identity theory

In the philosophy of mind, the doctrine that mental events are identical to physico-chemical events in the brain.

So-called "type" identity theory asserts that each type of mental event, such as pain, is identical to some type of event in the brain, such as the firing of c-fibres. In response to objections based on the assumed "multiple realizability" of mental states, "token" identity theory makes the weaker claim that each token of a mental event, such as a particular pain, is identical to some token of a brain event of some type. See also mind-body problem.

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▪ philosophy

      in philosophy, one view of modern Materialism that asserts that mind and matter, however capable of being logically distinguished, are in actuality but different expressions of a single reality that is material. Strong emphasis is placed upon the empirical verification of such statements as: “Thought is reducible to motion in the brain.”

      The double-aspect theory is similar to this, with one notable exception: reality is not material; it is either mental or neutral. The latter case is illustrated by an undulating line that is both concave and convex at the same time; each aspect is an integral, but only a partial, expression of the total reality.

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