Akerlof, George A.

born June 17, 1940, New Haven, Conn., U.S.

U.S. economist.

He studied at Yale University (B.A., 1962) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D., 1966) and in 1966 began teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, becoming Goldman Professor of Economics in 1980. Akerlof's research often drew on other disciplines, including psychology, anthropology, and sociology, and he played an important role in the development of behavioral economics. His landmark study on asymmetric information in the used car market demonstrated how markets malfunction when sellers have more information than buyers. Akerlof shared the 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics with A. Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz.

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▪ American economist

born June 17, 1940, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.

      American economist who, with A. Michael Spence (Spence, A. Michael) and Joseph E. Stiglitz (Stiglitz, Joseph E.), won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 for laying the foundation for the theory of markets with asymmetric information.

      Akerlof studied at Yale University (B.A., 1962) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D., 1966). In 1966 he began teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, becoming Goldman Professor of Economics in 1980. His research often drew from other disciplines, including psychology, anthropology, and sociology, and he played an important role in the development of behavioral economics.

      Akerlof's study of markets (market) with asymmetric information concentrated on those in which sellers of a product have more information than buyers about the product's quality. Using the example of a secondhand-car market, he demonstrated that this could lead to “adverse selection” of poor-quality products, such as a defective car known as a “lemon.” In his 1970 seminal work “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Akerlof explained how private or asymmetric information prevents markets from functioning efficiently and examined the consequences. He suggested that many economic institutions had emerged in the market in order to protect themselves from the consequences of adverse selection, including secondhand-car dealers who offered guarantees to increase consumer confidence. In the context of less-developed countries, Akerlof's analysis explained that interest rates were often excessive because moneylenders lacked adequate information on the borrower's creditworthiness.

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