logical positivism

—logical positivist.

a philosophical movement that stresses the function of philosophy as a method of criticizing and analyzing science and that rejects all transcendental metaphysics, statements of fact being held to be meaningful only if they have verifiable consequences in experience and in statements of logic, mathematics, or philosophy itself, and with such statements of fact deriving their validity from the rules of language. Also called logical empiricism.

[1930-35]

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Early school of analytic philosophy, inspired by David Hume, the mathematical logic of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1921).

The school, formally instituted at the University of Vienna in a seminar of Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) in 1922, continued there as the Vienna Circle until 1938. It proposed several revolutionary theses: (1) All meaningful discourse consists either of (a) the formal sentences of logic and mathematics or (b) the factual propositions of the special sciences; (2) Any assertion that claims to be factual has meaning only if it is possible to say how it might be verified; (3) Metaphysical assertions, including the pronouncements of religion, belong to neither of the two classes of (1) and are therefore meaningless. Some logical positivists, notably A.J. Ayer, held that assertions in ethics (e.g., "It is wrong to steal") do not function logically as statements of fact but only as expressions of the speaker's feelings of approval or disapproval toward some action. See also Rudolf Carnap; emotivism; verifiability principle.

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▪ philosophy

also called  Logical Empiricism 

      a philosophical doctrine formulated in Vienna in the 1920s, according to which scientific knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge and all traditional metaphysical (metaphysics) doctrines are to be rejected as meaningless. A brief treatment of Logical Positivism follows. For full treatment, see Positivism: Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism (Positivism).

      The Logical Positivist school differs from earlier empiricists and positivists (David Hume, Ernst Mach) in holding that the ultimate basis of knowledge rests upon public experimental verification rather than upon personal experience. It differs from Auguste Comte and J.S. Mill in holding that metaphysical doctrines are not false but meaningless—that the “great unanswerable questions” about substance, causality, freedom, and God are unanswerable just because they are not genuine questions at all. This last is a thesis about language, not about nature, and is based upon a general account of meaning and of meaninglessness. All genuine philosophy (according to the group that came to be called the Vienna Circle) is a critique of language; and (according to some of its leading members) its result is to show the unity of science—that all genuine knowledge about nature can be expressed in a single language common to all the sciences.

      The Vienna Circle, which launched its first manifesto in 1929, had its origin in discussions among physicists and mathematicians before World War I. The general conclusion was reached that the empiricism of Mill and Mach was inadequate since it failed to explain mathematical and logical truths, or to account satisfactorily for the apparently a priori element in natural science. In 1922 Hans Hahn at Vienna University laid before his students the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, Ludwig), published in the previous year. This work introduced a new general theory of meaning, derived in part from the logical inquiries of Giuseppe Peano, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and A.N. Whitehead, and gave the Vienna group its logical foundation. Most of the group's members moved to the United States at the outset of World War II. In the meantime disciples had been found in many other countries: in Poland, among the mathematical logicians; and in England, where A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic (1936; rev. ed., 1946) provided an excellent introduction to the views of the group.

      In England, however, the direct influence of Wittgenstein proved much more powerful. Wittgenstein had visited England before World War I and had spent some time at Cambridge; while there he discussed logic with Bertrand Russell. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus expresses and generalizes the conclusions that he had reached upon philosophical questions. In 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge and worked there (with a few intermissions) until 1947. During this later period Wittgenstein himself subjected the doctrines of the Tractatus to fundamental criticism and produced what was in effect a new account of philosophy. His Philosophical Investigations (German text with English trans., 1953) appeared posthumously.

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