplicity.

      This new outlook, though propagated by the revolution, began as one of those subdued feelings mentioned earlier, as undercurrents beneath Enlightenment doctrine. In England and Germany especially, a taste developed for folk literature—the border ballads, the legends and love songs of the people, their dialects and superstitions. Educated gentlemen collected and published these materials; poets and storytellers imitated them. Horace Walpole in The Castle of Otranto, Macpherson in Ossian, Chatterton in his forgeries of early verse, and Goethe in his lyrics exploited this new vein of picturesque sentiment. A scholar such as Herder or a poet-dramatist such as Schiller drew lessons of moral, psychological, and philosophical import from the wisdom found in the subculture of das Volk. The folk or people was not as yet very clearly defined, but the revolution would shortly take care of this omission.

      In France, where the revolution occurred, the situation was somewhat different. There were no collectors of border ballads or exploiters of Gothic superstitions. France by 1789 had been for more than a century the cultural dictator of Europe, and it is clear that in England and Germany the search for native sources of art was stimulated by the desire to break the tyranny of the French language and literature. The rediscovery of Shakespeare, for example, was in part a move in the liberation from French classical tragedy and its rigid limitations of subject matter and form.

Simplicity and truth
      Yet cultural nationalism was also the expression of a genuine desire for truth. This in turn implied the release of feelings that the confidence of the Enlightenment in the power of reason had tended to suppress. Two 18th-century figures tapped this fount of emotion, Samuel Richardson (Richardson, Samuel) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques). The novels of Richardson, in which innocent girls are portrayed as withstanding the artful seductions of titled gentlemen, might be said to foreshadow in symbolic form the struggle between high cosmopolitan culture and the new popular simplicity. These novels were best-sellers in France, and Rousseau's Nouvelle Héloïse followed in their wake, as did the bourgeois dramas of Diderot, Beaumarchais's satirical comedies about the plebeian Figaro, and the peasant narratives of Restif de la Bretonne, to mention only the most striking exemplars of the new simplicity.

      At the very centre of sophistication the simple life became a fad, the French court (including Marie-Antoinette) dressing up and playing at the rustic existence of milkmaids and shepherds. However silly the symptoms, the underlying passion was real. It was the periodic urge of complex civilizations to strip off the social mask and recover the happiness imagined as still dwelling among the humble. What was held up to admiration was honesty and sincerity, the strong and pure feelings of people unspoiled by court and city life. Literature therefore came to express an acute sensitivity to scenes of undeserved misfortune, of heroic self-sacrifice, of virtue unexpectedly rewarded—a sensitivity marked by tearfulness, actual or “literary.”

      This surge of self-consciousness about sophisticated culture has often been confused with an idealization of primitive man and attributed to Rousseau. But contrary to common opinion, the so-called back-to-nature movement does not at all echo the noble-savage (noble savage) doctrine of the 17th century. Rousseau's attack on “civilization,” which evoked such a powerful response in the latent feelings of his contemporaries, goes with a characterization of the savage as stupid, coarse, and amoral. In Rousseau and his abettors, what is preached is the simple life. What nature and the natural really are remains to be found by trial and error—the fit methods and forms of religion, marriage, child rearing, hygiene, and daily work.

      It is easy to see in these beliefs and sentiments (which often passed into sentimentality) additional materials for the populism that the revolution fostered. Revolution, to begin with, is also an urge to simplify. The revolutionary style was necessarily populist—Marat's newspaper was called L'Ami du peuple (“The Friend of the People”). The visible signs that a revolution had occurred included the wearing of natural hair instead of wigs and of common workmen's trousers instead of silk breeches, as well as the use of the title of citoyen instead of Monsieur or any other term of rank. Now, equality coupled with sincerity and simplicity logically leads to fraternity, just as honest feeling coupled with devotion to the people leads to puritanism: a good and true citizen behaves like a moral man. He is, under the revolutionary principles, a responsible unit in the nation, a conscious particle of the will of the sovereign people, and as such his most compelling obligation is love of country—patriotism.

      With this last word the circle of ideas making up the cultural ambient of the French Revolution might seem to be complete. However, in the effort to trace back and interweave the strands of feeling and opinion that make up populism, one must not overlook the first political axiom of revolutionary thought, which is the recognition of individual rights. Their source and extent is a subject for political theory. The recognition of the individual goes with the assertion that his freedom rests on natural law, a potent idea, as we know who have witnessed the vast extension of rights far beyond their first, political meaning. Here the concern is with their cultural role, which can be simply stated: individual rights generate ism (individualism) and magnify it. That -ism denotes both an attitude and a doctrine, which together amount to a passionate belief: every human being is an object of primary interest to himself and in himself; he is an end in himself, not a means to the welfare of class or state or to other group purposes. Further, the truly valuable part of each individual is his uniqueness, which he is entitled to develop to the utmost, free of oppression from the government or from his neighbours. That is why the state guarantees the citizen rights as against itself and other citizens. Again, this power accrues to him for himself because he is inherently important—not because he is son or father, peasant or overlord, member of a clan or a guild.

      These ideas shift the emphasis of several thousand years of social beliefs and let loose innumerable consequences. Individualism lowers the value of tradition and puts a premium on originality; it leads to the now familiar “cult of the new”—in art, manners, technology, and social and political organization. True, the individual soul had long been held unique and precious by Christian theology, but Christian society had not extended the doctrine to every man's mundane comings and goings. Nor were his practical rights and powers attached to him as a man but, rather, to his status. Now the human being as such was being officially considered self-contained and self-propelling; it was a new regime and its name was liberty.

Nature of the changes
      The contents and implications of these powerful words—liberty, equality, and fraternity, individualism and populism, simplicity and naturalness—enable us to delineate the cultural situation of Europe at the dawn of the era under review. Yet these continuing ideas necessarily modified each other and in different times and countries were subject to still other influences.

      For example, the active phase of the revolution in France—say, 1789 to 1804—was influenced by the classical education of most of its public men. They had been brought up on Roman history and the tales of Plutarch's republican heroes, so that when catapulted into a republic of their own making, the symbols and myths of Rome were often their most natural means of expression. The eloquence of the successive national assemblies is full of Roman allusions. Later, when General Bonaparte let it be seen that he meant to rule France, he was denounced in the Chamber as a Caesar; when he succeeded, he took care to make himself consul (a title of the ancient Roman Republic), flanked by two other consuls of lesser rank. The title was meant to show that no Caesar was in prospect.

      In the fine arts this Roman symbolism facilitated a thorough change of taste and technique. The former “grand style” of painting had been derived from royal and aristocratic elegance, and its allusions to the ancient classical past were gentle and distant, architectural and mythological. Now, under the leadership of the painter David (David, Jacques-Louis), the great dramatic scenes of ancient history were portrayed in sharp, uncompromising outlines that struck the beholder as the utmost realism of the day.

      In David's “Death of Socrates” and “Oath of the Horatii” civic and military courage are the respective subjects; in his pencil sketches of the victims of the Terror as they were led to execution, reportorial realism dominates; and, in his designs for the setting of huge popular festivals, David, in collaboration with the musicians Méhul and Grétry, provided the first examples of an art in scale with the new populism: the courtly taste for intimate elegance and subtle manners gave way to the more striking, less polished large-scale feelings of a proud nation.

      It must be added, however, that except for a few canvases and a few tunes (including the “Marseillaise”) the quality of French Revolutionary (French Revolution) art was not on a par with its aspirations. Literature in particular showed the limitations under which revolutionary artists must work: political doctrine takes precedence over truth, and the broad effects required to move the masses encourage banality. There is no French poetry in this period except the odes of Chénier, whom the revolution promptly guillotined, as it did France's greatest scientist, Lavoisier. The French stage was flourishing but not with plays that can still be read. The revolutionary playwrights only increased the dose of sentiment and melodrama that had characterized plays at the close of the old regime. The aim was to hold up priests and kings to execration and to portray examples of superhuman courage and virtue. Modern operagoers who know the plot of Beethoven's Fidelio can judge from that sample what the French theatre of the revolutionary years thrived on. Others can imagine for themselves Molière's Misanthrope rewritten so as to make Alceste a pure patriot and hero, undermined by the intrigues of the vile courtier Philinte.

      It may seem odd that once the revolution was under way there should be such persistent indignation and protest against courtiers, priests, and kings and such fulsome homage paid to virtue and patriotism. What accounts for it is the difficulty of transforming culture overnight. People have to be persuaded out of old habits—and must keep on persuading themselves. Even politically, the revolution proceeded by phases and experienced regressions. Manners and customs themselves did not change uniformly, as one can see from portraits of Robespierre at the height of his power wearing a short wig and knee breeches, republican and Rousseauist though he was.

Napoleon's influence
      After Bonaparte's coup d'état, tension eased as the high revolutionary ideals dropped to a more workaday level, just as the puritanism was replaced by moral license. The general's expedition to Egypt in 1798 before his self-elevation to power introduced a new style competing with the ancient Roman in costume and furnishings; the Middle East became fashionable and out of the cultural contact came the new science of Egyptology. The Roman idea itself shifted from republic to empire as the successful general and consul Bonaparte made himself into the emperor Napoleon (Napoleon I) in 1804.

      The emperor had an extraordinary capacity for attending to all things, and he was concerned that his regime should be distinguished in the arts. He accordingly gave them a sustained patronage such as a revolutionary party rent by internal struggles could not provide. Napoleon, nonetheless, had tastes of his own, and he had to control public opinion besides. In literature (he had been a poet and writer of novels in his youth), he relished the Celtic legends of Ossian and encouraged his official composer Lesueur in the composition of the opera Ossian ou les Bardes. In painting, he favoured the surviving David and the younger men Gros and Géricault, both “realists” concerned with perpetuating the colour and drama of imperial life. But to depict matters of contemporary importance on the stage (except perhaps in the ballet, which was flourishing) did not prove possible, for the stage must present genuine moral conflict if it is to produce great works, and moral issues are not discussable under a political censorship.

      The paradox of the Napoleonic period is that its most lasting cultural contributions were side effects and not the result of imperial intentions. Two of these contributions were books. One, Chateaubriand's (Chateaubriand, François-Auguste-René, vicomte de) The Genius of Christianity (1802), was a long tract designed to make the author's peace with the ruler and revigorate Roman Catholic faith. The other, Madame de Staël's (Staël, Germaine de) Germany (1810), was a description of the new and thriving literature, philosophy, and popular culture in Germany. Napoleon prohibited the circulation of the book in France, but its message percolated French public opinion nonetheless. Two other sources of future light were the Idéologues, a group of philosophers who were scientific materialists particularly concerned with abnormal psychology, and Napoleon Bonaparte himself, or rather the figure of Napoleon as seen by his age after Waterloo.

General character of the Romantic movement
      The mention of Waterloo (1815) suggests the need to make clear a number of chronological discrepancies. It has been possible so far to discuss the general shift in the temper of European life without naming fixed points. It sufficed to say “before or after 1789” or “from 1789 to the Napoleonic empire.” However, from now on the generations of culture makers and the dates of some of their works must be duly situated, without on that account losing sight of unities and similarities in the onward march of artistic and intellectual movements. If, for example, one considers the poets called Romantic or Romanticist, one finds that Goethe came to maturity in the 1770s, when the English Romantics were just beginning to be born. Their French, Italian, Russian, Polish, and Spanish counterparts were, in turn, born about the year 1800, when the English were already in mid-career. The same irregularity in the onset of Romanticism is found in the other arts, and it is complicated (at least superficially) by the names given to various movements and persons in the different countries of Europe. Thus, in Germany the term Romantismus is applied to only a small group of writers, and Goethe and Schiller are called classic. In Poland and in Russia, classic is likewise the label for the great writers whose characteristics in fact align them with the Romantics elsewhere.

      All these accidents of birth and nomenclature can be taken in stride by remembering the patterns found in each country or decade and the reasons for their appearance at that time and place. Within the slightly more than half century between 1789 and 1848, the phenomenon of Romanticism occurred and developed its first phase. Those who made it may have come early or late, belonged to this or that nationality, proved to be originators or synthesizers of existing elements—all such considerations appertain to individual biography or the history of a particular art or nation. What matters in the evolution of European culture considered as a whole is the orchestration of all the voices as they come in to swell the ensemble.

      The main purport of the Romantic movement is commonly said to be a revolt against 18th-century rationalism and a resulting variety of new attitudes and activities: a turning in upon the self (self), a love of nature, the rediscovery of the Middle Ages, the cult of art, a taste for the exotic, a return to religion, a fresh sense of history, a yearning for the infinite, a maudlin sentimentality, an overvaluing of emotion as such, a liberal outlook in politics, a conservative outlook, a reactionary outlook, a socialist-utopian outlook, and several other “characteristic features.”

      It is clear that not all these can be equally true, characteristic, or important, since some contradict the others. At the same time it was inevitable that so sweeping a cultural revolution as Romanticism should contain incompatible elements. For instance, the political opinions enumerated above did in fact win the allegiance of different groups among the Romantic artists and thinkers for a longer or shorter time. But—to take note of other supposed definitions—not all Romanticists returned to religion: Goethe and Berlioz were pantheists; Byron and Heine, atheists; and Victor Hugo, a sort of Swedenborgian. As for sentimentality, its occurrence was rather a hangover from the 18th century than a new fashion of feeling, for the Romantic cult of art and of strong emotion goes dead against the weak sentimental mood. Similarly, the taste for history, for the Middle Ages, and for the exotic shows a strong curiosity about the particulars of what is real though ignored by previous conventions. All critics, however, are agreed upon one Romantic trait: individualism. And it is here that the figure of Napoleon plays its cultural role.

      Napoleon, or more exactly Bonaparte, the revolutionary general, the overthrower of old monarchies and creator of new national republics, the organizing genius who rescued France from chaos and who held off the reactionary forces leagued against him throughout Europe—that figure is the one that inspired Beethoven's Eroica symphony, Balzac's and Stendhal's heroes, and the poems, paintings, and compositions of many others. Here was the model of the new man. He was the self-made man and the man of genius. His career was the manifestation of will and intelligence overcoming the greatest imaginable resistance. He typified the individual challenging the world and subduing it by his genius. A movement that numbered as many artists and geniuses as did Romanticism was bound to find in Napoleon the individual par excellence or, as might be said in modern jargon, a supremely autonomous personality. This perception explains why nearly all the great names of the first half of the 19th century are found on the roster of those who praised Napoleon—from Beethoven and Byron to Hazlitt and Stendhal and Manzoni. Some who were politically his enemies—Sir Walter Scott, for example—nonetheless respected and pondered over the miracle of his achievements. No comparable attention has been paid to the dictators of the 20th century, a fact sufficiently explained by the real difference between them and Napoleon. Stendhal, who as a military intendant took part in the Russian campaign of 1812, stated that difference: Napoleon was a man of thought and vision, and not merely a successful soldier and politician. In everything he touched, he showed originality of conception, a stupendous grasp of detail in execution, and the utmost speed in acting out his vision. This sequence, translated to other realms, was the very pattern of the artist-creator's imagination. It also seemed the vindication of individualism as a philosophy of life: open the world to the individual and the world will witness marvels unimagined before.

      These remarks about Napoleon should convey a sense of the Romantics' attitude toward themselves and their situation. It is true that culturally they stood in opposition to their immediate forebears. All generations do the same; yet it is not always true that out of the conflict comes great art. The Romanticists had an advantage in undergoing or being emotionally close to a quarter century of violent change. Besides being a stimulus, the tumult of battle and political overturns did its share to clear the ground for artistic innovation. When habits and expectations are repeatedly upset and frustrated in the broad public realm, the general mind opens up to novelty offered in other realms. That is one avenue of cultural, stylistic, and emotional change. When Stendhal was expounding Romanticism to the French in 1822, he argued that to go on writing in the Neoclassic vein was “to provide literary pleasure for one's grandfather.” His remark was readily understood—at least by his young readers. Mighty events had dug a chasm between past and present, making plain the remoteness of the 18th century.

      And yet a paradox remains. When a Romantic artist first published his innovative work—say Wordsworth with the Lyrical Ballads of 1798—he had to wait a good while for a hearing, though he might have expected that readers would share his conviction that the style and forms of 18th-century Neoclassicism were dead. Already in 1783 Blake had written of contemporary English verse that “The sound is forced, the notes are few.” But these two poets' estimate was, so to speak, the professional's view of the state of the art. The public, no longer the small, concentrated court-and-town coterie, lagged behind this perception. It is a cliché that such artists are ahead of their time. It would be more accurate to say that it is the public which lags behind its own time.

      This phenomenon is characteristic of the modern period generally, because through social and educational emancipation the audience for things artistic and intellectual has steadily grown larger. That fact complicates the study of the Romantic movement: When did it conquer public opinion in different countries and why at different times? In England and Germany one can point to the 1790s: Blake, Wordsworth, and Coleridge; Goethe (with the first fragment of Faust), Schiller, Herder, Jean Paul (Richter), Beethoven, Tieck, Wackenroder, Hölderlin, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and the “rediscovery” of Shakespeare mark the advent of the new age.

      In Italy, France, and Russia, the decisive years opened in 1820. They are signalized in Russia by the abundant poetic output of Pushkin, in Italy by the work of Manzoni and Leopardi and by the surrounding discussions of literary theory, and in France by the poems of Lamartine, Vigny, Musset, Victor Hugo, and Mme Desbordes-Valmore. The paintings of Delacroix, the first compositions of Berlioz, and Balzac's Chouans show that a new spirit was at work. Finally, in the 1830s, Poland—through its poet and novelist Mickiewicz—and Spain—through the works of Rivas, Espronceda, José de Larra, and Zorrilla—joined the rest of Europe in its richest artistic flowering since the Renaissance: the leading nations can boast one or more Romantic artists of the first magnitude.

Romanticism in literature and the arts (arts, the)
      The fundamental Romantic purpose was to grasp and render the many kinds of experience that classicism had neglected or had stylized. Romanticism was the first upsurge of realism—exploratory and imaginative as to subject matter and inventive as to forms and techniques. The exploration of reality surveyed both the external world of peoples and places and the internal world of man. The Scottish and medieval novels of Sir Walter Scott (Scott, Sir Walter, 1st Baronet), beginning with Waverley in 1814, illustrate the range of the new curiosity, for Scotland was a “wild” place, outside the centres of civilization, and the Middle Ages were similarly “barbarous” and distant in time. When Byron (Byron, George Gordon Byron, 6th Baron) or Chateaubriand went to the Middle East or Goethe to Italy, it was not in the tradition of gentlemen's tourism; it was in the spirit of the cultural explorer. Byron, for one, by using “the Isles of Greece” and the Mediterranean as settings for his wildly popular narrative poems, was developing in the Western mind a new interest, a new sense that the “exotic” was as real, as important, as Paris or London. In all these writers, factual detail is essential to the new sort of effect: the scenery is observably true, and so is the history, given through local colour. As Byron said when criticized: “I don't care two lumps of sugar for my poetry, but my costume is correct.” Blake (Blake, William), 20 years earlier, had taken a stand against Sir Joshua Reynold's academic doctrine that the highest form of painting depicted the broadest general truth. Said Blake: “To particularize is the only merit.”

      Particulars, moreover, are all equally proper for the artist; the use he makes of them is what matters. When Wordsworth (Wordsworth, William) and Coleridge (Coleridge, Samuel Taylor) sought to revivify English poetry, they hit upon two divergent kinds of subject: Coleridge took superstition and the folk tale and wrote “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” in the form of an old ballad; Wordsworth took the modern street ballad—a kind of rhymed newspaper—and produced his versified incidents of common life in common speech. In France, where the division of the vocabulary into “noble” and “common” (i.e., unfit for poetry) had been made and recorded in dictionaries, the Romantics led by Hugo (Hugo, Victor) used the prohibited words whenever they saw fit. Hugo's verse drama Hernani (1830) created a scandal in the audience when the heroine was heard to speak of her handkerchief and when a character did not use a roundabout phrase about “the march of the hours” to say: “It is midnight.”

      The importance of such details can hardly be exaggerated and can perhaps be best understood by recalling what the rediscovery of Shakespeare (Shakespeare, William) meant to the Romantics. His rise from grudging esteem, even in England, to European idolatry by 1830 had a significance beyond the one already mentioned of serving to put down French classical tragedy and, with it, French cultural tyranny. The German scholar, critic, and playwright Lessing (Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim) was among the first to use Shakespeare for that purpose, but the arguments in his theatre reviews, called Hamburgische Dramaturgie, sprang from critical genius and not mere national resentment. Shakespeare spelled freedom from narrow conventions—the set verse form in couplets, the lofty language and long declamations, the adherence to verse throughout, the exclusion of low characters, comic effects, and violent action—or, in a word, from royal and artistic etiquette.

      What the rediscovery and idolization of Shakespeare meant (and not to poets and playwrights alone—witness his enormous influence on Berlioz) was the right of the artist to adapt or invent forms to suit contents, to use words formerly excluded from poetic diction, loosen the joints of grammar and metric (or the canons of any art), follow the promptings of his spirit (tragic or gay, vulgar or mysterious, but in any case venturesome), and see where this emancipation from artificial rules led the muse. There was danger in freedom, as always; the conventions ensure safety. The aim of the Romantic genius, however, was not to play safe or even to succeed; it was to explore and invent, multiply modes of feeling and truth, and thereby breathe new life into a dead or dying culture. The motto was not common sense but courage. This resolve explains why the men who came to worship Shakespeare also rediscovered Rabelais and Villon and revalued Spinoza, the lone dissenter who had revered a God pervading the cosmos; Benvenuto Cellini, the fearless artist at grips with the principalities and powers; and “Rameau's Nephew,” the ambiguous hero of Diderot's posthumous dialogue, a strange figure disturbingly in touch with the dark forces of the creative unconscious.

      With so much feeling astir and so many novel ideas being agitated, it might seem logical to expect a flourishing school of Romantic drama. Yet only a few isolated works, more interesting than irreplaceable, compose the dramatic output of the Romanticists—Shelley's Cenci, Byron's Manfred, and Kleist's brilliant pieces in several genres. Ironically, Shakespeare's new role as emancipator had a curiously paralyzing effect on the theatre down to the middle of the century and beyond. In England, poet after poet tried his hand at poetic drama, only to fail from too anxious a desire to be Shakespearean. On the Continent, various misconceptions about him and old habits of classical tragedy prevented a new drama from coming to life. Victor Hugo's plays contained brilliant verse, and their form influenced grand opera (Wagner's no less than Verdi's), but the fact remained: the dramatic quality could be found everywhere in Romanticist art except on the stage.

      Reflection on this point suggests that, quite apart from Shakespeare, the very concern of the Romantics with exploring the inner and outer worlds simultaneously hampered the playwright. Perhaps great drama requires that one or the other world be taken as settled so that conflict, which is the essence of drama, develops between a strong new force and a solid resistance. Be that as it may, the Romantics found themselves in an age when both inner and outer worlds were in flux and from that double uncertainty derived their creative impetus.

      This generality holds for the painters as well; their “reality,” too, was by no means “given,” so that the notation of fresh detail and the study of new means to transmute the visible into art occupied all those who came after David. Goya led the way in Spain by depicting the vulgarity of court figures and the horrors of the Peninsular War. In England, Constable (Constable, John) painted country scenes with a vividness at first unacceptable to connoisseurs. He had to argue with his patron, Sir George Beaumont, about the actual colour of grass. To prove that it was not of the conventional brownish tint used by academicians, he seized a violin, ran out of the room with it, and laid it on the lawn, forcing the unaccustomed eye to perceive the difference between chlorophyll and old varnish. At the same time, Géricault (Géricault, Théodore) astonished the Parisians by painting, in harrowing detail, “The Raft of the Medusa,” not an antique and noble subject but a recent event: the survivors of a shipwreck adrift and starving on a raft.

      The young Delacroix (Delacroix, Eugène) was emboldened by the example and, inspired also by the work of his English friend Bonington, began to paint contemporary scenes of vivid realism—e.g., the Turkish massacre of the Greek peasants at Chios. Later, Delacroix was to visit Morocco (exoticism again) and to discover there the secret of coloured shadows and other pre-Impressionist techniques. His English counterpart, J.M.W. Turner (Turner, J.M.W.), was pursuing the same goal of realistic truth, though along a different path that nonetheless also led to Impressionism—and beyond. When asked one day why he had pasted a scrap of black paper on a portion of his canvas, he replied that ordinary pigment was not black enough. And he added: “If I could find something even blacker, I would use that.”

      No similar transformations of the visual occurred in sculpture or architecture. Canova and Thorvaldsen continued to produce figures and busts on Neoclassical lines; and only Barye, the great sculptor of animals, and Rude, the creator of the Marseillaise panel on the Arc de Triomphe, showed any signs of the new passions. As for architecture, it may have been the love of history that prevented distinctive work. Pugin and Viollet-le-Duc (Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène-Emmanuel) did grasp the principles of what a new style should be, the former's love of Gothic reinstating the merit of framework construction and the latter's breadth of vision as a restorer leading him to predict that iron construction would one day pass from mere utility to high art.

      It was actually in railway construction that the seeds of a new architecture were sown. Tunnels and bridges and terminals were needed as early as the mid-1830s, and unassuming engineers such as the (Brunel, Sir Marc Isambard) Brunels (Brunel, Isambard Kingdom) and Robert Stephenson (Stephenson, Robert) set to work to design them. All they had for solving the new and awkward problems of topography, speed, and cost were the ideas they drew from machinery and the vulgar materials, chiefly wood and iron, that they had learned how to handle in industry. The results were often remarkable, and they remained to inspire the makers of 20th-century steel and concrete architecture.

      It may seem as if the art of music by its nature would not lend itself to the exploration and expression of reality characteristic of Romanticism, but that is not so. True, music does not tell stories or paint pictures, but it stirs feelings and evokes moods, through both of which various kinds of reality can be suggested or expressed. It was in the rationalist 18th century that musicians rather mechanically attempted to reproduce stories and subjects in sound. These literal renderings naturally failed, and the Romanticists profited from the error. Their discovery of new realms of experience proved communicable in the first place because they were in touch with the spirit of renovation, particularly through poetry. What Goethe meant to Beethoven (Beethoven, Ludwig van) and Berlioz (Berlioz, Hector) and what German folk tales and contemporary lyricists meant to Weber, Schumann, and Schubert are familiar to all who are acquainted with the music of these men.

      There is, of course, no way to demonstrate that Beethoven's Egmont music—or, indeed, its overture alone—corresponds to Goethe's drama and thereby enlarges the hearer's consciousness of it; but it cannot be an accident or an aberration that the greatest composers of the period employed the resources of their art for the creation of works expressly related to such lyrical and dramatic subjects. Similarly, the love of nature stirred Beethoven, Weber, and Berlioz, and here too the correspondence is felt and persuades the fit listener that his own experience is being expanded. The words of the creators themselves record this new comprehensiveness. Beethoven referred to his activity of mingled contemplation and composition as dichten, making a poem; and Berlioz tells in his Mémoires of the impetus given to his genius by the music of Beethoven and Weber, by the poetry of Goethe and Shakespeare, and not least by the spectacle of nature. Nor did the public that ultimately understood their works gainsay their claims.

      It must be added that the Romantic musicians—including Chopin, Mendelssohn, Glinka, and Liszt—had at their disposal greatly improved instruments (musical instrument). The beginning of the 19th century produced the modern piano, of greater range and dynamics than theretofore, and made all wind instruments more exact and powerful by the use of keys and valves. The modern full orchestra was the result. Berlioz, whose classic treatise on instrumentation and orchestration helped to give it definitive form, was also the first to exploit its resources to the full, in the Symphonie fantastique of 1830. This work, besides its technical significance just mentioned, can also be regarded as uniting the characteristics of Romanticism in music: it is both lyrical and dramatic, and, although it makes use of a “story,” that use is not to describe the scenes but to connect them; its slow movement is a “nature poem” in the Beethovenian manner; the second, fourth, and fifth movements include “realistic” detail of the most vivid kind; and the opening one is an introspective reverie.

      In this Romantic investigation of the self (self), some critics have seen little more than excessive ego or, in modern terms, a tiresome narcissism. No doubt certain Romantic works arouse boredom or disgust with hairsplitting analysis. The boredom, however, is often due to the fact that after a hundred years the discoveries have staled. When fresh, they came as a revelation; in the works of the great poets and novelists, in Hazlitt's essays and Jean Paul's fictions, and the irony of Byron's letters or Heine's journalism, the truth has not grown dim or platitudinous.

      It was in any case desirable that this extensive analysis of the self should be attempted then, for only an age in which individualism was both theoretical and passionate could see the logic of the undertaking and act upon it. The logic was this: given the autonomous and unique individual, a search by himself into his moods, motives, fears, and loves must bring forth data otherwise unobtainable. Add these results together, and one has a repertoire of clues to the inner life of mankind as a whole. For the uniqueness of each individual is bounded by traits he shares with his fellows, and this common element enables the psychologist to connect and organize the reports of the self-searchers. It is on this hypothesis, incidentally, that the demand for originality in art has continued unabated since the Romanticists. Forget the “model,” for there is no such thing; avoid conformity; discover your true self, the buried child; be authentic and sincere—these precepts, which still govern art and criticism, are the legacy of Romantic individualism.

      Introspection naturally implies an inner life worth looking into, and most Romantic artists brought forth extraordinary findings. They form the groundwork of modern thought. One cannot easily imagine Freud or Joyce, much less the degree of self-consciousness shared by Westerners today, without the deliverances of Blake, Wordsworth, Keats, Leopardi, Stendhal, Constant, Sainte-Beuve, Heine, and innumerable other writers of the early 19th century. And towering above them as the creator of the prototype of Romantic introspection is Goethe with his Faust.

      Faust was the figure in which a whole age recognized its mind and soul; and the adjective Faustian, as Spengler's use of it makes clear, still describes tendencies at work in culture today. The principal one, already mentioned, self-consciousness—the identity crisis—remains. The belief, moreover, that movement, activity, is better than repose and that striving is better than achieving is clearly the great postulate of contemporary civilization. Faust himself ends by giving his life to practical works in behalf of his fellow man; however, he sets himself on that path only after a slow and deep analysis of his divided soul, which has been ruled in turn by despair, lust, superstition and the forces of the unconscious, the love of innocence, the conviction of sin and crime, the horrors of hypocrisy and conventional life, the temptations of wealth and power, the disgust with pedantry and established religion, and the yearning for infinite knowledge, in the hopes of attaining by it wisdom and peace. Faust, in short, traverses the whole cosmos, made up of the inner and outer worlds, to find in the act of self-dedication to humanity the justification of his existence.

Early 19th-century social and political thought
      The Romantics who studied society through the novel or discoursed about it in essays and pamphlets were no less devoted to this “cause of humanity,” but they arrived at politically different conclusions from Goethe's and from one another's. Scott and Disraeli were forerunners of Tory democracy as Burke was of liberal conservatism. Dickens (Dickens, Charles), a passionate humanitarian, stirred the masses with his examples of the law's stupid cruelty, but he proposed no agency of betterment, content to despise Parliament, the law courts, and the complacency of the wealthy. Balzac (Balzac, Honoré de) wrote his huge array of novels as a “social zoology” that was to show what a bloody jungle society becomes without the church and the monarchy to restrain human passions.

       Stendhal noted the same reality but was more concerned with the free play of individual genius; he resigned himself to the social struggle, provided not too many stupid individuals ran the inevitably heavy-handed regimes. Freedom might be found by the happy few through the loopholes of a mixed government such as England's, whereas in the ostensibly free United States there was no protection against social pressure and no likelihood of genius in art or in politics.

      The great authority on American democracy was Tocqueville (Tocqueville, Alexis de), whose astonishing survey in two volumes contained many true predictions and is still packed with useful lessons. Tocqueville confirmed Stendhal's low estimate of freedom of thought in America, but he foresaw in the United States the first example of a type of democracy that would surely overtake the Western world. He found in such a future many good things and many defects; he predicted a day when slavery would threaten disaster to America; he foretold what kind of poetry a democracy would produce and delineated the art of Walt Whitman; he apprehended the complication of laws and the declining quality of justice; but he was reconciled to what must be.

Postrevolutionary thinking
      What lay behind all 19th-century writings on politics and society was the shadow of the French Revolution. In the 1790s the revolution had aroused Burke (Burke, Edmund) to write his famous Reflections and Joseph de Maistre (Maistre, Joseph de) his Considérations sur la France. They differed on many points, but what both saw, like their successors, was that revolution was self-perpetuating. There is no way to stop it because liberty and equality can be endlessly claimed by group after group that feels deprived or degraded. And the idea that these principles are universally applicable removes any braking power that national tradition or circumstance might afford.

      Proof that the revolution marched on, slow or fast, could be read (as it still can be) in every issue of the daily paper since 1789. In the early 19th century the greatest pressure came from the liberals, whether students, bankers, manufacturers, or workmen enlisted in their cause. They wanted written constitutions, an extension of the suffrage, civil rights, a free-market economy, and from time to time wars of national liberation or aggrandizement in the name of cultural and linguistic unity. For example, all the intellect of western Europe sided with Greece in the 1820s when it began its war of emancipation from Turkey. Byron himself died at Missolonghi while helping the Greeks. Poets wrote odes that musicians set to music, and painters painted scenes of war. Between this liberalism and the nationalism that sought freedom from foreign rule the line could not be clearly drawn. In Italy, Germany, Poland, Russia, Spain, Portugal, and South America, revolt in the name of liberty was endemic until the middle of the century. Only England escaped by a timely reform of Parliament in 1832, but it averted revolution only by a hair's breadth, after protracted threats of civil war and many violent incidents expressing the same animus as elsewhere.

      Meanwhile, the first disturbances resulting from machine industry (Industrial Revolution)—sabotage, strikes, and conspiracies (for trade unions were generally held illegal)—reinforced the revolutionary momentum, not only in fact but also in theory. As early as 1810 the business cycle, the doctrine of the exploitation of the worker, and the degradation of life in industrial societies had been noted and discussed. By 1825 the writings of the Count de Saint-Simon (Saint-Simon, Henri de), which proposed a reorganization of society to cure these evils, had won adherents; by 1830 the Saint-Simonians were an acknowledged party with sympathizers abroad, and by 1832 the words socialism and socialist were in use.

      The Saint-Simonian doctrine proposed a benevolent dictatorship of industrialists and scientists to remove the inequities of the free-for-all liberal system. Other reformers, such as the practical Robert Owen, who organized successful communities in Scotland and the United States, depended on a strong leader using ad hoc methods. Still others, such as Leroux and Cabet, were communists of divergent kinds seeking to carry out elaborate blueprints of the perfect state. Proudhon (Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph) denounced the state, as such, and all private property. As a philosophical anarchist, he wished to substitute free association and contract for all legal compulsions. In England, the school of Bentham and Mill—utilitarians (Utilitarianism) or philosophical radicals—attacked existing institutions in the name of the greatest good of the greatest number, and by their arguments they succeeded in reforming the top-heavy legal system. Without doctrine but moved by a similar sense of wrong, Thomas Carlyle (Carlyle, Thomas) fought the utilitarians for their materialistic expediency and himself sought light on the common problem by pondering the lessons of the French Revolution and publishing in 1837 what is still the greatest account of its catastrophic course. Later, Carlyle gave in Past and Present a suggestive picture of what he deemed a true community: quasi-medieval, based on the Faustian joy of work, and relying for its cohesion on its leader's genius and strength of soul.

      In the Germanies, repeated outbreaks changed little the system imposed from Vienna by Metternich—censorship, spying on students and intellectuals, repression of group activities at the first sign of political or social advocacy. This drove original thought underground or abroad in the persons of refugees such as the poet Heine and later Karl Marx. At home, the prevailing mood was despair. Max Stirner (Stirner, Max) in his book The Ego and His Own (1845) recommended, instead of social reform, a ruthless individualism that should seek satisfaction by any means and at whatever risk. A small group of other individualists, Die Freien (“The Free”), found that satisfaction of the ego through total disillusion and radical repudiation: nothing is true or good—the state is a monster, society sheer hypocrisy, religion a fraud, for God is dead (1840).

      Elsewhere the struggle went on, taking shape as reform or revolt as occasion arose. In Italy and France, secret societies carried on propaganda for programs that might be liberal, nationalist, or socialist, but all revolutionary. One irony about the socialists is that the tag that has clung to them is utopian (utopia). It suggests purely theoretical notions, whereas the historical fact is that a great many were tried out in practice, and some lasted for a considerable time. As in Carlyle's book, the force of character of one man (Owen was a striking example) usually proved to be the efficient cause of success. Throughout this social theorizing, whatever the means or ends proposed, two assumptions hold: one is that individuals have a duty to change European society, to purge it of its evils; the other is that individuals can change society—they need only come together and decide what form the change shall take. These axioms by themselves, without the memory of 1789, were enough to keep alive in European culture the hope and the threat of continuing revolution.

The principle of evolution
      Yet it should not be imagined that revolution by force or radical remodeling inspired every thinking European. Even if liberals and reactionaries were still ready to take to the barricades to achieve their ends, the conservatives were not, except in self-defense. The conservative philosophy, stemming from Burke and reinforced by modern historical studies, maintained the contrary principle of evolution. Evolution indeed swayed as many 19th-century minds as its rival, and it was sometimes the same minds.

      Evolution was the belief that lasting and beneficial change comes about by slow and small degrees. It is often imperceptible and therefore congenial to human habits. It breaks no heads and spills no blood; it is natural, organic. The idea of evolution is patterned on biology—the slow growth and decay of living things. More than that, evolution in the zoological sense of “descent with modification” had been a recognized speculation among men of science since 1750, when Buffon included it in his Histoire naturelle. Lamarck (Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste) had elaborated the idea at the turn of the 18th century, while Erasmus Darwin (Darwin, Erasmus), the grandfather of Charles, had by 1796 worked out for himself a compendious theory of similar import. In 1830–33 the geologist Lyell (Lyell, Sir Charles, Baronet), setting forth the corresponding notion that changes in the Earth take place through the operation of constant and not cataclysmic causes, devoted a chapter to Lamarckian biology—to the evolution of species by imperceptible steps.

      As if these teachings were not enough to implant a form of thought, the revival of interest in history made easy and obvious the transition from the world of nature to that of man. It seemed logical to think of both as evolutions and even to liken the state to an organism. Certainly the student of institutions finds them steadily and profoundly altered by minute incidents and variations. Compared to these causes, the violent breaks made by war and revolution seem more superficial and less permanent.

      The evolutionary scheme encouraged several other beliefs while also furnishing fresh arguments and convenient principles. Anyone who had inherited from the previous era a faith in progress could now attach it to this new motive power, evolution. Anyone who wished to classify nations or institutions by rank could place them as he thought proper on an evolutionary scale. Anyone who resisted change or wished to speed it up could be admonished with the aid of some evolutionary yardstick. Finally, anyone who intended to write a work of history or propaganda found the organizing principle ready-made. In the first half of the 19th century, every subject of interest, from costume to the criminal law, was presented in innumerable studies as proceeding majestically at an evolutionary pace.

      Another way of stating the influence of this great idea is to say that the mind of Europe had experienced the “biological revolution.” Whereas in the 17th century Newtonian physics and its description of the cosmos had imposed the model of mechanics and mathematics, what impressed itself on the 19th century as the universal pattern was the living organism—change and variety as against fixity and regularity. The logic of preferring “biology” to “mechanics” in an age of individualism, of realism about concrete particulars, and of passionate imagination and introspection need only be stated to be evident.

      This is not to say that the science of physics stood still during the Romanticist period. It was the time when the conservation of energy was established and the mechanical equivalent of heat demonstrated. There also prevailed the “physical” pseudo-science of phrenology, which professed to relate individual attributes to bumps and hollows in the skull and which led to the physical anthropology that defined 3, 10, 20, and 100 different races of man by the end of the century. Still, the 19th was more emphatically the century that furnished the theory of the cell (Schleiden and Schwann, 1838–39), which led ultimately to the notion of microscopic creatures responsible for putrefaction and disease and, later still, to cytology and genetics.

      It is noteworthy, too, that the 19th century saw the establishment of chemistry on the Daltonian hypothesis of the atom, but it was coloured by the “biological” notion of elective affinities to explain compounds. Goethe, who was an early evolutionist and the scientific expositor of the metamorphosis of plants, called his last novel of human love Elective Affinities.

      On the surface the poetic mind of the age seemed hostile to both science and technology. Wordsworth looks like an enemy of science when he says: “We murder to dissect” and deprecates the man who is willing to “peep and botanize upon his mother's grave.” Yet reflection shows that the animus here is not so much against science in general as for the science of life and the reality of human thought and feeling. To understand this temper of the times one must remember how uncertain the intellectual status of physical science still was. Eighteenth-century philosophy had ended in materialism and skepticism. Some writers, such as d'Holbach (Holbach, Paul-Henri Dietrich, baron d'), had reduced all phenomena to the interaction of hard and unfeeling particles; others, such as Hume (Hume, David), had “proved” that man can know nothing beyond his impressions and therefore can have no certainty about the truth of cause and effect, on which scientific statements depend. The Romanticist generations could neither agree that life was a concourse of unfeeling atoms nor trust the physicists' assertions based on a law of causation that the most acute thinkers had discredited.

      Such were the iron constraints within which the famous “crises of the soul” and conversions to religions new or old took place in the 1820s and '30s. Carlyle, Mill, Lamennais, and many others described these crises in famous autobiographical works. The choice seemed to be between a blind and meaningless universe and human life conceived as a brief, pointless exception to the mechanical play of forces. Even if the latter scheme “explained,” it was vulnerable to Hume's irrefutable doubts.

Early 19th-century philosophy
      What enabled 19th-century culture to pursue the scientific quest and regain confidence in spiritual truth was the work of the German idealist (Idealism) philosophers, beginning with Immanuel Kant (Kant, Immanuel).

      Kant took up Hume's challenge and showed that, although we may never know “things as they are,” we can know truthfully and reliably the data of experience. The reason for this certitude is that the mind imposes its categories of time and space and causation on the flowing stream and gives it shape. Science, therefore, is not a guess, nor is human knowledge a dream. Both are solid and verifiable. Indeed, certainty, according to Kant, extends as far as morals and aesthetics. The essence of morals is the commandment not to perform any act that one would not want to become a precedent for all human action and always to consider an individual as an end in himself, not as the instrument of another's purpose. The fusion in Kant of ideas stemming from Rousseau and the Enlightenment with ideas fitting the needs of the coming century (Kant died in 1804) made him the fountainhead of European philosophy for 50 years.

Kant's disciples
      His disciples—Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer—twisted or amplified his teachings. Coleridge in England and Victor Cousin in France adapted to home use what seemed fitting. The school as a whole was known as German idealism because it relied on the distinction between the thinking subject and the perceived object; “idea” and “thing” were unlike, but idea (or the mind) played a role in shaping the reality of things, from which derived all stability and regularity in the universe.

      Stability was desirable as a guarantor of natural science, but in the social world it was obviously contradicted by events, especially by those since the French Revolution. By 1840 many historians had told the story of the past 50 years, and the lesson they drew from it was almost uniformly that of pessimism. Deprived of Providence and the explanation it used to supply by its “mysterious workings,” history seemed neither morally rational nor humanly tolerable.

      The German philosopher Hegel (Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich), however, drew a different conclusion. Coming after Kant and having witnessed Napoleon's victory at Jena in 1806, he conceived the world as ruled by a new logic, no longer a logic of things static but of things in movement. He saw the forces of history in perpetual battle. Neither side wins, but the upshot of their struggle is an amalgam of their rival intentions. Hegel called the pros and the cons and their survivors thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Human affairs are ever in dialectic (dialoguing) progression. At times a “world-historical figure” (Luther, Napoleon) embodies the aspirations of the masses and gives them effect through war, revolution, or religious reformation. Yet throughout the succession of events, what is taking place is the unfolding of Spirit or Idea taking on itself the concrete forms of the real. Hegel's was another version of evolution and progress, for he foretold the extension of liberty to all men as the fulfillment of history. It is interesting to note that until 1848 or 1850 Hegel was generally considered a dangerous revolutionary, a believer in an irresistible progress that mankind must earn by blood and battle. Karl Marx (Marx, Karl), as a younger Hegelian, was to carry out Hegel's unspoken promise on a different base.

      Other branches of the all-powerful German philosophy deserve attention but can be spoken of only as they relate to high Romantic themes. Fichte's (Fichte, Johann Gottlieb) modification of Kant made the ego the “creator” of the world, an extreme extension or generalization of individualism. At the other extreme, but more in tune with contemporary science and art, Schelling (Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von) made nature the source of all energy, from which individual consciousness takes off to become the observer of the universe. Nature is a work of art and man is, so to say, its critic, and because human consciousness results from an act of self-limitation, it perceives moral duty and feels the need to worship.

religion and its alternatives
      That need made itself felt ecumenically throughout Europe from the beginning of the 19th century. It had indeed been prepared by the writings of Rousseau as early as 1762 and in England by the even earlier preaching of John and Charles Wesley, the founders of Methodism. The surviving atheism and materialism of the 18th-century philosophes was in truth a greater stimulus to the religious revival of the early 19th century than anything the French Revolution had done, briefly, to replace the established religions. When in the 1800s the Roman Catholic writings of Chateaubriand and Lamennais in France, the neo-Catholic Tractarian movement in England, and the writings of Schleiermacher and his followers in Germany began to take effect, their success was due to the same conditions that made Romanticist art, German idealism, and all the “biological” analogies succeed: the great thirst caused by dry abstractions in the Age of Reason needed quenching. Religious fervour, artistic passion, and “gothic” systems of philosophy filled a void created by the previous simple and mechanical formulas.

      The religious revivals, Catholic or Protestant, also aimed at political ends. Their participants feared the continuation in the 19th century of secularism and wholly material plans. In every country the liberals proposed to set up in the name of tolerance (“indifference,” said the Christian believers) governments that would serve exclusively practical (indeed commercial) interests. Church and state were to be separated, education was to be secular, which would really mean antireligious. National traditions would be broken, forgotten, and youth would grow into “economic man,” Benthamite utilitarian man, with no intuition of unseen realities, no sensitivity to art or nature, no humility, and no inbred morals or sanction for their dictates.

Scientific positivism
      This desire for renewed faith and passion, however, found alternative goals. One was scientific positivism; the other was the cult of art. The name Positivism is the creation of Auguste Comte (Comte, Auguste), a French thinker of a mathematical cast of mind who in 1824 began to supply a philosophy of the natural sciences opposed to all metaphysics. Science, according to Comte, delivers unshakable truth by limiting itself to the statement of relations among phenomena. It does not explain but describes—and that is all mankind needs to know. From the physical sciences rise the social and mental sciences in regular gradation (Comte coined the word sociology), and from these man will learn, in time, how to live in society.

      Having elaborated this austere system, Comte discovered the softer emotions through a woman's love, and he amended his scheme to provide a “religion of humanity” with the worship of secular saints, under a political arrangement that the sympathetic Mill nonetheless described as “the government of a beleaguered town.” Comte did not attract many orthodox disciples, but the influence of his positivism was very great down to recent times. Not alone in Europe but also in South America it formed a certain type of mind that survives to this day among some scientists and many engineers.

The cult of art
      The second “religious” alternative, the cult of art, has had even greater potency, being at the present time the main outlet for spirituality among Western intellectuals. In the Romantic period this fervour was allied with the love of nature and the idolatrous admiration of the man of genius, beginning with Napoleon. A writer as sober as Scott, a thinker as cogent as Hegel, and an artist as skeptical as Berlioz could all say that to them art and its masters were a religion; and they were not alone. At the death of Goethe in 1832, Heine inveighed against the great man's followers who made art the only reality. In the second and third Romantic generations, born about 1820, the religion of art grew still more pronounced and took on an antisocial tone that became more and more emphatic as time passed. “Art for art's sake” (art for art's sake) ended by signifying, among other things, “art the judge of society and the state.” This doctrine was expounded in full detail by the Romantic poet Gautier (Gautier, Léon) as early as 1835 in the preface to his entertaining and sexually daring novel Mademoiselle de Maupin. In those pages the familiar argument against bourgeois philistinism, against practical utility, against the prevailing dullness, ugliness, and wrongness of daily life was set forth with much wit and that spirit of defiance which one usually thinks of as belonging to the 1890s or the present day. Its occurrence then is but another proof that Romanticism was the comprehensive culture from which later styles, thoughts, and isms have sprung.

The middle 19th century
      During the half century when Romanticism was deploying its talents and ideas, the political minds inside or outside Romanticist culture were engaged in the effort to settle—each party or group or theory in its own way—the legacy of 1789. There were at least half a dozen great issues claiming attention and arousing passion. One was the fulfillment of the revolutionary promise to give all Europe political liberty—the vote for all men, a free press, a parliament, and a written constitution. Between 1815 and 1848 many outbreaks occurred for this cause. Steadily successful in France and England, they were put down in central and eastern Europe under the repressive system of Metternich.

      A second issue was the maintenance of the territorial arrangements of the treaties that closed the Napoleonic Wars at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Metternich's spies and generals also worked to keep this part of the post-Napoleonic world intact; that is, the boundaries that often linked (or separated) national groups in order to buttress dynastic interests. Except in Belgium, the surge of national, as distinct from liberal, aspirations throughout Europe was unsuccessful in the 1830s. Defeats only strengthened resolve, particularly in Germany and Italy, where the repeated invasions by the French during the revolutionary period had led to reforms and stimulated alike royal and popular ambitions. In these two regions, liberalism and nationalism merged into one unceasing agitation that involved not merely the politically militant but the intellectual elite. Poets and musicians, students and lawyers joined with journalists, artisans, and good bourgeois in open or secret societies working for independence: they were all patriots and all more or less imbued with a Romanticist regard for the people as the originator of the living culture, which the nation was to enshrine and protect.

      To be sure, this patriotic union of hearts did not mean agreement on the details of future political states, and the same disunion existed to the west, in England and France, where liberals, only half satisfied by the compromises of 1830 and 1832, felt the push of new radical demands from the socialists, communists, and anarchists. Reinforcing these pressures was the unrest caused by industrialization—the workingman's claims on society, expressed in strikes, trade unions, or (in England) the Chartists' demanding “the Charter” of a fully democratic Parliament. This cluster of parties agitated for a change that went well beyond what the advanced liberals themselves had not yet won. Add to these movements those that purposed to stand still or to restore former systems of monarchy, religion, or aristocracy, and it is not hard to understand why the great revolutionary furnace of 1848 (1848, Revolutions of)–52 was a catastrophe for European culture. The four years of war, exile, deportation, betrayals, coups d'état, and summary executions shattered not only lives and regimes but also the heart and will of the survivors. The hoped-for evolution of each nation and would-be nation, as well as the desire for a Europe at peace, was broken and, with all other hopes and imaginings, rendered ridiculous. The search began for new ways to achieve, on the one side, stability and, on the opposite, the final desperate revolution that would usher in the good society.

      For although they seemed decisive, the battles of '48 and after did not, in fact, test the worth of any one idea. Nationalism won and lost in different parts of Europe. Liberalism gained in Italy and Switzerland, but was set back in Germany and France. English Chartism seemed to collapse, yet its demands began to be carried out. The socialist experiment in France (Louis Blanc's national workshops) also seemed discredited; yet the ensuing regime of Napoleon III made attempts, however clumsy, to deal with poverty by welfare methods. There was peace, but war was imminent; and subversive groups continued to plot and frighten the bourgeois, to try to kill royal heads of state, while machine industry and the resulting urbanization contributed their gains at the cost of the now familiar miseries and sordor.

      In these circumstances the mind of Europe suffered an eclipse, followed by a protracted mood of despondency. Many established or emerging artists and thinkers had been killed or torn from their homes or deprived of their livelihood: Wagner fleeing Dresden, where he conducted the opera; Chopin and Berlioz at loose ends in London, because in Paris music other than opera was moribund; Verdi going back to Milan with high patriotic hopes and returning to Paris in a few months, utterly disillusioned; and Hugo in exile in Belgium and later in Guernsey—all typify the vicissitudes in which men of reputation found themselves in mid-career. For the young and unknown, such as the poet Baudelaire or the English painters who formed the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, it was no time to invite the public to admire boldness and accept innovation. Critics and public alike were all nerves and hostility to subversion. To read Flaubert's (Flaubert, Gustave) masterpiece, Sentimental Education (1869), is to understand the atmosphere in which the first phase of Romanticism ended and its ramified sequels came into being.

Realism and Realpolitik
      The dominant feeling was that high hopes had perished in gunfire, and this realization bred the thought that hope itself was an error. Any new effort must therefore stay close to the possible, the “real.” realism with a capital R and Realpolitik together sink their roots in a distrust of man's imagination. This grim caution born of harsh experience coincided with a sense of fatigue that made Romanticist work seem like the foolishness of youth.

      The appropriate cultural note must no longer be the infinite or heroic or colourful but rather their opposites. If the commonly accepted term Realism for this reaction of the 1850s is used, it must be with these presuppositions in mind. For the Romantic passion for the particular and exact was a realism, too; it was what Dr. Johnson much earlier had called “vehement real life.” The Realism of the disillusioned '50s dropped the vehement, the passionate and, in order to run no risk of further disillusion, limited what it called real to what could be readily seen and felt: the commonplace, the normal, the workaday, and often the sordid.

      In the same spirit Realpolitik rejected principles. The word did not mean “real” in the English sense; in German it connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to existing facts, pursuing plain objects, admitting no obligation to ideals. In this light we can understand the unexpected epithet “scientific” that Marx (Marx, Karl) and his followers bestowed on their brand of socialism. It was a science not merely because it was presumably based on the laws of history but even more because in its view the advent of the socialist state was to result from the interaction of things (classes, means of production, and economic necessity) and not, as in earlier socialism, from the will (that is, the imaginative efforts of thinking men). The “objective” appearance given to the new politics of things, socialist or other, generated that tough, no-nonsense atmosphere, which people then wanted as a source of reassurance in all their dealings.

      This search for certainty went with a swinging back of the pendulum in science itself from the vitalism of the previous period to the materialism of the mid-century. German philosophers derided idealism and taught the equivalence of consciousness and chemistry: “without phosphorus, no thinking.” The machine once more became the great model of thought and analogy—and nowhere more vividly and persuasively than in biology, where Darwin's (Darwin, Charles) advocacy of natural selection won the day because it provided a mechanical means for the march of evolution. The struggle for life (Spencer's phrase of 1850, adopted by Darwin in the subtitle of his book) obviously had the requisite “toughness” to convince and, like Realpolitik, it followed no principle—whoever survived survived. That Darwin to the very last included other factors in his theory of evolution—Lamarckian “use and disuse” as well as direct environmental forces—carried no weight with a generation bent upon machine certainty. These secondary explanations were ignored, in the usual way of cultural single-mindedness, and for 30 years after the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859, an orthodoxy of universal mechanism reigned over all departments of thought.

      It prevented the recognition of Mendel's work on genetics; it put religious, philosophical, and ethical thought on the defensive—only what was “positive” (i.e., material) held a presumption of being real and true. The same reasoning produced a school of social Darwinists (social Darwinism) who saw war between nations and economic struggle among individuals as beneficent competition leading to the survival of “favoured races”—another phrase from Darwin's subtitle. And by a final twist of logic, the creed of materialism reinforced the moral gloom of the period by casting doubt on both the permanence and the validity of all that was being redefined as “really real.” For on the one side, the second law of thermodynamics guaranteed the cooling of the Sun and the pulverization of the cosmos into cold and motionless bits of matter; and, on the other, orthodox “machine-ism” brought its leading prophets, Huxley and Tyndall, to consider people and animals as automatons moved as helplessly as atoms and planets. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon—in plain words, an illusion—precisely as in Karl Marx (Marx, Karl) consciousness and culture are illusions floating above the reality of economic relations.

Victorian morality
      To be sure, not everybody in Europe believed or worried about these affirmations. And although ideas long debated do in the end filter down to the least intellectual layers of the population, the time and place of triumph for a philosophy are limited by this cultural lag—a fortunate delay, without which whole societies might collapse soon after the publication of a single book. What kept mid-19th-century civilization whole was a subdued faith in the reality of all the things Realism and materialistic science denied: religious belief, civic and social habits, the dogma of moral responsibility, and the hope that consciousness and will did exist.

      The sum of these invisible forces is conveniently known as the Victorian ethos or Victorian morality, a formula applicable to the Continent as well as Britain and one whose meaning antedates not only the mid-century revolutions but also the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837. Like Romanticism, this powerful moralism had its roots in the late 18th century—in Wesleyan Methodism and the Evangelical movement, in Rousseau, Schiller, and Kant. Its earnestness was of popular origin; it was antiaristocratic in manners, and it sought the good and the true in a simple, direct, unhesitating way. Perceiving with warm feeling that all men are brothers under God, the moral man saw that slavery was wrong; and having so concluded, he proceeded to have it abolished by act of Parliament (Britain, 1833).

      Such fervent convictions when widely shared exert tremendous power, and this concentration of belief and emotion made Victorian morality long impregnable. As Chesterton (Chesterton, G.K.) said of the Victorian painter Watts: (Watts, George Frederick)

He has the one great certainty which marks off all the great Victorians from those who have come after them: he may not be certain that he is successful, or certain that he is great, or certain that he is good, or certain that he is capable: but he is certain that he is right.

      The sense of rightness generated a sense of power, which the Victorians applied to the monumental task of keeping order in a postrevolutionary society.

      Partly by taking thought and partly by instinct, they perceived that the drive to revolution and the sexual urge were somehow linked. Therefore they repressed sexuality; that is, repressed it in themselves and their literature, while containing it within specified limits in society. Further, they knew that the successful working of the vast industrial machine required a strict, inhuman discipline. The idolatry of respectability was the answer to natural waywardness. To pay one's bills, wear dark clothes, stifle individual fancy, go to church regularly, and turn aggression upon oneself in the form of worry about salvation became the approved common modes of pursuing the pilgrimage of life.

      It could not be expected that everybody would or could conform. From its beginning to the end, the Victorian age numbered a galaxy of dissenters and critics who scorned the conformity, called the religion a sham, and viewed respectability as mere hypocrisy. Yet the front held, and the massed forces behind it were at their strongest after the multiplied assaults of 1848.

      Nothing gives a better idea of the astonishing moral structure called Victorianism than the development of the London Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard), begun under Sir Robert Peel (Peel, Sir Robert, 2nd Baronet) in 1829. A lawyer and a former captain who had fought in the Peninsular War were the first joint commissioners and creators of the force. At first they had to weed out the drunks and the bullies who had been the main types of recruit in earlier attempts at policing cities. At first, too, the people both ridiculed and fought with the new police. Gradually, the “peelers” came to be trusted; they remained unarmed regardless of circumstances; they learned to handle rioters without shedding blood; and in the putting down of crime they finally enlisted the public on their side. For something less than a century this unique relationship lasted, in which “law-abiding” and “police” were terms of respect—correlative terms, since the peelers (later “bobbies”) could not have become what they were without the self-discipline and moral cohesion of the “respectable.”

      The upheavals of the mid-century, cultural as well as political, put Victorianism to a severe test, for after wars and civil disorders laxity is natural, and ensuing despair induces a reckless fatalism. There was cause indeed for apprehension. When the Great Exhibition of 1851 was planned on a scale theretofore unattempted, many expressed the fear that to allow tens of thousands from all over Europe to come together under the Crystal Palace was to invite massive riots. Ministers and heads of state would be assassinated. In the event, no protracted assembly of common people and their leaders was ever so quiet and orderly. The moral machinery worked as efficiently as that which was on display under the glass dome.

The advance of democracy
      Yet, while a stringent moralism held in check endemic subversion and anarchy, Darwinism and the machine analogy stimulated endless forms of self-consciousness. If man could fashion and continually improve these engines, perhaps he could also engineer an improved society. Because evolution was at last “proved,” thanks to Darwin, perhaps it also gave warrant for social and political progress by gradual steps. Spencer's all-inclusive philosophy, likened then to Aristotle's, foresaw an inevitable movement from the simple and undifferentiated to the complex and specialized—as in modern life. Clearly, whether automatons or not, people kept thinking and having purposes; and among evolutionists and scientific socialists alike, thought and purpose included the hastening by voluntary action of what was sure to come by force of natural laws. These and other desires acting in the light of Realism and taking shape in the increasing organization of the toiling masses brought Europe to accept democracy as inevitable.

      The word democracy is used here in a cultural sense. It does not imply a set of political institutions so much as the signs and the agencies that herald the coming populist state of our day: for example, the extension of the franchise, in parliamentary or plebiscite form; the secret ballot; the legalization of trade unions; the rise of a Roman Catholic social movement; the passage of education acts providing free, public, and compulsory schooling; the formulation of the paternalistic Tory democracy as a cure for the evils of free-for-all economic liberalism; the beginnings of welfare legislation (in France under Napoleon III, in Germany under Bismarck); the secularization of life by state action, by the prestige of science, and also by the liberal movements within the churches themselves; and finally, after a decade or so of public education, the great extension and popularization of the press. At the passage of the Reform Act of 1867 in Britain, which gave the vote to urban workingmen, Robert Lowe had said, “Now we must educate our masters.” In a parliamentary system the means to that education cannot be the schools alone. The adult “common man” must continually be informed and appealed to for his own satisfaction as well as for coherent policy in government. The instrument for this purpose was the new journalism. The quarterlies of the early 19th century gave way to the monthlies in the 1860s and they in turn to the weeklies, while the daily papers, costing now but a penny and simplifying all they touched, began to reach the millions.

realism in the arts (arts, the) and philosophy
      In the period of so-called Realism, the arts and philosophy as usual supplied—at least for the educated elite—form and substance to the prevailing fears and desires. The mood of soberness and objectivity was alone acceptable, and what art presented to the public confirmed the reasonableness of the mood.

      This interaction accounts for such things as the marked change of tone in Dickens' (Dickens, Charles) novels that occurs between David Copperfield (1850) and Bleak House (1853). The temper expressed in most concentrated form the very next year in Hard Times now dominates Dickens' mind and works to the end: life is a dreary sort of underworld; happy endings are artificially contrived and not to be believed.

      The same mood explains why Gustave Flaubert's (Flaubert, Gustave) Madame Bovary (1857), which ranks today as the realistic novel par excellence and is on all counts grim enough in its rendering of boredom and vulgar misery, was judged “too artistic” by some contemporary critics, not close enough to the most common of realities, that of common speech. At the same time, the sought-for effect could be achieved in poetry by juxtaposing the ideal, or simply the decent, with the dreary and disgusting, especially the occurrence of these in the now hateful urban life. This is what Baudelaire did in a volume of poems called The Flowers of Evil (1857). The attack this time came not from critics who found the work insufficiently real, but from the “respectable” readers who found it indecent and immoral.

      Yet the evolution of Flaubert's mind remains instructive for an understanding of Realism as a literary creed. Flaubert had begun by writing a highly coloured, imaginative story on The Temptation of Saint Anthony (1848), which the author's friends advised him to burn, tone down, or rewrite. Flaubert put it aside and began the novel that became Madame Bovary. Its setting was the provincial world around him, not the Egyptian desert; the characters were of the most ordinary type, not an improbable Christian ascetic haunted by visions. Yet, even in the working out of his plain tale, Flaubert had to subdue his lyrical Romantic genius to the discipline he had adopted. The description of a rainstorm, for instance, had to be done over and over again so that it would not stand out and be “interesting” by virtue of the observer's mind. It had to be made ordinary and the observer kept outside, just as in science. Madame Bovary, begun as a magazine serial, was soon censored by the editor and then prosecuted as immoral by the state. For Flaubert's Realism had gone so far as to portray in no flattering colours the dreary lives and motives of average provincials of both sexes, and the picture violated the rules of the indispensable moralism. What is more, the fate of Flaubert's unhappy heroine symbolized what had happened to the more daring and poetic-glorious time before 1848: as Flaubert said, Emma Bovary was himself.

      His novel is thus simultaneously a model and a critique of the new genre—a critique, too, of the state of Europe that produced it. Many other writers between 1850 and 1890 pursued matter-of-factness without this ulterior effect and rendered the details of middling life with such impassiveness and fidelity that to this day many use “realistic” as a synonym for dreary or sordid and regard “the novel” as a reliable historical source. On the precise definition of Realism, George Gissing gave, through a character in one of his own novels, a brilliant commentary: the character is at work on a novel which shall be so true to the dullness of daily life that no one will be able to read it.

painting and sculpture (Western sculpture)
      The term Realism applies no less to the plastic arts than to literature, but in painting and sculpture it proved difficult to give form overnight to the change of attitude just noticed in literature and political life. The transition between the passionate poetry and drama of Géricault and Delacroix and the Realism of Courbet (Courbet, Gustave) and Manet (Manet, Édouard) was gradual. It came by way of the “open-air” school of Barbizon (Barbizon school), whose landscapes seemed arid (at least to the classically trained academic painters of the day) and pointless in the sense that they depicted the commonplace. Still, when the full shock of Realism inflicted by the works of Courbet and Manet occurred, it was severe: here were coarseness and violence in manner and subject. Courbet's backgrounds are thick and his people drab; Manet's nude “Olympia” is no goddess nor even a beautiful woman; she is a prostitute, and her name seems like a piece of irony. The portrait of his parents is a painful representation of simple poverty unrelieved by any glow of spirit or intelligence—yet the work itself is beautiful: such was, throughout, the aim and achievement of Realism.

      In England, by an historical accident, pictorial realism was embodied in subjects that seem far removed from the commonplace. The school that took up the challenge against academic painting and modified the vision of Constable and Turner called itself Pre-Raphaelite (Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood). Its members were Holman Hunt, John Millais, and Dante Gabriel Rossetti, and the name they took for their “brotherhood” expressed their resolve to paint like the masters who came before the imitators of Raphael. It is necessary to put it in this clumsy way in order to make clear that Raphael himself was not being condemned, but only his academic followers who introduced “unreality.”

      To be a Pre-Raphaelite was to see the world with a sharp eye and an undistorting mind and to render it with intense application to solidity of form, bright colour, and natural pose and grouping. All this was to be understood from the motto “Death to Slosh!” In order to make the new virtues vividly clear and also because the Pre-Raphaelites were reared on great literature, their subjects tended to draw upon legend, or Dante, or the New Testament. It was the conception and treatment that constituted the innovation. Everybody could see it, because it went against the habit of “pretty-pretty” illustration. In fact the nominal subject dropped out of sight in the startled response to form and colour. Paradoxically, then, the commonplace subjects of the French Realists and the legendary ones of the English Pre-Raphaelites were alike insignificant when compared with the effort to re-create by art the texture and “feel” of actuality—and nothing more. Such was precisely the goal Flaubert pursued and reached in Madame Bovary. His final version of the St. Anthony story (1874) made the same point with a legendary subject, like the Pre-Raphaelites.

      It hardly needs to be added that this conscious purpose of high art could interest but a relatively small portion of the public and that, for the growing mass of readers of fiction and viewers of art, other kinds of satisfaction were necessary. The ordinary three-volume novel from the lending library and the continued serial in the magazine or newspaper supplied the demand by aping, adapting, and diluting not one but half a dozen literary tendencies, old and new. The number of novels produced in all languages in the 19th century has never been estimated, but it surely must be on the order of astronomical magnitudes. And the whole output was realistic in the sense that it professed to impart the real truth about life. It was contemporary in setting and speech, took the form of a history, and taught its readers how other people lived. The pictorial counterpart was the “chromo,” the cheap colour lithograph that illustrated either fiction or news stories in forms which, however false they must seem to a critical eye, again gave the illusion of commonplace reality.

      At first sight, it would seem as if music were a medium in its nature resistant to Realism, but that is to reckon without the obvious use that music has always made of sounds directly associated with life—church bells, hunting horns, military bands, and the like. In an age when Realism was at a premium, the opera would be the form where these and other associations easily found their place. So it was in mid-century Europe, where Meyerbeer and others provided the effects to suit the fussily “real” staging of all plays, musical or not. Clocks, tables, animals, waterfalls, and especially costume could be relied on to be genuine up to the limit of the possible: live bullets for real deaths were shied away from, and real lightning was out of reach.

      A genius who is often mistakenly grouped with the Romantics, Richard Wagner (Wagner, Richard), supplied this ultimate deficiency—and by musical means. As critics have pointed out, Wagner's system of leitmotivs (leitmotiv), or musical tags that denoted an object, a person, or an idea, was consciously or unconsciously an accommodation of Realist intent to operatic understanding. This is true not simply because the musical notes “wave” up and down as Isolde waves her scarf at Tristan—a trivial enough device of a sort found in many composers; it is also true in the deeper sense, which constitutes Wagner's unique genius, namely that he was able to compose great music that was steadily and precisely denotative of items in the story by repeating and interweaving their assigned musical tags.

      Looking back from the perspective of Modernism, which is characteristic of 20th-century culture, it is clear that its predecessor, Romanticism, did not stop in the middle of the 19th. Rather, it evolved and branched out into the phases known as Realism, Neo-Classicism, Naturalism, and Symbolism. All the tendencies and techniques that gave passing unity to these actions and reactions are found in germ in the original flowering of art and thought that dates from about 1790.

      By concentrating on one purpose, by specializing as it were in one affirmation, the succeeding movements after 1848 made their emphatic mark, until the original inspiration was exhausted. It is thus that cultural movements end—in sterile imitation and pointlessness—and thereby earn the scorn of the next generation. This in turn explains why in the decade before World War I one finds, besides a fresh surge of energy and shocking creations, the driving force of anti-Romanticism, anti-Victorianism, anti-everything that was not some form of the new and “Modern.”

Jacques Barzun

A Maturing Industrial Society
The “second industrial revolution”
      As during the previous half century, much of the framework for Europe's history following 1850 was set by rapidly changing social and economic patterns, which extended to virtually the entire continent. In western Europe, shifts were less dramatic than they had been at the onset of the Industrial Revolution, but they posed important challenges to older traditions and to early industrial behaviours alike. In Russia, initial industrialization contributed to literally revolutionary tensions soon after 1900.

      The geographic spread of the Industrial Revolution was important in its own right. Germany's industrial output began to surpass that of Britain by the 1870s, especially in heavy industry. The United States became a major industrial power, competing actively with Europe; American agriculture also began to compete as steamships, canning, and refrigeration altered the terms of international trade in foodstuffs. Russia and Japan, though less vibrant competitors by 1900, entered the lists, while significant industrialization began in parts of Italy, Austria, and Scandinavia. These developments were compatible with increased economic growth in older industrial centres, but they did produce an atmosphere of rivalry and uncertainty even in prosperous years.

      Throughout the most advanced industrial zone (from Britain through Germany) the second half of the 19th century was also marked by a new round of technological change. New processes of iron smelting such as that involving the use of the Bessemer converter (invented in 1856) expanded steel production by allowing more automatic introduction of alloys and in general increased the scale of heavy industrial operations. The development of electrical and internal combustion engines allowed transmission of power even outside factory centres. The result was a rise of sweatshop industries that used sewing machines for clothing manufacturing; the spread of powered equipment to artisanal production, on construction sites, in bakeries and other food-processing centres (some of which saw the advent of factories); and the use of powered equipment on the larger agricultural estates and for processes such as cream separation in the dairy industry. In factories themselves, a new round of innovation by the 1890s brought larger looms to the textile industry and automatic processes to shoe manufacture and machine- and shipbuilding (through automatic riveters) that reduced skill requirements and greatly increased per capita production. Technological transformation was virtually universal in industrial societies. Work speeded up still further, semi-skilled operatives became increasingly characteristic, and, on the plus side, production and thus prosperity reached new heights.

      Organizational (business organization) changes matched the “second industrial revolution” in technology. More expensive equipment, plus economies made possible by increasing scale, promoted the formation of larger businesses. All western European countries eased limits on the formation of joint-stock corporations from the 1850s, and the rate of corporate growth was breathtaking by the end of the century. Giant corporations grouped together to influence the terms of trade, especially in countries such as Germany, where cartels controlled as much as 90 percent of production in the electrical equipment and chemical industries. Big business techniques had a direct impact on labour (organized labour). Increasingly, engineers set production quotas, displacing not only individual workers but also foremen by introducing time-and-motion procedures designed to maximize efficiency.

Modifications in social structure
      Developments in technology and organization reshaped social structure. A recognizable peasantry (peasant) continued to exist in western Europe, but it increasingly had to adapt to new methods. In many areas (most notably, The Netherlands and Denmark) a cooperative movement spread to allow peasants to market dairy goods and other specialties to the growing urban areas without abandoning individual landownership. Many peasants began to achieve new levels of education and to adopt innovations such as new crops, better seeds, and fertilizers; they also began to innovate politically, learning to press governments (government) to protect their agricultural interests.

      In the cities (city) the working classes (proletariat) continued to expand, and distinctions between artisans and factory workers, though real, began to fade. A new urban class emerged as sales outlets proliferated and growing managerial bureaucracies (both private and public) created the need for secretaries, bank tellers, and other clerical workers. A lower middle class, composed of salaried personnel who could boast a certain level of education—indeed, whose jobs depended on literacy—and who worked in conditions different from manufacturing labourers, added an important ingredient to European society and politics. Though their material conditions differed little from those of some factory workers, though they too were subject to bosses and to challenging new technologies such as typewriters and cash registers, most white-collar workers shunned association with blue-collar ranks. Big business employers encouraged this separation by setting up separate payment systems and benefit programs, for they were eager to avoid a union of interests that might augment labour unrest.

      At the top of European society a new upper class formed as big business took shape, representing a partial amalgam of aristocratic landowners and corporate magnates. This upper class wielded immense political influence, for example, in supporting government armaments buildups that provided markets for heavy industrial goods and jobs for aristocratic military officers.

      Along with modifications in social structure came important shifts in popular behaviour, some of them cutting across class lines. As a result of growing production, prosperity increased throughout most of western Europe. Major economic recessions interrupted this prosperity, as factory output could outstrip demand and as investment speculation could, relatedly, outstrip real economic gains. Speculative bank crises and economic downturns occurred in the mid-1850s and particularly in the middle years of both the 1870s and '90s, causing substantial hardship and even wider uncertainty. Nevertheless, the general trend in standards of living (standard of living) for most groups was upward, allowing ordinary people to improve their diets and housing and maintain a small margin for additional purchases. The success of mass newspapers, for example, which reached several million subscribers by the 1890s, depended on the ability to pay as well as on literacy. A bicycle craze, beginning among the middle classes in the 1880s and gradually spreading downward, represented a consumer passion for a more expensive item. Improvement in standards of living was aided by a general reduction in the birth rate, which developed rapidly among urban workers and even peasants. Families increasingly regarded children as an expense, to be weighed against other possibilities, and altered traditional behaviour accordingly. Reduction in the birth rate was achieved in part by sexual abstinence but also by the use of birth control devices, which had been widely available since the vulcanization of rubber in the 1840s, and by illegal abortions, while infanticide continued in rural areas. Completing the installation of a new demographic regime was a rapid decline in infant mortality after 1880.

      Rising living standards were accompanied by increased leisure time. Workers pressed for a workday of 12, then 10 hours, and shortly after 1900 a few groups began to demand an even shorter period. Scattered vacation days also were introduced, and the “English weekend,” which allowed time off on Saturday afternoons as well as Sundays, spread widely. Middle-class groups, for their part, loosened their previous work ethic in order to accommodate a wider range of leisure activities.

      The second half of the 19th century witnessed the birth of modern leisure in western Europe and, to an extent, beyond. Team sports were played in middle-class schools and through a variety of amateur and professional teams. Many sports, such as soccer (football), had originated in traditional games but now gained standardized rules, increasing specialization among players, and the impassioned record-keeping appropriate to an industrial age. Sports commanded widespread participation among various social groups and served as the basis for extensive commercial operations. Huge stadiums and professional leagues signaled the advent of a new level of spectatorship. While many sports primarily focused on male interests, women began to participate in tennis and entire families in pastimes such as croquet and bicycling.

      Leisure options were by no means confined to sports. Mass newspapers emphasized entertaining feature stories rather than politics. Parks and museums open to the public became standard urban features. Train excursions to beaches won wide patronage from factory workers as well as middle-class vacationers. A popular theatre expanded in the cities; British music-hall, typical of the genre, combined song and satire, poking fun at life's tribulations and providing an escapist emphasis on pleasure-seeking. After 1900, similar themes spilled into the new visual technology that soon coalesced into early motion pictures.

The rise of organized labour and mass protests
      Mass leisure coexisted interestingly with the final major social (social movement) development of the later 19th century, the escalating forms of class conflict. Pressed by the rapid pace and often dulling routine of work, antagonized by a faceless corporate management structure seemingly bent on efficiency at all costs, workers in various categories developed more active protest modes in the later 19th century. They were aided by their growing familiarity with basic industrial conditions, which facilitated the formation of relevant demands and made organization more feasible. Legal changes, spreading widely in western Europe after 1870, reduced political barriers to unionization and strikes (strike), though clashes with government forces remained a common part of labour unrest.

      Not surprisingly, given the mood of reaction following the failures of the 1848 revolutions, the 1850s constituted a period of relative placidity in labour relations. Skilled workers in Britain formed a conservative craft union movement, known as New Model Unionism, that urged calm negotiation and respectability; a number of durable trade unions were formed as a result, and a minority of workers gained experience in national organization. Miners and factory workers rose in strikes occasionally, signaling a class-based tension with management in many areas, but no consistent pattern developed.

      The depression of the 1870s, which brought new hardship and reminded workers of the uncertainty of their lot, encouraged a wider range of agitation, and by the 1890s mass unionism surfaced throughout western Europe. Not only artisans but also factory workers and relatively unskilled groups, such as dockers, showed a growing ability to form national unions that made use of the sheer power of numbers, even in default of special skills, to press for gains. Strike rates increased steadily. In 1892 French workers struck 261 times against 500 companies; most of the efforts remained small and local, and only 50,000 workers were involved. By 1906, the peak French strike year before 1914, 1,309 strikes brought 438,000 workers off the job. British and German strike rates were higher still; in Britain, more than 2,000,000 workers struck between 1909 and 1913. A number of nationwide strikes showed labour's new muscle.

      Unionization formed the second prong of the new labour surge. Along with mass unions in individual industries, general federations formed at the national level, such as the British Trades Union Congress and the French and Italian general confederations of labour. Unions provided social and material benefits for members along with their protest action; in many industries they managed to win collective bargaining procedures with employers, though this was far from a uniform pattern in an atmosphere of bitter competition over management rights; and they could influence governmental decisions in the labour area.

      The rise of organized labour signaled an unprecedented development in the history of European popular protest. Never before had so many people been formally organized; never before had withdrawal of labour served as the chief protest weapon. Many workers joined a sweeping ideological fervor to their protest. Many were socialists (socialism), and a number of trade union movements were tightly linked to the rising socialist parties; this was particularly true in Germany and Austria. In other areas, especially France and Italy, an alternative syndicalist (syndicalism) ideology won many adherents in the union movement; syndicalists urged that direct action through strikes should topple governments and usher in a new age in which organizations of workers would control production. Against these varied revolutionary currents, many workers saw in unions and strikes primarily a means to compensate for changes in their work environment, through higher pay (as a reward for less pleasant labour) and shorter hours. Even here, there was an ability to seek new ends rather than appealing to past standards. Overall, pragmatism battled with ideology in most labour movements, and in point of fact none of the large organizations aimed primarily at revolution.

      Labour unrest was not the only form of protest in the later 19th century. In many continental nations (but not in Britain or Scandinavia), nationalist (nationalism) organizations drew the attention of discontented shopkeepers and others in the lower middle class who felt pressed by new business forms, such as department stores and elaborate managerial bureaucracies, but who were also hostile to socialism and the union movement. Nationalist riots surfaced periodically in many countries around such issues as setbacks in imperialist competition or internal political scandals. Some of the riots and accompanying organizations were also anti-Semitic (anti-Semitism), holding Jews responsible for big business and socialism alike. France witnessed the most important agitation from the radical right, through organizations like the Action Française; but anti-Semitic political movements also developed in Germany and Austria.

      Important women's movements (women's movement) completed the new roster of mass protests. The basic conditions of women did not change greatly in western Europe during the second half of the 19th century, with the significant exception of the rapidly declining birth rate. The steady spread of primary education increased female literacy, bringing it nearly equal to male levels by 1900. A growing minority of middle-class women also entered secondary schools, and by the 1870s a handful reached universities and professional schools. Several separate women's colleges were founded in centres such as Oxford and Cambridge, and, against heavy resistance, a few women became doctors and lawyers. For somewhat larger numbers of women, new jobs in the service sector of the economy, such as telephone operators, primary-school teachers, and nurses, provided opportunities for work before marriage. Gradually some older sectors of employment, such as domestic service, began to decline. Nevertheless, emphasis on a domestic sphere for women changed little. Public schools, while teaching literacy, also taught the importance of household skills and support for a working husband.

      These were the circumstances that produced increasingly active feminist movements, sometimes independently and sometimes in association with socialist parties. Feminist leaders sought greater equality under the law, an attack on a double-standard sexuality that advantaged men. Above all, they came to concentrate on winning the vote. Massive petitions in Britain, accompanied by considerable violence after 1900, signaled Europe's most active feminist movement, drawing mainly on middle-class ranks. Feminists in Scandinavia were successful in winning voting rights after 1900. Almost everywhere, feminist pressures added to the new variety of mass protest action.

Conditions in eastern Europe
      Social conditions in eastern and southern Europe differed substantially from those of the west, but there were some common elements. Middle- and upper-class women in Russia, for example, surged into new educational and professional opportunities in some numbers. Growing cities and factories produced some trade union activity, on the part of skilled groups such as the printers and metalworkers, that resembled efforts elsewhere.

      Rural conditions, however, were vastly different from those in western Europe. Eastern and southern Europe remained dominated by the peasantry (peasant), as urbanization, though rapid, was at a far earlier stage. Peasant conditions were generally poor. Amid growing population pressure, many peasants suffered from a lack of land in areas dominated by large estates. One result was rapid emigration, to the Americas and elsewhere, from Spain, southern Italy, and eastern Europe. Another result was recurrent unrest. Peasants in southern Spain, loosely organized under anarchist banners, rose almost once a decade in the late 19th century, seizing land and burning estate records.

      The social and economic situation was most complex in Russia. Stung by the loss of the Crimean War (1854–56) to Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire, literally in their own backyard, Russian leaders decided on a modernization program. The key ingredient was an end to the rigid manorial system, and in 1861 Alexander II, a reform-minded tsar, issued the Emancipation Manifesto, freeing the serfs (serfdom). This act sought to produce a freer labour market but also to protect the status of the nobility. As a result, noble landlords retained some of the best land and were paid for the loss of their servile labour; in turn, serfs, though technically in control of most land, owed redemption payments to the state. This arrangement produced important changes in the countryside. Peasants did develop some commercial habits, aided by gradually spreading education and literacy. More and more peasants migrated, temporarily or permanently, to cities, where they swelled the manufacturing labour force and also the ranks of urban poor. Rural unrest continued, however, as peasants resented their taxes and payments and the large estates that remained.

      From the 1870s the Russian government also launched a program of industrial development, beginning with the construction of a national rail network capped by the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Factory industry was encouraged; much of it was held under foreign ownership, though a native entrepreneurial class emerged. Large factories developed to produce textiles and to process metals. Conditions remained poor, however, and combined with the unfamiliar pace of factory work and rural grievances to spur recurrent worker unrest. Illegal strikes and unions became increasingly prominent after 1900. A minority of urban workers, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, were won to socialist doctrines, and a well-organized Marxist movement arose, its leadership after 1900 increasingly dominated by Vladimir Ilich Lenin (Lenin, Vladimir Ilich), a creative theorist who adapted Marxist theory to the Russian situation and who concentrated single-mindedly on creating the network of underground cells that could foment outright revolution. Russia was embarked on a genuine industrial revolution; with its massive size and resources, it ranked among world leaders in many categories of production by 1900. However, it operated in an exceptionally unstable social and political climate.

The emergence of the industrial state
Political patterns
      During the second half of the 19th century, politics and socioeconomic conditions became increasingly intertwined in Europe, producing a new definition of government functions, including a greatly expanded state and a new political spectrum. Linkage to cultural trends also showed through an interest in hard-headed realism. Predictably, political conditions in eastern Europe, though mirroring some of the general developments, remained distinctive.

 The decades between 1850 and 1870 served as a crucial turning point in European politics and diplomacy, somewhat surprisingly given the apparent victory of conservative forces over the revolutions of 1848. Reactionary impulses did surface during these years. A Conservative Party eager to hold the line against further change emerged in Prussia. A number of governments made new arrangements with the Roman Catholic church to encourage religion against political attacks. Pope Pius IX, who had been chased from Rome during the final surge of agitation in 1848, turned adamantly against new political ideas. In the Syllabus of Errors accompanying the encyclical Quanta cura (“With What Great Care,” 1864), he denounced liberalism and nationalism and insisted on the duty of Roman Catholic rulers to protect the established church, even against religious toleration. The proclamation of papal infallibility (1870) was widely seen as another move to firm up church authority against change.

      Many conservative leaders, however, saw the victory over revolution as a chance to innovate within the framework of the established order. They were aided by a pragmatic current among liberals, many of whom were convinced that compromise, not revolution, was the only way to win reform. Thus in Britain Benjamin Disraeli (Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl Of Beaconsfield, Viscount Hughenden Of Hughenden), the Conservative leader in the House of Commons, in 1867 sponsored a new suffrage measure, which granted the vote to most urban workers; Disraeli hoped that the new voters would support his party, and some of them did so. In France Emperor Napoleon III, who had insisted on an authoritarian regime during the 1850s, began to sponsor major industrial development while maintaining an active foreign policy, designed to win growing support for the state. In the 1860s, pressed by diplomatic setbacks, Napoleon also granted liberal concessions, expanding parliamentary power and tolerating more freedom of press and speech. The Habsburg (Habsburg, House of) monarchy promoted an efficient, largely German bureaucracy to replace the defunct manorial regime and in the 1860s sought to make peace with the leading nationalist movement. In the Ausgleich (“compromise”) of 1867, Hungary was granted substantial autonomy, and separate parliaments, though based on limited suffrage, were established in Austria and Hungary. This result enraged Slavic nationalists, but it signaled an important departure from previous policies bent on holding the line against any dilution of imperial power.

      The key centres of dynamic conservatism, however, were Italy (Risorgimento) and Germany. In the Italian state of Piedmont during the early 1850s, the able prime minister, Camillo di Cavour (Cavour, Camillo Benso, conte di (count of)), conciliated liberals by sponsoring economic development and granting new personal freedoms. Cavour worked especially to capture the current of Italian nationalism. By a series of diplomatic maneuvers, he won an alliance with France against Austria and, in a war fought in 1859, drove Austria from the province of Lombardy. Nationalist risings followed elsewhere in Italy, and Cavour was able to join these to a new Italian state under the Piedmontese king. The resultant new state had a parliament, and it vigorously attacked the power of the Roman Catholic church in a liberal-nationalist combination that could win support from various political groups.

      Inspired in part by Italian example, a young chief minister in Prussia, Otto von Bismarck (Bismarck, Otto von), began a still more important campaign of limited political reform and nationalist aggrandizement. The goal was to unite Germany under Prussia and to defuse liberal and radical agitation. In a series of carefully calculated wars during the 1860s, Bismarck first defeated Denmark and won control over German-speaking provinces. He then provoked Austria (Seven Weeks' War), Prussia's chief rival in Germany, and to general surprise won handily, relying on Prussia's well-organized military might. A Prussian-dominated union of northern German states was formed. A final war with France (Franco-German War), in 1870–71, again resulted in Prussian victory. This time the prize was the province of Alsace and part of Lorraine and agreement with the southern German states to form a single German empire under the Prussian ruler. This new state had a national parliament with a lower house based on universal manhood suffrage but an upper house dominated by Prussia, whose own parliament was elected by a voting system that assured the political power of the wealthiest elements of society. As in Italy, appointment of ministers lay with the crown, not parliament. Freedoms of press and speech were extended and religious liberty expanded to include Jews, but the government periodically intervened against dissident political groups.

      These developments radically changed Europe's map, eliminating two traditional vacuums of power that had been dominated by a welter of smaller states. Nationalism was triumphant in central Europe. At the same time, regimes had been created that, buoyed by nationalist success, appealed to moderate liberal and conservative elements alike while fully contenting neither group. The old regime, attacked for so many decades, was gone, as parliamentary politics and a party system predominated through western and central Europe. Concurrently, important powers for throne and aristocracy remained, as liberals either compromised their policies or went into sullen, usually ineffective, opposition.

      A slightly different version of the politics of compromise emerged in France in the 1870s. Defeated by Prussia, the empire of Napoleon III collapsed. A variety of political forces, including various monarchist groups, contended for succession after a radical rising, the Paris Commune, failed in 1871. Eventually, through a piecemeal series of laws, conservative republicans triumphed, winning a parliamentary majority through elections and proclaiming the Third Republic. This was a clearly liberal regime, in which parliament dominated the executive branch amid frequent changes of ministry. Freedoms of press, speech, and association were widely upheld, and the regime attacked the powers of the church in education and other areas. At the same time, dominant liberals pledged to avoid significant social change, winning peasant and middle-class support on this basis.

      With the emergence of the Third Republic, the constitutional structure of western Europe was largely set for the remainder of the 19th century. All the major nations (except Spain, which continued to oscillate between periods of liberalism and conservative authoritarianism) had parliaments and a multiparty system, and most had granted universal manhood suffrage. Britain completed this process by a final electoral reform in the mid-1880s. Belgium, Italy, and Austria held out for a longer time, experiencing considerable popular unrest as a result, though voting reforms for men were completed before 1914. Important political crises still surfaced. Bismarck warred with the Roman Catholic church and the Catholic Centre Party during the 1870s before reaching a compromise agreement. He then tried virtually to outlaw the socialist party, which remained on the defensive until a liberalization after he fell from power in 1890. During the 1890s, France faced a major constitutional crisis in the Dreyfus affair. The imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus (Dreyfus, Alfred), a Jewish army officer falsely accused of treason, triggered a battle between conservative, Catholic, and military forces, all bent on defending the authority of army and state, and a more radical republican group joined by socialists, who saw the future of the republic at stake. The winning pro-Dreyfus forces forced the separation of church and state by 1905, reducing Catholicism's claims on the French government and limiting the role of religion as a political issue.

      The politics of compromise also affected organized religion, partly because of attacks from various states. A number of Protestant leaders took up social issues, seeking new ways to reach the urban poor and to alleviate distress. The Salvation Army, founded in Britain in 1878, expressed the social mission idea, whereby practical measures were used in the service of God. Under a new pope, Leo XIII, the Roman Catholic church moved more formally to accommodate to modern politics. The encyclical Rerum Novarum (“Of New Things,” 1891) urged Catholics to accept political institutions such as parliaments and universal suffrage; it proclaimed sympathy for working people against the excesses of capitalism, justifying moderate trade union action though vigorously denouncing socialism. Steps such as this muted religious issues in politics, while on the whole relegating organized religion to a more modest public role.

      In general, the resolution of major constitutional issues led to an alternation of moderate conservative (conservatism) and liberal (liberalism) forces in power between 1870 and 1914. Conservatives, when in charge, tended to push a more openly nationalistic foreign policy than did liberals; liberals, as the Dreyfus affair suggested in France, tended to be more concerned about limiting the role of religion in political life. Both movements, however, agreed on many basic goals, including political structure itself. Both were capable of promoting some modest social reforms, though neither wished to go too far. In Italy, conservatives and liberals were so similar that commentators noted a process of transformism (trasformismo), by which parliamentary deputies, regardless of their electoral platforms, were transformed into virtually identical power seekers once in Rome.

      As the range of dispute between conservatives and liberals narrowed (save for fringe movements of the radical right that distrusted parliamentary politics altogether), the most striking innovation in the political spectrum was the rise of socialist (socialism) parties, based primarily on working-class support though with scattered rural and middle-class backing as well. Formal socialist parties began to take shape in the 1860s. They differed from previous socialist movements in focusing primarily on winning electoral support; earlier socialist leaders either had been openly revolutionary or had favoured setting up model communities that, they thought, would produce change through example. Most of the socialist parties established in the 1860s and '70s derived their inspiration from Karl Marx (Marxism). They argued that revolution was essential and that capitalists and workers were locked in a historic battle that must affect all social institutions. The goal of socialist action was to seize the state, establishing proletarian control and unseating the exploitative powers of capitalism. In practice, however, most socialist parties worked through the political process (with support for trade union activities), diluting orthodox Marxism. Universal manhood suffrage created a climate ripe for socialist gains, especially since, in most countries, these parties were the first to realize the nature of mass politics. They set up permanent organizations to woo support even apart from election campaigns and sponsored impassioned political rallies rather than working behind the scenes to manipulate voters. Newspapers, educational efforts, and social activities supplemented the formal political message.

      By the 1880s the German socialist party (Social Democratic Party of Germany) was clearly winning working-class support away from the liberal movement despite Bismarck's antisocialist laws. By 1900 the party was a major political force, gaining about two million votes in key elections and seating a large minority of parliamentary deputies. By 1913 the German party was polling four million votes in national elections and was the largest single political force in the nation. Socialist parties in Austria, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries won similar success. Socialism in France and Italy, divided among various ideological factions, was somewhat slower to coalesce, but it too gained ground steadily. In 1899 a socialist entered the French Cabinet as part of the Dreyfusard coalition, shocking orthodox Marxists who argued against collaboration with bourgeois politicians. By 1913 the French party had more than a hundred delegates in parliament. British socialism grew later and with less attention to formal ideology. The Labour Party was formed in the 1890s with strong trade union connections; it long lagged behind the Liberals in winning workers' votes. Nevertheless, even in Britain the party was a strong third force by 1914. In many countries socialists not only formed a large national minority capable of pressing government coalitions but also won control of many municipal governments, where they increased welfare benefits and regulated urban conditions for the benefit of their constituents.

      The rise of socialism put what was called “the social question” at the forefront of domestic policy in the late 19th century, replacing debates about formal constitutional structure. Fear of socialism strengthened the hand of ruling conservative or liberal coalitions. At the same time, success mellowed many socialist leaders. In Germany about 1900 a revisionist movement arose that judged that revolution was not necessary; it was thought that Marxism should be modified to allow for piecemeal political gains and cooperation with middle-class reformers. Most parties officially denounced revisionism in favour of stricter Marxism, but in fact they behaved in a revisionist fashion.

Changes in government functions
      Shifts in the political spectrum and larger issues of industrial society prompted important changes in government functions through the second half of the 19th century. Mass education headed the list. Building on earlier precedents, most governments in western Europe established universal public schooling in the 1870s and '