tautology

—tautological /tawt'l oj"i keuhl/, tautologic, tautologous /taw tol"euh geuhs/, adj. —tautologically, tautologously, adv. —tautologist, n.

/taw tol"euh jee/, n., pl. tautologies.

1. needless repetition of an idea, esp. in words other than those of the immediate context, without imparting additional force or clearness, as in "widow woman."

2. an instance of such repetition.

3. Logic.

a. a compound propositional form all of whose instances are true, as "A or not A."

b. an instance of such a form, as "This candidate will win or will not win."

[1570-80; < LL tautologia < Gk tautología. See TAUTO-, -LOGY]

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In logic, a statement that cannot be denied without inconsistency.

Thus, "All bachelors are either male or not male" is held to assert, with regard to anything whatsoever that is a bachelor, that it is male or it is not male. In the propositional calculus, even complicated symbolic expressions such as [(A ⊃ B) ∧ (C ⊃ ¬ B)] ⊃ (C ⊃ ¬ A) can be shown to be tautologies by displaying in a truth table every possible combination of T (true) and F (false) of its arguments A, B, C. A tautology can be purely formal (a statement form rather than a statement), and in some usages only such formal truths are tautologies.

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▪ logic

      in logic, a statement so framed that it cannot be denied without inconsistency. Thus, “All men are rational” is held to assert with regard to anything whatsoever that either it is a man or it is not rational. But this universal “truth” follows not from any facts noted about real men but only from the actual use (or one such use) of “man” and “rational” and is thus purely a matter of definition. The statement cannot but be true because it asserts every possible state of affairs: it is true whichsoever of its constituents are true, and it is also true whichsoever are false.

      In the propositional calculus, a logic in which whole propositions are related by such connectives as ⊃ (“if . . . then”), · (“and”), ∼ (“not”), and ∨ (“or”), even complicated expressions such as [(A ⊃ B)·(C ⊃ ∼B)] ⊃ (C ⊃ ∼A) can be shown to be tautologies by displaying in a truth table every possible combination of T (true) and F (false) of its arguments A, B, C and after reckoning out by a mechanical process the truth-value of the entire formula, noting that, for every such combination, the formula is T. The test is effective because, in any particular case, the total number of different assignments of truth-values to the variables is finite; and the calculation of the truth-value of the entire formula can be carried out separately for each assignment of truth-values.

      The notion of tautology in the propositional calculus was first developed in the 20th century by Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of Pragmatism and a major logician. The name tautology, however, was introduced by one of the founding fathers of Linguistic Analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who argued in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) that all necessary propositions are tautologies and that there is, therefore, a sense in which all necessary propositions say the same thing—viz, nothing at all.

      Wittgenstein's use of the term requires its extension from the propositional calculus to the first-order functional calculus, which can range over classes, sets, or relations as well as over individual variables. This extended notion, further explained by F.P. Ramsey in 1926, is, in fact, a less precise forerunner of what is now usually called validity.

      Later, certain Logical (Logical Positivism) Positivists, especially Rudolf Carnap (Carnap, Rudolf), amended Wittgenstein's doctrine in the light of the distinction that there is an effective test of tautology in the propositional calculus but no such test of validity even in the functional calculus of the lowest (first) order. The Logical Positivists held that, in general, every necessary truth (and, thus, every tautology) is derivable from some rule of language; its only necessity is its being prescribed by a rule in a certain system. Because such derivations are difficult to perform in ordinary language, however, as with the statement “Whatever has a beginning in time must have a cause,” attempts have been made—as in Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928; The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 1967)—to construct an artificial language in which all necessary statements could be demonstrated by appeal to formulas.

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