guerrilla warfare

guerrilla warfare
the use of hit-and-run tactics by small, mobile groups of irregular forces operating in territory controlled by a hostile, regular force.

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▪ military tactics
also spelled  guerilla warfare 

      type of warfare fought by irregulars in fast-moving, small-scale actions against orthodox military and police forces and, on occasion, against rival insurgent forces, either independently or in conjunction with a larger political-military strategy. The word guerrilla (the diminutive of Spanish guerra, “war”) stems from the duke of Wellington (Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st duke of, marquess of Douro, marquess of Wellington, earl of Wellington, Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, Baron Douro or Wellesley)'s campaigns during the Peninsular War (1808–14), in which Spanish and Portuguese irregulars, or guerrilleros, helped drive the French from the Iberian Peninsula. Over the centuries the practitioners of guerrilla warfare have been called rebels, irregulars, insurgents, partisans, and mercenaries. Frustrated military commanders have consistently damned them as barbarians, savages, terrorists, brigands, outlaws, and bandits.

      The French military writer Henri, baron de Jomini (Jomini, Henri, baron de) (1779–1869), classified the operations of guerrilla fighters as “national war.” The Prussian general and theorist Carl von Clausewitz (Clausewitz, Carl von) (1780–1831) reluctantly admitted their existence by picturing partisans as “a kind of nebulous vapoury essence.” Later writers called their operations “small wars.” During the Cold War (1945–91), Chinese leader Mao Zedong's term revolutionary warfare became a staple, as did insurgency, rebellion, insurrection, people's war, and war of national liberation.

      Regardless of terminology, the importance of guerrilla warfare has varied considerably throughout history. Traditionally, it has been a weapon of protest employed to rectify real or imagined wrongs levied on a people either by a ruling government or by a foreign invader. As such, it has scored remarkable successes and has suffered disastrous defeats.

      The role of guerrilla warfare considerably expanded during World War II, when Josip Broz Tito (Tito, Josip Broz)'s communist (communism) Partisans tied down and frequently clashed with the German army in Yugoslavia and when other groups, both communist and noncommunist, fought against the German and Japanese enemies. During the prolonged Cold War period, numerous guerrilla forces of varying political beliefs were showered with money, modern weapons, and equipment from assorted benefactors. The stew of animosities was further seasoned by ethnic and religious rivalries, a factor that helps to explain why guerrilla warfare continues to be fought in a large number of countries today. In some instances it has assumed a universal character under the banner of religious fundamentalism. The most prominent practitioner of this type is the Muslim group al-Qaeda (Qaeda, al-), which has attracted religious fanatics from various countries to carry out vicious terrorist attacks, the most famous being the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001. Still another major change has been the transition of some guerrilla groups, notably in Colombia, Peru, Northern Ireland, and Spain, into criminal terrorism on behalf of drug barons and other Mafia-style overlords.


Early history
      In 512 BC the Persian warrior-king Darius I, who ruled the largest empire and commanded the best army in the world, bowed to the hit-and-run tactics of the nomadic Scythians and left them to their lands beyond the Danube. The Macedonian king Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) also fought serious guerrilla opposition, which he overcame by modifying his tactics and by winning important tribes to his side. In 218 BC the Carthaginian general Hannibal faced considerable guerrilla opposition (Punic War, Second) in crossing the Alps into Italy; he was later brought to bay by the delaying military tactics of the Roman general Quintus Fabius Maximus (Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, Quintus), from whom the term Fabian tactics is derived and who earned the surname Cunctator (meaning “Delayer”). The Romans themselves fought against guerrillas in their conquest of Spain for more than 200 years before the foundation of the empire.

      Guerrilla and quasi-guerrilla operations were employed in an aggressive role in ensuing centuries by such predatory barbarians as the Goths and the Huns, who forced the Roman Empire onto the defensive; the Magyars, who conquered Hungary; the hordes of northern barbarians who attacked the Byzantine Empire for more than 500 years; the Vikings, who overran Ireland, England, and France; and the Mongols, who conquered China and terrified central Europe. In the 12th century the Crusader invasion of Syria was at times stymied by the guerrilla tactics of the Seljuq Turks, a frustration shared by the Normans in their conquest of Ireland (1169–75). A century later, Kublai Khan's army of Mongols was driven from the area of Vietnam by Tran Hung Dao, who had trained his army to fight guerrilla warfare. King Edward I of England struggled through long, hard, and expensive campaigns to subdue Welsh guerrillas; that he failed to conquer Scotland was largely due to the brilliant guerrilla operations of Robert the Bruce ( Robert I). Bertrand du Guesclin (Guesclin, Bertrand du), a Breton guerrilla leader in the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), all but pushed the English from France by using Fabian tactics of harassment, surprise, ambush, sudden assault, and slow siege.

Origins of modern guerrilla warfare
      Guerrilla warfare in time became a useful adjunct to larger political and military strategies—a role in which it complemented orthodox military operations both inside enemy territory and in areas seized and occupied by an enemy. Early examples of this role occurred in the first two Silesian Wars (1740–45) and in the Seven Years' War (1756–63), when Hungarian, Croatian, and Serbian irregulars (called Grenzerer, “border people”), fighting in conjunction with the Austrian army, several times forced Frederick the Great (Frederick II) (Frederick II) of Prussia to retreat from Bohemia and Moravia after suffering heavy losses. Toward the end of the U.S. War of Independence (American Revolution) (1775–83), a ragtag band of South Carolina irregulars under Francis Marion (Marion, Francis) relied heavily on terrorist tactics to drive the British general Lord Cornwallis from the Carolinas to defeat at Yorktown, Virginia. Wellington's (Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st duke of, marquess of Douro, marquess of Wellington, earl of Wellington, Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, Baron Douro or Wellesley) operations in Spain were frequently supported by effectively commanded regional bands of guerrillas—perhaps 30,000 in all—who made life miserable for the French invaders by blocking roads, intercepting couriers, and at times even waging conventional war. In 1812, in the long retreat from Moscow, the armies of Napoleon I suffered thousands of casualties inflicted by bands of Russian peasants working with mounted Cossacks.

      Guerrilla wars flourished in the following two centuries as native irregulars in India, Algeria, Morocco, Burma (Myanmar), New Zealand, and the Balkans tried, usually in vain, to prevent colonization by the great powers. Indian tribes in North America stubbornly fought the opening of the West; Cuban guerrillas fought the Spanish; and Filipino guerrillas fought the Spanish and Americans. In the South African War 90,000 Boer commandos held off a large British army for two years before succumbing.

      As these bloody campaigns continued, political motivations became more and more important. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) in China, a peasant uprising against the Qing dynasty, killed an estimated 20 million Chinese before it was suppressed. During the American Civil War mounted guerrillas from both sides raided far behind enemy lines, often looting and pillaging randomly. (See John Singleton Mosby (Mosby, John Singleton); William C. Quantrill (Quantrill, William C.).) Mexican peasants, fighting under such leaders as Emiliano Zapata (Zapata, Emiliano) and Pancho Villa (Villa, Pancho), used guerrilla warfare to achieve a specific political goal in the Mexican Revolution (1910–20). Arab tribesmen under Fayṣal I employed the brilliant guerrilla strategies and tactics of British officer T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence, T E) in their campaign to liberate their lands from the Ottoman Empire in World War I. In 1916 the Easter Rising in Ireland led to a ferocious guerrilla war fought by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—a war that ceased only with the uneasy peace and partition of Ireland in 1921. In 1927 communist leader Mao Zedong raised the flag of a rural rebellion that continued for 22 years. This experience resulted in a codified theory of protracted revolutionary war, Mao's On Guerrilla Warfare (1937), which was later called “the most radical, violent and extensive theory of war ever put into effect.”

The Cold War period
      Political ideology became a more pronounced factor in the numerous guerrilla campaigns of World War II. In most of the countries invaded by Germany, Italy, and Japan, local communists either formed their own guerrilla bands or joined other bands—such as the French and Belgian maquis. (See resistance.) While consolidating their hold on the country, some of these groups spent as much time eliminating indigenous opposition as they did fighting the enemy, but most of them contributed sufficiently to the Allied war effort to be sent shipments of arms, equipment, and gold, which helped them to challenge existing governments after the war. In the following decades the Soviet Union and United States supported a series of widespread guerrilla insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in dangerous and often unproductive—but always costly—proxy wars.

      In Yugoslavia and Albania the communist takeover of government was simple and immediate; in China it was complicated and delayed; in South Vietnam it succeeded after nearly three decades; in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines it was foiled—but only after prolonged and costly fighting. Noncommunist insurgents simultaneously used guerrilla warfare, with heavy emphasis on terrorist tactics, to help end British rule in Palestine in 1948 and Dutch rule in Indonesia in 1949.

      After 1948 the new state of Israel was faced with a guerrilla war conducted by the fedayeen (fedayee) of its Arab neighbours—a protracted and vicious struggle that over the next 30 years led to three quasi-conventional wars (each an Israeli victory) followed by renewed guerrilla war. Despite concerted efforts to negotiate a peace, the struggle continued, as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its militant wing Fatah, and three competing major terrorist groups ( Ḥamās, Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqṣā Martyrs Brigade) remained determined to regain control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and, eventually (a long-term goal for at least some of them), all of pre-1948 Palestine.

      Mao's victory in China in 1949 established him as the prophet of “revolutionary warfare” who had transferred Marxism-Leninism from the industrial areas to the countryside and in doing so heartened contemporary insurgents and encouraged new ones. In Indochina, Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh guerrillas, ably commanded by Vo Nguyen Giap, had been fighting the French overlords since 1945. The struggle ended in 1954 with the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (Dien Bien Phu, Battle of), when a strongly fortified French garrison surrendered after a two-month-long quasi-conventional ground attack by Giap's army. A civil war followed between Ho's North Vietnam and South Vietnam, the former supported by the Soviet Union and China and the latter by the United States and its allies. U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War steadily increased, resulting in the first commitment of U.S. troops in 1961 and ending only with the North Vietnamese conquest of the entire country in 1975.

      Meanwhile, a spate of new insurgencies, both communist and noncommunist, followed to end French rule in Algeria and British rule in Kenya, Cyprus, and Rhodesia. Fidel Castro (Castro, Fidel)'s overthrow of the tottering and corrupt regime of Fulgencio Batista (Batista, Fulgencio) in Cuba in 1959 provoked other rural insurgencies throughout Latin America (see also Che Guevara (Guevara, Che)), Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Old and new insurgencies flourished in Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Kashmir, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Angola, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, and Spain.

      The Afghan War of 1978–92 saw a coalition of Muslim guerrillas known as the mujahideen, variously commanded by regional Afghan warlords heavily subsidized by the United States, fighting against Afghan and Soviet forces. The Soviets withdrew from that country in 1989, leaving the Afghan factions to fight it out in a civil war. South Africa similarly was forced to relinquish control of South West Africa (now Namibia) in 1989, and guerrilla activity by the African National Congress (ANC)—one of the most successful guerrilla operations of the modern era—was largely responsible for the end of the apartheid system and for the institution of universal suffrage in South Africa in 1994.

      In the early 1970s the general failure of rural insurgencies in Central and South America caused some frustrated revolutionaries to shift from rural to urban guerrilla warfare with emphasis on the use of collective terrorism. Fired by the quasi-anarchistic teachings of German American political philosopher Herbert Marcuse, French revolutionary-philosopher Régis Debray, and others and armed with a do-it-yourself manual of murder (Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil [1970]), New Left revolutionaries embraced assassination, robbery, indiscriminate bombing, and kidnapping to attain their ends—crimes that became the order of the day as did, on an international scale, airplane hijackings, kidnappings, and mass murder.

      Such was the media-heightened impact of urban guerrilla warfare, and such its potential danger to civilized society, that some observers believed “urban terrorism” should be classified as a new genre of warfare. But terrorist tactics, urban or rural, even the most extreme, have always been integral to guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare—indeed to all warfare. “Kill one, frighten 10,000,” wrote the Chinese general Sunzi (Sun Tzu) in 350 BC.

      Initially, urban guerrilla warfare alone appeared to be a losing proposition, in that its promiscuous collective destruction—particularly mass murder—tended to alienate a formerly passive and even sympathetic citizenry. Its Achilles' heel was threefold: a lack of a viable political goal based on the repair of social, economic, and political failures, a lack of an organization designed to reach that goal and capable of providing operational bases and sanctuary areas, and a failure to recruit and train new activists. The lack of organization in depth helps to explain the eventual demise of fringe advocates and practitioners of urban and international terrorism, groups far removed from guerrilla insurgencies. Examples of such groups in the 1970s and '80s are the Black Panther Party, the Weathermen, and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States; the Japanese Red Army; the Red Army Faction in West Germany; the Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom; the Red Brigades of Italy; Direct Action in France; and Middle Eastern groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command and the Abū Niḍāl Group.

      However, urban warfare, once properly organized and combined with rural guerrilla warfare and with the increased employment of bomb attacks, played an important role in bringing cease-fires and even peace (however tentative) to such places as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Israel-Palestine (though not to Colombia, Spain, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, or Chechnya). Not without reason did some experts conclude that guerrilla warfare and terrorism, rural or urban, internal or international, had become the primary form of conflict for that time.

The post-Cold War period
      The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did little to alter this gloomy prognostication. Variations of communist ideology, Marxist or Maoist, continued to fuel insurgencies in Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Nepal, East Timor, and the Philippines. Added to this was the growth of the Muslim religious factor in such localized insurgencies as Israel-Palestine and Kashmir and in renegade terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Laden (bin Laden, Osama)'s al-Qaeda (Qaeda, al-). Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian expatriate and religious fanatic, patched together a worldwide network of followers whose activities during the 1990s and beyond included a series of hideous bombings. Forced to take refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, bin Laden planned the aerial suicide attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, on the United States. Although this deed led to the elimination of bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan and to a subsequent “war on terror,” al-Qaeda continued to take credit for terrorist attacks.


Purpose and motivation
      Fundamental to militant revolution is a cause, which unfortunately has never been difficult to find in a less-than-perfect world. The guerrilla cause may assume several guises: to the world it may be presented as liberating a country from a colonial yoke or from an invader's rule; to the peasant it may be freedom from serfdom, from oppressive rents to absentee landlords, or from taxation; to a middle-class citizen it may be establishment or restoration of representative government as opposed to a military or totalitarian dictatorship.

      Whether real or artificial, whether inspired by political ideology, religion, nationalism, or, more often, a genuine desire for a better life, this cause is fundamental in motivating people to armed action. Mao leaves no doubt of its importance:

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.

      The lack of a viable political goal has often been the key factor in an insurgency's failure. It will continue to be so as long as an insurgency is tainted by extreme criminal actions. Some insurgent leaders recognize this basic fact in confining revolutionary activities to their traditional purposes.

Popular support
      Revolutionary writings have constantly stressed the guerrillas' affiliation with the people (population). Guerrillas spring from the people, who in turn support their spawn, not only by furnishing sons and daughters to the cause but also by furnishing money, food, shelter, refuge, transport, medical aid, and intelligence—support that must simultaneously be denied to the enemy. Although T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence, T E) called for no more than “a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy,” he also wrote that his guerrillas “had won a province when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom.” Georgios Grivas (Grivas, Georgios), a Greek soldier who led the Cypriot rebellion in the 1950s, wrote that a guerrilla war stands no chance of success unless it has “the complete and unreserved support of the majority of the country's inhabitants.” Mao repeatedly stressed the importance of proper troop behaviour: the Chinese guerrilla was required to pay a peasant for food, to respect his property, and not to offend propriety by undressing in front of a peasant woman.

      Essential to maintaining domestic support and to gaining international support is vigorous, intelligent, and believable propaganda. Tito spread the word by newspaper and the Algerians by newspaper and radio, thereby enforcing Lawrence's dictum that the press is the greatest weapon in the army of a modern commander. The printed word has since been supplemented by the television camera, which has been defined as “a weapon lying in the street, which either side can pick up and use—and is more powerful than any other.” Today images of guerrilla and counterguerrilla clashes are delivered in real time, via satellite television and the Internet, from around the world.

Leaders and recruits
      Such are the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare that outstanding leadership is necessary at all levels if a guerrilla force is to survive and prosper. A leader must not only be endowed with intelligence and courage but must be buttressed by an almost fanatical belief in himself and his cause. Lawrence, Tito, Mao, Ho, Castro, the Soviet leaders Vladimir Ilich Lenin and Leon Trotsky, the Filipino Luis Taruc (Taruc, Luis), the Israeli Menachem Begin (Begin, Menachem), the Kenyan Jomo Kenyatta (Kenyatta, Jomo), the Malayan Ch'en P'ing, the Algerian Ahmed Ben Bella (Ben Bella, Ahmed), the Palestinian Yāsir ʿArafāt (Arafāt, Yāsirʿ), the Sri Lankan Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the East Timorese Xanana Gusmão, Osama bin Laden, a host of IRA leaders in Northern Ireland and ETA leaders in Spain—these and many others attracted followers to a cause, organized them, and instilled a disciplined zeal matched only by the most elite military organizations.

      The guerrilla recruit must be resourceful and enduring, committed totally to the cause if he is to withstand the hardships and dangers of guerrilla fighting. A prolonged and difficult campaign may force guerrilla leaders to abandon selectivity and resort to intimidation in order to gain recruits—as was the case in Vietnam, where rigorous political indoctrination only partially compensated for lack of voluntary zeal.

Organization and unity of command
      The tactical organization of guerrilla units varies according to size and operational demands. Mao called for a guerrilla squad of 9 to 11; his basic unit was the company, about 120 strong. Grivas initially deployed sabotage-terrorist teams of only four or five members. The Greek Civil War of the late 1940s opened with about 4,000 communist guerrillas divided into units of 150 fighters that, as strength increased, grew to battalions 250 strong. Tito (Tito, Josip Broz) began his campaign with about 15,000 fighters organized into small cadres; he ended the war with some 250,000 troops organized into brigades. Vietnamese guerrillas initially were organized into small squads that expanded to battalion and even regimental strengths. As modern guerrilla leaders have discovered, undue expansion may result in security failures and in partial loss of control, as has been the case in Northern Ireland, Colombia, and Palestine. Urban guerrilla units for the most part have remained small and more tightly organized in a cellular structure that, from a security standpoint, has proved valid over the decades—as is witnessed by the September 11 (September 11 attacks) suicide attacks by al-Qaeda.

      Protracted revolutionary warfare demands a complicated organization on both political and military levels. Mao early developed a clandestine political-military hierarchy that began with the cadre or cellular party structure at the hamlet-village level and proceeded to the top via district, province, and regional command structures. This was roughly the concept followed by guerrilla forces in Malaya and Indochina. Tito was careful to build a parallel political organization in areas that came under his control as a foundation for his future government. Other guerrilla leaders formed civil organizations to provide money, supplies, intelligence, and propaganda. The Viet Cong, Algerian rebel groups, and the PLO established provisional governments in order to win international recognition, financial backing, and in some instances recognition by the United Nations.

      Divisions within political and military commands stemming from ego, envy, ambition, greed, and ignorance have plagued guerrilla leaders through the centuries and are probably more responsible for failed insurgencies than any other factor. The Algerian rebellion of the 1950s suffered severely until the National Liberation Front either absorbed or neutralized rival guerrilla groups, but it failed to settle feuds between the Arabs and the Berbers or between its own internal and external commands. Colombian rebel groups are frequently in conflict. The IRA lost a great deal of effectiveness when it splintered in 1969. Chechnyan rebels are divided between Islamic extremists, who insist on gaining an independent state ruled by Sharīʿah law, and orthodox guerrilla fighters, including those who favour an autonomous government under Russian rule. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are believed to be divided between Prabhakaran's hard-liners, who demand a separate state, and moderates, who want peace and would accept a reasonable autonomy. At least three major rebel groups and numerous splinter groups are at work in the Philippines, including Islamic fundamentalists, moderate Muslims, and communists. During the Afghan War against Soviet occupation in the 1980s, a score or more of mujahideen rebel groups, ranging from a few hundred to several thousand fighters, were held precariously together by the Islamic religion, an infusion of several billion U.S. dollars, enormous profits from the opium trade, and the desire of each warlord to enlarge his traditional turf. Scarcely had the Taliban government been overthrown by U.S. and allied forces in late 2001 than the warlords turned on one another and on the newly established central government, creating a dangerous semi-anarchy.

      The guerrilla by necessity must fight with a wide variety of weapons (military technology), some homemade, some captured, and some supplied from outside sources. In the early stages of an insurgency, weapons have historically been primitive. The Mau Mau in Kenya initially relied on knives and clubs (soon replaced by stolen British arms). French and American soldiers in Vietnam frequently encountered homemade rifles, hand grenades, bombs, booby traps, mines, and trails studded with punji stakes soaked in urine (to ensure infection). Nearly every guerrilla campaign has relied on improvisation, both from necessity and to avoid a cumbersome logistic tail. Molotov cocktails and plastique (plastic explosive) bombs are cheap, yet under certain conditions they are extremely effective. Stolen and captured arms also traditionally have been a favourite source of supply, not least because army and police depots also stock ammunition to fit the weapons.

      The worldwide proliferation of weapons during the decades of the Cold War added a new dimension to guerrilla capabilities, as the superpowers and other states provided modern assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, and such sophisticated weapons as rocket-propelled grenades and antitank and antiaircraft missiles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of some of its republics into independent states brought on a fire sale of more weapons. Many other weapons, however, also came from the busy arsenals of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and Israel.

      This largesse has proved to be a double-edged sword for rebels. Although it has improved their staying power, it has also produced an unwanted financial and logistic requirement to feed the hungry weapons and at times has led to quasi-conventional set-piece battles—usually to the guerrillas' regret.

Sanctuary and support
      It was axiomatic to Mao and his followers that revolution begins in familiar terrain. Once sufficient base and operational areas are established, guerrilla operations can be extended to include cities and vulnerable lines of communication. This rural strategy may be influenced by such factors as political goal, geography, and insurgent and government strengths.

      If a guerrilla force is to survive, let alone prosper, it must control safe areas to which it can retire for recuperation and repair of arms and equipment and where recruits can be indoctrinated, trained, and equipped. Such areas are traditionally located in remote, rugged terrain, usually mountains, forests, and jungles.

      Sympathetic neighbouring countries may also provide sanctuary, both as a physical redoubt and as a source of material support. Ho's (Ho Chi Minh) guerrillas, in the later stages of the war against France, relied on China for refuge, training, and supply of arms and equipment; later, in the war against the United States, they used Laos and Cambodia for sanctuary. Still later Thai guerrillas found sanctuary and support in Cambodia, as did Nicaraguan guerrillas in Honduras. Palestinian irregulars have often enjoyed refuge in Arab states bordering Israel, and a wide variety of militant groups found refuge in Afghanistan during the 1990s. For years the Basque ETA terrorists took cover in France. Islamic terrorists in the Philippines routinely lose themselves in the jungles of small southern islands. Chechnyan guerrillas frequently find sanctuary in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia and in Georgia.

      People offer a final form of sanctuary, one especially important to an urban guerrilla employing terrorist tactics. A sympathetic population can turn a blind eye to guerrilla activity, or it can actively support operations. During the Cypriot war Grivas was surrounded by a British force for nearly two months without being captured. An Algerian rebel leader installed himself within 200 yards of the army commandant's office in Algiers. The position of neither rebel leader was betrayed despite generous inducement offered to collaborators. An outstanding example from more recent times is the disappearance of Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mohammed Omar despite an intensive manhunt and a reward of $25 million for information leading to their capture.

Terror (terrorism)
      Terror is one of the most hideous characteristics of guerrilla warfare yet one of its most basic and widely used weapons. It is employed on several levels for several reasons. Tactically, its purpose is to intimidate the military-police opposition—for example, by slitting the throat of a careless sentry or by tossing a grenade into a provincial police outpost. At a slightly higher level it is used to eliminate political and military leaders and officials in order to destabilize the government; to persuade the general populace to offer sanctuary, money, and recruits; and to maintain discipline and prevent defections within the organization. On a still higher level it is used to focus attention on the rebel cause with the hope of winning international support (including financing and recruits) while maintaining internal morale.

      It is important to note that up to a certain point the use of terror, though condemned by orthodox governments, is expected and is also a major tactic in counterguerrilla warfare. But what is that certain point? Public opinion seems to put it at promiscuous murder, as exemplified by bomb attacks, whether suicidal or otherwise, against civilian targets. In defense of such attacks, terrorists point to their debilitating effect both in destabilizing governments and in bringing on excessive military reprisals that cost the government public support. What guerrillas risk in such attacks, however, is crossing a line that the public draws between guerrilla fighters and common criminals.

      Not all guerrilla leaders have favoured the use of such extreme tactics, either because of humanitarian concerns or because they realize that the resultant stigma outweighs the psychological gains. In Palestine the Haganah broke with two other Zionist militias, Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, over the issue. In Ireland IRA (Irish Republican Army) leaders had sharp disagreements on the use of extreme terror, which resulted in a movement divided between “official” and “provisional” wings, along with numerous splinter groups. Although the PLO denounced the use of such tactics, Ḥamās, Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqṣā Martyrs Brigade continued to employ them on the grounds of justifiable retaliation for military terrorism—as did other groups in Chechnya, Spain, the Philippines, and elsewhere, while also using them for purposes of intimidation and identification.

      It is difficult to assess the psychological impact of criminal terrorism on the general population, but it appears that even those persons passively sympathetic to a guerrilla cause are slowly alienated by terrorists planting bombs in shopping centres and holiday resorts or blowing passenger aircraft out of the sky. The sea change in public opinion may have come with the September 11 aerial suicide attacks against American targets and with the United States' subsequent “war on terror.” After Sept. 11, 2001, guerrilla warfare, no matter the form or purpose, was generally judged by Western and some Eastern countries to be anathema. Law-enforcement agencies and military forces around the globe were enlarged and adapted to fight terror—literally and with no holds barred. The unforeseen results have been several, but the most unfortunate one has been the use of the war on terror as a shield for continuing abuses by the military, paramilitary, or police in fighting domestic insurgencies. The result is ironic: the more repressive the military terrorism, the greater the number of moderates who come to sympathize with extremists and turn a blind eye to their murderous attacks—a vicious cycle sadly illustrated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as conflicts in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Chechnya, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere.

Strategy and tactics
      The broad strategy underlying successful guerrilla warfare is that of protracted harassment accomplished by extremely subtle, flexible tactics designed to wear down the enemy. The time gained is necessary either to develop sufficient military strength to defeat the enemy forces in orthodox battle (as did Mao in China) or to subject the enemy to internal and external military and political pressures sufficient to cause him to seek peace favourable to the guerrillas (as the Algerian guerrillas did to France, the Angolan and Mozambican guerrillas to Portugal, and the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to the United States). This strategy embodies political, social, economic, and psychological factors to which the military element is often subordinated—without, however, lessening the ultimate importance of the military role.

      That role varies greatly, as does the way it is carried out. Lawrence's (Lawrence, T E) Arabian campaign (1916–18) was strategically vital in protecting the flank of the British general Edmund Allenby (Allenby, Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, 1st Viscount)'s conventional army during its advance in Palestine, yet its success hinged on carrying out the Arabs' political aim, which was to expel Ottoman forces from tribal lands. Lawrence's acceptance of this goal, combined with his linguistic ability, imagination, perception, and immense energy, helped him to establish and maintain unity of command. Popular support was ensured in part by tribal loyalties and hatred of the Ottomans, in part by effective propaganda and decent treatment of the people. There were too many Ottoman soldiers to risk doing battle, but in any case killing the enemy was secondary to killing his line of communication. In Lawrence's words (published in his classic account The Seven Pillars of Wisdom [1935]), “the death of a Turkish bridge or rail” was more important than attacking a well-defended garrison. Lawrence kept discipline and organization (Arab, not Western, style) simple and effective. He drilled his men in the employment of light machine guns and in rudimentary demolitions. Camels provided transport. The terrain was desert and desert was sanctuary, and the guerrillas were “an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas.” Demanding “perfect intelligence, so that plans could be made in complete certainty,” Lawrence “used the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place.” Mobility and surprise were everything. Hit-and-run tactics on a broad front cut communication, eventually causing enemy garrisons to wither on the vine. By war's end the Arabs had gained control of some 100,000 square miles while holding 600,000 Ottoman soldiers in passive defense. Arabs had killed or wounded 35,000 enemy at little loss to themselves. They had protected Allenby's vital flank in Palestine and had proved the truth of Lawrence's later dictum: “Guerrilla warfare is more scientific than a bayonet charge.” (Lawrence summarized his principles in the article “” in the 14th edition of Encyclopædia Britannica.)

      Mao's (Mao Zedong) political goal was the communist takeover of China. Guerrilla warfare alone, he realized, could not achieve this, but in a prolonged war it was an indispensable weapon, particularly in holding off the enemy (Chinese and Japanese) until orthodox armies could take to the field.

      Mao's guerrilla campaign of over two decades stressed the flexible tactics based on surprise and deception that the ancient writer Sunzi had called for in The Art of War. Mao later wrote that “guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack.” He demanded tactics based on surprise and deception: “Select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack, withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision.” Mao instructed his subordinates to accept battle only under favourable conditions, otherwise avoid it and retreat: “We must observe the principle, ‘To gain territory is no cause for joy, and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow.' ” Careful planning was vital: “Those who fight without method do not understand the nature of guerrilla action.”

      Ho (Ho Chi Minh) and his able military commander Vo Nguyen Giap were disciples of Mao's teachings, as was shown in their remarkably successful campaigns against the French and, later, against the U.S. and South Vietnamese armies. Ho and Giap did not, however, hesitate to extend guerrilla operations to the cities when occasion warranted. Vietnamese organization and leadership were generally effective, albeit expensive in lives. The use of terrain was often masterful, both tactically and for sanctuary. When popular support lagged, terrorist tactics were used—particularly the murder of pro-government village headmen—to coerce peasants into furnishing recruits, food, and information while denying these to the enemy. Operations were carefully planned and audaciously executed. As cruel as it was, the guerrilla portion of the Indochina wars must rank as one of the most successful in history.

      Leaders who do not respect the principles of guerrilla warfare soon find themselves in trouble, particularly against effective counterguerrilla forces. Greek communist guerrillas lost their war (1946–49) for a variety of reasons, not so much because Tito deprived them of sanctuary in and supply from Yugoslavia but more because they forfeited popular support in northern Greece by their barbarous treatment of civilian hostages, by their rapacious behaviour in villages, and by kidnapping children and sending them to be raised in communist countries.

      Filipino, Malayan, and Indonesian guerrillas of the 1940s and '50s suffered from poor organization and leadership as well as from lack of external support, and later movements failed for similar reasons. Uruguayan and Guatemalan insurgents lost control over terrorist tactics and suffered heavily for it. Basque guerrillas became unpopular in Spain because of their brutal assassinations. Polisario (Polisario Front) fighters, inadequately supported by Algeria and Libya, faced continuing stalemate in their war against Morocco over Western Sahara. Angolan and Mozambican guerrillas split into several factions and became pawns of Cuba (and by extension the Soviet Union), South Africa, and the United States. The use of indiscriminate terrorist tactics by the provisional wing of the IRA brought general opprobrium on their movement, including a partial loss of what had been heavy financial support from previously sympathetic Irish Americans.

      Why then do guerrilla leaders condone criminal terrorism? Not all of them are able to prevent its use, but, as is mentioned above, terrorist campaigns have played and continue to play important roles in forcing reluctant governments into negotiations. Negotiation, however, is not to the taste of some guerrilla leaders, especially those who reckon that their demands are being unfairly pared down. The discontented are usually extremists who may take their followers and splinter from the main group in order to continue their own war. In some cases they will be financed by outside agencies, such as extremist religious organizations, or by selling their services to criminal organizations, as has happened in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Spain. Splinter groups may also find support at home, depending on the kind of campaign conducted against them by the government.

Counterguerrilla warfare
      Perhaps the most important challenge confronting the military commander in fighting guerrillas is the need to modify orthodox battlefield thinking. This was as true in ancient, medieval, and colonial times as it is today. Alexander the Great's (Alexander the Great) successful campaigns resulted not only from mobile and flexible tactics but also from a shrewd political expedient of winning the loyalty of various tribes (Alexander recruited one guerrilla leader into his army and then married his daughter). The few Roman commanders in Spain—Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius), Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato, Marcus Porcius), Scipio Africanus the Elder and the Younger (Scipio Africanus the Younger), and Pompey the Great—who introduced more mobile and flexible tactics often succeeded in defeating large guerrilla forces, and their victories were then exploited by decent treatment of the vanquished in order to gain a relatively peaceful occupation.

      In their conquest of Ireland, the Normans (Norman) borrowed the enemy guerrilla tactics of feigned retreat, flanking attack by cavalry, and surprise. (These tactics were countered by the Irish retreat to impenetrable bog country.) Early settlers in Virginia and New England tried to adopt the best features of Indian guerrilla tactics: small-unit operations, loose formations, informal dress, swift movement, fire discipline, terror, ambush, and surprise attack. As frontiers expanded, colonists reverted to European methods of formal warfare with disastrous results until a Swiss mercenary, Henry Bouquet, trained his new light-infantry regiment to fight Indian-style in the French and Indian War (1754–63). (See also Robert Rogers (Rogers, Robert).) Bouquet's treatise on tactics, clothing, arms, training, logistics, and decentralized tactical formations is reminiscent of Caesar's work on Gaul. British generals fighting in the New World never quite understood Bouquet's teachings and suffered accordingly. A similar blindness cost Napoleon I and his generals disastrous defeats in Spain and Russia.

      The French conquest of Algeria (1830–44) might well have failed had it not been for tribal discord and the tactical innovations of Thomas-Robert Bugeaud (Bugeaud, Thomas-Robert, duke d'Isly, marquis de la Piconnerie), who understood the value of the ruse, the raid, and the ambush. Bugeaud dispensed with heavy columns in favour of small, fast-moving task forces, or “flying columns,” which pursued the Berbers and brought them to battles that were usually won by disciplined French troops using superior arms. Although Bugeaud believed in constructive occupation—“the sword only prepared the way for the plough”—he nonetheless depended more on fear than on persuasion, relying on the razzia (raid) to implement a scorched-earth policy to starve the natives into submission. Bugeaud's offensive tactics of clearing, holding, and expanding became the model for subsequent pacification campaigns around the globe, including the United States' winning of the West and U.S. forays into colonialism in Cuba and the Philippines.

      Such were the string of colonial successes that occasional serious reverses due to inept leadership and ill-trained troops were shrugged off. Orthodox commanders were generally quite content to put unquestioning faith in sheer military weight with little consideration given either to the poor organization and leadership of native forces or to the lack of modern arms and allies. Blockhouses and garrisons kept the peace in pacified areas. If natives rebelled, they were put down with force.

      This simplistic approach was challenged by a French general, Louis-Hubert-Gonsalve Lyautey (Lyautey, Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve). He had been taught by Joseph-Simon Gallieni (Gallieni, Joseph-Simon) in Indochina in 1895 that military success, in Gallieni's words, meant “nothing unless combined with a simultaneous work of organization—roads, telegraphs, markets, crops—so that with the pacification there flowed forward, like a pool of oil, a great belt of civilization.” Lyautey later employed this tache d'huile, or oil-spot, strategy in Algeria, where he used the army not as an instrument of repression but, in conjunction with civil services, as a positive social force—“the organization on the march.”

      Lyautey's success went generally unheeded—the South African War, for instance, introduced the use of the concentration camp for civilian noncombatants—as did the potency of the guerrilla weapon in World War I and subsequent decades. Native rebellions continued to be put down with force, and no one paid much attention to Mao's guerrilla war; nor were orthodox commanders greatly impressed with the guerrilla weapon in World War II. The greater was the postwar shock, then, when these commanders and their subordinates were called upon to quell organized insurgencies by ideologically motivated, combat-trained guerrillas equipped with modern weapons and often politically allied with and supplied by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries.

      Most governments and commanders simply floundered while calling for more soldiers and more weapons. The Greek army originally tried to suppress what they termed “bandits” by using static defense tactics that soon failed. Once the army had received massive reinforcements of U.S. arms and equipment, it launched large-scale offensives, or “search-and-clear” operations, which met with only limited success. Chinese Nationalist commanders moved vast armies hither and yon in futile efforts to capture Mao's guerrillas before finally holing up in towns and cities, where they eventually fell prey to Mao's own army divisions. During the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946–54), U.S. Army advisers in the Philippines trained and equipped Filipino combat teams supported by armour, aircraft, artillery, and even war dogs. Large-scale search-and-destroy operations—the “ring of steel” tactic similar to that unsuccessfully employed by German commanders against Tito's guerrillas—produced minimal results, as did free-fire areas (zones in which troops may fire at anything and everything), massive and sometimes brutal interrogations of villagers, and the employment of terrorist tactics, all of which further alienated the rural people whose support was necessary to defeat the guerrillas. Wiser commanders replaced conventional tactics with small-unit patrols and a variety of ruses that largely neutralized overt guerrilla action, then turned the army to the vital task of winning civil cooperation. With this the Huk insurgency died, but by the 1970s the failure to carry out promised reforms, mainly land distribution, brought on a guerrilla insurgency by the New People's Army that lasted into the 21st century.

      British commanders in Malaya also performed ineffectually in the early phases of the communist insurgency that began in 1948. Eventually, however, they realized that the support of the rural natives was vital to their goal of eliminating the entire guerrilla apparatus. Once they had achieved a reasonable civil-military chain of command, their first priority became the reestablishment of law and order, which meant revitalizing the rural police function. The military effort concentrated on breaking up and dispersing large guerrilla formations, then depriving them of the initiative by small-unit tactics—mainly frequent patrols and ambushes based on valid intelligence often gained from natives. The subsequent civil effort was designed to win “the hearts and minds” of the people, first by providing security in the form of village police and local militias working with government forces, second by providing social reforms (land reform, schools, hospitals) that identified the government with the people's best interests. Harsh measures were necessary: the compulsory census, an identity-card system, suspension of habeas corpus (with carefully publicized safeguards), searches of private property without a warrant, the death sentence for persons caught with unauthorized weapons, harsh sentences for collaborators, curfews, resettlement of entire villages, and other extraordinary measures. These were somewhat palliated by the British government's promise of eventual independence and by the general unpopularity of the guerrillas among the majority Malay population as well as among the urban Chinese business community.

      American military forces began to recognize the rising importance of unconventional warfare during the Cold War, though this recognition came only grudgingly to the top command. In the early 1950s U.S. Army Special Forces units—later known as the “Green Berets”—were formed as deep-penetration teams designed to contact and support indigenous guerrilla groups in rising against communist governments. Though superbly trained, they suffered from severe linguistic limitations and in the event were never committed. In a notable role reversal during the Vietnam War, numerous Green Beret teams were assigned to assist Montagnard tribes in countering the generally effective operations of Viet Cong guerrillas—though not with outstanding success in spite of heavy financial and material support.

      Orthodox senior commanders in Vietnam (Vietnam War) and later conflicts seemed oblivious to lessons learned in Malaya and the Philippines, the foremost of which was to offer the opponents, and particularly their supporters, a government that would fairly adjudicate their grievances. Believing solely in a military victory, they relied on tactics that only further alienated the very people whose hearts and minds had to be won over if the guerrillas were to be denied their support. Wholesale aerial bombings, mass artillery interdiction of suspected sanctuary areas, division- and corps-strength “sweeps” in which few guerrillas were captured or killed while entire villages were destroyed, free-fire areas that resulted in the deaths of women and children, isolated chains of military outposts and static defensive barriers that were easily outflanked, mass arrests, brutal interrogations, and cruel incarcerations—all of these amounted to a frightful expenditure of lives and money as one country after another threw in the towel, the United States in Vietnam, France in Algeria, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

      These campaigns failed on two levels. On the civil level, the authorities refused to admit the validity of often well-founded grievances and failed to undertake vital and generally long-overdue reforms under military and police protection for as long as was necessary. On the military level, the specific failures cited above can be summarized in four words: too much too soon. In order to be successful, counterguerrilla warfare must be a happy marriage between civil and military authority, between the civilian administrator and the soldier-policeman. For the administrator to function properly, the rebels must be contained and then neutralized—a long and arduous task. Throughout history commanders have proudly pronounced the demise of the guerrilla only to witness his reappearance in a year or two, as happened in Peru with the Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”) group.

      The key to waging successful counterinsurgency warfare lies in the nature of the insurgency. If an insurgency is an ill-founded uprising, either political or criminal, a legitimate government can treat it as such and can call on the support of other governments if necessary. But if an insurgency is founded on legitimate grievances that an ineffectual, biased, or corrupt government refuses to recognize, much less amend, then the conflict will not be ended until that government agrees to reach a solution by negotiation, not force. Too many governments, influenced by strong military establishments or by sweeping declarations of war, have refused to recognize the legitimacy of guerrilla challenges, seeking instead an ephemeral victory by means of military force, which is eventually answered in kind by guerrilla warfare.

Robert Brown Asprey

Additional Reading
Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (1975, reissued 2002), surveys guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare from its origin to the 1990s. Other surveys can be found in Richard L. Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare (1990); and Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opposites since 1750 (2002).

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Universalium. 2010.

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