predicable

—predicability, predicableness, n. —predicably, adv.

/pred"i keuh beuhl/, adj.

1. that may be predicated or affirmed; assertable.

n.

2. that which may be predicated; an attribute.

3. Logic. any one of the various kinds of predicate that may be used of a subject.

[1545-55; < L praedicabilis assertable, L: praiseworthy, equiv. to praedica(re) to declare publicly (see PREDICATE) + -bilis -BLE]

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▪ logic

      in logic, something that may be predicated, especially, as listed in Boethius' Latin version of Porphyry's Isagoge, one of the five most general kinds of attribution: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. It is based upon a similar classification set forth by Aristotle in the Topics (a, iv–viii), which has “definition,” however, in place of “species.”

      Aristotle treated only statements of the form “A is B,” in which subject and predicate are both universal. He noted that in every true statement of this type the predicate either is convertible with the subject (i.e., “B is A” follows from “A is B”) or else it is not. If the predicate is convertible and states its essence, then it is the definition of the subject; whereas if it is convertible but does not state the essence, it is a property of the subject. On the other hand, if the predicate is not convertible with the subject but is part of the definition, it is the genus or differentia of the subject, for a definition always consists of genus and differentia. Finally, if the predicate is not convertible and is not part of the definition, it is an accident of the subject.

      Some Aristotelian examples may be briefly mentioned. In the true statement “Man is a rational animal,” the predicate is convertible with the subject and states its essence; therefore, “rational animal” is the definition of man. The statements “Man is an animal” and “Man is rational,” while true, are not convertible; their predicate terms, however, are parts of the definition and hence are the genus and differentia of man. On the other hand, the statement “Man is capable of learning grammar” is true and convertible; but “capable of learning grammar” does not state the essence of man and is therefore a property of man. The true statement “Man is featherless” offers an example of an accident. Its predicate is not convertible with its subject, nor is it part of the definition; accordingly, it expresses only an accidental characteristic of man.

       Porphyry gave the following examples of predicable relationships in which the subject is “man”: of genus, animal; of differentia, rational; of property, risible; and of accident, white.

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