Financial Support for the Elderly

▪ 1994

Introduction

by Janet H. Clark

      By 1993 industrialized countries throughout the world were facing a common and growing problem—how to cope with the financial problems created by a growing proportion of elderly in their populations. Governments could no longer afford the generous welfare systems built up during the 1960s and 1970s, and in most developed countries pensions for the elderly accounted for the largest share of benefits. The problem was being compounded by the fact that workforces relative to the retired population were shrinking. This meant that there were fewer employers and employees to contribute to the national welfare systems on which increasing numbers depended for their financial livelihood.

      An unprecedented growth in the pensions markets in the industrialized world and in newly industrializing countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. This was the result of employer and employee concern about provision for the elderly. Longer life expectancies (the longest being 81 years for the average Japanese female) and in some countries the scaling down or capping of state pensions added to these fears. Birthrates in most of Europe had been falling since the mid-1960s.

      In most of Europe, too, the cost of state social security schemes, of which pensions accounted for the largest share, had for many years been rising much faster than national income. Expenditure on health care for the elderly—largely financed by the state—was becoming increasingly onerous. The costs showed that for a typical European country 80% of state health spending was used for people over the age of 65. Governments had little choice, particularly at a time when raising the rate of taxation was not politically acceptable, but to try to shift the burden of pensions onto the private sector. The trend was expected to accelerate as more countries reassessed their benefits systems.

Growing Demographic Pressures.

      In 1993 the population of Europe, as in much of the rest of the industrialized world, was near stagnation. Children were no longer seen as essential in a marriage, and the development of social welfare systems reduced the economic need for having a family. Elsewhere, the less developed countries that made up most of the world's population had the opposite problem. They wanted to reduce their population growth rates.

       Economic AffairsThe industrialized countries' share of the world population was shrinking rapidly. (See Table (Economic Affairs).) It was projected that by 2025 the 12 member countries of the European Community (EC) would have only 4% of the world population, compared with 11% in 1950 and an estimated 6.4% in 1991. The share of the U.S.'s population was also projected to fall sharply from 6.1 (1950) to 3.9% (2025), and that of Japan was expected to drop from 3.3 (1950) to 1.6% (2025). The combination of low birthrates and longer life expectancy, however, meant that the proportion of those over 60 was increasing and would make up more than a quarter by 2025, compared with less than one-fifth in the early 1990s. Already the economic recession in the industrialized countries had added to the number of "pensioners." Employees over the age of 50 were being laid off and given early retirement as companies tried to cut costs. In many European countries it was possible to receive state benefits in advance of the official pension age.

      Higher unemployment levels were adding to dependency ratios (the population of those over 65 to the population aged 15-64 years). These were already in the region of 20 to 25% and by the year 2035, in most major countries, would be in the range 32 to 42%. A majority of pensioners in Europe relied on the state for most of their retirement income. The individual on average earnings in France (including mandatory private), Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, for example, could expect to receive a state pension at retirement the equivalent of between 60% and nearly 90% of final earnings, provided that certain contribution requirements had been met. In countries where the state pension was less generous—such as Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, and the U.K.—and was expected to cover a smaller proportion of final earnings (24-40%), the shortfall tended to be met from a company or personal pension. In most countries higher-paid workers were less dependent on the state for retirement income.

      Although pension-provision methods varied widely in industrialized countries, the aim of most state and company plans was to provide a total pension on retirement of about two-thirds of earnings at retirement. A more meaningful measure of the pension, and the degree to which it enabled the recipient's standard of living to be maintained after retirement, was to compare the take-home pension (the amount received after any income taxes owed have been deducted) with the take-home pay at retirement. An individual retiring on one and a half times the average national earnings in 1993 in the EC could expect a net total pension equivalent to 84% of net earnings. Gross pension as a percentage of gross earnings was a much lower 68%, the better take-home pension reflecting the much larger tax and other statutory deductions taken from the pay of those still working. By contrast the take-home pension for retirees in Japan and the U.S. was less than the EC average of 84%, at 79 and 67%, respectively. So, too, was the average for the seven European Free Trade Association countries, at 76%. Within Europe there were quite large national variations, with the net replacement of earnings being a very high 92% in The Netherlands, compared with 74% in Germany. Europe's generous pensions relative to earnings—at least for those with uninterrupted careers and good contribution records—were becoming unsustainable in countries where the major share of the funding was being provided by the state. These included Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where the governments needed to cut public spending to curb burgeoning public deficits. In some cases the benefits in these countries were already being scaled down. Where state systems provided most of the pension, private pension schemes tended to be poorly developed. This made shifting the burden to the private sector more difficult.

The Choice Governments Faced.

      Governments were faced with a difficult choice in ensuring that future pensions were adequate. In many countries governments were reluctant for political reasons to abandon what was seen as their social responsibilities. But the cost of supporting generous social security systems had led to the introduction of unacceptedly high levels of taxation. Even Sweden, which had become the most highly taxed country in Europe, was forced to make reforms, notably raising the eligibility age for receiving a partial pension. The general trend was to shift responsibility to the private sector—both corporate and individual. Other moves included encouragement of workers to take later retirement, increases in contribution rates to state schemes, and a capping of earnings-related benefits. In the countries of Eastern Europe, reforms also were taking place. Pensions provided in the former centrally planned economies had quickly become totally inadequate as inflation eroded their value in the transition to a mixed economy. The state no longer had the revenue to meet its earlier promises.

      In all the industrialized countries there were different types of retirement provision (both public and private) and ages at which pensions became payable. Most state systems were pay-as-you-go, under which contributions of the current workers paid for the pensions of those already retired. As the number of workers relative to the retired declined, these systems were jeopardized. Some countries, such as France, faced the prospect of more pensioners than workers by the year 2020.

      Private schemes, such as those in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Japan, and The Netherlands, tended to be funded with funds held separately from company assets. Workers and, usually, employers on their behalf made contributions that were actuarially calculated to meet the liabilities of the pension fund. The investment and management of the funds varied widely. Most notably, in Germany book reserves were allocated in the company accounts to meet pension liabilities, the risk of insolvency being covered by insurance. Most schemes were noncontributory. Companies set up a reserve in their accounts, in accordance with tax authority requirements, and claimed a tax deduction. In the U.S. some individual savings plans received tax breaks. The adequacy of such arrangements to meet future liabilities given the demographic trends was questionable.

Pension Funds Were a Powerful Force.

      The political and economic importance of pension funds was considerable. Europe's pension funds were estimated at about $1 trillion, with those in the U.S. being three times larger. Global pension funds were expected to rise to about $7.2 trillion by 1996. The way such investments were invested affected capital and currency markets. In Europe the U.K. not only had the largest pension fund assets but also had considerable investment freedom. Some three-quarters of assets were invested in equities, compared with under a quarter in most of continental Europe, where bond investments were much more important. The U.S., Japan, and Canada invested heavily in domestic equities and bonds. The recycling of tax-advantaged funds, which was facilitated by book reserves schemes, such as in Germany, made a major contribution to corporate growth.

      Any action on the part of governments that affected pension funds, such as changes in investment regulations or taxation of pension contributions or fund assets, could have far-reaching consequences. Not only was the financial security of pensioners at stake but so too was the stability of capital and currency markets.

Janet H. Clark is research manager for Sedgwick Noble Lowndes employee benefits consultants and author of a forthcoming book on the crisis in European labour costs.

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